



U.S. Department of Justice
*Executive Office for the
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces*

(202) 514-0296
ocdetf.foia@usdoj.gov

Washington, D.C. 20530

April 1, 2019
Re: FOIA-OCD2018-0029;
JMD#7017 1000 0000 2547 2208
18-cv-01854

Mr. William Marshall
Judicial Watch
425 Third Street, SW
Suite 800
Washington, DC 20024
Phone: 202-646-5172

Dear Mr. Marshall,

This is the third interim response pertaining to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request dated May 29, 2018 and received in this Office on June 7, 2018 regarding "records from the office of the Director of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force relating to Fusion GPS, Nellie Ohr and/or British national Christopher Steele, including but not limited to all records of communications (including those of former OCDETF Director Bruce Ohr) about and with Fusion GPS officials, Nellie Ohr and Christopher Steele." This request was originally directed to the Justice Management Division FOIA/PA Office at the Department of Justice, and subsequently forwarded to this office. This response is being made on behalf of the Executive Office for the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF).

On December 3, 2018 and March 1, 2019, we provided you with interim responses to your request. We have now completed processing 31 additional pages containing records responsive to your request. At this time, we have determined that these 31 pages are appropriate for release with excisions made pursuant to Exemptions 6, 7(C), and 7(E) of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), and (b)(7)(E), and copies are enclosed. Some of the excisions in these records are made on behalf of other entities, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department's Criminal Division. Please note that one of the enclosed pages contains yellow highlighting. This highlighting was present on this page as located by this Office and was not made as part of our FOIA review process. Please be advised that duplicative and non-responsive records were not processed, and are marked accordingly.

Exemption 6 pertains to information the release of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of third parties. Exemption 7(c) pertains to records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, the release of which could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of third parties. Exemption 7(E) pertains to records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, the release of which would disclose certain techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions.

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (2012 & Supp. V 2017). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

If you have any questions regarding this interim response, please contact Michael Gerardi of the Department's Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch, at 202-616-0680.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jill Aronica".

Jill Aronica
Chief, Information Systems Section

From: Ohr, Bruce G. (OCDETF)
Sent: Monday, December 18, 2017 2:07 PM
To: Bob Houston
Subject: Re: That's all folks...

Bob -

It's so nice of you to reach out. Thank you for your kind wishes, it means a lot to me. It's certainly not pleasant, but we are doing okay and just going on with our lives and work. Hope you are doing well these days!

- Bruce

Sent from my iPhone


On Dec 18, 2017, at 1:25 PM, Bob Houston (b) (6) > wrote:

Hey Bruce,


I just wanted to let you know that I am thinking about you. Sorry to see your name - and Nellie's - being bandied about in the media. I'm sure it is tough on your family. Stay strong.

Regards,
Bob

Not Responsive Record



Not Responsive Record



From: Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF)
Sent: Friday, December 8, 2017 5:24 PM
To: B(6), b(7)(c) - per FBI (RH) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Gute Reise

FYSA ☺

From: Ohr, Bruce G. (OCDETF)
Sent: Friday, December 08, 2017 5:17 PM
To: Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF) (b) (6)
Subject: Re: Gute Reise

Lisa -

Vielen dank! And many thanks to B(6), b(7)(c) for his kind wishes!

Bruce

Sent from my iPhone

On Dec 8, 2017, at 4:27 PM, Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF) (b) (6) wrote:

Hi Bruce,

I just wanted to wish you and Nellie a safe trip to Germany and France. I really hope the time away will be a good break for you both.

On a semi-related note, B(6), b(7)(c) - per FBI called me yesterday and asked me to give you his best and to let you know that if there's anything you need, don't hesitate to contact him.

Best,
Lisa

From: Nellie Ohr <(b) (6)>
Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2016 4:06 PM
To: Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF);Wheatley, Joe (CRM);Nizich, Ivana (CRM)
Subject: Fwd: Invitation: Kleptocracy Archive Launch - Tuesday, May 17, 9:30-11:00 am

This message has been archived.

With all of your free time....

