

# HOMO AMERICANUS: CHILD OF THE POSTMODERN AGE



TOMISLAV SUSIC  
Foreword by Professor Kevin MacDonald

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# Homo americanus: Child of the Postmodern Age

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# Preface

A preface to a book may serve as the author's place for justifying his scriptural shortcomings. In some cases it tacitly serves as a place for his ethical and ideological disclaimers. Also, when uncertain of the general direction of his main thesis,

the author may resort to excuses in his preface, as if wishing to forestall the reader from passing harsh judgments against him, and also nudge him into showing more comprehension and compassion for his often mediocre prose. Some readers, right at the start of this book, may accuse me of similar shortcomings, that is, of presenting my subject matter clumsily or differently

from what they expected. I am aware that the subject discussed in the book is very large. Every subtitle in this book could generate several volumes of deeper analyses and each minor bibliographic note at the end of the book could expand into a load of books able to fill an entire library shelf.

However much the vast topic of America and Americanism has the

advantage of offering an author methodological and ideological latitudes, it also has its limits. The fluid and much abused word “Americanism” contains an impressive inventory of concepts, each consisting of dozens of distinctive elements and each requiring its own mode of analysis. I conceived of this book as a short summary of ideas by authors critical of Americanism and



its two main facets: belief in progress and egalitarianism.

The reader will notice that I mainly use a descriptive style, translating and quoting European and American authors who write from their own perspectives and within their own fields of study about various aspects of *Homo americanus*, without necessarily ascribing value judgments to my own paragraphs. Toward the end

of the book, however, I use a more analytical approach, which to some extent, may be viewed by the reader as colored by my own biased assessments. Having lived in Europe and America, having experienced lengthy spans and spasms of life in communism and capitalism, I am trying to project myself into two diverse geopolitical and socio-historical perspectives—both as a critic

of Americanism from within  
and as a critic of  
Americanism from without;  
both as a subject of criticism  
and as the object of criticism.

I am trying, however, to  
avoid the anti-American  
clichés that still appear  
among many cultivated  
European authors and which  
are often founded on sketchy,  
vicarious, second-hand  
hearsay knowledge of  
America. In fact, I am also

arguing that Americanism,  
with a different system of  
values, different people in  
charge of cultural hegemony,  
and of course, under a  
different historical setting,  
could have become a true  
motivating force of creativity  
for a large number of people  
of European extraction.

This book contains  
quotations and descriptions  
by authors who are savants in  
the fields of sociobiology,

philosophy, history and literature. The reason I am using an interdisciplinary approach to such a vast topic lies in the fact that I have always avoided a single approach in the humanities.

The manner in which the social sciences has been taught in Europe and America since 1945, both in terms of methods and content, has been heavily determined by the referents of antifascism

and democracy. Authors, even when mildly critical of liberalism, parliamentary democracy, or multiculturalism, have had marginal readership, which does not exclude the likelihood of the same fate for the present book and its author.

In understanding the spirit of Americanism, be its good or bad side, it is my view that American novelists or

essayists like Sinclair Lewis,  
Henry Miller, Edgar Allan  
Poe, or H.L. Mencken, let  
alone French novelists, L. F.  
Céline, Henry de  
Montherlant, Jean Cau, or the  
German Joachim Fernau, to  
name only a few, can better  
bring us the stench or beauty  
of Americanism than  
hundreds of sociologists,  
political scientists,  
eugenicists, and other experts  
dealing with the subject

matter of Americanism within their own narrow field of specialization. Of course, one could study *Homo americanus*, that is the proverbial American man, from the sociobiological perspective; or for that matter one might describe the American life style from the point of a view of a clinical psychologist or a criminologist. One could also use the field of religious



studies in examining American foreign policy. All these approaches are valid, but when taken separately and when disconnected from each other, they lead to a boring area study and they also show signs of academic reductionism. It is the intent of this book to reject a one way specialized approach in studying Americanism and try to encompass instead as many other approaches in

social science as possible. For that matter, I hope the book will be a good introduction for the future study of Americanism. I have made an effort to describe American man as observed by a cultivated European, but I also examine the self-perception of American citizens.

When a reader opens up a book dealing with a social phenomenon, it is

commendable that he looks first into the author's ethnic, social, racial, and historical pedigree. Do not we all have prejudices, even if we do not wish to admit to the fact?

And are not our views, however sophisticated and learned they may be, also colored by our racial origin, our family tree, and our early upbringing? This is in particular true when studying contemporary history which

this book also uses as a framework for analyzing *Homo americanus*.

A cautionary word needs to be added. The English historian Edward Carr, once wrote that before studying history a student or a reader must first study the historian.

This same principle of positive or negative empathy with any author must be applied in any field of social science. Therefore, a reader

of this book is justified to raise the question regarding my motives in writing this book. Also, he should ask me a standard question as to who is this book designed for? Hence the eternal: *Cui bono?*

A reader will note that a large number of authors quoted in this book had or still have a reputation of being on the right side of political spectrum, and are often dubbed in the liberal

and socialist vernacular as  
“right-wingers,”

“nationalists,” or “racists.”

Being a user but also a victim  
of the English language and  
its meta-language, as it is in  
standard use by the late 20<sup>th</sup>  
and early 21st century, this  
may also apply to the choice  
of my own words in the  
present text. Many words  
used in this book, such as  
“traditionalists,” “racialists,”

“right-wingers,” although having politically negative connotation, once upon a time had a neutral or positive connotation. For instance, the word “democracy,” acquired by the late 20<sup>th</sup> century a sacrosanct meaning; it is viewed as a crowning glory for normative political discourse. However, it cannot be ruled out that a hundred years from now, this word

will acquire a pejorative meaning and might be avoided like the plague by future opinion makers or the future ruling class in America. I must admit that in my quotations I largely resort to anti-liberal and so-called “right-wing” authors whose critical vision of Americanism has been ostracized or has not received a due hearing. In my chapter on postmodernity and the



English language, I examine in more detail the semantic distortions that many English American words were subjected to in the course of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Had I quoted or referred to authors of the opposite ideological background, who are more in line with the egalitarian, democratized, and Americanized spirit of the time, this book would have

taken a different turn. To put it differently, any book, dealing with contemporary ideas, however impartial its author may be, carries a distinct flavor that can be best spotted by looking at the list of quoted and bibliography.

The prime task of this book, however, is to redefine some concepts, provide a different meaning to those concepts, and attempt to bring those concepts closer to the

reader. In the conclusion of my book, which deals with the notion of democracy in postmodernity, I am “deconstructing” concepts that have been part of the political and media environment since 1945. Therefore, the book can also be seen as an exercise in linguistic revisionism, in so far as it revises the conventional wisdom linked to the concept of

Americanism and the recent history of political ideas. Luckily, the unwritten rules of postmodernity encourage everybody to critically examine all grand narratives, including the American narrative of permanent economic progress. It is a standard procedure in the author's preface to enumerate persons who helped him finish the book. I must admit that I did most of

the homework and most of the footwork myself. The idea to write this book and with this title came to me during the conference organized by the Charles Martel Society, in Washington DC, in October 2005. I was then a guest of honor and a speaker on the topic of Americanism. The editorial board of the *Occidental Quarterly* and the publisher Mr. William Regnery deserve credit for

organizing that venue. Later, the idea came to me to expand the topic of my speech into a more academic treatise, yet without resorting to an esoteric and a too academic language. Some smaller parts of the book have already been published in different forms, or in an abridged version, in French and English, notably in the journals, *The World and I*, *The Occidental Quarterly*,

and *Catholica*. Some thoughts on Americanism also derive from my book *Americka ideologija* which I wrote in the Croatian language in 1993.

I need to mention the names of colleagues and friends who made valuable suggestions and who helped me with some technical issues, including the direction of my thoughts. Without them I would have never started

nor finished this book. Joe Pryce from New York, a man unknown outside literary circles, a man of frail health yet of staggering erudition, helped me much with bibliography, particularly when dealing with American Puritanism. Professor Patrick McNally from Japan helped polish up my text. So did the author and artist Jonathan Bowden from London. Bowden's sense of pedantry



was of great help in rendering my prose accessible to the reader of little or no background in the social sciences. I also wish to thank the philosopher Alain de Benoist, who himself wrote much on Americanism. My former American mentor, Professor Paul Gottfried, an erudite scholar and a connoisseur of the liberal system in America, also deserves my thanks. I must

mention Flemish-European writer Robert Steuckers, whose proficiency in several languages, as well as his knowledge of Western intellectual heritage, helped him easily follow my own train of thought. Also, many thanks to friends David Yates, Troy Southgate from London, the editor and writer Tord Morsund from Norway, and to other intellectual heavy weights, friends and

scholars of diverse temperament. Some of these scholars mentioned herein do not agree with each other on many points regarding the American system, nor would they agree with all of my analyses. I respect, however, their free spirit, their tolerance, their great erudition —and their help.

Lastly, to my close friend David Stennett, a true American rebel who now

resides in Europe, I must credit with doing the final proofreading and stylization. I hope these colleagues and friends whose names are mentioned above will not be the only ones to read this book.

Zagreb, Croatia  
January 2007

**Foreword to Homo  
americanus:  
*Child of the  
Postmodern Age* by  
*Tomislav Sunic***

**P**erhaps because of America's role as lone international superpower, Americans live in a rather

self-absorbed, egocentric universe in which the opinions of non-Americans really don't matter much. This is unfortunate because, just as in one's personal life, it's wise to at least know how others see you, and especially so if the other is a keen observer.

Tomislav Sunic is such an observer. As someone who has lived under communism and has seen firsthand the

workings of state terror, he is in a unique position to describe the current slide of America into what he aptly terms “soft totalitarianism.”

This regime is maintained less by brute force than by an unrelenting, enormously sophisticated, and massively effective campaign to contain political and cultural activity within very narrow boundaries. Dissenters are not trundled off to jail or beaten

with truncheons, but are quietly ignored and marginalized. Or they are held up to public disgrace, and, wherever possible, removed from their livelihoods.

The regime is maintained by a consensus that has become part of the furniture of life, repeated endlessly in the major media and reassuringly affirmed by wise-looking professors at



prestigious universities. To dissent from this consensus removes one from the mainstream and stigmatizes one as immoral and quite possibly suffering from a psychiatric disorder. One immediately thinks of attitudes on immigration. Even the most fearless mainstream opponents of immigration restrict their opposition to illegal immigrants and are careful to

couch their arguments in economic or cultural (but never ethnic or racial) terms.<sup>1</sup>

One simply cannot mention in polite company that the end result of this massive influx of peoples into the traditional homelands of European peoples will be displacement, a decline in their power, and ultimately, perhaps, their disappearance as an identifiable people. But

there are a host of other issues that are at least as untouchable as immigration.

Soft totalitarian regimes can only be maintained by a sense of moral and intellectual legitimacy - the willing assent of the vast majority of the people.

Without this legitimacy, the entire apparatus of cultural control either disintegrates or transforms into hard totalitarianism - the

truncheons and the gulags.  
But here there is a major  
difference between  
communism in Eastern  
Europe and the current  
cultural regime in the United  
States. As Sunic notes,  
“Behind the communist  
semantics in Eastern Europe  
there loomed a make-believe  
system in which nobody truly  
believed and where  
everybody, including former  
communist party dignitaries

made fun of in private.”

However, “in America, by contrast, many serious people, politicians, and scholars, let alone the masses, believe in...the message of the media.” The people who dissent from the American consensus have been successfully relegated to the fringes. The gods are still worshiped.

Sunic sees quite clearly that this moral and intellectual

legitimacy is fundamentally the result of the triumph of the left in World War II. This transformation occurred first in Western Europe which has now mostly moved well beyond soft totalitarianism to the beginnings of a gulag system where there are formal legal sanctions for thought crimes. The thought crimes, enforced by liberal and conservative European governments alike, are

designed to enforce the dogmas of leftist orthodoxy, most notably everything related to multiculturalism, race, immigration, and the Holocaust. Even in England, the *font et origo* of American democracy, academics are removed for stating their beliefs on scientific evidence on race differences in intelligence or criminality. (For example, in 2006 Frank Ellis of the University of

Leeds was suspended for statements supporting race differences in intelligence.)<sup>2</sup>

Legal sanctions enforce orthodoxies in the area of multiculturalism and anything having to do with the fascist past.

In searching for the origins of this phenomenon, one must begin, as Sunic does, by describing the forcible imposition of leftist ideology



and institutions in Germany and France after World War II. As a psychologist, I am always tempted to see the origins of leftist ideological hegemony solely in psychological terms - to wonder what incredible psychological defect would lead to a whole people to adopt an ideology in which they were cast as having a grave psychiatric defect. But first and foremost, the

triumph of the left in Europe  
was accomplished via a purge  
and re-education of  
intellectuals, educators and  
media figures.

As Sunic notes, the most  
obvious beneficiaries of this  
sea change were the major  
leftist ideologies of the 20<sup>th</sup>  
century: Marxism,  
psychoanalysis, and the  
Frankfurt School. Since much  
of my writing deals with

Jewish issues, I can't help noting that these ideologies have in common that they are all part of the "Culture of Critique": Intellectual and political movements originated and dominated by Jews and intended by their Jewish participants as advancing Jewish interests, such as ending anti-Semitism.

Any claim that an intellectual or political movement is or was a

“Jewish” movement immediately raises all kinds of red flags in most readers. Just as the ethnic interests of Europeans cannot be mentioned in discussing the effects of immigration, the Jewish identifications and commitments of the people who originated and disseminated these ideas has been moved to the fringes of intellectual discourse. But research in the ethnic

motivations of people is perfectly respectable. No one would be surprised if Mexican activists proudly and explicitly advocated the interests of Mexicans in immigration and affirmative action. Nor are we surprised if Jewish activists promoted the interests of Israel. By the same logic, we shouldn't be surprised if Jewish social scientists are motivated by their ethnic interests. It is an

empirical question that can be investigated like any other question in the social sciences, and I think that the data confirms the hypothesis that the Jews who were central to the origins and influence of these movements had a strong Jewish identification and were motivated by their ethnic interests.

As usual, there is a double standard here. It is a routine

for scientists like Arthur Jensen, J. Philippe Rushton, or Richard Lynn to be called racists when they call attention to the biological roots of race differences in intelligence or criminality. And my writing on how Jews have pursued their ethnic interests in the intellectual and political arena has been termed “anti-Semitism” on more than one occasion. Implicitly the charge of

racism or anti-Semitism  
assumes that these writers are  
nothing more than ethnic  
activists and that their claims  
of scientific truth are nothing  
more than a fig leaf covering  
their ethnic interests - exactly  
the claim that I am making  
about the role of Jews in the  
triumph of Marxism,  
psychoanalysis, and the  
Frankfurt School.

Unfortunately, the people  
making these charges of



“racism” and “anti-Semitism” typically feel no need to dispute the scientific accuracy of the theories they are trying to discredit or even try to provide evidence of ethnic motivation of the scientists involved. Simply making the charge is sufficient. Such is the power of the left.

*The Frankfurt  
School's Program of*

# *Ethnic Warfare*

Sunic is quite correct in directing most of his attention to the Frankfurt School. The Frankfurt School developed a devastatingly effective ideology that continues to reverberate in the contemporary world even after the fall from grace of Communism and psychoanalysis. Fundamentally the

Frankfurt School attempted to develop an ideology that pathologized National Socialism. Because National Socialism was first and foremost a movement of ethnic cohesion, it is not surprising that the ideology of the Frankfurt School called into question all of the sources of cohesion of Western societies: Family, religion, culture, and race/ethnicity. From the

beginning there was a rejection of value-free social science research (“the fetishism of facts”) in favor of the fundamental priority of a moral perspective in which Western societies were to be transformed into utopias of cultural pluralism.

According to the Frankfurt School ideology, Europeans who identify with family, nation or race suffer from a psychiatric disorder. In the

ideal Frankfurt School world,  
Western nations would  
become therapeutic states.  
They would be dedicated to  
rooting out the remnants of  
adherence to traditional  
cultural forms of family,  
nation, religion and race in  
their citizens. And they would  
do so in the interests of  
promoting mental health not  
to mention moral rectitude.  
The basic logic pursued by  
the Frankfurt School

stemmed from the fact that positive attitudes toward church, community, nation and race tend to result in negative attitudes toward people from different religions, communities, nations and races. As a result, successful families that inculcate family pride in their children were seen by the Frankfurt School as sources of pathology. For example,

*The Authoritarian*

*Personality* - a major work of the Frankfurt School intended for an American audience - claimed that expressions of family pride were “a setting off of a homogeneous totalitarian family against the rest of the world.”

In this upside-down world, families that are proud of their ancestors, concerned with moving up socially, or even having biological heirs are viewed as pathological. In

fact, one might conclude that the real agenda of *The Authoritarian Personality* is to pathologize adaptive behavior in general. Those who value highly committed marriages and cohesive families, who are upwardly mobile and seek material resources, who are proud of their families and identify with their parents, who have high self-concepts, who believe that Christianity is a



positive moral force (p. 408) and a spiritual consolation (p. 450), who strongly identify as males or females (but not both!), and who are socially successful and wish to emulate paragons of social success (e.g., American heroes) are viewed as having a psychiatric disorder.

On the other hand, those who are socially isolated, who have negative and rebellious attitudes toward

their families, who are ambivalent and insecure in their sexual identities, who have low self-esteem and are filled with debilitating insecurities and conflicts (including insecurities about whether their parents loved them), who are moving downward in social status, and who have negative attitudes toward high social status and acquisition of material resources are viewed

as the epitome of  
psychological health.

Psychoanalysis - that other  
pillar of 20<sup>th</sup> century leftism  
and the culture of critique -  
was obviously an ideal  
vehicle for creating the  
upside-down world of  
Frankfurt School ideology. A  
central feature of  
psychoanalysis is the idea  
that surface appearances can  
often overlay deep

unconscious desires and conflicts. And since psychoanalysis never required any empirical evidence for such claims, it essentially allowed the Frankfurt School authors to make up any story they wanted. If the family relationships of ethnocentric subjects were very positive, Frankfurt School theorists could interpret them as surface affection masking

deep, unconscious hostilities toward their parents. Any shred of negative feelings by ethnocentric subjects toward their parents then became a lever they could use to create an imaginary world of suppressed hostility masked by surface affection. Yet when another volume of *Studies in Prejudice* found that anti-Semites had poor relationships with their parents, the results were taken

at face value.<sup>3</sup> The result was not science, but it was effective in achieving its political goals.

It is not difficult to suppose that the entire program of research of *The Authoritarian Personality* involved deception from beginning to end. This is suggested by the authors' clear political agenda and the pervasive double standard in which

ethnocentrism and involvement in cohesive groups are seen as symptoms of psychopathology among non-Jews whereas Jews are simply viewed as victims of irrational gentile pathologies and no mention is made of Jewish ethnocentrism or allegiance to their own group.

Although it is difficult to assess the effect of works like *The Authoritarian Personality* on the culture of

the West, there can be little question that the thrust of this work, as well as other works inspired by psychoanalysis and its derivatives, was to pathologize adaptive behavior in general. Good parenting, upward social mobility, pride in family, religion, nation, and race were all suspect. Many of the central attitudes of the 1960s countercultural revolution find expression in *The Authoritarian*



*Personality*, including idealizing rebellion against parents, uncommitted sexual relationships, and scorn for upward social mobility, social status, family pride, Christianity, and patriotism.

Viewed at its most abstract level, the fundamental agenda of the Frankfurt School is to influence European peoples to view concern about their own demographic and cultural eclipse as irrational

and as an indication of psychopathology. People who do not identify with the basic social categories of family, religion, nation or race would not be concerned with their demise.

*The Jewish  
Intellectual and  
Political  
Infrastructure*

The success of the Frankfurt School and other varieties of leftist orthodoxy stem not only from their imposition by the military in parts of post-World War II Europe. After all, this forcible imposition did not happen in the United States or other areas of Europe, despite the fact that the Frankfurt School and other movements of “the culture of critique” have also had a great deal of influence

there as well.

In the absence of a conquering army, another important source of influence, at least in America, is what one might term the Jewish intellectual and activist infrastructure of the post-World War II era. Despite its scientific weakness, the ideology that positive attitudes about family, nation, and race resulted from disturbed parent-child

relationships was promulgated by the most prestigious institutions throughout the West, and especially by elite universities and the mainstream media, as the essence of scientific objectivity.

One aspect of this effort was the production of a great many other writings that reinforced the basic ideas found in *The Authoritarian Personality* and other works

of the Frankfurt School. This general intellectual onslaught is important because it produced a zeitgeist that was far more effective than one or two works by isolated authors.

A good example is *The Politics of Unreason* (1970). This volume was part of the *Patterns of American Prejudice Series* funded by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith and written by

Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab. (Raab and Lipset also wrote *Prejudice and Society*, published by the Anti-Defamation League in 1959.)

First and foremost, we see here the close relationship between Jewish activist organizations and academic writing on ethnic relations. In the same way, the *Studies in Prejudice Series* that produced *The Authoritarian*

*Personality* was funded by the American Jewish Committee. Obviously there is a link between academic research on ethnic relations and Jewish activist organizations like the AJC and the ADL. Raab's career has combined academic scholarship with deep involvement as a Jewish ethnic activist. Raab was associated with the ADL and is executive director emeritus



of the Perlmutter Institute for Jewish Advocacy at Brandeis University. He was also a columnist for the San Francisco *Jewish Bulletin*.

*The Politics of Unreason* analyses political and ideological expressions of ethnocentrism by European-derived peoples as irrational and as being unrelated to legitimate ethnic interests in retaining political power.

Movements aimed at

retaining or restoring the power of the European-derived majority of the United States are labeled “right-wing extremism.” Their politics is “the politics of despair.”<sup>4</sup> For Lipset and Raab, tolerance of cultural and ethnic pluralism is a defining feature of democracy, so that groups that oppose cultural and ethnic pluralism are by

definition extremist and anti-democratic.

*The Politics of Unreason*

may therefore be seen as an argument that the European peoples in the United States and other areas of the

Western world should not resist declines in their cultural and demographic dominance. (Analogous arguments rarely seem to surface among Jews contemplating whether Israel should remain a Jewish state.)

Attempts by majorities to resist the increase in the power and influence of other groups are contrary to “the fixed spiritual center of the democratic political process” (p.5). “Extremism *is* anti-pluralism.... And the operational heart of extremism is the repression of difference and dissent.”<sup>5</sup> “Right-wing extremism” is also condemned because of

its populist tendencies—its distrust of institutions that intervene between the people and their direct exercise of power. Indeed, in the post-

World War II era *The*

*Authoritarian Personality*

was an important ideological weapon against historical

American populist

movements, especially

McCarthyism.<sup>6</sup> “[T]he people as a whole had little

understanding of liberal  
democracy and ...important  
questions of public policy  
would be decided by  
educated elites, not submitted  
to popular vote.”<sup>7</sup>

The conclusion of this  
analysis is that democracy is  
identified not with the power  
of the people to pursue their  
perceived interests. Rather,  
government is to be the  
province of morally and

intellectually superior elites who have no commitment to the ethnic interests of the European majority; and in an Orwellian turn, democracy is defined as guaranteeing that majorities will not resist the expansion of power of minorities even if that means a decline in their own power.

The moral and intellectual elite established by these movements dominated intellectual discourse during a

critical period after World War II and leading into the countercultural revolution of the 1960s. As a result, college students during this period were powerfully socialized to adopt liberal-radical cultural and political beliefs. These effects continue into the present era.

The importance of the intellectual infrastructure can also be seen with other intellectual and political



movements. Neoconservatism illustrates the common features of this intellectual infrastructure: It has been championed by a well-defined group of mainly Jewish authors writing with shared assumptions, a common institutional base in universities and think tanks, access to major media, and mutual admiration.<sup>8</sup> The power of the movement

comes not from the work of a few individuals but from its dissemination in the media, its legitimacy in the universities, its promotion by Jewish activist organizations, and its constant repetition in slightly different forms and for different audiences by like-minded intellectuals and writers.

However, this intellectual infrastructure did not occur in a political vacuum. Also of

critical importance was the  
“intergroup relations  
movement” which was  
dedicated to passing  
legislation and disseminating  
these ideas in the schools.

The Frankfurt School was a  
critical part of the intellectual  
justification for the  
“intergroup relations  
movement” in its effort to  
“eliminate prejudice and  
discrimination against racial,  
ethnic, and religious

minorities” in the period following World War II.<sup>9</sup> The intergroup relations movement was a multifaceted effort, ranging from legal challenges to racial bias in housing, education, and public employment; legislative proposals and efforts to secure their passage into law in state and national legislative bodies; efforts to shape messages in the media;

educational programs for students and teachers; and intellectual efforts to reshape the intellectual discourse of academia.

As with the other movements with strong Jewish involvement, Jewish organizations, particularly the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, and the Anti-Defamation League, were the leaders. These organizations

provided the major sources of funding, devised the tactics, and defined the objectives of the movement.

As was also the case with the movement to open up the United States to immigration from all areas of the world, a conscious aim of the intergroup relations movement was to prevent the development of a mass anti-Jewish movement in the United States: Jewish

activists “saw their commitment to the intergroup relations movement as a preventive measure designed to make sure ‘it’ - the Nazis’ war of extermination against European Jewry - never happened in America.”<sup>10</sup> A consistent theme emphasized the benefits to be gained by increased levels of intergroup harmony. But there was no mention that some groups,

particularly European-derived, non-Jewish groups, would lose economic and political power and decline in cultural influence.<sup>11</sup>

Based on the writings of the Frankfurt School, the intergroup relations movement disseminated the ideology that ethnocentrism and discrimination against outgroups was a mental disease and thus literally a



public health problem. The assault on negative attitudes toward other groups was likened to the medical assault on deadly infectious diseases. People with the disease were described by activists as “infected”<sup>12</sup> and terms like “virulent anti-Semitism” were invented. Negative attitudes toward groups were viewed not as the result of competing group interests but rather as

the result of individual  
psychopathology.<sup>13</sup>

The story of the Frankfurt School and the intergroup relations movement are paradigmatic example of Jews producing formidable, effective groups - groups able to have powerful, transformative effects on the peoples they live among. In the modern world, these traits of Jewish groups have

resulted in great influence on the academic world, the political process, and the world of mainstream and elite media. In my book *The Culture of Critique* and monograph on neo-conservatism, I have identified several very influential Jewish intellectual and political movements: Boasian anthropology and the campaign against the concept of biologically based racial

differences; Jewish involvement in the political left; psychoanalysis; the Frankfurt School; the New York Intellectuals; U.S. immigration policy; and neoconservatism.

The end result of the triumph of these movements has been a huge increase in Jewish power and influence, and a concomitant decrease in the political and cultural power of European-derived

peoples - ethnic warfare by  
any other name.

The reality is that Jews  
have repeatedly become an  
elite and powerful group in  
societies in which they reside  
in sufficient numbers. Despite  
the fact that Jews constitute  
less than 3 percent of the U.S.  
population, the Holocaust has  
become a cultural icon as a  
direct result of Jewish  
activism and influence in the  
media, Israel has become a

sacred cow in American politics, and the role of Jewish organizations in helping unleash massive multiethnic immigration into the U.S. goes unmentioned in public debate. Yuri Slezkine was quite correct to title his book on Jewish involvement with Bolshevism in the USSR *The Jewish Century*: Quite simply, Jews have been central to all of the important

upheavals of the 20<sup>th</sup> century,  
and there doesn't seem to be  
any change in this trend as we  
enter the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## *Responding to Breaches of Decorum*

Because the Jewish  
community has been so  
intimately involved in  
creating the therapeutic state,  
it is noteworthy to examine  
how the Jewish community

responds to breaches of decorum - that is, to challenges to its hegemony. Here the methods are quite similar to those used in post World War II Germany, as described by Sunic: “When silencing their critics the German authorities do not need to resort to violent means. They usually create a cultural smearing campaign whereby a cultural heretic is portrayed as a funny, pseudo-



scientific crank that does not merit a place in mainstream publishing houses. Moreover, the heretic is often induced into a self-muzzling behavior making impossible any portrayal of himself as a martyr.”

A good example is the response to the unflattering portrayal of the Israel Lobby, by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt. The power of the Israel Lobby is legendary

and has had a major effect on U.S. foreign policy, including the recent war in Iraq. The typical response has included an argument or two aimed at small pieces of the edifice erected by Mearsheimer and Walt, but the real common denominators are intimidation, guilt by association, and charges of anti-Semitism. The guilt by association tactic appeared in the very earliest media

accounts of the article and has continued to be invoked regularly. For example, David Duke has been repeatedly cited as supporting Mearsheimer and Walt. Alan Dershowitz's 46-page rebuttal of Mearsheimer and Walt contains no less than 14 references to David Duke and 5 references comparing Mearsheimer and Walt's article to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Charges of

anti-Semitism abound. This occurs despite the fact that David Duke is never cited as a source on foreign policy issues or anything else in the mainstream media. However, since Duke is an activist on behalf of European-Americans who is regularly linked in the media with the Ku Klux Klan, Nazism, and “White supremacy,” the technique works to marginalize the work of

Mearsheimer and Walt - even though Mearsheimer and Walt have performed the ritual denunciation of Duke.

The sad reality is that discussing a whole host of issues related to Jews, even in a rational, informed manner, brings charges of anti-Semitism and incompetent scholarship ringing down from the highest reaches of academia and the elite media. One can easily see that this is

a recipe for paranoia,  
frustration and ultimately  
anti-Semitism.

But the tactics of the Jewish  
intellectual and political  
infrastructure are effective  
because even if they create  
dark suspicions about the  
behavior of the organized  
Jewish community among a  
few and vague twinges of  
anxiety among many, these  
attitudes are forced to remain  
underground. They occur in

the privacy of one's thoughts  
or in guarded conversations  
and coded emails. And  
because there is more than a  
grain of truth to these  
attitudes, for some they  
readily give rise to  
apocalyptic, impossible  
conspiracy theories. After all,  
if the reality of Jewish power  
on issues such as Israel is as  
plain as the nose on your face  
and you know that its power  
is ultimately maintained by

intimidation, smear tactics,  
and endlessly repeated  
propaganda emanating from  
the mainstream media and  
elite academic institutions, at  
some point informed people  
start thinking that there's  
probably a whole lot else they  
aren't telling you.

There is an old saying that  
“sticks and stones can break  
my bones, but words can  
never hurt me.” However, the  
sad reality is that the vast



majority of Americans in politics, the media, and the academic world are terrified of being labeled an anti-Semite or of having their work compared to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. This is at least ironic, because there is an image of academicians as fearless seekers of truth. Unlike politicians who must continue to curry favor with the public in order to be reelected and

unlike media figures who have no job protection, academics with tenure have no excuse for not being willing to endure labels such as “anti-Semite” or “racist” in order to pursue the truth. Part of the job - and a large part of the rationale for tenure in the first place - is that they are supposed to be willing to take unpopular positions - to forge ahead using all that brain power and expertise to chart

new territories that challenge the popular wisdom.

But that image of academia is simply not based in reality, as shown by an article appearing almost two months after the publication of Mearsheimer and Walt's essay and appropriately titled "A hot paper muzzles academia."<sup>14</sup> "Instead of a roiling debate, most professors not only agreed to

disagree but agreed to pretend publicly that there was no disagreement at all. At Harvard and other schools, the Mearsheimer-Walt paper proved simply too hot to handle —and it revealed an academia deeply split yet lamentably afraid to engage itself on one of the hottest political issues of our time. Call it the academic Cold War: distrustful factions rendered timid by the

prospect of mutually assured career destruction.”

Professors refused to take a stand on the paper, either in favor or against. As one Ivy League professor noted, “A lot of [my colleagues] were more concerned about the academic politics of it, and where they should come down, in that sense.”

Bear in mind that the vast majority of the professors unwilling to take a stand on

this issue have tenure and can't literally be fired. They are afraid not of starvation but of having their career ruined by being associated with the wrong side in this debate. The downside is that they won't be invited to deliver papers at other universities or important conferences. They will not be able to publish their work at prestigious academic or commercial presses, or they

may even have difficulty having their work published at all. They won't be invited to the good parties, or get nice summer fellowships, or get asked to serve as dean, or in a future administration in Washington. Or maybe their sources of funding will dry up.

And it's pretty clear that the "wrong side" of this debate is to publicly approve of a paper that has been denounced in

the elite media as anti-Semitic, as endorsing conspiracy theories at the same level as the Protocols, and as being on the same side of an issue as David Duke. Can anyone believe that the Alan Dershowitzes of the world are not taking names and will not hold people accountable for supporting a paper that they have publicly denounced as spreading the most vicious lies about Israel



and the American Jewish community?

It's not that professors don't want to sound off on public policy issues. When there is an opportunity to spout righteous leftism, professors leap to the front of the line. A good example is a recent case where three white men from the Duke University lacrosse team allegedly gang-raped, sodomized, and choked a

black woman who had been hired as a stripper for a party.<sup>15</sup> Despite considerable evidence that the charges are spurious, three academic departments, 13 programs, and 88 professors at Duke bought an ad in the campus newspaper in which they assumed the guilt of the men, and stated that “what happened to this young woman” resulted from

“racism and sexism.”<sup>16</sup>

But of course in this case, the professors who went public with their indignation knew they were part of a like-minded community and that there would be much to gain by being on the politically correct side. Indeed, a university committee charged with looking into the response of the Duke administration to this incident

recommended more hiring of minorities in order to increase the diversity of the Duke administration.

Sadly, there is now a great deal of evidence that academics in general are careful to avoid controversy or do much of anything that will create hostility. In fact, some researchers are pointing to this fact to call into question whether tenure is justified. A recent survey of

the attitudes of 1004 professors at elite universities illustrates this quite clearly.<sup>17</sup>

Regardless of their rank, professors rated their colleagues as reluctant to engage in activities that ran counter to the wishes of colleagues. Even tenured full professors believed [other full professors] would invoke academic freedom only “sometimes” rather than

“usually” or “always”; they chose confrontational options “rarely”, albeit more often than did lower ranked colleagues, and appeared more conciliatory ...than one might have anticipated in light of the principles governing academic freedom. Their willingness to self-limit may be due to a desire for harmony and/ or respect for the criticisms of colleagues whose opinions they value.

Thus, the data did not support the depiction of *Professorus americanus* as unleashed renegades. Seen in this context, the reaction to Mearsheimer and Walt makes a lot of sense. As one professor noted, “People might debate it if you gave everyone a get-out-of-jail-free card and promised that afterwards everyone would be friends.” <sup>18</sup>

This intense desire to be accepted and liked by one's colleagues is certainly understandable. It is probably part of human nature. There have been times when I have had to endure charges of anti-Semitism, most recently in an article by Jacob Laksin titled "Cal State's Professor of Anti-Semitism" published by David Horowitz's FrontPageMagazine.com.<sup>19</sup>



It's perhaps worth nothing that [FrontPageMagazine.com](http://FrontPageMagazine.com) also published perhaps the most vitriolic anti-Mearsheimer and Walt piece to date, Abraham H. Miller's The New Protocols. (Miller begins by stating "Professors Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer's recently disseminated anti-Semitic screed has been ripped apart by both prominent scholars and literary figures showing it

to be an intellectual fraud being passed off as serious scholarship.” The essay ends with “Anti-Semites have now found the new Protocols of the Elders of Zion.”)

It didn't really bother me much that such an article was published if the discussion was confined to the impersonal world of the internet. I would write a detailed reply and circulate it among the people who read

my stuff, and I knew that people who support my writing would rally to my defense and say nice things about me and my reply to Laksin. And I knew that I would get a few pieces of hate mail and maybe a couple of death threats, but that is to be expected. And it's all rather abstract, since I basically sit in solitude at my computer and read it all, and it pretty much ends there.

Frankly, there is a part of me that feels good about it because visits to my website are up and more people are buying my books. I fantasize that the word is getting out, even if only a little bit.

The point is that when this article came out, almost all my anxiety stemmed from worries that the article would be picked up by people on my campus or in professional organizations that I am

involved in. I wasn't worried that I would lose my job, although Laksin was clearly upset about California State University's "ignoring altogether the question of why it considers the manufacture of stylized bigotry an appropriate avocation for a tenured scholar." What I dreaded was coming into my office and being greeted by cold shoulders and hostile stares,

by colleagues not wanting to go to lunch or nervously looking away when I passed in the hall. I worried about reading sensationalistic articles in the campus newspaper.

I imagined going to academic conferences and receiving the same sort of reception. I worried that people wouldn't invite me to write academic papers or wouldn't cite my writing in

other areas not related to  
Jewish issues.

This little bit of personal  
experience is doubtless  
typical of the forces of self-  
censorship that maintain the  
political order of the post-  
World War II West. It's the  
concern about the face-to-  
face consequences of being a  
non-conformist in the deeply  
sensitive areas related to race  
or to Jewish influence.  
Consider the response of

Anne Morrow Lindbergh to the torrent of abuse heaped upon her husband, Charles Lindbergh, for stating that Jews were one force promoting war against Germany in 1941. The speech threw her into “dark gloom.”

“Will I be able to shop in New York at all now? I am always stared at—but now to be stared at with hate, to walk through aisles of hate!”<sup>20</sup>



Again, what is most feared is the personal, face-to-face hatred.

As an evolutionary psychologist, it's tempting to speculate that our evolved psychological mechanisms are triggered far more by the close and personal context of day to day interactions, not in the cold and impersonal world of communicating on the internet.

And it's not just that it is in

the face-to-face world of everyday life. It is that the areas of non-conformity we are talking about here have huge moral overtones. If one dissents from the reigning theory of macro-economics or the main influences on 19<sup>th</sup> century French Romanticism, one may be viewed as a bit eccentric or perhaps none too smart. But one is not likely to be viewed as a moral

reprobate. One is not likely to be subjected to torrents of moral outrage.

Evolutionary theorist Robert Trivers has proposed that the emotion of guilt is a sign to the group that a person will mend his ways and behave in the future, whereas shame functions as a display of submission to people higher in the dominance hierarchy. From that perspective, a person

who is incapable of shame or guilt even for obvious transgressions is literally a sociopath - someone who has no desire to fit into group norms. Such sociopathy would usually be a death sentence in the small groups that we humans evolved in.

Only the most dominant individuals would be able to resist the moral outrage of the group, and even they must be concerned about coalitions

rising against them.

What is striking and perhaps counterintuitive is that the guilt and shame remain even when we are completely satisfied at an intellectual level that our beliefs are based on good evidence and reasonable inferences. Anne Morrow Lindbergh writes, “I cannot explain my revulsion of feeling by logic. Is it my lack of courage to face the

problem? Is it my lack of vision and seeing the thing through? Or is my intuition founded on something profound and valid? I do not know and am only very disturbed, which is upsetting for him. I have the greatest faith in him as a person - in his integrity, his courage, and his essential goodness, fairness, and kindness - his nobility really ...How then explain my profound feeling

of grief about what he is doing? If what he said is the truth (and I am inclined to think it is), why was it wrong to state it?" <sup>21</sup>

Her reaction is involuntary and irrational - beyond the reach of logical analysis.

Charles Lindbergh was exactly right in what he said, but a rational understanding of the correctness of his analysis cannot lessen the

psychological trauma to his wife who must face the hostile stares of others. In psychological terms, the trauma is the result of implicit, unconscious processes stemming from our evolved psychology and a long history of successful socialization.

## *Puritan Moralism and Christian*



# *Universalism*

The preceding discusses the “push” of movements that have attempted to alter American and other European-derived societies into defenseless entities with no ethnic or cultural identity. But the other side of the equation must also be examined –the traits that predispose Westerners to willingly accept their own

oblivion as a moral necessity.

Here Sunic emphasizes the heritage of Christian universalism and, especially in the case of America, the heritage of Puritan moralism.

Several writers have noted the Puritan spirit of egalitarianism and democracy combined with violent crusades against immorality.<sup>22</sup> In the 17<sup>th</sup> century, Puritan areas had

low levels of personal violence but the highest levels of public violence directed at heretics and those suspected of witchcraft. I have suggested that this emphasis on relative egalitarianism and consensual, democratic government are tendencies characteristic of Northern European peoples as a result of a prolonged evolutionary history as hunter-gatherers in

the north of Europe.<sup>23</sup> But the Puritans added a high degree of cohesion within the group made possible by a powerful emphasis on cultural conformity (e.g., punishment of religious heresy) and public regulation of personal behavior related to sex (fornication, adultery), public drunkenness, etc. One might say that Puritans tried to square the circle by

combining egalitarianism and democracy - both strongly associated with individualism - with high levels of cultural control - a collectivist trait.

But, as Sunic emphasizes, it is the Puritan tendency to pursue utopian causes framed as moral issues that stands out the most - their susceptibility to utopian appeals to a 'higher law' and the belief that the principal purpose of government is moral. New

England was the most fertile ground for “the perfectibility of man creed,” and the “father of a dozen ‘isms.’ ”<sup>24</sup>

There was a tendency to paint political alternatives as starkly contrasting moral imperatives, with one side portrayed as evil incarnate - inspired by the devil. Puritan moral intensity can also be seen in their “profound personal piety”<sup>25</sup> - their

intensity of commitment to live not only a holy life, but also a sober and industrious life.

Puritans waged holy war on behalf of moral righteousness even against their own cousins. Whatever the political and economic complexities that led to the Civil War, it was the Yankee moral condemnation of slavery that inspired the rhetoric and rendered the

massive carnage of closely related Anglo-Americans on behalf of slaves from Africa justifiable in the minds of Puritans. Militarily, the war with the Confederacy rendered the heaviest sacrifice in lives and property ever made by Americans.<sup>26</sup>

Puritan moral fervor and its tendency to justify draconian punishment of evil doers can also be seen in the comments



of “the Congregationalist minister at Henry Ward Beecher’s Old Plymouth Church in New York [who] went so far as to call for ‘exterminating the German people ...the sterilization of 10,000,000 German soldiers and the segregation of the woman.’”<sup>27</sup>

This Puritan moralism and its deep roots in America account for the importance of

moral legitimacy in  
maintaining the current  
cultural regime. It's  
interesting that Anne Morrow  
Lindbergh commented in her  
thoughts on her husband's  
speech that "I would prefer to  
see this country at war than  
shaken by violent anti-  
Semitism. (Because it seems  
to me that the kind of person  
the human being is turned  
into when the instinct of Jew-  
baiting is let loose is worse

than the kind of person he becomes on the battlefield.)”

In other words, the thought that even a disastrous war that might kill hundreds of thousands of Americans (and, as her husband believed, might result in the destruction of European culture and the white race) is preferable to the possibility of an outbreak of violent anti-Semitism. For Puritans-at-heart like Mrs. Lindbergh, the moral

demeanor of Americans is more important than their survival as a nation or people.

Elsewhere I have argued that this tendency toward moralistic punishment is a form of “altruistic punishment” described recently by research on group behavior in individualistic cultures.<sup>28</sup> Because Europeans are individualists at heart, they readily rise up

in moral anger against their own people once they are seen as morally blameworthy - a manifestation of their much stronger tendency toward altruistic punishment deriving from their evolutionary past as hunter gatherers.

Thus the current moralistic crusade of the left so characteristic of contemporary Western civilization: Once Europeans

were convinced that their own people were morally bankrupt, any and all means of punishment should be used against their own people. A major theme of *The Culture of Critique* is that the most influential intellectual and political movements of the 20<sup>th</sup> century presented European civilization as morally bankrupt and the proper target of moralistic

punishment. Western culture had become the culture of guilt whose central icon had become the Holocaust and the slavery of Africans.

## *Conclusion*

The forces maintaining the current cultural regime are multi-layered. Because this culture of guilt has seized control of the pinnacles of moral and intellectual

authority, resistance carries huge costs that go far beyond practical considerations like keeping one's job. The costs are also psychological and deeply personal.

But resistance does serve a function. As Sunic notes, there is a real prospect of social breakdown given the increasing ethnic divisions in the U.S. In *The Culture of Critique* I predicted that the current regime would lead to



increased ethnic strife and an increased sense of group consciousness among the European peoples of the United States. As an evolutionist, it is difficult for me to believe that a racial group would be unconcerned with its own eclipse and domination.

I believe that in the United States we are presently heading down a volatile path - a path that leads to ethnic

warfare and to the development of collectivist, authoritarian, and racist enclaves. Although ethnocentric beliefs and behavior are viewed as morally and intellectually legitimate only among ethnic minorities in the United States ... the development of greater ethnocentrism among European-derived peoples is a likely result of present trends....

Ethnocentrism on the part of the European-derived majority in the United States is a likely outcome of the increasingly group-structured contemporary social and political landscape - likely because evolved psychological mechanisms in humans appear to function by making ingroup and outgroup membership more salient in situations of group-based resource competition .... The

effort to overcome these inclinations thus necessitates applying to Western societies a massive “therapeutic” intervention in which manifestations of majoritarian ethnocentrism are combated at several levels, but first and foremost by promoting the ideology that such manifestations are an indication of psychopathology and a cause for ostracism, shame,

psychiatric intervention, and counseling. One may expect that as ethnic conflict continues to escalate in the United States, increasingly desperate attempts will be made to prop up the ideology of multiculturalism with sophisticated theories of the psychopathology of majority group ethnocentrism, as well as with the erection of police state controls on nonconforming thought and

behavior.

At some point the negative consequences to the European population of the U.S. of multicultural ideology and massive influx of other peoples will become so obvious that current levels of control will be ineffective. We will be like the Soviet Union when it became, in Sunic's words, "a make-believe system in which nobody truly believed and

where everybody, including former communist party dignitaries made fun of in private.”

And if at this point, Europeans stare into the abyss and voluntarily cede political and cultural power, they will have no one to blame but themselves. But they will be cursed by their descendants. Perhaps they will one day read Tomislav Sunic’s excellent book and

think about what might have been.

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# Chapter I

## Americanism and Anti-Americanism

With its Latin etymology, the neologism “*Homo americanus*” may stand in a derogatory fashion for American man and his life

style. The American system, the American Puritan ethos, and, particularly, American foreign policy, form the subject matter of critical studies in Europe. The word “Americanism” has a slightly pejorative meaning and is more often used in Europe than in North America. Usually the term “Americanism” stands for a set of daily beliefs, life styles, and the American language -

all of which could be described as elements of American ideology.

Social behavior that might be viewed by American citizens as un-American or even anti-American is often considered normal and natural in Europe. There are numerous books in Europe dealing with the American mindset. Some of them possess a predominantly polemical and

pamphleteering character; some fall into the category of social and political satire, and some attempt to scientifically demonstrate the flaws of American foreign policy.<sup>29</sup>

Most Americans would be offended by the label *Homo americanus* and would likely argue, in view of the fact that America is such a large country, that there cannot be any common denominator for

so many different American citizens of such diverse social, ethnic, and racial backgrounds. Admittedly, America is the least homogeneous country in the Western hemisphere in terms of the background of its citizens, their life styles, and their different dreams. But there is one common feature which is characteristic for all Americans, regardless of their social and racial background

or status; namely their rejection of their previous roots, however much this rejection may be expressed as a hidden desire for the re-projection of oneself into one's former being or embellished roots. The rejection of these roots, be they of racial, ethnic, or cultural origin, by no means implies, as many European critics wrongly assume, that America is an outcast of

Europe, although it often appears in its cultural endeavors as a travesty of Europe. In many instances, however, Americans have proven that they can safeguard Europe cultural heritage better than Europeans themselves. But this European heritage, projected by Americans, has a different meaning in postmodern America. Jean Baudrillard, a French

theoretician of postmodernity,  
sees in the American a  
constant reenactment of all  
cultural things from Europe; a  
certain form of anachronism  
that lends itself through its  
mimicry of the social and  
political grotesque, and which  
often causes among  
Europeans irrational outbursts  
of anti-Americanism.

However, Baudrillard is no  
less critical of the false  
mannerism of Europeans and



their social gesticulation,  
which is absent among  
Americans and which gives  
Americans a unique trait of  
historical detachment, not to  
be seen in Europe. Europeans  
seem to be more concerned  
with the appearances of their  
good manners than with good  
manners themselves that, in  
the eyes of Americans, often  
makes Europeans look like  
theatrical creatures.

