

1 UNITED STATES SENATE
2 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
3 WASHINGTON, D.C.
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7 INTERVIEW OF SUPERVISORY INTELLIGENCE
8 ANALYST
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11 THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2020
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16 The interview was convened, pursuant to notice, at
17 10:10 a.m., in Room SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building,
18 Washington, D.C.
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P R O C E E D I N G S

[10:10 a.m.]

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3 Mr. Somers. This is a transcribed interview of [REDACTED]
4 [REDACTED]. Chairman Graham requested this interview as part of
5 an investigation by the Senate Judiciary Committee into
6 matters related to the Justice Department's and the Federal
7 Bureau of Investigation's handling of the Crossfire
8 Hurricane investigation, including the applications for and
9 renewals of a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act warrant
10 on Carter Page.

11 Would the witness please state his name and his
12 current position at the FBI for the record?

13 [REDACTED]. [REDACTED], Supervisory Intelligence
14 Analyst, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

15 Mr. Somers. Could you just do that one more time? It
16 didn't come through very clearly.

17 [REDACTED]. [REDACTED], Supervisory Intelligence
18 Analyst, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

19 Mr. Somers. Thank you. On behalf of Chairman Graham,
20 I want to thank you for appearing today, and we appreciate
21 your willingness to appear voluntarily. I will just note
22 for the record, since I'm not sure it'll come through on
23 the transcript, that we are doing this interview remotely
24 via Webex.

25 My name is Zachary Somers. I'm the majority chief

1 investigative counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee.
2 I'm here in the committee room. With me is senior
3 investigative counsel Arthur Baker. Everyone else I
4 believe is appearing remotely. I think Lee Holmes, our
5 staff director, may join us at some point via Webex or in
6 the room.

7 Mr. Holmes. I'm on, Zach.

8 Mr. Somers. I think just for the record I'd like to
9 have everybody go through and just put their name on the
10 record. I think the way to do it, we'll start with Ranking
11 Member Feinstein's staff to go first. There's two staffers
12 from Feinstein's office on the Webex, and then if we could
13 go to the FBI counsel that are present, and then conclude
14 with [REDACTED] personal counsel, and then I'll get back
15 to my preamble. So, Sara, maybe if you could start off on
16 our chain of introductions.

17 Ms. Zdeb. Sara Zdeb, senior counsel for the minority
18 Ranking Member Feinstein.

19 Mr. Fausett. Good morning. This is Andrew Fausett,
20 also senior counsel for Ranking Member Feinstein on the
21 minority staff.

22 [Pause.]

23 Mr. Somers. [REDACTED], we didn't get that.

24 [Pause.]

25 [REDACTED]. [REDACTED], FBI Office of General

1 Counsel, is here. Also with [REDACTED], FBI Office of
2 General Counsel. I'm not sure, [REDACTED], if they were able to
3 hear your name for the record.

4 Mr. Somers. So from the FBI, we just have [REDACTED] and
5 [REDACTED]. Is that correct?

6 [REDACTED]. You also have [REDACTED], FBI OGC, on
7 the line.

8 Mr. Somers. Okay.

9 Mr. Linehan. Patrick Linehan from Steptoe & Johnson
10 on behalf of Brian Auten. Did that come through?

11 Mr. Somers. Yes, that came through.

12 Mr. Linehan. Great.

13 Mr. Somers. I think that's everybody.

14 Mr. Linehan. And, Zach -- this is Pat Linehan just
15 for the record -- I just wanted to confirm on the record
16 that other than a recording that the court reporter may be
17 making, this proceeding is not being recorded either by
18 video or audio?

19 Mr. Somers. No; we're just -- just the transcription
20 by the court reporter.

21 Mr. Linehan. Great. Thank you.

22 One more. [REDACTED] just reminded me to ask that this is
23 -- even though we're on Webex, this is considered
24 unclassified?

25 Mr. Somers. I think your question was whether it was

1 classified. This is an unclassified setting.

2 Mr. Linehan. Yes, that's right. I was just
3 confirming that. Thank you.

4 Mr. Somers. Okay. I'll get back to my preamble now.

5 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply in
6 this setting, but there are some guidelines that we follow
7 that I'd like to go over. Our questioning will proceed in
8 rounds. The majority will ask questions first for an hour,
9 and then the minority will have the opportunity to ask
10 questions for an equal period of time. We will go back and
11 forth in this manner until there are no more questions and
12 the interview is over.

13 Typically, we take a short break at the end of each
14 hour of questioning, but if you would like to take a break
15 apart from that, [REDACTED], please let us know.

16 As I noted earlier, you are appearing voluntarily.
17 Accordingly, we anticipate that our questions will receive
18 complete responses. To the extent that you decline to
19 answer our questions or if counsel instructs you not to
20 answer, we will consider whether a subpoena is necessary.

21 In the room with Art and me is an official reporter
22 taking down everything that is said to make a written
23 record. So, [REDACTED], we ask that you give verbal
24 responses to all of our questions. Do you understand that?
25 [REDACTED]. Yes.

1 Mr. Somers. So that the reporter can take down a
2 clear record, it is important that we don't talk over one
3 another or interrupt each other if we can help it. The
4 committee encourages witnesses who appear for transcribed
5 interviews to freely consult with counsel if they so
6 choose, and since we are not all in the same room, just as
7 I mentioned before we went on the record, please let us
8 know when you consult with your counsel just so that we
9 know that that's what's going on.

10 We want you to answer our questions in the most
11 complete and truthful manner possible, so we will take our
12 time. If you have any questions or if you do not
13 understand one of our questions, please let us know. If
14 you honestly don't know the answer to a question or do not
15 remember it, it is best not to guess. Please give us your
16 best recollection, and it is okay to tell us if you learned
17 the information from someone else. If there are things you
18 don't know or can't remember, just say so and please inform
19 us who, to the best of your knowledge, might be able to
20 provide us with a more complete response to our question.

21 You should also understand that although this
22 interview is not under oath, you are required by law to
23 answer questions from Congress truthfully. Do you
24 understand that?

25 I think you may be muted. Could you try again? I

1 could read your lips, but I couldn't hear you.

2 [REDACTED]. I understand that.

3 Mr. Somers. Thank you. This also applies to
4 questions posed by congressional staff in an interview. Do
5 you understand this?

6 [REDACTED]. I understand that.

7 Mr. Somers. Witnesses who knowingly provide false
8 testimony could be subject to criminal prosecution for
9 perjury or for making false statements. Do you understand
10 this?

11 [REDACTED]. I understand that.

12 Mr. Somers. Is there any reason you are unable to
13 provide truthful answers to today's questions?

14 [REDACTED]. No.

15 Mr. Somers. Finally, we ask that you not speak about
16 what we discuss in this interview with anyone apart from
17 those participating in today's interview by Webex or Art
18 and I here in the room in order to preserve the integrity
19 of our investigation.

20 That's the end of my preamble. Before we begin our
21 first round of questioning, does anyone have any questions?

22 [No response.]

23 Mr. Somers. Okay. I assume that's no questions from
24 anybody, and it is now 10:18, and we'll begin our first
25 round of questioning.

1 [REDACTED], have you read or reviewed the IG's December
2 2019 report on the Carter Page FISA applications?

3 [REDACTED]. Yes, I have.

4 Mr. Somers. And, for the record, are you the person
5 identified as the supervisory intel analyst in the IG's
6 FISA report?

7 [REDACTED]. Yes, I am.

8 Mr. Somers. And other than your personal attorneys
9 and the attorneys from the FBI, did you speak with anyone
10 in preparation for today's interview?

11 [REDACTED]. No.

12 Mr. Somers. According to the IG's FISA report, the
13 Crossfire Hurricane investigation was officially opened on
14 July 31st of 2016. What was your position at the FBI on
15 July 31st of 2016?

16 [REDACTED]. On July 31, 2016, I was a supervisory
17 intelligence analyst.

18 Mr. Somers. And is that the same position you hold
19 now?

20 [REDACTED]. Correct.

21 Mr. Somers. And what branch and division of the FBI I
22 guess are you in and were you in on July 31st of 2016?

23 [REDACTED]. On July 31, 2016, I was in the
24 Counterintelligence Division.

25 Mr. Somers. Are you still in the Counterintelligence

1 Division?

2 [REDACTED]. Yes.

3 Mr. Somers. And when were you assigned to the
4 Crossfire Hurricane investigation?

5 [REDACTED]. I was assigned to the Crossfire Hurricane
6 investigation either on August 1st or August 2nd, 2016.

7 Mr. Somers. And do you recall when you stopped
8 working on the Crossfire Hurricane investigation?

9 [REDACTED]. I stopped working on the Crossfire
10 Hurricane investigation when I moved over to the Special
11 Counsel's office.

12 Mr. Somers. And did you stay with the Special
13 Counsel's office until the Special Counsel's office I guess
14 ceased to exist?

15 [REDACTED]. Yes.

16 Mr. Somers. And then trying to understand sort of the
17 nature of your assignment to Crossfire Hurricane, was this
18 in addition to your usual duties? Was this the primary
19 focus during this time period? Can you kind of give us a
20 description of how this fit into your other duties you
21 otherwise had at the FBI?

22 [REDACTED]. Between August 1st, August 2nd, 2016, up
23 through probably the January time frame of 2017, this was
24 my primary duty. Between January 2017 and approximately
25 mid-March of 2017, it was an additional duty along with

1 working back in my particular unit in the
2 Counterintelligence Division. And then after mid-March of
3 2017 through the beginning of the Special Counsel, it was
4 my primary duty.

5 Mr. Somers. And then just to kind of get a picture of
6 all that, physically did you move from your -- I assume
7 you're assigned to headquarters. Is that correct?

8 [REDACTED] Correct.

9 Mr. Somers. Did you move offices within headquarters
10 to a different location to be part of the Crossfire
11 Hurricane team?

12 [REDACTED] Initially, yes. In August of 2016, we
13 moved to a particular office, and we had a number of
14 different offices during that time.

15 Mr. Somers. Okay. And then did you move into
16 wherever the Special Counsel office was housed during the
17 pendency of the Special Counsel?

18 [REDACTED] Yes.

19 Mr. Somers. Okay. And how did you get assigned to --
20 who assigned you to the Crossfire Hurricane investigation?
21 Start there.

22 [REDACTED] The intelligence section chief assigned
23 me.

24 Mr. Somers. Is that Jonathan Moffa?

25 [REDACTED] Yes.

1 Mr. Somers. Did he ask you if you wanted to join this
2 investigation, or were you just assigned to this
3 investigation?

4 [REDACTED] He in effect assigned me -- I mean, asked
5 me if I wanted to do it, but asked me to do it.

6 Mr. Somers. Okay. What was your -- or I guess at the
7 time -- let's state the time. What was your specialty at
8 the FBI in July of 2016?

9 [REDACTED] I was, again, a special -- sorry, a
10 supervisory intelligence analyst within the Eurasia
11 Analysis Unit.

12 Mr. Somers. Do you have any specialization expertise
13 -- I don't know exactly how you would characterize it -- on
14 Russia in particular?

15 [REDACTED] I have some, yes.

16 Mr. Baker. What is your educational background, sir?

17 [REDACTED] I have a bachelor's degree in history from
18 the [REDACTED]. I have a
19 master's degree in national security studies from
20 [REDACTED]. And I have
21 a Ph.D. in international politics and strategic studies
22 from the [REDACTED].

23 Mr. Baker. Thank you.

24 Mr. Somers. Do you speak or read Russian?

25 [REDACTED] I speak some. It's rusty.

1 Mr. Somers. And prior to being assigned to the
2 Crossfire Hurricane investigation, were you working on the
3 more general subject of Russian interference in the 2016
4 election?

5 [REDACTED] To a certain extent, yes.

6 Mr. Somers. And how would you describe, very
7 generally, obviously not getting into anything classified,
8 the work you were doing on Russian election interference
9 prior to joining Crossfire Hurricane?

10 [REDACTED] Russian election interference has been a
11 historical issue, and so that is something that is part and
12 parcel of working that particular country target.

13 Mr. Baker. I want to back up just a second. How long
14 have you been employed at the FBI?

15 [REDACTED] Since January of 2005.

16 Mr. Baker. And did you enter on duty as an
17 intelligence analyst or in some other capacity?

18 [REDACTED] As an intelligence analyst.

19 Mr. Baker. And where did you work prior to the
20 Bureau?

21 [REDACTED] I was an adjunct professor while I was
22 completing my dissertation.

23 Mr. Baker. An adjunct professor teaching --

24 [REDACTED] I was teaching national security studies
25 at [REDACTED].

1 Mr. Baker. Is that the only institution you've taught
2 at?

3 [REDACTED] No.

4 Mr. Baker. What are the others?

5 [REDACTED] I did some teaching at the [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED]. I did a little bit of teaching at the
7 [REDACTED]. And then most recently I
8 have taught as a -- I've taught counterterrorism at [REDACTED]
9 [REDACTED].

10 Mr. Baker. When you teach these courses, is there any
11 specialty in these -- is there any subcategory of
12 counterterrorism or counterintelligence that you specialize
13 in or focus on?

14 [REDACTED] No. It's been more -- it's more general
15 than that. The course on counterterrorism is a general,
16 almost a survey course.

17 Mr. Baker. Do you teach a course or have you ever
18 taught a course that deals in some way, shape, or form with
19 the ethics of intelligence or, more specifically, the
20 ethics of spying?

21 [REDACTED] I've never taught a course on that, no.

22 Mr. Baker. Have you written materials regarding the
23 expertise that you teach on?

24 [REDACTED] Have I written materials -- I'm sorry.
25 I'm not --

1 Mr. Baker. Have you published any books or articles
2 about counterintelligence or counterterrorism?

3 [REDACTED] No. The only book that I've published was
4 my dissertation.

5 Mr. Baker. What about articles?

6 [REDACTED] Articles, I have written articles on
7 various issues involving defense policy and involving
8 national security policy.

9 Mr. Baker. But you've never written an article about
10 the ethics of spying?

11 [REDACTED] No. I have written an article about the
12 ethics of spying. I've just never taught a course on the
13 ethics of spying.

14 Mr. Baker. But you have written an article on it?

15 [REDACTED] Correct.

16 Mr. Baker. And where was that published?

17 [REDACTED] It was originally published in, I believe,
18 [REDACTED].

19 Mr. Baker. And that is the name of a magazine or a
20 journal?

21 [REDACTED] It is the name of a journal.

22 Mr. Baker. Okay. Thank you.

23 Mr. Somers. Switching a little bit to the Foreign
24 Intelligence Surveillance Act, in the course of your
25 career, do you know approximately how many investigations

1 you have worked on that have involved FISA authority?

2 [REDACTED] I would have no way of counting that.

3 Mr. Somers. Because it's a very -- is it a large
4 number?

5 [REDACTED] Over the course of the last 15 years, it
6 would be a sizable number.

7 Mr. Somers. Okay. And in terms of -- I assume you
8 were an analyst before you were a supervisory intelligence
9 analyst. So I guess as an analyst or as a super -- maybe
10 we'll start as an analyst. We've had a number of agents in
11 that we've interviewed about FISA and FISA authority.
12 What's the analyst's role in a FISA application, in seeking
13 FISA authority?

14 [REDACTED] The analyst's role is a supportive role.
15 It is assisting special agents in gathering information
16 that they can use in applications.

17 Mr. Somers. And then is it -- and then once the FISA
18 is up and running, does the analyst have a role in looking
19 at the data that's received?

20 [REDACTED] Yes.

21 Mr. Somers. And then in terms -- is the role any
22 different of a supervisory intel analyst versus an analyst
23 in terms of seeking FISA authority?

24 [REDACTED] No.

25 Mr. Somers. Did you receive any training on the FISA

1 process?

2 [REDACTED] Virtual training, yes.

3 Mr. Somers. And what did that training consist of?

4 [REDACTED] It was going through the -- what a FISA
5 is, what a FISA does, the Bureau's authorities to use FISA.

6 Mr. Somers. And did you receive that as part of your
7 training to become an analyst, or is that an ongoing thing
8 at the Bureau?

9 [REDACTED] Both.

10 Mr. Baker. When you entered on duty, were you
11 recruited by someone or entities already at the FBI? Or
12 did you see a posting for a job? Or how did you become
13 interested in employment at the FBI?

14 [REDACTED] It was a general posting.

15 Mr. Baker. And what was the posting specifically for?

16 [REDACTED] It was a posting for intelligence analyst.

17 Mr. Baker. So you applied, you went through some sort
18 of interview process, and you were ultimately hired?

19 [REDACTED] Correct.

20 Mr. Baker. When you were hired -- Mr. Somers talked a
21 little bit about specific training concerning the FISA
22 process -- did you go through a more broad, a more
23 generalized training program with the FBI? Specifically,
24 did you attend anything, any program at Quantico, Virginia,
25 as you entered on duty?

1 [REDACTED] Not when I entered on duty, but in the
2 months following my entrance on duty, yes.

3 Mr. Baker. And what kind of training was that?

4 [REDACTED] It was a program that they called at that
5 time "ACES," and it covered a whole multitude of things, to
6 include FISA.

7 Mr. Baker. And how long of a program is this?

8 [REDACTED] I have a tough time remembering exactly
9 how many weeks, but I want to say somewhere along the lines
10 of 12, maybe 11.

11 Mr. Baker. And this was at Quantico, Virginia?

12 [REDACTED] Correct.

13 Mr. Baker. And was this the program where the
14 incoming or onboarding analysts are embedded for a certain
15 amount of time of that training with the new agent
16 trainees?

17 [REDACTED] No. That was -- the program you're
18 describing is something that happened subsequent to the
19 training that I went through.

20 Mr. Baker. Okay. So you had a program of some weeks
21 that was new intelligence analysts coming on board and
22 learning what an intelligence analyst for the FBI does or
23 what's expected and whatnot?

24 [REDACTED] Correct.

25 Mr. Baker. Thank you.

1 Mr. Somers. And as part of this training, did the
2 training include information on like what duties are owed
3 to the FISA Court?

4 [REDACTED] I don't recall exactly details regarding
5 what duties are owed to the FISA Court. It was more of an
6 issue regarding, again, kind of what's the authority of
7 using FISA, maybe a little bit about process, but I don't
8 recall exactly.

9 Mr. Somers. What about was there training on the
10 Woods Procedures?

11 [REDACTED] No.

12 Mr. Somers. Have you subsequent in your career
13 received any training on the Woods Procedures?

14 [REDACTED] No.

15 Mr. Somers. What, if any, is an analyst's role in
16 putting together the Woods file in a FISA application?

17 [REDACTED] An analyst's role is, again, supportive.
18 It is providing, perhaps researching and providing
19 information that the special agent can use in putting
20 together the application.

21 Mr. Somers. So an analyst could be gathering
22 information that -- if they were tasked by a special agent
23 to do so, they could gather information that would then go
24 in the Woods file? Is that accurate?

25 [REDACTED] That is accurate.

1 Mr. Somers. Do you know what -- even if it wasn't
2 through training, are you familiar with what duties are
3 owed to the FISA Court?

4 [REDACTED] To a certain extent, yes.

5 Mr. Somers. Are you familiar with the duty of candor?

6 [REDACTED] Yes.

7 Mr. Somers. And what do you understand the duty of
8 candor to be?

9 [REDACTED] That you are required to be -- have candor
10 with the Court.

11 Mr. Somers. Does the duty of candor require providing
12 the Court with information, you know, if required by the
13 duty, that could be contrary, could be exculpatory to the
14 witness -- not the witness, the subject of the FISA
15 application?

16 [REDACTED] So I am -- I'm not a lawyer, and so in
17 terms of what is exculpatory or inculpatory, I'm not in a
18 position to determine that.

19 Mr. Somers. I'm just trying to understand what your
20 knowledge as an analyst is of the duty of candor.

21 [REDACTED] So I would say you need to be honest with
22 the Court. That's my understanding of the duty of candor.

23 Mr. Somers. I'm sorry. You said "honest" and broke
24 up a little bit.

25 [REDACTED] Honest with the Court. That is my

1 understanding of the duty of candor.

2 Mr. Somers. Do you understand it to involve, you
3 know, you might have to provide information that's not
4 necessarily helpful to seeking a FISA application?

5 [REDACTED] Again, I don't know at what point --
6 again, I'm not a lawyer. I don't know at what point things
7 that are, again, exculpatory or inculpatory are required to
8 be provided to the Court.

9 Mr. Somers. And what's your understanding of the
10 Woods Procedures? What's the purpose of the Woods
11 Procedures?

12 [REDACTED] I would describe the Woods Procedures very
13 much like footnotes or endnotes to be able to check your
14 work so somebody can come behind you and determine whether
15 or not you have -- you are able to match what you have in
16 the application to supporting documentation.

17 Mr. Baker. In your role of supporting the agent
18 investigators, were you ever told to find support for an
19 assertion that the agents were making in a FISA
20 application? Were you as an analyst ever said to go find
21 this footnote, go find this endnote that we need to put in
22 this application so we can show where this assertion that
23 we're making comes from?

24 [REDACTED] I have been asked over the years to find
25 information to support applications, yes.

1 Mr. Baker. And is that process where you're asked, is
2 this something formal where there's paper generated, sort
3 of like a lead, please find supporting material for this
4 assertion? Or is it less formal than that? Just how does
5 it -- you said this has happened over the years. How do
6 you know to start this task? And how do you report back on
7 the completion of that task with what you found?

8 [REDACTED] It is less formal than an actual lead.
9 I've had situations where agents have emailed me to ask
10 whether or not I could find something to assist.

11 Mr. Baker. And your title, supervisory intelligence
12 analyst, can I assume from that that you supervise people
13 also?

14 [REDACTED] Correct.

15 Mr. Baker. And who are the people you supervise? Not
16 names but titles and functional duties.

17 [REDACTED] I would supervise intelligence analysts
18 under me.

19 Mr. Baker. And how many intelligence analysts are
20 under you?

21 [REDACTED] Presently I don't have any intelligence
22 analysts under me, but in the past I have had any number of
23 intelligence analysts who have worked under me.

24 Mr. Baker. And how many would you have had during the
25 Crossfire Hurricane investigation?

1 [REDACTED] I think the number was approximately five
2 or six.

3 Mr. Baker. So when you get these requests to find
4 documentation to support an assertion, is this something
5 that you yourself take and begin to look for supporting
6 information? Or would this be something that you would
7 assign to some of these analysts that you supervise?

8 [REDACTED] It would depend on the situation.

9 If you could excuse me for a moment, I'm having some
10 noise here on the side. If I could just figure out how to
11 adjust that.

12 Mr. Baker. Sure.

13 Court Reporter. Someone is not muted.

14 Mr. Somers. It sounds like somebody is not muted. It
15 sounds like there's typing going on.

16 [Pause.]

17 [REDACTED] I'm back on. This is [REDACTED].

18 Mr. Baker. Okay. So you were saying that these
19 requests for documentation for assertions made in the
20 applications, they could have been things that you yourself
21 would, for lack of a term, run with or they could have been
22 things that you delegated down to somebody that you
23 supervise?

24 [REDACTED] That is correct. It could be either.

25 Mr. Baker. Okay. Thank you.

1 Mr. Somers. And then in terms of the actual
2 application itself, as an analyst or a supervisory analyst,
3 do you ever review, read all or parts of a FISA
4 application?

5 [REDACTED] On occasion, yes.

6 Mr. Somers. I should have said -- that's before it's
7 submitted to the Court?

8 [REDACTED] Correct.

9 Mr. Somers. Do analysts ever write parts of a FISA
10 application?

11 [REDACTED] Analysts will sometimes provide
12 information or even sometimes language that is given to the
13 special agent that might be of use in an application.

14 Mr. Somers. And then if you're -- I'm just trying to
15 understand the role in actually reviewing an application.
16 If you're an analyst, you're working on an investigation
17 and FISA coverage is going to be sought, an application is
18 being put together, would you necessarily read the
19 application?

20 [REDACTED] No. It's much more ad hoc.

21 Mr. Somers. As an analyst, if you saw something in
22 the application that you thought was incorrect, what would
23 you generally -- what would your responsibility be to
24 address that? And how would you address that?

25 [REDACTED] Generally, you would address that with the

1 case agent handling the FISA application.

2 Mr. Baker. And what would happen if you, as the
3 person that's running with the request to find
4 documentation, or the employees you supervise, what would
5 happen if you could not find supporting documentation for
6 the assertion or you could only find information that was
7 contra or seemed to be contra to the assertion?

8 [REDACTED] You would tell the case agent.

9 Mr. Baker. And how would that reporting to the case
10 agent go? Would that be still informal, or would it be
11 more formal since it potentially raises an issue with an
12 assertion made in the application?

13 [REDACTED] I think it would still be probably less
14 formal.

15 Mr. Baker. And in the course of your career, have you
16 had instances or have you supervised individuals that have
17 had instances where they could not find documentation for
18 an assertion or they could only find contra information to
19 the assertion?

20 [REDACTED] I don't recall exactly situations of that
21 happening right offhand.

22 Mr. Baker. Even if we narrowed it down more
23 specifically to the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, were
24 there any instances where you could not verify an assertion
25 or information seemed to be contra to the assertion?

1 [REDACTED] Again, I would basically say at that point
2 you're talking about what the case agent is looking at.

3 Mr. Baker. Okay. Thank you.

4 Mr. Somers. How does the -- you know, you're a
5 supervisor intel analyst; there's an intel analyst; then
6 there's case agents; I assume special agents; then you have
7 SSAs. What's sort of the chain of command there? If
8 there's a case agent, but you're a supervisory intel
9 analyst, are you guys completely in separate chains of
10 command? Are you sort of superior to a case agent? Could
11 you kind of explain that interaction?

12 [REDACTED] We are in completely separate chains of
13 command.

14 Mr. Somers. So even though you're a supervisory intel
15 analyst, you don't actually have any supervisory authority
16 over a case agent. Is that correct?

17 [REDACTED] That is correct.

18 Mr. Somers. And during Crossfire Hurricane, was
19 Jonathan Moffa your direct supervisor?

20 [REDACTED] That is correct.

21 Mr. Baker. So I would think at some point on the
22 chain of command, as you go up -- I understand you're
23 saying that you're in a separate chain of command as an
24 analyst. But at some point as you go up, doesn't there
25 become some common supervisor, maybe at the section chief

1 or the Assistant Director level?

2 [REDACTED] So in this situation, the section chiefs
3 are separate commands. The DADs would be -- excuse me, the
4 Deputy Assistant Directors would be separate commands. But
5 the Deputy Assistant Directors would both report to the
6 Assistant Director of the Counterintelligence Division.

7 Mr. Baker. And who would that have been during
8 Crossfire Hurricane?

9 [REDACTED] Bill Priestap.

10 Mr. Baker. And who would the Deputy Assistant
11 Director in your chain be?

12 [REDACTED] I would say that depends on what point
13 you're talking about in the Crossfire Hurricane
14 investigation.

15 Mr. Baker. Early part.

16 [REDACTED] Early part in the investigation? The
17 chain of command would have been from me on the
18 intelligence side to Jon Moffa, with Jon Moffa reporting to
19 Bill Priestap.

20 Mr. Baker. Middle part of the investigation.

21 [REDACTED] Middle part of the investigation would
22 have been me reporting on the Crossfire Hurricane matters
23 to Jon Moffa, Jon Moffa reporting to the Deputy Assistant
24 Director, Dina Corsi, and Dina Corsi reporting to Bill
25 Priestap.

1 Mr. Baker. End part of the investigation.

2 [REDACTED] End part of the investigation would have
3 been me reporting to [REDACTED] reporting
4 to Bill Priestap.

5 Mr. Baker. And how about for your agent counterpart?
6 Who would their DADs have been?

7 [REDACTED] It would have depended on the period of
8 time we're talking about in the Crossfire Hurricane
9 investigation.

10 Mr. Baker. Beginning of the investigation.

11 [REDACTED] Beginning of the investigation, case
12 agents would have reported to SSA-1, SSA-1 would have
13 reported to Peter Strzok, and Peter Strzok would have
14 reported to Bill Priestap.

15 Mr. Baker. Middle part.

16 [REDACTED] Middle part, the case agents -- well, it
17 would depend on -- the middle part is rather more
18 complicated.

19 Mr. Baker. How is it more complicated?

20 [REDACTED] Different cases were in different field
21 offices, and, therefore, you would have had case agents in
22 their field office reporting to their field office chains
23 of command with headquarters program managers. Those
24 headquarters program managers would have been SSAs
25 reporting to two different DADs. One DAD would be Jennifer

1 Boone, one DAD would be Peter Strzok, both of those DADs
2 reporting to Bill Priestap.

3 Mr. Baker. And how would the difference between DADs
4 be determined, who reported to which DAD? That would
5 depend on what field office?

