



A Free and Open Indo-Pacific

The United States is and always has been an Indo-Pacific nation. From our first trading ships that departed for China just eight years after the American Revolution, to establishing our first diplomatic presence in India in 1794, U.S. engagement in the region has been built on trade, cooperation, and shared sacrifice, yielding the peace and prosperity enjoyed across the region today.

The *United States Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific* (henceforth, the *Framework*) has served, for the last three years, as the Trump Administration's overarching strategic guidance for implementing the President's 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) within the world's most populous and economically dynamic region.

The NSS recognizes that the most consequential challenge to the interests of the United States, and those of our allies and partners, is the growing rivalry between free and repressive visions of the future. To realize America's positive vision for the region, and to address the unprecedented challenges that Indo-Pacific nations face to their sovereignty, prosperity, and peace, in February 2018, President Trump approved the *Framework* for implementation across Executive Branch departments and agencies. The original document has been declassified and released, to communicate to the American people and to our allies and partners America's enduring commitment to this vital region.

The *Framework* has guided the development of numerous subordinate policy frameworks and campaign plans that have steered the U.S. approach to specific issues of importance to the Indo-Pacific region and beyond, such as the *U.S. Strategic Approach to the People's Republic of China*, the *U.S. Strategic Framework for Countering China's Economic Aggression*, the *U.S. Campaign Plan for Countering China's Malign Influence in International Organizations*, and others. Together with its subordinate documents, the *Framework* has guided U.S. whole-of-government actions to advance regional prosperity and stability, including sovereignty, freedom of navigation and overflight, reciprocity in trade and investment, respect for individual rights and rule of law, and transparency.

Beijing is increasingly pressuring Indo-Pacific nations to subordinate their freedom and sovereignty to a "common destiny" envisioned by the Chinese Communist Party. The U.S. approach is different. We seek to ensure that our allies and partners – all who share the values and aspirations of a free and open Indo-Pacific – can preserve and protect their sovereignty.

The *Framework* recognizes that a free and open Indo-Pacific depends on robust American leadership. The United States has a long history of fighting back against repressive regimes on behalf of those who value freedom and openness. As the world's largest economy, with the strongest military and a vibrant democracy, it is incumbent on the United States to lead from the front.

The *Framework* seeks to strengthen our wide and diverse network of allies and partners, which has long underwritten stability and peace in the Indo-Pacific. To that end, the *Framework* reflects the importance of supporting allies' and partners' complementary approaches to regional engagement. These approaches include Japan's *Free and Open Indo Pacific* concept, Australia's Indo-Pacific concept, India's *Security and Growth for All Regions*

policy, the Republic of Korea's *New Southern Policy*, Taiwan's *New Southbound Policy*, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) *Outlook on the Indo-Pacific*. Many of these concepts and approaches are resonating globally, with countries such as France and Germany publishing their own policy frameworks for the Indo-Pacific.

This growing alignment of strategic approaches in the region is perhaps nowhere more noteworthy than in the growth of the U.S.-Japan alliance during the last four years. President Trump grasped the strategic resonance of the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific, first advanced by Japan. In a speech in 2007 in India, then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called for a "broader Asia" spanning the Pacific and Indian Oceans – "seas of freedom and prosperity, which will be open and transparent to all." In Nairobi, Kenya, in 2016, Prime Minister Abe further articulated the concept's panoramic reach, calling for the region, from Africa to Asia, to develop as "a place that values freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, free from force or coercion, and [...] prosperous."

In Da Nang, Vietnam, in 2017, during the longest trip to the region in more than a quarter century by a U.S. President, President Trump built on Prime Minister Abe's vision, calling for a free and open Indo-Pacific. The region, according to President Trump, is a place where sovereign and independent nations, with diverse cultures and many different dreams, can all prosper side-by-side, and thrive in freedom and peace."

In April and October 2018, senior officials from the U.S. National Security Council staff and Departments of State and Defense convened representatives from countries across the region in Honolulu to discuss the U.S. vision for the Indo-Pacific and invite representatives from each country to share their own perspectives on concepts and actions to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific. Working collaboratively, participants identified common principles shared by diverse countries all over the region. These principles included the importance of sovereignty, rule of law, and accountability to the public; the centrality of ASEAN in regional architecture; the importance of open commons of the sea, overflight, and cyberspace; the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes; free, fair, and reciprocal trade; and investment and regional integration through connectivity and investment projects that are financed transparently and improve social and environmental outcomes.