“Europeans are free in spirit;

Americans are free in action,”  
writes Baudrillard.”<sup>30</sup> This  
only reiterates the assumption  
that American society can  
function without cumbersome  
layers of social pathos, so  
typical of traditional Europe.  
One could very well argue  
that the foundation of  
America was the result of the  
supreme will to power on the  
part of European genius, i.e.  
an ultimate form of European

Prometheism—something unheard of in any other civilization and something unparalleled in the whole of Western history. That this experiment ended in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century in secularized Bible-inspired fundamentalism and the theocratic system resented by much of the outside world, is a matter for value judgment. Not a single American

politician will ever admit that America is a theocratic system with a peculiar political theology. Clearly, the American social experiment could have taken a different social form. America might have just as well renounced Biblical moralism and adopted instead a neo-Darwinian, evolutionary, and racist approach in its domestic and foreign policy. There were

some serious academics in the first half of the twentieth century who used the field of eugenics in studying social changes, and who left some impact on decision making circles in America.

One may also argue, from a sociobiological and racist perspective, that early Americans, at least until the mid 19<sup>th</sup> century, constituted a peculiar gene pool able to

weather real or figurative storms which their European left-behinds, particularly in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century, were neither physically nor emotionally capable of confronting. As transatlantic “supermen,” early Americans must have had lots of stamina to answer the “cull of the wild” in their new homeland. It is unquestionable that the rigors of the weather and a

harsh unpredictable life in the early South-West must have resulted in a sociobiological selection that in time gave birth to the famed American breed. The subsequent social cleavages between and among Americans, including their unparalleled social mobility, along with the profusion of different lifestyles, makes, therefore, impossible any preconceived stereotype of a “unique”

American species, i.e.,  
“*Homo americanus*.”

The much decried  
American conformism, which  
Alexis de Tocqueville  
critically observed along with  
other European thinkers, must  
also be put in perspective.  
America is definitely more of  
a consensual society than  
Europe, and its bipartisan  
spirit is often wrongly  
interpreted in Europe as a  
sign of intellectual



provincialism. Werner Sombart, a prominent German sociologist of the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, writes that Americans “are inclined to striking uniformity”(…) and “they also show herd instincts.”<sup>31</sup>

Such quick judgments must be put in perspective. In early postmodernity, by the end of the twentieth century, American conformism proved

to be the ideal social framework for the flawless functioning of a sophisticated high-tech industrialized society. European proponents of organic and traditional society, also known as traditionalists, nationalists, national revolutionary conservatives, etc., must, therefore, think twice before blaming America as a threat to historical memory. In a global postmodern system

relying on satellite and fiber optic networks and rapidly evolving digital mindset, the former European conservative palaver needs to be reexamined. It is precisely the sense of social conformism that gave Americans a distinct ability for team work and functional solidarity that cannot be observed in Europe, yet which is indispensable for smooth functioning of a

postmodern system.

In a similar manner, America became a military superpower often against its own will. Its military supremacy after the end of the bipolar world, by the late twentieth century, was more a chance result of a global power vacuum and less a product of America's will to hegemony.

While it is common for all peoples on earth to make

stereotypes, or even crack racial jokes about their next door neighbors, different races, and different ethnic groups, no nation, or for that matter not a single individual likes to hear someone else making jokes about his country of origin, regardless of how much he may subconsciously hate his country, or the country of his ancestors' origin. After all, it is always the "Other" who is

wrong or who incarnates  
Evil; it is “Myself” who is  
always right. And who likes  
to hear deprecatory remarks  
or jokes about himself or his  
native country? Europeans  
often talk about strange  
American eating and sexual  
habits, American  
superficiality in professional  
and intimate relationships,  
about the obesity of  
American women, and over  
obsessive lachrymal

sentimentality of American politicians whose behavior is colored by fanatical moralism. Europeans also lambast Americans for their lack of historical memory, the American absence of a sense of the tragic and its infantile optimism. These remarks, which have been made by countless European observers of America, are more or less correct. But Europeans have to admit that they do not like

it when Americans remind them of their own parochial customs, or when Americans make observations that the much vaunted European “historical memory” has led to countless nightmares for all European peoples.

Although the vast majority of both Europeans and Americans descend from the same racial stock, there are serious differences in their respective societies.



However, with almost the complete Americanization of the European continent at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, what is the point of studying *Homo americanus* in America only? Is not Europe an extended part of America—albeit in a reversed historical manner? The American species, *Homo americanus*, exists all over Europe now and has gained in visibility in

each corner of Europe—both in the West and the post-communist East. Hence another paradox: the belated European version of *Homo americanus* appears often unnerving to American visitors in Europe in search of an elusive “true” Frenchman, German, or a Dutchman. In the process of world wide globalization and American cultural imperialism having become the main vector for

new cultural hegemony, it is increasingly difficult to tell the difference in life styles between citizens of America and those in Europe.

The transnational uniqueness of the American system can be critically examined at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century by research work in different academic fields. However, the best approach to a critical

examination of *Homo  
americanus* and

Americanism, both in

America and in its mimicked

European version, can be

achieved by means of

interdisciplinary research and

historical comparison. This

interdisciplinary approach is

important given the fact that

the more one wishes to

narrow down the field where

*Homo americanus* thrives, the

more this field becomes

evasive. Alas, as long as there is a single American citizen who displays un-American or “anti-American” traits, it is not fair to place common labels on the entire postmodern American population. Just because most French love eating cheese does not mean that all Frenchmen are cheese lovers. Just because Russian Jews, in 1919, made up percentage wise the majority of early

Bolshevik commissars, does not mean that all Jews were communists. Yet, one must be cautious when making such elegant disclaimers.

Unlike political scientists or historians, many biologists and geneticists will not reject allegations that nations, races and ethnic groups share distinct behavioral and physical traits that facilitate our cognition and our perception of the “other” in

our day to day life. And there should be nothing offensive about this. Pretending that racial or ethnic differences do not exist and that each man is a product of nurture and education only, does not sound convincing. This belated liberal dogma of equality, so powerful during the 20<sup>th</sup> century, is losing credibility in the postmodern world. Or rather, this dogma

will sound credible but only from the angle of its advocates in academia and the political arena, including those opinion makers who shield their vested interests and who are interested only in their version of the truth.

Unquestionably, most fields in social science since the end of the Second World War have been heavily influenced by the left-leaning, Marxist, egalitarian, liberal and



Lamarckian framework of analysis, to the extent that serious criticism of the egalitarian dogma is viewed as a threat to democracy and by extension a threat to modern Americanism and its twin brother liberalism. In the same vein, much of what has been written or published in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century about America came from leftist and liberal

sources—not from right-wing sources. Seen from the historical perspective, it must not be forgotten that the modern framework of political references, particularly since the end of the Cold War, has been based on the dogma of antifascism and multiculturalism, with both elements of this dogma well incorporated into Americanism, and with both reflecting the geopolitical

configuration of Europe and America after World War II. Using other perspectives or quoting books by anti-egalitarian authors, let alone immersing oneself into the study of modern and postmodern belief systems from a historical revisionist or sociobiological point of view, is viewed with alarm and rejected as “unscientific.” These fields of analysis, or authors who resort to these

unconventional approaches,  
remain an isolated breed,  
often stigmatized as “fascists”  
and “racists.”

The fundamental issue that  
needs to be addressed here,  
even when one deals with  
such an abstract notion as  
Americanism, is not what is  
true or false, but who is the  
master of modern  
Americanized discourse and  
who is in charge of defining  
what the concept of (anti)-

Americanism means. And why not give a chance, for a change, to authors who have voiced different views on Americanism and its founding principles: consumerism, multiculturalism, egalitarianism and the myth of progress?

Following the Second World War, hundreds of European and American authors were removed from

library shelves on the basis of their allegedly extremist, racist and unscientific character. The point one needs to make in this chapter is not whether these authors, politicians, and academics were “pro-American” or “anti-American,” democrats or non-democrats, credible individuals, quacks, monsters, or angels, but rather to stress the fact that they deserve a fair hearing and should stop

being subject to intellectual and academic ostracism.

Otherwise, any critique of the American system, of modern liberalism, or for that matter any critical study of a social phenomenon related to postmodernity, will continue to be subject to preconceived notions that yield self-serving conclusions. This is all the more necessary, as after the end of the Cold War and the breakdown of communism in

Eastern Europe, paradigms that were used during the preceding fifty year period of the Cold War in the social sciences are no longer valid.

Critical studies of Americanism are not new. *Homo americanus* and the American system have been the subject matter of critical study for a very long period of time, both from the left-wing and right-wing perspective. Indeed, one can



also think of National Socialist and Fascist politicians and scores of their intellectual supporters who probed into the mechanism of modernity, who examined the American system, and whose analyses must not be rejected out of hand—just because they originated in a system which is abhorred by liberal democracy and by American elites. The fascist anti-American prose, when not

forbidden, which is still the case in Europe by the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, is avoided or dismissed as “crazy” and “unscientific.” It is a typical trait, particularly in higher American education and the American media to eulogize noble principles of intellectual detachment and impartiality. However, each time an intellectual inquiry turns towards the fascist

epoch or to the cultural heritage of fascism, all hell breaks loose, all dirty epithets are allowed. An average reader, be he a European or an American, rarely has the chance to judge for himself the other side of the story surrounding the epoch in Europe that stretched from 1933 to 1945. This is relevant not just for that specific political period but also for the political ideas that were

dominant during that time. Having been subject since 1945 to a deluge of liberal and communist interpretation of contemporary history, with the social science curricula impregnated by antifascist and egalitarian theorems and having been exposed to different schools of thought more in line with the spirit of Marxist and liberal times, the average reader or student of contemporary America or

Americanized Europe may not be fully aware of the existence of other schools of thought or alternative historical perspectives.

Even the attempt to accept as a working hypothesis that due to a peculiar historical and political environment, the American system may have given birth to a more or less new type of citizen with distinct behavioral traits, is rejected as unscientific by

mainstream opinion makers.  
If one accepts, however, as a  
working postulate, that  
“*Homo americanus*” is a  
distinct sociobiological specie  
and not only a derogatory  
label for an average American  
citizen, irrespective of the  
fact that he may be an  
Oklahoma hick, an  
Appalachian hill-billy, a red  
neck from Chicago’s steel  
mills, a Joe Six pack from  
suburban Los Angeles, or a

Jewish neocon journalist,  
then it may be easier to  
speculate about a set of  
evolutionary changes that  
have occurred in America  
over the last two hundred  
years.

Who defines Americanism,  
in which time frame, and in  
which location, and by whose  
vocabulary? When one  
speaks of the average *Homo  
americanus*, should one refer  
to an East Coast banker or to

an antebellum poet like Edgar Allan Poe? Is Americanism embodied in the American heretic Thomas Jefferson or an equally strong antebellum American heretic George Fitzhugh? One way or another, these individuals during their prime were also depicted as “un-American” by their political opponents. If we were to take some contemporary neo-conservative scholar as the



ideal archetype of  
postmodern *Homo  
americanus*, then we might  
just as well use his judgments  
regarding the modern and  
postmodern American system  
with all its multiethnic facets.

That way a Jewish neocon  
might consider himself to be  
as genuine and as equal an  
American as some Southern  
Agrarian American of  
yesteryear, although their  
respective racial, ethnic, and

political views may be light-years apart. Therefore, the conclusion as to who *Homo americanus* is, will hinge on the social, intellectual, racial, and ethnic pedigree of the observer and the observed. It would be interesting to know what would happen with postmodern self-proclaimed Americans if their country started to rapidly fall apart. Who would be willing then to define America and the

meaning of the American  
spirit?

## *Race and the 'Cull' of the Wild*

In postmodern America and  
its cultural satellite the  
European Union, racial  
profiling is not a rewarding  
job. Making across the board  
and general statements about  
non-European peoples or  
ethnic groups can earn a

politician, journalist,  
professor, or scholar a label  
of being prejudiced, or being  
a racist bigot. Even the word  
race, once frequently used in  
America and Europe, was  
replaced by the late seventies  
of the 20<sup>th</sup> century by a more  
neutral word “ethnicity.”  
Simultaneously, multiracial  
societies were also  
euphemistically dubbed by  
the expression “multicultural

societies,” thereby adding more confusion into the original meaning of the word “culture” and “race.” Asking officially somebody in postmodern America about his racial or his ethnic origins is viewed as an affront against his personality. Over the last half a century, due to immigration laws passed in 1965, America has fundamentally changed its ethnic and racial composition,

a fact that has resulted in mandatory employment of different semantic locutions.

It is seemingly a matter of time until different legal and political structures will also

be added to those

demographic changes that have been at work since the mid 20<sup>th</sup> century. How will

one define the word “Americanism” in the year 2025, and who will qualify

then as a “good American”?

The various scenarios about the possible Balkanization of America are legion and usually it is traditionalists and so-called right-wing authors and scholars who depict the future of America in catastrophic terms. Many of them are aware that once upon a time, “immigrants were met with the unflinching demand to ‘Americanize.’” Now they are told that they

should retain and reinforce their diversity.”<sup>32</sup> In the early 21<sup>st</sup> century racial diversity is causing in America serious legal problems as newcomers from Third World countries display two different political and cultural loyalties.

Modern multiculturalism in America implies by definition social integration and stands in sharp contrast to the assimilation process which



was once a mandatory scheme for newcomers in their acceptance of new identity. However, the notion of assimilation in America is rightly viewed by postmodern liberal theorists as an eraser of America's "ethnic diversity." Hence a paradox: on the one hand newcomers in America are encouraged to erase their non-American roots as soon as possible. On the other, they are

encouraged, in the name of some romantic belief in multiculturalism and racial diversity, to retain their non-American roots, and this by means of integration. It seems, therefore, that the American legal system, when dealing with non-European immigration, has become a victim of its own suicidal vocabulary. Terms like “diversity” and “ethnic sensitivity” are just empty

locutions in the liberal and multicultural arsenal.

According to the English-American scholar Peter Brimelow, a strategy of forcible multiculturalism results in “positive discrimination” against European Americans.

Therefore, the definition of what Americanism means at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century will remain an

impossible task to solve.

The modern Western system incorporated in postmodern neo-liberalism and spearheaded by America and its carrier *Homo americanus*, has imposed its own vernacular, its own version of truth, and its own framework of analysis. The word race is avoided because, apparently, there is only one human race -except when one talks about racial profiling,

racial discrimination, or racial harassment, which seems to be a daily topic in postmodern America. Multiracial diversity, as has been already seen in countless cases, both in America and Europe, is not a recipe for multiracial conviviality. The prospects for America's Balkanization are real as different non-European ethnicities "with disparate mores, verbal

communication problems and  
different abilities provide a  
recipe...for social  
breakdown...”<sup>33</sup>

When facing their political  
adversaries, America’s  
masters of postmodern  
discourse keep throwing  
around signifiers, such as  
“anti-American,” “fascism,”  
“communism,” “Stalinism,”  
“racism,” whose signified and  
interpretation depend on their

own good will. And even the  
signified is differently  
interpreted by dissimilar  
parties as long as it serves  
their political agendas or their  
vested interests. Nominally,  
both liberal America and its  
replica in Europe, claim to be  
highly tolerant systems  
allowing diverse critics to  
voice criticism of  
Americanism, however  
vicious or bizarre this  
criticism may sometimes be.

Hundreds of different organizations, agencies, or sects throughout America and Europe, defend the rights of marginal social groups, ranging from political dissidents from different antipodes to local homosexuals, lesbians, or other gender bender minorities, including non-European religions of old and new. In theory, multiracial liberalism, with its main



motor in America, tolerates any political view and life style—the point which it likes to stress on all wave lengths throughout the world.

However, the more American society becomes heterogeneous the more this society needs to struggle for racial consensus. What may for instance be seen as a highly desirably topic in the study of European literature for an American student of

European origin, may be viewed as a demeaning and degrading act for a student of non-European descent. In addition, there are social minefields engendered by political and academic elites in postmodern America that are meant to be “off limits” to intellectual scrutiny. In this sense, postmodern Americanism, which one may just as well replace by the word neo-liberalism, despite

a torrent of eulogies about its tolerant nature, contains serious threats against its critics.

Admittedly, every epoch has its dominant ideas, and each ruling class in every country on earth is never too eager to discard its founding myths and replace them with other myths that may be seen as factors destabilizing for its political survival. Likewise, the dominant ideas at work in

modern Americanism are often hailed by the ruling class and its court historians as “self-evident.” Questioning the veracity of that self-evidence can cause serious troubles for an intellectual heretic and can even lead to the signing of a death warrant to their intellectual career. For instance, challenging the principles of American democracy or probing critically into the legacy of

antifascist victimology must be strictly avoided. These prohibitions are not officially on display in America; they just constitute a public no-entry zone. An author or a politician who ventures into one of these forbidden fields is at best shrugged off as a crank by the masters of modern American discourse or labeled as a “prejudiced” person. At worst, he can end up in prison. In most cases,

however, he will find himself cut off from academic discourse and political debate, which in effect means that he is intellectually sentenced to death.

Another American “self-evidence,” which seems to be part of the American political theology, transpires in constant commemoration of the Jewish Holocaust—an event which has become a civic ritual all over the

Americanized world, and which prohibits any critical inquiry. The topic of the Holocaust, along with the issue of multiculturalism, is one of those subjects of early postmodernity that can only be discussed by a chosen few—and usually in flattering terms. Professor Kevin MacDonald, an American sociobiologist writes: “The Judaization of the West is nowhere more obvious than

in the veneration of the Holocaust as the central moral icon of the entire civilization.”<sup>34</sup> On the basis of the incessant commemoration of the Holocaust, it can be easier to understand what postmodern Americanism means and which role this new ideology has played in the process of the Americanization of Europe and the entire world.



The process of Americanization seems to be enhanced by the rapid growth of multiracial society, which has always had strong supporters among Jewish intellectuals in America who have never hidden “that making of the US into a multicultural society has been a major Jewish goal from the beginning of the nineteenth century.”<sup>35</sup>

No wonder, therefore, that Americanism and Americanization are rapidly becoming terms devoid of original meaning. America is comprised of different peoples “who differed from one another so vastly in religion, race, background and education and lineage and who agreed to forget all these things.”<sup>36</sup> Questioning critically, in the epoch of

postmodernity, the meaning of Americanism, can earn a person the label of a prejudiced person. However, even the word “prejudice” must be put into linguistic perspective, as this word has the common root with the word “prejudgment,” which is part of the biological and psychological makeup in human speciation without which any civilization would collapse. When properly

used, writes Alan McGregor, prejudice serves as a useful intellectual tool in comparing and contrasting and as a short cut in reaching important decisions.<sup>37</sup> Undoubtedly, all humans discriminate, be that in the choice of their mates, friends, or against their political enemies. Nation-state building is a process carried out by the principles of “in-group” vs. “out-group”

discrimination, wherein a tribe or an ethnic group, in a manner of an extended family, prefers to interact with its own in-group members. People of same racial ethnicity, in this case white Americans, are more or less genetically similar and will, therefore, tend to display overt or covert prejudices against other racial groups.<sup>38</sup>

For numerous authors,

particularly in the fields of sociobiology, xenophobia and racial prejudice are inherent in all human beings since they are “the natural and biological consequences of parental selections.”<sup>39</sup> Ethnic or racial discrimination, let alone charges of anti-Semitism, are viewed in postmodern Americanism as the ultimate intellectual sin. But is not, after all,

friendship also a form of the most subtle form of discrimination in view of the fact that an individual cannot be friends with all people on earth? One discriminates when mating and in sexual relationships, a point often made by prominent sociobiologists, but who are often targets of criticism by their liberal opponents. Long ago, an American author close to the school of thought

dealing with sociobiology, Dr. William Shockley, wrote that those who persist in holding views of ethnic exclusion regarding heredity and race “are denied tenure and research funds, physically threatened, and shouted off platforms.”<sup>40</sup>

Similar views on human diversity, let alone public ostracism of academics who argue that race and heredity



play a significant role in social and political behavior, have been legion in Europe and America. However, in the best of all worlds, in so-called free America, certain dogmatic views, particularly those regarding the sacred Jewish question and inherent goodness of non-European races, are imposed by force and must be accepted by all.

When a human being makes a specific choice in his

life, he automatically discards other options and rejects other propositions, even if his act may hurt a fellow human being. Examples abound: In postmodern America and Europe, if a citizen shows in public positive prejudices. i.e., by making laudatory comments about some racial groups, he can fearlessly resort to grammatical constructs without using embellishing qualifiers or

disclaimers. Thus, one can hear in America that “African-Americans are good singers and basketball players.” There is nothing wrong with this general statement which implies that *some* blacks are not gifted for playing basketball. By contrast, a general statement that “African-Americans are prone to violence and that they are not family-oriented,” can earn a person who uttered

those words the label of being a “racist.” One can also sometimes hear general remarks that “Jews are good musicians”- and hardly anybody will object to this more or less well documented fact. However, avoiding the qualifier “some,” and saying that “Jews are very rich,” may cause social objections and is prudently avoided by many in America’s public discourse. In other words, if

an author were to display a critical view about some non-European ethnic group or a race in America, or for that matter if that European author lambasted the proverbial *Homo americanus* as a Jewish paradigmatic man of commercial and banking activities, he had better be prepared to use the whole arsenal of diminutives and make sure he frames his critical arguments in

conditional sentences. By equipping himself with loads of disclaimers an author critical of Americanism and its numerous social derivatives such as globalism, liberalism, egalitarianism, can secure himself a professional exit, in case he needs one in an emergency. It may come in handy if he needs to plead professional ignorance. Politics means comparing. The way Europeans

traditionally perceive Americans differs from the way Americans perceive themselves—let alone how they both perceive each other's perceptions. In order to be aware not just of his object's difference, but also of his own subjective difference, a scholar, or for that matter an intelligent person, needs to put himself in perspective and try to observe himself through the

eyes of his interlocutor or his political adversary, regardless of how stupid or intelligent his adversary or his interlocutor, or for that matter he himself may be or appear. This is important as the end of the Cold War brought about the necessity for a different type of political discourse. Words such as “left vs. right,” “communists vs. fascists,” are no longer appropriate for labeling



political or ideological opponents, although these words are still in use by politicians and scholars. Unfortunately, these words are also used as derogatory labels for defaming or dismissing the adversary, despite the fact that they had lost their original meanings.

The verbal constructs “*Homo americanus*,” “*Homo occidentalis*,” or “*Homo sovieticus*,” although vogueish

today, can be described as pejorative platitudes for somebody's ideological stance and someone's social views. Most likely in the foreseeable future they will disappear and be replaced by other verbal constructs, and rightly so. Former cleavages in the political landscape which marked the entire 20<sup>th</sup> century make little sense in postmodernity, as the entire

political vocabulary has been subject to change. Similarly, with a changing world a new word came into usage by the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, namely the word “postmodernity.” This vague, but also snobbish word is increasingly used in the description of America and Americanism. After the end of communism, America is rightly viewed by many as an

ideal laboratory for the study,  
not just of political change in  
the Western hemisphere, but  
also as the place for the  
destined “end of history.” If  
one were to follow this  
Americano-centric logic, no  
other historical meaning,  
other than Americanism, is  
allowed to thrive. By the late  
20<sup>th</sup> century, America had  
already become the concave  
mirror reflecting, as well as

initiating, postmodern  
changes all over the world.

Although viewed as a  
nemesis by its critics,  
America, nonetheless, exerts  
enormous social, political,  
and cultural attraction, even  
on those non- or anti-  
American scholars and  
politicians who resent  
America and Americanism.  
Baudrillard, in his perceptive  
work on postmodernity and  
Americanism, sees America

as a compounded dreamland of all—including its critics:

*America is neither dream nor reality. It is a hyperreality because it is utopia which has behaved from the very beginning as though it were already achieved. Everything here is real and pragmatic, and yet it is all the stuff of dreams too. It may be that the truth of America can only be seen by*

*a European, since he alone  
will discover here the perfect  
simulacrum—that of the  
immanence and material  
transcription of all values.*<sup>41</sup>

It is for this reason why  
every European, desiring to  
better understand himself and  
his European homeland,  
needs to observe himself  
through the eyes of  
postmodern America first.  
But are Americans, who

reside in America, also capable or willing to observe themselves through the eyes of Europeans? This point, of course, depends on the ideological baggage of the observer or the lack thereof.

Traditionally, both the European and American radical left and radical right have been critical of the American system, the only exception being that the European or American left,



when criticizing America claim that America is “not American enough,” i.e. that it has departed from its egalitarian founding myths.

In other words, the Left claims that modern America has not achieved enough equality, enough democracy, and enough progress.

Consequently, America should return to its originally charted goals. The same deductive logic could be seen,

after the break-down of communism at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century among scores of disenchanted Marxist intellectuals, both in America and Europe, who argue that the Gulag and communist repression were unintended results of Marxism, and that true Marxian socialism was betrayed by Soviet reality. True communism (whatever “true” may mean), deserves,

therefore, a second chance. When a Jewish-American left-leaning writer, Noam Chomsky, attacks in his books the American system for its alleged or real corruption, he never touches on the sanctity of the American founding fathers and the importance Jeffersonianism exerted on scores of American social scientists. Indeed, Chomsky sounds full of praise for the

Jeffersonian legacy and acknowledges that “Jefferson and John Dewey today sound like crazed Marxist lunatics.”<sup>42</sup> To similar conclusions regarding the American Declaration of Independence, comes Lawrence R. Brown in his magnum opus *The Might of the West*. But unlike the leftist Chomsky, Brown, despite his erudite and

thoughtful analyses, is unknown in America. Brown acknowledges that the Declaration was a form of political theology, compatible with the spirit of the time of Enlightenment, and therefore replete with platitudes and “self-evident” truths. The Preamble of the Declaration could very well fit into the Middle Ages, albeit by changing the wording into a more divine language.

“Custom does not permit us to call these Eighteen Century liberals what in historical perspective they really were: leftists.”<sup>43</sup> In hindsight, the meta-language used by the framers of the American Constitution does appear as something quite normal to an observer in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Yet, during the period of the late Enlightenment the words uttered by the architects of

the American Republic set  
the whole Western world on  
fire.

Many European authors,  
usually associated with the  
stigma of the “radical right,”  
with notable American  
exceptions, reject any aspect  
of Americanism. When some  
French right-wing thinker or  
German philosopher Martin  
Heidegger voices criticism of  
the American system, he  
curtly challenges the very

being of modernity. And this is something that needs to be pondered when dealing with the notion of postmodern Americanism vs. anti-Americanism:

*From a metaphysical point of view, Russia and America are the same; the same dreary technological frenzy, the same unrestricted organization of the average man. At a time when the*



*farthermost corner of the globe has been conquered by technology and opened to economic exploitation; when any incident whatever, regardless of where or when it occurs, can be communicated to the rest of the world at any desired speed...when time has ceased to be anything other than velocity, instantaneousness, and simultaneity, and time as history has vanished from the*

*lives of all peoples; when a boxer is regarded as a nation's great man; when mass meetings attended by millions are looked on as a triumph—then, yes then, through all this turmoil, a question still haunts us like a specter: What for?- Whither.- And what then?*<sup>44</sup>

The above passage  
summarizes what many  
European traditionalists and

conservative thinkers in reality think of Americanism, although one must admit, one could find similar “anti-American” views among anti-egalitarian and antidemocratic American authors who would wholeheartedly agree with Heidegger’s every comment. Authors, such as Ezra Pound, Lothrop Stoddard, Revilo P. Oliver, or Francis Parker Yockey, also viewed themselves as exemplary

American patriots, yet they were denounced as “un-American” by their liberal opponents, although they did not hesitate themselves to hurl the same epithets of anti-Americanism at their detractors. However, when words of anti-Americanism come from such an important European heavy-weight philosopher as Martin Heidegger, who was linked for a while to the National

Socialist experiment, then these words carried special weight. After all, Heidegger cannot be depicted as a right-wing crank. The reason Heidegger and other authors of his stature in Europe and America are often dubbed “anti-American” lies not so much in their criticism of American society. Their anti-American image is primarily due to the fact that they squarely rejected

parliamentary democracy and the American-inspired myth of postmodernity. In the modern and postmodern Western world, saturated by the ideology of anti-fascism and democratism, their un-American prose will never sound credible enough and will be subject to ostracism. More likely, in a non-liberal climate, Martin Heidegger along with his American compatriots would become

mandatory reading and would be held as major role models in the study of postmodernity.

Alas, sympathy for anti-egalitarian ideas having their inspiration in the heritage of revolutionary conservatism, anarcho-conservatism, in the hierarchical non-parliamentary system, or in historically tarnished National Socialism or Fascism, however carefully these ideas may be voiced,

will be denounced as  
“fascist” by postmodern  
opinion makers. Books by so-  
called fascist authors, even  
when their subject matter  
comprises of literal fairy  
tales, will not reach a wider  
audience.

In contrast to Heidegger’s  
endless speculation about the  
loss of Being in the  
Americanized time, one may  
quote similar views, less  
colored by metaphysical



lingo, yet similar in their anti-American and anti-modern message. After reading critical judgments about America and Americanism by the National Socialist heavy-weight Joseph Goebbels, a chief cultural propagandist in the Third Reich, one is struck by similarities with Heidegger's views, and with the similar opinions of latter-day European right-wing critics of the American

system. Moreover, over the last past decades Goebbels' views on Americanism have been unknowingly used by leftist critics of America, although their antifascist pedigree secured them literary notoriety. Goebbels sounds postmodern when he writes in the distant 1942, i.e. right in the midst of the Second World War that "the less Americans know about some matter the more they

talk about it in an expert-like fashion. They quite earnestly think that European peoples only wait to be taken care of and led by them.”<sup>45</sup> Similar critical views of America were to be encountered among leftist and rightist French scholars and critics in the second half of the twentieth century. With or without the famed Goebbels, many Europeans today would

echo similar views about America and would privately complain about the American compulsive drive to compartmentalize each field of human existence.

Probably, the major point worth singling out in Goebbels' prose regarding Americanism is his critique of American cultural decadence, especially when he writes that "Americanization is a form of

*Verkitschung*”(…). “If Americans had no money they would probably be the most despised people on earth.”<sup>46</sup> After the Cold War, similar critical views began circulating in European cultural circles across wide segments of the intelligentsia. As the sole superpower on the planet Earth, America, for each minor failure in its foreign or domestic policy,

turned into a subject matter of undeserved criticism.

America's alleged materialistic civilization was bound to give birth to new enemies around the globe.

The American religion of money, as a form of spiritual salvation, became the main target of its critics—Goebbels notwithstanding. It was America's excessive idea of progress and its overemphasis on material well being that

most European right-wing critics found appalling.

Goebbels acknowledges

America only as high-tech civilization, when he writes:

“As much as we safeguard the achievements of modern civilization and wish to make it ours in the embellishment of our life, equally much are we convinced that it cannot be seen as the meaning of Being.”<sup>47</sup> Probably, if one

were to drop the name of Goebbels and leave out other pro-fascist authors with similar anti-American views, similar views about America and Americanism would have a safe passage in contemporary academia and would likely capture the attention of a postmodern reader. However, if an author is *a priori* designed as a “fascist monster” or as a “supreme Nazi devil,” as



Goebbels has been, then such observations about America are likely to fall on deaf ears. Therefore, one is allowed to resort to critical observations about America only when quoting authors who abide by the canons of liberal and socialist dogma.

This brings up again the subject matter of ideology from which America has claimed itself to be spared, especially when describing its

political arena. Hardly any American politician would admit that there is any ideology in America. American social scientists and politicians have traditionally associated ideologies with European power politics. For them, each ideology has something “un-American,” something incompatible with the principle of freedom and parliamentary democracy,

something usually linked to the discredited European ideologies of Communism and National Socialism.

American elites, instead, prefer the word “policy,” in which the omnipotent market does away with muscled politics. However, if one were to set out from the premises that America posits the market as the ultimate human goal, can one not argue that the veneration of

the market becomes in turn  
another ideology?

American political elites  
have always stressed the  
notion of liberty in describing  
the American unique  
historical experiment, while  
carefully avoiding to state the  
obvious, namely that it was  
the dream of economic  
progress and not the abstract  
notion of liberty which had  
brought together the  
American founding fathers.

Charles Beard, a prominent American historian, writes that America was founded on economic and capitalist premises, as “democracy of how to get rich” and that the framers of the Constitution literally “usurped the principles of Jeffersonian democracy.”<sup>48</sup> If one accepts his thesis one may then conclude that American citizens, as a result of the two

hundred years of racial and biological selection, constitute today a special infra-European breed that, although looking European by their phenotype, has a proclivity to act as economic agents. This negative biological selection affected the behavior of future generations of Americans. Americans whose values and interests were different had to be removed from mainstream

politics or could not play an important role in the making of the American dream. One can, therefore, use the synonym of *Homo economicus* for *Homo americanus* given that postmodern Americans are focused exclusively on commodities amassment, to the point of becoming perishable commodities themselves.

Some early European

eugenicists did bring this point, i.e. the American breed of *Homo economicus*, to larger academic attention by noticing that “America was a result of economic selection.”(...) “On the whole, the dominant influence in the making of America has been overwhelmingly bourgeois, and the population has been selected by the requirements



of the capitalist regime.”<sup>49</sup> If one accepts a hypothesis of a distinct American genotype that has surfaced as a result of capitalist social selection, then one may give some credence to Heidegger, notably that both the Americans and Soviets had managed to groom a special infra-racial breed—blacks, Mexicans, and other non-European immigrants

notwithstanding.

In view of this, European racialists and eugenicists differ considerably from American racialists as the former tend to emphasize more the role of historical community by underlining the importance of the cultural-political arena in human interaction. By contrast, liberalism and its embodiment in Americanism, has brought about negative

sociobiological selection by fostering “the mercantile gene.” America’s dogma of the survival of the fittest basically applies not the fittest in the fields of arts, politics or workers solidarity, but to the fittest in capitalist commerce. Ludwig Woltmann, an early German left-leaning national-racist scholar, who had a significant impact on racial theorizing in Europe in the first half of the

20<sup>th</sup> century, writes that  
“economic selection under  
given circumstances can have  
specific and degenerative  
consequences, especially  
when commerce and money  
hoarding play a prominent  
role in human life...”<sup>50</sup> One  
must not, however, forget that  
racialism and eugenics had  
numerous supporters in  
America and both fields were  
well combined with early

American liberalism. Even modern liberalism, under cover of locutions such as “human rights” and “democracy,” promotes unabashedly fierce economic selection in the free market, by rewarding only those who are most successful in it.

American eugenicists and white racialists also claim that the white race should have the upper hand in America. Their concern and anxiety

over the dramatic racial demographic change in American seems to be justified. However, there seems to be a contradiction in their analyses regarding the waning of the Euro-American world. While they bewail the passing of the white race, they fail to critically examine the economic foundations of Americanism, i.e. an ideology that is fully propitious for low wage non-European

immigrant workers. What role models will the withering white race of Euro-Americans endorse if American values have gravitated for centuries around the myth of economic progress regardless of whether white racialists or dark multiculturalists are in power? Why should one worry about the passing of the great white race if that race has only been involved in endless economic

transactions?

It is a typical trait for a political system to project its goodness and to minimize its flaws, or at least to cover up its short-comings with trendy verbiage. Thus, many white Americans, when critical of their present rulers, often try to embellish the legacy of the American dream by extrapolating the alleged goodness of their previous rulers. This seems to be a



feature of many white American racialists who stubbornly refuse to criticize capitalism—which has traditionally been the main motor for attracting European immigrants, including postmodern masses of non-European economic migrants. It would be interesting to find out the percentage of early American settlers who had come to their new American homeland for reasons other

than “making a quick buck.”

## *Prime Americanism and anti- Semitism*

Modern American racialists and traditionalists examine the ugly results of multiracialism and multiculturalism, such as riots arising from racial tensions and ill-defined affirmative action programs favoring non European-Americans.

However, they seldom look at economic motives that brought these different peoples and diverse races to the shores of America.

Similar inconsistencies can be seen among white Europeans in Europe who, when angry at the present ruling class, project their wishful thinking into a romantically untainted all-white European past. A few American authors, such as Francis P. Yockey and

Reילו P. Oliver did point to those contradictions among American racialists, especially when they criticized Americanism from an anti-egalitarian and anti-mercantile point of view. Their prose, hostile to liberal canons, has been subject to ostracism and denounced as “un-American.” It is because American elites make stringent disclaimers on all ideologies, that it is worth

while raising the question whether America's obsession with the market and its fanatical belief in progress also makes America an ideological system.

Yockey and Oliver could have easily passed for European revolutionary conservatives in the 1930s, or for that matter, as the godfathers of modern conservative anti-Americanism in Europe.

Harshly critical of American ideology, of Yankeeism, of the American constitution, of Jewish “culture distortion” elements, Yockey echoes in anti-American European authors. Immediately after the Second World War, he wrote that the words “America” and “American” were stripped of all spiritual-national significance, and were given a purely ideological

significance.”<sup>51</sup> This was in particular true for his nemesis, American Jewry who, in his words, had succeeded in kidnapping political concepts and dubbed his writings “un-American.” “(T)hey (the Jews) were able to identify their Jewish idea with America, and to label the nationalism of America with the term un-American.”<sup>52</sup> Does this mean,

therefore, that a correct definition of what Americanism and anti-Americanism is cannot be given by a European-American racialist or traditionalist, or some proverbial American right-winger? Jewish American scholar, Alvin H. Rosenfeld, half a century later, writes that “anti-Americanism is always similar to anti-Semitism; they relate to each



other and empirically are almost always in close proximity, even if not totally identical. The overlap in bias between them has become more pronounced since the end of World War II.”<sup>53</sup>

Rosenfeld wrote those words during the American military campaign in Iraq in 2003, an event which was not welcomed by American right-wingers and traditionalists. At

that time, criticism of American foreign engagements in the Middle East, particularly when coming from Europe, was interpreted by the American establishment as a new form of anti-Americanism.

In early postmodernity, many American Jews assume to have discovered in European anti-Americanism a veiled form of anti-Semitism.

The early 21<sup>st</sup> century, for the first time after the Second World War, highlighted a tension between political elites in Europe and America, and brought to the fore unpleasant historical memories that are likely to grow in severity in the years to come. It is the past that does not want to pass away and it is Israel and the Jewish question that have become

time again unavoidable topics in studying postmodern America, the ideology of Americanism, and its carrier *Homo americanus*. Seldom do European and American politicians wish to publicly mention those fateful words “the Jewish question” and the Jewish role in the process of Americanization, although they all know in private that the closest ally of America, Israel and American Jews, are

indispensable factors in studying the different aspects of Americanism and anti-Americanism. “The dreaded word anti-Semitic functions like the word anti-Soviet.

Being undefined it is unfalsifiable,” writes the American journalist Joe Sobran, who once fell into disrepute with the American mainstream due to his probing into the semantics of

the word anti-Semitism.<sup>54</sup>

There has been a growing tendency in America ever since the fall of communism, to draw a parallel between anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism, which some Jewish-American neoconservative scholars have been very eager to emphasize.<sup>55</sup> It is a strange socio-political phenomenon, that despite much bragging

about universal rights to  
freedom of speech, the  
subject of Jews, Judaism, and  
the role of Jews in  
Americanism is carefully  
avoided.

Does this mean that at the  
beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century,  
a genuine American is a  
Jewish American, or at least a  
European American  
sympathetic to Israel and  
Jews? This is the impression

one gets after scanning the American media and the role of Jews in postmodernity. In the years to come, the Jewish question, which modern political and intellectual elites feel so uncomfortable talking about, will be a decisive factor in the future for America, Europe and the entire world. One needs only to look at the flurry of anti-European newspaper articles in America, following the



invasion of Iraq in 2003 to realize the scope of lies and mendacities that could at any moment degenerate into open hostility between America and Europe on the one hand, and between Euro-Americans and non-Euro-Americans on the other.<sup>56</sup> It suffices to witness a major world crisis, following the terrorist attack on New York on September 11, 2001, or the subsequent

American military involvement in Iraq in order to realize what Americans think of the outside heretic world and what this outside heretic world thinks of America. It should not come as a surprise that a number of prominent American Jews discovered their brand of American patriotism and began to support the flag-waving star and stripes Americanism in all its

postmodern expressions. Respectable pro-American and pro-Israeli journalists, both in America and Europe, published after that fateful event of “9-11” a whole list of laudatory articles about America, always comparing anti-Americanism to anti-Semitism. “In the Jewish consciousness the attacks against America are simultaneously attacks

against Jews.”<sup>57</sup> One thing remains certain though; the more one looks for the true definition of who a true American is or what American ideology is all about, the more one gets bogged down in a semantic morass.

The term “un-American” seems to be a frequent word in depicting the foes of Americanism. It is an

amorphous ideological term  
used by America's elites,  
however much they  
adamantly reject ideological  
denominations in depicting  
the enemies of America. In  
times of crisis, the term "un-  
American" has been hurled  
by American elites at heretics  
voicing criticism against  
different American  
administrations. By a curious  
semantic twist, in the late 20<sup>th</sup>

century, criticizing the policy of American ally Israel, could easily earn an American or a European author the label of anti-Semitism. In reverse, it can garner him the label of anti-Americanism. Criticizing the American founding myths can earn an author, as apparently it did to Yockey, a double stigma: of being an anti-American and of being an anti-Semite. One must not rule out the possibility that

criticizing the American system in the years to come will be seen as a hostile “un-American” act, like in the ex-Soviet Union where criticism of communism was considered a criminal offence. Both systems—one past, the other still present, under cover of democracy, progress, and boundless economic growth—were based on philosophical finitude, excluding other

ideological alternatives. How dare one reject a system designed as the ultimate human achievement in goodness—as America portrays itself to be? By the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, after becoming the sole hegemon on the planet, one observes a greater dose of hubris in America's ruling class—a trait which usually appears when a system or an



ideological system reaches  
the zenith of its might.

# Chapter II

## **Twin Brothers: Homo sovieticus and Homo americanus**

**T**he closer one studies American ideology, the better one can understand its

relationship with other political beliefs, be they of a secular or religious nature. At first sight it may seem preposterous to draw parallels between Communism and Americanism, between *Homo americanus* and *Homo sovieticus*. Americanism, after all, in the second part of the twentieth century, drew a solid part of its world legitimacy from strong anticommunist beliefs.

Anticommunism was part and parcel of American foreign policy and hatred of communism constituted a solid arsenal among American conservative elites and the great majority of American citizens. One could ridicule Americanism and its moralistic escapades regarding the real or alleged “red scare,” yet the fact remains that had it not been for America, had it not been

for the massive American investment in the policy of containment, communism and its chief motor the Soviet Union would likely have become a reality of life for many people on earth. Surely, under such a scenario communism under Soviet hegemony would be less sympathetic to consumerism, permissiveness and less attractive to Third World immigration. Most likely the

life style of Americans and Europeans would be less individualistic and their personal values would remain more conservative. Yet it is hard to deny that the drabness of communism and the machinery of its incarceration system would have left deadly traces on millions of its citizens.

Therefore, “warm death” in the fun-infested ideology of Americanism seems to be

more attractive for the masses  
world wide, regardless of its  
deadly consequences for the  
cultural and racial memory of  
every people on earth.

Americanism, as a big  
promoter of the “fun  
ideology” has had no  
problems in disarming its  
opponents. Moreover,  
Americanism has had no  
difficulty in creating  
consensus if not outright  
complacency of postmodern

world citizens, something unheard of in communism. Its avoidance of physical terror, its recurrence to therapeutic social programs, helped it secure lasting longevity. It is undeniable that the vast majority of people, had they had a choice between communism and Americanism, would have opted for the latter. European conservative critics of Americanism often forget that



fact—because many never lived under communism.

Worse, communist genocidal legacy has not been graphically depicted by the world media in the similar proportions as has been the legacy of fascism. There are, of course, citizens in every system who are born rebels and who do not easily fall into the dualistic trap of “the good America vs. the bad Soviet Union,” but who

search, instead, for a third social and political option.

Yet these individuals and heretics can be literally counted on the fingers of one hand. Certainly, communism kills the body, in contrast to Americanism which kills the soul, but even the worst type of intellectual “soft-killing” in the postmodern American system seems to be dearer to the masses than physical maltreatment or a violent

communist death.

This chapter does not dispute this fact. It only argues that both the American and the Soviet experiments were founded on the same principles of egalitarianism, however much their methods varied in name, time and place. It is also questionable how tempting the world would be today had the Soviet-style communism won the political and intellectual

contest during the Cold War.

Probably the communized masses in a Soviet America would be today subject to the torrents of guilt feelings regarding their real or alleged racist past, the displacement of American Indians, the segregation of American blacks, and in addition, they would likely be forced to critically examine all facets of American foreign policy.

Probably many former

American vocal conservative patriots would be among the first to offer their service to the new communist ruling class, and would be among the most avid supporters of global communism. The trait of intellectual fickleness has been common to Western history and this point does not need more elaboration. For instance, at the end of the Cold War, Eastern European communist officials did not

hesitate for a second to embrace the new creed of Americanism and to pay lip service to American anticommunist slogans. The same people, only a few months earlier, lambasted American capitalism and sang odes to the glorious communist future.

It is undeniable that during the Cold War, American ideology had at least the advantage of partly revealing

to the wider public the communist killing fields in Eastern Europe and Russia, however much American elites had once helped the local Communists in setting up these same killing fields. In view of the sudden demise of Soviet style communism at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, many American traditional conservatives must be out of a job. Their

nemesis, the Soviet Union, is gone now for good with little chance of resurrection.

Furthermore, American anticommunism has always had a superficial and self-defeating ideological substance, more in line with the Christian crusade against communist atheism, and with little or no focus on the egalitarian dynamics which underlines both communism and Americanism. After the



demise of the Soviet Union, crypto-communist features which had lain hidden in Americanism, or were carefully hidden during the Cold War, suddenly began to emerge. This was to be expected in view of the fact that America, just like the ex-Soviet Union, has been legally anchored in the same egalitarian foundations. If the Soviet Union had only managed to achieve some

type of an affluent society, as America has, very likely nobody in the postmodern world would have given a passing thought to the millions of citizens who perished in communist genocides. By the same token, if America had failed to achieve such surprising economic growth, it is questionable how many of its proponents and spokesmen would be preaching American

ideology. Conversely, if one accepts the hypothesis that America has already achieved many communist goals, notably with the erection of its large multiracial universe, it is likely that less and less interest will be shown in the future to probe into the nature of the withering freedom of speech among Euro-Americans. Why examine freedom of speech if the legal foundations in America

already posit freedom of speech as something “self-evident”?

Aside from natural geopolitical frictions which arose during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the USA, both systems pursued the same goal of creating “a new man,” stripped of his cumbersome past and ready to enter the lala-land of a radiant egalitarian future. The once

much acclaimed Japanese-American author Francis Fukuyama, who had written about the “end of history” and whose books once stirred much feigned interest in America and Europe, had nothing new to transmit to those who had lived under communism and Americanism. Fukuyama’s palaver about the end of history was just the replica of a discourse once aired on all

wave lengths in the old communist universe; namely, with Communism history must have a stop. Similar discourse about the end of history has been a standard theme in America over the last two hundred years. Real historical time supposedly began in the Soviet Union in 1917 and in the USA in 1776. All other past events were and are still considered irrelevant at best, reactionary

and barbaric at worst. Here lies part of the drama with most American elites who are unable to put themselves in historical perspective.

The former Communist nomenclature in the Soviet Union knew that it was living a historical lie; American elites seriously think that they live the historical truth. Yet history, as the events in post-Cold War Europe demonstrated, is always open,

and the “problem is not that Americans do not have history; they do not wish to have one,” writes de Benoist.<sup>58</sup>

Similar pessimistic remarks about the end of history in America were once made by the revolutionary conservative European philosopher, Julius Evola, who writes that “the structure of history is cyclical, not



evolutionary. It is far from being the case that most recent civilizations are necessarily superior. They may be in fact senile and decadent”(...). For Evola, this linear and senile mindset is typical of Americanism and its carrier *Homo americanus*, who “has neither spiritual dilemmas nor complications; he is a natural joiner and a conformist.”<sup>59</sup> The parallel

with *Homo sovieticus* in the ex-communist Eastern Europe and Russia appears obvious.