6 [REDACTED] It would depend on which unit was program
7 managing the cases in which field office.

8 Mr. Baker. Okay. And then in the end of the
9 investigation, who would the DADs have been?

10 [REDACTED] The end of the investigation, the case
11 agents would have reported through SSA-2; SSA-2 would have
12 reported to [REDACTED] would have
13 reported to at that point Bill Priestap.

14 Mr. Baker. Okay. Were there any other DADs either on
15 the intel side or the agent side that came in for a
16 temporary duty or were just short tenured, either
17 beginning, middle, or end of the investigation, or the
18 names you've named pretty much covers it?

19 [REDACTED] I've pretty much covered it, I believe.

20 Mr. Baker. Thank you.

21 Mr. Somers. All right. So I think earlier you
22 indicated you were assigned to Crossfire Hurricane on
23 either August 1st or August 2nd of 2016, and that you -- is
24 that when you also became aware of Crossfire Hurricane,
25 when you were assigned to it?

1 [REDACTED] I believe I was assigned -- it was an
2 email that was sent to me to report to intel section
3 chief's office on the Monday following the 31st, and I
4 reported on the Monday, and I was given information about
5 where the case was.

6 Mr. Somers. And what was your understanding of what
7 the case was when you were assigned?

8 [REDACTED] I was told that a friendly foreign
9 government had provided information to the FBI and that
10 friendly foreign government information was predicating an
11 investigation.

12 Mr. Somers. And what was it an investigation of?

13 [REDACTED] So the friendly foreign government
14 information indicated that an individual who had been an
15 adviser of the Trump campaign had told a representative of
16 that friendly foreign government that the Russians had
17 indicated that they could assist the Trump campaign with
18 the release of anonymous information detrimental to Hillary
19 Clinton and detrimental to President Obama.

20 Mr. Somers. And when you were assigned, were there
21 analysts already assigned to Crossfire Hurricane, or were
22 they assigned after you?

23 [REDACTED] They were assigned after me.

24 Mr. Somers. And I think you mentioned that you were
25 supervising around the time of Crossfire Hurricane five or

1 six analysts. Were those five or six analysts, analysts on
2 Crossfire Hurricane, or were these five or six analysts you
3 were supervising in your usual job capacity?

4 [REDACTED] The five or six are the analysts that were
5 under me in Crossfire Hurricane.

6 Mr. Somers. Were those the same people that you were
7 already supervising prior to Crossfire Hurricane?

8 [REDACTED] I believe some I had been supervising and
9 some I had not been directly supervising.

10 Mr. Somers. So the ones you hadn't been directly
11 supervising, where did -- did you go out and get them? Did
12 Jonathan Moffa go out and get them? How did they get
13 assigned to Crossfire Hurricane?

14 [REDACTED] If I recall correctly, Jon Moffa and I
15 talked about analysts that were in the division, in the
16 unit actually that I was part of.

17 Mr. Somers. But they weren't supervised by you prior
18 to Crossfire Hurricane?

19 [REDACTED] Correct. We have multiple supervisors in
20 the unit.

21 Mr. Somers. Okay, but they're all at headquarters?

22 [REDACTED] Correct.

23 Mr. Somers. Did you ever pull any analysts not from
24 headquarters into Crossfire Hurricane?

25 [REDACTED] There was one special -- sorry, one what's

1 called an "SOS," and she was brought over from WFO --
2 Washington Field Office, excuse me.

3 Mr. Somers. And then you just went through a minute
4 ago with Mr. Baker sort of how the case got split amongst
5 different field offices as it progressed. Did the analysis
6 section know that that stayed the same, it was always out
7 of headquarters? Or were they using analysts when the case
8 got more split up later on? Were they using analysts from
9 those field offices?

10 [REDACTED] No. The analyst cadre became more diffuse
11 during that time.

12 Mr. Somers. So they could have been using analysts as
13 well from field offices?

14 [REDACTED] Correct.

15 Mr. Somers. Did you supervise then those analysts
16 that were being used from field offices?

17 [REDACTED] So after the probably mid-March time frame
18 up through the beginning of Special Counsel's office, one
19 might call that a more -- a period of more recentralization
20 of the cases, and in that point I was doing a lot of
21 liaison work with the different field offices and the
22 intelligence cadres and attempting to centralize the
23 intelligence that was being done at that time.

24 Mr. Somers. And when you went to Special Counsel
25 Mueller's Office, did you bring analysts with you?

1 [REDACTED] Yes.

2 Mr. Somers. And these were the same analysts that had
3 been working the case, or were these new analysts?

4 [REDACTED] In some cases they were analysts who had
5 been working the case, and in some cases there were new
6 analysts brought over.

7 Mr. Somers. Were those also from headquarters, these
8 analysts?

9 [REDACTED] Not all.

10 Mr. Somers. Not all. Were you responsible for
11 bringing them into Special Counsel Mueller's team, for lack
12 of a better term?

13 [REDACTED] I would say in nearly all cases I had -- I
14 was responsible for helping to bring them over. Not in
15 all, though.

16 Mr. Baker. Did you have any role in bringing agents
17 on board to either the Crossfire Hurricane team or to the
18 Special Counsel's office? Did you have any input in agent
19 selection?

20 [REDACTED] No.

21 Mr. Baker. Thank you.

22 Mr. Somers. So how would you describe your role,
23 let's say, right up to the first Carter Page FISA
24 application being submitted? How would you describe your
25 role in Crossfire Hurricane?

1 ██████████ My role, I was supervising, again, a group
2 of approximately five or six analysts. They were writing
3 materials, assisting case agents, and I would be reviewing
4 work as well as ensuring that my executive management was
5 regularly briefed up on what was going on within the cases.

6 Mr. Somers. What about doing work yourself? Do you
7 think you were more reviewing work of analysts versus
8 generating your own product during this time period?

9 ██████████ I don't recall generating my own product
10 per se, but there were times that I would assist with
11 searches or I would assist with material.

12 Mr. Somers. Okay. And then eventually in Crossfire
13 Hurricane, four investigations are opened. There's the
14 Crossfire Hurricane investigation; there's investigations
15 opened of four individuals within the Crossfire Hurricane
16 umbrella. Did you have any role in identifying those four
17 individuals?

18 ██████████ Our analysts, and myself included, looked,
19 once the umbrella case had been opened, to see whether or
20 not what kind of -- who would best fit certain parameters
21 that were set up, and, therefore, we were engaged with case
22 agents in providing case agents information that they could
23 use in opening those cases.

24 Mr. Somers. But those names were given to you, I take
25 it. Then you went and analyzed how they fit into the

1 Crossfire Hurricane investigation. Is that correct?

2 [REDACTED] I wouldn't say that they were given to us.
3 It was more that we had the umbrella investigation that was
4 opened, and then evaluating individuals that in public
5 source information were associated with the campaign or
6 would have been actually in a position to have received or
7 have been in receipt of the information that was shared by
8 the friendly foreign government.

9 Mr. Somers. Okay. And I'm not asking you for any
10 names here because these aren't people whose names have
11 been out there. Did you look at other individuals other
12 than these four individuals, you know, for possibly opening
13 an investigation on them?

14 [REDACTED] I don't recall exactly outside of the four
15 investigations whether or not there were any other names
16 that rose to the point of opening an investigation.

17 Mr. Baker. Do you recall any dissension among the FBI
18 ranks about the individuals that were ultimately opened?
19 Was there anybody saying, well, it shouldn't be this one or
20 that one or whoever?

21 [REDACTED] No, I don't recall that.

22 Mr. Somers. The IG's report indicates that DOJ was
23 briefed on these four individuals on August 2nd. You said
24 you joined on either August 1st or August 2nd. I assume --
25 well, I won't assume. Did you do any work immediately on

1 identifying these four individuals?

2 [REDACTED] What page number are you referencing for
3 that?

4 Mr. Somers. I just have a note here. I don't have
5 the page number. I just have a note that on August 2nd DOJ
6 was briefed on the Crossfire Hurricane investigation and
7 that the names of the four targets were briefed to DOJ.

8 [REDACTED] I'm going to speak to my counsel for just
9 a moment, if possible.

10 Mr. Somers. Yes, that's fine.

11 [Witness confers with counsel.]

12 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. I'm back.

13 Mr. Somers. Okay.

14 [REDACTED] I don't recall any DOJ briefing that
15 you're talking about with respect to discussions of the
16 four individuals.

17 Mr. Somers. Yeah, no, I don't believe that you were
18 involved in the briefing. I think Mr. Moffa was. I was
19 just getting back to your role in identifying the four
20 individuals that cases were -- or, sorry, investigations
21 were eventually opened on, and I'm just trying to
22 understand what your role, if any, was in identifying these
23 four individuals. And just looking at the time frame, I
24 was -- I guess my question is: How quickly did you begin,
25 if you were assigned on August 1st or August 2nd, how

1 quickly did you begin looking at these four individuals?

2 [REDACTED] Number one, my recollection is that those
3 cases were not opened on the four individuals on either
4 August 1st or August 2nd. I believe my recollection is
5 that we were looking at different individuals in the period
6 of August 1st and August 2nd. I do not recall whether or
7 not those four individuals were, for lack of a better term,
8 kind of summarized by that time or determined by August 1st
9 or August 2nd.

10 Mr. Somers. Okay. And one of those individuals was
11 George Papadopoulos. What was your understanding in the
12 early parts of Crossfire Hurricane as to who George
13 Papadopoulos was?

14 [REDACTED] George Papadopoulos was the individual who
15 had provided the friendly foreign government with the
16 information that predicated the Crossfire Hurricane
17 investigation. We understood him to be an adviser to the
18 Trump campaign on issues of, I believe, energy.

19 Mr. Somers. What was your understanding of how he
20 could influence the Trump campaign?

21 [REDACTED] I'm sorry. I don't quite --

22 Mr. Somers. I'm trying to understand what was your
23 understanding of his role. You know, what did it mean to
24 be an adviser to the Trump campaign on energy?

25 [REDACTED] I believe George Papadopoulos was part of

1 the rollout of advisers on the Trump campaign that had
2 taken place, if I recall correctly, somewhere in either
3 mid- or late March of 2016.

4 Mr. Somers. Did you understand him to have a
5 significant role on the Trump campaign?

6 [REDACTED] I don't know if I would say "significant,"
7 but he was one of the main players that was announced as a
8 Trump adviser sometime around March of 2016.

9 Mr. Somers. What about Carter Page? He's also one of
10 the individuals who was opened on in early August of 2016.
11 What was your understanding of who Carter Page was in the
12 early days of Crossfire Hurricane?

13 [REDACTED] Again, kind of the same type of thing, as
14 an adviser to the Trump campaign on matters of
15 international politics, primarily Russia.

16 Mr. Somers. And would you have characterized his role
17 as significant in the Trump campaign?

18 [REDACTED] Again, I don't know how exactly I would
19 characterize it with respect to the campaign itself. He
20 was one of the individuals, as per my recollection, that
21 was also announced in the March time frame.

22 Mr. Somers. Okay. Now, just the mechanics of how
23 this investigation worked. So you reported to Jonathan
24 Moffa on the agent side. SSA-1 was roughly your equivalent
25 on the agent side. He reported to Peter Strzok, and then

1 Moffa and Strzok both reported to Bill Priestap. I've got
2 some questions about the information flow, I guess. Were
3 there team meetings as part of the Crossfire Hurricane
4 investigation?

5 [REDACTED] Yes.

6 Mr. Somers. And how often did you have those team
7 meetings?

8 [REDACTED] I think it depended on how things were
9 going. They could be every other day. They could be
10 sometimes every day. I think it would just depend.

11 Mr. Somers. And who attended those team meetings?

12 [REDACTED] I think that also was dependent on
13 situations.

14 Mr. Somers. These daily or every-other-day-type
15 meetings, were these meetings that would be attended by
16 Peter Strzok or Jonathan Moffa?

17 [REDACTED] Yes, they could be.

18 Mr. Somers. Regularly? Did they regularly attend
19 these meetings?

20 [REDACTED] I would say regularly, yes.

21 Mr. Somers. What about Bill Priestap?

22 [REDACTED] No.

23 Mr. Somers. Never or not regularly?

24 [REDACTED] In the early part of Crossfire Hurricane,
25 I do not remember Bill Priestap coming to any of our team

1 meetings.

2 Mr. Somers. Okay. What about people from the Office
3 of General Counsel?

4 [REDACTED] Yes.

5 Mr. Somers. Did the -- I'm trying to remember his
6 identifier so I don't use a name. Did the OGC attorney
7 attend these regular team meetings?

8 [REDACTED] Yes.

9 Mr. Somers. What about the OGC unit chief?

10 [REDACTED] On occasion, yes.

11 Mr. Somers. But not as regularly as the OGC attorney?

12 [REDACTED] I don't think as often, but it would
13 depend.

14 Mr. Somers. What about Trisha Anderson?

15 [REDACTED] No.

16 Mr. Somers. Jim Baker?

17 [REDACTED] No.

18 Mr. Somers. Lisa Page?

19 [REDACTED] On occasion.

20 Mr. Somers. And then what about your DAD? I believe
21 you said it was Dina Corsi?

22 [REDACTED] That would have been in the March -- like
23 late March to June time frame, and by that time -- oh,
24 excuse me, no. I'll make a correction on that. That would
25 have been in the January to March time frame, and the -- we

1 were not having regular team meetings during the January to
2 March time frame.

3 Mr. Somers. Okay. Who was the DAD before Dina Corsi?
4 [REDACTED] DAD -- I'm sorry. DAD at the initial part
5 of Crossfire Hurricane?

6 Mr. Somers. Yes, yes.

7 [REDACTED] So the DAD would have been -- well, they
8 weren't reporting to -- it was Jon Moffa and Pete Strzok
9 reporting directly to Bill Priestap. So there was not a
10 DAD they were reporting to in between Bill Priestap.

11 Mr. Somers. I'm just trying to picture the structure
12 here. So prior to Strzok becoming a DAD, he was reporting
13 directly to Bill Priestap as well?

14 [REDACTED] He and Moffa were reporting directly to
15 Bill Priestap, yes.

16 Mr. Somers. Okay. That clears up my confusion on
17 that. Okay. So these are the regular team meetings. Who
18 kind of conducted these meetings? Who was in charge?

19 [REDACTED] I think it would depend. I don't recall
20 exactly that there was somebody regularly in charge. I
21 mean, if Jon Moffa or Peter Strzok were there, they would
22 usually chair those meetings. If it --

23 Mr. Somers. And, otherwise, it would -- go ahead.

24 [REDACTED] If it was case agents that were just
25 meeting with the analysts, typically it would be a case

1 agent that would run the meeting.

2 Mr. Somers. Did you run any of these meetings?

3 [REDACTED] I may have on occasion.

4 Mr. Somers. And would that be dependent on what the
5 meeting was about? Is that a fair characterization?

6 [REDACTED] I think that's a fair characterization,
7 yes.

8 Mr. Somers. Okay. So we have these regular team
9 meetings. Were there other meetings that might have been
10 attended by, say, Bill Priestap?

11 [REDACTED] I would not have insight into which
12 meetings Bill Priestap would be going to.

13 Mr. Somers. I guess my question is: Did you attend
14 any meetings with Bill Priestap about Crossfire Hurricane?

15 [REDACTED] Yes, I believe I attended a few meetings
16 with Bill Priestap about Crossfire Hurricane in the early
17 period, and then I would say as time went on, there would
18 be occasions to meet with Bill Priestap.

19 Mr. Somers. Did you brief things directly to Bill
20 Priestap yourself?

21 [REDACTED] I believe later on in the investigation I
22 may have briefed Bill Priestap on things. Early part of
23 the investigation, Bill Priestap would have been in
24 meetings where I was briefing other individuals.

25 Mr. Somers. So he would have attended a meeting where

1 you were also providing information?

2 [REDACTED] Correct.

3 Mr. Somers. And these meetings with -- would Jim
4 Baker attend these meetings that Bill Priestap was in?

5 [REDACTED] I think one of the briefings I did or two
6 of the briefings I did for the seventh floor, Jim Baker was
7 in the meetings.

8 Mr. Somers. What about Trisha Anderson?

9 [REDACTED] I don't recall if Trisha Anderson was in
10 those meetings.

11 Mr. Somers. Was Andy McCabe in these meetings?

12 [REDACTED] Yes.

13 Mr. Somers. Director Comey?

14 [REDACTED] I briefed Director Comey, but it was later
15 -- later in the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, probably
16 in the May time frame of 2017.

17 Mr. Somers. What did you brief Director Comey about?

18 [REDACTED] It was the state of the investigations as
19 of May of 2017.

20 Mr. Somers. Shortly before he was removed as FBI
21 Director? Would that be right?

22 [REDACTED] That would be correct.

23 Mr. Somers. And you briefed him on the state of all
24 four investigations?

25 [REDACTED] There were a host of things that we were

1 briefing Director Comey on, I was briefing, along with a
2 gentleman by the name of Paul Holdeman.

3 Mr. Baker. Was this just a run-of-the-mill kind of a
4 status update briefing for Mr. Comey, or were there any
5 problems that had surfaced in the investigation that you
6 were calling to his attention?

7 [REDACTED] It was a status update.

8 Mr. Somers. Was this in anticipation of congressional
9 testimony, or was it just a general status update on the
10 investigation?

11 [REDACTED] It was a general status update on the
12 investigation.

13 Mr. Somers. What about Deputy Director McCabe? How
14 many meetings did you attend, roughly, that Director McCabe
15 was in?

16 [REDACTED] Probably three or four.

17 Mr. Somers. And would that be about the same number
18 of meetings you attended that Bill Priestap was in, or were
19 there more meetings that Bill Priestap was in?

20 [REDACTED] I would say I would have had more
21 interaction with Bill Priestap than I did with Andy McCabe.

22 Mr. Somers. What about the Department of Justice?
23 What were your interactions with the Department of Justice?

24 [REDACTED] In the March to May time frame of 2017, I
25 had some very limited interaction with individuals from

1 DOJ. In the early part of Crossfire Hurricane, I would
2 have been on emails from individuals with DOJ, and in the
3 January to March time frame, I was involved in interviews
4 where there were DOJ individuals present.

5 Mr. Baker. Who were these individuals, either on
6 email or in meetings?

7 [REDACTED] In the early part of Crossfire Hurricane,
8 I was on emails involving an OI attorney. In the middle
9 part of the investigation, I was part of a 3-day interview
10 where there was an NSD/DOJ representative at all three
11 meetings. And in the latter part of Crossfire Hurricane, I
12 was in touch with, again, DOJ attorneys from across the
13 street regarding certain aspects of the cases that were in
14 existence at that time.

15 Mr. Baker. Are all of these people below SES where
16 you can't name names, or are there any ones that you can
17 name names?

18 [REDACTED] I believe most of them, if not all of
19 them, have not been named, at least with respect to this IG
20 report.

21 Mr. Somers. Okay. So with respect to the early time
22 frame, you said you were on a number of emails with, I
23 think you said, OI attorneys. Were there meetings as well,
24 or was it just mainly by email?

25 Mr. Linehan. Did you say "OI attorneys" or "an OI

1 attorney"? Single or plural.

2 [REDACTED] Excuse me just one moment.

3 Mr. Somers. Yes.

4 [Pause.]

5 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] back. I just want one point
6 of clarification. I said "OI attorney," not plural,
7 "attorneys."

8 Mr. Somers. Sorry. So you were on an email -- was it
9 an email chain, or was it just you and the OI attorney?

10 [REDACTED] It was an email chain.

11 Mr. Somers. So in the early -- this is prior to the
12 first Carter Page FISA application being filed?

13 [REDACTED] Correct.

14 Mr. Somers. You were on an email chain that involved
15 the OI attorney, as identified in the IG report. Did you
16 have any meetings with NSD?

17 [REDACTED] I don't recall having any meetings with
18 NSD.

19 Mr. Somers. Then in January to March of 2017, you
20 took part in a 3-day interview where there were NSD
21 attorneys. Any other interactions other than that 3-day
22 interview with NSD during that time period?

23 [REDACTED] Not to my recollection, no.

24 Mr. Somers. And then you said you had limited
25 interactions between March and May of 2017. What did those

1 limited interactions consist of?

2 [REDACTED] To the best of my recollection, there were
3 DOJ attorneys that would come over to FBI headquarters that
4 we would discuss certain aspects of the Crossfire Hurricane
5 cases with.

6 Mr. Somers. You mean like how the investigation was
7 going? Was this a status update thing, or were these
8 specific questions about parts of investigations?

9 [REDACTED] These would have been status updates as
10 well as case agents talking to the attorneys about the
11 status of cases and what needed to be done with cases.

12 Mr. Somers. What was DOJ's interest in particular
13 during this March to May time period?

14 [REDACTED] Again, they were getting status updates on
15 a number of cases.

16 Mr. Somers. Would this be like are we renewing -- did
17 they ask whether you were renewing the FISA application
18 again?

19 [REDACTED] I don't recall discussions with DOJ about
20 that in particular.

21 Mr. Somers. Were you discussing the Flynn
22 investigation?

23 [REDACTED] There may have been discussions about the
24 Flynn investigation.

25 Mr. Somers. Were there discussions of the Logan Act?

1 [REDACTED] I do not recall discussions of the Logan
2 Act.

3 Mr. Somers. Were there discussions about General
4 Flynn's phone calls with Ambassador Kislyak?

5 [REDACTED] I don't recall discussions with the
6 attorneys during that time frame of the Kislyak phone
7 calls.

8 Mr. Somers. Were these discussions about -- do you
9 recall any discussions about interviewing Carter Page?

10 [REDACTED] I don't recall discussions about
11 interviewing Carter Page with DOJ attorneys.

12 Mr. Somers. Okay. Were you involved in the March
13 interviews of Carter Page?

14 [REDACTED] I was not.

15 Mr. Somers. Do you recall discussions about George
16 Papadopoulos during these meetings with DOJ attorneys?

17 [REDACTED] There may have been discussions about
18 George Papadopoulos during those meetings.

19 Mr. Somers. Do you recall what was discussed?

20 [REDACTED] I do not.

21 Mr. Somers. What about other Government agencies?
22 Did you have any interaction with the State Department with
23 regards to Crossfire Hurricane or any of the subjects
24 thereof?

25 [REDACTED] I don't recall having any contact with the

1 State Department regarding Crossfire Hurricane.

2 Mr. Somers. Did you ever receive any information from
3 the -- maybe not directly but indirectly, from the State
4 Department about Crossfire Hurricane?

5 [REDACTED] We would have used information available
6 in government systems probably from information derived
7 from State Department reporting.

8 Mr. Somers. No, I'm thinking about whether you -- so
9 the State Department -- were you aware that the State
10 Department also interacted with Christopher Steele?

11 [REDACTED] I think I recall that there were emails
12 that had gone back and forth with our State Department
13 liaison at one point that dealt with issues involving
14 Christopher Steele.

15 Mr. Somers. So you saw that information?

16 [REDACTED] Did I -- I'm sorry. I don't know what
17 information you're talking about.

18 Mr. Somers. I'm sorry. I guess my question is: Did
19 you see information from the State Department, did you see
20 any documents, emails, communications directly from the
21 State Department? Or is what you saw just from the FBI
22 agent who was a liaison to the State Department?

23 [REDACTED] My recollection is the latter.

24 Mr. Somers. Okay.

25 Mr. Baker. Did you or your analysts have any dealing

1 with or any knowledge of an entity known as the "Crossfire
2 Hurricane Fusion Center"?

3 [REDACTED] I did, yes.

4 Mr. Baker. And what exactly is that?

5 [REDACTED] I'm going to talk to my counsel for a
6 moment, please?

7 Mr. Baker. Sure.

8 [Witness confers with counsel.]

9 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] back. Is everybody on mute?
10 I'm sorry. I was hearing some feedback.

11 Mr. Baker. Yes, Arthur Baker here and Zach's here.

12 [REDACTED] Okay. So with respect to the Fusion Cell,
13 I can acknowledge the existence of the Fusion Cell as that
14 information has become public. However, any discussions in
15 terms of my interactions with the Fusion Cell or other
16 interactions with the Fusion Cell would actually be over
17 and above the classification level for this discussion.

18 Mr. Somers. Can you tell us what it was?

19 [REDACTED] I believe that would be over the
20 classification of this discussion.

21 Mr. Baker. Can you tell us where it's at?

22 [REDACTED] I believe that would be over the
23 classification of this discussion.

24 Mr. Somers. Can you say whether it was outside of the
25 FBI?

1 [REDACTED] Again, my comfortability level in
2 discussing this, I prefer not to actually even get close to
3 getting over the classification level of this discussion.

4 Mr. Baker. Are any of your analysts assigned to it?

5 [REDACTED] Again, I would give the same answer.

6 Mr. Baker. Okay. Let's walk back from that, and
7 let's go back to the Hoover Building. It's my
8 understanding that the intelligence analyst component
9 profession is, relatively speaking, fairly new in the FBI,
10 certainly the professionalization of intelligence analysts
11 and the dedicated career track and upward mobility and
12 whatnot. And my understanding of your background -- and
13 you indicated it at the beginning of this interview -- I
14 would consider you an intelligence analyst professional.
15 That seems to be where you've spent your time at the
16 Bureau, your teaching in that arena, you've published in
17 that arena. That seems to be your expertise.

18 In your chain of command of Crossfire Hurricane, did
19 you encounter any individuals that did not buy into the
20 intelligence part of the FBI and the role of the
21 intelligence analyst in an investigation like this?

22 [REDACTED] I would say no. The people --

23 Mr. Baker. So everybody you encountered from the very
24 top down to your level was completely onboard with the
25 intelligence analyst role and the idea of validating and

1 vetting and everything that the intelligence analyst does?

2 [REDACTED] I think by the time 2016 hit, I think
3 there was enough comfortability, particular at
4 headquarters, with the intelligence analyst role.

5 Mr. Baker. Was there any dissension at all, just what
6 I would call "situational dissension," that maybe somebody
7 had a disagreement with what an intelligence analyst was
8 reporting on as it related to Crossfire?

9 [REDACTED] I don't recall any dissension with respect
10 to the intelligence analyst role in Crossfire Hurricane.

11 Mr. Baker. How about dissension regarding any
12 particular aspect of the investigation? Was there any
13 disagreement where the team split into camps as to whether
14 something should or shouldn't be done?

15 [REDACTED] I don't recall any of that.

16 Mr. Baker. Okay. Thank you.

17 Mr. Somers. On page 79 of the IG report, it indicates
18 that, "FBI officials told us that the early steps in the
19 investigation focused on developing information about the
20 four subjects and conducting CHS operations to obtain
21 relevant subject specific information."

22 What did you do from the analyst side, if anything,
23 early on to develop information about the four subjects?

24 [REDACTED] So our analysts started to -- I mean, were
25 able to dig through FBI holdings, dig through other

1 government agency holdings, dig through open-source
2 material to put together full pictures for the case agents
3 on each of the four cases.

4 Mr. Somers. And what does that product look like?

5 [REDACTED] It depends on the situation. They're
6 usually a Word document that is put together in a type of,
7 for lack of a better term, tactical package, if you wanted
8 to call it that way.

9 Mr. Somers. So there would be -- is that like a --
10 let's just take one individual and just say Carter Page.
11 Is there like a memorandum that you guys are putting
12 together on Carter Page in the early going? Is that fair?

13 [REDACTED] You could call -- I mean, you could fairly
14 all it a "memorandum."

15 Mr. Somers. So is it one document or is it more like
16 a folder that has information about Carter Page?

17 [REDACTED] I think that would depend. I mean, there
18 were multiple documents that were written up.

19 Mr. Somers. So were you told that, you know, to
20 basically go out and figure -- see everything you could on
21 Carter Page? I mean, how does that tasking -- I'm just
22 trying to understand how the tasking goes there. I'm not
23 --

24 [REDACTED] Usually that's --

25 Mr. Somers. Go ahead.

1 [REDACTED] I would say usually that, what you just
2 stated, is often the case. The case agent says, "I need
3 you to find whatever you can on Subject A."

4 Mr. Somers. Okay. Is that what happened here on
5 these subjects? You were tasked with finding information
6 on these four subjects?

7 [REDACTED] Pretty much our analysts were tasked with
8 doing that, yes.