The declassification of the *Framework* today demonstrates, with transparency, America's strategic commitments to the Indo-Pacific and to our allies and partners in the region. The United States views the Indo-Pacific region as "a beautiful constellation of nations, each its own bright star, satellites to none – and each one, a people, a culture, a way of life, and a home," in the words of President Trump in Vietnam in 2017. As long as nations work together to keep the region free and open, we can ensure that that this vision continues to inspire long into the future.

Robert C. O'Brien
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
January 5, 2021

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 15, 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
THE SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OF STAFF
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO
THE UNITED NATIONS
CHAIR OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE SMALL BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND COUNSEL TO THE
PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY AND DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
AND DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
AND COUNTERTERRORISM

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by Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Robert C. O'Brien 1/5/2021

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CHAIR OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM
PRESIDENT OF THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE
UNITED STATES
DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND
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CHAIR OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE PRESIDENT'S
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
ADMINISTRATOR OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT
NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: (~~S//NF~~) Cabinet Memorandum on the U.S. Strategic
Framework for the Indo-Pacific

(~~S//NF~~) On February 2, 2018, the President endorsed the
interests, assumptions, desired end states, lines of effort, and
objectives of the "U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-
Pacific." This endorsement follows agreement by Principals in
early November 2017 to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific
region and adopt a clear-eyed approach to China. This Strategic
Framework fits within the National Security Strategy and sits

above the "Strategic Framework for Countering China's Economic Aggression" that the President approved on October 27, 2017.

~~(S//NF)~~ National Security Council staff will convene Policy Coordination Committee meetings to develop a whole-of-government implementation plan for this Framework for Principals consideration by May.



H.R. McMaster
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

(U) Attachment

Tab A ~~(S//NF)~~ U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific

(U) U.S. STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC

(U) **National Security Challenges**

- (~~S//NF~~) How to maintain U.S. strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific region and promote a liberal economic order while preventing China from establishing new, illiberal spheres of influence, and cultivating areas of cooperation to promote regional peace and prosperity?
- (~~S//NF~~) How to ensure North Korea does not threaten the United States and its allies, accounting for both the acute present danger and the potential for future changes in the level and type of the threat posed by North Korea?
- (~~S//NF~~) How to advance U.S. global economic leadership while promoting fair and reciprocal trade?

(U) **Enduring Vital Interests of the United States:**

- (U) Protect the homeland;
- (U) Advance American prosperity;
- (U) Preserve peace through strength; and
- (U) Advance American influence.

(U) **Top Interests of the United States in the Indo-Pacific:**

- (~~S//NF~~) Defend the homeland and American citizens abroad; prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them;
- (~~S//NF~~) Preserve U.S. economic, diplomatic, and military access to the most populous region of the world and more than one-third of the global economy;
- (~~S//NF~~) Enhance the credibility and effectiveness of our alliances; and
- (~~S//NF~~) Maintain U.S. primacy in the region while protecting American core values and liberties at home.

(U) **Assumptions:**

- (U//~~FOUO~~) U.S. security and prosperity depend on free and open access to the Indo-Pacific region, which will remain an engine of U.S., regional, and global economic growth.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) North Korea's nuclear missiles and its stated intention of subjugating South Korea pose a grave threat to the U.S. homeland and our allies.

Classified By: MPottinger, DAP and Senior Director for Asia, NSC

Derived From: NSC SCG

Declassify On: 20421231

NSC declassification review

Declassified in Part

by Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

~~SECRET~~ Robert C. O'Brien 1/5/2021

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Shifting regional power balances will continue to drive security competition across the Indo-Pacific, leading to increased defense investment by many countries in the region, including India and Japan.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Proliferation, maritime security, terrorism, and unresolved territorial disputes will remain the primary security concerns and sources of conflict.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Loss of U.S. preeminence in the Indo-Pacific would weaken our ability to achieve U.S. interests globally.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Strong U.S. alliances are key to deterring conflict and advancing our vital interests.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Strategic competition between the United States and China will persist, owing to the divergent nature and goals of our political and economic systems. China will circumvent international rules and norms to gain an advantage.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) China aims to dissolve U.S. alliances and partnerships in the region. China will exploit vacuums and opportunities created by these diminished bonds.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) A strong India, in cooperation with like-minded countries, would act as a counterbalance to China.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Chinese economic, diplomatic, and military influence will continue to increase in the near-term and challenge the U.S. ability to achieve its national interests in the Indo-Pacific region.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) China seeks to dominate cutting-edge technologies, including artificial intelligence and bio-genetics, and harness them in the service of authoritarianism. Chinese dominance in these technologies would pose profound challenges to free societies.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) China's proliferation of its digital surveillance, information controls, and influence operations will damage U.S. efforts to promote our values and national interests in the Indo-Pacific region and, increasingly, in the Western hemisphere and at home.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) China will take increasingly assertive steps to compel unification with Taiwan.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Russia will remain a marginal player in the Indo-Pacific region relative to the United States, China, and India.