Regardless of its verbal anticommunist crusade, America, although having rejected the outward signs of its former communist nemesis, has always resorted to the use of the same egalitarian principles; it has only given them a different name and veneer. It must be

emphasized that political slogans and words have changed their meaning over the past decades, although certain principles inherent in communism had taken hold more properly in America than in the ex-Soviet Union. The American transmutations of those paleo-communistic virtues require from the viewpoint of a postmodern observer a different form of conceptualization for which,

unfortunately, words are still lacking. It is therefore wrong to assume that just because the communist Soviet Union disappeared, the major discourse about equality, accompanied by the chiliastic principle of hope, will also disappear. Quite the contrary. At the beginning of the third millennium, the immense egalitarian meta-narrative, encapsulated in Americanism, is very much alive and

kicking, which is particularly visible in America's academia and mass media. The utopian belief in equality represents the last big hope for millions of non-European newcomers living in America.

To a detached observer, communism had one distinct advantage over Americanism. Its repressive character made it look appalling even in the eyes of its erstwhile

supporters. There is ample historical evidence, both in Europe and America, showing how the most ardent communist believers eventually became the most ardent critics of communism. Many of them, nonetheless, continue to think that communism can be better implemented by “non-communist” means, preferably in a country such as postmodern America.

As seen in the ex-Soviet Union, very early on communism started to breed enemies within its own body politic—both among its communized citizens and amidst communist party members. Consequently, and contrary to the pampered masses in America, the grayness of communism helped the citizens of Eastern Europe and Russia come to grips with an elementary

political notion: the distinction between friend vs. foe. Thus, unlike Americans or Americanized West Europeans, citizens in communism had the immense political privilege of knowing how to decipher the communist enemy and how to fool the communist enemy.

As communism began to wither away by the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, a myriad of



communistic principles that had hitherto hovered only in the realm of theory took hold, more aggressively, in Western Europe and America. A large number of American left leaning intellectuals seriously began to think that “true” communism could have a second chance with a humane face in America, and this by means of employing different forms of social engineering.

Some European authors observed that communism died in the East because it had already been implemented in the West.<sup>60</sup>

After the end of the Cold War, and particularly after the shock caused by the terrorist attack on America on September 11, 2001, *Homo americanus* turned into a finite postmodern global specie who, although

originating in the USA, is thriving now in all parts of the world. He is no longer restricted to the territory of the United States or to a specific region of the world. He is an achieved global kind similar to his ex-twin brother, but also his ex-counterpart *Homo sovieticus*, who had pitifully finished his historical journey. In contrast to the Soviet system, the American system proceeds with philo-

communist social engineering  
more efficiently than the ex-  
Soviet Union and in a fashion  
more digestible to the  
Americanized masses. The  
breakdown of communism in  
Eastern Europe played into  
the hands of American elites  
and helped them legally  
strengthen American  
ideology, both at home and  
abroad. The demise of  
communism in the East gave  
further legitimacy to

American-style communism in the West. Alexander Zinoviev noted that “by idealizing the situation in the West, by exaggerating out of proportion in their imagination Western abundance, ex-Soviet citizens transferred to the West the communist promise of a terrestrial paradise.”<sup>61</sup>

Admittedly, with its strong egalitarian substance,

Americanism has so far been much more receptive to a reenactment of a new proto-communist utopia.

During the Cold War, Americans liked contrasting themselves to Russians and often self-righteously declared their system to be superior to the Soviet system.

In most cases, this comparison was made in the realm of economic growth and standard of living. At that

time, it was considered natural by many Americans to refer in a derogatory manner to a slothful Soviet citizen, while proudly pointing out how American affluence and high tech remained unsurpassed in the world. Curiously, few American experts on communism looked into the hidden advantages of Soviet-style communism, such as guaranteed economic security

and psychological predictability that the Soviet version of communism was able to secure better for its masses than the American system. During the Cold War, abstract principles of liberty, which American citizens liked gloating about, were primarily associated with the country's economic performance. At the same time, however, hardly anybody in the so-called free



West thought it necessary to tackle the American psychology of proto-communist conformism and to critically examine the surprising communist-like sameness of *Homo sovieticus* and *Homo americanus*.

It was the author Zinoviev who coined the term *Homo sovieticus* for species living in a Soviet style communist system and also having the communized mindset. This is

a curious specie of low integrity yet of phenomenal adaptability to all egalitarian experiments.<sup>62</sup> Zinoviev's understanding of communist psychology remains unsurpassed, all the more so as his description of communist psychology facilitates now a study of *Homo americanus* in postmodernity. Contrary to many other anticommunist

dissidents, Zinoviev, after the breakdown of communism, did not hesitate to critically examine Americanism and its human carriers, which explains why his analyses are still ignored by many.

In the contest with the Soviet Union, America poured millions of dollars into projects known under the names of Sovietology and Kremlinology; America's different governmental think

tanks developed during the Cold War a host of abstract theories regarding the future behavior of Soviet citizens and the communist nomenklatura. The Soviet Union was portrayed by professional American anticommunists as a totalitarian hell in comparison to which democratic America shined as a bright city on the hill. During the Cold War, the official American endeavor to

inquire into the Soviet mind was further facilitated by the oppressive political situation in Eastern Europe as well as the dream of many East European citizens to immigrate to America. Ironically, the average East European and Russian anti-communists viewed America only through the prism of economic success, hardly paying attention to the flaws in the American system,

including a well hidden  
American brand of thought  
control. Subconsciously, most  
Russians and East Europeans  
continued to remain “true  
communists” in their mind  
and merely conceived of the  
communist paradise as more  
easily attainable in America.  
During the Cold War period,  
there were thus more true  
“Americans” in Eastern  
Europe than in America  
itself!

After the breakdown of Soviet communism, the American method of negative legitimization, that is, the preceding invocation of the real or surreal communist threat, no longer sounds convincing. Needless to say that none of the American or Western experts could fathom the sudden demise of the Soviet Union, nor understand the root causes of the communist breakdown. Had

they understood the origins of the collapse of communism, American elites would have had to focus critically on the same paleo-communist impulses within their own system and within their own populace. But how could they ever carry out this process of introspection in view of the fact that Americanism preaches the same principles of equality and progress—so dear to both *Homo*



*americanus* and *Homo sovieticus*? The paradox is that citizens during Soviet communism never believed in the official communist version of their radiant future; they saw their radiant future only palpable in America—albeit under an anticommunist name.

It is fundamentally wrong to blame the communist party in the ex-Soviet Union or Eastern Europe as the only

culprit for communist mismanagement or state-sponsored terror. The communist party in the Soviet Union was the repository of an egalitarian ideology whose goal was not to further the interests of party members only, but to serve as the operating philosophical principle governing social conduct of millions of its citizens.<sup>63</sup> A parallel could be

drawn with the Catholic Church in earlier centuries, an institution which was not only represented by the Pope and the clergy, but which served as an organizational principle that provided a pattern of social behavior for countless individuals, irrespective of their personal feelings toward Christian dogma. Likewise, Americanism has never been an administrative foundation

of the American political system, nor has it been embedded solely among the members of political elites in Washington. Americanism, as a common denominator for perfect egalitarianism, transcends different lifestyles, different political affiliations, and different religious denominations.

Contrary to the assumption of liberal theorists, in communist societies the

cleavage between people and party was almost nonexistent since rank-and-file party members were recruited from all walks of life and not just from one specific social stratum.<sup>64</sup> The same parallel could apply to the circulation of political elites in postmodern America. Inevitably, the logic of the Declaration of Independence and its egalitarian discourse

had to give birth to a  
multiracial society and to the  
ever increasing demands of  
non-European new comers  
for their share of the  
American dream. Many  
American conservatives and  
racialists wrongly assume that  
one could keep the legacy of  
the early founding fathers  
while establishing a strict  
hierarchical society based on  
the racial merits of dominant  
white European Americans.

Yet, the historical dynamics of Americanism has shown that this is not possible. Once the flood gates of egalitarianism open—however modest this may appear at the beginning—the logic of equality will gather momentum and will end up eventually in some protean form of proto-communist temptation.

It is a serious failure to disregard communism as

something historically  
redundant or as a temporary  
zig-zag of history.

Communism is the most  
logical form of perfect  
egalitarianism. It is the  
system which is dearest and  
nearest to the masses no  
matter how dreadful its  
consequences can be for the  
masses. Communism is a  
system which flatters the  
animalistic impulses of each  
human being and brings out



the worst behavioral elements in all individuals. However, communism is also an ideal social model for future mass societies facing shrinking natural resources and rapid modernization. After its official disintegration in the Soviet Union, the main features of communism, such as the belief in progress and economic growth, have been brought to their perfection in America. In the decades to

come the role of  
Americanism, even if  
America splits up into smaller  
geographical entities, will  
continue to be dominant,  
regardless of the alleged  
withering of the state in the  
global world. In the case of  
an emergency, such as a war,  
famine, terrorism, or some  
other unforeseen cataclysm, a  
future communized American  
mass society will be obliged  
to recur to *manu militari* in

order to preserve its stability. At that point American elites will cease to resort to verbal abstractions such as the free market or individual human rights for all. In a perfect egalitarian system citizens are designed to be expandable since according to the canons of egalitarianism, everybody equals everyone. Thus, in order for the proper functioning of future Americanized society, the

removal of millions of surplus citizens must become a social and possibly also an ecological necessity. The results of such new social engineering will be visible in America and Europe in the near future.

Admittedly, in Soviet-style communism the per capita income was three to four times lower than in capitalist America, and as the daily drudgery and bleakness of

communist life indicated, life under communism was by no means pleasant. Yet, did the lower purchasing power in the ex-communist East necessarily indicate that the overall quality of life was inferior to life in the West during the same epoch? This judgment will depend on the criteria that a critic of both Americanism and communism uses. If one takes into account that an average

worker in the communist system put in three to four hours every day in his work (for which he usually never got reprimanded, let alone ran a risk of losing his job), then his pay made the equivalent of the pay of a worker in a capitalist America.<sup>65</sup> Stated in

Marxist terminology, a worker in the communist system was not economically exploited, but instead “took

the liberty” of allocating to himself the full surplus value of his labor which the communist state never provided to him. Hence the popular joke, so firmly entrenched in post-communist Europe which still vividly explains the longevity of the communist nostalgia: “Nobody can pay me less than the little I can work.” Speculations about the economic superiority of

American capitalism over communism or fascism, or for that matter allegations that American capitalist economies are more efficient than communist economies, are groundless. Views by American plutocratic elites about the purportedly better life in America seldom take into account long-term social benefits and the quality of life provided by Soviet elites to their citizens. China is a case



study of a gigantic mass society which in a pragmatic fashion managed to combine a command economy with a market economy. America will likely engage in a similar socio-economic experiment in the years to come.

And why also not measure the correlation of economic growth with social and mental stress and various other social abnormalities that characterize the American

free market, yet which were virtually absent in the Soviet-style communist system? In the years to come, communist social advantages, however Spartan they once appeared to foreign observers, will be in demand by more and more citizens in America and Americanized Europe.

*America in the Eyes  
of post-communist*

# *Europe*

Post-communist Eastern Europe and Russia are ideal laboratories that help us understand the interaction between the two twin brothers, *Homo americanus* and *Homo sovieticus*. While a massive amount of both critical and laudatory literature about America has been circulating in Western Europe, only a few critical

books about America and the American way of life have been published thus far in post-communist Eastern Europe.<sup>66</sup> At the beginning of the third millennium, America is observed by many people in post-communist and Third World countries as the only remaining dreamland on earth.

People living in Eastern Europe do not like being

called Eastern Europeans; neither do they like being labeled with the term *Homo sovieticus*. Also the term “Eastern Europe” has the ring of an insult in their ears. They consider themselves, despite their region’s communist past, to be full-blooded Europeans—as much, if not more so than West Europeans and Americans. There may be a grain of truth in this semi-complacent attitude. From a

racial point of view, all post-communist countries in Eastern Europe are highly homogeneous, with relatively few non-Europeans living on their soil. Western Europe and America, by contrast, have been subject to increasing racial and demographic changes which, by the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, began to leave traces on the legal and political structure of

their systems. Ironically, due to the closed nature of communism, Eastern Europe had never experienced a large influx of non-Europeans. By contrast, at the beginning of the third millennium, America and Western Europe are awash with non-European emigrants. It is often forgotten that quite in accordance with the stateless and multicultural ideology of Marxism, the communist

system in Russia and Eastern Europe was originally designed as a multicultural system of mass foreign immigration. However, its Spartan nature in Eastern Europe could not attract many non-European immigrants or would be immigrants, who opted, instead, for a more financially promising West European and American itinerary. The irony of history is that the



political rigidity and economic frugality of communist systems helped East Europeans and Russians remain racially homogenous. Another historical irony is that due to the repressive nature of communism, Eastern Europe is now more ready to face the challenges of multicultural postmodernity. Looming inter-racial riots in America, which will likely break up

America, are hardly conceivable in post-communist Eastern Europe and Russia. However, problems of a different geopolitical nature and the creeping sense of a loss of national sovereignty are already looming large on the East European horizon. In addition, in the span of ten years after the end of the Cold War, the process of Americanization has made

many regions in Eastern Europe look like a replica of distant America.

Although claiming to be one hundred percent

European, East European nations, and particularly the newborn nation-states in the region, are well aware of their racial and European roots—more so than are West Europeans and Americans.

For decades, during the darkest hours of communism,

East Europeans showed strange love for white America, while displaying strange resentments toward their next-door white European neighbors. Despite their communized mindset and *Homo sovieticus*—inspired culture of sloth, most Eastern Europeans and Russians, at least in private, showed anticommunist, racialist, and even pro-American feelings. During

the Cold War, in the eyes and ears of East Europeans, the West was not the nearby rich and opulent Western Europe, but rather the distant, Hollywood-hazed America. Former American presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan had more true, albeit hidden constituents in communized Poland, Hungary, and Albania than on the West or East Coast of America. It was difficult for

many East Europeans,  
particularly those who had  
physically suffered under  
communism, to grasp the  
motives of left leaning  
Western critics of America.

Their self-styled  
Americanism knew no limits.  
Of course, pro-American and  
anticommunist sentiments  
among wide layers of official  
Eastern European society had  
to be skillfully hidden. A  
great majority of people in

Eastern Europe, despite their communist life style, privately cherished U.S. foreign ventures and America's harsh anticommunist rhetoric, and most were seriously persuaded that sooner or later American GIs would liberate their homelands from the red plague. After the end of communism and with the rapid Americanization of Eastern Europe, citizens in

this part of Europe are beginning to realize that America had other fish to fry than liberating their region from communism.

To some extent, Eastern European attitudes toward America resemble those of West Europeans following World War II, when America, as a shining myth, surpassed its own gloomy reality. In early postmodernity, Eastern European politicians and their



constituents still view with mistrust the European arbitration of their regional or ethnic disputes. They first turn their eyes toward distant America. Even among America-haters in Eastern Europe, the prevailing assumption is that America, due to its historical detachment and its proverbial geographical naiveté, can be the only honest broker in international affairs. Despite

grotesque cravings to become part of the West, so vividly exhibited by East Europeans during the Cold War, the East European political class continues to view itself as a loyal progeny of Americanism. Former communist officials in Eastern Europe have good reasons to be vocal spokesmen of Americanism. The virulent economic competition in America,

offering little safety net to American workers, can serve for them as a role model for their quasi lawless and clannish oriented post-communists societies. “The savage side of economic competition in the American manner (bankruptcy and corruption), can closely be related to the dynamics of post-communism.”<sup>67</sup> Even the most cultivated Eastern

European opponents of the American way of life or the harshest critic of U.S. foreign policy, cannot dispute the fact that America elicits awe and respect among Eastern European leaders and that, therefore, America is expected to be the only mediator vis-à-vis a pesky European neighbor. Such a view only gives additional credibility to the American expansionist experiment in

Eastern and Central Europe.

Everybody in Eastern Europe finds something inexplicably attractive about America. The servility of post-communist elites towards American elites is a natural and logical outcome of their colonial mentality. Once it were the Soviets who needed to be paid all due respect by Eastern European rulers; today they know that “it is the American

ambassador, in the capacity of the proconsul, who commands behind the scene.”<sup>68</sup>

But is America still the same role model country for East Europeans as it was prior to the dissolution of communism? America's racial profile has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War, which is largely due to a massive

influx of non-European immigrants as well as to the persistence of the pseudo-Marxist and neo-liberal role models of ethnic diversity who still frame the discourse in American universities. During the heyday of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe's embellished image of America, accompanied by an often ludicrous love of an imaginary America, was a predictable gut reaction

against the endless official anti-American rhetoric by the communist ruling class. Even when communist apparatchiks in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union aired slogans that carried some truth about America's racial discrimination, poverty and high crime rates, East European masses across the board refused to believe in it. This was understandable. How could they ever believe



communist propaganda given that the communist system in the East was founded on a big lie and could only function by lying on all wavelengths twenty-four hours a day. Instead, East Europeans opted for their own self-styled version of imaginary America, which real Americans would have found laughable and hard to believe in. The more realistic the picture of America was

presented by the communist propaganda machine, the more East Europeans believed in its surreal and hyperreal side.

This has now slowly started to change. More and more East Europeans are beginning to realize the advantages of their “all white” post-communist Eastern Europe; more and more will tend, in the years to come, to close themselves off from

multicultural Western Europe and America, a system whose social profile looks less and less European.

It might now take some time before East Europeans realize that *Homo americanus*, similar to his twin brother in communism, also has its local taboos which must never be tackled.

After the first euphoria, following the demise of the Soviet Union, Eastern

Europeans are gradually toning down their illusions about quick Americanization and Westernization—which in their popular parlance was once a code word for becoming rich. By the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, communist mendacity, police repression, and economic scarcity prompted East Europeans and Russians to kick out communism from power. But

would they have done the same thing had there not been the prospect of a better and a more affluent American “communist” counterpart? Had America failed in its headlong drive towards economic progress, most East Europeans would be still happy with their home grown communist systems. With the Soviet negative referent of comparison gone, and having now heard that the American-

style egalitarian utopia  
requires private initiative and  
back breaking hard work,  
often in a climate of a dog eat  
dog mentality, East  
Europeans instinctively revert  
to demands for more  
communist-style security and  
for more social promiscuity  
which was once associated  
with their beloved breed of  
*Homo sovieticus*. “This anti-  
democratic disenchantment,  
shows again, how in the

countries of the ex-Soviet block, parliamentary democracy is only a surface phenomenon,” writes Claude Karnoouh.<sup>69</sup> Oh how beautiful it would be to live a life combining the glamour and glitz of the vicarious *Homo americanus*, as seen on the American TV screen, and enjoy the psychological security of *Homo sovieticus*! And who says that America

cannot engage in this project too? Who says, after all, that thought control cannot be carried out in a democratic fashion, and that individuals or masses always know what is in their best interest?

Sometimes a leader, a strongman, a *fuehrer*, a *caudillo*, or a *vodj*, best knows the answer.

The psychological legacy of communism in Eastern Europe is hard to grasp even



for those American thinkers  
of substantial cultural and  
intellectual probity.

Communism had created  
distinct patterns of behavior  
that will take much longer to  
discard than its ideological or  
legal legacy. A shrewd  
American traveler to post-  
communist Eastern Europe,  
whether a businessman, a  
politician, or a student, will  
notice how citizens in post-  
communist Prague,

Bucharest, Budapest, or Zagreb, despite their obnoxious flag-waving Americanism, continue to display the communist phenotype. Essentially, as Claude Karnoouh notes, political elites in post-communist Eastern Europe are the same communist apparatchiks who converted after the Cold War to the ideology of liberalism and Americanism, and “whose

democracy is often reduced to lexical incantation.”<sup>70</sup> The communist culture of social leveling had resulted in a considerable depletion of the gene pool and brought to the fore the most vulgar and the most mediocre communistic individuals, who in early postmodernity are dressed up in the garb of pro-American neo-liberalism. Earlier communist mass genocides,

especially in the first phase of the communist consolidation process, had created a mindset of base survivalism and fickleness, and gave birth, subsequently, to a peculiar Eastern European subspecies that still lives on today.

Although this subspecies looks very European by its phenotype, its communist behavioral traits have not changed all that much.

For a variety of reasons,

Western European and American elites have never been willing to reveal these gigantic sociobiological changes in Eastern Europe and Russia for fear of revealing their tacit approval of communist genocides. It is more convenient for American elites to narrate about real or alleged fascist crimes than to talk about the far bigger and more numerous crimes committed

by their erstwhile communist allies. Thus, the entire postmodernity in Americanized post-communist Eastern Europe may be characterized as an epoch of an almost nauseating and continuous discourse of antifascist victimology mixed with pro-American sentimental incantations, with little to no mention of crimes committed by the local ex-post-

communist elites. As a result, Americans should not be surprised if they witness how the new post-communist political elites in Eastern Europe conceptualize the capitalist American reality differently from what the American reality actually is.

Beneath the style and the rhetoric of these new post-communist and pro-American elites, the substance of *Homo sovieticus* still lives on.

Indeed, from the Balkans to Baltic countries, the majority of Eastern European politicians are basically the sons and daughters of recycled communists, who for obvious geopolitical and techno-scientific reasons converted to Americanism. Karnoouh adds that “within one day former professors of “scientific socialism,” who were once in charge of inculcating the casuistic *doxa*



to their students and to their colleagues, discovered in themselves, by some miraculous intervention of the Holy Liberal Ghost, fervent disciples of Hayek.”<sup>71</sup> In hindsight, it is questionable to what extent these ex-Communists were true believers in their former communist deities, and for how long they will believe in their newly discovered

theology of the free market.

The culture of *Homo sovieticus* cannot be wished away by State Department officials or would-be American moralists. Over the last half a century the American attitude toward Eastern Europe has been based on pragmatic (albeit too idealistic) models and schemes that foresaw a solution, or at least a contingency plan, or a

formula for every crisis and for every nook and cranny of East European life. But America's endless formulas, which a good observer of America, Thomas Molnar derides, do not contain a ready made answer for post-communist Eastern Europe.

Americans, unlike other peoples, like to have extended recipes for everything; how to teach democracy in Africa and Europe, how to have safe

sex, how to become rich, and how to find a formula for political and economic success stories in post-communist Eastern Europe, and so on. “The Americans are at unease and have bad conscience as soon as they have to leave the magic circles of formulas,” notes Molnar.<sup>72</sup> The quest for formulas is basically a logical product of American

rationalism, which in practice explains why American elites lack the feeling and understanding of someone's else "suddenness," i.e. why they cannot grasp the concept of national state of emergency in Europe. It must, therefore, not come as a surprise that the average Eastern European or Russian will continue to display behavioral traits of *Homo sovieticus*, however much he

may be subject to the American process of democratic re-education. An average post-communist Eastern European is prone to irrational emotional outbursts and he continues to harbor paranoid conspiracy theories about foreigners, including the Americans. Due to negative biological selection caused by earlier communist genocides, he learned, long ago, the basic formulas of

survivalism. An Eastern European, although far less individualistic in his decision making, is more of a con man and less of a social conformist than his American counterpart. Since he often thinks that all American and Western foreigners are potential crooks, he will do his best to double-cross them. Civic loyalty, initiative, professional commitment, and economic self-reliance,

which are still visible in America and Western Europe, are almost completely nonexistent in Eastern Europe. The prevalent opinion in the post-communist postmodern East is that in order to show self-initiative one must be a crook—in a positive fashion. The imbedded communist practices of double dealing present, thus, a formidable barrier for any long term



Americanized alternative in Eastern Europe. Numerous American scholars and politicians think that these barriers will disappear with the brutal implementation of the free market. They are wrong. For Eastern Europeans, the American dream boils down to transplanting themselves vicariously into surreal American TV soaps—as long as these soaps last.

Conversely, white elites in America tacitly envy Eastern Europeans for something that America lost long ago and something Eastern Europeans are still not quite aware of: racial homogeneity and all out European roots. What contemporary Americans, along with Western Europeans, seem to envy among Eastern Europeans most is their sense of belonging to something more

important than the mere individual self. Despite the depletion of their best genes, Eastern Europeans have retained a sense of historical and racial identity with a distinct feeling of nationhood. Thus far, they have been less bruised by consumerism and multiculturalism. One may argue, as does Jean Baudrillard, a theorist of postmodernity, that America, although being a utopia

achieved at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, remains a crippled utopia designed only for Third World immigrants.

Despite visible long term advantages, Eastern Europe, however, has skipped the most important part of modern history; it never carried out wholesale political decommunization, and it never began educating the masses in civility. But how

could it, in view of the depletion of its best genes and the absence of real role models? Where exactly should Eastern Europe look for new inspiration? Should Eastern Europe look for guidance in multicultural and multiracial Western Europe? The tragedy of Eastern Europe consists in the fact that despite its racial homogeneity, it has functioned over centuries as a

social laboratory for Russian or Soviet and Western elites, including America's present elites. The sense of civic identity is gravely missing there.

But equally true is that Western Europe and America never bothered to carry out the demarxification of their own public discourse; nor did America ever attempt after the Cold War, to seriously debunk Lamarckian methods

which are still influential in Western higher education. It must not be ignored that Communism, as was once practiced in Russia and Eastern Europe, had intellectually been conceived in Western European and American universities. Trends may have changed by now but the communist substance of incivility has remained the same. America's postmodern exports to Eastern Europe, in

the form of cheap video  
thrills, are replete with  
decadence and their  
aftershocks will be more  
damaging for Eastern  
Europeans than the legacy of  
communism. Once upon a  
time when serial communist  
killings were taking place in  
Eastern Europe, American  
universities were teeming  
with professors teaching  
Freudo-Marxian  
scholasticism and raving



about alternative Cuban,  
Yugoslav, and Chinese  
communist models. Later,  
when communism in the East  
and the Soviet Union  
tempered its violent phase of  
political repression, the same  
American ex-Marxist  
professors and scribes  
deemed it necessary to  
replace Marxism with  
liberalism and the capitalist  
creed. But their former goals  
of globalization and

economic progress have never been abandoned.

During the initial post-communist phase, following the Cold War, Eastern Europeans thought that by shouting pro-American anticommunist slogans they would open up the road to rich Americanism. This was visible in 2003, when Eastern European leaders were among the first Europeans to endorse the American military

intervention in Iraq. Their servility to Americanism knew no bounds as they seriously thought that by mimicking Americanism they would soon find the stepping stone for the much desired entry into an earthly paradise. A good observer of the East European mindset, Bruno Drweski, writes, how Eastern European elites have become “the Trojan asses of the

United States of America.”<sup>73</sup>

It is no accident that the first governments in post communist Eastern Europe, shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, were made up of radical anticommunist and nationalist politicians—acceptable but not much beloved by American elites. Later, during the second phase, which is still in progress, the Eastern

European political class engaged in a grotesque emulation of America's multiculturalism, while rejecting its erstwhile tribal nationalism. Everybody started regurgitating words such as "economic growth," "privatization," "globalization," and "Euro-Atlantic integration," without knowing what those words actually stood for.

This phase of

Americanization is now coming slowly to an end, leaving a dangerous vacuum behind and a minefield of mass anxiety ahead. One may not rule out that after the post-Cold War brief experiment “made in the U.S.A.,” Eastern Europeans will suddenly, out of defiance, revert to their aged domestic hard-liners. Security comes first; liberty may be a distant second. The rapid

process of Americanization in Eastern Europe, with its self-induced, self-gratifying dreams, has already had its nasty drawbacks, let alone that previous projected illusions have not been matched by the American reality. The Hollywood custom designed America for Eastern European has not materialized. If an American academic or politician recovers courage and starts

raising similar questions  
about the rapid “de-  
Europeanization” and  
“communization” of  
America, then both Eastern  
Europe and America will be  
ready to abandon the  
American dream, and will get  
ready to face up to a new  
chapter of tectonic history.  
Eastern Europeans, for their  
part, will gladly flock to their  
treasure trove of myths and  
legends which lie in



abundance beneath America's  
passing glitz.

## *The Meta-Language of Americanism*

The political language in America is a potent weapon for legitimizing the system. Probably this book should have dealt first with the semiotics of Americanism given that the language in America has acquired a

different meaning from the meaning used elsewhere in the world. The American meta-language, as used in the political arena, is reminiscent of the communist language in the ex-Soviet Union, although American politicians tend to use words and phrases that appear less abrasive and less value loaded than words used by European politicians. In the American academe, media, and public places, a

level of communication has been attained which avoids confrontational discourse and which resorts to discursive vocables devoid of substantive meaning.

Americans, in general, avoid political hyperbolas and qualifiers that the state-run media and Party nomenklatura in the ex-Soviet Union once used in fostering the veracity of communist ideology. Also, unlike West

Europeans, and very much in line with the ideology of historical optimism and progress, Americans are enamored with the overkill of morally uplifting adjectives and adverbs. Their choice of grammatical embellishers is consistent with the all-prevailing market which, as a rule, must employ for the commerce of its goods and services adjectives in their superlative forms. By

contrast, behind the communist semiotics in Eastern Europe, there always loomed a general doubt. Communism was a make-belief system in which, ironically, citizens never believed and which everybody, including communist party dignitaries made fun of in private. Eventually, verbal mendacity spelled the death of Soviet communism.

In America, by contrast, politicians and scholars, let alone the masses, passionately believe in every written word of democratic discourse. American official communication perfectly matches the rule of law and can, therefore, rarely trigger a violent or a negative reaction among the citizens. Surely, Americans like staging protests and marches; they are masters of organizing

rallies against some unpopular governmental decision; they can easily drum up public support on behalf or against some issue—be it against American military involvement in a foreign country, or against fraudulent behavior of some local political representative.

But, as an unwritten rule, seldom can one see rallies in America that challenge the democratic substance of

Americanism or the ceremonial language of the American ruling class.

In his classic, *Metascience and Politics*, the American scholar James Gregor provides a solid theoretical account of the postmodern language and politics.

However, his analysis of political meta-language appears to be too hermetic and it rarely provides a much needed example regarding



political use and abuse of the language by American elites.

Being also known as the foremost expert on intellectual fascism in Europe, Gregor certainly knows what he is writing about. One must give him credit for dissecting political semiotics—as long as the totalitarian systems of communism and fascism are involved—yet, he hesitates in lodging the same critique

against political utterances by American elites and their court historians. Are not “normative locutions,” as he calls political propaganda in fascism and communism, also part and parcel of the American ceremonial language that banks on the lowest impulses of the American masses in order to sell them the “best of all worlds?” Gregor, unfortunately, does not use

the explicit word for American “double talk,” preferring instead an arcane label of “the non-cognitive language which is used for manipulative or predictive analyses.”<sup>74</sup> Despite valuable insights, Gregor fails to provide examples for propagandistic American rhetoric, although he notes that “social sciences have produced ample evidence that

most people do not have clearly articulated values, much less any one specific subtending values.”<sup>75</sup>

To put it crudely, postmodern Americans and the Americanized masses in Europe are better fooled and deceived by official propaganda than were the Sovietized and communized masses in Eastern Europe. Due to the torrent of

meaningless vocables and idioms, such as “human rights” and “democracy,” the thought control and intellectual repression in postmodern America functions far better.

Therefore, in the American “soft” system, a motive for a would-be heretic to overthrow the system is virtually absent. The American system is posited as a historical finitude, simply

because there are no competitors for another “freedom narrative” in the present world. Thus, America gives an impression of being the freest country and the best of political systems—when compared to any past or present system.

It is worth observing that millions of former communist sympathizers and opinion makers in the USA and in the European Union, after the

Cold War, deemed it necessary to refurbish their former Marxist phraseology by substituting it with “soft” liberal locutions. Owing to its awesome technical know how, America became the first country on earth that managed to substitute its conception of political reality to a projected hyperreality. It managed to force upon the public eye the imagery which precedes a real political

event. This is best observed on the American TV screen and in motion pictures, which endlessly rehash countless contingency plans about one single theme or one single topic. This surreal imagery has significantly helped the postmodern American intelligentsia in search of new “paradigms”- an endeavor which fully squares away with their definition of polymorphous postmodernity.



It would be, therefore, wrong to interpret the sudden conversion to liberalism by the left leaning American intelligentsia as a sign of intellectual treason. After all, fickleness has always been a standard feature of Western intellectuals and at all times in history. Given that communism and Americanism share the same techno-morphic roots going back to the Enlightenment

and its idea of progress, as well as the common parable of a new post-historical and a-historical man, both systems are compelled to inflate or deflate their respective languages. Hence the reason why former Marxists and communist intellectuals, turned liberal and pro-American after the Cold War, can easily shrug off with impunity their former “hard core” rhetoric

revolving around Marx. In postmodernity they have no troubles embracing the more advanced form of “soft” rhetoric made in the USA.

Americanism and its accompanying dogma of liberalism came to be viewed, after the breakdown of communism, as a safe exit which enabled many leftist thinkers and authors to save face yet help them continue with the same sloganeering

about egalitarianism and global humanity, albeit in a more respectable and non-violent Americanized fashion.

An external ritual had to be changed too. At some recent point in history European and American left leaning intellectuals made pilgrimages to Havana and to Moscow. After the Cold War, with the beginning of postmodernity, it became mandatory, short of ruining

one's career, to travel to the newly found super-egos: Tel Aviv and New York.

However much communism may be dead as a programmatic religion, its verbal substratum in Americanism is much alive, not just among left-leaning intellectuals but even among those Americans professing conservative beliefs. One must dismiss the communist signifiers, and look instead

into the signified. In the USA there are surprisingly many academics who seriously believe in the veracity of egalitarian and pan-racial ideas, although they package these ideas in humanitarian or Christian ecumenical words.

Red star and hammer and sickle are dated referents in America; what is crucial is the usage of new symbols conveying the same meaning, but in a disarming and more

sentimental way. In order to enforce its paleo-communist goals, Americanism requires a different social setting than the one the Bolsheviks used in Russia at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Therefore, words and sentence structures conveying communistic messages in America must be framed by different signifiers.

Modern public discourse in the USA is also teeming with

Soviet-style messages such as  
“ethnic sensitivity training,”  
“political correctness,”  
“affirmative action,” and  
“holocaust studies.” This is  
best observed in American  
higher education which, over  
the last thirty years, has  
transformed itself into places  
of higher commissariats of  
political correctness which  
consist of “committees on  
preventing racial perjuries,”  
“ethnic diversity training



programs,” and in which racial awareness courses have become mandatory for the faculty staff and students. No longer are professors required to demonstrate skills in their subject matters; instead, they must parade with sentimental and self-deprecatory statements which, as a rule, denigrate European cultural heritage.<sup>76</sup> What strikes the eyes is that these new verbal

constructs and neologisms resemble retarded and well masked carbon copies of the old Communist meta-language going back to the 50s and 60s, and which was once obligatorily parroted in different dialects by communized subjects all over Eastern Europe and Russia. These refurbished ritual utterances are now being mouthed by *Homo americanus*.

In trying to be original with their diversity, American government-sponsored multicultural groups and agencies tend to end up being the same. As much as these different groups, ranging from lesbian clubs and gay societies to fellowships of cat lovers to sun worshippers, often stress their diversity, the imagery and rhetoric they use is always the same—and therefore redundant. A

theorist of postmodernity, Jean Baudrillard, writes that “it is in its resemblance, not only analogical but technological that the image becomes most immoral and most perverse.”<sup>77</sup> By constantly stressing the same referent of “diversity,” diverse American groups and infra-political tribes prove their sameness, making dispassionate observers easily

bored and tired.

Nowhere is this sign of American hyperreality more visible than in the constant verbal and visual featuring of Jewish Holocaust symbolism, which ironically, is creating the same saturation process among the audience as was once the case with former communist symbolism. Soviet communist truth, which also consisted of endless antifascist body-

counting, eventually triggered the opposite result from what the Soviet politicians had initially expected. *Homo sovieticus* did not believe in communist victimology, even when that victimology contained elements of credibility. The best proof of communist mendacity was, ironically, laid barren not by the proverbial counterrevolutionaries or the world bourgeoisie, but by

former communist  
apparatchiks themselves. This  
explains why after the  
breakup of the Soviet Union  
the same apparatchiks did not  
have qualms in rapidly  
converting to Americanism  
and anticommunism. One  
may conclude that if they so  
skillfully betrayed their self-  
evident beliefs once, very  
likely they will equally  
quickly discard their newly  
adopted American ideology

—when time becomes ripe  
for new “self-evidences.”

In a similar fashion, the  
American visual description  
of the hyperreality of  
Auschwitz will not enhance a  
better understanding of the  
Jewish question; it will cause  
more anti-Semitism. “It is the  
perpetuation of it in a  
different guise, under the  
auspices not of a site of  
annihilation but a medium of  
dissuasion,” writes



Baudrillard.<sup>78</sup> The larger postmodern narrative about the Holocaust runs thus the risk of no longer representing a historical event, but of turning into a massive media non-event.



Both *Homo sovieticus* and *Homo americanus* were and still are the products of rationalism, Enlightenment, egalitarianism, and the belief

in progress. They both believe that a glorious future is unfolding on the horizon. Both herald the slogan that all men are created equal. The early Bolsheviks were as much inspired by the French revolutionaries as were the founding fathers of America. Now, in hindsight, the famed Declaration of Independence, signed by Jefferson and stating that all men are “created equal,” may sound to

conservatives or racialists in the United States, let alone in Europe, as semantic nonsense devoid of any empirical basis.

Yet, attempts to rectify the damage are coming too late.

All academic discussions about genetic or racial differences are quickly neutralized by the all-encompassing words such as “racism” or “hate speech.”<sup>79</sup>  
In multiracial postmodern

society, as is America, this has been foreseeable and inevitable. It appears that a multiracial society, such as America, will soon become the least tolerant society, precisely because every constituent racial or ethnic group wishes to underline its own version of historical truth. For fear of being called confrontational or racist, an honest politician or an academic must practice self-

censorship.

Left-leaning critics, who argue that the methods for measuring I.Q. are Western-biased and that they only reflect Western standards of measurement, are, from the methodological point of view, correct. But at the same token, it is also correct to state that social and anti-racist discourse in postmodernity, including egalitarian analyses in vogue and the methods of

critical inquiry into the origins of European slavery and racism, are also Western and American made. In fact, even those non-white academics and politicians in America who resent each vestige of traditional Western discourse, are forced to admit that their own conceptualization and their own hatred against the white world, has been handed down to them by the sons and

daughters of their former white masters. America created slavery and racial theories of inequality; it also created self-hatred and numerous theories of racial equality.

If something is “self-evident” it does not need to be repeated ad infinitum, it need only be stated once. Communist systems were replete with “self-evident truths” and questioning that

truth could land a dissident in jail. One may surmise that if a political belief or an idea, such as is the case with Americanism today, is founded on strong empirical evidence, it does not need to be repeated *ad nauseam*. Conversely, if an ideology or a political belief is founded on frail evidence, its enforcers and disciples are obliged to resort to its constant repetition. The



censorial intellectual climate in the American media, so similar to old Soviet propaganda, bears witness that American elites, at the beginning of the third millennium, are worried about the future identity of the country they rule. Surely, the American system doesn't yet need truncheons or police force in order to enforce its truth. It can remove, by using the syndrome of "guilt by

association,” all rebellious individuals from important places of decision—be it in academia, the political arena, or the media. Once the spirit of the time will have changed, the high priests of this new postmodern inquisition will likely be the first to dump their current truths and replace them with other voguish “self-evident” truths.

It would be a waste of time

to speculate what was crossing Jefferson's mind at the time of the signing of the Declaration. Jefferson and his compatriots were people of the Enlightenment and Rationalism. Jefferson was a man of his epoch and his intellectual legacy can only be understood within the spirit of his time. American conservatives use him as a logo; liberals and leftists admire him; and even the pro-

fascist poet Ezra Pound raved about Jefferson's "proto-fascist" legacy. Jefferson is considered a hero in America, although at some point in the future, he may be dismissed as a crook or a con man. The timeless quest for historical meaning will always depend on those who define that meaning as well as the truth seeker himself.

George Fitzhugh, a Southern racialist, and an

antebellum author, was a person who intensely hated Jefferson. Yet, he viewed himself as a good American—but not in a Jeffersonian fashion. Being a keen observer of political semiotics, he knew well how words could historically be deployed—sometimes with positive and sometimes with negative results:

*The true greatness of Mr.*

*Jefferson was his fitness for revolution. He was the genius of innovation, the architect of ruin, the inaugurator of anarchy. His mission was to pull down, not to build up. He thought everything false as well in the physical as in the moral world. He fed his horses on potatoes, and defended harbors with gunboats, because it was contrary to human experience and human opinion. He*

*proposed to govern boys  
without the authority of  
masters or the control of  
religion, supplying their  
places with Laissez Faire  
philosophy...* <sup>80</sup>

Similar critical views of  
early American ideology  
were later echoed by many  
American and European  
authors whom we have  
already quoted in this book.  
Their un-American words

may sound offensive to the ears of a 21<sup>st</sup> century liberal spokesmen of the American dream. One must admit, however, that Jefferson certainly did not consider native Indians or Africans to be his equals. But equally true is that the spirit of Enlightenment gradually seeped over into the egalitarian dynamic of early Americanism and gave birth,



two hundred years later, to *Homo sovieticus* and *Homo americanus*. The philosophical tenets of the Declaration made everybody wish to be his own boss and not to be bossed around by a king or a prince. The result of this passionate drive for equality must lead, eventually, to mutual suspicion and latent civil strife, as was observed in the ex-Soviet Union. Needless to

say, irrespective of their official “*braggadioccio*,” regarding their lauded multicultural and democratic credentials or the egalitarian dream which they like to sport, in private, the vast majority of white European American politicians and academics hardly believe in the equality of peoples and races. But it is their haunting fear of falling into disrepute which functions as a self-

projected scarecrow and that prevents them from saying these “self-evident” words aloud in public.

Is it not “self-evident” that men are different? But does it matter at all? What Jefferson and his likes had in mind is of little importance; what is important is what his successors and non-European American interpreters had in mind two centuries later. Jefferson’s words could at

any time be easily taken out of context and used as a justification for copying paleo-communistic practices.

In all fairness, one must give credit to those rare American rebels mentioned earlier who fell out with the syndrome of *Homo americanus*, yet who refused to embrace its communist replica. Who says that the enemy of my enemy must be my friend? Often my enemy's

enemy can be even my worst foe. If one was to calculate the ratio between true American rebels and true European rebels, then one would need to question the often stated European cliché about the alleged American conformism vs. the alleged European non-conformism. The role of intellectual elites in Europe during the Cold War period, and especially after the end of communism,

has been deplorable. Aside from a few intellectuals, as will be shown in the next chapters, European intellectuals and politicians have been masters of self-censorship self-delusion, as well as great impresarios of ideological mimicry. As a rule, they discard their ideas as soon as these ideas are no longer trendy.

From the European perspective one can welcome

the fact that Europe has by and large been an area of cultural endeavors and of great history. Yet Europeans have also deftly proven to be experts in tribal warfare and mutual mayhem—which consequently renders their attempt at objectively describing *Homo americanus* as not credible. Europeans have lamented for centuries about the alleged Turkish, Arab or Judaic danger, often

forgetting that they like  
carving each other to pieces  
when alien races and nations  
are no longer on their turf.

There is, therefore, little  
reason to search for points of  
differences between America  
and Americanized Europe on  
the one hand, and between  
*Homo americanus* and *Homo*  
*sovieticus* on the other. At the  
beginning of the third  
millennium, americanolatry  
and democratic mimicry



became a part of the common landscape in America, Europe and the ex-communist Eastern Europe. Each side is trying to outwit the other with a surplus of Americanized verbiage such as “tolerance,” “democracy,” and “human rights.” “In the Americanized world of the present and the immediate future those forces are set against culture,” noted Aldous Huxley, quite some time ago... “The born culture

haters are much more numerous than the born culture lovers.”<sup>81</sup> One can detect in the above Huxley quote a good understanding of Americanism, the results of which are reminiscent of communism whose mechanism Huxley also well understood.

Huxley knew what he was writing about when he observed the mimicry of

Americans he met. He had detected similar mimicry amidst citizens in communism. His understanding of the egalitarian communist pathogenesis remains unsurpassed by his contemporaries, including the much quoted George Orwell.<sup>82</sup> *Homo americanus*, *Homo occidentalis*, or *Homo sovieticus*, are still thriving in

postmodern Europe and America and their days are not numbered yet. These species harbor herd like instincts which are malleable for all egalitarian experiments. Huxley noted that all actions of extraordinary men in the Americanized future—given that their acts do not fall into the egalitarian social scheme —“will be regarded as a crime.” He wrote, “In this

reversal of the old values, I see a real danger, a menace to all desirable progress.”<sup>83</sup>

Granted the ex-Soviet Union was a criminal enterprise, how about suggesting that Americanism may also have some criminal traits? Would it not be desirable in postmodernity, as Molnar suggests, to set up the studies of “Americanology,” and to critically examine the

“American man” and  
alongside him the entire  
American ideology? “We  
must look forward to a time  
where there will be  
‘Americanologists’ in the  
same capacity as there were  
‘Sovietologists.’”<sup>84</sup> For those  
thinkers and advocates of the  
study of Americanolatry—or  
at least for those individuals  
who think critically—using  
the same analyses in studying

the egalitarian obsessions in the United States, which were once applied in the Soviet Union, is a matter of civic honesty and intellectual integrity. By probing critically into Americanism and *Homo americanus*, one could probably set the stage for a better understanding of postmodernity and also better grasp the Americanized system in any corner of the world.

It must be recalled that the passionate American desire to make the world safe for democracy also led, after World War II, to the creation of the Nuremberg Tribunal whose legal structures make up the judicial framework of the postmodern European Union, including the European Criminal Code. Some eloquent European and American authors and historical revisionists, who



examined the American system during and after the Second World War, certainly do not fall into the category of *Homo americanus*. They opened up, long ago, a Pandora's Box that may lead to new paths in the search for new social models and a new historical meaning.

# **Chapter III**

## **The Origins of Political Correctness and America's Role in its Perfection**

**“**Political correctness” is a  
euphemism for

intellectual censorship whose legal and cultural origins can be traced to America and Europe, immediately after the Second World War. For the first time in European history, a large scale attempt was made by the victorious United States of America, the Soviet Union and their allies, to condemn a large number of thinkers and writers from defeated Germany and its allies to intellectual oblivion.

Social engineering, channeled thorough various forms of intellectual self-policing and self-censorship, became mandatory after 1945. Although Fascism, as an organized political system, no longer poses a threat to Western democracies, any criticism—however mild it may be—of egalitarianism and multiculturalism can earn the author or politician the stigma of “fascism,” or even

worse, of “anti-Semitism.” Any revision of the intellectual heritage linked to nationalism and racialism is severely reprimanded. Principles of vilification of an intellectual opponent or a political adversary have become the rule in postmodernity.

The modern thought police in both the USA and Europe are hard to spot. They make themselves invisible as they

seek cover under soothing words such as “democracy” and “human rights.” While today each member state of the European Union likes to show off the beauties of their constitutional paragraphs, seldom do these constituent states attempt to tackle the ambiguities of their criminal codes. At issue is the enactment of ever new legislation whose objective is to counter the growing

suspicion about the viability of a multiracial America and European Union. In addition, following the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, and in the wake of occasionally veiled anti-Israeli comments by American and European mainstream journals, the wish of the European Commission is to exercise maximum damage control via maximum thought control. This became

visible when the European Commission sponsored legislation regarding legal provisions against “hate crimes”—which was meant to be the best tool for muzzling free speech.

One of the salient features of Americanism and its pendant of European neo-liberalism is to reverse the meaning of words, which in turn can be aptly used by the judiciary of each European



state for silencing its heretics.

The judiciary of any individual EU member state in which an alleged “verbal offence” has been committed, no longer carries legal weight. Legal proceedings and “appropriate” punishment have become the prerequisite of supra-national courts.