9 Mr. Somers. It looks -- yeah, I looks like our --

10 Mr. Baker. Can I get one quick one in?

11 Mr. Somers. All right. One last question, and then
12 our first hour is up.

13 Mr. Baker. It's my understanding the agent population
14 -- and I'm not just talking Crossfire Hurricane here -- the
15 agents sometimes carry professional liability insurance,
16 and I believe the Bureau or the Department even reimburses
17 them a certain portion of that. Do intel analysts
18 similarly carry professional liability insurance?

19 [REDACTED] Not as many, but some do.

20 Mr. Baker. Now, being more specific with Crossfire
21 Hurricane, did you ever become aware of analysts discussing
22 about the possibility of needing insurance, liability
23 insurance, because of being assigned to Crossfire
24 Hurricane?

25 [REDACTED] I think there was some discussion of

1 professional liability insurance with respect to the
2 analysts who were on Crossfire Hurricane.

3 Mr. Baker. And what precipitated that discussion?

4 [REDACTED] I think --

5 Mr. Baker. What was the concern?

6 [REDACTED] Not so much as a concern as it is that
7 this was going to be -- this is an investigation that would
8 likely result in extra scrutiny.

9 Mr. Baker. So did analysts get this insurance or it
10 was sort of ad hoc, piecemeal, some did, some didn't?

11 [REDACTED] I would say that characterization is
12 correct, ad hoc, piecemeal.

13 Mr. Baker. When you say there was a discussion, was
14 there a gathering together of analysts to discuss the
15 perils of this case and, hence, the possible need for
16 insurance? Or was this, you know, just a small group of
17 people that raised the issue? I'm just curious. What was
18 the forum for the discussion about the potential need for
19 liability insurance?

20 [REDACTED] There was no overarching meeting, to my
21 recollection, bringing the analysts together to talk about
22 the need for professional liability insurance.

23 Mr. Baker. And, again, the need that was articulated
24 or the need that you understood to be amongst the people
25 that were talking about it was based on a general

1 heightened scrutiny that a case of this nature might get?
2 Or were there specific concerns about the investigation?

3 [REDACTED] I would say the former, a general
4 heightened amount of scrutiny.

5 Mr. Baker. Did anybody have a specific concern about
6 it?

7 [REDACTED] Not to my recollection, no.

8 Mr. Baker. Okay. Thank you.

9 Mr. Somers. We can go off the record now. Sara, do
10 you want to take like a 5-minute break?

11 [Recess 11:23 a.m. to 11:34 a.m.]

12 Ms. Zdeb. So it is 11:34, and we can go back on the
13 record.

14 [REDACTED] thanks very much for being here. My
15 colleague Andy Fausett and I, as we indicated earlier, are
16 with the Ranking Member, Senator Feinstein, and we're going
17 to tag-team a bit on our side. I have just a couple of
18 quick follow-ups on the questions that Mr. Baker was asking
19 you at the end of the last round, and then I'm going to
20 turn it over to Mr. Fausett to continue our questions.

21 You had just indicated in response to Mr. Baker's
22 questions on professional liability insurance that any
23 discussion among analysts about whether or not to get
24 liability insurance in Crossfire Hurricane would have been
25 motivated more by a general sense that there could be some

1 heightened scrutiny associated with the investigation as
2 opposed to specific concerns about the investigation. Is
3 that correct?

4 [REDACTED] That is correct.

5 Ms. Zdeb. And I think you also indicated that, beyond
6 Crossfire Hurricane and as a general matter, in your
7 experience, sometimes analysts in other investigations
8 would get professional liability insurance and sometimes
9 they would not. Is that correct?

10 [REDACTED] That is correct, as well as if you are a
11 manager of analysts, there is oftentimes discussion of
12 whether to get professional liability insurance given the
13 things that come up in management.

14 Ms. Zdeb. So is it fair to say that, to the extent
15 there was some discussion among analysts or managers of
16 analysts in Crossfire Hurricane about whether to get
17 professional liability insurance, it would not have been
18 unique to that investigation but, rather, something that,
19 in your experience, happens in investigations as a general
20 matter?

21 [REDACTED] As a general matter, there are occasions
22 where analysts will talk about getting private -- sorry,
23 professional liability insurance.

24 Ms. Zdeb. Thank you.

25 Mr. Fausett. All right. [REDACTED] good morning.

1 Can you hear me clearly, sir?

2 [REDACTED] I can.

3 Mr. Fausett. Terrific. All right. So just to take a
4 step back to more general matters, I know you testified or
5 you stated earlier today that you've reviewed the Inspector
6 General's report from last December entitled, "Review of
7 Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI's
8 Crossfire Hurricane Investigation." According to that
9 report, the Inspector General and his office examined more
10 than 1 million documents, interviewed more than 100
11 witnesses, including Christopher Steele and numerous
12 current and former government employees.

13 Did you cooperate with the Office of the Inspector
14 General's investigation?

15 [REDACTED] Yes, I did.

16 Mr. Fausett. Were you interviewed as part of that
17 investigation?

18 [REDACTED] Yes, I was.

19 Mr. Fausett. How many times?

20 [REDACTED] I believe four times.

21 Mr. Fausett. And about how long in total did you
22 spend in these interviews, sir?

23 [REDACTED] I would estimate perhaps up to 20 hours.

24 Mr. Fausett. And throughout your interviews, did you
25 provide complete and truthful answers to the questions that

1 the Office of the Inspector General asked you?

2 [REDACTED] Yes, I did.

3 Mr. Fausett. Did you or the Justice Department or the
4 FBI provide the Office of the Inspector General with
5 documents related to your involvement with the Crossfire
6 Hurricane investigation?

7 [REDACTED] Yes.

8 Mr. Fausett. Did the Office of the Inspector General
9 ever complain that it needed more information from you, to
10 your knowledge?

11 [REDACTED] To my knowledge, no.

12 Mr. Fausett. And did it ever complain that it didn't
13 get documents pertaining to your involvement?

14 [REDACTED] I am not aware of any of that type of
15 discussion.

16 Mr. Fausett. You stated earlier that you reviewed the
17 report. Did you review the report before it was published?

18 [REDACTED] Yes.

19 Mr. Fausett. And did you have an opportunity to
20 provide comments on the draft that you reviewed?

21 [REDACTED] Yes, I did.

22 Mr. Fausett. Now, recognizing that different
23 witnesses will have differing recollections or
24 interpretations of certain events, does the Inspector
25 General's report accurately reflect the testimony you

1 provided to the Office of the Inspector General in --

2 [REDACTED] Sir, I --

3 Mr. Fausett. -- specifically?

4 [REDACTED] Sir, I have been asked if I could go off
5 for a moment and speak with counsel. I apologize.

6 [Counsel confers with witness.]

7 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] back. Could you repeat your
8 question, please?

9 Mr. Fausett. Sure. So you stated just a second ago
10 that you had reviewed the Inspector General's report while
11 it was still in draft form, and you stated that you did
12 provide some comments back to it. Recognizing that
13 different witnesses may have differing recollections or
14 interpretations of certain events that may have been
15 described in the report, does the report accurately reflect
16 the testimony that you provided to the Office of the
17 Inspector General?

18 [REDACTED] Yes.

19 Mr. Fausett. Have you been interviewed by any other
20 congressional committees about matters pertaining to
21 Crossfire Hurricane?

22 [REDACTED] No.

23 Mr. Fausett. And so, just to make sure I've got it
24 right, you said you were interviewed four times by the
25 Inspector General for approximately 20 hours total, so you

1 spent about 20 hours in total preparing for this matter and
2 the various ways that you've been subject to oversight?

3 [REDACTED] I think I spent approximately 20 hours
4 being interviewed by the IG.

5 Mr. Fausett. There has been significant second-
6 guessing of the decision to investigate whether anyone
7 associated with the Trump campaign was assisting Russia in
8 its efforts to influence the 2016 election. According to
9 the Inspector General, the FBI learned in late July 2016
10 from a friendly foreign government, which is sometimes
11 called "FFG," for the sake of simplicity, that George
12 Papadopoulos had told a foreign official about a Russian
13 offer to help the Trump campaign by releasing hacked emails
14 damaging to Hillary Clinton. I know you spoke a little bit
15 about that with our colleagues.

16 First, are you familiar with this term "friendly
17 foreign government" or "FFG" for short?

18 [REDACTED] Yes.

19 Mr. Fausett. And what does that term signify as a
20 general matter?

21 [REDACTED] As a general matter, that signifies that
22 it is a government that is friendly to the interests and
23 policies of the United States.

24 Mr. Fausett. And would you consider such a government
25 to be a trusted ally or partner?

1 [REDACTED] Yes.

2 Mr. Fausett. Is it fair to say, absent evidence to
3 the contrary, and understanding that you take each
4 situation as it comes, but that in general, when you have a
5 source government or source official from a friendly
6 foreign government, you would not ordinarily suspect that
7 source or individual of fabricating information that's
8 being provided to harm the United States?

9 [REDACTED] I would say as a general rule that would
10 be the case.

11 Mr. Fausett. And was there any evidence of
12 fabrication or anything giving rise to suspicious
13 circumstances here?

14 [REDACTED] No.

15 Mr. Fausett. So, overall, was the fact that this came
16 from a friendly foreign government significant in terms of
17 the FBI's need to take the information seriously?

18 [REDACTED] Well, the FBI takes information very
19 seriously from all manner of people that it receives
20 information from, so I don't know if I would say that this
21 -- the basis of it coming from a friendly foreign
22 government necessarily rises it above in terms of
23 acceptance on the part of the FBI.

24 Mr. Fausett. Would you have been inclined to give it
25 more credence, pending further review and analysis, based

1 on the fact that it was coming from a friendly foreign
2 government as opposed to, say, a hostile nation or a nation
3 with adverse interests to the United States?

4 [REDACTED] In that scenario, I would say yes, it
5 would be more comfortable taking something from a friendly
6 foreign government.

7 Mr. Fausett. Okay. So Bill Priestap, who opened
8 Crossfire Hurricane, told the Office of the Inspector
9 General -- and I'm going to quote now from page 53 of the
10 Inspector General's report. Mr. Priestap said, "...the
11 combination of the FFG information and the FBI's ongoing
12 cyber intrusion investigation of the DNC hacks created a
13 counterintelligence concern that the FBI was 'obligated' to
14 investigate."

15 Do you have any reason to dispute Mr. Priestap's
16 explanation of why he opened the investigation?

17 [REDACTED] So, to be clear, Mr. Priestap did not open
18 the Crossfire Hurricane investigation on the opening.

19 Mr. Fausett. Okay. Who opened --

20 [REDACTED] So the opening was written by Pete Strzok.

21 Mr. Fausett. Do you have any reason to question Mr.
22 Priestap's explanation based on his understanding of why
23 the investigation was opened?

24 [REDACTED] I have no basis to dispute that.

25 Mr. Fausett. Do you understand what Mr. Priestap

1 meant when he described this situation, this friendly
2 foreign government information concerning George
3 Papadopoulos, as a "counterintelligence concern"? Do you
4 know what he meant by that?

5 [REDACTED] I do know what he meant by that, yes.

6 Mr. Fausett. And what's your understanding of what he
7 meant by that? And what did you take it to mean?

8 [REDACTED] When you look at the information that came
9 from the friendly foreign government and you compared that
10 with the fact that in July of 2016, late July of 2016,
11 there was information released on WikiLeaks from the DNC,
12 it basically kind of looked like this was a situation in
13 which the Russians may have been trying to interfere in our
14 election.

15 Mr. Fausett. So it sounds like you would agree that
16 the information then presented a legitimate
17 counterintelligence concern. Would you agree that the FBI
18 was obligated to investigate?

19 [REDACTED] Yes.

20 Mr. Fausett. I'd like to walk through some of the
21 specific events in 2016 and ask how they relate to this
22 counterintelligence concern. In March and then in May of
23 2016, FBI field offices identified a spearfishing campaign
24 by the GRU targeting email addresses associated with the
25 DNC and the Clinton campaign as well as efforts to place

1 malware on DNC and D Triple C -- DCCC -- computer networks,
2 and I'm sourcing that from the Mueller report, Volume I of
3 the Mueller report. I think we mentioned this already, but
4 from your perspective, does that activity constitute a
5 counterintelligence concern? Does it create a
6 counterintelligence concern?

7 [REDACTED] Yes, that activity would be a
8 counterintelligence concern.

9 Mr. Fausett. And why is that?

10 [REDACTED] Because it's a foreign entity or foreign
11 government attempting to obtain information to which it is
12 not supposed to have access.

13 Mr. Fausett. And then on July 22, 2016 -- and, again,
14 I'm referencing the Mueller report here -- WikiLeaks
15 published 20,000 emails stolen from the DNC, as you
16 mentioned earlier. This was 6 days before the FBI learned
17 from the FFG that the Trump campaign may have had advance
18 knowledge of Russia's plans to release the stolen emails.
19 I think we've covered this, but just to be clear, that in
20 and of itself also creates a counterintelligence concern.
21 Is that correct?

22 [REDACTED] That is correct.

23 Mr. Fausett. And then on July 27, 2016, Donald Trump,
24 then a candidate for President, said at a press conference,
25 and I'm quoting now, "Russia, if you're listening, I hope

1 you're able to find" Hillary Clinton's emails. And
2 according to Special Counsel Mueller's report, he uncovered
3 that Russia attempted to hack Clinton's server for the
4 first time later that same day.

5 Does that confluence of events, Candidate Trump's
6 statement as well as the fact that Russia attempted to hack
7 the server for the first time that same day, does that
8 create a counterintelligence concern?

9 [REDACTED] Russia's attempts to hack that server
10 would be a counterintelligence issue, yes.

11 Mr. Fausett. Would the confluence with the statements
12 made by then-Candidate Trump create a counterintelligence
13 concern concerning the candidate or the campaign for
14 President -- for Mr. Trump?

15 [REDACTED] Which statements are you referring to?
16 Excuse me?

17 Mr. Fausett. The statement, "Russia, if you're
18 listening, I hope you're able to find" Hillary Clinton's
19 emails.

20 [REDACTED] I'm not sure I would say that the
21 statement itself would be a counterintelligence issue, but
22 the confluence of events with the foreign government
23 attempting to for the first time hack rises to the level of
24 a counterintelligence issue.

25 Mr. Fausett. And why is that?

1 [REDACTED] Again, you have a foreign government who
2 is attempting to hack into information that it has no
3 access to.

4 Mr. Fausett. Between March and August of 2016, the
5 FBI became aware of numerous attempts to hack into State
6 election systems. These include confirmed access and
7 elements of multiple State or local electoral boards using
8 tactics, techniques, and procedures associated with Russian
9 state sponsors -- or state-sponsored actors, according,
10 again, to Special Counsel Mueller in his report. Does that
11 create a counterintelligence concern?

12 [REDACTED] Yes, it does.

13 Mr. Fausett. And why is that?

14 [REDACTED] It would be a foreign government
15 attempting to get into information to which it does not
16 have access.

17 Mr. Fausett. The Inspector General noted -- and I'm
18 now actually quoting from the Mueller report -- that "the
19 FBI learned that Russian efforts also included cyber-
20 enabled scanning and probing of election-related
21 infrastructure in several States." Does that create a
22 counterintelligence concern?

23 [REDACTED] Yes, it does.

24 Mr. Fausett. And why is that?

25 [REDACTED] Again, it's a foreign government, an

1 adversary government, attempting to obtain information that
2 it does not have access to.

3 Mr. Fausett. Now, some have expressed the view that
4 there is no basis to investigate the Trump campaign's ties
5 to Russia because Special Counsel Mueller did not
6 ultimately charge anyone affiliated with the Trump campaign
7 with conspiring with Russia. Is it fair to say that you
8 think there was a sufficient basis, a reasonable basis, to
9 investigate the Trump campaign's ties to Russia?

10 [REDACTED] There was a reasonable basis to open the
11 Crossfire Hurricane investigation and subsequent cases that
12 followed on from that.

13 Mr. Fausett. As a general matter, does the FBI
14 require analysts or -- I'm sorry, agents or the analysts
15 who support them to have an expectation that they will find
16 and be able to prove wrongdoing in order to open an
17 counterintelligence or criminal investigation?

18 [REDACTED] No.

19 Mr. Fausett. And what impact would imposing such a
20 requirement have on the FBI's ability to investigate
21 counterintelligence threats?

22 [REDACTED] So you open an investigation either on the
23 basis of a tip or information or articulable facts rising
24 to the level of a national security threat. That's what
25 you need to open an investigation.

1 Mr. Fausett. If that standard were that you needed to
2 be in a position to prove wrongdoing or establish beyond a
3 reasonable doubt the wrongdoing rather than the lower
4 predicate, what impact would that have on the FBI's ability
5 to do its job?

6 ██████████ It would be very difficult -- it would be
7 very difficult to do counterintelligence investigations if
8 that were the standard.

9 Mr. Fausett. So what is your response to the claim
10 that there was never a valid reason to investigate possible
11 ties between the Trump campaign and Russia?

12 ██████████ I disagree with the assertion that there
13 was -- that there was not viable reasons to open the
14 Crossfire Hurricane investigation and the subsequent cases
15 that came out of that.

16 Mr. Fausett. I wanted to ask you a few questions,
17 drilling down just a bit into the alleged actions of George
18 Papadopoulos and those actions in the context of the
19 opening of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. Bear
20 with me if some of this is a little bit repetitive, but we
21 do want to be clear here as to your understanding of
22 things.

23 Now, based upon what's in the Inspector General's
24 report, the opening electronic communication for the
25 Papadopoulos investigation noted that the Trump campaign

1 may have had advance knowledge that Russia had stolen
2 emails and planned to release them to harm Hillary Clinton.
3 I think you talked about that earlier. It said that
4 Papadopoulos --and I'm now quoting from page 60 of the
5 report -- "made statements indicating that he is
6 knowledgeable that the Russians made a suggestion to the
7 Trump campaign that they could assist the Trump campaign
8 with an anonymous release of information during the
9 campaign that would be damaging to the Clinton campaign."

10 Can you explain why these statements made Mr.
11 Papadopoulos a concern to the FBI?

12 [REDACTED] So if the Russians had provided a
13 suggestion that Mr. Papadopoulos was aware of that it could
14 assist the Trump campaign through the anonymous release of
15 information that was detrimental to Hillary Clinton, then
16 that constitutes interference in our political process and
17 would be a counterintelligence concern.

18 Mr. Fausett. Now, I know you stated earlier that you
19 continued on after Crossfire Hurricane with the FBI wrapped
20 and supported the Special Counsel's office as well, so I'm
21 going to quote just a little bit again from the Special
22 Counsel's report: "Although the FBI first learned of the
23 FFG information in late July 2016, according to the Special
24 Counsel's report, Papadopoulos was told in April 2016 of
25 Russia's willingness to release `dirt' on Hillary Clinton

1 `in the form of thousands of emails.'"

2 To your knowledge, did Mr. Papadopoulos report
3 Russia's apparent offer of assistance to the FBI when he
4 learned of it in April 2016?

5 [REDACTED] Not to my knowledge, no.

6 Mr. Fausett. Did he come forward to the FBI in July
7 2016 when WikiLeaks began doing what Papadopoulos had been
8 told the Russian Government would do, i.e., releasing
9 thousands of emails on Hillary Clinton?

10 [REDACTED] No.

11 Mr. Fausett. To your knowledge, did Mr. Papadopoulos
12 ever come forward to report what he had been told about
13 Russia's willingness to help the Trump campaign and harm
14 Hillary Clinton?

15 [REDACTED] To my knowledge, no.

16 Mr. Fausett. Would you agree, then, that the fact
17 that Papadopoulos learned of Russia's willingness to harm
18 Clinton by releasing thousands of emails, saw that release
19 happen, and still did not come forward itself raises a
20 counterintelligence concern that the FBI needed to
21 investigate?

22 [REDACTED] I would agree with that.

23 Mr. Fausett. And, in fact, the current Director of
24 the FBI, Mr. Wray, testified before the Senate Judiciary
25 Committee that, "Any threat or effort to interfere with our

1 election from any nation-state or any nonstate actor is the
2 kind of thing the FBI would want to know." Do you agree
3 with Director Wray that people should inform the FBI if
4 they learn of information suggesting that a foreign
5 government may be attempting to interfere in our elections?

6 [REDACTED] Yes.

7 Mr. Fausett. And why is it important to do that?

8 [REDACTED] Because the FBI needs to know if there are
9 situations in which a foreign government is attempting to
10 interfere with our political processes.

11 Mr. Fausett. According to the Inspector General's
12 report, the foreign official who reported what Papadopoulos
13 had told him was not aware of who else Papadopoulos had
14 informed about Russia's offer to the Trump campaign. And
15 the Inspector General further reported that you and others
16 said -- and I'm going to quote now from page 59 of the
17 report, that you and others collectively -- it's not
18 individually attributed -- said "...the initial
19 investigative objective of Crossfire Hurricane was to
20 determine which individuals associated with the Trump
21 campaign may have been in a position to have received the
22 alleged offer of assistance from Russia."

23 So, in fact, it seems from that quote, if it's
24 accurate, that one of the primary goals of the initial
25 stages of Crossfire Hurricane was to determine who else on

1 the campaign, if anyone, knew of Russia's offer of
2 assistance. Is that correct?

3 [REDACTED] Correct.

4 Mr. Fausett. After a 3-year investigation, the Senate
5 Select Committee on Intelligence recently issued a
6 bipartisan finding that although it did not confirm exactly
7 who Papadopoulos spoke with, and I'm quoting the Senate
8 Intelligence Committee here, "it is implausible that
9 Papadopoulos did not" share the offer with members of the
10 Trump campaign.

11 Do you have any basis to dispute the Senate
12 Intelligence Committee's finding that it is implausible
13 that Papadopoulos did not share his offer with other
14 members of the Trump campaign?

15 [REDACTED] I think I would say that I'm not
16 comfortable commenting on implausibility versus
17 plausibility in that situation.

18 Mr. Fausett. Would you be concerned that Mr.
19 Papadopoulos may have shared this offer with other members
20 of the Trump campaign?

21 [REDACTED] Yes, that would have been a concern.

22 Mr. Fausett. All right. Of course, as we discussed,
23 our colleagues discussed with you earlier, Mr. Papadopoulos
24 was not the only subject of the Crossfire Hurricane
25 investigation. The team opened individual cases on Paul

1 Manafort, Carter Page, and Michael Flynn as well in August
2 of 2016. The opening electronic communication for the
3 Manafort investigation noted that the Trump campaign may
4 have had advance knowledge that Russia had stolen emails
5 and planned to release them to harm Hillary Clinton, and it
6 said

7 -- and I'm going to quote again from the Inspector
8 General's report on page 60. It said that Manafort was
9 "designated the Delegate Process and Convention Manager for
10 the Trump campaign, was promoted to Campaign Manager for
11 the Trump campaign, and had extensive ties to pro-Russian
12 entities of the Ukrainian government."

13 Can you explain why these activities made Manafort a
14 concern to the FBI?

15 [REDACTED] So in this situation, Manafort had access
16 within the campaign. Manafort had extensive ties to pro-
17 Russian entities in the Ukrainian Government, which would
18 have placed him in a position to be one of the individuals
19 who could have possibly received the information that was
20 related by Papadopoulos to the representative of the
21 friendly foreign government.

22 Mr. Fausett. The opening electronic communication for
23 Lieutenant General Flynn said that he "may wittingly or
24 unwittingly be involved in activity on behalf of the
25 Russian Federation which may constitute a crime or threat

1 to the national security."

2 It went on to note that Flynn was an adviser to Trump,
3 had various ties to state-affiliated entities of Russia,
4 and had previously traveled to Russia.

5 Do you recall what Mr. Flynn's ties to Russia were
6 beyond what I just read back to you?

7 [REDACTED] I remember there was discussion of Flynn's
8 visits to Russia and interactions, and other than that, I'm
9 not sure I can talk about that at this level.

10 Mr. Fausett. But can you say -- and I understand if
11 you can't, but can you say whether these visits and
12 interactions gave rise to similar concerns about having
13 access and connections as you had with Mr. Manafort?

14 [REDACTED] I would say yes, similar concerns.

15 Mr. Fausett. Okay. In addition to stating that
16 Carter Page may wittingly or unwittingly be involved in
17 activity on behalf of Russia, the electronic communication
18 opening that investigation noted that the Trump campaign
19 may have had advance knowledge that Russia had stolen
20 emails and planned to release them to harm Hillary Clinton.
21 We talked about that. It said, again quoting from the same
22 page from the Inspector General's report, "Page was a
23 senior foreign policy adviser for the Trump campaign, had
24 extensive ties to various Russia-owned entities, and had
25 traveled to Russia as recently as July 2016."

1 It also stated that he "was the subject of
2 an...ongoing counterintelligence investigation assigned to
3 the FBI's New York Field Office."

4 Can you explain generally why these activities made
5 Mr. Page a concern to the FBI?

6 ██████████ It would be similar to what was said
7 before with respect to access within the campaign and then
8 the availability or potential for Mr. Page to have been in
9 a position to have received the information documented --
10 or, sorry, discussed by Papadopoulos to the representative
11 of a friendly foreign government.

12 Mr. Fausett. So given this access that all four of
13 these individuals had to the campaign and the connections
14 that they had to various Russian actors, do you believe it
15 was reasonable for the FBI to be concerned that members of
16 the Trump campaign, whether Papadopoulos, Manafort, Page,
17 Flynn, or perhaps others, perhaps even Candidate Trump
18 himself, may have had knowledge of Russia's activities?

19 ██████████ I believe it was justified to open these
20 cases, yes.

21 Mr. Fausett. And just one sort of housekeeping matter
22 for us. As you stated earlier, you continued on with the
23 Special Counsel's investigation. I know there's been some
24 confusion as to whether the nature of that investigation
25 was purely criminal or also had a counterintelligence

1 component. Can you tell us, do you know whether the
2 Special Counsel undertook any investigation into the
3 counterintelligence concerns that may have been raised by
4 contacts between individuals associated with the Trump
5 campaign and Russia?

6 [REDACTED] The Special Counsel's office was a
7 criminal investigation.

8 Mr. Fausett. Okay. All right. Sara, do you have
9 anything?

10 Ms. Zdeb. Yeah, I have just a couple of quick follow-
11 ups on an exchange that you had a bit earlier with Mr.
12 Fausett. So when he was asking you about Bill Priestap's
13 assessment that the combination of the friendly foreign
14 government information and the ongoing cyber intrusions by
15 Russia created a counterintelligence concern that the FBI
16 was "obligated" to investigate, I think you interjected
17 that it was Mr. Strzok who opened Crossfire Hurricane, and
18 I wanted to quickly clarify that for the record, if I
19 could.

20 Just for starters, you joined Crossfire Hurricane a
21 day or two after the investigation had been opened. Is
22 that correct?

23 [REDACTED] That is correct.

24 Ms. Zdeb. And the Inspector General -- and this
25 appears in a couple of places in his report, but it appears

1 I think for the first time on page Roman iii that it was
2 Mr. Priestap who approved the opening of the case. And I
3 think you probably were thinking earlier in the exchange
4 with Mr. Fausett of the actual opening electronic
5 communication, which was, in fact, signed by Mr. Strzok.
6 But as the Inspector General found on page iii of his
7 report, it was actually Assistant Director Priestap,
8 Strzok's supervisor, who was the official who ultimately
9 made the decision to open Crossfire Hurricane.

10 Do you have any basis to dispute the Inspector
11 General's conclusion that it was actually Mr. Priestap who
12 approved the opening of Crossfire Hurricane?

13 [REDACTED] I do not. I was thinking of the
14 electronic communication.

15 Ms. Zdeb. Thank you.

16 I think that's all we have for this round, so it is
17 12:03 and we can go off the record.

18 [Recess 12:02 p.m. to 12:52 p.m.]

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AFTERNOON SESSION

[12:52 p.m.]

1 Mr. Somers. All right. We can go back on the record.
2
3 It is 12:52, and I think I'd like to just start by going
4 through with you, [REDACTED] some events or instances or,
5 you know, I don't know exactly how I would characterize
6 them. It's a series of things that either were identified
7 in the IG report or we've become aware of since the IG
8 report. And I'd just like to gauge your awareness of these
9 -- I think the relevant time frame would be prior to the
10 final Carter Page FISA application, that third renewal
11 being filed. So I would just go through these and ask if
12 you were aware of them prior to that final renewal being
13 filed. I think it might -- you know, one, it'll give us
14 some information; two, it may steer us clear of asking some
15 questions on these areas that are more specific if you
16 didn't have any awareness of the items on my list, if that
17 makes sense.