-----Original Message-----

From: Hudson Institute <events@hudson.org>
To: Nellie Ohr (b) (6)
Sent: Wed, May 11, 2016 2:21 pm
Subject: Invitation: Kleptocracy Archive Launch - Tuesday, May 17, 9:30-11:00 am

Facebook <<http://hudsoninstitute.cmail20.com/t/i-l-hhklhkt-irijhvt-t/>>
Twitter <<http://hudsoninstitute.cmail20.com/t/i-l-hhklhkt-irijhvt-i/>>
YouTube <<http://hudsoninstitute.cmail20.com/t/i-l-hhklhkt-irijhvt-d/>>

Hudson Institute <http://i1.cmail20.com/ti/i/88/47A/D3C/050533/csimport/hudson_logo2x_3.png>
Event Invitation

Kleptocracy Archive Launch

(Alengo/Getty Images) <<http://hudsoninstitute.cmail20.com/t/i-l-hhklhkt-irijhvt-h/>>

Tuesday, May 17th
9:30 to 11:00 am

Hudson Institute
Stern Policy Center
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Suite 400
Washington, DC 20004
Register for event <<http://hudsoninstitute.cmail20.com/t/i-l-hhklhkt-irijhvt-b/>>

Add to Calendar <<http://hudsoninstitute.cmail20.com/t/i-l-hhklhkt-irijhvt-n/>>

<http://i8.cmail20.com/ti/i/88/47A/D3C/050533/csimport/spacer_4.gif>

On May 17, Hudson Institute will launch the Kleptocracy Archive, an online database of thousands of primary source documents showing the malfeasances of corrupt authoritarian regimes. More than a year in the making, the Kleptocracy Archive will debut documents pertaining to individuals and corporate entities primarily from Russia and Ukraine. Each profile features a short biography and document folders including press reports, business records, banking details, and legal cases. This information has never before been collated into a comprehensive and easily accessible resource. Public concern about kleptocracy has never been stronger. The Kleptocracy Archive is a powerful new resource for journalists, law enforcement, legislators, policy executives, scholars, and anyone interested in the threats posed by kleptocratic regimes.

Panel

Charles Davidson

Charles Davidson is Publisher of The American Interest magazine and Executive Director of the Kleptocracy Initiative at Hudson Institute.

David Satter

David Satter is a Hudson Institute Senior Fellow and former Moscow correspondent. His books include *Darkness Before Dawn: The Rise of the Russian Criminal State*, and the forthcoming *The Less You Know, The Better You Sleep: Russia's Road to Terror and Dictatorship Under Yeltsin and Putin*.

Karen Dawisha

Karen Dawisha is the Walter E. Havighurst Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political Science at Miami University, and Director of the Havighurst Center for Russian and Post-Soviet Studies. She is the author of *Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?*

Glenn Simpson

Glenn Simpson is a Senior Fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center. A former Wall Street Journal correspondent with more than 20 years' experience of investigating financial crime, he now works frequently on Russian corporate crime and criminal organizations.

Program

Opening Remarks

9:30—9:40 am

Archive Presentation

9:40—10:30 am

Panel Discussion and Q & A

10:30—11:00 am

View more upcoming events <<http://hudsoninstitute.cmail20.com/t/i-l-hhklhkt-irijhvt-p/>>

Hudson <http://i2.cmail20.com/ti/i/88/47A/D3C/050533/csimport/hudson_5.gif>

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<http://i8.cmail20.com/ti/i/88/47A/D3C/050533/csimport/spacer_4.gif>

This email was sent to

(b) (6) Nellie Ohr from Hudson Institute. To ensure that you continue receiving our emails, please add info@hudson.org to your address book or safe list.

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<http://i8.cmail20.com/ti/i/88/47A/D3C/050533/csimport/spacer_4.gif>

<<https://hudsoninstitute.cmail20.com/t/i-o-hhklhkt-irijhvt/o.gif>>

From: (b)(6), b7(c) - per FBI (CID) (FBI) <(b)(6), b7(c) - per FBI >
Sent: Monday, May 9, 2016 12:22 PM
To: Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF)
Subject: RE: Video about corrupt Ukrainian oligarch

This message has been archived.

Thanks, Lisa. I will take a look.

From: Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF)(b) (6)
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2016 12:19 PM
To: (b)(6), b7(c) - per FBI (CID) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Video about corrupt Ukrainian oligarch

FYI

From: Nellie Ohr
Sent: Friday, May 06, 2016 9:12:35 AM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada)
To: Holtyn, Lisa; Nizich, Ivana; Wheatley, Joe
Subject: Fwd: Video about corrupt Ukrainian oligarch

They don't name the oligarch in the text, and I didn't take the time to watch the video, but I assume it's Kolomoyskiy

Bloody Money (Trailer)

By VICE News <<https://news.vice.com/contributor/vice-news>>

May 5, 2016 |

In 2014, Western countries made Ukrainians a promise. They pledged to recover money stolen by the country's deposed president and his cronies, and to return it. Ukraine was in desperate need of funds, as it sought to repel a Russian invasion, to maintain basic services, to pay its foreign debt, and to end — once and for all — its crippling epidemic of corruption. Two years on, it's time to ask how that is going.