Pursuant to this law’s ambiguous wording of the concept “hate crime” or “racial incitement,” anyone

convicted of such an ill-defined verbal offense in country “A” of the European Union, can be fined or imprisoned in country “B” of the European Union. In reality, this is already the case with some European and American authors, right-wing militants or journalists, who to be sure, do not necessarily end up in prison, but whose lives are ruined by defamation and smear

campaigns orchestrated by the ruling class and the media. In hindsight, the enactment of EU “hate crime” laws appears like a reenactment of the communist criminal code of the late Soviet Union. For instance, the communist judiciary of the now defunct communist Yugoslavia had for decades resorted to a similar legal meta-language, such as the paragraph 133 of

the Yugoslav Criminal code, mentioning “hostile propaganda.” Such semantic abstraction, i.e. “hostile propaganda,” could apply to any political heretic—regardless of whether he had committed acts of physical violence against the communist Yugoslav state, or simply cracked a joke critical of communist ideology.<sup>85</sup>

At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup>

century, the United Kingdom enjoys the highest degree of civil liberties in Europe; Germany the lowest. Since 1994, Germany, Canada, and Australia have strengthened laws against dissenting political views, particularly against historical revisionists who question the official truth regarding modern historiography and in particular the number of Jews killed during the Second

World War. Several hundred German citizens, including a number of high-profile scholars, have been accused of incitement to racial hatred, “defamation of the memory of the dead,” or of denying the Holocaust, on the basis of the strange German legal neologism of Section 130, notably “incitement to popular hatred,” (“*Volksverhetzung*”), as stipulated by the German

Criminal Code. From this clumsily worded yet overarching German-Orwellian grammatical construct, which is hard to translate into English, it is easy to place a German journalist or a professor in legal difficulty in Europe if he questions official historiography or if he happens to be critical about the rising number of non-European immigrants in

Europe.

How did this happen and who introduced this climate of intellectual censorship and self-censorship in America and Europe at the beginning of the third millennium?

## *Brainwashing the Germans*

In the aftermath of World War II, the role of the American-based Frankfurt



School scholars and European Marxist intellectuals was decisive in shaping the new European cultural scene. Scores of American left-leaning psychoanalysts—under the auspices of the Truman government—swarmed over Germany in an attempt to rectify not just the German mind but also to change the brains of all Europeans. Frankfurt School activists were mostly of

German-Jewish extraction  
who had been expelled by the  
German authorities during  
National Socialist rule and  
who, after the Second World  
War, came back to Europe  
and began laying the  
foundations for a new  
approach in the study of the  
humanities. But there were  
also a considerable number of  
WASP Puritan-minded  
scholars and military men  
active in post-war Germany,

such as Major General McClure, the poet Archibald MacLeish, the political scientist Harold Laswell, the jurist Robert Jackson and the philosopher John Dewey, who had envisaged copying the American way of democracy into the European public scene. They thought of themselves as divinely chosen people called to preach American democracy—a procedure which would be

used by American elites in the decades to come on each occasion and in every spot of the world.<sup>86</sup>

Most of the new American educators, however, were former disciples of Freud and Marx, who considered that the best approach in curing defeated Germany was by treating Germans as a nation of “clinical patients” in need of a hefty dose of liberal and

socialist therapy.<sup>87</sup> The Frankfurt School, during its days of American exile, had already drafted various social theories as to how to cure Germany of its “authoritarian character.” Accordingly, its major spokesmen argued that “the German petite bourgeoisie has always demonstrated a sado-masochistic character, branded by veneration for the

strong man, hatred against the weak, narrow-mindedness, pettiness, hostility, thriftiness, often bordering on miserliness (both in terms of their feelings and money).”<sup>88</sup>

In the decades to come it sufficed to be labeled a “Neo-Nazi” or a “radical right winger” in order to lose the right of free speech and become an intellectual pariah. Although the American

provisional military  
government in Germany  
pursued the hunt for National  
Socialist dignitaries and  
brought many to justice, it  
used the same tactics in the  
realm of German education  
and the media. It never  
crossed the mind of American  
post-war educators that their  
actions would facilitate the  
rise of Marxist cultural  
hegemony in Europe and lead  
to the prolongation of the

Cold War.

As a result of Frankfurt School reeducational endeavors in Germany, thousands of book titles in the fields of genetics and anthropology were removed from library shelves and thousands of museum artifacts were, if not destroyed in the preceding Allied fire bombing, shipped to the USA and the Soviet Union. The liberal and



communist tenets of free speech and freedom of expression did not apply at all to the defeated side which had earlier been branded as “the enemy of humanity.”

Particularly harsh was the Allied treatment of German teachers and academics. Since National Socialist Germany had significant support among German teachers and university professors, it was to be

expected that the US reeducational authorities would start screening German intellectuals, writers, journalists and film makers. Having destroyed dozens of major libraries in Germany, with millions of volumes gone up in flames, the American occupying powers resorted to improvising measures in order to give some semblance of normalcy in what later became “the

democratic Germany.” The occupying powers realized that universities and other places of higher learning could always turn into centers of civil unrest, and therefore, their attempts at denazification were first focused on German teachers and academics.<sup>89</sup>

*From the Allied viewpoint, and particularly from the viewpoint of the American military government, the*

*universities, despite their undoubtedly great academic achievements in the past, were the breeding ground of reactionary nationalism conducted by the conservative oligarchy of professors. The focus of the universities was overspecialization by means of sharp delimitation between students as a unique elite versus the rest of the society. Moreover, education at the universities transmitted*

*technical competence while neglecting social responsibility.*<sup>90</sup>

During the post-war screening of well-known figures from the German world of literature, thousands of German intellectuals were obliged to fill in questionnaires known in post-war Germany as *Fragebogen*. These questionnaires consisted of sheets of paper

containing well over one hundred questions probing into all spheres of private, sexual, and political affinities of German suspects. The questions had many misspellings and their ultra-moralistic wording was often difficult for Germans to grasp. Had those “Fragebogen” not acquired a doomsday meaning for many Germans, they would have made good material for a

Hollywood vaudeville. A German novelist and a former conservative revolutionary militant, Ernst von Salomon, describes in his satirical novel, *Der Fragebogen*, how the American “new pedagogues” extorted confessions from German captives, who were then either intellectually silenced or dispatched to the gallows.<sup>91</sup>

There is still a perception in the liberal American establishment and its academia that women in National Socialist Germany were deprived of their rights and that their role consisted of shuttling from the church to the kitchen and then back to the children. Such comments, often to be heard and read by respectable liberal scholars in America, do not further the study of



Fascism and National Socialism. They do, however, throw additional light on the genesis of political correctness in post-war and postmodern Europe. In many ways German women in the Third Reich had higher cultural and political visibility than anywhere else in Europe or America during the same epoch. Actresses like Leni Riefenstahl, Zarah Leander, and Joseph Goebbels' friend

(a Czech woman) Lida Baarova, or test aviation pioneer Hannah Reitsch and many other German women, played significant cultural roles in the Third Reich.<sup>92</sup> Among the new American educators, the opinion prevailed that the allegedly repressive European family was the breeding ground of political neurosis, xenophobia, and racism

among young children:

*Whoever wishes to combat fascism must start from the premises that the central breeding ground for the reactionary person is represented by his family. Given that the authoritarian society reproduces itself in the structure of the individual through his authoritarian family, it follows that political reaction will defend the*

*authoritarian family as the basis for its state, its culture and its civilization.*<sup>93</sup>

Patrick J. Buchanan, an American conservative Catholic author and a former American presidential candidate, observes that Frankfurt School intellectuals in postwar Germany, bankrolled by the American military authorities, succeeded in qualifying

National Socialist sympathizers as “mentally sick,” a term which would later have a lasting impact on political vocabulary and the future development of political rectitude in Europe and America. Political prejudice, notably, a sense of authority and the resentment of Jews, were categorized as mental illnesses rooted in traditional European child-rearing. Therefore, in the eyes

of the American  
reeducational authorities, the  
old fashioned European  
family needed to be removed  
and with it some of its  
Christian trappings.<sup>94</sup> Similar  
antifascist approaches to  
cultural purges were in full  
swing in Soviet-occupied  
Eastern Europe, but as  
subsequent events showed,  
the Western version of  
political correctness proved to

be far more effective. In the early postwar years the Americans and their war allies carried out large scale intellectual purges in the media, notably with issuing special licenses to newly launched newspaper outlets in Germany. The words “Nazism” and “Fascism” gradually lost their original meaning and turned, instead, into synonyms of evil. The new educational principle of

*“reductio ad hitlerum”*  
became a new paradigm for  
studying social sciences. A  
scholar who would slightly  
diverge from these newly  
installed antifascist  
pedagogical methods would  
have meager chances for  
career advancement if not  
outright fired. In some cases,  
even sixty years after the end  
of World War II, he would  
have to face stiff penalties,



including a jail term.<sup>95</sup>

During the same postwar period in communist Eastern Europe, Soviet-led cultural repression was far more severe, but, ironically, its vulgar transparency, as seen in previous chapters, gave its victims an aura of martyrdom. In addition, as the Cold War, by the end of the 40s, began to pit the communist East against the

capitalist West, the ruling Western elites deemed it appropriate to come to the moral rescue of Eastern European anticommunist dissenters—less on the grounds of their anticommunist views, but more as a sign that the American liberal system was more tolerant than communism. However, at the end of the twentieth century, with the breakdown of

communism and with Americanism and liberalism having become the dominant ideologies of the West, this ceased to be the case. The ideology of antifascism became by the late 20<sup>th</sup> century a form of negative legitimacy for the entire West. It implied that if there was no “fascist threat,” the West would cease to exist in its present form. Therefore,

the simulacra of ever-resurgent fascism and anti-Semitism needed to be kept alive.

Shortly after 1945, and largely due to the process of reeducation of German society, Marxist theoreticians and militants in Western Europe implanted themselves as a “counter-power” in places of opinion making, although legally speaking, the West had never embraced

communist ideology. Western European and American universities, particularly in the fields of social sciences, were thus in a position to field more true Marxist believers than their communist fellow travelers in Eastern Europe. In the following decades Western European political elites went a step further: in order to show to their American sponsors democratic

credentials and their philo-  
Semitic attitudes, they  
introduced strict legislation  
forbidding historical  
revisionism of the Second  
World War and any critical  
study of mass immigration  
into Western Europe,  
including the study of  
negative socio-economic  
consequences of  
multiculturalism and  
multiracialism.

After the Cold War, despite

the increasing thought control in higher education, America remains, legally speaking, just about the only country in the West upholding some elements of free speech. By contrast, the much vaunted constitutional provisions stipulating freedom of speech and expression in other European countries, stand in blatant contradiction to their individual penal codes which stipulate a prison sentence for

a written comment or an uttered word that minimizes the Jewish Holocaust or trivializes the dogma of multiculturalism.<sup>96</sup>

Revisionist authors, or for that matter authors and academics critical of modern liberalism, are obliged to resort, more and more, to marginal publishing companies or strictly to the internet in order to have their



words heard. The impression prevails that an author sympathetic to the legacy of right-wing conservatism must be mentally disturbed. At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the whole intellectual climate in America and especially in Europe came to resemble the medieval period by forbidding critical inquiry into “self-evident truths” of liberal democracy and its

chief mentor, America.

The case in point is postmodern Germany.

Following the end of communism in the East, the German Criminal Code appears in its substance more repressive than the former Soviet Criminal Code. When silencing their critics, the German authorities do not need to resort to violent means. They usually create a cultural smearing campaign

whereby a cultural heretic is portrayed as a funny, pseudo-scientific crank that does not merit a place in mainstream publishing houses. Moreover, the heretic is often induced into self-muzzling behavior, thereby disabling himself from being portrayed as a victim of state repression.

This postmodern mimicry of political rectitude has attained the same mendacious proportions regarding the

relationship between America and Europe. In Germany, for instance, the country's perception of the USA must coincide with its own self-perception as a self-flagellating pupil labeled once by the Frankfurt School as a chronically sick patient state. Day after day Germany has to prove that it can perform self-educational tasks better than its American tutor. It must show signs of

being the most servile  
disciple of the American  
hegemon, given that the  
“transformation of the  
German mind (was) the main  
home work of the military  
regime.”<sup>97</sup> If one wishes to  
grasp the concept of modern  
political correctness, one  
must study in detail the  
political psychology of the  
traumatized German people.  
In Germany, contrary to

England and America, there is a long legal tradition that everything is forbidden that is not explicitly allowed. In America and England, legal practice presupposes that everything is allowed that is not specifically forbidden. This may be the reason why Germany adopted after the Cold War stringent laws against independent minded intellectuals, often dubbed as “right-wingers,” or “Neo-

Nazis.” In addition to frequent media vilification of local intellectual trouble makers, Germany also requires from its civil servants, pursuant to the Article 33, Paragraph 5, of its Basic Law, the obedience to constitutional commands, and not necessarily their loyalty to the people or to the state of Germany.<sup>98</sup> Germany’s looming constitutional

agencies, designed for the supervision of the constitution, have the task to control the purity of American imported democracy and the appropriate usage of the democratic meta-narrative. The famed “Office for the Protection of the Constitution”

(“*Verfassungschutz*”), as the German legal scholar Josef Schüsselburner writes, “is



basically an internal secret service with seventeen branch agencies (one on the level of the federation and sixteen others for each constituent federal state). In the last analysis, this boils down to saying that only the internal secret service is competent to declare a person an internal enemy of the state.”<sup>99</sup>

Given that all signs of nationalism, let alone

racialism, are reprimanded in Germany, on the ground of their real or purported unconstitutional and undemocratic character, the only patriotism allowed is “constitutional patriotism.” “The German people had to adapt itself to the constitution, instead of adapting the constitution to the German people,” writes the German legal scholar,

Günther Maschke.<sup>100</sup> This new form of German secular religion, i.e. “constitutional patriotism,” which has now become mandatory for all citizens in the European Union, encompasses a belief in the rule of law and so-called open society. Under cover of tolerance and civil society, it is considered legally desirable to hunt down European heretics who

voice doubts in the legal premises of parliamentary democracy or who criticize some aspects of modern historiography.

Furthermore, in view of the fact that Western societies have also changed their social and ethnic profile, the interpretation of existing laws must also be subject to the political circumstances on the ground. German constitutionalism, continues

Schüsselburner, has become  
“a civil religion,” whereby  
“multiculturalism has  
replaced Germans with  
citizens who do not regard  
Germany as their homeland,  
but as an imaginary “Basic  
Law Land”(…). As a result of  
this new civil religion,  
Germany, along with other  
European countries, has now  
evolved into a “secular  
theocracy.”<sup>101</sup>

Since the end of the Cold War, all over Europe, the social arena has been designed as a replica of a huge market. In America and Europe, the free market itself has become a form of an additional secular religion whose principles must be encompassed in the judiciary of each country. In a similar fashion, raising critical questions about the viability of the market can also cause

an author professional troubles. It is considered conventional wisdom that any flaw of the market can and must be cured by the infusion of more free market principles and more “invisible hand” friendly policies.

Economic efficiency is seen as the sole criterion for any social interaction. Hence, individuals, who may have some second thoughts about the founding myths of liberal

economy, are seen as enemies of the system.

Also, books dealing with themes that critically examine parliamentary democracy, or the role of America in World War II, or authors questioning antifascist victimology, are less and less accessible in mainstream publishing companies. Books or journals challenging the official number of fascist crimes during the Second World war



or disputing the body-count in the Jewish Holocaust, are banned and their authors often end up in prison.<sup>102</sup>

Similar to Communism, historical truth in Western Europe is not established by an open academic debate but by state legislation. In addition, scientists whose expertise is in genetically induced social behavior, or who lay emphasis on the role

of I.Q. in human achievement, while downplaying the importance of education and social environment, are branded as racists. The entire West, including America itself, has become a victim of collective guilt which, strangely enough, is induced more by intellectual self-denial and by Christian inspired atonement, and less by state repression. In politically correct

America, the academic language is also subject to hygienic rules. New qualifiers emerge among would-be heretics serving as disclaimers for their controversial thoughts. In the eyes of new inquisitors an intellectual right-wing heretic must be monitored—not on the basis of what he has said or wrote, but on the basis of whom he saw and met. “Guilt by association” hampers

someone's career and ruins the life of a diplomat, a politician, or an academic who ventures as a speaker into some right-wing or racialists literary circle, or who attends a venue where the contents of a revisionist book are discussed. Any idea critically examining the foundations of egalitarianism, democracy, and multiculturalism becomes suspicious. Declaring oneself

a “conservative” is also dangerous. Even the mildest forms of cultural conservatism are gradually pushed into the category of “right-wing extremism,” or “white supremacism.” And these qualifiers are disarming enough to silence even the most vocal heretic. “There is a typical European form of political correctness, which consist, in seeing fascism everywhere,” writes the

French Jewish philosopher  
Alain Finkielkraut, although  
with his former endorsement  
of the previous antirevisionist  
laws in France, from 1990, it  
is questionable whether  
Finkielkraut always means  
what he writes. In November  
2005, Finkielkraut was  
himself called to account by  
the French antiracist agency  
MRAP for his alleged  
deprecatory statements  
against rioting French blacks

and Arabs in France, an event which the author described in an interview to the Israeli newspaper *Haaretz*.<sup>103</sup> Thy irony is that Finkelkraut, along with many French and American court historians and philosophers of postmodernity, and very similar to American neoconservatives, was once upon a time a supporter of Marxist-inspired

multiculturalism. Now, wearing his neo-con skin, he seems to be the victim of his own theories. The “Finkelkraut” syndrome is quite common among former communist sympathizers, who became ardent anticommunists and liberals when Marxism ran out of fashion. The only problem is that a lot of people have died in the process—as a result of their erstwhile intellectual



Marxist and antifascist fantasies.

As much as American imported liberalism rejects and punishes racial stereotypes, it does not hesitate to use stereotyping when depicting its own cultural or political enemies. When Muslims and Islamists residing in America or Europe become the perpetrators of street riots or terrorism, the modern system

tolerates name calling and the sporadic usage of anti-Arab slurs. Conversely, a Muslim American resident or a Muslim living in Europe can often get away with anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli remarks, which a Gentile citizen, or a scholar, cannot even dream about—for fear of being called by the dreaded word “anti-Semite.” Thus, the ruling class in America and Europe successfully resorts to

the scarecrow of debate  
stopping words, such as “anti-  
Semitism” and “Neo-  
Nazism,” as an alibi for  
legitimizing its perpetual  
status quo. The specter of a  
projected catastrophic  
scenario must silence all free  
spirits. Naturally, if fascism is  
legally decreed as absolute  
evil, any aberration in the  
liberal system will  
automatically appear as a  
lesser evil. The modern

liberal system, which  
originated in America,  
functions as a self-  
perpetuating machine of total  
mind control.<sup>104</sup>

## ***Publish and Perish***

It would be false to blame  
only America and  
Americanism for the climate  
of political correctness which  
has engulfed the European  
intellectual scene. The

ongoing inquisitorial atmosphere in postmodern Europe is due to Europe's own ideological divisions going back to the Second World War, and even earlier to the French Revolution. The climate of intellectual censorship became salient after the breakdown of communism and the emergence of Americanism as the only remaining cultural and political referent. It needs

to be added that the communist version of the Cold War had only given the finishing touches to a future tide of European thought police.

In late 1944, prior to the establishment of the provisional military government in Germany, France was subject to severe communist inspired intellectual purges which overshadowed the subsequent

American-led denazification process in Germany. In order to grasp the repressive laws which are in effect in France, at the beginning of the third millennium, one must first delve into the period of the French civil war among its intellectuals—which raged during the Second World War. In 1942, under the prodding of U.S. authorities, the London based exiled deputies and politicians

(Pierre Bloch, Pierre Mendès France, etc.), issued a statement that “the French opinion would not understand why the accomplices and helpers of the enemy could continue exerting any authority whatsoever in the liberated territories.”<sup>105</sup> Their elaborated programs for intellectual purges were later endorsed by the provisional Assembly of the new French



Republic in Algiers, on July 10, 1944, a month which coincided with the American invasion of France. Thus, the exiled French politicians in Northern Africa and London, who were backed up by the American authorities, looked also for American moral and legal guidance in settling their scores with French fascist and pro-fascist sympathizers and collaborators.

The aftermath of the American invasion of France in June 1944 opened up the flood gates of domestic reprisals and barbaric retributions in France and in the rest of Europe—often with the tacit approval of the American provisional military authorities in Germany. The problem was further aggravated by the fact that the vast majority of pro-Fascist French, Flemish,

Walloon, Danish and Norwegian politicians and intellectuals, charged for collaborating with National Socialist Germany, were once former left-leaning and Marxist intellectuals and politicians. Former French communists and socialists, who in the mid-thirties participated in the setting up of diverse antifascist “committees of vigilance” in Europe, welcomed the

German occupation of France in 1940. In many cases they fully endorsed Germany's racial policies. Some of them did it on purely opportunistic grounds, although many had become in the meantime aware of communist heritage and its incarnation in the species of "*Homo sovieticus*."

<sup>106</sup> As history amply shows, "true believers" have no qualms in switching

from one religion or ideology to another. Likewise, by gauging the psychological profile of liberal thinkers and politicians in Europe and America today, one cannot rule out that with different winds blowing tomorrow on the horizon, these postmodern self-proclaimed democratic vigilantes, vying for the constant favor of Israel or American Jews, would become ardent anti-Semites.

If one studies the psychological legacy of anti-Semitism in Europe, one can never discount that this may happen again.

In the wake of the antifascist purges in France in late 1944 and early 1945, the majority of prominent French writers and artists, i.e. former fascist “opinion makers,” disappeared from the public eye, only to be replaced by French and German Marxist-

oriented authors, who were to become the new trend-setters in the realm of mores, the arts and esthetics for the next half a century all over Europe and America.

*Of all professional categories journalists and writers were hit the most. This underlines the ideological character of the conflict and the ensuing purges. The proportion of*

writers and journalists who were shot, imprisoned, and barred from their profession surpasses all other professional categories. Do we need to be reminded of the assassination of Albert Clément, Philippe Henriot, Robert Denoël, of the suicide of Drieu La Rochelle, of the death of Paul Allard in prison prior to court hearings and of the executions of Georges Suarez, Robert Brasillach,



*Jean Luchaire (..) ... The death sentence pronounced in absentia or a commuted prison sentence for Lucien Rebatet, Pierre-Antoine Cousteau, etc.) The targets were the providers of the ideas more than the entrepreneurs who had contributed to the German war industry. By 1944 the professional interdiction decreed by the CNE (Comité nationale des écrivains)*

*targeted approximately 160  
journalists and writers.*<sup>107</sup>

After the Second World War, an *ex post facto* law was adopted in France, making some political opinions a crime, and which was primarily designed to monitor French revisionist historians. Often, these newly adopted laws were pushed by the same individuals who only a few months earlier had

themselves collaborated with the Germans in pro-fascist Vichy France. From then on, in French intellectual life, “journalist, just as new politicians, of whom most did not have any professional competence, came into possession of journals, of the offices and the material, and this contrary to the customary laws,” writes a French novelist, Marcel Aymé, himself a victim of postwar

antifascist purges.<sup>108</sup> Many French authors were hit by the legal verbal construct of “national indignity” (*indignité nationale*) which meant in practice that they were deprived of literary exposure. Mutual denunciation became part of European intellectual life as former colleagues vying for literary and artistic fame began blaming each other for

their real or purported “Nazi sympathies or collaboration with Fascism.” The French Academy, once full of praise for Marshal Pétain, quickly expelled from its ranks several major academics on the suspicion of their war time collaboration with the Germans.<sup>109</sup>

The subsequent social and cultural unrests in Europe, particularly the student

revolts in May 1968 that were sponsored by crypto-Marxist intellectuals and carried out under the banner on “anti-Americanism,” were not intended to challenge prevailing American cultural dominance in Europe. In fact, for many leftist French intellectuals, America was not antifascist and procommunist enough. Very much in contrast to them, during the same period,

European conservative intellectuals imagined that America was the only barrier against the communist threat.

As mentioned earlier, however, America, other than using its policy of military containment of the Soviet Union, had never seriously envisioned the intellectual roll-back of Marxism. Had it ever contemplated waging a serious culture war against Marxism, it would have been

obliged to retroactively repudiate its cultural policy in postwar occupied Germany.

On July 14, 1990 a law, known by the name of French Communist and Socialist deputies Laurent Fabius and Jean-Claude Gayssot, respectively, came into effect in France. The law forbade critical inquiry into the troubled French past and the minimizing of Jewish plight during World War II. The



legal precedent of this new French law, whose goal was also to institutionalize political correctness in the realm of French scholarship and the media, was basically the tardy legacy of the Nuremberg Tribunal of 1946.

“The law has its origins in this process (Nuremberg), or rather in its judicial masquerade. This law is its retarded offspring; its debility

is congenital”<sup>110</sup>, writes French attorney Eric Delcroix, himself once a victim of the French thought police.

Moreover, any critical inquiry into the dominant ideas surrounding France’s multiculturalism, or any critical examination of anti-Fascism during the period of the Second World War, are legally considered to be a

criminal offence in France.

Also, the opinions of dissident scholars, attempting to resurrect French authors who were once sympathetic to fascism or who collaborated with the short-lived Vichy France, are considered a threat to public order in France. “Here we are again, we must have landed into an epoch of permanent political processes,” writes Delcroix. “Worse, we are in

the permanent ideological process. The defendants are not blamed for their acts—provided there were any—but for their ideas.”<sup>111</sup> At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, as a result of this repressive intellectual climate in Europe, hundreds of French and German authors showing sympathies for anti-liberal authors or who voice criticism of multicultural

experiments in postmodern Europe or America are subject to legal sanctions and public ostracism.

One would have expected that after the Cold War, and especially after the end of communism in Russia and Eastern Europe, a more tolerant intellectual climate would have developed in Europe and in America. But this has not been the case. Leftist cultural hegemony

continues unabated; this time under the guise of liberal rhetoric. Freedom of speech must only be defined within the framework of the liberal parameters and possibly contain some laudatory remarks about Jews and other non-European residents. Paul Gottfried, an American-Jewish scholar, argues how the American Left, particularly after the end of the Cold War, became the

fundamental pillar of intellectual reference for the European ruling class. His thesis supports the much debated idea in postmodernity; namely, that Communism fell apart in the East because it had fully been implemented in the West.<sup>112</sup>

At the beginning of the new millennium, the feigned pro-American conduct by European elites becomes even

more obvious. Any form of power politics has been handed over to the Americans on the grounds that America is the only country which knows how to decide who is the enemy of democracy and who is the friend of democracy. As a result, European states have become handicapped in their own foreign policy dealings and devoid of any independent decision makers. This, in



turn, has made them incapable of containing even local interethnic wars in their own backyard, such as the one that occurred in ex-Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Moreover, as one can observe, wars, contrary to America's messianic wishes, have not become restrained in their violence. Since they are *a priori* viewed as illegal and criminal enterprises by American elites, wars tend to

become more savage, losing  
their limited nature  
altogether.

It is true that Western  
Europe, unlike Eastern  
Europe, could escape the  
naked terror of communism,  
although Western Europe's  
own subspecies, the  
*antifascist homunculi*, as  
German scholar Günther  
Maschke derogatorily calls  
modern Americanized  
opinion makers in Europe,

tirelessly watch for any sign of a nationalist revival. The apprenticeship of American democracy must be, therefore, constantly waved in Europe as a sign of political rescue. “In order to venture out onto the field of democracy, a reeducated person is obliged to lie successfully. And so the lie became the essence of the hitherto unknown freedom in Germany!,” writes

Maschke.<sup>113</sup> The image of Hitler and National Socialism has become so negatively popular in both America and Europe, it has guaranteed that Hitler himself is destined to live forever. Despite the fact that under the American-sponsored Basic Law of 1949, Germany acquired all the prerogatives of a sovereign country, its sovereignty has in reality

been nil.

After the end of the Cold War, which began with the fall of the Berlin Wall, many scholars and politicians in Europe assumed that antifascist rituals would be superseded at least briefly by some mild forms of anticommunist rhetoric, or at least some sporadic acknowledgments that communism had left rivers of blood that needed to be

drained too. Nothing of this sort has ever happened. One wonders, why does not the Communist criminal legacy trigger a similar negative outcry in the wider public as the fascist legacy? Why must the public stay tuned to endless recitals of National Socialist crimes, whereas rarely ever does it have an opportunity to hear something about Communist horrors? Arguably, one can conclude

that if the public was more sensitized to the communist syndrome, one could not rule out that National Socialism and Fascism, if not pardoned, could at least be better understood. But this is where a serious ideological problem could occur since such an intellectual endeavor could easily cripple the legitimacy of the ruling class in America and Europe. In hindsight, after reading National

Socialist politicians and their accounts of the psychology of communism, one gets a better sense of what communism was all about.<sup>114</sup> Invariably, if one were to examine in detail the legacy of communist anthropology, one does not have to read modern and postmodern mainstream democratic conservative authors who have made valiant strides in describing



the communist system. All that they have said and written since 1945 about communist terror had already been graphically described in detail by preceding fascist politicians and their opinion makers. The only problem is that these forgotten or demonized fascist anticommunist authors do not have any credibility in the eyes and ears of the liberalized and Americanized

postmodern masses. This confronts us again with the fundamental question: In order to understand the barbaric aspects of communism, must one embrace the theoretical foundations of Fascism and National Socialism?

Political correctness, as a peculiar type of thought control, will not disappear overnight from the political and intellectual life in

postmodern America and Europe. In fact, at the beginning of this new millennium, it has strengthened its hold in all spheres of social, political and cultural activity. Its chief standard bearers, as regards the antifascist struggle, are alive and well and in charge of the grand democratic narrative. Post-communist and post-Marxist intellectuals, as seen earlier in

our descriptions, continue to thrive and control modern discourse in the higher echelons of the media and opinion making. They may have discarded their Freudo-Marxian scholasticism of yesteryear, but they continue to relentlessly advocate the ideology of multiculturalism, egalitarianism, and globalism—that is, all those doctrines which were once destined to make up the perfect

communist system. The only difference is that the Americanized version of political correctness has become more effective through the adoption of managerial capitalism and Judeo-Centric modern historiography. Whereas the average American and European citizen is a daily witness to a constant barrage of antifascist Holocaust victimology that has obtained

religious status in Europe, hardly any mention is made against former left-leaning intellectuals who once marched in the footsteps of Maoism, Trotskyism, Titoism, and who are still entrenched in the media and educational system. Thus, in postmodern interregnum, both America and Europe appear hardly distinguishable. They function symbiotically in a mimicking manner, as if

each is trying to prove that it  
does not lag behind its  
overseas fellow traveler and  
its own antifascist therapeutic  
rhetoric. Ironically, as Europe  
and America move further  
and further away in time from  
the epoch of Fascism and  
National Socialism, the more  
their public discourse  
revolves around an endless  
antifascist theme. Never has  
the West preached so much  
tolerance and so much

multiracial conviviality, at a time when the whole system is ripe with all forms of subterranean violence and mutual hatred.

The West, with American elites at the helm, like to admonish countries not to their liking, about the need to uphold human rights. Yet, daily occurrences where individuals in America and Europe are fired, penalized, or sent to prison on charges



of racism, xenophobia or a “hate crime,” go mysteriously unnoticed. The larger public in America and Europe have little knowledge that in Germany alone, in the last decade of the twentieth century, thousands of individuals, ranging from German youngsters cracking jokes about non-European immigrants, to scholars dealing critically with the Jewish Holocaust, have been

sentenced to either financial fines or to considerable prison terms. In the political and academic environment, writes the modern German heretic Germar Rudolf, it must, therefore, not come as a surprise that “political scientists, sociologists and historians do not wish to call things by their names.”<sup>115</sup>

They are afraid of being called “Nazis” or anti-

Semites and lose their perks,  
a fact which Rudolf, as a  
former chemical scientist  
experienced first hand when  
doing research on forensic  
details related to the  
Auschwitz concentration  
camp museum. By the mid-  
nineties of the previous  
century, for his politically  
incorrect views he was  
obliged to flee to America.  
However, his revisionist  
writings and books in

America, which continued to probe into the official veracity of the Holocaust narrative, could not find a safe haven there either. His appeal for political asylum in 2005 was rejected by the American authorities as “frivolous.”<sup>116</sup> Subsequently, he was deported to Germany in order to stand trial for the previous charges filed against him by the German

authorities regarding his  
“incitement to public hatred.”

The spiral of intellectual  
cowardice only reinforces the

Americanized system’s  
thought control. The silence  
of American academics and  
prominent human rights  
advocates, following the  
arrest of Rudolf in America,  
proves time and again that  
American intellectuals realize  
that there must be limits to  
their freedom of speech,

however much they all like  
eulogizing the alleged  
academic freedom in Western  
democracies. Consequently, it  
is not far fetched to say that  
Western intellectuals, as has  
been observed on many  
occasions, are also among the  
first to embrace new utopias  
and new academic paradigms  
when the old ones become  
outdated. Rudolf notes in his  
earlier writings age old  
wisdom, i.e. that

“dictatorships generate fear, because only the fearful subject is a good subject.”<sup>117</sup>

The American brain child, the post-war Federal Republic of Germany, might enter some day into history books as the most bizarre system ever seen in Europe. It uses American post-World War II ukases and institutionalizes on a grand scale mutual snitching and intellectual self-surveillance.

Such a paranoid climate has already resulted in the loss of elementary civic courage among most German intellectuals.

Despite its vaunted First Amendment, America has also shown on countless occasions how it rids itself of its own heretics—often under cover of free speech and in the name of proverbial human rights. American politicians and academics are aware of



the fact that even a minor critical comment about Jews and Judaism can ruin their career—and life. The Russian author, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, noted long ago, how the decline in courage had become the hallmark of America. America seems to have lost its civic courage, both as a whole and as a state of individual citizens. Such a decline in courage is particularly noticeable among

the American ruling class and intellectual elites, and has created the impression of a complete loss of courage by the whole of American society. “Of course,” writes Solzhenitsyn, “there are many courageous individuals but they have no determining influence on public life. Political and intellectual bureaucrats show depression, passivity and perplexity in their actions and in their

statements and even more so in theoretical reflections to explain how realistic, reasonable as well as intellectually and even morally warranted it is to base state policies on weakness and cowardice.”<sup>118</sup>

This cowardice has today become the main political and academic pillar in America and Americanized Europe.

Contrary to a widespread

belief, political correctness, as a bloodless version of intellectual repression, is not a result of a violent ideology espoused by a handful of thugs, as was once observed in the ex-Soviet Union. Civic fear, feigned self-abnegation, and intellectual abdication create an ideal ground for the loss of freedom. Under the influence of American neo-liberalism and European Marxist-sponsored

multiculturalism, political rectitude has been fueled since 1945 by a popular belief that somehow things will straighten themselves out. But growing social apathy and rising self-censorship only boost the climate of intellectual and political mendacity. Essentially, the spirit of political correctness is the absence of all spirit.

## Chapter IV

# The Biblical Origins of American Fundamentalism

America is a land of the Bible. In America, it is virtually unheard of to openly declare oneself an agnostic or an atheist and to aspire at the

same time to some high political office. No country on earth has ever known such a high degree of biblical influence as the United States of America. Over the last two hundred years, biblical vocabulary has played a much stronger role in American public affairs than the much lauded American constitutionalism or the praised rule of law.

While trying to decipher

the intricacies of the American system, one must unavoidably look at the religious phenomenon of Biblical Puritanism and the role of early American pilgrims in New England.

Calvinism, although originating in Europe, reached its moralistic climax in America and its message marked forever subsequent American politicians. Later, despite the fact that



America's founding fathers were men of the Enlightenment, opposed to religious fanaticism of any sort, the Calvinist heritage continued to have the upper hand in formulating the American political character and American society at large. America is indeed a unique country, where all church denominations—unlike in Europe—are strictly separated from the political

arena, yet where Biblically derived ethics plays a decisive influence in American political behavior.

As was to be expected under the influence of the Enlightenment and the progressive secularization of America, the legacy of Biblical Puritanism lost its original theological God-fearing message and adopted, at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century,

a secular neo-liberal form of the human rights gospel. Subsequently, by a bizarre twist of fate, the Calvinist legacy of Puritanism that had been chased from Europe by the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century started its journey back home to Europe—particularly after America came out victorious after the Second World War. Although Europe remains a much less Bible-oriented

society than America, the moralistic message, as an old Bible derivative, is making strong headways in the postmodern European social arena. However much the surface of America shows everywhere signs of secularism, rejecting the Christian dogma and diverse religious paraphernalia, in the background of American political thought always looms the mark of the Bible.

In hindsight, in the British context of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the strongest political standard bearer of Puritanism, Oliver Cromwell, appears as a passing figure who did not leave a lasting political impact on the future of the United Kingdom or on the rest of continental Europe. Yet Cromwell's unwitting political legacy had more influence on the American

mindset than Lenin's rhetoric did on the future of communized Russia, or for that matter on millions of leftist intellectuals in Europe.

Just as Cromwell used the Bible in justifying the murder of King Charles and later in his expeditions against the Scots and Irish, so did his American Puritan progeny provided a framework for the rise of American moralistic zeal in conducting the policy

of world improvement.

Regardless of the fact that millions of Americans adhere to various Christian and non-Christian sects and denominations, or even belong to anti-Christian tribes or cults, the mindset of the majority of Americans is shaped by the Bible.

Christopher Hill, the English foremost scholar on the English civil war and early Calvinism in England, writes

in his books about the often forgotten period of religious fanaticism in England in the mid 17<sup>th</sup> century and the ensuing civil war. Having in mind a revolutionary fervor which had swept England, as well as the subsequent birth of proto-communist millenarian Christian sects, such as Levellers, Ranters, and Quakers, with each having little tolerance for the



other, one wonders whether the 17<sup>th</sup> century was the most intolerant century in Western history? The same Biblical fanaticism that had accompanied the Civil War in England was to be detected in the English colonies overseas—in what was to become America.<sup>119</sup>

Puritanism was an ideal religion for American pilgrims as it fostered social

discipline and hard work, urging avoidance of violent rhetoric, while promoting a remarkable degree of civic decency. The American way of life and the so-called “have a nice day” mentality, which Europeans wrongly deride as a form of hypocrisy or a capitalist facade, are direct behavioral products of early Puritanism. In Geneva in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, Calvin

himself did not see anything wrong in mercantile activities—a credo gladly accepted by his American successors in the late 17<sup>th</sup> century. Calvin's teachings perfectly matched the early development of capitalism in America and later, during the period of Enlightenment, they gave birth to the liberal belief in the ideology of progress.

Although America prides

itself on a high degree of social tolerance and rejects in practice political interference of any organized church, its obsession with moralistic preaching borders on mass delirium. Most Americans are hardly aware of it and usually take their moralistic stance as something desirable for all human beings. Foreigners, by contrast, and particularly Europeans, immediately notice in American behavior

strong pedagogical outbursts which they wrongly interpret as camouflage for capitalist hypocrisy. In the eyes of Europeans, even among those who are highly religious and Bible-oriented, the American type of moralism is viewed as something odd. This can be observed in constant references by many Americans to Jesus and the Bible, which happens to make up the main rhetorical

ingredient of all American politicians. The former president Ronald Reagan used to say that “the prosperity and might of America are the proof that America is blessed by God.”<sup>120</sup> “The country which is closest to God must also be Gods’ representative on Earth with the three godly characteristics; omniscience, omnipotence, and

generosity.<sup>121</sup> Similar biblical  
nebulosity can be heard over  
and over again in all walks of  
life in postmodern America.  
Therefore, it is questionable  
to what extent America can  
be a free country for all if the

Biblical moralistic  
framework, however secular  
it appears, is a precondition  
for professional success.

Freemasonry followed later  
in the footsteps of Puritanism

and found its adherents among the framers of the American Constitution. U.S. society is that “which forbids any religious discord in its offing; yet allows the belief in divine providence. This is, therefore, a typical American phenomenon.”<sup>122</sup> Again, this is additional proof that America is a land of extreme biblical fundamentalism, albeit perfectly compatible



with the most violent  
capitalist endeavors.

Although no church in  
America is allowed to exert  
political power, the Biblical  
message is viewed as a  
fundamental moral decorum  
in social and political affairs.  
Whichever side one turns to  
in America, left or right,  
Catholics or Methodists, the  
center or periphery, to  
hippies, junkies, blacks, or  
whites, the inevitable

moralistic formula aiming at the world improvement, always points to the ever present Bible.<sup>123</sup>

In contrast to European Catholicism or Lutheranism, Calvinist Puritanism managed to strip Christianity of pagan elements regarding the transcendental and the sacred, and reduced the Christian message solely to the basic ethical precepts of good

behavior. American Puritanism deprived Christianity of its aesthetic connotations and symbolism, thereby alienating American Christians as well as American cultural life in general, further from its European origins. In this way, Americans became ripe for modernism in architecture and new approaches in social science, while at the same time readily embracing

pseudo-historicism which  
was coherent with  
sentimental relationship to  
religions and the concept of  
the sacred.

## *In the Land of Hypermoralism*

Puritanism played the  
starring role in so far that it  
introduced into American  
political behavior a high level  
of hypermoralism and self-

serving messianism. The German anthropologist, Arnold Gehlen, an author who was close to the legacy of European revolutionary conservative thought, notes that the American system and its later liberal expression are deeply embedded in hypermoralism, which in postmodern America often spills into political fundamentalism. This Biblical fundamentalism has

different turns and shapes,  
and it usually functions  
without a reference to  
classical political ideas or  
symbols. It is often  
formulated in petty  
sentimentalism, passing pep  
talks, gigantic fake smiles,  
verbiage teeming with  
bombastic adjectives, and a  
vicarious “love thy neighbor  
attitude,” always  
accompanied by a strong  
desire for social conviviality.

It is a common sight in America to witness an endless stream of new sects, interest groups, and lifestyles. Many of these sects are of a bizarre and passing nature, passionately advocating the rights of birds, insects, animals, but always enveloping their agenda in a hypermoralistic discourse that resembles “some sort of a new humanitarian

religion.”<sup>124</sup> This hypertrophy of moralism had its birth place in New England during the early reign of the Pilgrim Fathers, which only proves our thesis that New England and not Washington D.C. was the birth place of Americanism. Therefore, understanding postmodern American man means tracking down his roots in New England of the early



17<sup>th</sup> century.

The moralistic message of the American founding fathers spread later to nations around the world. This effort by American elites was facilitated in so far as the new secular human rights oriented moralists could well combine their rhetoric with the advocacy of total sexual permissiveness and hyper-consumerism. Also, the

obsession with  
hypermoralism could be  
perfectly linked to war  
mongering and American  
bellicosity; it could be a tool  
for preaching peace too.  
American hypermoralism is a  
timeless *pret à porter* for any  
occasion and for any life  
style. Early Puritan  
asceticism, the cult of work,  
the spirit of saving money,  
gave birth after World War II  
to a new hero who was both

the opposite of the old American ideal yet at the same time his logical postmodern extension. One can speculate whether under the impact of Puritanism a new sociobiological selection has also occurred in America just as it once did in the ex-communist Soviet Union, following large scale communist genocides. The Puritan mindset must have provided an ideal social

framework for a distinct biological selection that predetermined future generations for activities in limited fields of human endeavor, notably in the all-encompassing free market. Early American individuals, who were genetically not endowed for such Bible inspired moralistic outbursts, could hardly fit into American society. The Bible and business became two

pillars of Americanism. This point was underlined by Louis Rougier, a European philosopher who depicts *Homo americanus* and his mercantile embodiment as a new species “who spends his time evaluating everything in dollars and who sets up the monetary equivalent for all objects he encounters, and for all people he meets...”<sup>125</sup>

It was to be expected with

the Puritans' idea of self-choseness that Americans took a special delight in the Old Testament. "From it, almost exclusively, they drew their texts, and it never failed to provide them with justification for their most inhuman and bloodthirsty acts" (...) Their God was the God of the Old Testament, their laws were the laws of the Old Testament, their guides to conduct were the

characters of the Old Testament. Their Sabbath was Jewish, not Christian. In New England, in their religious persecutions and Indian wars, the sayings of Christ never prevailed to stay their hands or to save the blood of their victims.”<sup>126</sup>

Early Puritans viewed themselves as self- righteous dissenters fighting for the ultimate goal of spiritual

salvation, whereas their new American homeland was welcomed as God's special gift. The Old Testament was their book of reference, whereas the "positive sides of the New Testament seem to have left them singularly cold."<sup>127</sup> Early English Puritans had much in common with the intolerance and fanaticism of early Muslims, and as the German



philosopher, Oswald Spengler notes, “the people surrounding Mohammed, such as Abu Bekr and Omar, were closely related to the Puritan leaders of the English revolution, such as John Pym and Hampdon.”<sup>128</sup> With its departure to America in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, Puritanism turned into the “American religion,” adds Spengler.”<sup>129</sup>

All three major

monotheistic religions, Islam, Christianity and Judaism share the same source, although often despising each other. The likeness and difference between Islamism and Americanism can be observed at the beginning of the third millennium, as the American political establishment and Islamic radicals around the world clash with each other in open warfare. A French

philosopher critical of American Puritanism, Alain de Benoist, goes a step further and writes, “not only did the Americans desire to break away from Europe. They also wanted to found a society which would be capable of regenerating the whole of mankind. They wanted to create a Promised Land which would become a universal republic. This Biblical theme which is at the

heart of the Puritan mind  
comes back over and over  
again as the real leitmotiv in  
the entire American  
history.”<sup>130</sup>

It is a widespread view that  
America is a tolerant country.  
In light of the endless wars  
and carnage that have  
accompanied Europe over the  
last two thousand years,  
America appears, at first  
sight, as a land that has

remained virtually immune to nationalist infighting and civil wars. But then one must also define the meaning of tolerance and look at its definer. What is the point of talking about tolerance in a system where Biblical conformism is considered a norm by all? De Tocqueville writes that the American form of materialism does not corrupt the soul but softens it up and extends all its

substance.<sup>131</sup> Likewise, if an intellectual in America strays away from the common moralistic consensus and moves beyond the Biblical dichotomy of “good vs. bad,” he will not be persecuted or go to prison. He will, however, get into trouble with his immediate pontificating environment and will likely become a moral outcast. This was well noted, not just by

European right-wing authors, but also by rare American left wingers, however much they themselves ignored the later reincarnation of the Puritan substratum in their neo-Marxian and liberal thought.

An early American Jewish activist and feminist, Emma Goldman, noted how Puritan chastity removes all esthetics and leads to a gloomy and uniform life in America. Puritanism, for her, is an

enemy of the American people since it is itself a creator of “most unspeakable vices.” She realizes that Puritanism inevitably leads to the “stifling of free speech and creates a culture of mediocrity.”<sup>132</sup> Half a century after her writings we will be witnessing the same type of American-based political Puritanism—albeit this time around under the



name of leftist “hate speech”  
and various forms of  
moralistic witch-hunts against  
critics of liberal democracy. It  
is questionable whether  
Goldman and her likes would  
still be critical of the modern  
version of neo-Puritan  
political correctness, whose  
genealogy we traced to  
Biblical Puritanism, and  
whose modern versions have  
adopted a different political  
message. Modern American

heretics are summarily dismissed as the “enemies of democracy” or “racists,” or “right-wingers.” How on earth dare one question American democracy and the free market if these elements make up the foundation of liberty? How can somebody resent American democracy if that democracy is destined to bring peace and prosperity to the entire globe?

With the rising affluence of

American society, followed by the rapid secularization of the West, and accompanied by a silent Freudo-Marxian “counter-revolution” in the early 1960s in American universities, it become fashionable for the offspring of American Puritans to engage in the same moralistic escapades—this time, however, in a reversed manner and with a different signifier. The new neo-

Puritan offspring advocate now “safe and clean sex,” “safe and clean politics,” affirmative action,” etc. The ideology of political correctness, which was described in the previous chapter, also originated in America in the 80s as a form of intellectual self-censorship.

Yet it also represents the postmodern version of the old Puritan mindset. Today this political correctness ruins the

careers of independent  
American and European free  
minds and makes intellectual  
inquiry into modern  
American taboos virtually  
impossible. In America, at the  
beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century,  
the castrated usage of verbal  
structures is just a graphic  
offshoot of the old proto-  
Puritan secular avatars, so  
typical of postmodernity.