18 The first thing on my list is on July 5, 2016,
19 Steele, according to the IG report, met with his handling
20 agent, Handling Agent 1. And according to notes of
21 Steele's, according to Steele, he told his handling agent
22 that "`Democratic Party associates' were paying for Fusion
23 GPS's research, the `ultimate client' was the leadership of
24 the Clinton Presidential campaign, and `the candidate' was
25

1 aware of Steele's reporting."

2 Were you aware of that before the final Carter Page
3 FISA application?

4 [REDACTED] No.

5 Mr. Somers. Were you aware that the DNC was the
6 ultimate client prior to the final Carter Page FISA
7 application?

8 [REDACTED] I think by the time the final Carter Page
9 FISA came along, I think so.

10 Mr. Somers. Okay. On August 2nd -- this is Footnote
11 223 of the IG report. I'm going to shorten it a little bit
12 so I don't have to read the whole footnote -- you received
13 an email -- I don't know if you recall receiving it or
14 whether you would have actually read it, but there was an
15 email sent that said that a confidential human source who
16 was run out of the New Haven Field Office had information
17 that Fusion GPS "had been hired by two entities (the
18 Democratic National Committee as well as another
19 individual...not name[d]) to explore Donald J. Trump's
20 longstanding ties to Russian entities."

21 Do you recall receiving that email?

22 [REDACTED] Yes, I recall receiving that email.

23 Mr. Somers. And did you recall having that
24 information prior to the final Carter Page FISA
25 application?

1 [REDACTED] Yes, I would have had that prior to the
2 final renewal.

3 Mr. Somers. What about prior to the first
4 application?

5 [REDACTED] I received that email on or about August
6 2nd of 2016.

7 Mr. Somers. Okay. Is that what alerted you to the
8 DNC being the ultimate client for the Steele dossier?

9 [REDACTED] No. I believe that at that point it was
10 still -- we understood Fusion GPS had a law firm client
11 after it, and that we did not know exactly what the law
12 firm after that was.

13 Mr. Somers. So you say you did not make the
14 connection between this August 2nd email and the DNC being
15 the ultimate client for the Steele dossier. Is that fair?

16 [REDACTED] No, I had not made the connection with
17 this email.

18 Mr. Somers. Okay.

19 [REDACTED] That connection came later.

20 Mr. Somers. Okay. On August 17th, [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
21 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] A government agency, another
22 government intelligence agency, informed the FBI, I believe
23 through a memorandum, that Carter Page had been approved as
24 an operational contact for the other agency from 2008 to
25 2013, and the memo further provided that [REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED]
2 provided information about Page's past contacts with
3 certain Russian intelligence officers. Were you aware of
4 that August 17 memo?

5 [REDACTED] I was aware of the August 17th memorandum,
6 yes.

7 Mr. Somers. You received it at the time or
8 thereabouts?

9 [REDACTED] Thereabouts, yes.

10 Mr. Somers. Okay. Were you aware on or about
11 September 7, 2016, that the FBI received an investigative
12 referral from the CIA regarding U.S. Presidential Candidate
13 Hillary Clinton's approval of a plan concerning U.S.
14 Presidential Candidate Donald Trump and Russian hackers
15 hampering U.S. elections as a means of distracting the
16 public from her use of a private email server?

17 Mr. Heberling. Zach, this is Brian Heberling. Let's
18 just go off the record for a second and talk to [REDACTED].

19 Mr. Somers. Sure.

20 [Counsel confers with witness.]

21 Mr. Somers. We'll go back on the record.

22 Were you aware that on or about September 7, 2016, the
23 FBI received an investigative referral from the CIA
24 regarding "U.S. Presidential Candidate Hillary Clinton's
25 approval of a plan concerning U.S. Presidential Candidate

1 Donald Trump and Russian hackers hampering U.S. elections
2 as a means of distracting the public from her use of a
3 private email server?"

4 [REDACTED] I was aware, yes.

5 Mr. Somers. And just one follow-up. You were aware
6 around that time, or you became aware later?

7 [REDACTED] I was aware around that time.

8 Mr. Somers. Okay. Were you aware of the letter that
9 Carter Page sent Director Comey on September 25, 2016, in
10 which he stated that he had interacted with members of the
11 U.S. intelligence community, including the FBI and the CIA,
12 for many decades and that he eagerly awaited FBI's call to
13 discuss any final questions they might possibly have?

14 [REDACTED] I do recall that letter, yes.

15 Mr. Somers. And you recall seeing it around the time
16 it was sent?

17 [REDACTED] Yes.

18 Mr. Somers. I had asked you in the last round a
19 little bit about State Department contacts with the FBI
20 regarding Christopher Steele and two things that the State
21 Department raised with the FBI. Were you aware that the
22 State Department noted, based on their interactions with
23 Christopher Steele and their review of the materials he
24 provided the State Department, that Steele had provided
25 incorrect information about a nonexistent Russian consulate

1 in Miami?

2 [REDACTED] I was not aware of that being reported to
3 the State Department.

4 Mr. Somers. Were you aware of that generally?

5 [REDACTED] Aware of what generally?

6 Mr. Somers. That the Steele reports reported about a
7 nonexistent Russian consulate in Miami.

8 [REDACTED] So I recall that one of the Steele reports
9 actually had that in it, yes.

10 Mr. Somers. Okay. And do you recall knowing that
11 that was not correct?

12 [REDACTED] Yes.

13 Mr. Somers. Okay. Do you further recall the State
14 Department providing information that the State Department
15 realizes that Steele is talking to the media, June
16 reporting started, New York Times and the Washington Post
17 have leaked all the best stuff, and there will be more? Do
18 you recall receiving a report like that from the State
19 Department?

20 [REDACTED] I do not recall receiving a report like
21 that from the State Department.

22 Mr. Somers. Okay. Were you involved in a November
23 21, 2016, meeting between the Crossfire Hurricane team and
24 Bruce Ohr and possibly others at the Justice Department?

25 [REDACTED] I was not.

1 Mr. Somers. Did you get a readout of that meeting?

2 [REDACTED] I may have received a readout, but I don't
3 recall exactly.

4 Mr. Somers. Okay. Do you recall that certain members
5 of the Crossfire Hurricane team learned from Bruce Ohr that
6 Steele was "desperate that Donald Trump not get elected and
7 was passionate about him not being the U.S. President"?

8 [REDACTED] I believe that was documented in the file
9 after that meeting.

10 Mr. Somers. So you were aware of that?

11 [REDACTED] At some point, yes, I was aware of that.

12 Mr. Somers. Were you aware that Ohr reported to
13 members of the Crossfire Hurricane team during that meeting
14 that reporting of criminal activities may be exaggerated or
15 conspiracy theory talk so Steele cannot know whether all
16 his reporting is true?

17 [REDACTED] I'm not sure if that's in the write-up or
18 not. I wasn't part of the meeting, so I wouldn't be able
19 to -- I'd have to -- I'm not sure if it's in the write-up.

20 Mr. Somers. Okay. Were you aware that Fusion GPS --
21 this is also from that same Ohr meeting -- that Fusion GPS
22 was hired by a lawyer who does opposition research and that
23 Steele's reporting was being distributed to the Clinton
24 campaign, Jonathan Winer at the State Department, and the
25 FBI?

1 [REDACTED] Again, I'm not sure exactly when I had an
2 understanding of that.

3 Mr. Somers. Did you at some time have an
4 understanding that the Steele reporting was going to the
5 Clinton campaign?

6 [REDACTED] At some moment, yes.

7 Mr. Somers. Prior to the final Carter Page FISA
8 application being submitted?

9 [REDACTED] I believe it would have been prior to the
10 final Carter Page application being submitted, yes.

11 Mr. Somers. And what about the fact that Steele was
12 sharing his information with the State Department? Were
13 you aware of that before the final Carter Page FISA
14 application was filed?

15 [REDACTED] I was probably aware of it before the
16 final application.

17 Mr. Somers. Okay. Were you aware that on December
18 17, 2016, the CIA expressed concern to the FBI about the
19 lack of vetting for the Steele election reporting and
20 believed it should not be included in the intelligence
21 community assessment as it was Internet rumor?

22 [REDACTED] I'm sorry. Do you have the date again? I
23 apologize.

24 Mr. Somers. I'm sorry. December 17, 2016.

25 [REDACTED] I was aware of that, yes.

1 Mr. Somers. You were aware of that at the time?

2 [REDACTED] At the time, yes.

3 Mr. Somers. And you were aware that the CIA believed
4 that it was Internet rumor?

5 [REDACTED] Well, I don't believe that that is a CIA
6 characterization. If I recall, that's actually a quote by
7 someone who was characterizing what the CIA's position was.

8 Mr. Somers. Do you have any reason to question
9 Jonathan Moffa's recollection that the intel section chief
10 stated that the CIA viewed it as "Internet rumor"?

11 [REDACTED] I have no reason to question Jon Moffa's
12 comment on that, but I don't know if that's an exact quote.

13 Mr. Somers. Okay. You didn't have a separate
14 conversation with the CIA where they said it was an
15 Internet rumor?

16 [REDACTED] No, I did not have a separate
17 conversation.

18 Mr. Somers. Okay. Were you aware that in December of
19 2016 Crossfire Hurricane team leaders learned that Steele's
20 primary sub-source from 2009 to 2011 was the subject of an
21 FBI counterintelligence investigation that indicated that
22 he might be a "threat to national security"?

23 Mr. Heberling. Zach, this is Brian Heberling again.
24 For the reasons we discussed yesterday, we're going to tell
25 [REDACTED] to respectfully decline to answer that question.

1 Mr. Somers. Okay. And following up, and you can not
2 answer this question either, but further that the Crossfire
3 Hurricane team learned in December of 2016 that in 2010 the
4 FBI went so far as to submit an application to the DOJ for
5 FISA coverage on the primary sub-source? Were you aware of
6 that?

7 Mr. Heberling. We're going to give [REDACTED] the same
8 instruction. Thank you.

9 Mr. Somers. All right. Fair enough.

10 Did you learn in January 2017 that the primary sub-
11 source lived in the United States?

12 [REDACTED] Yes.

13 Mr. Somers. So in learning that, did you realize that
14 he was not "Russian-based," like the FISA applications
15 represented?

16 [REDACTED] Yes.

17 Mr. Somers. Do you recall on January 12th or
18 thereabouts, January 12, 2017, that the FBI received a
19 report outlining an inaccuracy in Steele's reporting about
20 the activities of Michael Cohen, a highly credible source
21 stated that it did not have high confidence in this subset
22 of Steele's reporting, and assessed that the referenced
23 subset was part of a Russian disinformation campaign to
24 denigrate U.S. foreign relations?

25 [REDACTED] This is from a footnote in the IG report,

1 correct?

2 Mr. Somers. Yes, it's from Footnote -- the
3 declassified version of Footnote 350.

4 [REDACTED] Yes, I was aware of that.

5 Mr. Somers. You were aware of that at the time?

6 [REDACTED] Yes.

7 Mr. Somers. And just for the record, you took part in
8 the -- I think you already said this earlier, but let's put
9 it on the record now. You took part in the 3-day interview
10 of the primary sub-source that occurred on or about January
11 -- started on about January 24, 2017?

12 [REDACTED] That is correct.

13 Mr. Somers. Do you recall where that interview took
14 place?

15 [REDACTED] It took place in the FBI Washington Field
16 Office.

17 Mr. Somers. So you're confident it did not occur at
18 the primary sub-source's lawyer's office?

19 [REDACTED] Correct.

20 Mr. Somers. Okay. And then back to this Footnote
21 350, the declassified version of it, on February 27, 2017,
22 were you aware that an intelligence community report
23 contained information about an individual with reported
24 connections to Trump and Russia who claimed that the public
25 reporting about the details of Trump's sexual activities in

1 Moscow during a trip in 2013 were false and that they were
2 the product of Russian intelligence service's "infiltrating
3 a source into the network of [redacted] who compiled a
4 dossier on that individual on Trump's activities"?

5 [REDACTED] Yes, I believe I was aware of that at the
6 time.

7 Mr. Somers. At the time, okay. Were you aware of the
8 March 2017 human source validation review of Steele that
9 found that his "past contributions to the FBI's criminal
10 program had been minimally corroborated"?

11 [REDACTED] I believe I had received that report
12 around that time.

13 Mr. Somers. Were you -- I don't know if you were
14 either aware of -- well, I'll first ask it this way: Were
15 you aware of the primary sub-source's March interview with
16 the FBI?

17 [REDACTED] I was aware of it, but I won't be able to
18 say exactly when I was aware of it.

19 Mr. Somers. Okay. But you were not a part of that
20 interview?

21 [REDACTED] Correct.

22 Mr. Somers. Were you aware that during that interview
23 the primary sub-source stated that he never expected Steele
24 to put the primary sub-source's statements in reports or
25 present them as facts?

1 [REDACTED] I believe I was aware of that, but, again,
2 I wouldn't be able to tell you exactly when I was aware of
3 that.

4 Mr. Somers. Do you know if you were aware of that
5 before the final Carter Page FISA application was
6 submitted?

7 [REDACTED] I would estimate it probably was before,
8 but, again, I don't have a clear recollection.

9 Mr. Somers. Okay. Do you recall learning that the
10 primary sub-source said that the statements were "word of
11 mouth and hearsay"; "conversations...had with friends over
12 beers"; or were statements "made in jest" that should be
13 taken with "a grain of salt"?

14 [REDACTED] Is that a quote from the --

15 Mr. Somers. It's a quote from the IG report, from the
16 Washington Field Office agent who took that March
17 interview.

18 [REDACTED] Again, I think I was aware of that
19 reporting, but I wouldn't be able to tell you exactly when
20 specifically I was aware of that reporting.

21 Mr. Somers. Do you think it was prior to the final
22 Carter Page FISA application being submitted?

23 [REDACTED] It could have been, but, again, I don't
24 have a clear recollection.

25 Mr. Somers. Did the primary sub-source express any

1 sentiments like that during your 3-day interview with him?

2 [REDACTED] Not to my recollection.

3 Mr. Somers. All right. That's all I have on that
4 sort of run-through line of questions. Let's stick with
5 the primary sub-source, though, since we were kind of
6 ending there with my previous line. So were you aware of
7 -- you know what? I want to start with Christopher Steele.
8 When did you first become aware of what's become known as
9 the "Steele dossier"?

10 [REDACTED] I believe that would have been either
11 September 19 or September 20, 2016.

12 Mr. Somers. Okay. So when it came in -- the IG
13 report says the Crossfire Hurricane team received it on
14 September 19th.

15 [REDACTED] That would have been the date then.

16 Mr. Somers. That's when you would have received it,
17 okay. What did the FBI's initial efforts to -- I don't
18 know if the word "corroborate" is correct, but to either
19 corroborate or look at the Steele reporting consist of?

20 [REDACTED] We immediately started to determine what
21 aspects of the reporting that we could confirm or
22 disconfirm, and so we began looking at FBI holdings; we
23 began looking at open-source material and began looking at
24 OGA material as well to see if there was anything that we
25 could use to help verify, again, confirm or disconfirm.

1 Mr. Somers. Okay. On page 101 of the IG report, it
2 says that, "After obtaining the six Steele reports on
3 September 19, analysts on the Crossfire Hurricane team
4 immediately began to evaluate the information in the
5 reports. By the next day, they had completed a draft
6 Intelligence Memorandum that summarized key points from the
7 reports and identified actions that needed to be taken to
8 assess the information."

9 Were you the author or one of the authors of that
10 Intelligence Memorandum?

11 ██████████ I was not the primary author, but I edited
12 that document.

13 Mr. Somers. Okay. That seems like a fast turnaround
14 to me. Is that a fast turnaround of an analytical product
15 like an Intelligence Memorandum?

16 ██████████ I wouldn't necessarily say that's a fast
17 turnaround. It was a memo that was summarizing what we had
18 received and then suggested or recommended courses of
19 action based upon what we had received.

20 Mr. Somers. So it took everything at face value at
21 that point in time. Is that a fair --

22 ██████████ We were just -- we were just starting the
23 analysis.

24 Mr. Somers. Okay. Page 125 of the IG report
25 indicates that, "Also on September 19...in an email to the

1 OGC Unit Chief and OGC Attorney, the Supervisory Intel
2 Analyst forwarded an excerpt from Steele's Report
3 94...concerning Page's alleged secret meeting with Igor
4 Divyekin in July 2016 and asked, `Does this put us at least
5 *that* much closer to a full FISA on [Carter Page]?' " Do
6 you recall that email?

7 [REDACTED] I do.

8 Mr. Somers. Why would receiving that information move
9 you that much closer to a full FISA on Carter Page?

10 [REDACTED] I wouldn't be able to speak to that at the
11 classification level of this.

12 Mr. Somers. I guess my question is: Why would this
13 unverified information move -- this is the same day you
14 received the Steele reporting. I'm trying to understand
15 why -- how on the same day you received the reporting it
16 would move you closer to receiving a FISA application.

17 [REDACTED] It was a matter of what -- I think from
18 the -- as far as saying based upon what's in that
19 paragraph, it is information that was researched on Igor
20 Divyekin.

21 Mr. Somers. Prior to receiving the Steele reporting,
22 is that what you're saying?

23 [REDACTED] Not prior.

24 Mr. Somers. What did you know about Christopher
25 Steele on September 19, 2016? Had you used his information

1 previously?

2 [REDACTED] No.

3 Mr. Somers. Had you ever met Christopher Steele?

4 [REDACTED] Turned out yes, I had in the past.

5 Mr. Somers. Had you worked in a professional context?

6 [REDACTED] In a professional context.

7 Mr. Somers. Had his information been used in an
8 investigation that you had worked on previously?

9 [REDACTED] I can't go into the details about what it
10 is that I was working on where I had the interaction with
11 Mr. Steele.

12 Mr. Baker. But it was during your time at the FBI?

13 [REDACTED] That is correct.

14 Mr. Somers. So you had some knowledge of Christopher
15 Steele prior to receiving the Steele dossier on September
16 19?

17 [REDACTED] So to be clear, at the time, no, I didn't
18 make the connection. But after I had actually met Mr.
19 Steele, I recognized him, came back, looked through some
20 material, and realized that he and I had met in the past in
21 a professional context on a particular matter involving the
22 FBI.

23 Mr. Baker. So you realized that after seeing him or
24 after digesting more information in files and his writings?

25 [REDACTED] After seeing him.

1 Mr. Baker. Okay.

2 Mr. Somers. So when you're analyzing this material,
3 if "analyzing" is the correct term -- I won't characterize
4 it for you. But you get the material on September 19th.
5 You draft the -- not you, I mean you and your team draft an
6 Intelligence Memorandum about this material. How are you
7 viewing this material? Are you skeptical of it? Is it --
8 what's your characterization of the material on September
9 19th and 20th?

10 [REDACTED] The characterization I would give is that
11 the FBI gets reporting from all manner of places, and we do
12 the same type of thing with all manner of reporting, which
13 is we look to see whether or not things can be verified.
14 We look to see whether or not it matches things that are in
15 open source or in classified holdings, and to determine
16 whether or not the information that we've received is
17 accurate or whether it can be confirmed or whether it can
18 be disconfirmed.

19 Mr. Baker. You had used the term "FBI holdings" a few
20 minutes ago in response to a question from Mr. Somers.
21 What do you mean when you say you're checking "FBI
22 holdings"?

23 [REDACTED] I mean that we're using FBI systems to
24 look at material that has been previously collected or
25 previously investigated by the FBI.

1 Mr. Baker. And that would be something you could
2 access if you came across a name or if a name came forward
3 as either someone providing information or someone who
4 could potentially be the subject of an investigation? You
5 could check these holdings to see if there were previous
6 contacts with this individual by the FBI?

7 [REDACTED] In terms of -- possibly, yes.

8 Mr. Baker. So would you have checked these holdings
9 when Mr. Steele first comes on the radar with this dossier?
10 Would you have checked holdings to see what relationship
11 the Bureau may have had with Mr. Steele?

12 [REDACTED] I don't recall checking to see what
13 relationship Mr. Steele had, but we were checking the names
14 and entities and things mentioned actually in the
15 reporting.

16 Mr. Baker. So, eventually, when you had names of
17 people that were in the report, you would have run those
18 names against "FBI holdings"?

19 [REDACTED] Correct.

20 Mr. Baker. So in doing that, you would have -- if
21 there were, in fact, a previous relationship with the FBI
22 of any of these individuals in his reporting, you would
23 have gotten a hit that there had been previous FBI interest
24 or this person had been previously on the FBI radar?

25 [REDACTED] Theoretically, yes.

1 Mr. Baker. And did that, in fact, happen with any of
2 these individuals or with anything that you verified or
3 attempted to verify through FBI holdings with the Steele
4 reporting? Did you get hits?

5 [REDACTED] So I'm not sure I'm comfortable talking
6 about what I was able to find or not find in FBI holdings
7 in a forum such as this.

8 Mr. Baker. But if you would have gotten something in
9 an FBI holding, theoretically, that would have cast -- or
10 would have been curious in that someone in the Steele
11 reporting has previously been on the FBI radar, you would
12 have let that be known to other people on your team?

13 [REDACTED] Yes, in that scenario, certainly.

14 Mr. Baker. Was that done in this case?

15 [REDACTED] Again, let me talk to FBI counsel for a
16 moment.

17 Mr. Baker. Sure.

18 [Witness confers with counsel.]

19 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] back.

20 Mr. Baker. Yes, sir.

21 [REDACTED] Would you mind repeating the question just
22 so that I --

23 Mr. Baker. Sure. I was asking, in your attempt to
24 look into FBI holdings of either people that come on the
25 radar in the course of this case or specifically in the

1 Steele reporting, did anything -- did you get a hit, a ping
2 on a previous contact that any of these people identified
3 or subsequently identified from the Steele reporting had
4 been previously on the FBI radar?

5 [REDACTED] So, again, I don't want to get into what I
6 got a hit on or not or didn't get a hit on with respect to
7 particular individuals in the Crossfire Hurricane case.
8 However, I do want to emphasize that FBI holdings are
9 organized oftentimes along what accesses one has, and,
10 therefore, there are situations in which cases are
11 restricted in the search function or prohibited in the
12 search function, and, therefore, I would not necessarily
13 always get all manner of hits on a particular individual or
14 entity.

15 Mr. Baker. Did you subsequently to any searches or
16 database checks, did you subsequently get any call or
17 communication from another part of the FBI inquiring why
18 you had queried someone where on your end you don't see a
19 hit, but there is a message transmitted to someone else
20 saying that someone has queried your case, and then that
21 someone or that someone's supervisor reaches out to you or
22 maybe your supervisor and inquires why you were searching
23 whatever it was you were searching? Did that happen?

24 [REDACTED] I don't recall getting any messages like
25 that over the course of Crossfire Hurricane.

1 Mr. Baker. And if you would have gotten any kind of
2 hit from FBI holdings that anybody in the Steele reporting
3 had been previously known or concurrently known to the
4 Bureau, you would have made that known to your team?

5 [REDACTED] Yes.

6 Mr. Baker. Okay. Thank you.

7 Mr. Somers. Did you have other information other than
8 the Steele dossier on September 19, 2016, that Igor
9 Divyekin and Carter Page had a meeting in July of 2016?

10 [REDACTED] No.

11 Mr. Somers. Is Igor Divyekin a person that would be
12 known in the intelligence community?

13 [REDACTED] I'm going to not answer that at this
14 classification level.

15 Mr. Somers. So you had no knowledge of a secret
16 meeting between Divyekin and Page, but you thought this
17 information put us at least that much closer to a full FISA
18 on Carter Page. Did you view the Steele dossier -- let's
19 just call it that. I know it wasn't quite what you guys
20 considered it at the FBI. But did you view the Steele
21 dossier as raw intelligence?

22 [REDACTED] I mean, it was reporting that we had
23 received, but there was not a finalized -- yeah, I mean, it
24 wasn't a kind of finalized report or anything of that sort.
25 It's information.

1 Mr. Somers. And you went about verifying -- not you,
2 the FBI and the Crossfire Hurricane team, which you were a
3 part of, went about verifying the -- or trying to verify
4 the information in the Steele dossier?

5 [REDACTED] Trying to, yes.

6 Mr. Somers. Why?

7 [REDACTED] To determine, again, whether or not it was
8 accurate, to determine whether or not we could confirm
9 material in it, or whether or not we could disconfirm
10 material in it.

11 Mr. Somers. But why does the mention of a meeting
12 between Page and Divyekin move you that much closer to a
13 FISA application if you haven't confirmed the information
14 in the Steele dossier?

15 Mr. Linehan. Zach, if I could jump in, I just want to
16 make a note that I think you're mischaracterizing the
17 email, the email in question. I don't think he states it
18 that declaratively in the email, but, you know, I'm not --
19 he can answer. He can respond. But I just want to note
20 that for the record.

21 Mr. Somers. Sure.

22 [REDACTED] As I was saying, there was something about
23 Divyekin. That's all I can say.

24 Mr. Somers. Okay. What about were you aware at that
25 time of Carter Page's denial that he had ever met with

1 Divyekin or even knew who Divyekin was?

2 [REDACTED] On September 19th?

3 Mr. Somers. Yes.

4 [REDACTED] I don't believe I was aware of that denial
5 on September 19th.

6 Mr. Somers. Were you aware of it in October of 2016?

7 [REDACTED] If I recall correctly, that was from the
8 September 23rd news article. Is that correct?

9 Mr. Somers. Well, there's a denial of -- according to
10 the IG report, on page 364 -- I think it's in numerous
11 places. But Page made "statements to an FBI CHS in October
12 2016 that the FBI believed supported its theory that Page
13 was an agent of Russia but omitted other statements Page
14 made" -- and this is the part I'm pointing to -- "omitted
15 other statements Page made, including denying having met
16 with Sechin and Divyekin, or even knowing who Divyekin
17 was." So that's in October of 2016, Page makes a statement
18 to an FBI CHS that he never met with Divyekin or even knew
19 who Divyekin was.

20 [REDACTED] Okay. Sorry.

21 Mr. Somers. Were you aware of that interaction
22 between Carter Page and the FBI confidential human source?

23 [REDACTED] I was aware of the interaction between
24 Carter Page and the CHS. I'm not exactly sure the extent
25 of my knowledge with respect to everything that was

1 discussed between Page and the CHS.

2 Mr. Somers. All right. Just for clarity, were you
3 aware of his statements denying knowing who Divyekin was?

4 [REDACTED] I don't recall exactly whether or not I
5 knew those statements at the time or whether I learned
6 about those statements subsequent to that time.

7 Mr. Somers. Do you think you learned about them prior
8 to the first Page FISA application?

9 [REDACTED] I'm not sure if I learned them before the
10 first Page application.

11 Mr. Somers. What about prior to the first renewal?

12 [REDACTED] Again, I'm not positive exactly.

13 Mr. Somers. What about prior to the last renewal?

14 [REDACTED] I probably knew about it before the last
15 renewal.

16 Mr. Somers. So getting back to some of the
17 verification, on page 102 of the IG report, it says that,
18 "They explained that the assessment" of Steele "involved
19 determining the credibility of Steele, including
20 understanding his record of furnishing reliable
21 information, motivation, and possible biases; and verifying
22 the information he provided through independent sources."

23 Where did you get your understanding of Steele's
24 record of furnishing reliable information?

25 [REDACTED] I understood that from Handling Agent 1.

1 Mr. Somers. Did you have any other sources of his
2 reliability, at least prior to the first FISA application,
3 other than Handling Agent 1?

4 [REDACTED] No, not to my recollection.

5 Mr. Somers. Did you consult his Delta file prior to
6 the first FISA application?

7 [REDACTED] No. I believe it was after the first --
8 after the initiation.

9 Mr. Somers. Why did you not consult his Delta -- not
10 you. Why did the Crossfire Hurricane team, including you,
11 not consult his Delta file until after the first
12 application?

13 [REDACTED] The Crossfire Hurricane team was
14 interested in moving on the reporting itself. We were not
15 focused on vetting Christopher Steele as a source at that
16 time.

17 I'm going to go off for a moment.

18 Mr. Somers. Yes.

19 [Witness confers with counsel.]

20 [REDACTED] So with respect to -- you know, I don't
21 know if anybody didn't look at the Delta file. With
22 respect to my look at the Delta file, I know that that did
23 not take place until after the first renewal.

24 Mr. Somers. Okay. How much corroboration of the --
25 or verification -- I don't know what the proper technical

1 term is -- of the Steele dossier was complete by October
2 21, 2016, when the first application was submitted to the
3 Court?