Bloody Money tells two stories. One is of a Ukrainian oligarch's bank account — and the \$23 million it contained. In unprecedented detail, it reveals where the money came from, how it was laundered, and what happened when a British judge ruled on its provenance. The other story is that of a Ukrainian mother, and her battle to find medicines for her hemophiliac daughter, in a country where healthcare is just one more opportunity for corrupt officials to make money.

The documentary reveals how kleptocrats use shell companies to obscure the origins of their stolen money, and how Western enablers — lawyers, accountants, and more — assist them in doing so. It also

Obtained via FOIA by Judicial Watch, Inc.

shows how Ukrainian officials continue to run corrupt schemes, despite 2014's revolution, and how that is sabotaging the country's reform efforts.

Bloody Money is produced in collaboration with Sundance Institute and VICE News, as part of the prize awarded to Global Witness when it won the 2014 TED Prize. Additional funds from Skoll Foundation. Directed by Havana Marking and presented by Oliver Bullough.

<https://news.vice.com/article/bloody-money-trailer-1>

From: Holtyn, Lisa
Sent: Friday, May 6, 2016 9:22 AM
To: Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF)
Subject: FW: Video about corrupt Ukrainian oligarch

This message has been archived.

From: Wheatley, Joe
Sent: Friday, May 06, 2016 9:21:57 AM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada)
To: Nellie Ohr; Holtyn, Lisa; Nizich, Ivana
Subject: RE: Video about corrupt Ukrainian oligarch

Thanks, Nellie—the video won't load on my work computer but I'll try looking over it on another browser.


Joseph Wheatley

Trial Attorney, Organized Crime and Gang Section

U.S. Department of Justice

(b) (6)

DUPLICATE



From: Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF)
Sent: Tuesday, May 3, 2016 1:09 PM
To: (b)(6), b7(c) - per FBI (CID) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Magisterial roundup of obshchak-like money laundering "pool" held by Russia's elite, compromat war etc.

This message has been archived.

I'll ask Nellie

From: (b)(6), b7(c) - per FBI (CID) (FBI) [mailto:(b)(6), b7(c) - per FBI]
Sent: Tuesday, May 03, 2016 11:16 AM
To: Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF)
Subject: RE: Magisterial roundup of obshchak-like money laundering "pool" held by Russia's elite, compromat war etc.

Thanks. I don't get these any more, but I would like to. I wonder how we get back on the list.

(b)(6), b7(c) - per FBI

From: Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF) (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, May 03, 2016 10:23 AM
To: (b)(6), b7(c) - per FBI (CID) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Magisterial roundup of obshchak-like money laundering "pool" held by Russia's elite, compromat war etc.

Hey, do you get these daily? I used to, but don't any more. Anyway, there's some interesting stuff in this one (see Nellie's note below).

From: Nellie Ohr (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, May 03, 2016 10:19 AM
To: Ohr, Bruce (ODAG); Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF); Wheatley, Joe; Nizich, Ivana
Subject: Magisterial roundup of obshchak-like money laundering "pool" held by Russia's elite, compromat war etc.

Wayne Allensworth has outdone himself in these latest notes. (His analysis is the bolded text). This touches on all kinds of scandals---Lesin's death, Shumkov's, Magnitsky etc. etc. A bit overwhelming, actually.
--Nellie

-----Original Message-----

From: Wayne Allensworth <(b) (6)>
To: Wayne and Stacy Allensworth <(b) (6)>
Sent: Mon, May 2, 2016 6:32 pm
Subject: Internet Notes 2 May 2016

Internet Notes 2 May 2016

Note on notes (Zolotov and the Security Council). 1

Latynina circles back to the Independent Oil Company, VTB, Sechin, Khudaiynatov (Another "violinist"?; Shumkov/Lesin and "the pool"). 1

Solovey on the intended audience for the "information attacks". 4

Stanovaya on kompromat about Putin (Putin is more vulnerable than he seems...but Western mass media is not the threat; Open Russia has more on Putin's ties to organized crime; Spain puts Deputy FSKN Director Aulov on a wanted list). 4

Strelkov: No murder charges?. 6

Land to be given away in the Far East. 7

Note on notes (Zolotov and the Security Council)

First we read that with the creation of the National Guard, Zolotov was to be elevated to the status of permanent Security Council member. Gryzlov was to be taken off the council. Then we read that Putin had issued an order reversing the earlier decision, with Zolotov designated an ordinary SovBez member (See the 12 April notes). But he's still listed as a permanent member:

<http://www.kremlin.ru/structure/security-council/members> <<http://www.kremlin.ru/structure/security-council/members>>