(U) **Desired End States:**

- ~~(S//NF)~~ North Korea no longer poses a threat to the U.S. homeland or our allies; the Korean Peninsula is free of nuclear, chemical, cyber, and biological weapons.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ The United States maintains diplomatic, economic, and military preeminence in the fastest-growing region of the world; most nations in the Indo-Pacific view the United States as their preferred partner; U.S. economic strength and influence increase throughout the region.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Regional countries uphold the principles that have enabled U.S. and regional prosperity and stability, including sovereignty, freedom of navigation and overflight, standards of trade and investment, respect for individual rights and rule of law, and transparency in military activities.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Free markets are the mainstream of Asia, and the U.S. economy generates jobs and growth as a consequence of its interaction with the Indo-Pacific region.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Regional disputes are resolved lawfully and without coercion.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Southeast Asia is bound more tightly together in business, security, and civil society - including through a strengthened Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) - and works closely with the United States and our allies and key partners to uphold the principles identified above.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Southeast Asia is capable of managing terrorist threats with minimal assistance from non-ASEAN states.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ India's preferred partner on security issues is the United States. The two cooperate to preserve maritime security and counter Chinese influence in South and Southeast Asia and other regions of mutual concern. India maintains the capacity to counter border provocations by China.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ India remains preeminent in South Asia and takes the leading role in maintaining Indian Ocean security, increases engagement with Southeast Asia, and expands its economic, defense, and diplomatic cooperation with other U.S. allies and partners in the region.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ The United States and its partners on every continent are resistant to Chinese activities aimed at undermining their sovereignty, including through covert or coercive influence.

(U) **Lines of Effort:**

(U) *Alliances & Partnerships*


- ~~(S//NF)~~ Objective: Emphasize our commitment to the region, highlighting a shared vision for a "free and open Indo-Pacific."

- Actions: Invigorate U.S. technical assistance to friendly governments to promote rule of law and civil institutions while communicating the strings attached to China's "Belt and Road Initiative." (See: "U.S. Strategic Framework for Countering China's Economic Aggression.") Develop a robust public diplomacy capability, which can compete with China's information campaigns; puncture the narrative that Chinese regional domination is inevitable.
- (~~S//NF~~) Objective: Strengthen the capabilities and will of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia to contribute to the end states of this strategy.
 - 
 - Align our Indo-Pacific strategy with those of Australia, India, and Japan.
 - Aim to create a quadrilateral security framework with India, Japan, Australia, and the United States as the principal hubs.
 - Deepen trilateral cooperation with Japan and Australia.
 - Encourage South Korea to play a larger role in regional security issues beyond the Korean peninsula.
 - Empower Japan to become a regionally integrated, technologically advanced pillar of the Indo-Pacific security architecture.
 - Assist in the modernization of Japan's Self Defense Forces.
- (~~S//NF~~) Objective: Reinvigorate alliances with the Philippines and Thailand, to strengthen their role in upholding a rules-based regional order.
 - Actions: Preserve and where possible expand foreign development assistance and defense engagement, including access, exercises and training, and interoperability.
- (~~S//NF~~) Objective: Advance U.S. security leadership in the region through expanded engagement with Indo-Pacific countries on non-traditional security challenges.
 - Actions: Expand collaboration with Indo-Pacific countries on peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster response, and global health.
 - Share the burdens and fruits of research and development with allies and like-minded partners to retain our military edge.
 - Encourage like-minded countries to play a greater role in addressing these challenges and in increasing burden-sharing. Share the benefits of our research and development with allies and like-minded partners to retain our collective military edge.

- (~~S//NF~~) Objective: Enable Taiwan to develop an effective asymmetric defense strategy and capabilities that will help ensure its security, freedom from coercion, resilience, and ability to engage China on its own terms.