4 [REDACTED] Are you asking for a percentage or are you
5 asking -- I'm not exactly sure.

6 Mr. Somers. Yeah, I'm asking what was the level of
7 verification or corroboration.

8 [REDACTED] I think by that time I would characterize
9 it as, again, a distinction between facts and allegations
10 as documented in the reporting, and that many of the facts,
11 people, places, entities themselves could be corroborated
12 or verified. In terms of the actual allegations
13 themselves, I'm not sure many of the allegations could be
14 verified at that time.

15 Mr. Somers. On page 196 of the report, and this is in
16 reference to the last -- the third renewal, but it says,
17 "Despite the FBI's efforts to corroborate and evaluate the
18 Steele election reporting, we were told by the Supervisory
19 Intel Analyst that, as of September 2017, the FBI had
20 corroborated limited information in the Steele election
21 reporting, and much of that information was publicly
22 available."

23 Would you say that you had corroborated even less
24 information by October 21st of 2016?

25 [REDACTED] I don't know if I would say less

1 information by October of 2017, but I would say that in the
2 end --

3 Mr. Somers. Sorry. 2016.

4 [REDACTED] 2016, excuse me. Could you repeat the
5 question then?

6 Mr. Somers. Yeah, I want to know -- so you made a
7 statement -- what I have from you is a statement that you
8 made in October -- I'm sorry, in September of 2017 saying
9 that the FBI -- this is not a direct quote of yours, but
10 this is essentially what you told the IG's office -- the
11 FBI had corroborated limited information of the Steele
12 election reporting, and much of that information was
13 publicly available. That's in September of 2017. There's
14 not a similar statement from you regarding October 21,
15 2016, so I'm wondering how you would compare the
16 corroboration statement you had in 2017 with where you were
17 in October of 2016.

18 [REDACTED] I would say on the basis of that question
19 we had less information than we had in September of 2017.

20 Mr. Somers. Okay. Gettomg back to the question I was
21 asking, so we went through understanding of the record of
22 furnishing reliable information. You got that from
23 Handling Agent 1. What about his motivation? What was
24 your assessment of his -- what did it involve in terms of
25 assessing his motivation?

1 [REDACTED] Steele's personal motivation?

2 Mr. Somers. Yes, and providing this information to
3 the FBI.

4 [REDACTED] My understanding when we received the
5 Steele material was that this information, again, was put
6 together by Steele and his business intelligence firm, was
7 being provided to the entity Fusion GPS, and that it was
8 going to a law office, and that the potential existed that
9 it was opposition research.

10 Mr. Somers. So you didn't know that it was opposition
11 research, I take it, by that response.

12 [REDACTED] Correct.

13 Mr. Somers. And you didn't know this, but you later
14 learned that the DNC was the ultimate client for the Steele
15 dossier. Is that correct?

16 [REDACTED] Eventually, yes.

17 Mr. Somers. Did that or does that change your opinion
18 from, you know, we thought it might be opposition research
19 to it was opposition research?

20 [REDACTED] I think that's a fair characterization.

21 Mr. Somers. So it moves from speculation to -- I
22 mean, that's what the DNC's after if they're paying for the
23 Steele dossier, right, is opposition research?

24 [REDACTED] I don't know exactly what the DNC was
25 paying for, so I won't characterize that.

1 Mr. Somers. Well, they weren't -- do you think the
2 DNC was paying for information that was favorable to Donald
3 Trump?

4 [REDACTED] Again, I don't know what the DNC was
5 paying for, but I will say that eventually it became clear
6 that this was opposition research.

7 Mr. Somers. Okay. And then the fourth thing it says
8 in your assessment -- not your assessment, the FBI's
9 assessment, was "verifying the information he provided
10 through independent sources." What did that consist of?

11 [REDACTED] Where are you quoting that from exactly?

12 Mr. Somers. Page 102. This is what I read earlier.
13 I'll read it again. "They explained that the assessment
14 involved determining the credibility of Steele" -- we went
15 through that -- "including understanding his record of
16 furnishing reliable information, motivation, and possible
17 biases; and verifying the information he provided through
18 independent sources." So now I'm to "verifying the
19 information he provided through independent sources," and
20 I'd like to understand just at a very general level what
21 you did to verify the information he provided through
22 independent sources.

23 [REDACTED] I think that goes back to my comments
24 earlier regarding searching through FBI holdings, querying
25 OGA material, et cetera.

1 Mr. Somers. Including public information?

2 [REDACTED] That would include public information,
3 yes.

4 Mr. Baker. So when the words being used that this
5 information or Steele's credibility was assessed, is this
6 the same thing as him being validated as a source, or this
7 is something different?

8 [REDACTED] It would be something different.

9 Mr. Baker. Was he ever validated as a source?

10 [REDACTED] Yes.

11 Mr. Baker. And was he determined to be credible? Did
12 he pass whatever you do to be validated?

13 [REDACTED] I believe from the IG report that it was
14 reliable, was the word that they used for it.

15 Mr. Baker. In general terms, is there an enhanced
16 validation process that the Bureau can do?

17 [REDACTED] I'm not sure I could speak about the
18 levels of validation that the Bureau goes about in this
19 type of forum.

20 Mr. Baker. Is there more than one type of validation?

21 [REDACTED] Again, I think you'd have to speak to
22 somebody in the validation process for greater clarity on
23 that.

24 Mr. Somers. Were you aware of SSA-1 requesting an
25 enhanced validation of Steele in November of 2016?

1 [REDACTED] I was aware of SSA-1 I believe asking for
2 a validation, but I don't know if I recall that it was some
3 sort of enhanced validation.

4 Mr. Baker. So what is the intelligence analyst role
5 in validations in general, outside of Crossfire Hurricane?
6 Are there intelligence analysts that are involved in
7 validating sources?

8 [REDACTED] There are intelligence analysts involved
9 in validating sources, yes.

10 Mr. Baker. So there would be -- or are there
11 intelligence analysts assigned to this validation unit that
12 you just referenced?

13 [REDACTED] I don't believe I referenced a unit on
14 that, but there are analysts who are involved in the
15 validation process.

16 Mr. Baker. Okay. You said that I would have to talk
17 to somebody in a validation something, a unit, a division,
18 or something. So would there be intelligence analysts
19 assigned to whatever that something is, be it a unit or
20 some other organizational entity?

21 [REDACTED] Yes, there are intelligence analysts that
22 are involved in the validation process on an official
23 basis.

24 Mr. Baker. So your unit, where you're the supervisory
25 intelligence analyst, if there had been any request of this

1 other validation entity, since your unit and your agent
2 counterparts are working with Mr. Steele, you would have
3 gotten any result of validation that was done on him.
4 Correct?

5 [REDACTED] I believe I received a report on the
6 validation that was done.

7 Mr. Baker. And what kind of report was it? Was it a
8 passing grade, a failing grade, an average grade? What
9 does the result that you got tell you about Mr. Steele as a
10 source?

11 [REDACTED] They're not graded in that way, and so I
12 think -- as I characterized just a few minutes ago, I think
13 one of the terms that's outlined in the IG report as they
14 describe the validation report is that he was determined to
15 be reliable, and that there were questions about how much
16 of his reporting had been corroborated.

17 Mr. Baker. Are you aware of any validation that was
18 requested of Mr. Steele that was stopped, that was told to
19 be put on hold or otherwise terminated by any FBI official?

20 [REDACTED] I don't recall that.

21 Mr. Baker. Okay.

22 Mr. Somers. Do you recall writing with the staff
23 operations specialist an Intelligence Memorandum on the
24 Steele reporting in late September 2016?

25 [REDACTED] I edited a memorandum from the SOS, yes.

1 Mr. Somers. And do you recall that in that memorandum
2 there was information that was then later used as part of
3 Steele's source characterization statement?

4 [REDACTED] I am aware that that memorandum was
5 subsequently used for the application, yes.

6 Mr. Somers. And I don't know if you recall -- I'm
7 looking at page 161 of the IG's report, and I'm reading the
8 source characterization statement for Steele that was in
9 the Carter Page FISA application. It says, "This
10 information comes from a sensitive FBI source whose
11 reporting has been corroborated and used in criminal
12 proceedings, and who obtains information from a number of
13 ostensibly well-placed sub-sources. The scope of the
14 source's reporting is from 20 June 2016 through 20 August
15 2016."

16 Do you recall where the information came from that
17 Steele's reporting has been corroborated and used in
18 criminal proceedings?

19 [REDACTED] I drafted that language.

20 Mr. Somers. And where did you get the impression that
21 his material had been corroborated?

22 [REDACTED] It was based on my understanding that he
23 had been -- his reporting had been the predicate for the
24 FIFA investigation.

25 Mr. Somers. And where did you get that understanding?

1 [REDACTED] My understanding came from the Handling
2 Agent 1 and also SSA-1, who had learned that from Handling
3 Agent 1.

4 Mr. Somers. And what about the "used in criminal
5 proceedings"?

6 [REDACTED] The same thing. It had predicated the
7 FIFA investigation which actually resulted in indictments.

8 Mr. Somers. What about "who obtains information from
9 a number of ostensibly well-placed sub-sources"? Where did
10 you get that information?

11 [REDACTED] I'm not sure that I drafted that
12 particular language on there, but it was basically based on
13 the reporting and how things were described within the
14 reporting.

15 Mr. Somers. Are you aware of the fact that the
16 handling agent said he wouldn't have approved this source
17 characterization statement for Steele?

18 [REDACTED] On the basis of what is written in the IG
19 report, I am aware of that.

20 Mr. Somers. But you were not aware of it at the time?

21 [REDACTED] Correct.

22 Mr. Somers. "According to Handling Agent" -- this is
23 on page 162. "According to Handling Agent 1, he was clear
24 with the Crossfire Hurricane team concerning Steele's role
25 and that Steele had provided leads and not evidence in the

1 FIFA case." Did you speak directly with Handling Agent 1
2 about Steele and his role?

3 [REDACTED] I don't recall speaking directly with
4 Handling Agent 1 about Steele's role in the investigation.
5 I recall that I had learned, again, either from Handling
6 Agent 1 or from SSA-1 who learned from Handling Agent 1
7 that Steele's information had predicated the FIFA
8 investigation.

9 Mr. Somers. Did you ever see this source
10 characterization statement written by Handling Agent 1:
11 "[CHS] has been signed up for 3 years and is reliable.
12 [CHS] responds to taskings and obtains info from a network
13 of sub sources. Some of the [CHS'] info has been
14 corroborated when possible"?

15 [REDACTED] I don't recall if I saw that language or
16 not.

17 Mr. Somers. So do you have any idea how Handling
18 Agent 1's source characterization statement got changed to
19 the one that ended up in the FISA application?

20 [REDACTED] I didn't write the application. I
21 understand that it has come from the Intelligence
22 Memorandum language.

23 Mr. Somers. Do you know how the handling agent's
24 source characterization statement got changed from what he
25 wrote to what appeared in the Intelligence Memorandum?

1 [REDACTED] No, I don't know exactly how that
2 happened.

3 Mr. Somers. But you did in part write the
4 Intelligence Memorandum?

5 [REDACTED] I did.

6 Mr. Somers. Did you ever talk to the prosecutors in
7 the FIFA case?

8 [REDACTED] I did not.

9 Mr. Somers. Did anyone on the Crossfire Hurricane
10 team talk to the prosecutors in the FIFA case, to your
11 knowledge?

12 [REDACTED] Not to my knowledge.

13 Mr. Somers. How about the agent on the FIFA case,
14 either you or somebody else on the Crossfire Hurricane
15 team?

16 [REDACTED] I'm not aware of that.

17 Mr. Somers. What was your understanding of how Steele
18 was collecting the information that was contained in his
19 election reports?

20 [REDACTED] At what point in the investigation are we
21 talking about here? Upon initial receipt?

22 Mr. Somers. Early on. What was your understanding of
23 -- prior to the first Carter Page FISA application.

24 [REDACTED] I think on the basis of the reports
25 themselves and on the structure of the reports themselves,

1 it was clear that he had -- I mean, there were a set of
2 sources that were being used and sources talking to sub-
3 sources.

4 Mr. Baker. What kind of -- as an intelligence
5 professional, what kind of problems, if there are problems,
6 what kind of problems exist when you have a source
7 reporting in essence which is what is in total information
8 that they are getting from this network of sub-sources?
9 What problems does that potentially present in using --

10 [REDACTED] I mean, theoretical --

11 Mr. Baker. -- that material?

12 [REDACTED] Theoretical problems that can arise are
13 things like Telephone Game where the sub-source is telling
14 the source one thing and then it gets reported inaccurately
15 or not quite accurately up the chain. You have the problem
16 of access, whether or not the sub-sources have the access
17 or are accurately talking about their accesses.

18 Mr. Baker. So there would be problems with the
19 ability on your end of assessing the information because
20 it's coming to you from one portal, for lack of a better
21 word, but that person is getting it from a network of
22 people that you really don't have much visibility into?

23 [REDACTED] It's not inherently problematic. I mean,
24 the FBI handles information that involves sources and sub-
25 sources all the time. It means that the way of going about

1 trying to verify can be challenging, and that it requires a
2 lot of digging into what's in the reporting and weighing
3 what the reporting says against other types of things.

4 Mr. Baker. But it would certainly be problematic if
5 you and your team of analysts get under the hood and
6 actually start looking at the sub-source network and find
7 that information -- or there's conflicting information from
8 what's been reported by the main source, the author of the
9 dossier. That would be problematic, right?

10 [REDACTED] So if you went to talk to a sub-source and
11 the sub-source indicated one thing and that was counter to
12 what the source reported to the end client, yes, that could
13 be problematic. If you talk to the main source and the
14 main source tells you something different that's written in
15 the end product, that can be problematic as well.

16 Mr. Baker. So how do you resolve -- if a main source
17 says one thing and a primary reporter or sub-source says
18 something different that was told to the main source, how
19 do you resolve the conflict between two people saying two
20 different things?

21 [REDACTED] Sometimes you can't resolve the conflict
22 between two people saying two different things. It's a
23 matter of what you can find that maybe on the outside helps
24 to weigh one thing or the other. And it also depends on
25 circumstances.

1 Mr. Baker. Would the circumstances be altered -- or
2 would the circumstances cause caution to fall on one side
3 or the other if the information that's potentially
4 incorrect is ultimately being presented in an application
5 to the FISA Court?

6 [REDACTED] That could be problematic, depending on
7 when it's found out and things of that sort, certainly.

8 Mr. Baker. And how far and wide in the Bureau would
9 information be, for lack of a better term, broadcast once
10 you start talking to the real sources of information and
11 where there are conflicts? What kind of alarm bells would
12 go off? Would somebody say, whoa, this creates a problem
13 here, we have people that are providing the information
14 that we've looked at, and they're saying that that's not
15 what they said, or it's inaccurate what's been reported?
16 What kind of a hue and a cry would go out from the
17 intelligence part of this Crossfire Hurricane or any part?
18 How are people notified that we might have a problem here?

19 [REDACTED] I think it again depends on circumstances.
20 You could have any number of situations arise where -- you
21 know, it depends on who's at the interviews. It depends
22 on, you know, which units are involved. It's not an easy
23 one answer to that question.

24 Mr. Baker. Even when it's ultimately -- the
25 information's ultimately being presented to the FISA Court

1 and the whole process of getting to that Court is, for lack
2 of a better term, special because of what the Court does, I
3 would think there's an enhanced obligation to sound a
4 louder bell that we might not be getting the true story and
5 we might need to dig a little deeper before we present or
6 keep presenting things to the Court. So I guess in the
7 instant case, was there meetings, was there timeouts? Was
8 there any concern that there's different information
9 potentially coming from people below the author of these
10 documents that conflicts with what's being given to the
11 Bureau all bundled up and tied with a nice little bow?

12 [REDACTED] The meetings with sub-sources were
13 documented, and -- they were documented, and that
14 documentation was put into the FBI's system of record where
15 it was available to people on the Crossfire Hurricane team
16 who would have been involved in the decisionmaking.

17 Mr. Somers. Who was the main source of the Steele
18 dossier -- Christopher Steele or the primary sub-source?

19 [REDACTED] So it would be the primary sub-sources
20 where Christopher Steele was getting his information.

21 Mr. Somers. So whose reliability -- go ahead.

22 [REDACTED] I mean, for the -- yes, it was the primary
23 sub-source. Sorry.

24 Mr. Somers. So whose reliability is more important --
25 the primary sub-source's or Christopher Steele's?

1 [REDACTED] Well, if -- again, it depends on when
2 you're talking about things. If all you know is
3 Christopher Steele and Christopher Steele's information has
4 been used in the past and you don't know the identity of
5 the primary sub-source, then what you have to rely on is
6 Christopher Steele's reliability and whether or not that
7 sourcing or that material has been used in the past and has
8 been effective or it's been accurate or been used. Once
9 you know the primary sub-source's identity, then it becomes
10 inherent to determine whether or not this primary sub-
11 source is reliable.

12 Mr. Somers. All right. To back up a second, so once
13 you know there's a primary sub-source or once you
14 understand this -- and I'm speaking specifically here about
15 the Steele dossier. Once you know who the primary sub-
16 source is, the existence of the primary sub-source, his
17 reliability becomes more important than Steele's. Is that
18 what you're saying?

19 [REDACTED] I would say that it weighs more heavily
20 once you've identified the primary sub-source if the
21 primary sub-source is the one from whom -- where the
22 information is being gathered and provided to Christopher
23 Steele.

24 Mr. Somers. Okay. A slightly different question.
25 You say once you identify. By that do you mean the guy's

1 actual name or do you mean you identify that there is a
2 primary sub-source?

3 [REDACTED] Well, I would say if all you've identified
4 is that there's a primary sub-source but you have no
5 information about that primary source's access or that
6 primary source's identity or anything of that sort, it's
7 hard to necessarily judge what that primary sub-source's
8 reliability is. I mean, what -- you're doing exactly what
9 we did, which is you take a look at other information and
10 you try to confirm or disconfirm what's in the actual
11 reporting --

12 Mr. Somers. When did you --

13 [REDACTED] Sorry?

14 Mr. Somers. I'm sorry if I cut you off. I thought
15 you were finished.

16 [REDACTED] No, that's fine.

17 Mr. Somers. Okay. When did you become aware that
18 there -- not who he was or who he is, whatever. When did
19 you become aware that Steele was using a primary sub-source
20 for the election reporting?

21 [REDACTED] I'm not exactly sure when we determined
22 that there was a primary sub-source, but the reporting, the
23 structure of the actual reporting lended itself to the idea
24 that there may have been one primary guy that was getting
25 information from a bunch of other sources.

1 Mr. Somers. And you knew that prior to the first FISA
2 application, right? Because that's --

3 [REDACTED] By the --

4 Mr. Somers. We talked over each other. Please go
5 ahead.

6 [REDACTED] No, I interrupted. Please ask your
7 question.

8 Mr. Somers. You knew that there was a primary sub-
9 source by the time the first FISA application was
10 submitted. Correct?

11 [REDACTED] Again, I'm not sure whether or not we were
12 settled on one primary sub-source by the time of the first
13 application. But, again, the structure of the reporting
14 suggested that there may only be one person from whom he's
15 getting his information.

16 Mr. Somers. You met with Christopher Steele in
17 October of 2016. Is that correct?

18 [REDACTED] That is correct.

19 Mr. Somers. In person in a European city?

20 [REDACTED] Correct.

21 Mr. Somers. Did you ask him if he had a primary sub-
22 source during that meeting?

23 [REDACTED] We talked about the source network during
24 that meeting, yes.

25 Mr. Somers. Did you ask him the names of his sources?

1 [REDACTED] I'm not -- I don't recollect whether we
2 specifically asked the name. I think we did.

3 Mr. Somers. Did he provide it?

4 [REDACTED] No.

5 Mr. Somers. When you eventually figured out who the
6 primary sub-source was, the FBI figured that out on its
7 own? It didn't just get a name from Christopher Steele?
8 Is that correct?

9 [REDACTED] Correct.

10 Mr. Baker. And sometime contemporaneous with that
11 identification of the primary sub-source -- I think we
12 talked about this earlier -- his "FBI holdings" would have
13 been checked?

14 [REDACTED] Again, I don't want to get into exactly
15 the process we used for identifying the primary sub-source
16 at this classification.

17 Mr. Baker. But separate and apart from how he was or
18 she was identified, you would have run whatever information
19 you had in holdings and gotten some result if this person
20 had been on the radar of the FBI prior?

21 [REDACTED] FBI holdings had a part of it, yes.

22 Mr. Baker. And then you had said -- never mind on
23 that one.

24 Mr. Somers. And we're almost out of time here. Just
25 on this whole -- we've been talking a lot about the

1 assessment, the verification, the corroboration, whatever
2 we want to call it. How important in terms of that process
3 was, one, identifying Steele's primary sub-source, once you
4 became aware that there was a primary sub-source or at
5 least someone who appeared to be one of the primary
6 sources, and then the rest of the network, how important of
7 a task was identifying the primary sub-source and/or the
8 rest of the Steele source network?

9 [REDACTED] I would say it was an important part of
10 the task.

11 Mr. Somers. Was it something that was regularly
12 discussed at meetings amongst -- these meetings you
13 described earlier?

14 [REDACTED] I don't know if identifying the primary
15 sub-source was something that was highlighted in the
16 meetings that we had prior to the identification of the
17 primary sub-source, but definitely trying to understand the
18 reporting and to, again, confirm and disconfirm what we
19 could of the reporting was something that was talked about.

20 Mr. Somers. Was it an important step in the process
21 when you did finally identify the primary sub-source?

22 [REDACTED] Yes, it was an important step.

23 Mr. Somers. Was that discussed in meetings, that,
24 hey, we've identified the primary sub-source?

25 [REDACTED] I recollect there were some meetings where

1 it was discussed, yes.

2 Mr. Somers. Did you ever discuss that with Peter
3 Strzok?

4 [REDACTED] I --

5 Mr. Somers. Let me rephrase. Was the identification
6 of the primary sub-source ever discussed in a meeting that
7 Peter Strzok was in?

8 [REDACTED] Again, a meeting? I am not -- I'm not
9 sure. I don't have a recollection of one specific meeting
10 where it was discussed.

11 Mr. Somers. Was it discussed through any sort of
12 messaging system, email or some sort of classified system?

13 [REDACTED] Again, I'm not sure whether Peter Strzok
14 received emails on it, but, again, it was discussed.

15 Mr. Somers. Do you believe he was aware of the
16 identification of the primary sub-source?

17 [REDACTED] Yes, I believe he was aware of the
18 identification of the primary sub-source.

19 Mr. Somers. What about Bill Priestap?

20 [REDACTED] Yes, Bill Priestap was aware of the
21 identification.

22 Mr. Somers. What about Andy McCabe?

23 [REDACTED] I don't know if Andy McCabe was.

24 Mr. Somers. What about Lisa Page?

25 [REDACTED] I'm not sure about Lisa Page.

1 Mr. Somers. Director Comey?

2 [REDACTED] I am not sure about Director Comey in
3 terms of either the identity of the primary sub-source or
4 that the sub-source had been -- yeah, I'm not positive.

5 Mr. Somers. That's what I'm asking, whether they're
6 aware that he had been identified, not that you provided
7 the name, which probably would have been meaningless.

8 [REDACTED] I believe Director Comey was aware that
9 the primary source had been identified.

10 Mr. Somers. Was he aware that the primary sub-source
11 had been interviewed?

12 [REDACTED] That I don't know.

13 Mr. Somers. Was Deputy Director McCabe aware that the
14 primary sub-source had been interviewed?

15 [REDACTED] That I don't know.

16 Mr. Somers. Was Bill Priestap aware that the primary
17 sub-source had been interviewed?

18 [REDACTED] Yes, I believe that Bill Priestap was
19 aware.

20 Mr. Somers. Peter Strzok?

21 [REDACTED] I believe Peter Strzok was aware.

22 Mr. Somers. Lisa Page?

23 [REDACTED] Unclear.

24 Mr. Somers. I think we have probably run a little bit
25 over our time, so --

1 Mr. Baker. Could I have 30 seconds?

2 Mr. Somers. Yeah, we have one last question for this
3 round.

4 Mr. Baker. Correct me if I'm paraphrasing this wrong,
5 but just a little while ago, when we were talking about
6 discovering that there's inconsistencies between the source
7 network and Mr. Steele's reporting, I think you said
8 something to the effect that that would be documented and
9 put in various FBI places for people to see or become aware
10 of. How would the Department of Justice become aware of
11 the inconsistencies? And how would the DOJ also become
12 aware of this discovery of a source network rather than it
13 just be singular reporting by Mr. Steele?

14 [REDACTED] So I think what I was referencing -- I
15 think you had asked specifically in this case what had
16 occurred, and what I indicated was that the discrepancies
17 or the inconsistencies were documented in the write-ups.
18 Those write-ups were put into the FBI system of record, and
19 that is available for people on the Crossfire Hurricane
20 team.

21 With respect to how DOJ learns about that information,
22 I'm not precisely sure. I would expect -- no, I'll just
23 leave it at I'm not precisely sure.

24 Mr. Baker. But it would not be the role of you or
25 someone in the intelligence side of things to do that. Is

1 that correct?

2 [REDACTED] That's correct.

3 Mr. Baker. So I would draw from that that it's
4 someone or some entity on the investigative side of things
5 that would do that, maybe the case agent or supervisor of
6 the case agent?

7 [REDACTED] I think that's fair.

8 Mr. Baker. Thank you.

9 Mr. Somers. That's it for this round. I don't know
10 if everybody needs a short break before the minority picks
11 up again.

12 [REDACTED] I could use a short break, please.

13 Mr. Somers. Okay. We'll take 10 minutes.

14 [REDACTED] Thank you.

15 [Recess 1:58 p.m. to 2:16 p.m.]

16 Mr. Somers. We're back on the record. All right.

17 So, I think, [REDACTED] you wanted to clarify something
18 from the last round of questioning regarding the handling
19 agent's source characterization statement. If you'd like
20 to go ahead?

21 [REDACTED] Yes, thank you. So I think we were
22 discussing two separate issues. We were discussing the
23 Intelligence Memorandum that had a source characterization
24 statement, and then on the top of page 161 we were
25 discussing language that the handling agent had provided to

1 Case Agent 1 that was different than the language that was
2 in the Intelligence Memorandum. I just wanted to clarify
3 that I don't believe I ever saw the language the handling
4 agent sent to Case Agent 1 regarding that source
5 characterization. The source characterization that I
6 helped to edit in the Intelligence Memorandum came from my
7 understanding that Steele's information had predicated the
8 FIFA investigation.

9 Mr. Somers. And you further believe that you got that
10 information from Handling Agent 1. Is that correct?

11 [REDACTED] Yeah, either Handling Agent 1 or from SSA-
12 1 who received it from Handling Agent 1 --

13 Mr. Somers. Okay.

14 [REDACTED] -- regarding FIFA.

15 Mr. Somers. Does that clarify everything?

16 Mr. Linehan. Yes.

17 Mr. Somers. Okay.

18 Mr. Linehan. It was the information from the handling
19 agent but not the email that went to SSA-1, at least to the
20 best of his recollection.

21 [REDACTED] Correct.

22 Mr. Somers. Okay. Sara or Andrew, if you want to
23 start your round.

24 Mr. Fausett. Yes, thank you, Zach. We'll begin the
25 next round here at 2:18 p.m.

1 [REDACTED] thanks for your patience in this process.
2 We had a lot of questions and answers about your knowledge
3 of and interactions with the primary sub-source in the last
4 round, and so I just wanted to ask a few follow-up
5 questions for that based on your participation in his
6 interview in January of 2017 and your expertise as an FBI
7 intelligence analyst.

8 Some in the public domain have alleged that because
9 the primary sub-source was not a well-connected current or
10 former Russian official and wasn't based in Russia, the
11 information that the primary sub-source provided to Mr.
12 Steele was unreliable. Some have referred to it as -- and
13 this is a quote here -- "second- and third-hand information
14 and a rumor at best."

15 So in your experience as an intelligence analyst, can
16 information that a source obtains from someone else turn
17 out to be accurate and reliable?

18 [REDACTED] Yes.

19 Mr. Fausett. And I guess, in other words, the fact
20 that a source obtained information from someone else
21 doesn't mean that it won't turn out to be useful or that it
22 is a "rumor at best." Is that fair?

23 [REDACTED] That is fair.

24 Mr. Fausett. And is it true that where a source has
25 obtained information from other sources, it's particularly

1 important for the FBI to understand where that information
2 came from, where it originated, which in this case would
3 mean understanding the source's source network. Is that
4 correct?