Latynina circles back to the Independent Oil Company, VTB, Sechin, Khudaiynatov (Another "violinist"?; Shumkov/Lesin and "the pool")

From the 22 February notes:

[On Sechin, Khudaiynatov, and a \$4 billion credit, Latynina refers to a post by Maksim Blant:
<http://mblant.livejournal.com/669.html> <<http://mblant.livejournal.com/669.html>>

Eduard Khudaiynatov was general director of Rosneft when Sechin was vice premier. Khudaiynatov was Sechin's shadow. When Sechin came back to Rosneft, Khudaiynatov created the Independent Oil and Gas Company (NNK) and NNK began to accumulate assets and licenses, many of them rather small assets. The main asset acquisition was Musa Bazhayev's Alliance group. The transaction was made in 2014, when Russia was already under sanctions, and the assumed value of the deal was \$4 billion. But where did Khudaiynatov, who had always been a hired manager, not a business owner, get the money? And Sechin had been consolidating oil assets in Rosneft—then his own former right hand makes such an acquisition.

Blant tells the story: Rosneft deposited \$4 billion in VTB, while simultaneously NNK was given a \$4 billion credit. Making a bank deposit that instantly becomes a credit is a common money-laundering method in Russia. Where did Rosneft get the \$4 billion? Latynina thinks it was sales to China. Latynina also believes the sale price was jacked up—and part of the transaction was Khudaiynatov getting a kickback for making the deal on Rosneft's behalf. Comment: I'm not sure I follow all this—is the deposit to credit transaction illegal? How is it money laundering? Anyway, Latynina says that with all Rosneft's financial troubles, Sechin wanted VTB to give its money back and VTB is not playing along. I don't understand that bit of the story at all—hadn't NNK acquired the company on Rosneft's behalf? That's what Latynina is claiming here. Blant referred to protocols from a Rosneft board meeting showing that the transaction was at a loss for Rosneft (Comment: OK, so the price was too high—to account for the kickback—Latynina also says that the terms of the deposit-to-loan deal were a loser for Rosneft. So when she said Rosneft wanted its money back, maybe it wanted back the loss on the deposit-to-loan transaction). Latynina goes on to imply that she thinks Sechin has been using NNK to go after oil assets for a while—like Bashneft. NNK made Sistema an offer, not Rosneft, on the asset. And Sistema's Yevtushenkov wound up under house arrest (See, for instance, the 30 October 2014 notes)...So, regarding the NNK purchase of Alliance group, Rosneft was financing the purchase (at a loss) while demanding money from the National Welfare Fund...]

Comment: So it appeared that a Rosneft that was under sanctions was using NNK, not under sanctions, as a vehicle for making acquisitions—but there was that money laundering part that I wondered about. In her program last week, Latynina asked whether NNK was the equivalent of Roldugin's offshore—another "violinist" being used to launder money acquired by dubious means. The acquisition, claimed Latynina, whose terms were not good for Rosneft, was really a put up deal designed to funnel and legalize shady money. The transaction fee—a kickback—was paid to Khudaiynatov as part of the laundering deal:

<http://echo.msk.ru/programs/code/1752700-echo/> <<http://echo.msk.ru/programs/code/1752700-echo/>> Latynina says the deposit-to-credit transaction is a common cover for money laundering...She adds that she thinks the approval for the deal (NNK purchasing Bazhayev's Alliance group) went all the way up to Putin—at the time, everyone figured oil prices would go up, but they didn't...But there's something else—there's a connection between the deal and the late Dmitriy Shumkov (See the notes from 8 and 10 December 2015 and 5 and 11 January). Latynina says that's why she came back to the story, though there was also Khudaiynatov's purchase of a villa in Porotfino (for 25 Million Euro) in 2015, after Putin told everybody not to buy any property abroad. The Roldugin offshore was shut down in 2014—after Crimea. By 2012, it became clear that the Americans were taking a negative attitude to such offshores—so they were no longer safe and Putin gave the order on no foreign property. But Khudaiynatov bought his villa in 2015.