(U) *India and South Asia*

- (~~S//NF~~) Objective: Accelerate India's rise and capacity to serve as a net provider of security and Major Defense Partner; solidify an enduring strategic partnership with India underpinned by a strong Indian military able to effectively collaborate with the United States and our partners in the region to address shared interests.
- Actions: Build a stronger foundation for defense cooperation and interoperability; expand our defense trade and ability to transfer defense technology to enhance India's status as a Major Defense Partner; increase our cooperation on shared regional security concerns and encourage India's engagement beyond the Indian Ocean Region; support India's membership in the Nuclear Supplier's Group; and work with India toward domestic economic reform and an increased leadership role in the East Asia Summit (EAS) and ADMM+. Offer support to India - through diplomatic, military, and intelligence channels - to help address continental challenges such as the border dispute with China and access to water, including the Brahmaputra and other rivers facing diversion by China.
- [REDACTED] support India's "Act East" policy and its aspiration to be a leading global power, highlighting its compatibility with the U.S., Japanese, and Australian vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
- Build regional support for U.S.-India Common Principles in the Indian Ocean, including unimpeded commerce, transparent infrastructure-debt practices, and peaceful resolution of territorial disputes.
- Promote U.S.-India energy cooperation across all sources and technologies to diversify India's energy sources and supplies.
- Partner with India on cyber and space security and maritime domain awareness. Expand U.S.-India intelligence sharing and analytic exchanges [REDACTED] creating a more robust intelligence partnership.

- Work with India and Japan to help finance projects that enhance regional connectivity between India and countries of the region.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Objective: Strengthen the capacity of emerging partners in South Asia, including the Maldives, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, to contribute to a free and open order.
- Actions: Establish a new initiative with South Asian partners modeled on the Maritime Security Initiative in Southeast Asia to improve maritime domain awareness, interoperability, and data-sharing with the United States.

- Support creation of a maritime information "fusion center" in the Indian Ocean.
- Establish a regional forum to promote common principles and standards.
- Establish and gain broad consensus on a statement of principles on acceptable maritime behavior, to include a commitment to regional cooperation in line with shared security objectives.

(U) *China*

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Objective: Prevent China's industrial policies and unfair trading practices from distorting global markets and harming U.S. competitiveness.
- Actions: Counter Chinese predatory economic practices that freeze out foreign competition, undermine U.S. economic competitiveness, and abet the Chinese Communist Party's aspiration to dominate the 21st century economy. (See: **"U.S. Strategic Framework for Countering China's Economic Aggression."**)
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Build an international consensus that China's industrial policies and unfair trading practices are damaging the global trading system.
- Actions: (See: **"U.S. Strategic Framework for Countering China's Economic Aggression."**)
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Objective: Maintain American industry's innovation edge vis-à-vis China.
- Actions: Work closely with allies and like-minded countries to prevent Chinese acquisition of military and strategic capabilities; broaden the scope of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States to cover venture capital and other forms of investment by China; and adopt domestic policies that promote growth in key technologies.

(See: "U.S. Strategic Framework for Countering China's Economic Aggression.")

- (~~S//NF~~) Objective: Promote U.S. values throughout the region to maintain influence and counterbalance Chinese models of government.
 - Actions: Develop public and private messaging and promote initiatives that show the benefits of democracy and liberty to all countries, including economic, technologic, and societal benefits.
 - Coordinate efforts to protect and promote internationally recognized rights and freedoms with likeminded partners.
 - Engage South Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia, Japan, and other regional democratic partners to demonstrate their own successes and the benefits they have accrued.
 - Support activists and reformers throughout the region.
 - Offer development, technical, and legal assistance to those countries who seek to reform.
- (~~S//NF~~) Objective: Deter China from using military force against the United States and U.S. allies or partners, and develop the capabilities and concepts to defeat Chinese actions across the spectrum of conflict.
 - Actions: Enhance combat-credible U.S. military presence and posture in the Indo-Pacific region to uphold U.S. interests and security commitments.
 - Devise and implement a defense strategy capable of, but not limited to: (1) *denying* China sustained air and sea dominance inside the "first island chain" in a conflict; (2) *defending* the first-island-chain nations, including Taiwan; and (3) *dominating* all domains outside the first island-chain. [REDACTED]
- Help our allies and partners improve their security posture, including military capabilities and interoperability, to ensure strategic independence and freedom from Chinese coercion. Expand partnerships and capabilities that limit China's ability to coerce allies and partners.
- (~~S//NF~~) Objective: Enhance U.S. engagement in the region while also educating governments, businesses, universities, Chinese overseas students, news media, and general citizenries about China's coercive behavior and influence operations around the globe.
 - Actions: Establish a mechanism that provides publicly available information that explains Chinese activities and

the problems they pose to the interests, liberty and sovereignty of nations. [REDACTED]