5 [REDACTED] That is correct.

6 Mr. Fausett. And why is that the case?

7 [REDACTED] Again, I would say that it's a matter of
8 whether or not his sources have the accesses that they say
9 they do in order to obtain the information that they are
10 providing.

11 Mr. Fausett. And so the type of access that a source
12 has is, in fact, a particularly relevant factor in
13 evaluating the information. Correct?

14 [REDACTED] One particular relevant factor, yes.

15 Mr. Fausett. Even if the primary sub-source was not a
16 well-connected Russian official, if the information they
17 gathered from their sources could still -- would it still
18 be reliable -- or could be reliable, I should say, if
19 members of that network had access to Russian officials?

20 [REDACTED] Could be reliable, yes.

21 Mr. Fausett. And the memo that I believe you prepared
22 memorializing your January 2017 interview with the primary
23 sub-source identifies one of the primary sub-source's
24 sources -- I believe it's Source 5 -- as having "ties to
25 the Russian intelligence and security services." Would

1 someone with that background potentially have access to
2 information pertinent to an investigation of ties between
3 the Trump campaign and Russia?

4 [REDACTED] I'm not precisely sure in that case
5 whether or not that would be the case, but on a theoretical
6 level, somebody with Russian intelligence service ties
7 could have the accesses to basically help on a
8 counterintelligence investigation.

9 Mr. Fausett. Knowing that someone had ties to
10 intelligence and security services from Russia, would you
11 want to better understand that source and their access
12 because of the potential value it could have in
13 understanding the reliability of the information?

14 [REDACTED] Yes, that would be one reason to want to
15 get more understanding into that source.

16 Mr. Fausett. The memo identifies another sub-source
17 -- I think this is Source 3 -- as having "direct and
18 indirect contact with a deputy or multiple deputies in" --
19 and then the text is redacted from your memo. Presumably
20 it's referring to the Russian Government or a particular
21 Russian agency. Would someone with that kind of background
22 contact with a deputy or deputies in the Russian Government
23 or a Russian Government agency potentially have access to
24 information pertinent to an investigation of ties between
25 the Trump campaign and Russia?

1 [REDACTED] Potentially, yes.

2 Mr. Fausett. Another allegation about the primary
3 sub-source is that the information they provided was
4 unreliable because Christopher Steele paid them for it.
5 Does the fact that a source has been paid in connection
6 with providing information mean that the information is
7 unreliable?

8 [REDACTED] No.

9 Mr. Fausett. In fact, isn't it the case that the FBI
10 routinely compensates sources who provide the Bureau with
11 information?

12 [REDACTED] Yes.

13 Mr. Fausett. Executive Assistant Director Michael
14 Steinbach told us when he was interviewed by our committee
15 that -- and I'm quoting now from his transcript -- "A
16 source in almost all cases is doing it for some ulterior
17 motive, get himself out of a jam for money." Is that your
18 experience as well?

19 [REDACTED] I would say that's an accurate statement.

20 Mr. Fausett. He also told us that -- and, again, this
21 is a quote -- "With all sources you take a look at it, and
22 you apply healthy skepticism. A lot of times source
23 information is only partially correct, so you need to
24 investigate to try to develop more information to run down
25 those leads." Is that your experience as well?

1 [REDACTED] That would be my experience.

2 Mr. Fausett. And is that how you approached Mr.
3 Steele, the primary sub-source, and the primary sub-
4 source's sources, with a healthy skepticism?

5 [REDACTED] I would say that is an accurate
6 assessment.

7 Mr. Fausett. And was that part of the reason at least
8 why you interviewed the primary sub-source, to learn more
9 about the information Steele had provided and determine
10 what leads were worth investigating?

11 [REDACTED] Yes.

12 Mr. Fausett. Now, a third allegation we've heard
13 that's intended to discredit the primary sub-source that
14 came up a little bit with our colleagues is the notion that
15 he had ties to Russian intelligence, perhaps was even a
16 Russian agent providing disinformation intended to harm
17 Candidate Trump. I'm not going to ask you specific
18 questions along the lines of our colleagues, but I do want
19 to raise it as context for some more general questions that
20 I do want to ask based on your personal experience and
21 expertise.

22 It would seem to me, on the one hand, a source that
23 has ties to a foreign government or intelligence agency
24 generally can pose risks and could make the information
25 they provide less reliable. Am I right about that?

1 [REDACTED]. There is the potential.

2 Mr. Fausett. And I believe the FBI has methods for
3 assessing the reliability of its sources. I think that was
4 covered in some detail in the last round. Is that correct?

5 [REDACTED]. Correct.

6 Mr. Fausett. And you used those methods here?

7 [REDACTED]. So we look to try to verify and, as I've
8 put it, confirm and disconfirm the reporting

9 Mr. Fausett. Right. So understanding that there can
10 be potential risks with relying on a source with ties to a
11 foreign government, on the other hand, a source that has
12 ties to a foreign government or intelligence agency I would
13 think could provide some benefits. For example, the
14 information they provide could be more reliable given the
15 access that they have. Is that correct?

16 [REDACTED]. That would be correct.

17 Mr. Fausett. And the fact that a source has ties to a
18 foreign intelligence service or may even be associated with
19 a foreign intelligence service, does that necessarily mean
20 that everything the FBI receives from that source is going
21 to be disinformation?

22 [REDACTED] No.

23 Mr. Fausett. In fact, much like paying sources in
24 general, the FBI recruits and often pays members of foreign
25 intelligence services, some of whom can go on to be some of

1 the FBI's best sources. Is that correct?

2 [REDACTED]. That is correct.

3 Mr. Fausett. My colleagues asked you a number of
4 questions about inconsistencies between the primary sub-
5 source's account and Mr. Steele's account of certain
6 matters described in his election reporting. You said to
7 the Inspector General's office that you had no "pains or
8 heartburn" about the accuracy of the Steele reporting based
9 on what the primary sub-source said, and that's from page
10 244 of the Inspector General's report.]

11 You also said that the reason for the discrepancies --
12 and this is a little bit of a longer quote from page 189 --
13 that the reason for the discrepancies "was difficult to
14 discern and could be attributed to a number of factors,"
15 such as "miscommunications between Steele and the Primary
16 Sub-source, exaggerations or misrepresentations by Steele
17 about the information he obtained, or misrepresentations by
18 the Primary Sub-source and/or sub-sources when questioned
19 by the FBI about the information they conveyed to Steele or
20 the Primary Sub-source."

21 I guess my first question about this is: Is it all
22 that unusual for there to be discrepancies between a
23 source's accounting of certain acts and an accounting of
24 the same facts as provided in this case months later by a
25 sub-source? Is that all that unusual?

1 [REDACTED] I don't know if I would evaluate how
2 unusual, but it's not unusual.

3 Mr. Fausett. And those discrepancies don't
4 necessarily mean that the source's version of the sub-
5 source's assertions was wrong and that the sub-source's
6 later accounting was right. Is that a fair -- I know it's
7 tricky, but --

8 [REDACTED] Could you repeat that one more time?

9 Mr. Fausett. I know. It's a tough one. My question
10 is: The fact that there is a discrepancy between what the
11 source said and what the sub-source may have said months
12 later, that doesn't necessarily mean that the initial
13 reporting from the source was wrong or that the later
14 reporting from the primary sub-source was wrong. It could
15 be either/or. Is that right?

16 [REDACTED] It does not necessarily mean that -- yeah,
17 I mean, I would agree with that. It does not necessarily
18 mean that the first or the second would be wrong.

19 Mr. Fausett. In fact, in the summary you wrote of the
20 interview, which the Department of Justice has since
21 released with some redactions, you stated that during the
22 interviews the primary sub-source "contradicted himself
23 when asked about his contact with Russian intelligence and
24 security services," initially claiming "to have no
25 interaction with individuals in" -- and the redaction says

1 "Russia." But then, by the third interview, referring to
2 previous contacts as intelligence and referencing another
3 source's senior-level connections. Do you recall that
4 aspect of your interview with the primary sub-source?

5 [REDACTED] I do recall that.

6 Mr. Fausett. Okay. And is that -- as you sit here
7 today, that's still an accurate description of your
8 recollection of what -- how those interviews transpired?

9 [REDACTED] Yes.

10 Mr. Fausett. And to that point, you actually told the
11 Office of the Inspector General that you believed that --
12 and I'm quoting from page 192 of the report now -- "there
13 were instances where the Primary Sub-source was
14 'minimizing' certain facts" but that you "did not believe
15 that he/she 'completely fabricating' events." And I guess
16 my question is: Under the circumstances of this case and
17 given the timing of your interview with the primary sub-
18 source in January of 2017, it isn't all that surprising for
19 a sub-source to minimize certain facts for their own
20 benefit, is it?

21 [REDACTED] No, it is not uncommon.

22 Mr. Fausett. And what makes you say that? Explain
23 why that happens.

24 [REDACTED] Well, there could be any number of reasons
25 why a source might minimize. The source may worry that the

1 source has done something wrong. It could be a situation
2 in which material has come out in public and the source has
3 second thoughts or wants to set up kind of a bit of
4 distance between what he or she might have originally
5 reported and what they are telling the FBI.

6 Mr. Fausett. And in this case, at the time of your
7 interview, there were materials out in the public, is it
8 safe to say?

9 [REDACTED] That is correct.

10 Mr. Fausett. Okay. After the interview with the
11 primary sub-source, you and other members of the Crossfire
12 Hurricane team decided to interview Steele and obtain more
13 information about his sub-sources before that interview to
14 figure out whether the primary sub-source gave you the
15 accurate information or if Steele was accurate. Is that
16 fair?

17 [REDACTED] That is correct.

18 Mr. Fausett. So then is it fair to say that you were
19 committed to resolving the discrepancies between the
20 primary sub-source's account in their January 2017
21 interview and the account as related by Steele, but that it
22 was premature at the time to conclude that they warranted
23 pains or heartburn?

24 [REDACTED] I would say that is an accurate
25 characterization.

1 Mr. Fausett. There was also, I think, some mention of
2 this two-page summary of an interview that you had prepared
3 for others in the Crossfire Hurricane team. You explained
4 to the Office of the Inspector General coming out of that
5 interview that you were focused on -- and this is from page
6 244 of the Inspector General's report -- "using the
7 additional information learned from the Primary Sub-source,
8 particularly the identity of his/her sub-sources, to see
9 what other investigative leads could be generated for the
10 team."

11 Is it fair to say that that summary was not intended
12 to provide a comprehensive account of the interview but,
13 rather, reflected your focus on using the additional
14 information that you learned from the primary sub-source to
15 see what other leads could be generated for the team?

16 ██████████ The memorandum was an overarching summary
17 of the 3-day interviews, and it was not meant to be a
18 comprehensive look at all of the inconsistencies.

19 Mr. Fausett. Was your decision not to include
20 discrepancies in that two-page summary motivated by a bias
21 against the President?

22 ██████████ No.

23 Mr. Fausett. Did anyone at FBI senior leadership or
24 in your chain of command tell you to omit inconsistencies
25 between the two accounts in your written report or to

1 overlook them in general?

2 [REDACTED] No.

3 Mr. Fausett. And, in fact, the summary was actually
4 internal in purpose, right? It was intended for your own
5 team and leadership to have, as you said, a basic
6 understanding of what happened in summary?

7 [REDACTED] That is correct.

8 Mr. Fausett. While we're on the topic of sources, the
9 Inspector General's report noted -- and I'll just quote
10 here for a little bit from page 308 of the report -- "The
11 agents, analysts, and supervisors who worked on Crossfire
12 Hurricane" said that confidential human sources "played an
13 important role in the investigation." Jonathan Moffa, for
14 example, said that confidential human sources are "one of
15 the best avenues to potentially get some meat on the bones
16 of the allegation that came through that started [Crossfire
17 Hurricane], to get somebody talking about what that reality
18 was, even if the reality was, this guy Papadopoulos knows
19 nothing or...this is what happened that actually explains
20 that predication.... [I]t was one of those few
21 avenues...available to us in that moment, where you could
22 start to get some clarity around...that initial predicating
23 allegation."

24 Is it fair to say that the purpose of the FBI's use of
25 confidential human sources in Crossfire Hurricane was to

1 determine the veracity of the allegations that the Trump
2 campaign was involved in Russia's ongoing election
3 interference efforts?

4 [REDACTED] The purpose of using CHSs was to determine
5 the veracity of the information that had come from the
6 friendly foreign government and that had predicated the
7 Crossfire Hurricane investigations.

8 Mr. Fausett. And I think similar to what you actually
9 stated to our colleagues, but just to be clear about this,
10 with respect to the confidential human sources and with
11 respect to the information that you were obtaining in
12 general, your purpose was to either corroborate or dispel
13 the allegations that had been made. Is that correct?

14 [REDACTED] That is correct.

15 Mr. Fausett. Beyond Crossfire Hurricane, have you
16 found confidential human sources to be a valuable tool for
17 corroborating or dispelling allegations during the course
18 of your work more broadly?

19 [REDACTED] Yes.

20 Mr. Fausett. Is it fair to say that, in your
21 experience and generally speaking, confidential human
22 sources play an important role in the work investigating
23 and understanding national security threats?

24 [REDACTED] Yes.

25 Mr. Fausett. Now, I have always understood sources

1 and methods to be things that the FBI vigorously protects.

2 Is that correct in your experience?

3 [REDACTED] Yes.

4 Mr. Fausett. And why is it important to protect your
5 sources?

6 [REDACTED] Because sources can be burned, sources can
7 run into difficulties, sources can lose access. Any number
8 of things.

9 Mr. Fausett. Well, what are the risks generally of
10 publicly disclosing the identity of a source?

11 [REDACTED] Well, the source can't operate any longer.

12 Mr. Fausett. And are there additional risks, are
13 there additional potential risks to the sources themselves?

14 [REDACTED] There can be, yes.

15 Mr. Fausett. What kinds of risks?

16 [REDACTED] There can be physical risks.

17 Mr. Fausett. And would there be a special concern
18 about physical risks when you're talking about a source or
19 number of sources who have connections to the Russian
20 Government or Russian intelligence services?

21 [REDACTED] There can be physical risks to that, yes.

22 Mr. Fausett. Would you say that it's a heightened
23 concern with respect to Russia or the same as it would be
24 for any government or intelligence service?

25 [REDACTED] I would say elevated.

1 Mr. Fausett. And what's your basis for saying that?

2 [REDACTED] I mean, the Russian Government -- there
3 are any number of news articles that have come out recently
4 regarding how the Russian Government handles internal
5 dissidents and handles individuals who have crossed the
6 administration in Russia.

7 Mr. Fausett. Okay. Does exposing a source's identity
8 impact the FBI's ability to recruit other sources?

9 [REDACTED] It can, yes.

10 Mr. Fausett. And I imagine that would be a particular
11 concern if, again, there is a heightened risk of physical
12 harm to the source arising from the disclosure?

13 [REDACTED] Yes.

14 Mr. Fausett. In situations where a source whose
15 identity is publicly exposed is still a current source for
16 the FBI, in your experience, does disclosing that source's
17 identity make it less likely that the source will continue
18 cooperating?

19 [REDACTED] I think it makes it more difficult for the
20 source to continue cooperating.

21 Mr. Fausett. And is that for the reasons we discussed
22 prior, or are there additional reasons why it would make it
23 difficult?

24 [REDACTED] I think just generally public exposure of
25 a source makes it difficult for that source to continue

1 operating in a confidential way, which is the basis of why
2 we call them "confidential human sources."

3 Mr. Fausett. Are you aware that the Department of
4 Justice declassified the FBI's memo summarizing a January
5 2017 interview with Mr. Steele's primary sub-source, an
6 interview you participated in, and that shortly after this
7 memo was posted on our committee's website, a blogger
8 deduced and Russia Today widely publicized the primary sub-
9 source's identity?

10 [REDACTED] I'm aware of that.

11 Mr. Fausett. And do you recall during your interview
12 with the primary sub-source that they said unless their
13 name goes public, they're fine when it comes to the source
14 network, they don't believe they can travel, but feels that
15 it would be in danger, as he put it, and then it's redacted
16 after that. Do you remember that back-and-forth with the
17 primary sub-source?

18 [REDACTED] Can you repeat that? I'm sorry.

19 Mr. Fausett. Yes. The statement, I'll read you the
20 exact quote, and this is quoting from your long summary of
21 the interview on page 42. "Unless his name goes public, he
22 is fine when it comes to his source network. He doesn't
23 believe he can travel [redacted] he feels that he would be
24 in danger, and as he put it, [redacted]."

25 [REDACTED] I recall that.

1 Mr. Fausett. What are the possible consequences in
2 this case of exposing the primary sub-source's identity?

3 [REDACTED] I'd like to talk to the FBI attorney for a
4 moment, please.

5 Mr. Fausett. Of course.

6 [Witness confers with counsel.]

7 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] back. I wanted to clarify one
8 point. I am aware of the article that came out regarding
9 the primary sub-source. I am not confirming the accuracy
10 of that article.

11 Mr. Fausett. Understood.

12 [REDACTED] And the second thing is I don't think -- I
13 think it's unwise to actually speculate whether or not --
14 the kind of dangers to the primary sub-source.

15 Mr. Fausett. Okay.

16 Ms. Zdeb. Could I just jump in before we leave the
17 topic of sources and the primary sub-source? Again,
18 appreciating the reasons why you may not want to speculate
19 about certain aspects of this issue. You said a moment ago
20 that if a particular source whose identity is exposed is a
21 current source for the FBI, that publicly disclosing their
22 identity could make it more difficult for that source to
23 continue cooperating with the Bureau.

24 If a source whose identity is exposed is similarly
25 situated to the primary sub-source in the sense that they

1 have their own network of sources that are providing
2 information to them, is one consequence of publicly
3 exposing the identity of that primary source that his or
4 her own source network would then know that the information
5 they are providing is being provided to the United States
6 Government such that they might then become more reluctant
7 to continue providing information to that source who has
8 been exposed?

9 [REDACTED] That is one potential consequence.

10 Ms. Zdeb. And you spoke some earlier about the
11 efforts that the FBI undertook in this case specifically
12 and might undertake in general in a case where you're
13 dealing with a source network to identify the different
14 members of that source network in an effort to run down
15 information and assess its reliability. We've heard from
16 other witnesses that, as part of that process, the FBI
17 might, in the same way you did with the primary sub-source
18 here, try to recruit and speak directly to the individual
19 members of that source's own source network. Is that
20 consistent with your experience?

21 [REDACTED] Yes, that is consistent.

22 Ms. Zdeb. And so, again, if we're talking about the
23 situation in which the identity of the source is exposed
24 and that source has his own source network, if the FBI has
25 been trying to identify and cultivate relationships with

1 individuals in that source network, I would imagine the
2 FBI's job would be made more difficult if the identity of
3 the primary source is exposed.

4 [REDACTED] I would agree with that.

5 Ms. Zdeb. And this may be getting into another area
6 where you don't wish to speculate, but I will just ask you
7 anyway. Are you aware that yesterday the Wall Street
8 Journal published an article purporting to identify the
9 individual who is called "Source 3" in Christopher Steele's
10 reporting?

11 [REDACTED] I'm aware of that news article.

12 Ms. Zdeb. And so to the extent the public disclosure
13 of a source can place that source at risk, can deter the
14 FBI from recruiting future sources, and can make it more
15 difficult for the FBI to develop or retain a relationship
16 with that specific source, would those risks be present in
17 this case with respect to Source 3 if, in fact, Source 3
18 were publicly identified?

19 [REDACTED] I think I'd prefer not to address that
20 specific hypothetical in this situation.

21 Ms. Zdeb. Fair enough.

22 Mr. Fausett. I would just ask one quick follow-up on
23 that, and I apologize if my colleague asked it while I was
24 distracted. But, hypothetically speaking, generally
25 speaking, not specific to this case, if an individual is

1 publicly identified as a source, even if they are not
2 actually the source, can there be -- in your experience,
3 are there harms that might befall the person identified in
4 that manner?

5 [REDACTED] Potential harms, yes.

6 Mr. Fausett. And what would some of those potential
7 harms be for that source?

8 [REDACTED] In a hypothetical, it depends on the
9 situation. So there can be reputational harms. There can
10 be financial harms. There could even be physical harms,
11 depending on the scenario.

12 Mr. Fausett. Okay. I want to sort of broaden out
13 from the primary sub-source to the topic of the Steele
14 dossier generally and just follow up with some of the
15 questions that our colleagues asked you earlier.

16 The first thing I want to do is to just put Mr.
17 Steele's election reporting in some context. Crossfire
18 Hurricane, as we've all heard, was opened on July 31, 2016.
19 The Inspector General determined that the Crossfire
20 Hurricane team didn't even become aware of Steele's
21 reporting until September 19th and that "the Steele dossier
22 played no role in the opening of Crossfire Hurricane."

23 Are you aware of any evidence that disputes that
24 finding from the Inspector General?

25 [REDACTED] No.

1 Mr. Fausett. Inspector General Horowitz testified to
2 our committee last December that the Carter Page FISA
3 warrant application errors relating to Christopher Steele
4 did not call into question "any part of the Special
5 Counsel's report." As someone who is in the unique
6 position of working in both the Crossfire Hurricane team
7 and supporting the Special Counsel's office, are you aware
8 of any evidence that disputes Inspector General Horowitz's
9 testimony that the Carter Page FISA warrant application
10 errors do not call into question any part of Special
11 Counsel Mueller's report?

12 [REDACTED] No, I am not aware of any evidence
13 contradicting that.

14 Mr. Fausett. Similarly, former Deputy Attorney
15 General Rod Rosenstein, who supervised the Special
16 Counsel's investigation, testified before our committee in
17 June. Senator Feinstein asked him to identify which
18 findings in Special Counsel Mueller's 448-page report
19 relied on information from the Steele dossier. Mr.
20 Rosenstein said, "I don't believe there is any such
21 information."

22 Do you have any evidence that contradicts Deputy
23 Attorney General Rosenstein's testimony that no findings in
24 the 448-page Mueller report rely on the Steele dossier?

25 [REDACTED] No, I have no evidence.

1 Mr. Fausett. Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein also
2 testified that none of the 199 criminal counts resulting
3 from the Special Counsel's investigation relied on
4 information obtained from Mr. Steele. Do you have any
5 basis to disagree with Mr. Rosenstein's statement?

6 [REDACTED] No, I have no basis to disagree with that.

7 Mr. Fausett. Okay. Just to be clear about what we're
8 saying here, you don't have any evidence or reason to
9 believe that Special Counsel Mueller or his team relied on
10 the Steele dossier for any of the 199 criminal counts their
11 office charged. Is that right?

12 [REDACTED] That is correct.

13 Mr. Fausett. You talked a little bit earlier with our
14 colleagues about the Validation Management Unit at the FBI
15 and the unit chief's conclusion reflected at pages 185 and
16 186 of the Inspector General's report that Mr. Steele's
17 election reporting had not been corroborated in the main.
18 You took issue with this characterization and told the
19 Office of the Inspector General that there's a distinction
20 between allegations and facts and that it would not be
21 appropriate to characterize all the factual information in
22 Steele's reports as uncorroborated. And I think I heard
23 you mention sort of the difference in your head between
24 facts and allegations in response to some our colleagues'
25 questions earlier, but I really want to give you a chance

1 to kind of clarify this point.

2 Can you elaborate? What is the difference between
3 allegations and facts and what could or could not or has or
4 has not been corroborated with respect to Mr. Steele?

5 [REDACTED] So with respect to the Steele reporting,
6 the Steele reporting details any number of allegations of
7 involvement of certain figures in certain actions and then
8 talks about interactions with Russian Government officials.
9 It talks about interactions in different areas. It talks
10 about personnel and individuals in Russian entities in
11 different countries. So the distinction I would make would
12 be that many of the individuals noted, not all of which
13 would be very well known in open sources, are mentioned in
14 a number of Steele reports, and the distinction between
15 facts and allegations would be many of the names, entities,
16 individuals, individual positions could be corroborated,
17 but the actual allegations and the actions described in
18 those reports could not be corroborated.

19 Mr. Fausett. If I'm hearing you correctly -- and I
20 want you to please correct me if I'm paraphrasing you
21 wrong.

22 [REDACTED] Okay.

23 Mr. Fausett. But it sounds like you're saying those
24 facts in Mr. Steele's reporting that could be corroborated
25 through normal factual research, checking with other

1 agencies, checking with your holdings, et cetera, they were
2 corroborated. The more complex, in some cases subjective
3 allegations in the reporting that frankly are more
4 difficult to corroborate, that's where there was no
5 corroboration generally. Is that a fair --

6 [REDACTED] I'm not sure I would describe it as the
7 more subjective aspects or elements. I think what I would
8 say is we were able to corroborate a great deal of the,
9 again, Russian names, Russian positions, some of which were
10 not very well known in open sources, some of which I'm not
11 sure were in open sources, many of the -- the kind of
12 context, but in terms of the core allegations of many of
13 the reports, we were not able to corroborate, many of the
14 core allegations, I would say.

15 Mr. Fausett. And would you say that many of those
16 allegations would be difficult to corroborate in general?

17 [REDACTED] Yes, absent, I think, probably very good
18 sources.

19 Mr. Fausett. Okay. You were also asked about a
20 December 2016 meeting that you and other FBI officials had
21 with professional contacts of Mr. Steele. Notes taken by
22 Bill Priestap and Peter Strzok suggest that these contacts
23 provided some negative feedback about Steele, including
24 poor judgment and pursuing people with political risk but
25 no intel value. And this is coming from, again, the

1 Inspector General's report. You also talked a little bit
2 at a separate meeting you did not attend involving Bruce
3 Ohr where Mr. Ohr reportedly said that "Steele was
4 desperate that Donald Trump not get elected and was
5 passionate about him not being the U.S. President."

6 I just want to be clear about this. Do a source's
7 motivations or biases automatically render any information
8 they provide false, not credible, or unreliable?

9 [REDACTED] No.

10 Mr. Fausett. In fact, you told the Office of the
11 Inspector General that whether Steele's reporting -- I'm
12 quoting now from page 102 -- "whether [Steele's] reporting
13 was 'opposition research' that was politically motivated
14 was not an issue" -- that's an accurate quote?

15 [REDACTED] That is an accurate quote.

16 Mr. Fausett. And that's because you would want to
17 independently -- and I'll quote you again -- "vet the
18 reporting to determine whether its contents were accurate."
19 Is that correct?

20 [REDACTED] That is correct.

21 Mr. Fausett. What impact would the inability for the
22 FBI to rely on any source who has demonstrated a motivation
23 or bias have on the FBI's ability to do its work?

24 [REDACTED] It would be very difficult for the FBI to
25 do its work.

1 Mr. Fausett. And why is that?

2 [REDACTED] Because all sources have different forms
3 of bias.

4 Mr. Fausett. Okay. When the Office of the Inspector
5 General asked Mr. Steele about the "desperate" comment from
6 Mr. Ohr, Mr. Steele said that he "was concerned that Trump
7 was a national security risk, and...had no particular
8 animus against Trump otherwise." That's coming from page
9 94 of the report. Do you have any basis to dispute Mr.
10 Steele's characterization of his own words?

11 [REDACTED] I don't have any basis to dispute Mr.
12 Steele's characterization of his own motives.

13 Mr. Fausett. Okay. I do just want to briefly touch
14 upon this footnote that came up, Footnote 350 from the
15 Horowitz report, which initially was redacted, it was
16 subsequently unredacted, and this has led to some
17 assertions in the public sphere that the contents of the
18 Steele reporting may have been, at least in part, the
19 product of a disinformation campaign by the Russian
20 intelligence services. There are also, frankly, some
21 statements in the public sphere about you -- not by name,
22 obviously, but by position title -- I think at one point
23 labeling you as "indifferent" to that threat and providing
24 a grossly inaccurate statement to the Office of the
25 Inspector General concerning your awareness of that threat.

1 So I really just want to give you an opportunity to
2 clarify. What did you mean when you spoke to the Office of
3 the Inspector General about the concern that the Russian
4 intelligence services may have penetrated the campaign?
5 You had said -- it's quoted in the report in Footnote 342
6 that you had no information as of June 2017 that Steele's
7 election reporting network had been penetrated or
8 compromised. I just want to give you a second to explain.
9 What did you mean, and what was your awareness of this
10 threat generally?

11 ██████████ So I think I'm going to just let that
12 statement stand as it is.