*“Judeo-American”*

# ***Monotheism***

American founding myths drew their inspiration from Hebrew thought. The notion of the “City on the Hill” and “God’s own country” were borrowed from the Old Testament and the Jewish people. The Biblical idea of predestination served the early American founding fathers as a launching pad for their own concept of

democratic self-righteousness. Of all Christian denominations, Calvinism was the closest to the Jewish religion and as some authors have noted, the United States owes its very existence to the Jews. “For what we call Americanism,” writes Werner Sombart,” is nothing else than the Jewish spirit distilled.”<sup>133</sup> The author, a disciple of Max

Weber, was sympathetic to Jews and, therefore, when he describes the overwhelming influence of the Judaic spirit in American life, he cannot be accused of having a bias against Jews. Similar remarks will be found later among legions of European authors, most of who fell into oblivion or disgrace given their ties to antidemocratic and racialist schools of thought. Sombart further writes that “the United



States is filled to the brim with the Jewish spirit.”<sup>134</sup>

Many wide-spread customs in America, such as giving new-born children Judaic names, or administering circumcision to young new-born males, come from Jewish heritage.<sup>135</sup> Very early on America’s founding fathers, pioneers, and politicians identified themselves as Jews who had come to the new

American Canaan from  
pestilent Europe. In a  
postmodern Freudian twist,  
these pilgrims and these new  
American pioneers were  
obliged to kill their European  
fathers in order to facilitate  
the spreading of American  
democracy world-wide.

“Heaven ha[s] has placed our  
country in this situation to try  
us; to see whether we would  
faithfully use the incalculable  
power in our hands for

speeding forward the world's  
regeneration.”<sup>136</sup> Even  
American Christian anti-  
Semites are subconsciously  
enamored with the Jewish  
idea of predestination, while  
at the same time harboring  
anti-Semitic sentiments. In  
fact, American anti-Semitism  
can be described as a  
distorted form of hidden  
philo-semitism which, while  
not able to materialize itself

on its own American  
choseness, projects its would-  
be supremacy through its  
hatred against Jews. It is not  
far fetched to argue, as some  
authors do, that the American  
dream is a role model for  
universal Jewishness that  
must not be limited to a  
specific race or tribe in  
America, as is the case with  
ethnocentric Jews who are  
well aware of their in-group  
racial feelings. Americanism

is designed for all peoples,  
races and nations on earth.  
America is, by definition, an  
extended form of globalized  
Israel and not reserved for  
one specific tribe only. Does  
that, therefore, mean that our  
proverbial *Homo americanus*  
is a universal carbon copy of  
*Homo judaicus*?

Of all topics in the  
twentieth century and  
particularly at the beginning  
of the third millennium,

critical analyses of Jewish influence in America or overt description of the preponderant Jewish role in public life in America, is tantamount to intellectual suicide. The legacy of the Second World War, the narrative about endless Jewish suffering, and the referent of the Jewish Holocaust form the basic framework for political, social, and academic

discourse of Americanism. In a country whose ideological principles are entrenched in an aggressive rhetoric about free speech, only few authors dare critically address the issue of Judaism in America. Most Americans, along with most Europeans, and particularly their respective political elites are very aware of the influence of Judaism in America, yet for reasons of self-induced fear or

hypocrisy, this subject matter is never openly and objectively discussed in public. When the role of the Jews in America is critically discussed, the author runs the risk of being branded an anti-Semite, or simply end up on the social and intellectual margins.

*American Neurosis:  
Love or Hate for the*



# *Jews?*

At the beginning of the third millennium, Jews happen to enjoy a privileged place in the American limelight, with their entire past continuously portrayed as a story of endless suffering at the hands of their non-Jewish enemy. In his well documented book on the psychology of Judaism in postmodernity, the French

scholar, Hervé Ryssen,  
examines the genesis of the  
concept of anti-Semitism and  
its multiple verbal distortions  
in daily political discourse.  
The word “anti-Semitism,”  
unlike words  
“anticommunism,” or  
“antifascism,” does not  
reflect political beliefs or  
critical views of the Jews.  
This term is exclusively used  
as a lexical label to depict a  
person’s grave mental illness.

As a perceived medical or judicial illness, anti-Semitism must never be debated; an anti-Semitic patient must not be a partner in scholarly duels; his sick views must not be the subject of academic inquiry and counter-inquiry.

As an element of medical pathology, anti-Semitism must only be treated by doctors, preferably by a Jewish psychoanalyst, or legally, by a liberal

prosecutor in court.

The word “anti-Semite” will likely be studied one day as a telling example of postmodern political discourse, i.e. as a signifier for somebody who advocates the reign of demonology.

“Many world-know Jewish authors, haunted by the either real or surreal menace of anti-Semitism, consider it a sickness, which enables them to avoid any form of

introspection,” writes  
Ryssen.<sup>137</sup> These remarks  
support our thesis that the  
present—however much it  
may be viewed as post-  
historical in America—is  
connected to the recent  
memory of the past, as both  
the present and the past affect  
civic identity, nation-state  
building, and the memory of  
Americans, and by extension  
that of postmodern

Europeans. How does one dare critically talk about the predominance of the Judeo-American spirit in America without running the risk of social opprobrium or of landing into psychiatric asylum, as Ezra Pound once did? While it is a common place for the vast number of white American elites to crack jokes in private about Mexicans, Africans, or for that matter deride their fellow

Gentile citizens, without looking over their shoulder, a critical comment about the staggering influence of Jews in America, even when that comment is founded on empirical facts, is viewed as a grave insult to Jews.<sup>138</sup> If a serious American scholar or a politician ventures into this forbidden field, his gesture is interpreted as a sign of being an *agent provocateur*, or

worse, as a sign of somebody  
who decided to write his  
obituary. Such a  
schizophrenic climate of self-  
censorship in America will  
sooner or later lead to  
dramatic consequences for  
both American Jews and  
Gentiles. The lack of healthy  
dialogue can last for a century  
or so, but feigned conviviality  
between American Gentiles  
and American Jews cannot  
last forever and remain based



on distorted perceptions of the Other and how this Other should behave. Mendacity carries the germ of a civil war. The entire Western history, particularly since the First World War, has abundantly proven that distorted self-perceptions, as well as the romanticized perception of the “Other,” if based on negative wishful thinking, lead to war and chaos. Eventually, both

American Jews and American Gentiles will be pitted into an ugly clash from which there will be no escape for any of them.

While a great many thinkers in America unabashedly challenge modern myths and sport staggering erudition and courage in their demolition, the most sensitive point of reference in the twentieth century, i.e., the Jewish

question, is carefully avoided.

If the subject of Jews is mentioned in America, then it is usually in a laudatory fashion, which clearly points to a morbid desire of postmodern American white elites to curry favor with the Jews. These same individuals will be the first to declare themselves certified anti-Semites when an opportunistic moment becomes official enough for

pogroms and Jew baiting. It is the lack of open discussion about the topic of the Jews that confirms how Jews play a crucial role in American conscience building, and by extension, in the entire West. This is an additional sign of how past times interact with present times. Twentieth century experience with National Socialism still serves as a powerful red flag in a political semantic field

which must be carefully  
trodden upon.

But contrary to classical  
anti-Semitic arguments,  
strong Jewish influence in  
America is not only the  
product of Jews; it is the  
logical result of Gentiles'  
acceptance of the Jewish  
founding myths that have  
seeped over centuries into  
Europe and America in their  
diverse Christian modalities.  
Postmodern Americanism is

just the latest secular version  
of the Judean mindset.

Hypothetically speaking, if  
Jews, by some miracle, were  
to play a marginal role in  
America—as they claim they  
do—then, logically, they  
would be the subject of a  
normal critical discussion,  
just like other American  
ethnic groups, races, or next  
door neighbors are.

Blaming American Jews for  
extraterrestrial powers and

their purported conspiracy to subvert Gentile culture borders on delusion and only reflects the absence of dialogue. American anti-Semitic delusions only provide legitimacy to American Jews in their constant search for a real or surreal anti-Semitic boogiemán around the corner.

Without the specter of anti-Semitism, Jews would likely assimilate quickly and hence

disappear. Thus, anti-Semitism provides Jews with alibis to project themselves as victims of Gentile prejudice. Consequently, it assigns them a cherished role of posing as the sole educational super-ego for Americans and by proxy the entire world. In his book on the social role of Jews, a prominent Jewish-French politician and author, Jacques Attali, writes: “As Russian Jews invented



socialism, and as Austrian  
Jews invented  
psychoanalysis, American  
Jews in the forefront,  
participated in the birth of  
American capitalism and in  
the Americanization of the  
entire world.”<sup>139</sup> For some  
Jewish authors, like Attali,  
such a remark is easier to  
write down than for a Gentile  
thinker, who with the same  
comment, would be shouted

down as an “anti-Semite.”

Each time American Gentiles write critically about the Jewish role in twentieth century America, they are likely to find marginal readership, and will hardly garner credibility in the mainstream media environment. But when some prominent Jewish author talks about the same issue, notably the phenomenal Jewish role in social and political affairs

in postmodern America and in the rest of the West, then his prose will elicit awe and respect. A critical Jewish author may be accepted with apprehension and irritation by his fellow Jews, but his words will nevertheless likely find their place in the ears and eyes of a larger audience.

It is an open secret that Jews played a disproportionate role in the Bolshevik revolution, and

more precisely in the early Soviet secret police. It is also a fact that although being a tiny minority in America, Jews play an influential role in the opinion making industry, i.e. the film industry, the media, and higher education. “Jews are simply indispensable for other nations,” notes Ryssen again.<sup>140</sup> There were literally tons of books published in the

early and late thirties of the preceding century in America, Germany and France that provided detailed accounts of the role of the Jews and their number in different important professions in America and Europe, and that specifically discussed Jewish numerical overrepresentation in the early Soviet Union and America respectively. The government in National

Socialist Germany had harnessed the best anti-Semitic brains in order to document every nook and cranny of Judaism in the Soviet Union and America.<sup>141</sup>

But at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, these books are either banned or derided as unscientific and anti-Semitic prose. In mainstream political discussions their authors are ignored. Their prose seems to

be only savored by readers who are already hostile to Jews, and who usually explain away the entire human drama by reducing it to an alleged Jewish conspiracy.

Therefore, a comment or a book by a Jewish author, who preferably sports a politically correct liberal pedigree, and who tackles this greatest taboo topic of postmodernity, i.e. the role of Jews in

America and Russia in the twentieth century, must be accepted with welcome. Such is the book of a liberal Jewish-Russian-American scholar, Yuri Slezkine, whose research does not reveal to someone already knowledgeable about the Jewish question any new insights regarding the Jewish role in America and the ex-Soviet Union. However, in view of the fact that these



views are formulated by a Jewish scholar, they may be used as a standard reference by a reader. Slezkine notes how Jews played a prominent role in the early Soviet terror machine and in the Soviet secret police, the NKVD, but they did it “because they fought for the state in order to become free of Jewishness.”<sup>142</sup> In other words, they happened to be

Jews against their own will.

They apparently wanted to leave the image of being first and foremost cosmopolitans wishing to improve humanity.

Slezkine also confirms that

America was an ideal promised land for the Jews in view of the fact that it “has no state bearing natives.”<sup>143</sup> It was to be expected that with the collapse of the Marxist mystique, Americanism, at

the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century,  
became a favorite ideology  
for disenchanted Jewish  
Marxists.

In the German language  
during the National Socialist  
epoch, the term “state bearing  
citizens,” used by Slezkine  
was “*staatsgestaltende  
Volksgenossen*,” the term  
which the National Socialist  
propaganda reserved for  
German citizens only, but the

term and status which was legally denied to European Jews. Slezkine notes that America became a Jewish substitute utopia because, unlike Europe and Germany, with their strong tribal adherences, “America knew only vestigial establishment tribalism.”<sup>144</sup> America, as a country of deracinated individuals, has never been in the position to put up ethnic

or racial barriers against Jews and other non-European ethnic groups, as has been the case with racially homogenous European states and empires. From its inception, America was an ideal country for Jews; it was designed to be a prime laboratory for diverse multicultural and academic experiments, be they of intra-European or extra-European nature. This multiracial social

engineering was facilitated by the ecumenical and globalistic framework of the early American Puritans—who had considered themselves as spiritual Jews.

What Jewish intellectuals could not attain in Europe, or later in the Soviet Union, was at hand in America where “Jewish power, economic status and cultural influence have increased dramatically

since 1960.”<sup>145</sup>

On a different level of analysis, one can notice the American absence of what the Germans call *Kulturvolk*, i.e. a rooted cultural and national community (and not just the adherence to the white race), which is the main prerequisite for any sound state-anchored nationalism. The absence of a common cultural identity among white

Americans seems to be the fundamental weakness of postmodern American nationalists, racialists and conservatives who, while not hiding their hostility to Jews, are unable to muster up common cultural and national energy for establishing their similar cultural and national uniqueness. Harping only on genetic determinism, as many eugenicists and modern American racialists do, in



order to promote an abstract white man identity is self-defeating. Therefore, the question comes back again: What does it mean to be an American in postmodernity?

One can naturally concur that Americans are influenced by Jews, but then the question arises as to how did it happen? Was not Christianity the offspring of Jewish monotheism? Was Jesus himself not a Jew? Jews in

America and their overrepresentation in powerful media positions and political appointments, which many Americans in private complain about, did not drop from the moon. Jewish social prominence, both in Europe and America, has been the direct result of the white Gentile's acceptance of Jewish apostles—an event which was brought to its perfection in America by

early Puritan Pilgrim  
Founding Fathers. Be it in  
Europe or in the USA,  
Christian religious  
denominations are  
differentiated versions of  
Jewish monotheism.  
Therefore, the whole history  
of philo-Semitism, or anti-  
Semitism in America and in  
Europe, verges on serious  
social neurosis.

American pro-Jewish or  
“Jewified” intellectuals often

show signs of being more Jewish than Jews themselves. Their excessive love for Jews stems from their subconscious hatred of Jews, a fact that most Jews are perfectly aware of, and which only gives further legitimacy to Jewish social prominence in America. Indeed, at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century there can be no worse insult than qualifying a prominent

white politician or an academic in America as an “anti-Semite.” And often this derogatory noun or adjective does not originate with persons labeled as anti-Semites, but are hurled by Jews or Gentile intellectuals sympathetic to the Jewish cause. Americans, hostile to Jews, often forget that the hypothetical disappearance of Jews from America or their lesser role in public life

would not open up a golden era of Americanism. The entire history of all European peoples, be that in Europe or in America, be it before Christ or after Christ, has abundantly proven that when Gentiles run out of Jews, then they start hacking each other to pieces—often for trivial reasons. As the latest version of Christianized and secularized monotheism, Judeo-Americanism

represents the most radical departure from the ancient European pre-Christian *genius loci*, which Europeans have managed to preserve better than Americans. How then to counter strong Jewish influence in Americanism without lapsing into anti-Semitism?

It is the proximity of Christians with Judaism, writes de Benoist, which explains their phony mutual

love and their frequent murderous wars. Christian anti-Semites in America often forget, in their endless lamentation about the changing racial structure of America, that Christianity is by definition a universal religion aiming to achieve a pan-racial system of governance. Therefore, Christians, regardless whether they are hypermoralistic Puritans or more authority



prone Catholics, are in no position to found an ethnically and racially all white Gentile society while adhering at the same time to the Christian dogma of pan-racial universalism. “Anti-Semitism was born from the Christian desire to fulfill Judaism, to “finish it up,” to attribute to it its “real” meaning.”<sup>146</sup> The Pilgrim Fathers had exactly this

globalistic and ecumenical approach in mind when they arrived in New England. Their secular successors are obligated in postmodernity to resort to democratic and human rights gospel as well to export ecumenical Americanism to the different antipodes of the earth. In the eyes of Christians “just as the Law, with Christ, had come to its *end* (in both senses of the word) and has become

useless, in the same vein each distinction between Israel and other nations has become redundant: there are no more Jews or Greeks (Gal. 3, 28). It is universal Christianity which is *verus Israel*.<sup>147</sup> De Benoist writes further:

*“This process, which emerged with the Pauline reforms had a double consequence. On the one hand it ended up with the*

*persecution of the Jews, who were depicted as the worst enemies of Christianity, on the ground of their genealogical proximity and their refusal to convert, that is, to recognize Christianity as “true Israel.” On the other hand, as Shmuel Trigano noted, while setting itself up as “new Israel,” the West recognized to Jewishness a factual, if not a juridical jurisdiction over itself. And*

*this boils down to saying that the West has become “Israelite” to the extent that it forbade to Jews to remain Israelites. It follows from this that the name “Judeo-Christianity” is a double incarceration; it imprisons the Christian West, which by its own act subordinates itself to a jurisdiction which is not its own, and in order to regain it, puts it in a position to deny this jurisdiction to its*

*legitimate keepers.*”<sup>148</sup>

The West, at its zenith in America, has become anti-Semitic to the extent that it has always yearned to become Israelite. The West, and particularly America, will cease to be Israelite once it leaves this neurosis, once it returns to its own local myths, and “by stopping to be what it is not and by allowing the “Other” to continue what

it is.”<sup>149</sup> The Judeo-Christian embrace, resulting in a mutual love-hate relationship, has been going on for centuries, and at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century it attained its final neurotic peak in America. This corroborates our thesis about the strong link between Puritanism and Judaism, with both being the “proposition myths” of pre-modern and postmodern

Americanism. These two beliefs do not exclude each other.

Many Jewish scholars rightly acknowledge deep theological links between Americanism and Judaism.<sup>150</sup> Also, American traditionalists and conservatives are correct in denouncing secular myths, such as Freudism, Marxism, and neo-liberalism which they see as ideologies



concocted by Jewish and pro-Jewish thinkers. They fail to go a step further and examine the Judaic origins of Christianity and mutual proximity of these two monotheist religions that make up the foundations of the modern West. Only within the framework of Judeo-Christianity can one understand modern democratic aberrations and the proliferation of new civic

religions in postmodernity. When, for instance, a number of American revisionist scholars critically point to factual inconsistencies regarding the historical narrative of World War II, or when they critically examine the Jewish Holocaust, they seem to forget the religious Judeo-Christian bonds which have shaped the historical memory of all European peoples. The words of

historical revisionists will have, therefore, very little consistency. Denouncing the alleged myth of the Jewish Holocaust, while believing in the mythology of a Jesus Christ rebirth, is a proof of moral inconsistency. No wonder that the level of Jewish outcry against critical writings about the Holocaust will be very strong. The scarecrow of anti-Semitism or the charges of Holocaust

denial are the best weapons to silence postmodern heretics. How can one dismiss the self-evident Holocaust story yet at the same time embrace a self-evident story of a Jew Jesus Christ? Both stories show inconsistencies. “Instead of submitting anti-Semitism to the free play of ideas, instead of making it a topic for debate in which all can join, Jews and their liberal supporters have managed to

organize an inquisition in which all acts, writings and even thoughts critical of Jewry are treated as a threat to the moral order of mankind.”<sup>151</sup> This brings us back to the point made earlier about the notion of “self-evidence.” If something is proclaimed to be self-evident, as the postmodern narrative of the Holocaust is, it does not have to be stated over and

over again. Conversely, when something is of dubious nature, its propagators turn it into a self-evident dogma that must be repeated *ad nauseum*, thus trivializing the very sacred idea which they attempt to uphold. The highly neurotic subject regarding the Jewish question will sooner or later result in another conflict between Gentiles and Jews.

The frightened attitude of

American and European intellectuals, who often extol the concept of “intellectual freedom,” is best seen in their servile attitude toward Jews in their proximity, to the extent that “(T)he pro-Semite has consequently made himself a mirror image of the anti-Semite.”<sup>152</sup> The danger of this fatal embrace lies not with Jews, but with American Christians. After all, an

American Christian-inspired anti-Semite must appear in the eyes of Jews like a bizarre specie. On the one hand he hates the alien Jew; yet on the other, he lugs behind himself a Levantine deity that is not of European cultural origin.

Many American conservatives, and particularly American Christian Zionists, believe in the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary, and equally



much in the future conversion  
of American Jews to  
Christianity. This  
monotheistic lineage, however  
contradictory it looks, makes  
sense. After all, just like  
Mary immaculately  
conceived her Jewish son  
Jesus, she remained an  
immaculate Jewess by birth.  
The feigned fraternity  
between the postmodern  
American “shabbath” goyim  
and American Jews is veiled

in servile mendacity and mutual make-belief mimicry which can be spotted in the postmodern American political establishment and its media. At the beginning of the third millennium, feigned love for the Jews is mimicked tirelessly by American vassals in Europe.

Admittedly, this will give rise to a proverbial Jewish hubris which will continue to grow as long as it receives the

appropriate Biblical fodder  
from Christian Americans  
and the self-censored  
European sheep which, after  
1945, learned the lessons of  
tacit self-surveillance.

Also, the reason America  
has been so protective of the  
state of Israel has little to do  
with America's geopolitical  
security. Rather, Israel is an  
archetype and a pseudo-  
spiritual receptacle of  
American ideology and its

Puritan founding fathers.  
Israel must function as  
America's democratic Super-  
Ego.

## *American Neo- Paganism*

Whatever one may think  
about the seemingly obsolete  
or even derogatory  
connotation of the phrase  
“paganism,” it is certain that  
it best represents the antidote

to Judaic spirit and anti-Semitism and can best protect America against Biblical fundamentalism.

Etymologically, paganism is related to the beliefs and rituals that were in usage in European villages and the countryside. But paganism, in its modern version, can also mean a certain sensibility, and a “way of life”—a phenomenon that stands in sharp contrast to the Puritan

heritage in America. To some extent, the European peoples in America still continue to be “pagans” because their national memory often contains allusions to ancient myths, fairy tales, and forms of folklore that bear the peculiar mark of pre-Christian themes. The omnipotence of Jewish-Christian beliefs has not completely silenced those ancient customs; it has only

suppressed them into the shadow of the unconscious.

In European culture, polytheistic beliefs began to dwindle with the rise of Christianity. In the centuries to come, it was to be expected that the polymorph system of explanation, whether in theology or later on in sociology, politics, history, or psychology, in short, the entire perception of the world, would gradually come

under the influence of Judeo-Christian monotheistic beliefs. Unquestionably, the two thousand year impact of Judeo-Christian monotheism, with its latest distilment in Americanism, has considerably altered its approach to politics as well as the overall perception of the world. Following the consolidation of Judeo-Christian belief in its Puritan form in America, the world



and world phenomena came to be observed by the American elites according to fixed concepts and categories governed by the logic of “either-or,” “true or false,” “good or evil”- with seldom any shading in between. But can the Judeo-Christian mindset continue to be a valid approach in twenty first century America, e.g., in a complex world replete with choices and intricate social

differences that stubbornly  
refuse categorization?

In modern popular  
consciousness, the centuries  
long and pervasive influence  
of Christianity has  
significantly contributed to  
the modern view that holds  
any glorification of  
polytheism, or for that matter  
nostalgia for the Greco-  
Roman spiritual order, as  
irreconcilable with  
contemporary Americanized

society. Modern individuals who reject Jewish influence in America often forget that much of their neurosis would disappear if their Biblical fundamentalism was abandoned. One may contend that the rejection of monotheism does not imply a return to the worship of ancient Indo-European deities or the veneration of some exotic gods and goddesses. It means forging another

civilization, or rather, a modernized version of scientific and cultural Hellenism, considered once as a common receptacle for all European peoples. Hardly can one argue for the conquest of the planet; rather, polytheism means envisaging a new community of European peoples in America whose goal should be the quest for their ancestral heritage and not the rejection

of it—as has been hitherto the case with Europeans coming to America's shores. A return to European roots means not a sectarian approach to some out of this world religion, as is often the case in postmodern America. It means the recapturing the lost transcendental pre-Christian memory. At this stage, America is already replete with awkward non-Jewish and often anti-Jewish political

groups, which are frequently embodied in weird sects and do not offer serious political alternatives. What makes these sects bizarre is less their refusal of Judeo-Christian monotheism but more their polytheism under primitive and puerile forms, related to what Oswald Spengler called “second religiosity” (*zweite Religiosität*). This second religiosity appears with rapid urbanization and corresponds

usually to a phenomenon of evasion, alienation, or confused compensation and without any serious repercussion on reality. “It appears in all civilizations as they achieve completion and then move to an ahistorical status.”<sup>153</sup> This is true today in America more than ever before, especially when one observes the myriad of quasi “pagan” sects or cults which

in most cases render impossible any positive meaning of paganism.

The Jewish spirit and its distilled version in Puritanism has also introduced into the American mindset an alien “anthropology” that is today directly responsible for the spread of an egalitarian mass society and the rise of a “soft” liberal thought police. Americanism represents an ideological system of a



unique truth; a system that upholds the idea of an absolute good versus an absolute evil; a system described in the Old Testament in which the idea of the enemy must be assimilated to evil—and an enemy who is, therefore, to be physically exterminated.<sup>154</sup> In short, Judeo-Christian universalism, practiced in America with its

various multicultural and secular offshoots, set the stage for the rise of postmodern egalitarian aberrations and the complete promiscuity of all values.

That Americanism can also be a fanatical and intolerant system “without God,” is quite obvious. This system, nonetheless, is the inheritor of a Christian thought in the sense in which Carl Schmitt demonstrated that the

majority of modern political principles are secularized theological principles. They bring down to earth a structure of exclusion; the police of the soul yield place to the police of the state; ideological wars follow up religious wars. Such views are shared by many American non-Christian traditionalist and eugenicist authors whom we have quoted here, and whose philosophical research

is directed toward the rehabilitation of European non-Christian thought, but who also reject any form of anti-Semitism. Louis Rougier argues how Christianity came under the influence of both the Iranian dualism and the eschatological visions of the Jewish apocalypses.

Accordingly, Jews and later on Christians adopted the belief that the good, who presently suffer, would be

rewarded in the future. When human beings lose the capacity to govern themselves, they resort to some sort of strange belief system; they create a salutary fiction which is necessary to them in order to transcend their earthy existence. The new postmodern fiction in America is called global democracy.

In the more rationalist and more developed countries,

such as in America, one is witnessing the birth of a myriad of strange religious beliefs and cults. “Only in the USA, over 1300 different cults share some 155 million believers.”<sup>155</sup> Over a period of time, the consequences of this largely dualistic vision of the world, inherent in Judeo-Christian monotheism, had to result in the portrayal of political enemies as always

evil by American elites, as opposed to system of Americanism, which is always considered a good value system. The Greco-Roman intolerance of foreign belief systems had never assumed such total and absolute proportions of religious exclusion. The intolerance towards Christians, Jews, and other sects was sporadic and usually aimed at certain

religious customs deemed contrary to Roman common law (such as circumcision, human sacrifices, sexual and religious orgies, and so on).

The most serious reproach that one can level against the Judeo-American mindset is that it has inaugurated secular versions of an egalitarian cycle, notably the idea of political progress, while introducing into the mind of its constituents a



revolutionary anthropology  
with a universalistic and  
globalistic character. Judeo-  
Christian monotheism, along  
with its secular liberal  
exclusiveness, presupposes an  
underlying idea of  
universalism, as well as the  
establishment of one  
undisputed truth. The  
consequence of the Judeo-  
Christian belief in ontological  
oneness, i.e., that there is only  
one God and, therefore, only

one democratic truth,  
resulted, over a period of  
time, in an effort to obliterate  
or downplay any other  
possible political truth or any  
other value system.

Accordingly, American  
intolerance of other political  
systems can be interpreted as  
a violent response against  
those who have departed  
from Yahweh's path, or to  
put it in a secularized  
language, those who have

strayed away from  
democratic finality. In  
America, this is best visible  
in the passionate desire  
among American elites to  
make the “world safe for  
democracy”- whatever the  
price may be. It should not  
come as a surprise that one  
often encounters among  
American elites the behavior  
of “false humility,”  
particularly in regard to  
American Jews and other

racial minorities. Although almost identical in their worship of one God, the mutual clash between American Jews and American Christians is waiting to occur. How can fanatical Christian-Zionists in America reconcile themselves with the fact that they must worship a deity of a *deicide* people? Jews by contrast, thanks to their religious exclusiveness, thrive in a system which is both

theologically and ideologically predetermined to accommodate their deities, as well as their own secular aspirations. Whereas Christianity of Gentile Americans is meant to be a universalistic religion whose goal is to proselytize in all corners of the world, American Jews can dispense with these efforts. Judaism must be an ethnic religion of only the Jewish people.

Judeo-Christian monotheism in America has substantially altered the modern approach towards understanding history and politics.

Consequently, American elites consider themselves obliged to assign to the American dream a history with a specific goal, the end result of which would be a gradual but definitive devaluation of past historical events that do not display

signs of God's theophany. And this theophany must end in a much cherished "end of history." Accordingly, the Judeo-American rationalization of historical process precludes the reassessment of America's own national or racial past, and in addition, it contributes to the "desertification" of American society. This disenchantment with Nature started with the biblical

notion of Creation. The Judaic rationalization of religious life, which was adopted by the early Puritans, stems from the ultra-rational character of Mosaic and Talmudic laws, which were incorporated into American legalism and the so-called rule of law. More than in any other monotheistic religion, Americanism, similar to Judaism, has rationalized (and imposed the formulas)



for all aspects of man's life, and this by means of a myriad of prescriptions, laws, and interdictions. The excessive American legalism has thus resulted in the desacralization of Nature and the devaluation of all cultural activity. One may conclude that if European Americans are to stave off spiritual anarchy, they would need to replace their monotheistic vision of the world with a polytheistic

vision of the world—which alone can guarantee the “return of the Gods,” that is, the plurality of *all* values. In contrast to Christian false humility and fear of God, polytheist and pagan beliefs stress courage, personal honor, and spiritual and physical self-surpassing. Early American settlers had a golden opportunity to create a new society as they had all the biological and racial

prerequisites for it. In addition, they were not burdened by dated tribal memories from Europe. Early settlers in America, particularly those trekking southwest, consisted of a special breed of European people whose sense of courage and sacrifice could hardly be encountered in Europe at that time. The American archetype of this super hero could still be seen

in a “lone cowboy” who essentially represents a modern version of

Prometheus fighting against all odds. Even nowadays one can encounter in the so-called Bible belt of rural America individuals who seem to have retained better ancient European principles of communal solidarity and self-sacrifice than Europeans in Europe. Many characters from Jack London’s novels

display Promethean  
superhuman and pagan traits.

But the problem is that the  
overkill of Biblical hyper-  
moralism has created a  
mindset which has invariably  
caused false consciousness  
and which had made  
Americans willfully embrace  
the alien “Other.” The future  
of America looks gloomy, as  
MacDonald remarks. Having  
become a “proposition  
nation,” America and its

ideology of multiculturalism will likely become a religious symbol with “sophisticated theories of psychopathology of majority group ethnocentrism, as well as with the erection of police state controls on nonconformists thought and behavior.”<sup>156</sup>

This behavior is already present in America, as Americans increasingly resort to a system of self-

surveillance and exclusion for their intellectual undesirables.

At the beginning of the third millennium, America has no other choice than to export its universal Gospel of democracy and import endless masses of non-European individuals who do not comprehend ancient European values. America is bound to become more and more a racial *pluriverse*. Had the early American settlers

accepted into their legal structures elements of biological Darwinism, as was briefly the case with some states in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century and had they rejected Judeo-Christian monotheism, probably America today would have become a different system—an empire similar to the Roman empire—yet limited only to the European genius. But guilt



feelings inspired by the Bible,  
along with the belief in  
economic progress and the  
system of big business,  
pushed America onto a  
different historical path of no  
return.

Unlike an American  
Christian, a man with  
“polytheist values”- be he an  
“agnostic,” or an “atheist,” is  
encouraged to assume his  
entire responsibility before  
history because he is the only

one who gives history a meaning. In pagan cosmogony, man alone is considered a forger of his own destiny (*faber suae fortunae*), exempt from historical determinism, from any “divine grace,” or economic and material constraints. Life, which is all the time faced-to-death and with-death, renders the future permanent in each instance; it becomes eternal by acquiring

an inscrutable depth by  
assuming the value of  
eternity. In order to face off  
with the crisis of  
postmodernity, Americans  
could possibly abandon the  
dualistic logic of Judeo-  
Christian exclusion, that is, a  
logic of exclusion which has  
been responsible for  
extremism, not only among  
individuals, but also among  
parties and peoples and  
which, starting out with the

American civil war in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, has disseminated into the world this dualistic split that has acquired deadly planetary proportions. In its present fashion, due to the legacy of the Bible, American monotheism excludes the possibility of historical return or “recommencement.”

History is destined in America to unfold in a predetermined way by

making inroads towards a final goal of permanent economic bliss. The American concept of history suggests that the flow of historical time is mono-linear, and therefore, limited by its significance and meaning. Henceforth, for American Jews and American Christians, history can only be apprehended as a totality governed by a sense of an ultimate end and historical

fulfillment. Small wonder that America is designated as the promise land for all peoples; no wonder that the creation of a distinct American nationalism appears to be a historical oxymoron.

History for *Homo americanus* appears at best *parenthetical*, at worst, an ugly episode or a “valley of tears,” which must one day be erased from earth and

transcended by economic  
paradise. Modern liberal  
ideas that are encountered  
today in America are aiming  
at replacing immemorial time  
by authorizing all  
uprootedness, all  
“emancipations,” which, as a  
rule, always lead to new  
disappointments. The Utopian  
American future is meant to  
replace the mythical  
American past. Incidentally,  
it is always the generator of

new deceptions, because the best that it announces must constantly be put off to a later date. Temporality is no longer a founding element for the deployment of a Being trying to grasp the game of the world; temporality is pursued from one goal and reached from one end. The American concept of time resembles chiliastic expectations and no longer a national or racial communion. According to



American liberal precepts, to  
submit historical becoming to  
an obligatory final outcome  
means in fact to enclose  
American history into the  
reign of objectivity, reduce its  
choices, its orientations and  
projects on behalf of  
economic commodities and  
instant gratification.  
Welcome to the club of  
Francis Fukuyama and  
American neo-cons!  
Consequently,

Americanism places all hope in the future since the future is thought to be able to “rectify” past errors and thereby assume the value of redemption. The concept of Time for Americans and their world acolytes is no longer reversible and, therefore, each historical occurrence must acquire the meaning of divine providence, of “God’s” finger, or theophany. Moses received the Laws at a *certain*

place and during a *certain* time and Jesus later preached, performed miracles, and was crucified at a *specifically* recorded time and place. In the same vein, the liberal *pax americana* wishes to bestow on all peoples world-wide a static and eternal bliss—  
notwithstanding the firebombings of Dresden, Tokyo, or Baghdad. The American monotheistic mindset interprets world

events by giving them a new meaning and by stripping these events of their true historical meaning. When the American Messiah comes, the world will then be saved once and for all, and history will cease to exist. But how many more eons must one wait for it to happen? How many more cultures need to perish in this endeavor? If one accepts the idea of “the end of history”—as American

globalists maintain, to what extent then can the entire history of suffering be explained? How is it possible, to “redeem” past oppressions, collective sufferings, deportations, and humiliations that have filled up the history of the West?

This is a fundamental problem to which modern liberal American authors provide no answer. Suffice to say that this enigma only

underscores the difficulty regarding the concept of distributive justice in egalitarian (both American and Soviet) societies. If a truly egalitarian society ever becomes a reality in America, it will be inevitably a society of the elected—of those, who managed to escape the pressure of history by being born at the right time, at the right place, and in the right country. One will become

“elected” by virtue of his affiliation to Americanized Yahweh. Yet, just like his future secular successors, Yahweh could not be other than a jealous god and in that capacity he was always opposed to the presence of other gods, i.e. to other political values. He is a “reductionist” and whatever exists beyond his fold must either be punished or destroyed. Not surprisingly,

throughout American history,  
Biblical zealots and their  
secular liberal progeny in  
Washington D.C. have been  
encouraged, in the name of  
higher goals, to destroy those  
who have strayed away from  
Yahweh's assigned path.

Undoubtedly, many  
American atheists and  
agnostics also admit that in  
the realm of ethics all men  
and women of the world are  
the children of Abraham.



Indeed, even the bolder ones  
who somewhat self-  
righteously claim to have  
rejected Christian or Jewish  
theologies, and who claim to  
have replaced them with  
“secular humanism,”  
frequently ignore the fact that  
their self-styled secular  
beliefs are also grounded in  
Judeo-Christian ethics.  
Abraham, Jesus and Moses  
may be dethroned today, but  
their moral edicts and

spiritual ordinances are much alive in American foreign policy. “The pathologies of the modern world are genuine, albeit illegitimate daughters of Christian theology,” writes De Benoist.<sup>157</sup> One could add that the global and disenchanted American world, accompanied by the litany of human rights, ecumenical and multiracial

society, and the “rule of law,” carries the principles that can be directly traced to the Judeo-Christian messianism and which resurfaces today in secular versions under the elegant garb of American ideology.

By contrast, a system that recognizes an unlimited number of gods acknowledges also the plurality of political and cultural values. A polytheist

system offers homage to all  
“gods” and, above all, it  
respects the plurality of all  
customs, political and social  
systems, and all conceptions  
of the world—of which these  
gods are sublime expressions.  
One must bear in mind that  
the Western world did not  
begin with the birth of Christ  
or in America. Neither did the  
religions of ancient  
Europeans see the first light  
of day with Moses—in the

desert. Nor did the much  
vaunted concept of  
democracy begin with the  
proclamation of American  
independence. Democracy  
and independence—all of this  
existed among the early  
predecessors of Americans in  
ancient Europe, albeit in its  
own unique social and  
religious settings. America's  
Greco-Roman-Nordic  
ancestors also believed in  
honor, justice, and virtue,

although they attached to those notions a radically different meaning.

Attempting to judge these old European political and religious manifestations through the lens of postmodern America-centric and reductionist glasses means losing sight of how much America has departed from its old European heritage. Just because one professes historical optimism,

or believes in the liberal “therapeutic state,” does not necessarily mean that the postmodern world must be the “best of all worlds.” Who knows, with the death of communism and the exhaustion of postmodern Americanism, one may be witnessing the dawn of a new American culture and a return to ancient European heritage. Who can dispute the fact that Athens was the homeland of

European America before  
Jerusalem became its painful  
edifice?



# Chapter V

## In Yahweh We Trust: A Divine Foreign Policy

**I**t was largely the Biblical message which stood as the origin of America's endeavor to "make the world safe for democracy."

Contrary to many European observers critical of America, American military interventions have never had as a sole objective economic imperialism but rather the desire to spread American democracy around the world. This objective became obvious, when America, following the end of the Second World War, became a major global power. After the Cold War, America also

became the arbiter of world affairs and the interpreter of international law. Whoever militarily challenged America ran the risk of being placed outside the category of humanity or labeled as a terrorist. Once declared outside humanity or declared a terrorist, a person, a nation, or a regime could be disposed of at will. When the Soviet Union and communism were gone, other negative

archetypes had to be invented in order to better profile America's unique democratic zeal. By the beginning of the third millennium, the negative fixation on the *Other* found its substitute in Islam and the official mantra of "fighting radical Islamic terrorists" all over the world. It is striking how America, ever since its foundation, has resorted to negative profiling of other political actors,

seldom looking at the specific root causes of the problem that stood behind their hostile un-American behavior.

Although postmodern America has assigned itself the role of being at the forefront in combating ethnic prejudices and racism, its own racial heterogeneity is having an impact on its foreign policy. As a multiracial society with over 25% of its citizens of non-

European origin, America's role in world affairs can no longer be the same. The September 11, 2001 terrorist bombing of the Twin Towers in New York came as a small respite in forbidden ethnic stereotyping. From then on, a joke or a deprecatory remark against Arabs or the religion of Islam could get a safe passage in America's media.

Many American conservatives and radical

right-wingers, including white racialists, fell into the trap of such negative stereotyping of Muslims, and their hatred of Islamic fundamentalism turned into an excuse for xenophobic sentiments against all non-white immigrants. General resentments against Islam became a common denominator for many white Americans as they could finally and safely vent their

frustrations against social experiments carried out in their home grown ideology of multiculturalism.

But why not point out that Bible-inspired American ideology can be as intolerant as Islamism, and why not recall that many Muslims living in Europe are of white European origin?

Furthermore, the outbursts of anti-Islamic feelings in America became a handy



instrument of different pressure groups including Jewish-American lobbies that had traditionally been on guard regarding the real or alleged rise of radical Islam in the Middle East. Therefore, in examining American foreign policy, particularly towards Muslim countries in the Middle East and Central Asia, one must ask the standard question: *cui bono?* Who benefits from it?

The American target of Islamism in the postmodern age should not come as a surprise. Similar negative stereotyping of the *Other* had its origin in the preceding vilification of Germany and Japan, the two countries which during the Second World War found themselves in a deadly military conflict with America and Americanism. The consequences of that military

and ideological clash are visible to this day and they continue to shape the political agenda of the political elites both in America and Europe.

It was to be expected that after the disappearance of Fascism and National Socialism in 1945, other negative stereotypes had to be used in order to legitimize the new American world order. One must raise the question whether Americanism can

survive at all without constantly looking over its shoulder for some negative political counter-model? To a large extent, the real or alleged Islamic threat, which became part of an American orchestrated global concern in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, is the logical continuation of America's compulsive quest to cleanse its own household of evil.

Europe and its heartland Germany experienced during World War II a full para-Biblical swing of American foreign policy, although the interests of American political elites in Europe were more complex than just removing “Nazi Evil.” After all, Germany was on the way of becoming a major Euro-Asian steam-roller ready to challenge America’s access to energy sources in the rimland

countries of the Middle East and the Pacific Basin. Carl Schmitt, the well known German jurist and a theoretician of international law, who also experienced for some time the wrath of American world improvers, writes that America's hubris received another boost after the Second World War as America had become a first rate economic and military superpower. After 1945,

America came to be viewed by reeducated European leaders as the economic embodiment of the spirit of the Enlightenment and as a pristine country of the state of nature that best reflected the dominant ideas of peace and progress. Later, even if many of America's foreign policy decisions were often looked down upon by European leaders, America's astounding economic growth,

coupled with amazing technological discoveries, earned it the reputation as a miracle do-gooding country. Psychologically, not a single European leader or a would-be hegemon could dismiss the fact that America represented something all political actors in Europe and elsewhere in the world had always dreamed about. America was destined to push aside Europe and begin to function as its



embellished substitute. It already had the ideological asset of having established its own city on the hill in a self-appointed desire to make the entire world safe for democracy. “The new West, America, will remove the old West, i.e. Europe from its own historical location, that is, from the old center of the world.”<sup>158</sup>

Regardless of the negative

portrayals of American foreign policy by European traditionalist and right-wing authors, America and Americanism cannot accommodate for a long period of time of other ideological alternatives. America can often be on friendly terms with smaller countries of different un-American and even anti-American ideological persuasions, provided these

countries never compete with it for world supremacy.

Hypothetically speaking, even if there were some replica of America, with the same geographical size, the same military capability, and sharing the same democratic values—it is very likely that present day America would sooner or later find itself on a collision course with this “other-sameness.” Finally, the question should be raised

not how harmful or beneficial American foreign policy is, but whether there is any other alternative to American hegemony at all. And if there were other non-American alternatives, who can deny that they cannot be worse? Over the last two thousand years, European politicians and thinkers have been sagely discussing about a common European homeland and a common European foreign

policy. The results of such well thought-out wisdom became obvious by the beginning of the third millennium, notably when European elites failed again to rearrange their endless tribal disputes in a newly launched entity, the so-called European Union. How then can European elites project their Europeaness in other parts of the world if they are not capable of finding

consensus on their own small peninsula which is one third the size of America? If America was to miraculously disappear, and with it all of its social and political ills, it is questionable whether some new European or some Asian superpower would be able to guarantee global security.

*The Insular Mind vs.  
the Continental Mind*

America has been a superpower often against its own will. It is a sole military powerhouse because at least for now there are no contestants for hegemony in the world arena. As an American author, a former diplomat and opinion maker, Zbigniew Brzezinski notes, “America was able to combine during the course of the twentieth century, four major factors in order to

preserve its superpower status: it had a first-rate military capacity; it was a world locomotive of economic growth; it made path-breaking innovations in the computer industry.

Finally, America's popular culture and its diverse leisure-oriented paraphernalia made the American life style acceptable by the whole panoply of word actors—even by those who profess



‘anti-Americanism.’”<sup>159</sup>

Indeed, this fourth point is the most important as it gives America cultural legitimacy which it can at any time translate into a military quest for power. Technically speaking, it is probable that the jurisdiction of America and its citizens can be projected into some other corner of the world, as this happened after World War II

with the Americanization of Europe. It cannot be ruled out that even if America, with its present geopolitical location and its capital in Washington D.C., disappeared from the map, America and Americanism could relocate to some Euro-Asian or African region of a similar size. America may have its own sense of order, which may be accepted or rejected by other world actors.

America does, however, have its own list of priorities that are often rejected by foreign powers, but which have sustained, over the last one hundred years, some sort of world order. Different theories, concocted by European anti-American theoreticians, notably about some Berlin-Paris-Moscow axis or a Euro-Asian empire in the offing, look silly and they reflect the typical

fantasies of right-wing Europeans on their own self-imposed political margins. These theories are not based on solid empirical facts.

The Euro-Asian continent and especially the European powers have traditionally been torn apart by different political narratives, and nothing indicates that Europe, or for that matter China, is capable of forming a common entity to counter America's

present or future ambitions.

In fact, America does not even need to have outstanding geopolitical ambitions; they become available to her as a result of constant Euro-Asian infighting. For instance, the much vaunted European Union, ever since its foundation in 1957 and its refurbishment in 1992, has been mired in bureaucratic horse trading. Paradoxically,

the much-acclaimed European cultural diversity hinders Europeans from having a common foreign policy. By contrast, the big advantage of America is its monolithic character, its linguistic unity, and nationless ideology of a one world government. Therefore, the American system has thus far been in a better position than any other to foster world hegemony.

Undoubtedly, at the beginning of the third millennium, America began to show ambitions in Central Asia that will inevitably clash with the future interests of China, Russia, and Europe.

This area represents a gigantic space, replete with energy sources which could possibly feed world energy demands for centuries to come, regardless of the Middle East imbroglio which

has marred America's foreign policy energy and absorbed most of its foreign aid over the last several decades. But given the long standing ethnic, racial, and cultural bickering of a myriad of actors in this large area, it is highly unlikely that some Euro-Asian empire hostile to America or Israel will emerge any time soon. Viewed from another angle, is it not preferable to have some sort



of stability and security—  
however criminal or  
hypermoral that stability may  
sound—to living in an  
ethnically independent and  
balkanized world governed  
by semi-anarchical regimes?  
Political disruptions in the  
Balkan Peninsula, following  
the end of the Cold War, the  
incapacity of Europe to halt  
the carnage in the ex-  
Yugoslavia, that is, in its own  
backyard, the call for

America to intervene in order to stop the Yugoslav killing fields, confronts us with the same age old dilemma: Is it not, after all, preferable to have American-staged security to some vague notions of liberty replete with fear and violence?

These remarks cannot be an excuse for American political theology which most foreign leaders comprehend with great difficulty. Since its

inception, America has been a victim of equivocal attitudes towards other political actors, a practice which has reflected itself in its foreign policy decision making to this day. On the one hand, American decision makers adhere to political autism, called isolationism; on the other, they often break into spasms of global military quests, frequently conducted by violent methods against the

“Other,” i.e. the “Non-believers,” “the Axis of Evil,” the “Empire of Evil,” the Communists, the Fascists, the Muslim Fundamentalists—that is, against all those who oppose the American religious crusade against “Evil.”

Similar to Bolshevik Russia, America introduced into the rules of military engagement a discriminatory factor against its military

opponents who are no longer regarded as “just adversaries” (*justus hostis*), but instead, as absolute foes that merit total annihilation. Naturally, absolute foe needs to be destroyed absolutely. This discriminatory factor first appeared during the American Civil War. Later, American engagements in Europe, particularly in the aftermath of World War I, followed a similar patten of

Biblical exclusion and discrimination; American wars became total wars aiming at eradicating “evil” and regenerating humanity.<sup>160</sup>

The firebombing of defenseless European cities during the Second World War, the destruction of Germany, as well as the bombing of other European countries<sup>161</sup> by the Anglo-American forces, must have

served, if not as an example,  
then at least as a moral  
excuse for similar  
destructions carried out by  
America's communist allies  
in Eastern Europe.