She gets back to Shumkov—he was close to Bazhayev, and was a sometime business partner of his. He was making big investments, was involved in big deals in Moscow when he reportedly committed suicide. Where did he get the money for those deals? Latynina thinks he got the money from the "strange" NNK/Bazhayev deal. Later, he supposedly committed suicide—was he desperate because he had been caught siphoning money off from the deal? Was he killed because he was stealing? (Comment: She doesn't tell us why she believes Shumkov stole money from the NNS/Bazhayev deal). Latynina says the Shumkov story reminds her of Lesin—also found dead, but in Washington, a death she says was most likely an unfortunate incident related to Lesin's extravagant habits. But Lesin lost his post after a deal that was similar to the deal Khudaiynatov made. In the Lesin case, there was Kovalchuk's Gazprom Media. Prof Media was purchased for Gazprom Media at a price of \$600 million. The word was that the sale price was above market value. Lesin had been loudly bragging about that. And the "violinist" affair let us know that 20% of Video International belonged to that violinist with a Stradivarius. So maybe the Lesin story wasn't about the Kovalchuks (Comment: One versiya explaining Lesin's death was that he was killed partly because he owed Kovalchuk money. One of the Panama Papers offshores was connected to Lesin).

Latynina again circles back to Shumkov—she goes on about "the pool" ("basseiyn"). The pool is a second, informal budget, a personal part of the treasury. It existed semi-unofficially and they say that it provides

the salaries for highly-placed officials. But it was mainly for emergency expenditures, like Crimea. Latynina says she thinks that it became apparent that the pool did not have as much money in it as was thought, and those that had their hands on the taps that fed the pool had their own streams. If the pool was leaking like a sieve, well, that could lead to some interesting re-distributions of authority in the elite. We already have the well-known story of Yakunin's resignation, after it came to light that his son had acquired citizenship in the UK. There was the interesting story of VEB's bankruptcy—how much did VEB hand over for the purchase of Sibuglement in 2014? \$1.8 billion? Wasn't that a lot for that company? Uralvagonzavod bought the Zarechniy mine, the Russian Coal Holding—together, that was 45 billion. Did that reflect their real value? Latynina ends by saying she thinks there will be more stories of the "leaky pool" and that Shumkov will not be the only victim...

Comment: "The pool," as Latynina casts this story, may also be something like an "obshak," a mafia organization's slush fund. She's implying here that both Lesin and Shumkov abused the pool and that others have as well, leading to some shakeups and maybe some murders. She is also saying that the NNK transaction and some others were money laundering operations held, apparently, on behalf of the pool and some who had access to it, such as Roldugin.

Let's backup and see what dots we can connect...In the 8 December 2015 notes, we read that there was a kompromat war underway and that Shumkov's death might be associated with it. One of Shumkov's patrons was an assistant of Chayka's, Aleksandr Zvyagintsev, who was dismissed following the scandal over kompromat on Chayka's son (See the 11 January notes). Recently, there have been numerous kompromat dumps on elites, a number of them involving foreign property. In December, around the same time as the kompromat attacks on Chayka, there were stories in the notes on Putin's links to organized crime (See the 29 and 31 December 2015 notes). In November and December, we saw stories on "Tikhonova" and her alleged husband, Shamalov (See, for instance, the 10 and 11 November 2015 notes and the notes from 21 December). There was an item in the 8 February notes linking Chayka's son to Shumkov.

Recall that Navalniy was behind a call for a check up on Yakunin and his operations at Russian Railways and that Millennium Bank was linked to RR. RR and Artyom Chayka owned shares in the bank, which had its license revoked (See the 8 February notes). Chayka claimed Browder and Navalniy were behind the dumps against him (See the 14 December 2015 notes; back in the 21 December 2015 notes, Yabloko's Sergey Mitrokhin said that Navalniy's attacks on Chayka were "ordered"; This spring, Browder and Navalniy were attacked by Rossiya TV as foreign agents. See the 11 April notes)—so we circled back to the Magnitskiy affair. Then Roldugin and the Panama Papers came along (4 April)—and Roldugin's offshore was subsequently tied to the Magnitskiy affair as a money laundering platform for the cash stolen in that case (27 and 28 April). The Nekrasov film appeared to be another reply to the kompromat dumps that related back to the Magnitskiy affair (27 April).

In the 4 April notes, I suggested that the attacks on Kasyanov were connected to the previous kompromat on Russian elites, especially the Panama Papers. My comments:

[Looks like the Kremlin anticipated the media reaction to the Panama papers and sought to soften the impact by showing that the opposition was dirty, too. And, as I wrote last week, I think Khodorkovskiy, some elites in Russia, and people associated with them are probably a major source—or at least a major distributor—of dirt like the Baevskiy material we saw last week (See the 31 April and 1 March notes), so there's a bit of retaliation going on. The Kremlin is showing that it can play that game as well. I doubt the illicit liaison in the Kasyanov video will shock anybody, nor will the corruption mentioned by Kasyanov, but that's not the point.]

Baevskiy was an associate of the Rotenbergs who had handled apartment purchases for "Putin's women," including Tikhonova and Kabayeva (See the notes from 31 March and 1 April).