- Invest in capabilities [REDACTED] that promote uncensored communication between Chinese people.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Objective: Cooperate with China when beneficial to U.S. interests.
 - Actions: In our diplomacy with China, emphasize high-level, substantive interaction to realize the President's vision for a constructive, results-oriented relationship. Past diplomacy has often been broad and shallow, which suits China's interests.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Objective: Maintain an intelligence advantage over China, and inoculate the United States, its allies, and partners against Chinese intelligence activities.
 - Actions: Equip U.S. allies and partners to cooperate with the United States in operating against China and countering China's clandestine activities in their countries.
 - Expand and prioritize U.S. intelligence and law enforcement activities that counter Chinese influence operations. Get like-minded countries to do the same.
 - Strengthen defensive and offensive counter-intelligence functions across the public and private sectors to neutralize China's growing intelligence advantages; expand intelligence diplomacy and law enforcement cooperation with other governments to bolster understanding of Chinese intentions and capabilities.
 - Help allies and partners develop high standards in counterintelligence, counter proliferation, cyber security, industrial security, and management of classified information.

(U) *Korean Peninsula*

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Objective: Convince the Kim regime that the only path to its survival is to relinquish its nuclear weapons.
- Actions: Maximize pressure on Pyongyang using economic, diplomatic, military, law enforcement, intelligence, and information tools to cripple North Korea's weapons of mass destruction programs, choke off currency flows, weaken the regime, and set the conditions for negotiations aimed at reversing its nuclear and missile programs, ultimately achieving the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Peninsula. Consider negotiations if North Korea takes steps to reverse its nuclear and missile programs. (See: **"The President's North Korea Strategy," Cabinet Memo, 28 March 2017.**)

- [REDACTED]
Do this by: (1) helping South Korea and Japan acquire advanced, conventional military capabilities; (2) drawing South Korea and Japan closer to one another; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

(U) *Southeast Asia & the Pacific Islands*

- (S//NF) Objective: Promote and reinforce Southeast Asia and ASEAN's central role in the region's security architecture, and encourage it to speak with one voice on key issues.
 - (S//NF) Actions: Deepen our relationships with Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia [REDACTED]
 - (S//NF) Highlight ASEAN centrality as a core component of the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy.
 - (S//NF) Reinforce Japan's proactive leadership to amplify U.S. strategic goals in Southeast Asia.
[REDACTED]
- (S//NF) Objective: Prevent the spread of terrorism in Southeast Asia.
 - (S//NF) Actions: Expand the involvement of Southeast Asian nations in the Defeat-ISIS coalition; foster better law-enforcement, military, and intelligence cooperation among Indo-Pacific states; and provide direct U.S. assistance to counter-terror efforts.
[REDACTED]
- (S//NF) Objective: Promote and support Burma's transition to democracy.
 - [REDACTED]
- (S//NF) Objective: Ensure the Pacific Islands (e.g., the U.S. territories, the Freely Associated States, the Melanesian and the Polynesian states,) remain aligned with the United States.
 - Actions: Solidify our diplomatic, military, intelligence, economic, development assistance, and informational advantages across the Pacific Islands.
[REDACTED]
- (S//NF) Objective: Pursue economic ties and increase connectivity with countries willing to adopt market-based reforms. Pursue trade agreements that contain trade and

investment standards set by the United States and that reduce the region's economic reliance on China.

- (U) Assign strategic purpose to the combined financial resources and economic power of the United States; promote an integrated economic development model in the Indo-Pacific that provides a credible alternative to One Belt One Road; create a task force on how best to use public-private partnerships.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Promote the U.S., ally, and partner-led development of energy, telecommunications, and logistics standards and infrastructure.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Expand the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation's work in promoting regional economic integration and support the formation of the ASEAN Economic Community through trade facilitation, customs modernization, and standards harmonization.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Incentivize the U.S. private sector to reignite an expeditionary spirit so that it expands two-way trade and investment in the Indo-Pacific.