Towards the end of the  
Cold War, some American  
and European scholars  
opened up a Pandora's Box  
by openly addressing the  
issue of American war crimes  
and "other losses" inflicted  
by American forces on war-

ravaged Europe.<sup>162</sup> This topic deserves a special chapter, as with the opening of numerous German files and archives, American-made myths are subject to different academic scrutiny. Here again we seem to be confronted with the same legal dilemma encountered earlier; notably, who defines what is historical truth, and what is a historical lie? What is an act of



humanity and what is a crime against humanity? The advantage of America, particularly in the latter half of the twentieth century, was its ability to justify the destruction of enemy forces by using the euphemism of “collateral damage,” and by wrapping up its military engagements in the rhetoric of human rights and democracy.

Other than the omnipotent

Bible that has traditionally served as a moral cover for providing good conscience to American political elites, the true advantage of America lies in its unique geopolitical position. No country on earth has been blessed by such a splendid insular location as America. Nor could America have prospered without constituting a common geopolitical whole, stretching from Alaska to Arkansas,

from New York to New Mexico, without encountering political or cultural barriers or alien systems hostile to America's interests. America, unlike any empire so far, has a coastal line stretching for over 10,000 miles from the East to West coasts. As a result, America has been in a position to directly immerse itself in the affairs of Pacific Rim countries and in the affairs of Europe, yet always

being able to retreat into isolationism. Spatial insularity permits America, even when it commits a cardinal error in foreign policy, to return to its home affairs. In addition, unlike other empires in history, America does not have to deal with militarily and industrially sophisticated neighbors in its immediate vicinity. America's ability to project its might to the

different antipodes remains, therefore, unchallenged.

Geography is America's destiny despite the fact that the academic field of geopolitics has never stirred much interest in America.<sup>163</sup>

Geography is the advantage of each insular country, as was once the case with Great Britain, in contrast to land-locked countries on the Euro-Asian continent. Continental

countries in central Europe  
are surrounded by  
unpredictable neighbors, as  
has been the case with  
Germany since the break-up  
of Charlemagne's empire.

Had Germany not been  
constrained by its  
claustrophobic and land-  
locked space, very likely it  
would have become, a long  
time ago, a major Euro-Asian  
world power and would likely  
play today a major role in

world affairs.

The Monroe doctrine became the major centerpiece in the formulation of American geostrategic calculations. Named after its architect, President Monroe in 1823, this doctrine had at the beginning a limited geographic scope which extended only to Central and Latin America. After World War I, however, with Woodrow Wilson as

President, the Monroe Doctrine was to encompass the entire globe. On January 22, 1917, Wilson officially declared the Monroe Doctrine the guiding principle of American foreign policy. Thus America could reserve for itself the right to project its military might to any corner of the globe, while using the same principle to prevent foreign encroachments in its own



backyard.<sup>164</sup> During its inception, the Monroe Doctrine was purely a defensive mechanism of American foreign policy, primarily designed as a tool to hedge against European colonial powers. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, America, other than benefiting from its insular position, was far from becoming a major naval

world power able to police the oceans. Following the Napoleonic Wars and the establishment of the European Holy Alliance, colonial and maritime Spain was still the major power in the Caribbean, that is, in the very vicinity of new-born America. Since then, with the gradual decline of European empires, America began to emerge as the only sea power, which in turn enabled it to

conduct a single handed  
policy of unilateralism.

The new thalassocratic  
policy of America has always  
been more of a reactive and  
less of a proactive nature.  
American leaders are aware  
that any geopolitical void,  
wherever it may appear, will  
be eventually detrimental to  
America's long term  
interests. Any geopolitical  
vacuum leads to anarchy. Be  
it in the Caribbean, in the

early twentieth century, or in the Balkans at the end of the twentieth century, or in Central Asia at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, distant America cannot tolerate political vacuum for an extended period of time. For reasons of its own geopolitical security, America will, therefore, team up with anti-American regimes as long as these regimes provide

stability and do not geopolitically pose a threat to America's interests. Despite its lachrymal Bible-inspired rhetoric, despite its obsession with political preaching, American political elites have demonstrated over the last two hundred years a remarkable sense of geographic realism. It is wrong, therefore, to accuse its elites of naiveté or ignorance in world affairs, as many

Europeans wrongly do.

America's good

understanding of the

complexity of the globe

appears all the more puzzling

as America is spatially and

historically a "suspended"

country whose perception of

the enemy differs from the

enemy's own self-perception,

or the enemy's perception of

America. Biblical fanaticism

has only been one distinct

trait of American ideology;

sound analysis of geopolitical issues, a field in which America has been quite successful, is another phenomenon. By failing to distinguish between these two different issues of American foreign policy, many European observers make fateful conclusions about America's long term objectives.

The Monroe Doctrine, as Schmitt notes, was basically a

unilateral decision. “It is not a treaty signed with other European countries.”<sup>165</sup> It is very general in its wording and can be interpreted at will by its architects, while providing America with an astounding weapon to counter hostile interests. The Monroe Doctrine, over the last two hundred years, has served its purpose; it subjected the Western hemisphere to



American influence and military control. America has achieved something which other powers have never been able to dream about. The Monroe doctrine is “extremely vague and its equivocal principles cannot be disputed by anybody. Other nations can never extract anything from America by means of this doctrine; America can always demand anything from any

political actor, whatever it desires.”<sup>166</sup> Despite the fact that America recognizes the sovereignty of the countries in its close and distant vicinity, it is actually American elites who define their concept of sovereignty and their concept of the political.

Later, after the First World War, the practice of unilateralism continued

unabated as America became the architect of the Geneva-based League of Nations—from which it quickly withdrew several years later when the legal provisions of the League were deemed contrary to America's own security interests. After the Second World War, America adopted the same detached attitude towards the United Nations and the Hague Tribunal, as well as to other

international bodies—which it had once contributed in creating. So long as these international bodies further American interests they are propped up and used as a legal cover for America's decision makers; when America, by contrast, deems their actions hostile to its interests or unfriendly to the interests of its favorite ally, Israel, it ignores them. Whenever other countries are

concerned, America insists on their full cooperation with the UN and Hague Tribunal and their strict adherence to the letter of international law.

Seldom do these rules apply to America or Israel when the interests of their countries are at stake.

In the late twentieth century, having become a master of political semiotics, the dynamics of Americanism reached all corners of the

world. The crucial moment, both from the semantic and political perspective, occurred in 1928, with the so-called Briand-Kellogg pact. By declaring that wars should be put “outside law,” America became the sole interpreter of a political meta-language which later enabled it to define what was internationally “good” and what was “bad;” who was the aggressor and/or who was the

victim of aggression. “This is the great superiority of the astonishing political mastership of America; its systematic recourse to general concepts that are open to any interpretation,” writes Schmitt (...) “The one who has real power also defines words and concepts.” As a result of the introduction of this new political meta-language, American future military engagements,

particularly those in Europe  
and in the Pacific Basin  
during World War II, found  
ample legal justification.  
Often those engagements  
were not viewed by American  
elites as full scale military  
interventions; they were  
euphemistically labeled as  
“humanitarian police  
actions.”<sup>167</sup>

Later, in the first half of the  
twentieth century, America’s



foreign policy took on even stronger messianic traits that were boosted by its tireless efforts to spread the gospel of democracy. Undoubtedly, the foreign policy of any country on earth must have a sound basis in some belief or some dogma, however angelic that dogma may appear to its architects and no matter how criminal it may appear to its victims. Therefore, a good analyst of a country's foreign

policy must carefully study the founding myths of that state and project himself into the mind of his opponent from that state. But how many modern and postmodern American politicians have gone through the trouble of observing—let alone of judging themselves—through the hostile eyes of their opponents whom they often regard as ignorant recipients of America's

divine deeds? Generally, only a few American authors acknowledge the self-serving influence of the Bible in American political and military affairs. One can find in Europe a large number of authors critical of American hyper-moralism and the role of the Bible in American political conduct. It is a common practice among American elites, regardless whether they consider

themselves “liberals” or “conservatives,” to sermonize other nations against real or alleged religious fanaticism; yet the response of America against the real or alleged Islamic fundamentalism, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on Washington and New York, has largely been veiled in a very dogmatic Christian-crusading spirit.

If one studies American

political behavior, one is struck with a large dose of simplistic rhetoric. Even the modern liberal ideology of “human rights,” so dear to secular American opinion makers, may be seen as another expression of the primeval Biblical code of good ethnical conduct.<sup>168</sup>

Words such as “humanity” and “democracy” have constantly been on the lips of

American foreign policy architects and these words also left a strong aftertaste on the American public in the twentieth century. American statesmen have used words such as “providence or destiny.” From John Adams to Andrew Jackson, from Franklin Roosevelt to George W. Bush, American politicians have resorted to a rhetoric that leaves other foreign actors puzzled and

shocked, particularly when they become themselves targets of American biblical millennialist and their sponsors in the White House.

“These are the same definitions that serve to justify (their) military aggression without justification under international law...”<sup>169</sup> As some critical, mostly European authors argue,

American involvement in Europe during World War II and the later occupation of Germany were motivated by America's self-appointed do-gooding efforts and the belief that Evil in its fascist form had to be removed, whatever the costs might be. Clearly, Hitler declared war on "neutral" America, but Germany's act of belligerence against America needs to be put into perspective. An



objective scholar must  
examine America's previous  
illegal supplying of war  
material to the Soviet Union  
and Great Britain. Equally  
illegal under international law  
was America's engaging  
German submarines in the  
Atlantic prior to the German  
declaration of war, which was  
accompanied by incessant  
anti-German media hectoring  
by American Jews—a  
strategy carried out in the

name of a divine mission of  
“making the world safe for  
democracy.” “The crisis of  
Americanism in our epoch,”

wrote a German scholar  
Giselher Wirsing, who had  
close ties with propaganda  
officials in the Third Reich,  
“falls short of degeneracy of  
the Puritan mindset. In  
degenerated Puritanism lies,  
side by side with Judaism,  
America’s inborn danger.”<sup>170</sup>

Nor have global issues surrounding America's messianism changed much today. Some modern authors call the postmodern American policy "neo-Jacobin," although this term may sound equivocal. "These new Jacobins (or neo-globalists), typically use democracy as an umbrella term for the kind of political regime that they would like to see installed all

over the world.”<sup>171</sup>

The concept of American democracy in postmodernity is also all-disarming. To oppose America's drive to democracy and peace must be seen as lunatic behavior. It then becomes clear why America has been such an avid lecturer in foreign affairs and why it has been able to foist its hegemony on all states in the world. Irving

Kristol, a prominent Jewish-American opinion maker, and a true spokesman of Americanism, writes that America's world mission "is that of an exceptional nation founded on a universal principle, on what Lincoln called 'an abstract truth, applicable to all men and all times.'" <sup>172</sup> It is the simplicity of American political discourse, ignoring the shades

of meaning, which has led,  
thus far, to untold  
misunderstandings and  
conflicts world-wide.

Towards the end of the 20<sup>th</sup>  
century, however, American  
unilateralism provoked  
serious rifts with America's  
allies and may be seen as the  
first sign of America's  
decline.

*A War Crime of the*

# *Bible*

In the first half of the twentieth century American Biblical fundamentalism resulted in military behavior that American postmodern elites are not very fond of discussing in a public forum.

It is common place in American academia and the film industry to criticize National Socialism for its real or alleged terror. But the

American way of conducting  
World War II—under the  
guise of democracy and  
world peace—was just as  
violent if not even worse.

Puritanism had given birth to  
a distinctive type of  
American fanaticism which  
does not have parallels  
anywhere else in the world.

Just as in 17<sup>th</sup> century  
England, Cromwell was  
persuaded that he had been



sent by God Almighty to  
purge England of its enemies;  
so did his American liberal  
successors by the end of the  
20<sup>th</sup> century, think themselves  
elected in order to impose  
their own code of military  
and political conduct in both  
domestic and foreign affairs.  
M.E. Bradford notes that this  
type of Puritan self-  
righteousness could be easily  
observed from Monroe to

Lincoln and Lincoln's  
lieutenants Sherman and  
Grant. "As an American long  
exposed to political  
Puritanism, I cannot help  
thinking of Cromwell by way  
of analogy to other men 'on  
an errand'; to our version of  
the species, and especially to  
the late gnostics who in  
God's name forged a Union  
of 'fire and iron' in our great  
Civil War (...) "The  
Southerners are puzzled at

such schizophrenia. They should have studied the life of Cromwell and then emptied the house.”<sup>173</sup> Similar discriminatory acts against ideological opponents were reserved for Germany during and after World War II.

Whereas everybody in American and European postmodern political establishment are obliged to know by heart the body count

of Fascist and National Socialist victims, nobody still knows the exact number of Germans killed by American forces during and after World War II. Worse, as noted earlier, a different perspective in describing the US post-war foreign policy toward Europe and Germany is not considered politically correct. After the ill-fated American military excursion into Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent

media coverage of American crimes committed there, the question in retrospect needs to be raised as to the behavior of the American military in Germany in 1945 and after. The American mistreatment of German POWs and civilians during World War II must have been far worse than that in Iraq after 2003.<sup>174</sup>

Just as communism, following the Second World

War, used large scale terror in the implementation of its foreign policy goals in Eastern Europe, so did America use its own type of repression to silence heretics in the occupied parts of postwar-Europe. Purges carried out by the American military authorities in postwar Germany remain an uneasy topic for many official American historians who mostly study the Allied

version of war events. Many European conservative scholars have also been unable to comprehend sudden shifts in American political behavior, because many have traditionally assumed that America is a cultural and spiritual extension of Europe. American political behavior in war ravaged Europe could only be understood and judged within America's own judgmental parameters. Using

classical European value judgments regarding the notion of limited vs. unlimited warfare, yields different results that are often rejected by American elites.

The American crusade to extirpate evil was felt by Germans in full force in the aftermath of World War II.

Freda Utey, an English-American writer depicts graphically in her books the barbaric methods applied by



American military authorities against German civilians and prisoners in war ravaged Germany. Although Utley enjoyed popularity among American conservatives, her name and her works fell quickly into oblivion. Nonetheless, it is worth reminding that when an American author of her stature writes about American war crimes in Europe, she or he will naturally elicit more

credibility than when a German or a French historian writes about the same topic.

Utley's book throws additional light on the other side of America's much vaunted humaneness. In hindsight one wonders whether there was any substantive difference between warmongering Americanism and Communism? If one takes into account the behavior of

American military authorities in Germany after World War II, it becomes clear why American elites, half a century later, were unwilling to initiate the process of decommunisation in Eastern Europe, as well as the process of demarxisation in American and European higher education. After all, were not Roosevelt and Stalin war time allies? Were not American and Soviet soldiers fighting

the same “Nazi evil”?

It was the inhumane behavior of the American military interrogators that left deep scars on the German psyche and which explains why Germans, and by extension all Europeans, act today in foreign affairs like scared lackeys of American geopolitical interests.

*A thoughtful American professor, whom I met in*

*Heidelberg, expressed the opinion that the United States military authorities on entering Germany and seeing the ghastly destruction wrought by our obliteration bombing were fearful that knowledge of it would cause a revulsion of opinion in America and might prevent the carrying out of Washington's policy for Germany by awakening sympathy for the defeated and*

*realization of our war crimes.*

*This, he believes, is the reason why a whole fleet of aircraft was used by General Eisenhower to bring journalists, Congressmen, and churchmen to see the concentration camps; the idea being that the sight of Hitler's starved victims would obliterate consciousness of our own guilt. Certainly it worked out that way. No American newspaper of large*

*circulation in those days  
wrote up the horror of our  
bombing or described the  
ghastly conditions in which  
the survivors were living in  
the corpse-filled ruins.  
American readers sipped  
their fill only of German  
atrocities.*<sup>175</sup>

Utley's work is today  
unknown in American higher  
education although her prose  
constitutes a valuable

document in studying the crusading and inquisitorial character of Americanism in Europe. There are legions of similar revisionist books on the topic describing the plight of Germans and Europeans after the Second World War, but due to academic silence and self-censorship of many scholars, these books do not reach mainstream professional and academic circles. Moreover, both



American and European historians still seem to be light years away from historicizing contemporary history and its aftermath. This is understandable, in view of the fact that acting and writing otherwise would throw an ugly light on crimes committed by the Americans in Germany during and after the Second World War and would substantially ruin anti-fascist victimology, including

the Holocaust narrative.

American crimes in Europe, committed in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, included extra-legal killings of countless German civilians and disarmed soldiers, while tacitly approving serial Soviet genocides and mass expulsions of the German civilian population in Eastern Europe.<sup>176</sup> As Utley notes,

the sheer sight of the horror  
and destruction which  
American warplanes had  
inflicted on German towns  
and cities, from the  
psychological point of view,  
must have prompted the  
American military authorities  
and subsequent American  
administrations, academics,  
journalists, historians, and  
opinion makers to cover up  
America's own misdeeds.  
Consequently, a whole new

industry of story telling regarding real or alleged National Socialist crimes was established in the West. As years and decades went by, crimes committed by the Americans against Germans were either whitewashed or ascribed to the defeated Germans. Utley describes in detail how thousands of German captives, before being dispatched to the gallows, were molested by

the American interrogators.  
Charges filed against them  
were based on flimsy  
evidence, with no chance for  
a suspect of standing a fair  
trial.<sup>177</sup>

The exact number of  
German casualties during and  
after the Second World War  
remains unknown. The  
number of German dead  
varies wildly, ranging from 6  
to 16 million Germans,

including civilians and soldiers.<sup>178</sup> The official American hesitancy to establish the precise number of German war losses is understandable, as this is a topic that American court historians do not find compatible with the spirit of Americanism. It is only the fascist criminology of World War II, along with the rhetorical projection of the

evil side of the Holocaust that modern historiographers like to repeat, with Jewish American historians and commentators being at the helm of this narrative. Other victimhoods and other victimologies, notably those of people who suffered under communism, are rarely mentioned. Although Germany was the direct party involved in the war, the entire European continent was

affected by the American military victory. The American supreme military headquarters, under the general Dwight Eisenhower, withdrew after May 8, 1945, the POW status to German soldiers who had earlier been taken prisoners. According to some German historians over a million and a half German soldiers died after the end of hostilities in American and



Soviet-run prison camps.<sup>179</sup>

Political events in America and Europe since 1945 bear a strong mark of the Manichean approach in American foreign policy and hark back to the struggle which pitted the nations of European ancestry against other European nations, albeit with three radically different world views. There is a large and impressive “un-American”

revisionist legacy in America depicting various aspects of American foreign policy during and after the Second World War. These revisionist scholars do not shy away from describing the plight of Germans and other Europeans at the hand of their American victors. However, their prose, although having legally a right of entry in America, has not had to date much of an impact on public

consciousness and political decision making. The answer is not difficult to guess. The masters of discourse in postmodern America have powerful means to decide the meaning of the historical truth and provide the meaning with their own historical context. Mentioning extensively Germany's war losses runs the risk of eclipsing the scope of Jewish war losses, which makes

many Jewish intellectuals exceedingly nervous. Every nation likes to see its own sacred victimhood on the top of the list of global suffering.

Moreover, if critical revisionist literature were ever to gain a mainstream foothold in America and Europe, it would render a serious blow to the ideology of Americanism and would dramatically change the course of history in the

coming decades. Having this in mind, America's former foes, Japan and Germany, as well as other European countries, must continue to toe the line of American "cognitive warfare" in postmodernity.

Despite frequent reversals in its foreign policy, America's self-perception at the beginning of the new millennium continues to abide by the same concepts of

self-choseness, mixed with  
puritanical moralism.

Irrespective of many experts  
and scholars who craft  
American foreign policy and  
who are in charge of  
improving America's  
“cognitive warfare” abroad,  
the idea prevails among many  
that there cannot be an  
alternative to the American  
system. This type of hubris is  
quite natural in view of the  
fact that America is the

richest country on earth and that it does not have to face other challengers yet. How can one reject the American system if America is seen and described by its ruling class as “the last best hope on earth,” or according to the former American secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, as an “indispensable nation”?<sup>180</sup>

Obviously, American elites use a different logic and make

different judgments when trying to understand a non-American perception of their own Bible-inspired foreign policy. As the French philosopher Louis Rougier writes, a true believer will continue to believe in his self-styled dogmas, however aberrant these dogmas appear or sound in the eyes and ears of future generations. “What matters is not the true or false foundation of a religion, but



how the believers live this religion. A historical truth, or a golden legend—but who cares!? It is in the hearts of the believers that gods live and resurrect.”<sup>181</sup>

Likewise, the goddess of American democracy must be grounded in an evangelical millenarianism that America has used in its foreign policy ever since its inception. Since its birth, America has defined

the foe in a way that has best suited its own moralistic and legalistic principles. With this goal in mind, the American language was also skillfully revamped for the description of America's future foreign policy gains or failures. As a result, many political concepts have acquired the role of a new political theology in American foreign policy. "The language became a deception: it was

infected not only with those great bestialities. It was called to enforce innumerable falsehoods,” writes George Steiner.<sup>182</sup> Therefore, it is indispensable for a student of Americanism, before studying any move or shake of American decision makers, to carefully look at the American political meta-language and the meaning this language has acquired.

This is especially important  
when studying America's  
political behavior in  
postmodernity.

In the second half of the  
20<sup>th</sup> century, it was again a  
Biblical narrative mixed with  
democratic babble that made  
the Americans embrace the  
new state of Israel, an act that  
triggered unforeseen  
consequences for the whole  
of the Middle East and for the

rest of mankind. Most American Presidents, writes Lawrence Davidson in his piece, followed the messianism of Woodrow Wilson, who was himself an ardent pro-Zionist and who was easily persuaded back in 1916 by Chief Justice Louis Brandeis, who was himself of Jewish origin, to support the Balfour Declaration. Subsequent American presidents held a

romanticized picture of the future state of Israel, a country which they viewed as their own spiritual homeland. In early postmodernity, their task was facilitated in so far as they could rely upon the millions of American evangelists, mostly residing in the American Bible belt, and whose behavior was often more Jewish than that of American Jews themselves. Once upon a

time, during the Cold War, it was the “evil” communists who were damned by the American political class. At the beginning of the third millennium, under the guise of abstract notions like “war against terror” and “fight for democracy,” America began waging endless wars against the real or alleged enemies of Israel. The high priest of this new Biblical fundamentalism in foreign policy, as

Lawrence Davidson calls him, is American President George W. Bush. “American Manifest Destiny and Christian Zionist delusions now pave the road down which we all walk. It runs through Palestine and leads to hell.”<sup>183</sup>

As many European journalists noted, the uniqueness of American Bible-inspired unilateralism



has become in postmodernity a dangerous factor in world politics. But has it ever been different? The behavior of American President George W. Bush during the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was quite in line with the behavior of his precursors. “Bush’s government is forced back to the doctrines of Puritanism as a historical necessity. If we are to understand what it is up to, we must look not to the

1930s, but to the 1630s.”<sup>184</sup>

And this new version of Bible-inspired American policy does not only apply to President Bush, but to all U.S. presidents since the American Declaration of Independence.

America's unconditional support of Israel resembles a belated form of White House Christian-inspired medieval neurosis. Fear of being called

an anti-Semite prevents American politicians and a great number of American academics from openly criticizing Israel. When some sparse critical voices are heard, they usually leave out the founding myths of the Biblical narrative, and focus, instead, on dry facts relating to the influence of Jewish lobbies in America. In typical American “expertise” fashion, American academics

who happen to be critical of Israel use one set of arguments while neglecting other scholarly approaches. In their analysis of the holy alliance between postmodern Israel and America, American scholars tend to forget that the Old Testament ties between these two countries had already predestined America to nurture special and privileged ties to the state of Israel.

Clearly, America has little, if any, geopolitical benefit from supporting Israel. Israel is more of a liability than an asset for America. Also, from the geopolitical perspective, Israel is a nuisance for America given that as a small country the size of Rhode Island, it is surrounded by a host of hostile cultures, religions, and neighbors, both outside and within its borders. Although America, due to its

unique insular position, has been able to avoid troublesome neighbors and their tribal problems, it has willingly accepted on its own soil the balkanized issue of the Middle East. America's special friend, Israel, acts in a similar way as ancient Prussia; in order to survive it must grow at the expense of its neighbors—or it must perish.<sup>185</sup> But America's

special filial-fatherly links to Israel must prevent this from happening. Metaphysically speaking, Israel is a spot of the spiritual origin of the American divine world mission and the incarnation of American ideology itself. Only within the context of a strange filial relationship with Jewishness and Israel can one understand why America accepts with equanimity its own deliberate decline into a

world-wide morass in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century. America's foreign policy actions stand in sharp contrast to the originally proclaimed goals of America's founding fathers.

Unfortunately, the fear of being called an anti-Semite prevents intelligent Americans from openly discussing the explosive issue of American-Israeli entanglement. Unlike



previous geopolitical evaluations that had some sound basis behind American foreign policy decision-making, the role of Israel and the Jewish lobby in America are the two major elements that formulate overall American foreign policy. The imagery of Israel and “God’s chosen people,” represents the framework of America’s commitments, not only toward the Middle East but

also regarding other foreign policy issues. In the meantime “any aspiring policymaker is encouraged to become an overt supporter of Israel, which is why public critics of Israeli policy have become an endangered species in the foreign policy establishment.”<sup>186</sup> These words were written in 2005 by two prominent American scholars whose essay was

relayed by major media outlets around the USA and Europe, which in turn prompted Jewish lobbies in America to cry foul and raise the proverbial specter of “anti-Semitism.” What John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt write, however, is nothing new to knowledgeable individuals. Similar critical views of Israel were voiced earlier by many American authors, and these

views also reflect, both in private and officially, those of many European scholars and politicians. But when such observations are uttered by scholars from respectable academic establishments they leave a different after-effect on the entire American political scene. This explains the reason for worry among American Jews and Israelis.

The extensive essay by John Mearsheimer and

Stephen Walt is a well documented survey depicting the staggering amount of financial aid that America gives to Israel. The essay also depicts America's persistent ignorance of the root causes of Islamic fundamentalism. The authors detail both the awesome amount of help provided by American taxpayers to Israel that the cowed Congress is always ready to approve at any whim

of American Jewish lobbies,  
and the irrelevance of Israel  
for the long term security of  
America. The Jewish  
American Lobby has its  
supporters among Christian  
Gentiles who often wish to  
show in public that they are  
more Jewish than the Jews  
themselves. This trait of  
political mimicry is  
widespread among American  
intellectuals and politicians  
who also wish to prove that

they are more Zionist than  
Zionist Jews. In hindsight,  
their behavior resembles that  
of former communist  
apparatchiks in the old Soviet  
run Eastern block who,  
during the reign of  
communism, pledged their  
ideological allegiance to the  
Kremlin by putting on display  
surplus strength of their  
mimicked, albeit feigned,  
communist orthodoxy. After  
the end of the Cold War it

was only a matter of days before they switched to the gospel of Americanism.

These authors note how the American Jewish lobby controls the research of major think-tanks and influences the decision making process in American foreign policy. The Jewish Lobby is also described as a modern thought police that monitors any critical inquiry about Israel by American



professors. “The Lobby also monitors what professors write and teach; and it encouraged students to report remarks or behaviour that might be considered hostile to Israel”(…) Similar views to those expressed by these two American authors are privately shared by a large number of American academics, but for reasons described earlier they cannot be uttered freely in public.

However, most critics of this unhealthy relationship between Israel and America seldom take into account the metaphysical relationship between Americanism and Jewishness. As a country deeply grounded in the monotheistic message of the Bible and in the philosophy of ontological chosenness, America must continue to support Israel even if Israeli policy takes America down

the path to its own  
destruction. *Homo  
americanus* must trust the  
chosen country of God and  
his birth place in Israel.

A wide-spread sense of  
civic duty to provide service  
for the greater good does not  
prevent America's political  
elites from using violent  
methods in foreign policy.  
The deeply-rooted idea of  
chosenness is further  
legitimized by the belief in a

democratic mission which, consequently, ignores or minimizes the truth or destiny of the “Other.” Regardless of what the odds are, *Homo americanus* will always have a good conscience in his foreign military adventures. Being a new form of political theology, Americanism, as a derivative form of Puritanism, must remain resilient to foreign criticism. The compulsive political

drive to lecture Europeans, Arabs, or the Japanese on the virtues of democracy, the urge to preach and pontificate, to “re-educate” heretics—all of these efforts were already tested out by America’s elites during and after World War II. By moralizing every aspect of their political life, America’s elites have attempted to extricate America from the tragic and from any form of

power politics.

This brings us again to an earlier point mentioned in this book, i.e. that America, while rejecting any political ideology, embraces its own para-biblical political theology which it calls American democracy.<sup>187</sup> The question, however, needs to be raised as to how long this Biblical discourse will make up the major political and

theological leitmotiv of American foreign policy. The brutal reality of the ever changing global environment has its own historical dynamics that refuse to be directed or wished away by “good or bad” analyses. Furthermore, America, just like any other country on earth, is also constrained by objective geopolitical factors and the ever changing constellation of smaller and

larger powers. America's incredible luck and fortune in the twentieth century may not repeat itself in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Its over-extended military position in the world does not mean that America must be forever a "major global player," as Brzezinski rightly notes. Brzezinski was himself one of the important men in shaping the theoretical foundations of Post-Cold War



American foreign policy. He rightly adds that “America is not only the true superpower but probably also the last one.”<sup>188</sup> Its sole advantage so far has been that a newcomer could become an American, or *Homo americanus* by choice—in contrast to other states in the world where nationality and citizenship are largely conferred by blood lineage.

Most importantly, as Brzezinski notes, given that America has become an increasingly multicultural and multiracial society, with different ethnic and cultural allegiances, “it will be more and more difficult to reach consensus concerning foreign policy issues.”<sup>189</sup> This is a theme which few American politicians openly wish to address. What may be

desirable tomorrow for American Jews regarding America's relationship to Israel may be seen as contrary to Arab American interests.

What may be considered a priority for European Americans tomorrow may be viewed as a hostile act by Asian Americans or Mexican Americans. Short of a major crisis, such as a common security threat which can bring about consensus among

all American ethnicities and racial groups, there will be less and less support among Americans for future foreign military adventures. After the terrorist bombing of the Twin Towers in New York in 2001 the common subject of anti-Islamism brought together, momentarily, Americans of different racial backgrounds and of all walks of life.

Islamism became suddenly a new catalyst of evil,

vindicating earlier predictions  
by the author Samuel  
Huntington about the clash  
between the Christian and  
Islamic civilizations. At the  
beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century,  
Islamism is seen in America  
as a seedbed of radicalism  
and a motor of world  
disruption and a no lesser evil  
than previously-defeated  
Fascism. “This is the only  
civilization which has

threatened on two occasions  
the very existence of the  
West,” writes Huntington.<sup>190</sup>

Although Huntington must  
be commended for his  
realistic views about the  
disruptive nature of  
multiculturalism in America,  
the scope of his analyses and  
predictions about  
Americanism are far behind  
the probity of the German  
jurist Carl Schmitt or the

expert on geopolitics Karl Haushofer. They both described a long time ago American expansion as a history of ‘longitudinal dynamics’ transforming itself into “latitudinal dynamics.””<sup>191</sup> Haushofer, who was a sharp critic of Americanism and American economic expansion, had some influence on the views held by National Socialist

Germany. In his numerous articles and books he views American economic imperialism irreconcilable with the notion of Germany's self-sufficient large spaces (*Grossraum*), i.e. an international regime best suited for co-existence with different states and cultures.<sup>192</sup> In contrast to Haushofer, the American conservative author



Huntington is enamored with the concept of the “West,” and notes “that whenever Americans look for their cultural roots then they find them in Europe.”<sup>193</sup>

However, Huntington also points out that during the last two hundred years America has been at war with almost every European power and had as a sole interest to “prevent Europe or Asia from

being dominated by a single power.”<sup>194</sup> Like most American conservatives from the establishment, Huntington uses the concept “West” as a synonym for both Europe and America, although European conservative thinkers, including Haushofer, use the term “West” solely when depicting America.

How can America safeguard Americanized

Europe in the future, given that since its incipience America has been at war with practically every European state, notably England, Spain, and lastly Germany?

Huntington's obsession with the specter of Islam is typical for American mainstream conservatives and many right-wingers at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The difference in bellicosity and

fundamentalism between Americanism and Islamism appears, however, marginal.

Both aim for a global civilization, albeit by using a different set of value systems.

Both are eager to convert unbelievers to their cause exclusively. Which side will win this historical contest only time will tell. Until now, the main ingredient of Americanism has consisted in the opposition to the creation

of an ethnic and racial cohesiveness among European-Americans and the rejection of a common cultural identity for the European-American population. The social fabric of America has traditionally been atomized, yet with the influx of non-European immigrants American society runs the risk of becoming thoroughly Balkanized. Inter-racial clashes and the

subsequent break-up of the  
country into smaller entities  
seem to be a looming  
American reality.

# Chapter VI

## Post-America and Postmodernity

The employment of general political terminology by American political and media elites has been an efficient way to cover up America's dark side of

postmodernity, both at home and abroad. The general nature of expressions, such as “human rights,” “struggle for peace,” “democracy,” has entered all social and political spheres of public discourse. The accompanying rise of the term postmodernity reflects an intellectual climate in which preceding political paradigms are meant to be discarded on the grounds of their allegedly outdated



nature. Pretentious diction and flowery language that was in vogue during the preceding modernity has now received a trove of new vocabulary. During the Cold War it was common for the Americans to lambast dictatorships, notably Communism, which became for a while part of a negative model in the liberal vernacular. But despite the arrival of a new age of

postmodernity the political diction has not changed much, except that it has adopted “softer” qualifiers. What strikes the eye of an observer is the constant usage of the negative referent “fascism” and the avoidance of the referent “communism.” The word “fascism” has figured prominently in the prose and rhetoric of all theorists of modernity—ever since 1945, and especially

since the end of Soviet communism. Possibly, a hundred years down the road, the word fascism will be studied as a symbol of America's negative legitimacy, as something that had to be used to describe the dark side of humanity in order to profile the bright and good side of American modernity. In most cases, postmodern authors do not even bother studying in detail

the intellectual origins of fascism because in most cases it is considered to be an infectious element in the field of demonology. It is the incredible plasticity of the word *fascism*, containing two easy syllables which have given this word such negative popularity. Its constant use by various theorists of modernity and postmodernity accounts also for its constant demand in scholarly analyses, despite

the world-wide claim by postmodernists that old paradigms need to be deconstructed. By contrast, the word communism, despite its legacy of the Gulag, contains some positive intonations. In fact, its verbal derivatives, such as “communalism,” “communitarian,” and “community,” convey positive and humanitarian messages that will likely

continue to attract the masses.

The same negative referent surrounds the word “Nazism,” a word often derogatorily used as a synonym for fascism.

However, the word “National Socialism,” is carefully avoided. Although the word “Nazism” was never officially in use in the Third Reich, postmodern critics consider this word more appropriate in denouncing

their enemy as a symbol of ultimate evil. By contrast, the noun “socialism,” when coupled with the adjective “national,” has something unnerving for leftist and liberal proponents of postmodernity and is carefully avoided. How can somebody be a socialist and a “Nazi” at the same time? Socialism is something that the American intelligentsia has been identifying with

since the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. It cannot be a privilege of the Nazis.

If one studies the intellectual pedigree of theorists of modernity and postmodernity one notices a host of former Freudo-Marxian intellectuals and activists. Now, in postmodernity, and with the so-called end of all truths and the end of all grand



ideological narratives, their new social experiment in American neo-liberalism is meant to be a more successful alternative. New linguistic constructs are used, and juggling with new concepts has replaced the former psycho-babble which was once typical of the American left. Postmodernity seems to be a trend in the intellectual life of America and Europe since the etymology of the

word implies that there cannot be any political paradigm after the occurrence of the modern Jewish Holocaust. Intellectual history has finally come to an end and everything must be replaced by micro-histories and consensual truth from all parts of the world, including all life styles imaginable.

Christian Ruby makes the distinction between postmodernity and neo-

modernity, the latter being more convivial and more egalitarian in its sources, having its philosophical root in the philosophy of Kant and universal reason. By contrast, the first one has its inspiration in nihilist and pro-fascist philosophers, Nietzsche and Heidegger. Can there be, after postmodernity, any standard norm of inquiry into anything?<sup>195</sup>

Despite allowing a free field for questioning all aspects of modern political thought and political action, postmodern language has not moved an inch from its entrenched dogmas of the Enlightenment, that is, from its belief in egalitarianism and the myth in boundless economic progress. One can, therefore, argue that postmodernity is a historical oxymoron, a buzzword which

neatly covers up intellectual mendacity. It is certainly not an accident that the new religion of political correctness, and all that political correctness entails in terms of judicial constraints, follows in the footsteps of postmodernity. Although being once enamored with the Marxist dogma, theorists of postmodernity use as their founding fathers paleo-fascist and fascist critics of

modernity, such as Martin Heidegger and Friedrich Nietzsche. On the one hand they abhor every aspect of fascism yet, on the other, their theories are inconceivable without the extrapolation of Nietzsche's and Heidegger's prose. One must commend their effort in retrieving these two giant anti-egalitarian and antidemocratic thinkers, although one cannot expect

them to do the same with  
hundreds of European-  
American eugenicists,  
anthropologists and legal  
scholars and their criticism of  
liberal and communist  
modernity.

Theorists of postmodernity  
usually delve into the  
intellectual heritage of paleo-  
fascist European and  
American thinkers only when  
these thinkers meet their  
methodological standards. A

possible retrieval of their anti-egalitarian, elitist, racist and antidemocratic substance is never welcome. The same can be said about the repetitive usage of the concept and negative referent, “totalitarian,” a term poorly defined and which in postmodernity is more in use than during its documented historical occurrence. In postmodernity, the word totalitarianism is used more



as a social scarecrow than as a political noun for some real past or present police state. In his seminal essay, “*Politics and the English Language*,” George Orwell, shortly after the end of the Second World War, noted how politicians, semi-intellectuals and would-be opinion-makers in the victorious West liked to envelope their prose and rhetoric with double-meaning words. With the birth of the

word and concept  
“postmodernity” not much  
has changed either. In  
academe and in public fora  
one can hear and read clumsy  
dangling sentences and  
propositions teeming with  
adjectives glorifying  
multiculturalism and racial  
diversity; one can encounter a  
whole verbal arsenal full with  
messages gloating over  
multiracial postmodernity.  
The same flowery language is

used and extra care is taken to avoid vocables that may in any way be offensive to members of racial minorities or to different lifestyles. Even when a postmodern topic revolves around an apolitical issue, a person who disagrees runs the risk of being smeared with the all-encompassing referent, “fascism.”

*Real and Hyperreal*

# *America*

An important phenomenon has occurred in the relationship between the American power elites and the media elites. At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century America, unlike other European countries, openly boasts of total freedom of speech. Yet the American media hardly dares tackle the

topics that are viewed as contrary to the postmodern spirit of Americanism. In fact, the postmodern American *mediacracy* operates more and more in common with the executive power of the ruling class. This cohabitation occurs in a corrective fashion, whereby one party sets ethical standards for the other, and vice versa. Major TV networks and newspapers in

America such as *CNN*, *The New York Times*, or *The Washington Post* toe the line of politicians and vice versa, or for that matter both set the standards for general political behavior. Among American citizens the idea is widespread that the media represents a counter-power to the system and that by its vocation it must be hostile to the decision making of power elites. But in reality, the

American media has always been an extended spokesman and the inspirer of executive power, albeit in an anonymous fashion, never citing the names of its governmental leaks. Ever since the First World War the American media has had a decisive influence in creating a psychological ambiance for American foreign policy, particularly when hectoring American politicians into

large-scale firebombing of European cities during World War II. The same strategy, although reduced in scope, was partly extolled by the American media during the American military engagement in Iraq in 2003.

In its choice of words the American ruling class and its transition belt in the media opinion-making industry no longer function in a disjointed and mutually exclusive



manner; they operate jointly, in a same pedagogical effort to “spread democracy and tolerance” word-wide.

“Regardless whether it has or has not administrative sponsorship over the media,” writes Régis Debray,” it is the media which is the master of the state. The state has to negotiate its survival with opinion makers.”<sup>196</sup> Debray, a prominent theorist of

postmodernity, does not reveal anything new, except that in postmodern “video-politics,” as he calls it, which is distilled by the modern electronic media, the lying of the politician appears more digestible than ever before. In other words, the presidential palace no longer has a decisive political importance; it is the TV tower that is now in charge of high politics. All major political narratives no

longer make up the  
“*graphosphere*”; they enter  
the domain of the emerging  
“*videosphere*.” In practice  
this means that it is no longer  
important what nonsense the  
politician thinks or says, but  
how well presentable and  
likeable he and his  
nonsensical comments are on  
the TV screen. There may be  
minor differences as to how  
the media and the American  
ruling class formulate their

message, or how their corrective efforts supplement each other, but the substance of their message must always have the same tune.

Have the TV and visual media changed the picture of the objective world? Or can the reality of the objective world be grasped when first aired by the media? Remarks by academics and politicians deemed contrary to the canons of media-fabricated

truths immediately encounter  
a wall of silence. Rebel  
sources and information,  
critical of the dogma of  
democracy and human rights,  
are usually kept outside the  
TV limelight. This is  
particularly true regarding  
those authors who question  
the essence of American  
democracy and who  
challenge the legitimacy of  
the free market.  
Modern American

politicians resort more and more to verbal referents that are veiled in a hermetic meta-language and that are meant to give an aura of respectability to their authors.

Postmodern politicians, including university professors, increasingly resort to bombastic words of exotic origin, and their jargon is often hidden behind a phraseology that they themselves seldom

understand. With the rapid onslaught of postmodern meta-discourse at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century the unwritten rule has become that the reader or the viewer, and no longer the author, should be the sole interpreter of political truth. From now on, the political lexicon is allowed to have multi-faceted meanings. But this, of course, does not apply to the dogma

of the free market or to modern historiography which must forever remain in a static state. Postmodern discourse enables a politician or an opinion maker to feign political innocence. Thus he is free to plead ignorance in case his political decisions go wrong. This, however, must not apply to his tentative wish to deconstruct the proverbial signifier “fascism” which is meant to remain a referent for



supreme evil.

In his above mentioned essay, published in 1946, a year after the total defeat of National Socialism, Orwell noted how the word “fascism” had lost much of its original meaning; “it has now no meaning except in so far as it signifies something not desirable.” (...) The same can be said for a vast array of postmodern referents, including the polymorphous

word, “totalitarianism,” which back in the early twenties of the preceding century when it first appeared, did not have a negative connotation. And who says it always should if one assumes that the proverbial American system, in case of emergency, will likely have to use totalitarian tools in order to guarantee its survival? If America was to face a major racial disruption

(the massive racial division that arose after the devastation of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 can be seen as a warm-up), it will more than likely have to adopt classical disciplinary measures—that is, police repression and martial law. Arguably, most postmodern theorists would then not object to the implementation of such measures, although the word “totalitarian” would

be wisely skipped. A long time ago, Carl Schmitt, who has already been mentioned, realized an age old truth; namely, political concepts acquire their true meanings only when the chief political actor, i.e. the state and its ruling class, find themselves in a sudden and unpredictable state of emergency. Then all former interpretations of “self-evident” truths become obsolete. One could witness

that after the terrorist attack of 9/11 in America—an event that was never fully elucidated—the ruling class in America used that opportunity to redefine the legal meaning of the expressions “human rights” and “freedom of speech.” After all, is not the best way to curb real civic rights the adoption of abstract incantations, such as “human rights” and “democracy”?

Seemingly, with the possible declaration of a large-scale political emergency in the future, America will finally be able to assign true meanings to its current political vocabulary. For the time being, however, postmodernity in America can be depicted as a passing semantic and artistic fad, best suited for academic and political surveillance, under the guise of one word:

democracy.

Unlike the word, the concept of postmodernity denotes a political or social event that, according to diverse circumstances, means anything and, therefore, nothing. Postmodernity is both a break with modernity and its logical continuation in its bloated form. But as noted, in terms of the egalitarian dogma of multiculturalism as well as the religion of

progress, postmodern  
discourse remains unchanged.

A French theorist of  
postmodernity, Gilles  
Lipovetsky, uses the term  
“hypermodernity” when  
describing postmodernity.

Postmodernity is  
hypermodernity in so far as  
the means of communication  
render all political signs  
disfigured and out of  
proportion. Henceforth,  
something considered



hypermodern must also be hyperreal or surreal, a fact exemplified by the indefinite proliferation of mini-discourses; from those eulogizing tribal historical memories to those honoring mass commemorations of the war dead. New signs and logos emerge representing the diverse nature of the Americanized world system. Lipovetsky notes that “very soon there will not be a single

activity, no object, no location that does not have the honor of a museum institution. From the pancake museum to the sardine museum, from the Elvis Presley museum to that of the Beatles.”<sup>197</sup> In multicultural postmodernity everything is the object of surreal remembrance and no tribe or a lifestyle must be left out of the loop. Jews have already

secured themselves a privileged position of being globally memorialized; now it is the turn of a myriad of other tribes, lifestyles, and of different marginal groups in search of their piece of the of global memory pie.

Officially, in multicultural America there are no races and no racial differences. Yet affirmative action quotas and the scarecrow of racism constantly bring the word

“race” to the fore. For something that is repeatedly rejected by the postmodern establishment in America, it surely is obsessed over and about incessantly. Racial minorities call for more equal human rights and advocate the need for social diversity; yet, in terms of their own demands they never shy away from pointing to their own stylish “otherness” and their own racial uniqueness. If

their demands are not met,  
authorities run the risk of  
being accused of  
“insensitivity.” So why not  
then, from now on, use the  
word hyper-racial hyper-  
America? The important  
thing is that the reader grasps  
what those terms mean in  
view of the fact that  
postmodernity, according to  
circumstances, can have  
contradictory meanings.  
America is as modern a

country as it has always claimed to be. Modernity and the religion of progress are part of its historical process. At the same time, however, metastatic elements of postmodernity, particularly the famous American overkill in media representation, have become present everywhere. Postmodernity has its traps. In order to avoid them its spokesmen use approaches to modern discourse by

resorting to apolitical and less loaded qualifiers. In the postmodern world, writes Lipovetsky, “one notices the predominance of the individual sphere over the universal sphere, the psychological over the ideological, communication over politicization, diversity over homogeneity, the permissive over the coercive.”<sup>198</sup> Similarly, social

and political issues surface into the limelights that were totally ignored and unheard of in the last decades of the twentieth century. The sexual impotence of a presidential candidate is considered a prime time political event—more so than his handling of an important domestic crime issue. A death of an infant in war ravaged Africa is considered a case of national emergency. Even the most



ardent supporter of multiculturalism could have hardly imagined the phenomenal changes in pan-racial discourse among American elites. Even the most optimistic consumer-prone progressivist in America could have never imagined such a mass display of linguistic permissiveness, including an explosion of millions of signs of sexual seduction. Everything turns

into a softer form of a new ideology; from the ideology of sex to the new religion of football—all the way to the ideological crusade against real or purported terrorism.

Mass culture in neo-postmodernity, as Ruby writes, facilitates extreme individualism to the extent that every tiny spot in human existence must be henceforth viewed as a perishable or a hygienic commodity.

“Someone’s personality is gauged by his white teeth and no spots of sweat under his armpits, as well as the absence of all emotion.”<sup>199</sup>

Even the word culture in the English language has been subject to semantic changes.

Now this word stands for different lifestyles and has nothing in common with its original meaning. Therefore, one might just as well call

postmodern America a  
“hypermodern” America, a  
description which suggests  
that in the years to come there  
will be more hyper-narratives  
all around hyper-America and  
the hyper-Americanized  
world.