Solovey commented on these "information attacks" on Russian vlast and their likely intended audience in the 1 April notes:

[Solovey on the intended audience for the "information attacks"

http://vk.com/id244477574?w=wall244477574_16316%2Fall

<http://vk.com/id244477574?w=wall244477574_16316/all>

...The talk about "information attacks" follows classic theory—"vaccinate" the public, that is, warn them that enemies intend slander. The question is, just who is being vaccinated? The Russian public? They'll brush off foreign exposés. They won't surprise anyone, or open anyone's eyes, or, and this is the main thing, change anyone's attitude to vlast. These exposés are aimed primarily at the Western elite. They are indifferent to the warnings of Russian officials...

Comment: I think he's right about the target audience for the kompromat dumps, which don't really tell us anything new. I think Khodorkovskiy and some Russian elites who would like it if there was not another Putin term are intending to help prevent any talk of lifting sanctions at this time, hoping for increased pressure on Putin. Maybe some of the elite are willing to endure more pain now for the prospect of Putin's leaving the Kremlin in 2018. Belkovskiy, who I think has been working for Khodorkovskiy, has been seeming to (sometimes) say that an exit that would not put him in danger is still possible for Putin. Pavlovskiy said that earlier this week (See the 30 March notes). Khodorkovskiy has been a little different, saying that those not implicated in crimes have no reason to fear a change in regime. When kompromat wars are going on, though, it can get a little blurry—maybe others might toss out some dirt on rivals, too. There may be more than one source for the material and more than one motivation.]

But Stanovaya thought that the cumulative impact of the kompromat might be relevant in the long run—and could turn Putin's base against him. From the 31 March notes:

[Stanovaya on kompromat about Putin (Putin is more vulnerable than he seems...but Western mass media is not the threat; Open Russia has more on Putin's ties to organized crime; Spain puts Deputy FSKN Director Aulov on a wanted list)

See yesterday's notes...

<https://slon.ru/posts/66002> <<https://slon.ru/posts/66002>>

Stanovaya wonders whether Putin should be worried about the "information attacks" Peskov has mentioned...Right now, all the criticisms aimed at Putin are coming from channels that have an axe to grind—the non-systemic opposition and the West. But when the criticism comes from, say, the protesting long-haul truckers, then that changes the picture quite a bit. When the "fifth column" in the eyes of vlast becomes the narod, then a revolution is underway...Putin less and less seems to believe that his rating could fall as a consequence of his own mistakes. It's not hard to see that Putin isn't just satisfied with the results of his rule, he is proud of them. And it will be hard for him to believe in the reality of popular disappointment when it manifests itself...Vlast also does not understand that "Krym nash" in the eyes of the general public means what it says—NASH—not Krym Putina or Krym Rotenberga, but Krym nash, that is, Putin is seen only as the instrument of re-establishing historical justice. Crimea should have been Russian with or without Putin.

Putin is more vulnerable than it seems. But the main sources of a threat are not Navalniy or Western mass media. The threat to Putin will appear when the accusations are coming from his own electorate...Anti-Putin information will be replenished, expecting consumers and it is they who will raise the question of justice, unless GKChP-2 intervenes...]

To recap and formulate a picture of what's going on...With elections approaching and an economic crisis

underway, Putin's enemies (Khodorkovskiy, and perhaps people in the Russian elite discontented with the way things have gone) are stepping up the kompromat attacks. The Magnitskiy affair and the Panama papers point to massive money laundering and asset transfer operations done on the behalf of high level players, with trusted figures like Roldugin acting as operators of the mechanisms involved. The money launderers may both try and create "clean" money for "the pool" and legitimize funds that have wound up there from operations like the tax rebate schemes connected to the Magnitskiy affair. Putin is not involved in this directly or in any hands-on way. The launderers/acquisition operatives may try and clean up money for lower level players like the MVD and Tax Service people involved in the Magnitskiy affair. They are rewarded for their efforts with kickbacks or shares in companies like Video International or Rosneft. "The pool" could operate, at least partly, like a mafia obshak—key players kick in funds that are available for major asset acquisitions and use "the pool" as a deposit for money that needs to be laundered.

Some of the players have abused their access to "the pool"—maybe Lesin, maybe Yakunin. Perhaps Shumkov was mixed up in operations that cost the pool too much and angered key pool members. At the time of Yakunin's ouster—and especially after his warning to other elites—I thought that we were seeing signs of friction in the inner elite at a time of diminishing resources, a smaller corruption pie, and tensions over the results of sanctions (See the 13 January notes, for instance). So I repeat that there may be more than one ultimate source of kompromat on Putin and other players—I could see an angry Yakunin maybe retaliating with dirt he surely knows about.