13 Mr. Fausett. Okay. All right. More generally, on
14 the question of the motivations for the Crossfire Hurricane
15 investigation and the team and its members, our committee
16 held a 6-hour hearing with Inspector General Horowitz last
17 December. A number of allegations were made against the
18 FBI during that hearing and subsequently repeated at other
19 hearings and meetings of the committee. We believe these
20 allegations have been investigated and answered by the
21 Inspector General in his report, but I'm going to ask you a
22 few questions about them because we continue to hear these
23 allegations from people who don't have firsthand knowledge
24 or evidence about Crossfire Hurricane.

25 The Inspector General found that there was no

1 documentary or testimonial evidence of bias impacting the
2 FBI's work in the Crossfire Hurricane investigation.
3 Nevertheless, there have been allegations that there was
4 "tons of evidence of bias." So I want to ask you, did
5 political bias impact any of your actions in connection
6 with Crossfire Hurricane?

7 [REDACTED] No.

8 Mr. Fausett. Do you have any evidence that political
9 bias otherwise impacted the FBI's work in Crossfire
10 Hurricane?

11 [REDACTED] No.

12 Mr. Fausett. It's been alleged that the FBI engaged
13 in a "massive criminal conspiracy over time to defraud the
14 FISA Court." Do you have any evidence that the FBI engaged
15 in a "massive criminal conspiracy over time to defraud the
16 FISA Court"?

17 [REDACTED] No.

18 Mr. Fausett. It's also been alleged that the FBI
19 "purposely used the power of the Federal Government to wage
20 a political war against a Presidential candidate they
21 despised." Do you have any evidence that FBI agents
22 purposely used the power of the Federal Government to wage
23 a political war against then-Candidate Donald Trump?

24 [REDACTED] No.

25 Mr. Fausett. Do you have any evidence that the FBI

1 wanted to attempt a coup against President Trump?

2 [REDACTED] No.

3 Mr. Fausett. Some people have asserted that the
4 Crossfire Hurricane investigation was a hoax or a witch
5 hunt intended to hurt President Trump politically. Was it
6 your goal to hurt President Trump politically?

7 [REDACTED] No.

8 Mr. Fausett. Do you have any basis for believing that
9 Crossfire Hurricane was part of a "deep state" effort to
10 take down President Trump?

11 [REDACTED] No.

12 Mr. Fausett. There have also been allegations, even
13 more, that the purpose of the Crossfire Hurricane
14 investigation was to change or nullify the results of the
15 2016 election. Was that your goal personally?

16 [REDACTED] No.

17 Mr. Fausett. Do you have any evidence that the
18 overall goal of Crossfire Hurricane was to change or
19 nullify the results of the 2016 election?

20 [REDACTED] No.

21 Mr. Fausett. When you joined the Crossfire Hurricane
22 team at the beginning of August, did you have a
23 predetermined outcome in mind for the investigation?

24 [REDACTED] No.

25 Mr. Fausett. Throughout your time on the Crossfire

1 Hurricane team, did you ever get the sense that other
2 members of the team had a predetermined outcome in mind?

3 [REDACTED] No.

4 Mr. Fausett. From your perspective, having served on
5 its entire duration, what was the goal of Crossfire
6 Hurricane?

7 [REDACTED] It was -- the goal of Crossfire Hurricane
8 was to determine whether or not the truth of the foreign
9 friendly government information was accurate.

10 Mr. Fausett. The Inspector General's report documents
11 several steps that the FBI took to ensure that the
12 Crossfire Hurricane counterintelligence investigation did
13 not impact the 2016 election. I'll quote the report here
14 from page 308: "...multiple witnesses told the OIG that
15 they were very concerned about preventing leaks regarding
16 the nature and existence of the Crossfire Hurricane
17 investigation."

18 Why was it so important to keep the nature and
19 existence of the investigation private?

20 [REDACTED] Because we didn't want the investigation
21 to impact the election.

22 Mr. Fausett. In its report on the midyear exam
23 investigation, the Office of the Inspector General
24 recommended that, "The Department consider providing
25 guidance to agents and prosecutors concerning the taking of

1 overt investigative steps, indictments, public
2 announcements, or other actions that could impact an
3 election."

4 Now, there was no formal guidance to that effect, at
5 least to our knowledge, while you were working on Crossfire
6 Hurricane. But the Crossfire Hurricane team nevertheless
7 took steps to avoid actions that could impact the 2016
8 election. Is that correct?

9 [REDACTED] I'd have to go back and take a look at --
10 I'm unclear about what you mean exactly there.

11 Mr. Fausett. Well, let me just ask it in a more open-
12 ended way. In your experience, did the Crossfire Hurricane
13 team take any steps to make sure that they did not affect
14 the 2016 election?

15 [REDACTED] We were very cognizant about not taking
16 steps to interfere in the election or taking steps that
17 would interfere in the election.

18 Mr. Fausett. And an open-ended yes or no question.
19 Were there any steps that you took that you would not have
20 ordinarily taken in a run-of-the-mill investigation,
21 whether national security or criminal, that you took in
22 connection with this investigation because of the
23 sensitivity of the investigation?

24 [REDACTED] Not to my recollection.

25 Mr. Fausett. Okay. The existence of Crossfire

1 Hurricane remained private until months after the election
2 when, in March 2017, FBI Director Comey disclosed it to
3 Congress. So the steps that you and members of the team
4 did take to keep the existence of Crossfire Hurricane a
5 secret from July 2016 to March 2017 were successful, were
6 they not?

7 [REDACTED] I'd like to talk to FBI counsel for just
8 one moment, please.

9 Mr. Fausett. Sure.

10 [Witness confers with counsel.]

11 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] back. I wanted to make a
12 point that your use of the term "you" in there, you know,
13 there are steps that can be made that I am not involved in
14 and was not a decisionmaker in or things of that sort. So
15 I just want to be clear, when you're asking "you," I can
16 speak to my own experience and my own observations and
17 things of that, but I'm not -- I can't speak on behalf of
18 the entire Crossfire Hurricane team, and I can't speak on
19 behalf of the entire FBI for that.

20 Mr. Fausett. Sure. Just to simplify this a little
21 bit, as just a basic factual matter, I think we all agree,
22 but I want to make sure that you agree, that Crossfire
23 Hurricane was not publicly disclosed until March of 2017.
24 Is that right?

25 [REDACTED] That is correct.

1 Mr. Fausett. And were you aware of any leaks of
2 Crossfire Hurricane's existence broadly before that point
3 in time?

4 [REDACTED] No.

5 Mr. Fausett. Okay. If the existence of the
6 investigation had been publicly known before the election,
7 might that have harmed President Trump's campaign in some
8 way?

9 [REDACTED] It potentially could have harmed the
10 election, yes.

11 Mr. Fausett. Could it have made it less likely that
12 President Trump would have won the election?

13 [REDACTED] I don't know if I'm going to speculate on
14 that or not.

15 Mr. Fausett. Do you think if a member of the
16 Crossfire Hurricane team had been conspiring to prevent
17 then-Candidate Trump from being elected, they could have
18 publicized the existence of the investigation if they
19 wanted to?

20 [REDACTED] I'm not going to speculate on that either.

21 Mr. Fausett. Okay. Is it fair to say that the
22 Crossfire Hurricane team sought to avoid doing anything
23 that could be construed, either then or now, as being
24 political?

25 [REDACTED] One more time with that question, please?

1 Mr. Fausett. Sure. Is it fair to say that the
2 Crossfire Hurricane team sought to avoid doing anything
3 that could be construed, then or now, as being political?

4 [REDACTED] I believe that is fair, yes.

5 Mr. Fausett. And why was that important for the
6 Crossfire Hurricane team to do?

7 [REDACTED] The Crossfire Hurricane team had a job to
8 do, and public revelation of that job would make it more
9 difficult for us to do that job.

10 Mr. Fausett. Okay. I think, Sara, one last -- if you
11 have anything, but I think we're done with this round. So
12 thank you.

13 [No response.]

14 Mr. Fausett. Zach, do you want to move ahead or take
15 a break?

16 Mr. Somers. Why don't we take 5 minutes and then come
17 back?

18 [Recess at 3:05 p.m. to 3:20 p.m.]

19 Mr. Somers. Okay. Let's start up here again. It is
20 3:20. We'll start with what will hopefully be our final
21 round or at least full round of questioning.

22 [REDACTED] when we left off last round, you got a
23 number of questions from the minority about the primary
24 sub-source, but I'm going to have to take you back to the
25 primary sub-source a little bit because of where we left

1 off when we ran out of time in the previous round.

2 On Roman v of the IG report, it states that, "Steele
3 himself was not the originating source of any of the
4 factual information in his reporting. Steele instead
5 relied on a Primary Sub-source for information, who used
6 his/her network of sub-sources to gather information that
7 was then passed to Steele."

8 Do you agree with that characterization on Roman v of
9 the introduction to the IG report?

10 [REDACTED] I agree with that characterization.

11 Mr. Somers. So I think in a previous round with the
12 minority you talked a little bit about, you know, whether
13 it mattered or how much it mattered there were differences
14 between what Steele reported in his dossier and what the
15 primary sub-source actually had to say when the FBI
16 eventually interviewed him numerous times. And I guess my
17 question is: Given that you agree -- I can understand,
18 obviously, sometimes there's differences between what
19 sources and sub-sources may report, and sometimes those may
20 be insignificant, sometimes they may be significant. But I
21 would think that given that Steele was not the originating
22 source of any of the factual information in his reporting,
23 would you agree that maybe in this case the importance of
24 those differences was actually important, the significance
25 of those differences was actually important?

1 ██████████ I don't think I'm saying that the
2 significance of the differences wasn't important. I guess
3 what I'm saying is that you have discrepancies that have to
4 be figured out and noted, and the fact is that talking to
5 the primary sub-source, there were differences and there
6 were distinctions and there were discrepancies that were
7 documented in that interview and that needed to be
8 resolved.

9 I wouldn't say it necessarily, you know, negated
10 Steele's reporting, but it just meant that there were
11 things that then needed to be investigated, and there were
12 things that needed to be resolved.

13 Mr. Somers. But if Steele had a bunch of sources
14 versus going the way he did his operation through the
15 primary sub-source, I would think discrepancies may be more
16 understandable than they are in this case where the primary
17 sub-source was the originating source of the factual
18 information in Steele's reporting.

19 ██████████ So I think as I described in the IG
20 report, the discrepancies noted could be any number of
21 levels. You could have a discrepancy between what the
22 primary source told Steele and what Steele reported. You
23 could have a discrepancy between what the sub-source told
24 the primary sub-source and what was told to Steele.
25 There's any number of levels of where those discrepancies

1 are, and so in that sense, what you have to do is determine
2 the best you can as to where those discrepancies might be
3 and to determine how to resolve those discrepancies.

4 Mr. Somers. Okay. Let me ask a similar question. On
5 page 133 of the IG report -- it's actually a question that
6 the OI attorney asked the case agent, but I'd like to kind
7 of ask it to you. And the OI attorney on September 30,
8 2016, in an email asked the case agent and the Crossfire
9 Hurricane team, "If the reporting is being made by a
10 primary source, but based on sub-sources, why is it
11 reliable -- even though second/third hand?" What's your
12 answer to that question, especially in the September 30th
13 time frame?

14 [REDACTED] I guess I would answer to the extent of
15 reliability, you're looking at two aspects of reliability
16 there, is what I would think of. One aspect of reliability
17 is: What types of reporting has Christopher Steele given
18 in the past and what of this source has been used in the
19 past, if any? And I guess the second question you would
20 ask is: What can be in a short amount of time -- given the
21 time frame that you're talking about here, what in a short
22 amount of time can be vetted -- and, again, going back to
23 my distinction between facts and allegations -- to
24 determine whether there's something reliable or whether the
25 reporting's reliable?

1 Mr. Somers. So what did you learn about Christopher
2 Steele's previous reporting? I mean, is it just what you
3 got from the handling agent?

4 [REDACTED] Yes. At that time, yes.

5 Mr. Somers. So what if in the previous reporting
6 Christopher Steele didn't use a primary sub-source? What
7 if he was out talking to sources on his own? Isn't that
8 almost a completely different scenario?

9 [REDACTED] Maybe a slightly different scenario, yes.

10 Mr. Somers. Okay. So I'm wondering, like how much --
11 you know, who did you talk to to understand what
12 Christopher Steele's previous reporting to the FBI was?

13 [REDACTED] So, again, I wasn't focused on Christopher
14 Steele's previous reporting to the FBI during this time. I
15 was focused on vetting this reporting.

16 Mr. Somers. But you said part of vetting that
17 reporting was understanding his reliability to the FBI and
18 previous reporting?

19 [REDACTED] I said that's one angle of reliability
20 that one could use, yes.

21 Mr. Somers. So you didn't --

22 [REDACTED] In this case -- in this case, we were more
23 focused on the character of this reporting and trying to
24 confirm and disconfirm this reporting.

25 Mr. Somers. Okay. So other than talking to the

1 handling agent, you didn't do anything to look into
2 Christopher Steele's previous reporting to the FBI?

3 [REDACTED] At that point, yes, that is correct.

4 Mr. Somers. So you get the Steele reporting on
5 September 19 of 2016, and at some point prior to January
6 24th of 2017 you identify, locate, and interview the
7 primary sub-source. Do you know why it took so long to
8 identify, locate, and interview the primary sub-source?

9 [REDACTED] Actually, I might characterize that as a
10 very short amount of time to identify an unidentified
11 primary sub-source. I don't necessarily agree with -- I
12 don't agree with your characterization of it took a long
13 time.

14 Mr. Somers. Okay. That's fair. There were -- by
15 January 24th, two FISA applications had been submitted. Is
16 that correct?

17 [REDACTED] That is correct.

18 Mr. Somers. Okay. Prior to identifying and
19 interviewing the primary sub-source, did you believe he was
20 Russian-based, as is stated in the FISA applications?

21 [REDACTED] I believed he was Russian-based up until
22 we had an identification -- once the identification was
23 strong yet tentative, I knew that he -- if it was the
24 person and we confirmed it was the person, it wouldn't be a
25 Russian-based source. And when we were able to actually

1 confirm that it was the person, we knew it wasn't a
2 Russian-based source.

3 Mr. Somers. Is that January 2017 when you were able
4 to actually confirm?

5 [REDACTED] Correct.

6 Mr. Baker. Would that have triggered any interest in
7 going back and looking at prior Steele reporting when
8 something that maybe wasn't specifically asserted, but
9 there was certainly an allusion given that it was a
10 foreign-based reporting. Would that have -- when it was
11 learned that that's not -- and we've heard from previous
12 witnesses that there was sort of a surprise and maybe shock
13 -- maybe that's my word -- of what and where information
14 was really coming from, would that have triggered any need
15 or interest in going back to look at previous Steele
16 reporting?

17 [REDACTED] I don't know necessarily if that in
18 particular would have triggered a need. I knew we went
19 back and looked at previous Steele reporting probably
20 around -- I think I looked at the Delta file in the
21 November time frame. But I don't recall that this
22 particular identification of a sub-source precipitated the
23 feeling like we needed to go back and look at Steele's
24 previous reporting.

25 Mr. Baker. So in the last round, our Democratic

1 colleagues went through a list of things, one of which --
2 and I'm paraphrasing; correct me if I've got it wrong --
3 was the idea, the concept, the fact that just because a
4 source might have a contact or an affiliation with a
5 foreign intelligence service -- and I'm thinking this might
6 be similar in the criminal world. Just because a source
7 has some contact with a criminal or a criminal enterprise
8 doesn't necessarily mean that the information they're
9 giving is incorrect or should be disregarded. Is that
10 correct?

11 [REDACTED] I would say that's correct.

12 Mr. Baker. In this particular instance, once the
13 identity of this primary sub-source is known, was there
14 anything subsequently learned that would cause questions
15 about what the accuracy of that information might be?

16 [REDACTED] On the basis of the sub-source's identity?

17 Mr. Baker. Yes.

18 [REDACTED] I don't recall anything kind of raising to
19 the concerns that this was fabricated or anything of that
20 sort on the basis of who we had identified the sub-source
21 to be.

22 Mr. Baker. So there was nothing considered that even
23 presented the possibility that any information coming from
24 this individual could be part of a disinformation campaign?

25 [REDACTED] So I would say --

1 Mr. Heberling. Can I just interject here? I just
2 want to make sure -- you're speaking sort of broadly. This
3 is Brian Heberling. [REDACTED] answers here are
4 qualified by the conversation we had previously. He's not
5 going to get into anything -- into any prior investigation
6 or other information like that.

7 Mr. Baker. Okay.

8 Mr. Somers. Going back to this -- well, I think some
9 of our other witnesses might have been -- I'll use the word
10 "surprised." Art used the word "shocked." Were you
11 surprised that the primary sub-source was based in the
12 United States?

13 [REDACTED] I don't remember being shocked. It was
14 unexpected, but I don't think I would characterize it as
15 "shocked."

16 Mr. Somers. Okay.

17 Ms. Zdeb. If I could briefly interject for the
18 record, I think Mr. Baker was maybe taking a few liberties
19 with the prior witnesses' testimony. None of the prior
20 witnesses have used the word "shocked" to describe their
21 reaction. I just wanted to clarify that for the record.

22 Mr. Somers. Sure. So once you learned the primary
23 sub-source is U.S.-based, the FISA applications all say
24 that he's Russian-based. Do you think that should have
25 been corrected with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance

1 Court?

2 [REDACTED] Again, I don't -- I am not involved in the
3 probable cause analysis of FISAs, and I don't write FISA
4 applications. That would be on the investigative and
5 operational side.

6 Mr. Somers. I thought I read somewhere -- I don't
7 have it at my fingertips here -- that you actually raised
8 this issue, though, with, I believe, either OGC or the OI
9 attorney and questioned whether that should be changed.

10 [REDACTED] I believe you're referring to the March
11 email I had with the OGC attorney when I was reviewing the
12 initiation as well as the first renewal for potential
13 release to Congress, and we were evaluating what could be -
14 - what needed to be redacted and what could be left
15 unredacted. And in that email, I noted to the OGC attorney
16 that there was still the line of Russian-based in that and
17 wondered if that needed to be changed.

18 Mr. Somers. And what response did you get back?

19 [REDACTED] I did not get a response back.

20 Mr. Somers. Did you understand that at least at some
21 point in time -- maybe it was after the interview, maybe it
22 was before -- that the primary sub-source had some sort of
23 contractual or some sort of employee-employer relationship
24 with Christopher Steele or Orbis Business Intelligence?

25 [REDACTED] I believe that came up during the

1 interview itself.

2 Mr. Somers. Do you believe that should have been
3 disclosed to the FISC?

4 [REDACTED] Again, that's not -- I'm not the one who
5 evaluates what needs to be disclosed to the FISC and what
6 doesn't need to be disclosed to the FISC.

7 Mr. Somers. What was your role in writing the -- what
8 we have is a 57-page summary of your 3-day -- the FBI's 3-
9 day interview with the primary sub-source. What was your
10 role in writing that summary?

11 [REDACTED] I was the primary writer.

12 Mr. Somers. And was that summary written as -- was it
13 a compilation of 302s put into one document, or was it
14 written that way as a 57-page --

15 [REDACTED] It was written that way. Excuse me. I
16 need to speak to the FBI attorney one moment.

17 Mr. Somers. Sure.

18 [Witness confers with counsel.]

19 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] back. Could you repeat the
20 question, please?

21 Mr. Somers. Yes. I think what I was asking you was
22 whether the 57-page summary was sort of an original
23 document or whether it was put together based on 302s of
24 the interview with the primary sub-source.

25 [REDACTED] It was not based on 302s, no.

1 Mr. Somers. Were there 302s separate from the 57-page
2 summary of that interview?

3 [REDACTED] So there were drafts that were put
4 together that were shared with the case agent, and then
5 from that I compiled the full document and sent that to the
6 case agent, and the case agent uploaded it to our system of
7 record.

8 Mr. Somers. Okay. The input -- so you drafted it.
9 You sent it to the case agent for his review. Is that
10 correct?

11 [REDACTED] Correct.

12 Mr. Somers. Was his review -- was that all done
13 electronically, by email, or by making edits? Or did you
14 guys have conversations about it?

15 [REDACTED] I think my recollection was via email. I
16 don't recall there were many edits going on back and forth.

17 Mr. Somers. Okay. Did you discuss the interview with
18 the case agent after it took place?

19 [REDACTED] I don't recall extensive conversations
20 about it, but I'm sure we did.

21 Mr. Somers. Did you discuss the interview every day
22 after it was -- after each session was completed with the
23 case agent?

24 [REDACTED] I think we had kind of a little bit of
25 after-action, but it wasn't an extensive amount.

1 Mr. Somers. Okay. So you complete eventually this
2 57-page-long summary that we've been provided. What did
3 you do with this summary once it was completed?

4 [REDACTED] I provided the summary to the case agent,
5 and the case agent subsequently entered it, as I said, into
6 our system of record.

7 Mr. Somers. What is your system of record?

8 [REDACTED] One second so I can talk to the FBI to
9 make sure I use the exact proper criteria and language for
10 this classification level.

11 Mr. Somers. Okay.

12 [Witness confers with counsel.]

13 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] back.

14 Mr. Somers. Okay.

15 [REDACTED] So it was inserted into our system of
16 record, which is called "Sentinel," "FBI Sentinel."

17 Mr. Somers. So once it was in Sentinel, who had
18 access to this summary?

19 [REDACTED] Everybody on the Crossfire Hurricane team
20 would have had access to it.

21 Mr. Somers. What about Peter Strzok?

22 [REDACTED] I believe so.

23 Mr. Somers. Bill Priestap?

24 [REDACTED] I believe so.

25 Mr. Somers. What about Lisa Page?

1 [REDACTED] I don't know about that.

2 Mr. Somers. What about either the Director or the
3 Deputy Director?

4 [REDACTED] Don't know about that either.

5 Mr. Somers. All right. So you complete the summary.
6 That's the written document. Were there any meetings about
7 the primary sub-source interview?

8 [REDACTED] I don't recall having any group meetings
9 about the primary source interview. This was the period of
10 time where we weren't really having team meetings as it was
11 the January to March period.

12 Mr. Somers. Did it come up in any other meeting?

13 [REDACTED] I provided, again, a two-page summary that
14 was provided to a number of people, and I believe that --
15 yeah, I did a two-page summary that was provided to a
16 number of people.

17 Mr. Somers. Okay. Did you ever discuss the primary
18 sub-source interview with Peter Strzok?

19 [REDACTED] Not to my recollection.

20 Mr. Somers. Or Bill Priestap?

21 [REDACTED] I may have with Bill Priestap, but I don't
22 recall exactly.

23 Mr. Somers. The Director?

24 [REDACTED] Not to my recollection.

25 Mr. Somers. The Deputy Director?

1 [REDACTED] Again, not to my recollection.

2 Mr. Somers. Lisa Page?

3 [REDACTED] Again, not to my recollection.

4 Mr. Somers. What about the OGC unit chief?

5 [REDACTED] I don't recall having a conversation with
6 the OGC unit chief either.

7 Mr. Somers. SSA-1?

8 [REDACTED] I'm not sure I had a talk with SSA-1 about
9 it.

10 Mr. Somers. What about -- I think I might -- I think
11 the SSA-1 may have rotated off by that point in time. The
12 supervisory special agent in charge of the Carter Page
13 investigation, did you --

14 [REDACTED] I may have discussed it -- I may have
15 discussed it with SSA-2.

16 Mr. Somers. Did you discuss it with -- you may have?
17 You don't recall?

18 [REDACTED] I don't recall exactly.

19 Mr. Somers. What about with Jen Boone?

20 [REDACTED] I believe, yes, with Jen Boone.

21 Mr. Somers. And what did you discuss with her?

22 [REDACTED] I think she was one of the recipients of
23 the two-page summary memo, if I recall correctly.

24 Mr. Somers. Did you discuss any inconsistencies
25 between the Steele reporting and what the primary sub-

1 source told you with Jen Boone?

2 [REDACTED] I don't recall going into detail about the
3 inconsistencies with Jen Boone.

4 Mr. Somers. Do you recall discussing the
5 inconsistencies with anybody at the FBI?

6 [REDACTED] I don't recall -- outside of documenting
7 the interview, I don't remember conversations where we
8 outlined or discussed the inconsistencies.

9 Mr. Somers. How about anybody at DOJ?

10 [REDACTED] Not to my recollection.

11 Mr. Somers. At some point in time, the representation
12 switches in the FISA, I think for the final two renewals,
13 that the sub-source was truthful and cooperative. Do you
14 recall that language?

15 [REDACTED] I do recall that language.

16 Mr. Somers. I think on page 190 of the IG report, it
17 says -- and this is not the IG report saying it. It's what
18 is in the FISA applications going forward: "the FBI found
19 the Russian-based sub-source to be truthful and
20 cooperative." Do you recall where that language came from?

21 [REDACTED] I do not recall where that language came
22 from.

23 Mr. Somers. Did you believe the primary sub-source to
24 be truthful and cooperative?

25 [REDACTED] I think my statement to the IG was

1 something along the lines of, "I don't think I could say a
2 blanket statement covering truthful and cooperative there.

3 Mr. Somers. Okay. On page 211 of the IG report, it
4 says, "The Supervisory Intel Analyst said that the
5 information from the interview with the Primary Sub-source
6 provided details used to identify sub-sources referenced in
7 Steele's reports, which assisted with the investigation."
8 Is that accurate?

9 [REDACTED] That is accurate.

10 Mr. Somers. That sounds like there's like an extra
11 step in there, though. Why didn't you just ask the primary
12 sub-source who his sources were?

13 [REDACTED] Can you ask that again? I'm not sure I
14 understand what you mean by a separate step there.

15 Mr. Somers. Well, it says the primary sub-source
16 provided details used to identify sub-source's reference in
17 Steele's reports. Instead of getting details from the
18 primary sub-source that would then allow you to identify
19 sub-sources, did you ask the primary sub-source who any of
20 his sources were?

21 [REDACTED] No. We asked the sub-source who his sub-
22 sources were, and he provided information, and then we were
23 able to find other additional information about them.

24 Mr. Somers. So you didn't use details to identify
25 sub-source's reference in Steele's reports?

1 [REDACTED] I think the -- I would say that the sub-
2 source provided information during the course of the
3 interviews, including the names of some of his sub-sources
4 that helped us to basically then build additional
5 information on those sub-sources.

6 Mr. Somers. Okay, but not identification, just
7 additional information about those sub-sources?

8 [REDACTED] Right -- again, I'm kind of unclear. I
9 would say during the interview the sub-source gave us the
10 names of some of his sub-sources.

11 Mr. Somers. So that's how you would identify them.
12 Maybe we're just talking past each other. So I think
13 you've answered my question, though. He gave you the names
14 of some of his sub-sources.

15 [REDACTED] Yes.

16 Mr. Somers. So, again, further down on page 211, it
17 says, "However, in some instances, statements the Primary
18 Sub-source made about what his/her sources told him/her --
19 and what he/she then provided to Steele -- were
20 inconsistent with information attributed to his/her sources
21 in Steele's reporting, as well as in the first Carter Page
22 FISA application and Renewal Application No. 1....most team
23 members told us that they either were not aware of the
24 inconsistencies or, if they were aware, did not make the
25 connection that the inconsistencies affected aspects of the

1 FISA applications. Further, Case Agent 1 and the
2 Supervisory Intel Analyst told us that the Primary Sub-
3 source may have been `minimizing' certain aspects of what
4 he/she told Steele."

5 Why didn't you make other members of the Crossfire
6 Hurricane team aware of the inconsistencies?

7 [REDACTED] Again, I documented the inconsistencies,
8 as I am required to do, and those inconsistencies were put
9 into the file, and that file was available to people on the
10 Crossfire Hurricane team.

11 Mr. Somers. But you didn't take the -- you did not
12 take the further step of going and talking to anyone about
13 the inconsistencies?

14 [REDACTED] Again, the case agent was there. The case
15 agent is the one who maintains the FISA. I don't think I
16 necessarily felt like I needed to go with the case agent
17 being there.

18 Mr. Somers. I'm not asking whether you needed to.
19 I'm just asking whether you did.

20 [REDACTED] I don't recall going and talking to people
21 affirmatively about inconsistencies.

22 Mr. Somers. Okay. And at the end of that quote, that
23 long quote I just read, it says that the "Case Agent...and
24 the Supervisory Intel Analyst told us that the Primary Sub-
25 source may have been `minimizing' certain aspects of what

1 he/she told Steele." What did you mean by that?