And what comes after  
postmodernity? “Everything  
appears,” writes Lipovetsky,  
“as if we had moved from an  
age of “post” to an age of  
“hyper;” a new society of

modernity is resurfacing. No longer does one wish to leave the world of tradition in order to accede to rational modernity, but to modernize the modernity, to rationalize the rationalization..."<sup>200</sup> It is the attempt to always add more progress, more economic growth, more TV special effects that is thought to fuel the existence of hyperreal America. The surplus of

American symbolism must  
continue to attract  
disillusioned ones from all  
races and all lifestyles, and  
from all corners of the world.  
A TV image or a theater story  
serves henceforth as a  
normative value for its global  
emulation—not the other way  
around. First comes the  
American virtual icon, most  
likely by means of a movie, a  
TV show, or a computer  
game; then the masses start

using this imagery in the implementation of their own local reality. It is the media projection of hyper-real America which serves from now on as the best propaganda weapon for the American dream.

A typical example of American hyperreality occurs when the American political class assumes that every error in its multicultural universe and each flaw in its gigantic

judiciary can be repaired by bringing in more foreign immigrants, by adding more racial quotas, or by further liberalizing its already liberal laws. In other words, the haunting fear of the balkanization of the country is thought to be best curable by infusing more racial diversity and by bringing in more non-European immigrants. Likewise, flaws in the free market, which are



becoming more and more visible everywhere in America, are thought to be solvable not by setting curbs on market competition but by allowing more competition, by espousing more privatization, by encouraging more economic deregulation, etc. This trait of postmodern “overkill” is the main ingredient of the American ideology which seems to have found its accelerated

momentum in early postmodernity. It never crosses the mind of America's elites that social consensus in multiracial America cannot be reached by decree. However, resorting to policies contrary to these hyperrealist endeavors already in place could mean the end of postmodern America.

Already at the end of the

20<sup>th</sup> century, America started showing signs of social obesity. It is the irrational nature of belief in progress which has grown in a metastatic fashion and which will eventually spell America's end. Lasch noted, quite some time ago, how back in the late twentieth century, the American narcissus savored sensual pleasures and indulged in all

forms of self-gratification. Having fun has always been part of American ideology. But the postmodern American fun seeking narcissus, as Lipovetsky calls it, has different worries now. His cult of body and his love of himself have yielded to panic attacks and mass anxiety: “Obsession with oneself manifests itself less in the joy fever, but more in fear, illness, and old age, in the

“medicalisation” of life.”<sup>201</sup>

In hyperrational America everything needs to be explained away by rational formulas, regardless whether the issue is a person's sexual impotence or the US president's political impotence. The unpredictable nature of life represents the biggest danger for *Homo americanus* because it does not offer him a rational

formula as to how to avoid death, therefore defying the very nature of Americanism.

Everything frightens American man today; from terrorism to his receding pension plan; from uncontrolled mass immigration to his possible job loss. It would be a waste of time to provide figures and numbers on American social ills at the beginning of the third millennium, such as

child abuse, drug abuse,  
violent crime, etc., but the  
number of these  
abnormalities will climb  
exponentially with the  
progressive march of  
America's postmodernity.

Each postmodernist uses  
his own meta-language and  
gives his own interpretation  
to historical meanings. If one  
accepts the definition of  
postmodernity by the French  
theorist Baudrillard, then

everything in postmodern America is a grotesque copy of reality. America has functioned since 1945 as a giant Xerox copy of meta-reality; not America as it is but America as it should be for the entire globe. The only difference is that by the 21<sup>st</sup> century the once gentle pace of history has shifted all the way upward into fifth gear. Events reel by in no historical



sequence and pile headlong  
onward towards all-out chaos.

According to Baudrillard,  
who is surely one of the best  
European observers of  
Americanism, America's  
hyperreality has devoured  
America's reality. Therefore,  
the question needs to be  
asked: in order to achieve the  
American dream, are not  
present and future Americans  
supposed to live in a  
projected dreamland? Is not

America a pretense, a fiction,  
a meta-reality? Is there any  
substance to America—given  
that Americanism, at least in  
the eyes of its non-American  
imitators, functions solely as  
a make-believe system, i.e. as  
a hyper-copy of its own  
projected and embellished  
self? In a postmodern virtual  
world of the internet and  
computers, the enactment of  
real events in America  
already has its preceding

ready-made reenactment plan that is supposed to serve as a pedagogical tool for different contingency plans. For instance, the American military elites have all possible formulas for any case of emergency, and in any spot on earth. One can, therefore, safely bet that a scenario in at least one formula will match with a real event on the ground. Briefly, argues Baudrillard, in

a country of millions of fractal events, however overrepresented and overplayed they are, everything turns into a non-event. Postmodernity brings about the trivialization of all values, even those it holds dear to its own political survival.

America and its ruling class may some day disappear, or America may break up into smaller American entities, but

American hyperreality will continue to seduce the masses world wide. Postmodern America must remain the land of seduction, albeit its seduction designed more for the non-European masses and less for white Americans who privately dream about going to other undiscovered Americas. In a country such as America, writes Baudrillard, “where the energy of the public sphere,

the energy which creates social myths and dogmas is gradually disappearing, the social arena turns obese and monstrous; it grows like a mammal and a glandular corpse. Once it was illustrated by its heroes; today it refers to its handicapped, its weirdos, its degenerates, its asocial persons—and all of this in a gigantic effort of therapeutic maternity.”<sup>202</sup>

Social outcasts and marginal types have become role models in America's postmodernity. Political truth has already become an issue of the private and emotional sphere, whereby a member of a religious sect or a spokesman of some lifestyle exercises at will his nebulous political judgments. A crank has as much liberty in publicly voicing his political opinion as a university

professor. A serial killer becomes a TV superstar, both before and after his killing spree. In fact, as the quest for diversity forever widens, new social groups and with them new social demands endlessly emerge. The therapeutic state of post-America, as Gottfried calls it, is the ideal system for studying all pathological behaviors.

As much as postmodernists



at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup>  
century like to urge  
everybody to question all  
paradigms and all political  
myths, they do, however,  
cherish their own petty  
verities; notably those of an  
ethnic and gender nature.  
They continue to advocate  
affirmative action programs  
that are meant to give  
visibility to non-European life  
styles and that espouse

different anti-white narratives. Diversity has become the magic word of postmodernists—albeit diversity based on negative legitimacy, that is, diversity which rejects European diversity by emphasizing the alleged nefarious nature of the white man's interpretation of history.

However much postmodernists attempt to deconstruct modernity by

using Friedrich Nietzsche as their main guide, they basically uphold their own micro-ideological and infra-political racial and diverse lifestyle agendas. They reject other interpretations of reality, especially if these clash with the all pervasive-myth of Americanism. The intellectual approach regarding their micro-verities and micro-myths must not be criticized under any

circumstance. Their narratives remain the sacrosanct foundation of *their* postmodernity. Essentially, each tribe's or each group's narrative appears as a big lie carried out in a horizontal fashion, whereby each lie cancels out the validity of another competing lie. A proponent of some bizarre lifestyle in America knows that his narrative is a falsehood; yet he must

pretend to be telling the truth.

Essentially, the discourse of postmodernity is a grand discourse in meta-mendacity.

If one adopts the logic of permissive postmodernity and the hyperreal micro-narrative of a religious zealot or a postmodern tribesman, regardless whether he aspires to be a TV talk show host, a porn star, or a would-be guerilla spokesman, then one might just as well accept the

idea of “post-democracy,”  
“post liberalism,” “post-  
Holocaust,” and “post-  
humans” in post-America.  
Since all the grand narratives  
of dying modernity are  
allowed to be questioned  
freely, one can find ample  
reason to question and  
discard the grand narrative  
surrounding American  
democracy. By the same  
token, one could resurrect  
thinkers, authors, and

scientists in America, who since the end of the antebellum South and particularly since the end of the Second World War in Europe, have been pushed into oblivion, or who are denounced as racists, bigots, and fascists in the endless fauna of political exclusion.

But postmodern authors prudently avoid the field of taboo themes. They realize that in the “freest of all

societies” antifascist anti-anti-Semitic myths must continue to thrive.

## *U.S Calling: A Revocable Nostalgia*

One must be cautious with comments regarding the alleged irrational resentments by many European and American authors against the American creed. Ironically, the most cynical remarks



about Americanism and *Homo americanus* do not originate among European critics but are voiced by isolated yet well-known American writers. One of these is the American novelist Henry Miller, better known in Europe for his erotic prose than by his insights into the European and American mind. He is one of those rare urban Americans who once visited Europe, not for tourist

purposes, but to live there for an extended period of time in various capacities; as an artist, as a bum, a beggar and an adventurer. Only after his lengthy stay in Europe and upon his return to America, prior to the outbreak of World War II in Europe, did the rediscovery of true America enable him to become aware of its hidden mystic parts which he had earlier been unaware of. In his novel, *The*

*Air-Conditioned Nightmare*, a book now almost ignored in America and Europe, Miller describes America's obsession with the idea of progress and the resulting uglification of the country. Even today, his visionary views seem to be a rare privilege of only a few American individuals, in so far as their stay in Europe helps them to critically assess their own country of birth and

their new spiritual homeland of choice. Miller seems to be aware of the new American subspecies he encounters in large cities: “Some other breed of man has won out.

This world which is in the making fills me with dread. I have seen it germinate...It is a world suited for monomaniacs obsessed with the idea of progress.”<sup>203</sup>

Strangely, Miller seems to be

rediscovering true America  
only in the mystical Deep  
South, in the bayous of  
Louisiana, and the deserts of  
Arizona. Miller's novel and  
his own life demonstrate that  
in order to understand and  
love true America, one must  
have a strong will to power,  
an exemplary Promethean  
spirit of cultural curiosity,  
and intellectual ability to  
constantly put oneself in  
diverse socio-political and

esthetical perspectives.

Other than the already mentioned authors critical of Americanism, there is also an “un-American” writer and American journalist, H.L. Mencken, who needs to be mentioned here given that he is viewed by many dissenting conservative Americans as the best American stylist. To him, America is a country of third-rate half-wits. He calls the American species

*“boobus americanus,”* a specie who only knows how to indulge in petty sensual gratifications. “The only thing that made life difficult for him,” writes Mencken, “was his congenital dunderheadedness”; “a nation of senescent Europeans,” “Anglo-Saxon immigrants,” “the botched and unfit...,” “Scandinavians run to all bone and no brain, Jews too incompetent to swindle even

the barbarous peasants of Russia and Poland.” In short, early Americans, the offspring of European immigrants were, according to Mencken, “weary peasants eager only for the comfortable security of a pig in a sty.”<sup>204</sup> It is hardly conceivable that prose as acerbic as Mencken’s could be published during the heyday of American



postmodernity, i.e. at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Mencken was a master of the English language, similar to his contemporary, the “un-American” poet and writer Ezra Pound. Pound is also critical of the psychology of *Homo americanus* and the ruling class in Washington D.C. It must be pointed out, however, that in comparison to Pound, Mencken savages

the American system and the lifestyle of his compatriots in a pamphleteering fashion, playing with words, thereby rendering his prose a good piece of social satire. This is not the case with a more radical Pound who, similar to right-wing European and American critics of Americanism, looks in detail at the biological and political substructure of Americanism, always probing into the tragic

and deadly elements behind America's belief in progress.

Pound's prose, similar to Francis P. Yockey's, is reminiscent of the revolutionary conservative European critics of Americanism and still has considerable popularity and readership in Europe.

Pound is a case in point in view of his post World War II troubles with the American military judiciary. His

American anti-Americanism may remind one of a handful of Russian anti-Soviet dissidents, such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Alexander Zinoviev who both hated the communist system yet refused to trade off their anticommunist beliefs for the love of plutocratic liberalism.

Pound complains about an inveterate American inability to put things in perspective; “the lack in America of *any*

habit of connecting and correlating *any* act or thought to *any* main principle, whatsoever...”<sup>205</sup> However,

Pound’s eulogy for a founding father of America, Thomas Jefferson, leaves one perplexed and confronts the reader with a puzzling dilemma of the meaning of postmodernity. The heritage of Jefferson, according to Pound, is “Here and Now, in

the Italian peninsula and the beginning of the fascist second decennia, not in Massachusetts or

Delaware.”<sup>206</sup> These words by a fascist author sound too laudatory for somebody who is viewed by liberals and leftists as an icon of American democracy.

Who can now give a proper definition of Americanism in light of Pound's eulogy of

egalitarian and liberal  
American founding father,  
Thomas Jefferson? Naturally,  
at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup>  
century, judgment will be  
made by those who are in  
charge of defining  
postmodern discourse and the  
meaning of the so-called self-  
evident truths of our times,  
American lies and truths  
notwithstanding.

Pound left the USA after

his releases from an insane asylum. On April 18, 1958, upon his arrival at Naples, Italy, Pound told the crowd of Italian journalists: “I left for good a psychiatric asylum of 180 million people.”<sup>207</sup> He probably wanted to show that a true American patriot shines best only when he quits America’s shores for good. Is it only after the departure from America that a good



observer can discover  
America's hidden attractions?  
This was the case with Miller  
and other uprooted American-  
born and European artists and  
thinkers who may be  
described as double returnees,  
suffering from double  
nostalgia. Miller rightly takes  
to his heart the rooted  
America teeming with the  
mystical character in places  
which had been spared the  
steamroller of

Americanization. These areas still exist in the Deep South.

In understanding Miller's Ulysses-like love and hate of America one must, therefore, decide to be a constant voyager, forever ready to live between two different worlds and in both of them at the same time. One could cite the insightful Jewish-French philosopher of cultural pessimism, Vladimir Jankélévitch, who depicts the

phenomenology of nostalgia as an ingredient of “pathetic geography,” a long forgotten memory of locations whose immemorial traces spur reminiscence and evoke all kinds of imagination. “The nostalgic person is at the same time here and there, neither here nor there; he is present and absent, two times present and two times absent.”<sup>208</sup> This is in

particular true for the Jewish people, constantly on the run, constantly on the road, having no desire to mix with others, or to cast permanent geographic roots anywhere in the world. Hence the reason Jews find the uprooted American system as the most appealing system of all.

But nomadic Americanism must be distinguished from the traditional and rooted Americanism of the South

which still exerts attraction from many European artists and thinkers who are resentful of both here and there, i.e. of both their host country and their native country, yet who secretly yearn for a static moment of spiritual or intellectual bliss in both locations. Nostalgia enables them to keep that moment frozen in the past; a moment to be kept secret and used as mental nourishment

in times of national or personal distress. After a lengthy absence from America, a returnee is bound to discover riveting spots that his eyes could never have spotted before. He may remember nostalgically his once-upon-a-time cigarette in some American cheap motel, his cup of coffee on Santa Monica beach, or the unexpected help by an unknown “hick” in Tennessee

who helped him fix his flat  
tire. Or he may savor  
retroactively his uplifting  
moments of mobile solitude  
on a large highway, with  
nobody in the back seat to  
breath down his neck.

These fleeting moments of  
the American dream may turn  
someone's life upside down;  
they may become the  
centerpiece of the meaning of  
life. But these moments may  
also acquire a different

meaning after physical  
absence elsewhere on the  
globe. The other side of the  
nostalgia-come true can result  
in ugly disappointment. The  
much romanticized  
homeland, rediscovered after  
decades of painful absence,  
may have become in the  
meantime a wretched reality  
replete with different peoples  
of different lifestyles. The  
return to a long searched  
homeland may become a



nightmare, as it did for Ulysses, who upon his much cherished return to his wife in Ithaca, spends his time cleaning up anarchy in his household. The ugly side of nostalgia retrieved is stored away, side by side with dark spots of unpleasant souvenirs.

Subconsciously, every disappointed returnee, be he an American or European, is forced time and again to ponder about a new

departure. Jankélévitch  
remarks well that “each  
departure holding each return  
in suspense is the best means  
to revive our nostalgia.”<sup>209</sup> Is  
not the dream of having  
another geographic  
alternative at hand the only  
way to make human life  
bearable?

Nostalgia is the reaction to  
the irreversible; it is the  
essence of the will to live; it

is the memory of static times.

America is the perfect embodiment of irretrievable times in retrievable space. In its vast and protean geography lies a spell both charming and dreadful.

It can be said that just as somebody can be a good American patriot by living outside postmodern America's jurisdiction, so can a person turn into a travesty of American man by living

and mimicking Americanism  
in America itself. In this  
sense, a true American heretic  
does not differ much from an  
anti-European or an  
anticommunist heretic who,  
once upon a time was forced  
to leave his country of birth,  
yet who refused to become an  
emulator of the political  
system of his adoptive  
homeland.

One must conclude that  
reactionary, traditionalist or

racialist anti-Americanism, is  
a sign of refusal of the  
American political  
experiment and its ideology  
of progress, as well as the  
rejection of the founding  
myths of the Enlightenment.  
European authors, who  
critically write about  
Americanism, do that more  
for political or esthetical  
reasons, while secretly  
dreaming about the spatial  
advantages that only America

offers. Many of them are aware of the claustrophobic nature of political life in Europe which cannot expand in a small area of so many crowded national narratives.

The origin of this claustrophobic European spirit lies in the extreme compartmentalization of European languages and cultures, and along with them the always looming possibility of civil strife.

European historical memories, whatever sweet dreams they provoke, have their share of nasty side-effects—as they have had for every European since the Stone Age.

American and European traditionalists and racialists make a mistake when advocating Sameness as a precondition for their ethnic and cultural survival. Often it is the Otherness in its

geographic or racial expression that helps a person discover his own national and racial uniqueness. No traditionalist, no white spokesman of his in-group identity can ever deny the fact that in his life time he has more than once been victimized by his fellow tribesman and in his old homeland. Sometimes, meeting a distant alien or moving to a far away country



becomes the only solace.

Nostalgia often brings about romantic thoughts and compels many American traditionalists to dwell in the past. But nostalgia has also its demonic side, however limited, apolitical and individualistic it may appear. The lack of large space and urban density, such as is the case in Europe, provokes a different perception of reality. Brooding over European

traditionalism does not only bring back sweet memories; those memories may resurrect a painful detail harking back to an unpleasant event or a haunting souvenir of someone's ugly face. It is often the imagery of a past in-group tribal quarrel that makes life a nightmare in Europe and which is less to be encountered in America.

Subconsciously, many Europeans who once decided

to move to America wished to  
rid themselves of the layers of  
unpleasant memories or  
substitute them for new  
referents, new imagery, while  
embracing the new notion of  
large space. The kingdom of  
forgetfulness makes life  
bearable, whatever European  
traditionalists and  
postmodern racialists may say  
to the contrary.

And why not admit that the  
much vaunted trade mark of

“historical memory” which Europeans often brag about can have its dark side? Just because the vast majority of Russians were victims of *Homo sovieticus* syndrome does not mean that the whole of Russia was synonymous with communism. By the same token, being critical of *Homo americanus* or rejecting the American political experiment does not mean that there cannot be

another America—which still  
waits to be discovered.

# Chapter VII

## E Pluribus

### Dissensus: Exit

#### European

#### Americans

**T**here is one advantage to postmodernity: it is self-destructive.      Given      that

postmodernity offers a myriad of conceptual frameworks, the future of Americanism can, from now on, be studied from a myriad of post-American viewpoints. It can be studied from a traditionalist, nativist, or racist American perspective. The plethora of literature on eugenics and racialism and extensive revisionist literature stretching from the

antebellum South to critical analysis of the Second World War, could also be used as a tool in bringing about changes in postmodern America. Surely, books can always be banned, but truth seems to be alive and well online on the Internet. Traditionalist Americans could resurrect their values and truths and make them look more palatable for the masses. The antebellum



South and an anti-egalitarian America could be revived and explained in a cogent and convincing fashion. After all, according to the theorists of postmodernity, truth is a matter of consensus.

With the end of the antebellum South an important chunk of American history has been lost to Americanism—a pattern which was to be repeated a hundred years later in Europe.

However, the lost Southern legacy could be extrapolated and post-modernized in a new context, while retaining its principles that are officially rejected as reactionary and un-American. And this means primarily attacking the ideology of progress that has been the centerpiece of Americanism and the Americanized world at large, particularly since 1945. Furthermore, postmodernity

can be a launching pad for diverse forms of Euro-American-nationalism, including the rebirth of a new European-inspired American political elite. In the years to come, nobody can rule out the prospect of racial segregation and the balkanization of America into different ethnic and racial entities. No one can rule out that European-Americans will cordon themselves off into

their own well-guarded racial reserves. At this moment this may sound preposterous, but it should not be viewed as improbable. In these hypothetical cases, postmodern America will have to resort to different myths that will have a bad or good side—depending on the judgment of the future leaders in power. Postmodernity can provide spiritual material for the revival of old American

antebellum customs that are long gone and that stand in sharp contrast to the American ideology of progress.

Postmodernity means the come-back of anti-modernity and the return of old American traditions which lay dormant in present day America. Why not conceive of an American system that, while rejecting the egalitarian version of postmodernity, can

recuperate ideas and thoughts  
of American pre-  
Enlightenment and anti-  
Puritan thinkers? Moreover,  
Nietzsche should not just be  
left out as a leftist tool for  
postmodern theorizing. With  
his radical rejection of  
egalitarian dogmas, Nietzsche  
can be a major locomotive for  
the European-American  
revival and their spiritual  
reawakening from the Puritan  
dogma of hypermoralism.

The term postmodern has a disadvantage of being equivocal, although the same can be said about the term *Homo americanus*, which has been used in this book to describe a species and a by-product of American ideology. But *Homo americanus*, within a different historical context and with a different value system, could be seen as a positive species, i.e., as a

prototype for a new

Promethean man whose anti-mercantile, anti-capitalist and anti-egalitarian values differ from those he once displayed when disembarking from the Mayflower and which ended up with his progeny on Wall Street. If America should be a pluralistic and heterogeneous entity, as postmodernists argue, i.e., a land consisting of millions of multicultural narratives, then one must also



accept the heritage of eugenics and racialism in its fold, and above all, the incorporation of traditional European cultures. According to this definition, America could combine traditionalism with hyper-modernism; it could become a repository for both traditional and postmodern European values. This is important to consider as the legacy of the anti-egalitarian, eugenic, and

polytheistic thought has been  
purposely ignored and  
demonized by the modern  
interpreters of historical  
meaning.

The present meaning of  
postmodernity is partly due to  
the legacy of World War II.

Having succumbed to the  
process of cultural  
brainwashing, more often by  
their own will than as a result  
of the American system,  
critics of Americanism have

failed to use other tools in order to capture cultural hegemony. All what they have done so far has consisted in displaying derision for American decadence and American politics on the one hand, or sending servile signs of love to American elites on the other. And even that servility on the part of European critics has been managed and hypocritical, since post-war

America has been able to exert influence on its foes and friends alike. In the eyes of many European critics, America has been reduced to the imagery of Hollywood and East Coast money sharks, with no nuanced description in between. The pristine and honorable America as depicted by Ambrose Bierce, or the heroism shown in early black & white cowboy movies, no longer exists—

however limited it may be in scope and number. Other notions of Americanism are possible, but those notions need to be based on anti-modern and postmodern values and opposed to the dogma of the Enlightenment. Ironically, the medieval man of Europe, with his traditional values of chivalry and self-sacrifice, has been better preserved in America than in Europe. The author

Christopher Lasch, a Euro-American author was one of those rare observers who spotted the vestiges of rudimentary and honorable Americanism, while realizing that the ideology of American progress and its mutation into liberalism, “turns out to be its greatest weakness; its rejection of a heroic conception of life.”<sup>210</sup>

Essentially, the ideology of

progress, according to Lasch, was designed as a liberal antidote to the Southern culture of despair.

The ideology of Americanism and its carrier *Homo americanus* are showing fissures in their respective edifices. Memory of past America, with its frozen times, provokes nostalgia and a desire for future static times. Nostalgia for the past has the advantage

of being immobile and not subject to accidents; it evolves around imagery that is not subject to historical disruptions. It is paradoxical that with all the yearning for progress and all that progress brings, most Americans, probably more than Europeans in Europe, suffer from a deep seated nostalgia. And this nostalgia, within a static America, as seen in previous chapters, was once



revolving around the first America of the South West—an America that still resides in the memory of many of its citizens. “Progress implied nostalgia as its mirror image,” recalls Lasch.<sup>211</sup> “Americans were notoriously given to recurrent fits of melancholy evoked by suggestions that some primal innocence... had been lost in the headlong rush for gold.”<sup>212</sup> Indeed, a foreign

observer, who understands the spirit of European Americans and all the nuances of the American language, can see a curious sense of “Weltschmerz” among the majority of white Americans, regardless of their educational level. These Americans often display a truly primeval European character trait. In his own pessimistic tone, as much as he wishes to hide it, Lasch

reflects this nostalgia for a primeval American time and his deep pessimism about the culture of progress. The fact that he often quotes Georges Sorel, a French author and a critic of liberal progress and a thinker who influenced intellectual fascism, indicates what Lasch himself thinks about the future of Americanism. He and his kindred hardly fit into the category of “*Homo*

*americanus.*”

# ***Southern Comfort: White Man's Discomfort***

The metaphysical roots of traditional America are largely ignored in Europe and even in postmodern America.

This should not come as a surprise, in view of the fact that the cultural heritage of

the antebellum South has been deliberately suppressed by the mainstream media and educational elites. Although America was a military and political winner of the Second World War, it also had to undergo a white man's atonement process and its own soul-searching homework, similar to vanquished Germany and its allies. As a result, anti-egalitarian and anti-liberal

American authors and ideas, which had sporadically thrived until the early 30s in America, were simply relegated to oblivion. Hence the additional perception among European authors that America has nothing to offer other than fast food and fast death.

Unlike Europe at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, America can boast a number

of rebellious thinkers who in many ways surpass their European colleagues with cultural achievements.

Amidst thousands of bizarre sects, clans, and religious denominations in America, one can encounter individuals of great probity and intellectual innovation. Their only problem is that in atomized and postmodern America their message cannot result in the creation of mass

movements. Modern American conservatism falls short of a historical oxymoron, and one wonders what is left to conserve in America in the first place?

Americanism, by its definition, is an ideology of progress that rejects any notion of a European-based traditional society and state.

Therefore, American conservatism is a semantic anachronism. Different



theories about American conservatism versus modernity and postmodernity appear often as a misnomer since all brands of conservatism in postmodern America carry a strong resentment against state and social welfarism. Therefore, American conservatives stand in radical opposition to traditional European conservatives who are usually respectful of a strong

socially-oriented state. To make things even more confusing, many former disillusioned Jewish American intellectuals, who were once sympathetic to Marxism, began to label themselves in the early eighties of the previous century with the term “neo-conservatives,” a term that added more semantic misery to an already bloated neo-post-modern American

discourse. In postmodern America, the so-called American neo-conservatives play a crucial role in the American opinion-making industry.<sup>213</sup>

In the early twentieth century, America made unique scientific breakthroughs in the fields of eugenics and later in sociobiology, two fields that could be used as a paradigm

for racialist in postmodernity.

In the first half of the twentieth century, eugenics was an important field of academic study with far reaching implementations in the judicial system of America. But the grand egalitarian narrative of Americanism, having the subject of race as the great scarecrow, prevents the study of eugenics from entering the public forum. Eugenics and

racialism, although usually associated with the radical right and traditionalism, are also the product of the Enlightenment and the ideology of progress. The study of human genes and genetic differences among humans is by no means the prerogatives of the so-called modern American racialists or National Socialists of the Third Reich. Research in eugenics had considerable

popularity among early theorists of socialism such as Marx and Engels, and their later successors in the early Soviet Union. At some point in recent history, eugenics matched with the communist and liberal ideas of progress.<sup>214</sup> It was in the interest of early American capitalists to improve biological performance of their workers, less for the

reasons of their racial beauty and more for the reasons of their own capitalist profit. Modern American racialists often forget that the goal of early eugenicists was not so much racial betterment of Americans for some allegedly cultural or spiritual purposes, but a crass attempt by an ultra-rationalist capitalist society to equip itself with healthy robots and happy consumers. Hypothetically

speaking, if an all-white  
racialist America was ever to  
become a political reality, and  
if that society was founded on  
the values of economism,  
adhering only to the theology  
of the free market, it would  
be an equally ugly system,  
not much better than present  
multiracial America.

Many American  
conservative and, especially,  
racialist authors and writers,  
while observing with concern



the changing racial profile of America, tend to downplay or leave out cultural factors in their analyses of decaying America. There is a lack of positive cultural, scientific, and social achievement that could go beyond their simplistic all-white-America propaganda rhetoric. Most so-called white nationalist groups in postmodern America, or those who label themselves as such, cannot

cooperate with other conservative and traditionalists factions on a larger political scale. Often, they are ridden by bizarre quarrels and factional infighting and are hardly able to conceive of a theory that would lay down the principles of a society that would even remotely resemble the kind they dream about. Most American racialists, irrespective of their

commendable sense of  
sacrifice and idealism,  
display outdated political  
romanticism grounded often  
in Biblical hypermoralism.

Also, the problem with  
American racialists,  
traditionalists, but also many  
paleo-conservatives, is their  
fixation on genetic  
determinism in explaining  
social problems in America.

In their journals and  
conferences they tirelessly

focus on the role of the I.Q., the human phenotype, the genotype of different races, and the high crime rate of non-European racial minorities, including the propensity of different ethnic groups to different illnesses. They use race as the only field of study in order to explain all of America's social ills, while forgetting other approaches, such as art, culture and languages. This

reductionism, so typical of Americanism, is no less harmful than the economic reductionism of modern liberals and Marxists, who argue that the problems of mankind can be solved through permanent economic growth. Furthermore, American racialism, which boasts some intelligent writers, hardly squares with Biblical fundamentalism, which continues to be the

trade mark of most American traditionalists and racialists.

As long as traditionalist Americans continue to lug about their monotheistic deities, they will be in a permanent position of political contradiction. Their neurotic behavior, i.e. the acceptance of Christian ecumenism on the one hand and the tacit approval of racial segregation on the other, cannot be a weapon for

cultural success. These two social phenomena exclude each other. Similar parallels could be drawn with post-Christian Europeans who in a similar fashion lament the changing racial demographics of Europe and the withering of white Europeans. In private, millions of them complain about the influx of foreign immigrants while at the same time they continue to adhere to Christian beliefs

of universalism, which by their very essence posit social and racial mixture.

In hindsight and by using the causal approach method, one may realize how events in Europe after the Second World War bear strange parallels to the events of the post-bellum American South. The psychological effects that the end of the Civil War had left on Americans in the late



19<sup>th</sup> century had similarities with the effects of Americanism on the European population after World War II. Attempts by American authors in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century to historically contextualize America in light of the antebellum South, and with different traditionalist values, remain meager at home and unheard of in Europe. At best these

descriptions resemble exercises in forgotten memories, however much these memories may have a romantic spell for European traditionalists. The efforts to re-examine the legacy of the antebellum South can be dubbed as “revisionism,” a term usually associated with a different interpretation of history than the one officially accepted. What would have happened if the South had

been able to secede and if its way of life had been preserved? This now appears as a futile attempt in guesswork.

The destructive nature of progress, inherent in modernism and postmodernism and their political offshoots in post-liberalism and post-communism, was well described in the early 30s by American traditionalist

authors, known as the Southern Agrarians. In many instances their prose is reminiscent of European revolutionary conservatives of the same epoch, whose echo one comes across among postmodern European nationalist thinkers. These Southern critics of the new post-Civil War American system resemble the authors of the same caliber in Europe as they both carry a touch of

literary and poetic verve in their metapolitical prose. These Southern authors need to be commended for their background which was not limited to political science only, but which encompassed other fields of social science, including literature and art. This needs to be stressed, as there is a custom among American thinkers and academics, quite in line with the hyper-rationalization of

postmodernity, and going back to the period of early scientism during the Enlightenment, to compartmentalize their field of study and make a small niche for their own specialization. The Germans have a nice word for such a hyper-analytical American approach, which is also a trade mark of postmodernity: “*Fachidiotismus*”. It is a scholarly obsession among

American academics to excel in one field, while ignoring and rejecting other fields.

And this is not just the sign of left-leaning and liberal authors, but also of so-called racist and right-wing authors. Hence the problem we encountered earlier in this book: American conservatives and traditionalists have a big problem putting things in perspective, precisely because

they miss the wider social framework for thinking in different time zones and from distinct and contradictory cultural and historical viewpoints. They are masters in one field; a field which in turn needs to be broken down into other smaller fields.

This hyperanalytical approach is typical of American eugenicists, racist authors, and other prominent traditionalists.



Individually, they all provide analyses of astounding scholarship, but fail to examine their subject of study within other fields of analysis. Similarly, American historical revisionists, who critically deal with some aspects of modern history often produce well-documented books on the topic of their research, but fail to introduce other perspectives into their study.

Other scholars will devote their entire life to the critical study of egalitarianism, but will fail to give a historical, cultural, or racial context to their analyses. In America, there is a standard lack of an interdisciplinary approach to any subject matter under consideration. This inorganic approach proves that “*Homo americanus*” in academia is also a byproduct of an atomized and hyperreal

system that hates a holistic approach to human science.

How, then, can American traditionalists or racialists, or whatever they may be called in the coming decades, come close to capturing cultural hegemony?

## *Postmodern Agrarians*

The Manifesto of the  
Southern Agrarians, "I'll

Take My Stand” is a valuable literary document that helps us understand the other would-have-been organic America. It was written by scholars who had a good sense of literary metaphor and who were not victims of academic overspecialization. In terms of substance, their essays appear in hindsight as a gloomy foreboding of what was to happen not just in America, but also in Europe

after 1945—not just in the political arena, but also in the realm of the spirit. These authors seem to have well understood what one calls today “the crisis of modernity,” in so far as they saw in Roosevelt’s New Deal capitalism, not the foe of early Soviet communism, but its twin brother preaching the same ugly goals, albeit by vulgar mercantile methods. Both systems were founded

on egalitarianism,  
multiculturalism, and the  
religion of progress. One can  
argue that the Southern  
Agrarians were—if one were  
to use postmodern vernacular  
—a very un-American lot.

They conceived of a true  
rebirth of American man, not  
as of “*Homo economicus*,”  
i.e. a happy consumer waiting  
in line for cheap thrills in the  
shopping mall, but first and  
foremost as a man with

spiritual needs that American industrialists and New Dealers had mercilessly ground into dust. By reading their nostalgic prose a reader gets a different taste of what the South was meant to be and what the whole of America could have become under different historical circumstances. Probably now, in the open field of postmodernity, some of their traditionalist Southern legacy

could be restored and used as  
a weapon in future culture  
wars.

One wonders in hindsight  
how it was possible that  
America, and later Europe,  
succumbed to the Almighty  
Dollar whose architects have  
neatly covered their rhetoric  
behind the slogans of  
globalism and human rights?  
The South, after the Civil  
War, underwent a process of  
forcible re-education—



similar to the re-education and overhaul of the European mind by the Americans after 1945. One of those Southern Agrarians writes: “The rising generation read Northern literature, shot through with the New England tradition. Northern textbooks were used in Southern schools; Northern histories, despite the frantic protest of local patriotic organizations, were almost universally taught in Southern

high schools and colleges...”<sup>215</sup> The Puritan mindset from the North invaded the South so that Southerners gradually began to believe that their ancestors were Pilgrim fathers like in New England. Similar psychological changes occurred in Europe after the Second World War, notably when the American educators introduced into European

places of higher learning the curricula consisting of Puritan derived hypermoralism, mixed with atheistic Catholic-bashing Freudo-Marxian scholasticism, and carried out by Frankfurt School theoreticians.

The South was forced to deny its history, just as a century later Europe (particularly Eastern Europe) was forced to deny and rewrite its own. Any form of

revisionism in Southern literature, let alone revisionism in historical writing, was banned.

Ordinary criminals, following the Civil War, turned into heroes like the maniac serial killer John Brown. A hundred years later, under the auspices of American opinion-makers, former Marxist terrorist sympathizers achieved similar prominent places in the pantheon of Western

thought. At the end of the Cold War, despite the breakdown of communism and the end of the so-called Cold War, these ex-revolutionaries retained their influential perks.

The North did not just defeat the South in a military conflict; it also managed to win the war of intellectual and spiritual conquest and in “this conquest the North fixed upon the South the stigma of

war guilt, of slave guilt, of treason...”<sup>216</sup> The parallel with silenced European thinkers in a defeated Europe after 1945 again becomes glaring, although by that time the complex of guilty feelings had spread to all Gentile nations, regardless whether they were on the fascist side or on the victorious anti-fascist side.

The end of the antebellum

South can serve as a laboratory for studying the guilty feelings that European peoples have been subject to in early postmodernity. The social malady consisting in self-hate started in America after the Civil War, only to be re-enacted a hundred years later all over Europe and postmodern America. In early postmodernity, Europe and America participated in the same joint guilt trip that can

only be atoned by financial gifts and excuses to non-Europeans. One could speculate what America could have become if the South had managed to retain its autonomy. The South was not just a geographic slice of North America; it was a separate civilization. A reader, when judging and evaluating those past events in the South, and in the light of new postmodern values,



must come to entirely different conclusions from those officially foisted upon him by the ruling class and the media.

Every opposing viewpoint was labeled by the liberal North as “hostile to freedom,” similar to the smear campaign of modern Northern successors against authors who criticize globalism and Americanism. A Norwegian Nobel prize winner, author,

novelists and later a sympathizer of National Socialism, as well as a good observer of America, Knut Hamsun, noted that the Civil War in America was not a war for the liberation of blacks; this was a war of annihilation of the aristocracy of the South. “The war was a war against the aristocracy and was fought with democratic people’s raging hate against the Southern

plantation Noblesse.”<sup>217</sup>

The term “agrarian,” used to describe America’s Southern anti-liberal racist authors prior to the Second World War, is not suitable for postmodern and post-democratic discourse. One could probably substitute it with a more appropriate word such as “organic,” because what those Southern authors had in mind was a

community-oriented and traditional America not based on economism and egalitarianism but on racial communitarianism. Nor should one limit the usage of the term “South” to the description of those states that made up the former Confederacy. The South was a peculiar mentality that, although now rare and sporadic, can still be detected scattered around some layers

of American society. It would be false, however, to extrapolate the legacy of the antebellum South or what is known as the “Deep South,” into postmodernity and make of it yet another romantic myth. After all, the Deep South is also the most fanatical Bible-prone area known in the 21<sup>st</sup> century with its rabid Christian Zionists and their strong

influence on the general conduct of the American political machinery. These Bible-thumping Americans in early postmodernity surpass with their Biblical zeal even the earlier proselytizing efforts of their Northern ex-enemies from New England. In the eyes of Europeans, the nostalgic and pristine America of valor and cowboy courage exists in the movies only; the so-called

conservative Deep South with its Biblical mindset hardly offers a model or an answer to the challenges of America's future. So far, all efforts in America on the conservative cultural level have been conducted by splinter groups of atomized individuals, either in academia or among political currents of a very sectarian nature. One wonders, indeed, whether postmodern America

can have any alternative and where will this putative new America search for moral and cultural guidance?

For America's Agrarians, American man was not designed to return to the trees or solely live by ploughing the land. He was primarily destined to realize his spiritual values, to show sacrifice and safeguard his racial and ethnic roots, and place them all above the



fleeting materialistic values  
of American hyper-  
capitalism. Regarding this  
point, most American  
traditionalists are in  
agreement, although their  
own differences do not  
provide much hope for a  
radical social change in post-  
America.

Lyle Lanier and other  
Southern Agrarians seem to  
have well grasped the scope  
of the incoming

postmodernist liberal  
propaganda, much earlier  
than many of his future  
postmodern contemporaries,  
especially when he criticizes  
the ideology of American  
progress. He realized that so-  
called industrialism stood for  
big business and plutocracy.  
In postmodern discourse, his  
premonitions will find  
manifestations in neo-liberal  
economic growth without  
substance, including the birth

of abstract words like  
“downsizing,” “outsourcing,”  
etc.<sup>218</sup> Lanier attacks the  
founding father of modern  
American education, Dewey,  
and argues that “man is not  
*tabula rasa* on which  
arbitrary patterns of conduct  
may be inscribed without  
regard to his natural  
propensities.”<sup>219</sup> Man has his  
genetic and historical  
endowments and his cultural

diversity needs to be respected. His words aimed at the heart of liberal propaganda and its offshoot *Homo americanus*, a new-born American species who during this time began to display traits of fake historical optimism and belief in economic progress.

The problems these Southern authors encountered and which their postmodern disillusioned successors are

also confronted with, lies in the nature of the American system and its anomic character. In Twenty-First Century America it is impossible to find a dozen cultivated conservatives, traditionalists and racialists capable of staging a solid meta-political campaign for their cause. One rarely encounters in postmodern America a traditionalist Gentile thinker who, outside

his narrow field of expertise, shows signs of Renaissance learning. Serious university professors or politicians with anti-liberal and traditionalist bent have no political significance. If they do, they are quickly silenced or framed by educational authorities on some trumped up charges, as was the case with the gifted writer and racist Dr. David Duke, or to some extent with ex-

presidential candidate and Catholic author Patrick Buchanan. Political attempts by less visible traditionalist politicians or scholars remain unnoticed in America, as powerful opinion making elites, including all-powerful Jewish lobbies, realize that in postmodern America the best way to silence critics is to ignore them.

One often encounters conservative thinkers and

scholars in America whose erudition has no parallel in Europe. But the inorganic nature of American society makes them often appear like archival species who hardly know how to use the public platform and launch a credible cultural counter-offensive. Their professorial or research role is decoupled from the grass roots level; their teaching profession is just another economic branch



in the giant free market. A number of American traditionalist writers and thinkers have anachronistic value with no meta-political significance. Under such circumstances, they can never have an impact on the mainstream opinion making industry.

However, there is some hope with the rapid rise of the Internet, which has already helped heretic American

thinkers enter the media limelight to the great distress of official American opinion-makers. Despite its atomizing character, postmodernity can offer opportunities for intellectual battles and can provide an environment for spreading different versions of the truth. Thus far, a journalist or a TV anchorman in America has had more of an impact on the consciousness building of

Americans than dozens of professors in the humanities taken together. But now, the virtual world of electronic media offers everybody a weapon to become his own political *impressario*. If this impressario is competent and cultivated enough, he might have some success—provided that he can distinguish between friend and foe. So far, the inability to think with an “opponent’s mind” has

been one of the biggest failures of traditionalists in America and has resulted in their repetitive failure to conceptualize the outside world. Their provincialism continues to create serious problems in their own communications, as well as with their own self-perception.

There is also a problem with historical and political referents for most American

traditionalists and racialists.  
America was founded during  
the period of the  
Enlightenment, a prime  
example of modernity.  
Hence, most American critics  
of hyper-Americanism, even  
when they strive to give  
America a different  
conservative cultural or  
ideological veneer, inevitably  
resort to the dated concepts of  
the 18<sup>th</sup> century, or circle

around a limited field of political options. By contrast, European traditionalist thinkers can pick out from a vast panoply of political ideas in case their present political system becomes tiresome or runs afoul. Europeans can chose from the heritage of socialism, syndicalism, anarchism, from different brands of monarchism, diverse types of nationalisms, or fascisms. It must be the

supreme irony of history that it was Europe that gave birth to Americanism and Sovietism, i.e. to *Homo americanus* and *Homo sovieticus*, yet which has always been critical of both. For historical reasons these two ideologies remain alien to Europe, although the European ruling classes have had to ape them in order to stay politically correct, that is, politically alive.

An additional problem regarding sound alternatives to the present American system is that most of its critics, including the Southern Agrarians, dwell too often on America's extrapolated past with no coordinated follow-up on the postmodern level with media militancy. This explains why insightful authors such as Ezra Pound, Francis Yockey, or later, the left-leaning Christopher



Lasch, were rapidly  
neutralized or used only in  
narrow intellectual and  
political circles.

Undoubtedly, the twelve  
Southern Agrarians were  
impressive intellectuals,  
surpassing even their likes in  
Europe, and who, if born in  
Europe, would have certainly  
left their marks and provided  
a good intellectual tool for the  
struggle against modernity.  
Nothing of this ever

happened, other than the standard regurgitation in academia about their works and loads of scholarly pieces by like-minded scholars about their conservative revolutionary heritage, having no impact at a grass-root level. Scores of their modern sympathizers in America remain isolated, known only in tight networks and playing no important role in the opinion making process in

postmodern America. This is the big tragedy of America, all the more so as America has the rare advantage of having a compact and strong white European constituency, which although dwindling in number, is not torn apart by intra-European tribal conflict. American traditionalists still have a chance to achieve their vision in postmodernity, in so far as they have better technical tools to grab

cultural hegemony. However, the nature of American traditionalism, mixed with a high dose of moralism, needs to be abandoned first.

Moreover, the pervasive concept of democracy and equality must be revised.

Richard Weaver, a Southern Agrarian disciple, analyzed the pathology of democratism in America. His prose seems to be a carbon copy of European

revolutionary conservative thinkers from the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. His essays are similar to those of the European sociologist of elitism, Vilfredo Pareto, the jurist Carl Schmitt, and scores of European thinkers who were removed after World War II from “the grand narratives” and who still remain ignored by American academic and political circles.

Weaver's problem, similar to the problems of other radical conservative American thinkers, seems to have been a lack of a political follow-up. Weaver demolishes the democratic mystique in America and calls for a true spiritual aristocracy based on meritocracy and fraternity, that is, on the elements that make up an organic and traditional society. But how is this possible in a system

where everything is reduced to the veneration of material commodities and where the rules of the market discard any spiritual value as a perishable commodity?

Weaver dissects with precision, similar to his Southern predecessors, the nefarious dynamics of liberalism and its associated value of egalitarianism as a system which creates “a reservoir of poisonous

envy.”<sup>220</sup> All these points had been earlier analyzed by European revolutionary conservative authors in their own descriptions of the American system. Weaver’s words, however, attack the core of Americanism and the belief in progress, since any egalitarian society, such as America, “if it promises equality of condition, it promises injustice, because



one law for the ox and the lion is tyranny.”<sup>221</sup> The paradox of liberal democracy lies in the fact that it constantly resorts to double standards in order to sustain its legal functioning. The author exemplifies this by noting that in America “an election is after all a highly undemocratic proceeding; the very term means discrimination. How is it

possible to choose the best man when by definition there is no best?"<sup>222</sup> The same paradox of American democracy was earlier well grasped by the sharp French observer De Tocqueville, who had spotted in the American system an incipient danger of majority terror. It is unusual that American and European critics of the American system are not

more aware of the Southern author and scholar George Fitzhugh, who could be safely called a postmodernist racial traditionalist. Why postmodern? Because his ideas of an organic society could serve as a model for postmodern racialists in America. In light of present historical quarrels and ideological debates about the future of multiracial America, Fitzhugh stands out as a

special, albeit lone man, not the least because he was aware of the semantic distortions of the English language by American politicians. But he is also intriguing in so far as he had a foreboding of the forthcoming Civil War in America and by extension of what was to be the destiny of Europe a hundred years later.

His racist successors, including linguists, should

read him, but so should all critics of modernity, including those who study the spirit of democratism.

Fitzhugh, who was a lawyer by education and a good judge of the English and Latin languages, and also of ancient Roman thought and Roman law, had a peculiar sense for linguistic and political nuances. He understood that words like “freedom,” “free trade,” and

“justice” could serve as a hide-out for new barbarians. Conversely, and in a reversed Orwellian twist, he sounds like a spokesman for slavery, not the least as he understood that each honorable person in a given social circumstance must be a slave to higher ethical goals. A slave does not only mean a physical slave, subject to physical torments on the part of his master; it could be a highly

cultivated person or a leader who decides to become a slave to his Promethean self-ascribed intellectual goals. The negative value judgment ascribed to the word “slave” must be rejected, as this word is bound to acquire different meanings in diverse social and historical circumstances.

A soldier, a general, a statesman—each man who takes up the duty of fighting for a higher cause, forfeits his

“state of nature,” and  
becomes a slave.