Navalnyy and Browder are players in their own right, as well as channels for transmitting kompromat. I think Navalnyy is still with us and not in prison because he gets at least "situational" cover from whichever Kremlin "tower" might be using him at a given moment. He is associated with anti-Putin forces, but he probably gets some help from people in the elite—maybe Alfa Group people—who are also thinking that it's time for a change (See the notes from 11 January; 17 May 2015; 29 December 2014; and 6 November 2014).

Another way to think of the pool is a place where players lower down the corruption food chain may kick in a piece of the action for their superiors. Questions: How does all this operate in practice? Who all is a part of what must be an intricate network of interlocking channels for money laundering and asset transactions in a system that has access to the pool? Who accounts for the money in the pool and where it may end up? I doubt that every pool-connected transaction is coordinated with other players—there is probably a high degree of independent operation within the network, with not all of those involved aware of all the others. The network that has access to the pool and includes elaborate money laundering channels and avenues for asset transactions probably arose spontaneously out of a few deals and grew from there, working out its own mode of activity and ground rules. The people who pulled off the scam in the Magnitskiy case were operating on their own, though they were connected to people higher up the food chain in various ways, and then they tapped into the channels that were linked to Roldugin and the pool. But how are the details worked out and who does the planning and organization? We are only hearing about a very small part of what goes on in the guts of what must be an elaborate informal machine that no one player probably knows inside and out.

Russia's overlapping money laundering channels are vast and involve lots of games—apart from the Magnitskiy affair, recall the lengthy GUEBiPK scandal, which pointed to a clash between the MVD economic security department (probably allied with elements in the Prosecutor's office) and the FSB and its allies in the Investigative Committee. The battle was said to be over controlling money laundering channels—see the 31 March notes.

To wind this up, Putin sees the Khodorkovskiy-Kasyanov-Navalnyy-Browder types as a united front in the West's war against him. He is aware of frictions in the elite and of the possibility of protests that could play into the hands of his enemies or dissatisfied Russian elites who might be looking for an alternative. One such alternative could be Sergey Shoygu (See the 8 April notes, for instance). So VVP creates the National Guard under trusted bodyguard Zolotov as his personal palace guard.

Latynina carried on in this past weekend's program: <http://echo.msk.ru/programs/code/1756772-echo/>
<<http://echo.msk.ru/programs/code/1756772-echo/>>

Why couldn't Russian vlast uncover the people responsible for the scam in the Magnitskiy affair? It wasn't because they were so highly placed. It was because they were using the same money laundering "washing machine" that some completely different people were also using—including Roldugin. It wasn't that Roldugin was involved in the Magnitskiy affair—it's that he and the others used the same "washing machine" ...

Latynina also takes some time to discredit Oleg Lure, who testified in an American court in the case involving Denis Katsyv and a money laundering case linked to the Magnitskiy affair—she has Lure basically repeating a lot of the claims made by Nekrasov in his film about Magnitsky (cited above). Lure claims Browder hired Navalniy. She points out that Lure was in jail for defrauding Senator Slutsker—and she also notes that Lure has claimed that he saw documents indicating that Navalniy was a spy (the same documents shown on NTV's attack piece against Navalniy and Browder).

Strelkov: No murder charges?

From the 25 April notes:

[Strelkov's post on the murder charges: http://m.vk.com/wall347260249_2127
<http://m.vk.com/wall347260249_2127>

Strelkov says that two men who identified themselves as police officers had visited his mother's residence and told her that he was being charged for two murders in St. Petersburg—they wanted to know whether she had seen her son around the time of the killings... So what were they up to? What are they trying to show me?, asks Strelkov. Surkov and company should not bother—organizing these kinds of vile actions won't work with me. They won't stop me from doing what I have to do—I'm ready for anything they can throw at me...]

http://m.vk.com/wall347260249_3529 <http://m.vk.com/wall347260249_3529>

About the criminal charges supposedly made against me—maybe there is a case and maybe not. So far I have no official word on that. There's supposed to be a public meeting on Suvorov Square on 2 May, but nobody will be there—how many people will think a meeting in honor of fallen countrymen is more important than shashlik on a holiday?

Land to be given away in the Far East

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russians-given-free-land-in-countrys-far-east/567729.html>
<<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russians-given-free-land-in-countrys-far-east/567729.html>>

President Vladimir Putin has approved a law giving Russian citizens free plots of land in the country's Far East, the Interfax news agency reported Monday.

All citizens will be entitled to apply for up to hectare of land in the Kamchatka, Primorye, Khabarovsk, Amur, Magadan and Sakhalin regions, the republic of Sakha, or the Jewish and Chukotka autonomous districts.