2 [REDACTED] I think what I meant by that at the time
3 was that many -- I mean, these reports had now been open in
4 the press and that there may have been situations in which
5 Steele was attempting to distance -- I'm sorry, excuse me.
6 Not Steele. The primary sub-source was attempting to
7 distance himself or to minimize some of what he had told
8 Steele when talking to the FBI in this instance.

9 Mr. Somers. And so you, I believe, said that you did
10 not believe the primary sub-source -- you said the primary
11 sub-source may not have been completely truthful. Would
12 minimization be part of that?

13 [REDACTED] I think I would -- I think yes, I would
14 say minimization could be part of that.

15 Mr. Somers. Did you ever see the -- do you recall
16 whether you ever saw the truthful and cooperative note in
17 the FISA applications?

18 [REDACTED] I don't recall seeing that in the FISA
19 application.

20 Mr. Somers. Did you have any involvement in the June
21 -- June or July 2018 13A letter to the FISA Court?

22 [REDACTED] Not to my recollection, no.

23 Mr. Somers. "However, the Supervisory Intel" -- this
24 is on page two -- somewhere around 244 or 245. It has your
25 impression that the sub-source may not have been completely

1 truthful and may have been minimizing certain aspects of
2 what he/she told Steele. "However, the Supervisory Intel
3 Analyst told the OIG that, on the whole, he did not see any
4 reason to doubt the information the Primary Sub-source
5 provided about who he/she received his/her information
6 from, which was the Supervisory Intel Analyst's focus."

7 So on the whole you believe the primary sub-source was
8 being truthful?

9 [REDACTED] I believe the primary sub-source was being
10 truthful about who his sub-sources were. I don't think he
11 was fabricating sub-sources.

12 Mr. Somers. What about -- yes, he might not have been
13 fabricating sub-sources. Do you think he was on the whole
14 truthful about everything he said in the interview?

15 [REDACTED] I think he was truthful with respect to
16 relating what his sub-sources were telling him.

17 Mr. Somers. Did the interview, the January interview
18 with the primary sub-source give you any pause about using
19 the -- continuing to use the Steele dossier information in
20 the subsequent FISA applications?

21 [REDACTED] I don't recall it giving me pause.

22 Mr. Somers. Did it cause you to reassess the Steele
23 reporting in any way?

24 [REDACTED] I think it led us to think that we had to
25 do additional digging to determine whether or not we could,

1 again, confirm or disconfirm any of this. It meant we had
2 more work to do.

3 Mr. Somers. How did you convey that more digging
4 needed -- I'm assuming -- you said "we" needed to do more
5 digging. I assume that means the analysts that -- maybe
6 among others that worked for you. How did you convey that
7 they needed to do more digging?

8 [REDACTED] I had analysts start to look at some of
9 the sub-sources and to determine, again, using the same
10 type of evaluating FBI holdings, OGA holdings, open source,
11 to see whether or not we could pull any information on any
12 of the sub-sources provided by the primary sub-source.

13 Mr. Somers. Do you know if your analysts had reviewed
14 the 57-page summary?

15 [REDACTED] My analysts had seen parts, if not the
16 whole, of the 57-page summary, yes.

17 Mr. Somers. And then at some point after the primary
18 sub-source interview, I believe -- and I believe this
19 relates to the primary sub-source interview -- you told the
20 IG's office -- I think it's on page 190 of the IG's report:
21 "The Supervisory Intel Analyst explained that the team
22 members believed that an interview with Steele `would be a
23 good way of potentially looking to see whether or not [the
24 Primary Sub-source] is giving us accurate information [or]
25 did [the Primary Sub-source] tell [Steele] something

1 different.'" Is that an accurate reflection in the IG
2 report of your --

3 [REDACTED] That is an accurate reflection, yes.

4 Mr. Somers. And I believe that it further says that
5 that interview didn't occur until September of 2017. Do
6 you know why it took so long for the interview to occur? I
7 say --

8 [REDACTED] I do, but I --

9 Mr. Somers. Go ahead.

10 [REDACTED] I do, but I wouldn't be able to talk about
11 it in this forum.

12 Mr. Somers. Did anyone ever consider not using the
13 Steele dossier information in the two FISA applications
14 that were filed during that time period?

15 [REDACTED] Not to my recollection. But, again, I
16 wasn't the one who was drafting the FISA applications.

17 Mr. Somers. But you don't recall any discussion of,
18 hey, maybe we ought to put a pause on using the Steele
19 information until we talk to him again?

20 [REDACTED] I don't recall any discussions of that.

21 Mr. Somers. On page 192 to 193 of the IG report, it
22 says, "FBI documents reflect that another of Steele's sub-
23 sources who reviewed the election reporting told the FBI in
24 August 2017 that whatever information in the Steele reports
25 that was attributable to him/her had been 'exaggerated' and

1 that he/she did not recognize anything as originating
2 specifically from him/her. The Primary Sub-source told the
3 FBI that he/she believed this sub-source was `one of the
4 key sources for the "Trump dossier"' and the source for
5 allegations concerning Michael Cohen and events in Prague
6 contained in Reports 135, 136, and 166, as well as Report
7 94's allegations concerning the alleged meeting between
8 Carter Page and Igor Divyekin. The Supervisory Intel
9 Analyst told us that he believed this Steele sub-source may
10 have been attempting to minimize his/her role in the
11 election reporting following its release to the public."

12 Is that your recollection that you believed this
13 Steele sub-source may have been attempting to minimize
14 his/her role in the election reporting?

15 [REDACTED] In some things, yes.

16 Mr. Somers. Why did you assume that they were trying
17 to minimize versus being truthful?

18 [REDACTED] Unfortunately, information regarding this
19 sentence, I'm just going to have to let stand what's in
20 there because in this forum I wouldn't be able to discuss
21 this in any form in a way that would be at the level at
22 which we are right now classification-wise.

23 Mr. Somers. Okay. But you did believe that the
24 source was minimizing?

25 [REDACTED] In some aspects, yes.

1 Mr. Somers. And you were ware of the information from
2 a highly credible source regarding Cohen and the events in
3 Prague? I think you testified to that earlier.

4 [REDACTED] Correct.

5 Mr. Somers. But even given that information, you
6 still thought the source was minimizing.

7 [REDACTED] I'm not -- I think in this case, I think,
8 again, where I thought the source was minimizing or what
9 the source was minimizing about I don't think I can talk
10 about here in this forum.

11 Mr. Somers. Okay. So you don't think the source --
12 there's something specific that you think the source was
13 attempting to minimize?

14 [REDACTED] I think there were some aspects that were
15 specific that the source was trying to minimize, yes.

16 Mr. Somers. Did they relate to Michael Cohen and
17 events in Prague?

18 [REDACTED] Again, I'm not going to talk about that.

19 Mr. Somers. I think you spoke about minimizing, and
20 you said there were "any number of reasons that a source
21 might minimize." Is that accurate?

22 [REDACTED] I believe that's accurate.

23 Mr. Somers. Would one reason that a source might
24 minimize be because the source was an agent of a foreign
25 government?

1 ██████████ That's possible, but if a source was an
2 agent of a foreign government and attempting to --
3 attempting to cede information to the United States, I'm
4 not sure they would minimize in that sense. They might
5 want to actually give more details, depending. I think
6 it's very circumstance-dependent.

7 Mr. Somers. We talked about this some earlier, I
8 think at least with regard to Divyekin. Hopefully I'm
9 pronouncing his name correctly, although I'm not sure he'll
10 be offended if I'm not. And I'd just like to ask -- and
11 you may not know. I mean, you're not -- obviously, you
12 said you're not the author of the FISA application. But
13 I'd just like to run through three pieces of exculpatory --
14 what I'll characterize as exculpatory information just for
15 purposes of asking the question. But I'd just like to ask
16 you why this material, if you know, did not make it into
17 the any of the Page FISA applications, the first being, you
18 know, do you know why the Divyekin -- the Page denial of
19 even knowing Divyekin, why that did not make it into the
20 FISA application?

21 ██████████ Again, as an analyst, I'm not a lawyer. I
22 don't -- I'm not involved with the probable cause
23 evaluation within a FISA. I would say I'm not the right
24 person to ask that question.

25 Mr. Somers. Okay. Do you know why the Page denials

1 regarding his involvement in the Republican platform
2 regarding Ukraine did not make it into the FISA
3 applications?

4 [REDACTED] I would give the same answer.

5 Mr. Somers. And what about Page's denials that he
6 literally never met Paul Manafort and never said one word
7 to him? Do you know why that didn't make it in the FISA
8 applications?

9 [REDACTED] I would give the same answer.

10 Mr. Somers. Did you use all this material, though, in
11 analyzing other material, all these confidential human
12 source recordings of Page?

13 [REDACTED] I think some of the information taken from
14 CHS interactions were analyzed and used in analysis, yes.

15 Mr. Somers. Do you know why Page's relationship with
16 the CIA, previous relationship with the CIA, did not make
17 it into the FISA applications?

18 [REDACTED] Again, I'd give the same answer as before.
19 I'm not a lawyer. I don't evaluate probable cause
20 assessments with respect to FISA applications.

21 Mr. Somers. Do you know why information that Person 1
22 was an egotist, a boaster, and, according to Steele, may
23 exaggerate -- may engage in embellishments didn't make it
24 into the FISA application with regards to the information
25 provided by Person 1?

1 [REDACTED] Same answer.

2 Mr. Somers. Okay. I think to start the interview, I
3 had asked you whether you'd reviewed the IG report, read or
4 reviewed the IG report, and you had answered that you had.
5 In reviewing the IG report, did you review the 17
6 significant errors and omissions identified by the IG?

7 [REDACTED] I understand that there were 17, yes.

8 Mr. Somers. Do you agree that there were errors and
9 omissions?

10 [REDACTED] I wouldn't be the person to evaluate
11 whether or not those are errors or omissions.

12 Mr. Somers. Did you review the 50 or so Woods errors
13 in the appendix to the IG report?

14 [REDACTED] I read through those, yes.

15 Mr. Somers. Do you agree that those were errors?

16 [REDACTED] Again, I'm not the person to make the
17 assessment as to whether or not those were Woods errors.

18 Mr. Somers. The IG's office also determined that the
19 Crossfire Hurricane team's receipt of Steele's election
20 reporting on September 19, 2016, played a central and
21 essential role in the FBI's and the Department's decision
22 to seek the FISA order. Do you agree with the IG's
23 assessment that the Steele reporting played a central and
24 essential role?

25 [REDACTED] I have no reason to disagree with the IG's

1 assessment on that point.

2 Mr. Somers. Getting back to these 17 errors and
3 omissions, whether or not you agree whether they're errors
4 or omissions, were you aware of any of these errors -- what
5 the IG characterizes as errors and omissions prior to the
6 initial or any of the subsequent renewals of the Carter
7 Page FISA application?

8 [REDACTED] Again, I'm not going to -- I'm not going
9 to characterize one way or another whether something's an
10 error and omission. I'm not the person to actually --

11 Mr. Somers. I'm asking you -- I'm asking whether you
12 were aware of the fact. I'm not asking you to
13 characterize. There's 17 what the IG characterized as
14 errors and omissions, and I'm asking whether you were aware
15 of any of them prior to the filings of the Carter Page
16 initial or renewal FISA applications.

17 Mr. Heberling. You know, Zach -- it's [REDACTED]. I don't
18 really think it's fair to put 17 on his memory. If you
19 want to take any one of them at a time and ask him factual
20 questions, that's fine. But I certainly couldn't remember
21 all that, and I don't think we should put on [REDACTED] memory
22 what he recalls or doesn't recall about 17 errors and
23 omissions, at least as alleged by the IG.

24 Mr. Baker. While Zach is looking at that, I just have
25 a general question, certainly in the context of Crossfire,

1 but, I mean, if you could also include in your answer a
2 broader scenario. Was there a concern at the FBI -- again,
3 specifically to Crossfire, but maybe more broadly, was
4 there a concern about leaking of things coming out of the
5 Hoover Building that weren't supposed to come out to the
6 press or just in general a concern about leaks?

7 [REDACTED] I would say there's always a general
8 concern about leaks, but I also know that in the IG report,
9 it was documented that there were concerns about leaks and
10 the potential for leaks with respect to the Crossfire
11 Hurricane investigation.

12 Mr. Baker. Were you aware at the time that there had
13 to be enhanced operational security or there had to be, you
14 know, bringing people into Washington Field -- were there
15 actually steps taken in the forming of the Crossfire team
16 or the investigation to recognize the potential for leaks?

17 [REDACTED] I think to my recollection the very fact
18 that it was done as a "headquarters special" was part and
19 parcel of trying to minimize the potential for leaks.

20 Mr. Baker. What exactly is a "headquarters special"?

21 [REDACTED] I think it's -- a headquarters special is
22 nomenclature that's used to designate maybe a special
23 project or an investigation that the decision is made to
24 actually run it out of headquarters rather than having a
25 field office run it.

1 Mr. Baker. But yet there were parts of this that were
2 still or subsequently run by field offices. Is that
3 correct?

4 [REDACTED] Yes, because the Crossfire Hurricane
5 investigation morphed over time in terms of structurally.

6 Mr. Baker. So then there was no further concern about
7 the leaks that ultimately started the case as centralized
8 at headquarters? There was no longer a concern about that?

9 [REDACTED] I think there was always a concern about
10 leaks, but the fact is the Crossfire Hurricane structure
11 morphed and changed over time.

12 Mr. Baker. Was there -- I mean, I understand there's
13 always a concern about leaks, but was the culture at the
14 FBI during this time one where there were a high incidence
15 of leaks that was causing concern for the managers?

16 [REDACTED] I'm going to talk to FBI counsel for just
17 a moment.

18 Mr. Baker. Sure.

19 [Witness confers with counsel.]

20 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] back. Would you mind
21 repeating the question for me, please?

22 Mr. Baker. I was just asking the centralization of
23 the case initially --

24 [REDACTED] Excuse me. Sorry. We're getting a lot of
25 feedback here. Let me figure out what this feedback is.

1 Mr. Baker. That sounds quiet now.

2 [REDACTED] How about now? It's better now.

3 Mr. Baker. Yeah, it sounds good.

4 [REDACTED] Apologies.

5 Mr. Baker. The centralization of the case at
6 headquarters initially, it seemed to be there was a concern
7 about leaks, and then subsequently there's cases that are
8 spun back out to the field. I was just curious. Was there
9 no longer a concern about leaks? And then sort of as an
10 add-on to that, was the concern about leaks just a general
11 operational concern, or was there a heightened incidence of
12 leaks at FBI headquarters during this time?

13 [REDACTED] I do not recall any heightened concerns
14 about leaks out of FBI headquarters.

15 Mr. Baker. But the reason for the centralization
16 initially of the case was to keep a close hold?

17 [REDACTED] Correct.

18 Mr. Baker. Were there operational impediments because
19 it was being run out of headquarters rather than being run
20 out of a field office?

21 [REDACTED] I wouldn't say operational impediments,
22 but as is discussed in the IG report, there were -- you
23 know, there's no evidence room at headquarters and the
24 like. So there are aspects that still have to be -- there
25 still has to be interaction with field offices.

1 Mr. Baker. So even though it may be or it may seem
2 centralized, the field office is really never completely
3 cut out of it because they have capabilities -- because
4 they're used to running investigations, they have
5 capabilities that headquarters just normally wouldn't have?

6 [REDACTED] I would say that's a fair statement, yes.

7 Mr. Baker. Okay.

8 Mr. Somers. Just on leaks, I think you -- and I don't
9 want to rebut questioning from the last round, but I think
10 you did characterize that there weren't many leaks or
11 something to that extent in the last round with the
12 minority. But I'd just ask you, you're aware of a
13 September 23rd Yahoo News article, are you not, "U.S. intel
14 officials probe ties between Trump adviser and Kremlin" by
15 Michael Isikoff? You're aware of that article?

16 [REDACTED] I am.

17 Mr. Somers. You're aware of an October 31, 2016,
18 article in Mother Jones, "A Veteran Spy Has Given the FBI
19 Information Alleging a Russian Operation to Cultivate
20 Donald Trump"?

21 [REDACTED] I am.

22 Mr. Somers. And are you aware of a February 2017 New
23 York Times article about contacts between the Trump
24 campaign and Russia?

25 [REDACTED] I am.

1 Mr. Somers. Okay. That's all I have.

2 Mr. Baker. I just have two quick points, one sort of
3 clean-up. Earlier, but not so long ago, regarding the
4 learning that the primary sub-source was domestically
5 based, I had said that maybe the word "surprise" -- and I
6 said "shock" might be my word. I want to make it clear for
7 the record that I had the impression from the answer given
8 by the witness to, I believe, my question in a previous
9 deposition was including both verbal and nonverbal
10 communication, and I was definitely given the impression
11 that the reaction to learning the source, the primary sub-
12 source was domestically based was more than just a "casual
13 surprise."

14 And then, finally, at some point I think you said
15 earlier you left the Crossfire team because the work had
16 been absorbed by the Special Counsel's office?

17 [REDACTED] Yes, that would be correct.

18 Mr. Baker. And what time period would that have been?

19 [REDACTED] It would have been May of 2017.

20 Mr. Baker. And when --

21 Mr. Somers. So when the Special Counsel -- just to be
22 clear. This is probably clear to everybody, but I'm just
23 not recalling it. When the Special Counsel's team is
24 formed, the Crossfire Hurricane team basically went away?
25 I mean, they may have been subsumed, but there was not a

1 separate Crossfire Hurricane team at the FBI while the
2 Mueller investigation is ongoing. Is that correct?

3 [REDACTED] That is correct.

4 Mr. Somers. Okay. Thank you.

5 Mr. Baker. I guess my final point or question, how
6 long were you on the Special Counsel team from the time
7 that you -- or the case was absorbed over to the Special
8 Counsel and you reported, how long were you on the team
9 from that time?

10 [REDACTED] May of 2017 until middle of 2019.

11 Mr. Baker. Okay. And I ask this sort of as a follow-
12 up to the leaks questions, but also just I'm curious for
13 operational security. When you left, were you instructed
14 or were you aware of anybody that was instructed to "wipe
15 their phones"?

16 [REDACTED] No.

17 Mr. Baker. Thank you.

18 Mr. Somers. I think that's all we have. I don't know
19 if the minority has another round. Obviously, they could
20 raise something that could cause us to ask a few more
21 questions, but we're complete in principle.

22 Mr. Fausett. I think we're in a position to move
23 forward. We don't have much at all. But, [REDACTED] I
24 want to give you the chance if you want a break.

25 [REDACTED] No, I think we can go forward.

1 Mr. Fausett. Okay. So I just want to kind of build
2 on one topic of conversation in this last round, which was
3 this notion of the primary sub-source being Russia-based
4 and then not Russia-based, and just a basic question.
5 Could an individual have meaningful relationships or
6 insights into the activities of a foreign government even
7 if they don't live in that country?

8 [REDACTED] Yes.

9 Mr. Fausett. And just again, I'm sure it's apparent
10 to you, but for the record, why is that the case?

11 [REDACTED] Communication changes make it possible to
12 keep in communication with individuals and even securely
13 communicate with individuals globally.

14 Mr. Fausett. All right. And I think really the last
15 two rounds there were a number of questions that you were
16 asked about the Carter Page FISA applications and some of
17 the errors that were identified by the Inspector General in
18 his report, and I just want to follow up with a couple of
19 questions.

20 First, to put the FISA errors in context, only 14
21 pages of the 448-page Mueller report addressed Carter Page,
22 and in December of last year, when Inspector General
23 Horowitz testified before our committee for 6 hours about
24 the errors he identified in the Page FISA applications, he
25 stated the errors do not call into question "any part of

1 the Special Counsel's report." Having worked in support of
2 both Crossfire Hurricane and the Special Counsel's office
3 investigation, do you have any evidence that the Page FISA
4 errors call into question any of Special Counsel Mueller's
5 findings?

6 [REDACTED] I have no evidence to suggest that it
7 calls into question the Special Counsel's findings.

8 Mr. Fausett. Okay. The Inspector General recommended
9 a number of corrective actions, including changes to the
10 Woods form and the FISA request form, which are designed to
11 ensure that OI at National Security Division receives all
12 relevant information, including confidential human source
13 information, needed to prepare FISA applications. Director
14 Wray has accepted and agreed to implement all of the
15 Inspector General's recommended corrective actions.

16 Do you have any reason to believe that the FBI is not
17 taking appropriate steps in response to the Inspector
18 General's report?

19 [REDACTED] No, I have no reason to believe that.

20 Mr. Fausett. Do you have any reason to believe that
21 the corrective actions that the Inspector General
22 recommended and which the FBI is now taking will not
23 adequately address the errors that the Inspector General
24 identified?

25 [REDACTED] I don't have any reason to believe that

1 the policies and procedures that they're putting in place
2 on the basis of the recommendations of the IG report won't
3 help the FBI in that area.

4 Mr. Fausett. Do you have any recommendations of your
5 own beyond those provided by the Inspector General for
6 improving or reforming the FISA process?

7 [REDACTED] I would not be in a place to actually make
8 recommendations as to how to reform or improve the FISA
9 process.

10 Mr. Fausett. The Inspector General noted, and I'm
11 going to quote from Footnote 499 of the report now,
12 "members of the Crossfire Hurricane team told us that their
13 performance should be assessed in light of the full scope
14 of responsibilities they had in 2016, in connection with
15 the FBI's...counterintelligence investigation, and that the
16 Carter Page FISA was a narrow aspect of their overall
17 responsibilities."

18 Is there any additional contextual information about
19 your responsibilities as a member of the Crossfire
20 Hurricane team that you think is important to a full
21 understanding of the errors that the Inspector General
22 identified?

23 [REDACTED] I don't think I have any comment on that.

24 Mr. Fausett. You were asked earlier about an email
25 you sent to FBI lawyers in September of 2016 forwarding

1 claims from Steele Report 94 that Carter Page secretly met
2 with a Kremlin-tied official Igor Divyekin -- I'm not sure
3 how you pronounce it, but I'll go with that -- in July
4 2016. In that email, again, you asked, "Does this put us
5 at least *that* much closer to a full FISA on [Carter
6 Page]?" That's on page 125 of the report.

7 At the time you sent that email, just to be clear, you
8 had not yet had an opportunity to speak with the primary
9 sub-source. Is that correct?

10 [REDACTED] That is correct.

11 Mr. Fausett. So when you asked the FBI lawyers
12 whether the excerpt from Report 94 would be helpful in
13 pursuing the FISA warrant, you had no independent reason to
14 question the credibility of Mr. Steele's reporting at that
15 point. Correct?

16 [REDACTED] That's correct.

17 Mr. Fausett. And, in fact, you told the Office of the
18 Inspector General that earlier that same day you had
19 "researched information on Divyekin that elevated the
20 significance of this particular allegation." Is that
21 correct?

22 [REDACTED] That is correct.

23 Mr. Fausett. I think we had a little back-and-forth
24 with your attorney about the characterization of that
25 question, so I just want to be clear here. Did you ask the

1 lawyers, the FBI lawyers, whether the excerpt from Report
2 94 would be helpful in pursuing a FISA warrant because you
3 were politically biased against Donald Trump?

4 [REDACTED] No.

5 Mr. Fausett. Did you ask it because you had an
6 anticipated outcome or a preferred outcome in mind for the
7 investigation?

8 [REDACTED] No.

9 Mr. Fausett. In fact, you told the Office of the
10 Inspector General -- I'm quoting from page 125 of the
11 Horowitz report -- that you "wondered whether OGC would
12 find that this information, along with the totality of the
13 other information on Carter Page, brought them closer to
14 probable cause on Page." Isn't that why you sent the
15 email?

16 [REDACTED] That is correct.

17 Mr. Fausett. And in your experience as an
18 intelligence analyst at the FBI, is it unusual for an
19 analyst to want to know whether there's enough evidence in
20 hand to warrant a Court order for surveillance?

21 [REDACTED] That is not uncommon.

22 Mr. Fausett. And why is that?

23 [REDACTED] I mean, again, analysts aren't the ones
24 that are making the probable cause assessment.

25 Mr. Fausett. And I think you've been very clear

1 about, you know, the role that you have played with respect
2 to the FISA applications, so I don't want to go through
3 that litany again. But I do want to be clear about one
4 thing. To the best of your knowledge, were any of the
5 reports -- or any of the errors, excuse me, identified by
6 the Inspector General in his report the result of political
7 bias?

8 [REDACTED] Again, not to my knowledge.

9 Mr. Fausett. To your knowledge, did anyone in an FBI
10 leadership role, whether it's Director Comey, Deputy
11 Director McCabe, Peter Strzok, or anyone else in your chain
12 of command direct you or any other member of Crossfire
13 Hurricane to commit any of the errors identified in the
14 Inspector General's report?

15 [REDACTED] The errors that are alleged in the report,
16 not to my -- no. I would say the answer is no.

17 Mr. Fausett. All right. Sara, I'll defer to you if
18 you have any others.

19 Ms. Zdeb. I have nothing else other than to say thank
20 you very much, [REDACTED] for your time and for being with
21 us. We also wanted to acknowledge that it is -- we
22 recognize that it is not the norm for the FBI to make
23 someone at your level and your position available for this
24 sort of interview, and, in fact, as we understand it, it is
25 contrary to their typical practice in investigations such

1 as this one. And so we appreciate your time today. Thank
2 you.

3 [REDACTED] Thank you. Yes, thank you.

4 [REDACTED]. Mr. Somers, it's [REDACTED]. Before we go off,
5 can I add one thing to the record?

6 Mr. Somers. Sure.

7 [REDACTED]. You and I exchanged an email offline. I
8 just want to make clear for the record that [REDACTED],
9 whose name came up on a couple different occasions, was not
10 at the time and is not now to my knowledge an SES employee.
11 So we would request that his name be redacted in any
12 transcript.

13 Mr. Somers. Sure. Just to clarify on that subject, I
14 think I was asking [REDACTED] who his DADs were during the
15 Crossfire Hurricane investigation. I think we got Dina
16 Corsi being one. Were there others?

17 [REDACTED] Sorry, that were in my chain of command in
18 terms of DADs?

19 Mr. Somers. Yes, in your chain of command.

20 [REDACTED] So, again, at the beginning of Crossfire
21 Hurricane, the chain of command went me to Moffa to
22 Priestap. The second part of -- the second part, excuse
23 me, of Crossfire Hurricane, which would have been the
24 January to late March period, the chain of command went
25 from me to Moffa to Dina Corsi to Priestap. And then in

1 the third chain -- or the third period, excuse me, the
2 March to June period, it would have gone from me to the
3 individual that [REDACTED] just mentioned has to be redacted to
4 Priestap.

5 Mr. Somers. So that individual is the intel section
6 chief?

7 [REDACTED] No. On the third it would not be the
8 intel section chief. He had a position -- he would have
9 been an SSA at that point, I believe. Or a unit chief? A
10 unit chief. Sorry.

11 Mr. Somers. I'm sorry. Okay. So a unit chief. So
12 no DAD and no section chief?

13 [REDACTED] Correct.

14 Mr. Somers. Okay. I think that's all we have. I
15 just wanted to clear that up since we were taking the
16 individual's name off the record. I do want to thank you
17 for appearing remotely today, taking the time out of your
18 day to discuss these matters with us, and we appreciate
19 that.

20 Mr. Baker. Yes, thank you very much.

21 [REDACTED]. Zach, this is [REDACTED] jumping in real
22 quick. There were two references during, I believe, the
23 first round to an OGA that I think were classified, and you
24 indicated that you would make sure they were redacted. I
25 just want to make sure that that gets followed through.

1 Mr. Somers. Yeah, I said the name of an agency, and I
2 shouldn't have. Is that what you're referring to, [REDACTED]?

3 [REDACTED]. Yes. I just wanted to make sure that it
4 didn't get lost in the --

5 Mr. Somers. Yeah, we'll take that out of there, since
6 now I've really highlighted it by saying I shouldn't have
7 said that.

8 All right. If that's everything, we'll go off the
9 record.

10 Mr. Linehan. Hey, Zach? Zach?

11 Mr. Somers. Yes?

12 Mr. Linehan. Before we go off the record, I just want
13 to confirm that we'll have an opportunity to review the
14 transcript?

15 Mr. Somers. Yeah, if we decide to release the
16 transcript, we will give you an opportunity to review it.

17 Mr. Linehan. Great. Okay, thank you.

18 Mr. Somers. All right.

19 Mr. Baker. Thank you, everybody.

20 Mr. Fausett. Take care, everyone.

21 [Whereupon, at 4:24 p.m., the interview was
22 concluded.]

23

24

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