Black slavery was to  
Fitzhugh a matter of fact; a  
social bond necessary for  
black Americans, who due to  
their incapacity to equally  
participate in free trade and  
cut throat competition, are far  
better off in farm bondage in  
the South, supervised by a  
paternalistic white farmer,  
than working for a Northern  
white crook who pontificates



about human rights and strips them of human dignity. In what sense are 21<sup>st</sup> century blacks in America better off than their predecessors? Once left to themselves, as demanded by northern abolitionists, they end up destitute and adrift in large cities at the mercy of capitalist sharks who brag about free trade and lecture on about human rights. The

widely proclaimed American equality becomes then a bitter pill because sooner or later everybody must conclude that in some human fields he or she will always lag behind.

And this applies not just to American blacks, but to other races and individuals who do not have the stamina nor the genes to compete in the free market, or whose talents are not in demand. Heidegger, who was quoted at the

beginning of this book,  
summarized this point when  
he denounced America as a  
place for a boxing career, but  
not a place for a career in  
philosophy.

Fitzhugh attacks the icon of  
American democracy,  
Thomas Jefferson, a founding  
father of America and the  
main author of the  
Declaration of Independence,  
whose words he views as  
“abstractions.” Fitzhugh

sounds postmodern in so far as he understands the mendacious nature of egalitarian and democratic meta-narratives. The flashy words of the Declaration of Independence were bound to open up the floodgates to incessant and never ending economic demands which had to lead to the capitalist war of all against all. The verbal tricks such as “we hold these truths to be self-evident that

all men are created equal, are  
bottomless pits out of which  
torrents of modern new  
demands keep arising: It is,  
we believe, conceded on all  
hands, that men are not born  
physically, morally or  
intellectually equal—some  
are males, some females,  
some from birth large, strong,  
and healthy, others weak,  
small and sickly—some are  
naturally amiable, others  
prone to all kinds of

wickedness—some brave others timid. Their natural inequalities beget inequalities of rights.”<sup>223</sup> Is it also not self-evident that all people are equal; a cripple dreams about being a strong man, just as an ugly man desires to become beautiful, or a moron wishes to become intelligent.

“Bestowing upon men equality of rights is but giving license to the strong to

oppress the weak. It begets the grossest inequality of condition.”<sup>224</sup>

Again, one can observe how the dogma of the free market, which found its ideal terrain in America, resulted in the worst form of racial discrimination, something readily apparent from the legal status of “freed” slaves in the abolitionist and democratic North. Fitzhugh

was aware that this was going to happen, although similar views, in a more veiled language, will be later heard by modern eugenicists.

Verbal constructs, suggesting that people are equal must lead to the final historical conclusion of liberal dynamics: demand for a communist system.

Therefore, only a true aristocratic society, where leaders are role models, can



have lasting legitimacy. The leader, in this fashion, becomes a slave as soon as he decides to take the duty on himself and fight for the interests of his community.

Fitzhugh's remarks sound very Platonic and remind us of the gold class in Plato's *Republic*. In this sense "the masters in free society or slave society, if they properly perform their duties, have more cares and less liberty

than the slaves

themselves.”<sup>225</sup> His words appear also “self-evident,” as historical examples show that great leaders or great thinkers have always been slaves to higher ideas.

# The Oddity of American Democracy

What do modern  
American  
traditionalists, agrarians, or  
racialists have in common  
and how do their ideas square  
with postmodernity and its  
inborn specie, *Homo*

*sovieticus*? To continue to review American authors who fit into the lexical and political category of “un-American” thinkers, and whose vision of the American dream is different from its present hyperreal image, has little effect. Even if their ideas about the rebirth of a postmodern and traditionalist America received in coming years better media coverage, it is questionable whether

these ideas could ever sway the masses. One could add that American democracy, by its nature, has always been a common denominator for egalitarian impulses, reaching their apex at the beginning of the third millennium. The compulsive mimicry by European and American leaders of this new brand of multicultural democracy must be traced to its prime source: Judeo-Christian monotheism

and its secular version in the ideology of egalitarianism.

Many white conservative Americans and Europeans continue to nurse the illusion that democratic societies such as theirs are congenitally pacifist and that only anti-democratic nationalism of the European brand, as well as the radical white racist heritage, lead to war and violence. They are wrong, as they confuse causes and

consequences of racial and ethnic violence.

Why do American citizens, more than other citizens in the world, reject the idea of having a hierarchical society with a strong leader, and why is it that this political option is immediately rejected as contrary to American democracy? Why do Americans opt instead for a horizontal type of democratic control where the system of

checks and balances inevitably transforms itself into the system of mutual surveillance? The French anti-egalitarian and postmodern author, Claude Polin, while raising this disturbing question, also provides some cogent answers. Similarly to De Tocqueville, Polin observes with concern the horizontal nature of the democratic process in America that



furnishes the framework for  
“terror of all against all.”  
“How is it possible,” he asks,  
“that one fears a king  
exercising his power and why  
is it that one has less fear if  
the same power is conferred  
on millions of little  
kings?”<sup>226</sup> Surely, in a  
dispersed egalitarian system  
of power sharing, such as in  
Americanism and  
Communism, with both

attempting to project their power worldwide and under the cover of global democracy, no citizen will ever dream about having absolute power. In the atomized system of Americanism, dispersed power inevitably leads to dispersed terror in which the line between the victim and the henchman is bound to disappear. Similar to Communism, Americanism

was destined to morph into a meta-system in which the vast majority of citizens while complaining of being terrorized by other fellow citizens also terrorize fellow citizens in their turn. In

America's early postmodernity, following the precepts of democracy, everybody is content, as was once laid out in the classical liberal social contract, to have a small fraction of power.

Surely, everybody feels miserable for not having more power; yet everybody will try to retain sufficient power for himself at the expense of the *Other*. This leads to similar appetites among other citizens.

Americanism has become, in a far better manner than communism, a world system resembling a giant state of nature in which an ongoing latent civil war can at any

time degenerate into a full scale global civil war.

In a county that is rapidly losing its racial homogeneity and increasingly turning into a mega-system of diverse and contradictory ethnic, racial and economic interests with competing narratives, there is a distinct possibility of the country's break-up. An incipient civil war in America will become a reality when a state of emergency is

declared, following some major racial riot or a catastrophic terrorist attack. This is the scenario American and pro-American elites in Europe fear most. At that moment American post-democracy, similar to the proverbial clothes-less emperor, will have difficulty trying to hide its nudity. “A democratic society is a society which contains no real principle of unity. It does

not even merit the name of society. In democracy, there can be no citizens; there are only private citizens whose occasional civic behavior does not even indicate the will to be citizens,” writes

Polin.<sup>227</sup> In atomized postmodern America, the nature of the social contract makes everybody suspicious of everybody and always on guard against fellow citizens.

Furthermore, the dynamics of the omnipotent market forces have everybody trying to outsmart and deceive everybody. Led by an unquenchable desire that he must exclusively act on his physical environment and improve his earthly lot, *Homo americanus* must come to the conclusion that the only possible way to realize his happiness is by placing his material welfare and his



individual well being above all other goals.<sup>228</sup> He is less and less prone to abide by common values of his racial or ethnic community. Instead, he focuses his attention on not being left out of the economic battle, always thinking of his fellow citizens and of the entire system as agents wishing to cheat and rob him. The famous German philosopher, Max Scheler,

observed long ago the psychology of American man and remarked that he is a “person living in a society which gives him the ‘right’ to compare himself to everybody; yet, in reality, a society in which he can compare himself to nobody.”<sup>229</sup>

It is fundamentally wrong to assume that in a so-called market democracy, American

and Americanized citizens automatically develop an organic and fraternal relationship to each other. Communal relationship is feasible only in an ethnically and racially homogenous society or a sharply segregated society with each ethnic group pursuing its own destiny. There is not a single case of a multiracial egalitarian society in recent history that has survived over

an extended period of time.  
Sooner or later it breaks up  
violently. Moreover,  
excessive individual  
gratification offered by the  
omnipotent American market  
strengthens the desire of  
citizens to act solely as free  
economic agents with no  
spiritual bonds to each other.  
A sense of the common good  
and the notion of historical  
community become devoid of  
any meaning.

We seem to be back at the beginning of the book. The egalitarian appetite, once observed in communist *Homo sovieticus*, is well under way and under a new name in America and in Americanized Europe. American ideology will gain more prominence in the future, as egalitarian dynamics and wide-spread advocacy of permanent economic progress gain momentum. Once, when

inequality was considered something natural, as it was in the antebellum South, or prior to the American

Revolution, then even the crassest sign of inequality did not offend the observer's eye. By contrast, when everybody is declared equal even the smallest dose of inequality becomes unbearable. "The desire for equality becomes more and more insatiable as equality increases," noted De

Tocqueville.<sup>230</sup>

Consequently, as the American system becomes more and more economically opulent, even the slightest economic crisis, resulting in a small drop in living standards is bound to cause social discord and political upheavals.

It remains to be seen how Americanism will pursue its odyssey in a society in which

those who are successful in the economic arena live side by side with those who lag behind. American ideology prohibits the development of ethical and political values that justify hierarchical differences, such as they were sustained in medieval Europe. In the near future, Americanism, similar to the former system of communism, will only function as an elementary



form of mass survivalism in which interracial wars will be the norm.

- Finis -

# Notes

## *Foreword by Professor Kevin MacDonald*

1

<http://www.vdare.com/macdonald>

2

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/1950>

3

Bettelheim, B., & Janowitz, M. 1950.

<sup>4</sup> Lipset & Raab 1970, 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6; italics in text.

<sup>6</sup> Gottfried 1998; Lasch 1991, 455ff.

<sup>7</sup> Lasch 1991, 455.

<sup>8</sup> MacDonald, 2004.

<sup>9</sup> See Svonkin (1997, 1) for an account of the Jewish role in the intergroup relations movement.

<sup>10</sup> Svonkin 1997, 10.

<sup>11</sup> Svonkin 1997, 5.

<sup>12</sup> Svonkin 1997, 30, 59.

<sup>13</sup> Svonkin 1997, 75.

<sup>14</sup> E. Fairbanks (2006). A hot paper muzzles academia. *Los Angeles Times*, May 14.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/op-fairbanks14may14,1,6447050.coll=la-news-comment>

<sup>15</sup> English, B. (2006). Immorality play. *The American Conservative*, May 22, 12–13.

<sup>16</sup> Taylor, S. (2006). In

Duke's case, a rogue's gallery. *National Journal*,

<sup>17</sup> Ceci, S. J., Williams, W. M., & Mueller-Johnson, K. (2006). Is tenure justified? An experimental study of faculty beliefs about tenure, promotion, and academic freedom. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, in press.

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<sup>20</sup> A. M. Lindbergh 1980,  
220-230; italics in text.

<sup>21</sup> A. M. Lindbergh 1980,  
220-230; italics in text.

<sup>22</sup> See: Fischer, D. H. 1989.  
Albion's Seed: Four British

Folkways in America. (NY: Oxford); MacDonald, K. B. (1994/2002). Diaspora Peoples preface to the paperback edition of A People that Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism as a Group Evolutionary Strategy. Lincoln, NE: iUniverse; Phillips, Kevin. 1999. The Cousins' Wars: Religion, Politics, and the Triumph of Anglo-America. New York, NY: Basic Books.

<sup>23</sup> Preface to the paperback edition of *The Culture of Critique*. K. MacDonald 2002; Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse.

<sup>24</sup> Fischer 1989, 357

<sup>25</sup> Vaughn, A. T. (1997). *The Puritan Tradition in America, 1620–1730*, revised ed. Hanover and London: University Press of New England, p. 20.

<sup>26</sup> Phillips *ibid.*, 477



<sup>27</sup> In Phillips *ibid.*, 556

<sup>28</sup> Preface to the paperback edition of *The Culture of Critique*. K. MacDonald 2002; Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse.

## ***Chapter I***

<sup>29</sup> Numerous essays by European traditionalists, conservatives, including the so-called revolutionary conservatives and anti-

egalitarian novelists, essayists and poets express views critical of America and the American way of life. Among many: Aldous Huxley, *America and the Future* (Austin and New York: Jenkins Publishing Company, 1970); Robert Steuckers, “L’Ennemi américain,” in the quarterly *Synergies européennes* (Brussels, 1996); Jean Cau, *Discours de la décadence* (Paris:

Copernic, 1978); D.H Lawrence, “Europe vs. America,” and “America, Listen to Your Own,” in *Phoenix; The Posthumous Papers* (1936 London, New York: Penguin Books, 1978); pp. 87-91; 117-118; Gottfried Benn, “Über den amerikanischen Geist,” in *Gesammelte Werke 7, Vermischte Schriften* (Wiesbaden: Limes, 1963), where on page 1658, Benn

writes: “Personally I am against Americanism. I hold the opinion that the philosophy of purely utilitarian thought, of optimism ‘a tout prix’ (at any cost) (French in text, n.a) of “keep smiling” (English in text, n.a.) with the everlasting smirk on the face, is not worthy of the Occidental man and his History.” Also the recently deceased Serbian elitist anti-liberal author,

Dragos Kalajic, *Americko zlo* (Beograd: Izdavacki graficki zavod, 1993). Also the Italian neo-pagan philosopher, Julius Evola's "*Civiltà*" *Americana* (American "Civilization"), first published in 1945, and reprinted in 1983 by the Julius Evola Foundation in Rome. See the link to Evola: <http://www.feastofhateandfear>  
See also the speech and article by Jean Cau, "Le triomphe de Mickey " in

*Etats-Unis: Danger (Actes du XXV colloques national du Grece* (Paris: Grece, 1992), p.8 where Cau compares America to a “gigantic washing machine of national memories.” Also Pierre Krebs “Kulturkrieg: Gegen den American Way of Life in *Das Thule Seminar* (Horn: Burkhart Weecke Verlag, 1994), p. 39-46. Pierre Krebs, *Europe contre Occident* (Burkhart Weecke Verlag:

Horn, 1997), especially the chapter “Americanopolis” p. 63-84. Also a Nobel prize winner and Norwegian *völkisch* novelist Knut Hamsun, who was quite critical of Americanism, and who similar to the American rebel Ezra Pound fell into intellectual disrepute after World War II - as a result of his sympathies to fascism. See his *Fra det moderne Amerikas Aandsliv*

(København/ Copenhagen: Aandsliv, P.G. Philipsens Forlag, 1889). On page 129, he writes: “.... And time passed, people came in huge waves to the country, steam to ship them over the ocean was invented, Boston was overflowed, New York was breached. Day after day, day after day, a world’s mass of people flooded the prairie, people of every race and language, countless good



men, bankrupts and criminals,  
adventurers and insane,  
priests and Negroes – all  
limbs of the pariah breed  
from the whole of the earth.  
And no noble souls...” (I owe  
this quote and the English  
translation to my Norwegian  
friend and author Tord  
Morsund).

<sup>30</sup> Jean Baudrillard, *America*  
(translated by Chris Turner)  
(NY, London: Verso, 1988),

p.94.

<sup>31</sup> Werner Sombart, *Warum gibt es in den Vereinigten Staaten keinen Sozialismus?* (1909 Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969), p. 17, and p.57.

<sup>32</sup> Peter Brimelow, *Alien Nation* (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 217.

<sup>33</sup> George Sunderland, “The End of History: Democracy

of Chaos?,” in *Will America Drown?*, ed. Humphrey Dalton (Washington: Scott Townsend, 1993), p. 91. Also about the “Mexicanization” of the USA, see George McDaniel and B.F. Long, *Metamorphosis* (Raleigh: Representative Government Press, 2003).

<sup>34</sup> Kevin MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of*

*Jewish Involvement in  
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Intellectual and Political  
Movement* (Bloomington:  
Autorhouse, 2002),  
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Praeger Publications,  
Westport CT, 1998), p. lxix.

<sup>35</sup> MacDonald, p.259.

<sup>36</sup> MacDonald, p.280.

<sup>37</sup> Alan McGregor, “The  
Double Nature of Prejudice,”  
*The Mankind Quarterly*, Vol.

XXXIII, No 4, (Summer 1993), pp.423-432.

<sup>38</sup> J. P. Rushton, “Ethnic nationalism, evolutionary psychology and genetic similarity theory,” *Nations and Nationalism*, 11 (4) p.498.

<sup>39</sup> Yves Christen, *L'Heure de la sociobiologie* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1979), p. 97.

<sup>40</sup> Roger Pearson, prefaced by Arthur B. Jensen, *Shockley on*

*Eugenics and Race*  
(Washington: Scott-Townsend Publishers, 1992),  
p.220.

<sup>41</sup> Jean Baudrillard, *America*  
(translated by Chris Turner)  
(NY, London: Verso, 1988),  
p.28.

<sup>42</sup> Noam Chomsky, *Secrets  
Lies and Democracy* (Tucson:  
Ordonian Press) pp. 16-17.

<sup>43</sup> Lawrence R. Brown, *The  
Might of the West*

(Washington: Joseph J. Binns Publisher, 1963), p. 529 and passim. By contrast, Jefferson can often be monopolized by right-wing and nationalist Americans, such as the pro-fascist and “un-American” poet and author Ezra Pound, *Jefferson and/or Mussolini* (London: S. Nott, 1936). According to different interpretations the early founding fathers can be seen either as traitors or heroes.

44 Quoted in Rüdiger  
Safranski, *Martin Heidegger:  
Between Good And Evil*  
(Cambridge, London:  
Harvard University Press,  
1998), p.289, See also M.  
Heidegger, *An Introduction to  
Metaphysics*, trans. by M.  
Mannheim, page 62. See also  
the erudite author associated  
with the conservative cultural  
revolution in Weimar  
Germany and close in many



aspects to Heidegger, Ludwig Klages, *Sämtliche Werke*, Band 4, *Charakterkunde* I. (2. Auflage) (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1983). On page 408 Klages writes: “These ‘free citizens’ are, in fact, mere marionettes; their freedom is imaginary, and a brief glance at American work methods and leisure time entertainments is enough to prove conclusively that *l’homme machine* is not

merely imminent: *it is already the American reality.*”

<sup>45</sup> Joseph Goebbels, “Aus Gottes eigenem Land,” *Das Eherne Herz: Reden und Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1941/1942* (München: Zentral Verlag der NSDAP, 1942), p. 421.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 423.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 426.

<sup>48</sup> Charles Beard, *An*

*Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1946), p. 324 and passim.

<sup>49</sup> Arthur Wallace Calhoun “Economic Factor in Eugenics,” p.408 in *Eugenics in Race and State*, Volume II. (Scientific papers of the Second International Congress of Eugenics) (Baltimore: Williams and

Wilkins Co., 1923).

<sup>50</sup> Ludwig Woltmann, *Politische Anthropologie* (Jena: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1903), p. 213. Also Ludwig Woltmann, *Die Darwinsche Theorie und der Sozialismus* (Düsseldorf: Hermann Michels Verlag, 1899). On page 326 Ludwig Woltmann writes: “Undoubtedly in an economic competitive battle occurs a

selection so that under given circumstances people with technical and mercantile gift have the upper hand.”

<sup>51</sup> Francis Parker Yockey, *Imperium* (1948 Washington: Noontide Press, 1962), p.497.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p.498.

<sup>53</sup> Alvin H. Rosenfeld, “Anti-Americanism and Anti-Semitism: A New Frontier of Bigotry” (New York: American Jewish Committee,

2003), p. 21.

<sup>54</sup> Joe Sobran, “For Fear of the Jews.” Speech given at the IHR Conference, Los Angeles, June 21-23, 2002.

[www.sobran.com/fearofjews.s](http://www.sobran.com/fearofjews.s)

The author talks about “guilt by association,” notably when he was himself a victim of general and generic accusations of mingling with Holocaust deniers: “I note that my enemies have written

a great deal about me, yet they rarely quote me directly.”

<sup>55</sup> Josef Joffe, “Nations We Love to Hate: Israel, America and the New Anti-Semitism.” (Speech delivered at the Centre for German Studies at Ben Gurion University, Spring 2004).

<sup>56</sup> A French expert on America, journalist Justin Vaïsse, in his essay “Des

clichés qui font mal,” *Le Figaro Magazine* (February 8, 2003), writes how American opinion makers and editors, sympathetic to Israel viewed the French refusal to support American foreign policy during the Iraqi crisis in 2003. Thus, American editorialists aligned six French sins: “intellectual arrogance, fundamental immorality of French diplomacy, venality, frivolity,



anti-Semitism and cowardice. Is there something more reasonable to add after such an ideological barrage?"

<sup>57</sup> Natan Sznaider, "America, du machst es besser," *Die Zeit* (Nr. 5), (January 23, 2003), p.29. The controversy about the US military involvement in Iraq provoked a flurry of pro-American and pro-Jewish activities on the one hand, and a torrent of

anti-American, anti-capitalist, and anti-Zionist literature on the other. Many leftist and communist activists in the West were also targeted by American and Jewish journalists and scholars for their alleged crypto anti-Americanism, i.e. anti-Semitism, because of their criticism of American capitalism. “One resorts to the truncheon of anti-Semitism in the hopes that

any critique of (capitalist) machinations will be removed,” in “Kommunisten on-line;” [www.kommunisten-online.de](http://www.kommunisten-online.de)

## *Chapter II*

<sup>58</sup> Alain de Benoist, “L’Amérique,” in *Critiques et Théoriques* (Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme, 2002), p.142.

<sup>59</sup> Julius Evola’s article “”Civiltà” Americana”

(American “Civilization”) was first published in 1945 and reprinted in 1983 by the Julius Evola Foundation in Rome. See the link:  
<http://www.feastofhateandfear>

<sup>60</sup> Augusto del Noce, “Le marxisme meurt à l’Est parce qu’il s’est réalisé à l’Ouest,” *Krisis* (Paris), No. 6, October 1990, pp. 124-129.

<sup>61</sup> Alexander Zinoviev, *La suprasociété globale*

(Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 2000), p.73.

<sup>62</sup> Alexander Zinoviev, *Homo sovieticus* (London: Victor Gollancz, LTD, 1985).

<sup>63</sup> Alexander Zinoviev, *The Reality of Communism* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1984) p.28 and passim.

<sup>64</sup> There is an extensive number of books dealing with the psychology of communism - more in France

than in the USA. See my *Against Democracy and Equality: Tthe European New Right* (1990 Los Angeles: Noontide Press, 2004), pp. 186-200. Also “Zinoviev’s Homo sovieticus,” in *The World and I* (June, 1989). Also Claude Polin, *Le totalitarisme* (Paris: PUF, 1982), p. 89. See Alain Besançon, *Les Origines intellectuelles du léninisme* (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1977),

p.292.

<sup>65</sup> Zinoviev, *The Reality of Communism*, p.103-104 and passim.

<sup>66</sup> This analysis is an abridged version of my essay “America in the Eyes of Eastern Europe,” *World and I* (November 2001).

<sup>67</sup> Claude Karnoouh, “Ex Occidente lux”! in *Outre Terre* (Paris) No 5, May, 2003, pp. 195-204.

[http://www.edition-eres.com/resultat.php?  
Id=1288](http://www.edition-eres.com/resultat.php?Id=1288)

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Claude Karnoouh, “De la chute du communisme à la tiers-mondisation,” in *La grande braderie à l’Est*, edited by Claude Karnoouh et Bruno Drweski (Paris: Le Temps des cerises, 2005), p.131.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p.132.



<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p.146.

<sup>72</sup> Thomas Molnar,  
*L'Américanologie* (Lausanne:  
L'Age d'Homme, 1991),  
p.33-34.

<sup>73</sup> Bruno Drweski and Claude  
Karnoouh, “Les dirigeants  
des pays de l’Est ‘ânes de  
Troie’ des Etats-Unis,” in  
*Utopie critique* (Paris, 2003),  
No. 26; pp.24 and passim.

<sup>74</sup> A. James Gregor,  
*Metascience and Politics*

(1971 London: Transaction, 2004), p.318.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid p.309.

<sup>76</sup> Alan Charles Kors, “Thought Reform: The Orwellian Implications of Today’s College Orientation,” in *Reasononline*, (March 2000). See the link:  
<http://reason.com/0003/fe.ak.tl>

<sup>77</sup> Jean Baudrillard, *The Evil Demons of Images*

(University of Sydney: The Power Inst. of Fine Arts, 1988), p.14.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., p.24.

<sup>79</sup> Alain de Benoist, “Au delà des droits de l’homme,” in the quarterly *Krisis* (Paris, 2004). On page 44 he writes: “The study of human biological nature, which has been endlessly moving ahead over the last past decades, shows that “Nature” is very

little egalitarian,” writes de Benoist. “Far from it that each individual makes the basis of each collectivity; rather it is the collectivity which constitutes his individual existence.”

<sup>80</sup> George Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All or Slaves Without Masters* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1982), p.135.

<sup>81</sup> Aldous Huxley, *America and the Future* (Austin and New York: Jenkins publishing Company), pp.8-9.

<sup>82</sup> Aldous Huxley, *L'Eminence grise* (Paris: La Table ronde, 1941). Also *Brave New World Revisted* (New York: Harper & Row, 1958).

<sup>83</sup> Aldous Huxley, *America and the Future*, p.16.

<sup>84</sup> Thomas Molnar,

*L'Américanologie* (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 1991), p.29.

## ***Chapter III***

<sup>85</sup> Tomislav Sunic, *Titoism and Dissidence* (Frankfurt, NY: Peter Lang, 1995).

<sup>86</sup> Paul Gottfried, *The Strange Death of Marxism* (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 2005), p.108.

<sup>87</sup> Caspar Schrenck Notzing,

*Characterwäsche* (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1965), p.115.

<sup>88</sup> Caspar Schrenck Notzing, p.120.

<sup>89</sup> Manfred Heinemann and Ulrich Schneider, *Hochschuloffiziere und Wiederaufbau des Hochschulwesens in Westdeutschland, 1945-1952*) (Editon Bildung und Wissenschaft, 1990), pp. 2-3 and passim. Also, *Die*

*Entnazifizierung in Baden 1945-1949* (Stuttgart: W Kohlhammer Verlag, 1991), regarding the process of purging German teachers and professors by French occupying forces in the occupied German province of Baden. Approximately 35 to 50 % of teachers in the American occupied parts of Germany were suspended and barred from teaching and other research activities. The



percentage of suspension in the French occupied parts of Germany was between 12-15%. See Hermann Josef Rupieper, *Die Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegesdemokratie* (Westdeutscher Verlag), p. 137.

<sup>90</sup> Hermann Josef Rupieper, p.137.

<sup>91</sup> Ernst von Salomon, *Der Fragebogen* (1951 Hamburg:

Rowohlt, 1999).

<sup>92</sup> Tomislav Sunic, “L’Art dans le IIIème Reich: 1933-45,” *Ecrits de Paris* (July-August, 2002), pp.30-36.

Women were quite active in the Third Reich. A famous German Olympic female athlete, the Olympics champion, Tilly Fleischer (1911-2005); two famous women pilots, Elly Beinhorn (1907) and Hanna Reitsch

(1912-1979); a Head of the League of National Socialist Women Gertrud Scholtz-Klink (1902-1999), etc.

<sup>93</sup> Caspar Schrenck Notzing, p.11.

<sup>94</sup> Patrick Buchanan, *The Death of the West* (New York: St Martin's Press, 2002), pp.82-83.

<sup>95</sup> Serge Thion, *Historische Wahrheit oder politische Wahrheit?* (Berlin: Verlag der

Freunde, 1994). The book discusses the fate of the French professor of literature, Robert Faurisson, who has been since 1977 in social and academic disgrace due to his skeptical accounts regarding the number of Holocaust victims.

<sup>96</sup> In the age of electronic media and due to anti-revisionist laws, prominent European and American

historians, but also some racialists, resort to the use of different web sites.

<sup>97</sup> Caspar Schrenck Notzing, p.140.

<sup>98</sup> Josef Schüsslburner, *Demokratie-Sonderweg Bundesrepublik* (Lindenblatt Media Verlag. Künzell, 2004), p.631.

<sup>99</sup> Schüsslburner, p.233.

<sup>100</sup> Günther Maschke, *Das bewaffnete Wort* (“Die

Verschwörung der Flakhelfer”) (Wien und Leipzig: Karolinger Verlag, 1997) p. 74.

<sup>101</sup> Schüsslburner, p.591.

<sup>102</sup> Marc Perelman, “Europe Seen Cracking Down on Holocaust Revisionists,” in *Forward*, November 25, 2005.

<sup>103</sup> Alain Finkielkraut, “Résister au discours de la dénonciation” in *Journal du*

*Sida*, April 1995. Also “What sort of Frenchmen are They?” interview with Alain Finkielkraut in *Haaretz*, November 17, 2005. As was to be expected, there was an outcry in leftist journals in France following his interview. In his subsequent interview in *Le Monde*, under the title “J’assume,” of November 26, 2005, Finkielkraut resorts to new wordings and disclaimers in

order to justify his earlier critical remarks about the Arab youth rioting in France.

<sup>104</sup> Alain de Benoist, “Die Methoden der Neuen Inquisition,” in *Schöne vernetzte Welt* (Tübingen: Hohenrain Verlag, 2001), pp.190-205.

<sup>105</sup> Quoted in Dominique Venner, *Histoire de la Collaboration* (Paris: Pygmalion, 2000), p. 512.



<sup>106</sup> See the anti-Semitic satire, wrongly labeled a “pamphlet,” and banned in France, by the French novelist, Louis Ferdinand Céline, *Bagatelles pour un massacre* (Paris: Denoël, 1938), in which the author after his return from the Soviet Union describes the mores of communized citizens and the role of Jews.

<sup>107</sup> Dominique Venner,

pp.515-516.

<sup>108</sup> Marcel Aymé

“L’Epuration et le délit d’opinion,” prefaced by Lucien Rebatet (Liège: Edition Dynamo, 1968), p.13.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid, p.17

<sup>110</sup> Eric Delcroix, *La Police de la pensée: du jugement de Nuremberg à la loi Fabius-Gayssot*, 1994. See <http://www.codoh.com/inter/ir>

<sup>111</sup> Delcroix, Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Gottfried, p.82-94.

<sup>113</sup> G. Maschke, p.82.

<sup>114</sup> Speech by the German Reichsminister Dr. Joseph Goebbels, “Weltgefahr des Bolschewismus” (The Global Threat of Bolshevism) given at the Nuremberg NSDAP Congress on September 10, 1936. From *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik* (Berlin: Hochschule für Politik, 1937), Vol. 4, p.53. Goebbels

goes on: “... because the Soviet Union cannot stand the truth regarding its internal situation, especially regarding an enlightened Western Europe. As flattering and tantalizing as the poison of Bolshevik theory may be, so frightful and gruesome is the Bolshevik practice.”

<sup>115</sup> Germar Rudolf, *Diktatur Deutschland* (Hastings, UK: Castle Hill Publishers, 2005),

p. 35.

<sup>116</sup> U.S. Court of Appeals/  
Petitioner Germar Scherer/  
Nos. 04-16231 & 05-11303;  
Board of Immigration  
Appeals No A 78-660-016  
(April 13th, 2006).

<sup>117</sup> G. Rudolf, *Diktatur  
Deutschland*, p. 54.

<sup>118</sup> Text of Address by  
Alexander Solzhenitsyn at  
Harvard Class Day Afternoon  
Exercises, Thursday, June 8,

1978.

## *Chapter IV*

<sup>119</sup> Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down* (London: Penguin books, 1972). See, Knut Hamsun, *Cultural life of Modern America* (Copenhagen: Philipsens forlag, 1889), who on page 110 writes:  
“Americans are ardent church goers. The majority of them

are of course women, but quite a few men are political enough to go there. It is mandatory for a Yankee if he wants to move up in the world, to be on good terms with the Churches; indifference to the Church and her superior and lower life; in effect the heavenly and mundane affairs – this indifference will most certainly be punished.

<sup>120</sup> Roger Garaudy, *Les Etats-Unis, avant-garde de la décadence* (Paris: Editons Vent du Large, 1997), p.72.

<sup>121</sup> Roger Garaudy, p.202.

<sup>122</sup> Dieter Kronzucker, “Kirchen und Kulte” in *Der amerikanische Alptraum* (München: Wilhelm Heyne Verlag, 1992), p.170.

<sup>123</sup> Robert de Herte and Hans Jürgen Nigra, “Il était une fois l’Amérique,” in *Nouvelle*



*Ecole* (No. 27/28), fall-winter, 1975, pp 50-60 and passim. This whole volume of *Nouvelle Ecole* is crucial to understanding the European conservative view of American civilization and European “anti-Americanism.”

<sup>124</sup> Arnold Gehlen, *Moral und Hypermoral* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann GmbH, 2004), p.78. Also on

“hypertrophe” of the ethics  
pp.141-165.

<sup>125</sup> Louis Rougier, *La mystique démocratique* (Paris: Albatros, 1983), p.220.

<sup>126</sup> Adams, James Truslow, *The Founding of New England* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1921), p. 80.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., p.82.

<sup>128</sup> Oswald Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*,

Vol II (1923 München:  
Beck'sche  
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1976),  
p. 933-934.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., p.934.

<sup>130</sup> Alain de Benoist,  
“L’Amérique” in *Critiques -  
Théoriques* (Lausanne: L’Age  
d’Homme 2002), p.142.

<sup>131</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville, *De  
la démocratie en Amérique*  
(Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1988),  
p.222. See also the critical

description of America by Gerald Messadié, *Requiem pour superman* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1988) and by the former French foreign minister Michel Jobert, *Les Américains* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1987).

<sup>132</sup> Emma Goldman, “Anarchism and Other Essays” (Second Revived Edition) (New York and London: Mother Earth

Publishing Associations,  
1911), pp.173-182.

<sup>133</sup> Werner Sombart, *The Jews and Modern Capitalism*, translated with notes by M. Epstein, (New York: Burt Franklin, 1969). Originally published in London 1913), p.43-44.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid., p.38.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid., p.249.

<sup>136</sup> “American Life in the 1840s” Bode, Carl (ed.).

(New York: Doubleday & Company, 1967), p.315.

<sup>137</sup> Hervé Ryssen, *Les espérances planétaires* (Paris: éd. Baskerville, 2005), p. 333.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid., p.274.

<sup>139</sup> Jacques Attali, *Les Juifs, le monde et l'argent* (Paris: Fayard; 2002), p. 419 and passim.

<sup>140</sup> Hervé Ryssen, *Les espérances planétaires*, p. 415.

<sup>141</sup> For the Jewish role in the Soviet Union and America respectively, see detailed accounts published in the series “Judaica,” in National Socialist Germany. Rudolf Kommos, *Juden Hinter Stalin* (first published by Niebelung Verlag in 1944, reprinted by Buchkreis Faksimile Verlag: Bremen, 1989). On page 70 Kommos writes: “The name of the Cheka, the GPU, and

the NKVD is linked to Jewishness for all times.” Regarding the role of Jews in America, see in the same series, Walter Freund, *B’nai B’rith- Judentum und Weltpolitik* (first published by Essener Verlag 1942, reprinted by Buchkreis Faksimile Verlag: Bremen, 1990). Freund writes on page 226, “Regarding the Jewish influence in the history of the USA, Margulis names in the



first place the Bible which set up the temple of democracy.”

<sup>142</sup> Yuri Slezkine, *The Jewish Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p.152.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid., p.369.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., p.209.

<sup>145</sup> Kevin MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century*

*Intellectual and Political Movements* (Bloomington: Autorhouse, 2002), Originally published by Praeger Publications, Westport CT, 1998), p.304.

<sup>146</sup> Alain de Benoist, *Comment peut-on être païen?* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1981), p.168.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., p.169.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., p.170.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., p.171.

<sup>150</sup> Milton Konvitz, *Judaism and the American Idea* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1978), p. 71. Also, Jerol S. Auerbach, “Liberalism and the Hebrew Prophets,” in *Commentary* 84:2 (1987): 58. Compare this with Ben Zion Bokser in “Democratic Aspirations in Talmudic Judaism,” in *Judaism and Human Rights*, ed. Milton Konvitz (New York: Norton, 1972): “The

Talmud ordained with great emphasis that every person charged with the violation of some law be given a fair trial and before the law all were to be scrupulously equal, whether a king or a pauper” (146). Ernst Troeltsch, *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen and Gruppen* (1922; Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1965), 768; also the passage “Naturrechtlicher and liberaler Character des

freikirchlichen  
Neucalvinismus,” pp.762-72.  
Compare this with Georg  
Jellinek, *Die Erklärung der  
Menschen-und Bürgerrechte*  
(Leipzig: Duncker und  
Humblot, 1904).

<sup>151</sup> Wilmot Robertson, *The  
Dispossessed Majority* (Cape  
Canaveral, FL: Howard  
Allen, 1972), p.180.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid., p.180.

<sup>153</sup> Oswald Spengler, *Der*

*Untergang des Abendlandes*,  
Vol II (1923 Beck'sche  
Verlagsbuchhandlung:  
München 1976), p.941.

<sup>154</sup> See Deuteronomy XIII.

<sup>155</sup> Louis Rougier, *Du  
Paradis à l'Utopie* (Paris:  
Copernic, 1979), p. 249.

<sup>156</sup> Kevin MacDonald, p. 312  
and passim.

<sup>157</sup> Alain de Benoist,  
*Eléments*, July 1997.

# Chapter V

<sup>158</sup> Carl Schmitt, *Der Nomos der Erde* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1950), p. 265 and passim.

<sup>159</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Die einzige Weltmacht* (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999), p. 44

<sup>160</sup> Carl Schmitt, *Ex Captivitate Salus* (Köln: Greven Verlag, 1950),

especially p. 58.

<sup>161</sup> Jean-Claude Valla, *France sous les bombes américaines, 1942-1945* (Paris: Librairie nationale). Over 70.000 civilians in France perished during the Anglo-American firebombing during World War II.

<sup>162</sup> James Bacque, *Other Losses* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1989). Also Alfred M. de Zayas, *Die Anglo-Amerikaner*



*und die Vertreibung der Deutschen* (1977 Frankfurt: Ullstein 1996). See also James L Payne's article "Did the United States Create Democracy in Germany?," *The Independent Review*, v XI. n. 2, Fall 2006. The author, a known figure in the US media and academic establishment, writes about the subject that all honest scholars have always known about, but have been afraid to

Speak about it in public. On page 211, Payne writes: “Modern writers’ first mistake is to assume that the goal of the American occupation in Germany was to make the country a democracy... Building democracy was *not* the aim of occupation policy. Instead, policy makers aimed to punish Germany and to deny it any war-making potential.”

<sup>163</sup> Jordis von Lohausen, *Les Empires et la puissance* (Paris: Labyrinthe, 1985), p. 23.

<sup>164</sup> Carl Schmitt: “Grand espace contre l’universalisme” in *Du Politique* (Paris: Pardès, 1990), p.129.

<sup>165</sup> Carl Schmitt, “Les formes de l’impérialisme en droit international,” in *Du Politique* (Pardès: Paris,

1990), p.86.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid., p.88.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid., p.99.

<sup>168</sup> Georg Jellinek, *Die Erklärung der Menschen und Bürgerrechte* (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1904), who writes on page 46 that “the idea to establish legally the unalienable, inherent and sacred rights of individuals, is not of political, but of religious origins.”

<sup>169</sup> Joe Lockard, “American Millennialists and the EU Satan,” *Bad Subjects*, issue No. 72, February, 2005. See: <http://bad.eserver.org/issues/20>

<sup>170</sup> Giselher Wirsing, *Der masslose Kontinent: Roosevelts Kampf um die Weltherrschaft* (Berlin, Wien: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1943), pp. 428-429. Wirsing was a well-known expert on the USA during National

Socialist rule and has published numerous books and articles dealing with the American system and the American mindset. In the same book he uses the phrase “the species of Homo americanus” (*Spezies des Homo Americanus*), p. 55.

<sup>171</sup> Claes G. Ryn, “The Ideology of American Empire” (Foreign Policy Research Inst., published by

Elsevier Sc. Ltd.), summer 2003, p. 385

<sup>172</sup> Ibid., p.387.

<sup>173</sup> M. E. Bradford, “Politics of Oliver Cromwell” *The Reactionary Imperative* (1990 Illinois, Sherwood Company), p.214.

<sup>174</sup> See Prof. Dr Helmut Schröcke, *Kriegsursachen, Kriegsschuld* (CZ-Ostrava: Verlag für ganzheitliche Forschung, 2000). This book

was printed, like thousands of similar revisionist titles, by the author himself - which is often the case in Germany with books dealing with sensitive topics of German World War II losses. Also Gerd Honsik in his “Geheimnis des Westens,” posted on his site, where he writes about 13, 5 million German civilian and military fatalities during and after WWII. See



<http://www.honsik.com/briefe>,

<sup>175</sup> Freda Utley, *The High Cost of Vengeance* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. 1949), p.183. See also, Ralph Franklin Keeling, *Schreckliche Ernte; Der Nachkriegs-Krieg der Alliierten gegen das deutsche Volk* (Long Beach: IHR, 1992). Translated from the original *Gruesome Harvest* (Institute of American

Economics, 1947).

<sup>176</sup> *Alliierte Kriegsverbrechen und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit* (Kiel: Arndt Verlag, 2001). The book represents a compendium of documented crimes committed by American soldiers in Germany after World War II.

<sup>177</sup> Utley, p.187 and passim.

<sup>178</sup> Schröcke,  
*Kriegsursachen,*

*Kriegsschuld*, pp. 296-297.

<sup>179</sup> “Vergeltung statt Recht,” by Franz W. Seidler, in the German annual military journal, *Deutsche Militärzeitschrift* (Kiel 2006): pp. 118-123.

<sup>180</sup> John B. Judis, “The Author of Liberty: Religion and U.S. Foreign Policy,” in *Dissent* (fall 2005), pp. 54-61. Also see the link: <http://www.dissentmagazine.o>

article=182 See also “One War is Enough,” by Edgar L. Jones, *Atlantic Monthly*, 1946.

<sup>181</sup> Louis Rougier, *Du Paradis a l’utopie* (Paris: Copernic, 1979), p. 262.

<sup>182</sup> George Steiner, *A Reader* (Oxford University Press: New York, 1984) p. 212.

<sup>183</sup> Lawrence Davidson, “Christian Zionism and American Foreign Policy:

Paving the Road to Hell in Palestine” in *Logos* (winter 2005)

<http://www.logosjournal.com/>

<sup>184</sup> George Monbiot,  
“Puritanism of the Rich:  
Bush’s ideology has its roots  
in 17th century preaching that  
the world exists to be  
conquered,” *The Guardian*,  
November 9, 2004.

<sup>185</sup> Jordis von Lohausen,  
p.266.

186 John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “The Israel Lobby” *London Review of Books*, Vol. 28 No. 6 March 23, 2006. Also published in an extended version by Harvard University, “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” by John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt; Working Paper Number: RWP06-011 Submitted: 13/03/2006.

<sup>187</sup> Carl Schmitt, *Politische Theologie* (München und Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker und Humblot, 1934), p.80.

<sup>188</sup> Brzezinski, p.298.

<sup>189</sup> Brzezinski, p.301.

<sup>190</sup> Samuel Huntington, *Le choc des civilisations* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2000), p. 306-307.

<sup>191</sup> Karl Haushofer, “Les Dynamiques latitudinales et longitudinales,” in *Vouloir*

(Bruxelles), No 9, Spring 1997. First published in *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, Nr. 8, 1943. See also a book by the prominent Swedish Tibet explorer and friend of National Socialist Germany, Sven Hedin, *Amerika im Kampf der Kontinente* (1943 Kiel: Arndt Verlag, 2006), especially pp. 179-180.

<sup>192</sup> See Frank Ebeling, *Geopolitik: Karl Haushofer*



*und seine Raumwissenschaft, 1919-1945* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), pp.95-100.

Haushofer's last letter immediately sent before the end of the war to his wife is reprinted in the book on page 98, where he compares the new world of the USA to a "handsome alligator ... which first honoured the old world of Europe with syphilis, and now with the Yankees."

<sup>193</sup> Samuel Huntington,  
pp.461-462

<sup>194</sup> Ibid., p.344.

## *Chapter VI*

<sup>195</sup> See Christian Ruby, *Le Champ de bataille postmoderne, néo-moderne* (Paris: Editions l' Harmattan, 1990).

<sup>196</sup> Régis Debray, *Cours de médiologie générale* (Paris. Gallimard, 1991), p.303.

<sup>197</sup> Gilles Lipovetsky, Sébastien Charles, *Les Temps hypermodernes* (Paris: Grasset, 2004), p.124.

<sup>198</sup> Gilles Lipovetsky, *L'ère du vide* (Paris: Gallimard, 1983), p.165.

<sup>199</sup> Ruby, p.59.

<sup>200</sup> Gilles Lipovetsky, Sébastien Charles, *Les Temps hypermodernes* (Paris: Grasset, 2004), p.78.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid., p.37.

<sup>202</sup> Jean Baudrillard, *Les stratégies fatales* (Paris: Grasset, 1983), p.79.

<sup>203</sup> Henry Miller, *The Air-Conditioned Nightmare* (London: Panther edition, 1965), p.19.

<sup>204</sup> H.L. Mencken, "On Being An American," in *Prejudices: A Selection* (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), pp.98-99 and passim.

<sup>205</sup> Ezra Pound, *Impact*;

*Essay on Ignorance and the Decline of American Civilization* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1960), p.221.

<sup>206</sup> Ezra Pound, *Jefferson and/or Mussolini* (New York: Liveright, 1970), p.11.

<sup>207</sup> Quoted in Christophe Dolbeau, *Les Parias: Fascistes, pseudo-fascistes et mal-pensants* (Lyon: Edition Irminsul, 2001), p.264.

<sup>208</sup> Vladimir Jankélévitch

*L'irréversible et la nostalgie*  
(Paris: Flammarion, 1974),  
p.281.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid. p.296.

## *Chapter VII*

<sup>210</sup> Christopher Lasch, *The True and Only Heaven* (New York: WW Norton, 1991),  
p.78.

<sup>211</sup> Ibid., p.92.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid., p.93.

<sup>213</sup> Paul Gottfried, *The*

*Conservative Movement*  
(New York: Twayne  
Publishers, 1993), especially  
pages 142-166.

<sup>214</sup> For a comprehensive  
introduction to the history of  
eugenics and its possible  
usage in postmodernity see  
the well documented book by  
John Glad, *Future Human  
Evolution: Eugenics in the  
Twenty-First Century*  
(Schuylkill Haven, PA;

Hermitage Publishers, 2006). On page 73-74, he writes: “Vladimir Lenin himself derided the claim that people are equal in ability. Galton’s chief pupil and the leader of Britain’s eugenics movement, Karl Pearson, was a Fabian socialist, as was Sidney Webb, who contributed an essay on eugenics to the influential 1890 Fabian Essays. Geneticists in the early Soviet state attempted,



unsuccessfully, to model the socialist experiment along eugenic lines.”

<sup>215</sup> Frank Lawrence Owsley, “The Irrepressible Conflict,” *I’ll take my Stand* (1930 New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p.64.

<sup>216</sup> Ibid., p.66.

<sup>217</sup> Knut Hamsun, *Cultural life of Modern America* (Copenhagen: PG. Philipsens forlag, 1889), p.119.

218 “A Critique of the  
Philosophy of Progress,”  
p.123.

219 Ibid., p.142.

220 Richard Weaver, *Ideas  
Have Consequences* (1948  
Chicago: The University of  
Chicago Press, 1984), p.42.

221 Ibid., p.44.

222 Ibid., p.46.

223 George Fitzhugh,  
*Sociology for the South, or  
the Failure of Free Society*

(Richmond VA: A Morris Publisher, 1854), pp.177-178.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid., p.233.

<sup>225</sup> Ibid., p.86.

<sup>226</sup> Claude Polin “Pluralisme ou Guerre civile”? *Catholica* (winter, 2005-06), p.16.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid., p.18.

<sup>228</sup> Claude Polin, *Le libéralisme, espoir ou péril?* (Paris: Table ronde, 1984), p.211.

<sup>229</sup> Max Scheler, *Das*

*Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen* (Abhandlungen and Aufsätze) (Leipzig: Verlag der weissen Bücher, 1915), p. 58.

<sup>230</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville, *De la démocratie en Amérique*, Vol. II (Paris: Gallimard, 1961), p.193.