The land can be used for any lawful purpose but can only be rented, sold, or given away after an initial five-year waiting period, according to the bill.

The program is one of a number of initiatives aimed at boosting the economy in Russia's Far East, including the construction of the new Vostochny cosmodrome. A recent deal also saw a number of Chinese companies set on relocating to the area.

From: (b)(6), b7(c) - per FBI (CID) (FBI) (b)(6), b7(c) - per FBI >
Sent: Friday, April 29, 2016 5:16 PM
To: Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF)
Subject: RE: (b)(6), b7(c) - per FBI

This message has been archived.

It does. I am baffled.


-----Original Message-----

From: Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, April 29, 2016 5:08 PM
To: (b)(6), b7(c) - per FBI (CID) (FBI)
Subject: RE: (b)(6), b7(c) - per FBI


I asked Bruce and he didn't know him, but is going to see if Nellie does.

I was wondering if maybe we knew him through some sort of Glenn Simpson or John Picarelli-sponsored event. If he hadn't referred to you as (b)(6), b7(c) - per FBI it wouldn't have bothered me so much, but knowledge of that particular nickname implies a certain degree of familiarity not available on the Internet.

Not Responsive Record



Not Responsive Record



From: Nellie Ohr <(b) (6)>
Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2016 8:23 PM
To: (b) (6) Nellie Ohr; Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF)
Subject: Re: Upcoming Events: Who Is Mr. Putin?, 2016 Election, and more

This message has been archived.

Hi Lisa,
I think I won't make it to the film tomorrow. Say hi to (b)(6), b7(c) - per FBI or me (I met her at a party at (b) (6)).
(The movie seems to be available on Youtube so I'll have a chance to watch it as time permits).

It was great to see you yesterday!

Cheers,
Nellie

-----Original Message-----

From: Nellie Ohr <(b) (6)>
To: Lisa.Holtyn2 (b) (6)
Sent: Mon, Apr 25, 2016 2:23 pm
Subject: Re: Upcoming Events: Who Is Mr. Putin?, 2016 Election, and more

I think dessert should do it. We stocked up on beer and wine. Thanks!!

-----Original Message-----

From: Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF) (OCDETF) (b) (6)
To: Nellie Ohr (b) (6)
Sent: Mon, Apr 25, 2016 2:03 pm
Subject: RE: Upcoming Events: Who Is Mr. Putin?, 2016 Election, and more

I'm actually going to this with (b)(6), b7(c) - per FBI. If you'd like to join us, please let me know! (Schedules permitting, we might try to grab a quick bite to eat ahead of time.)

On a semi-related note, I'm bringing dessert tonight, but is there anything else you guys need? Happy to bring wine, beer, etc., or any other food stuffs!

From: Nellie Ohr [mailto:(b) (6)]
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2016 1:21 PM
To: Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF); Wheatley, Joe; Nizich, Ivana
Subject: Fwd: Upcoming Events: Who Is Mr. Putin?, 2016 Election, and more

Don't know if there will be anything that's not already in Dawisha's book, but it might attract a wider audience.... I'm not sure I'm up for such a long evening.....

-----Original Message-----

From: Hudson Institute <events@hudson.org>

To: Nellie Ohr <(b) (6)>

Sent: Mon, Apr 25, 2016 11:46 am

Subject: Upcoming Events: Who Is Mr. Putin?, 2016 Election, and more

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Upcoming Events

Wednesday | "Who Is Mr. Putin?"

U.S. and English-Language Film Premiere Featuring David Satter, Anastasia Kirilenko, Karen Dawisha, and Ilya Zaslavskiy

Vladimir Putin

Wednesday, April 27, 6:30pm - 10:00pm

Wednesday, April 27, 6:30pm - 10:00pm

Hudson Institute's Kleptocracy Initiative hosts the first U.S. screening and English-language premiere of the film *Who Is Mr. Putin?* Based on investigations by independent journalists Anastasia Kirilenko and Vladimir Ivanidze, the film documents the origins of Russian President Vladimir Putin's private wealth and subsequent rise to power. The screening will be followed by a short panel discussion, moderated by Hudson Senior Fellow David Satter, featuring Anastasia Kirilenko, Karen Dawisha, and Ilya Zaslavskiy. [Register Here](#)

The events above will take place at Hudson's Washington, DC headquarters unless otherwise noted.

Hudson

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Washington, DC 20004

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From: Nizich, Ivana
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2016 3:56 PM
To: Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF)
Subject: RE: Upcoming Events: Who Is Mr. Putin?, 2016 Election, and more

This message has been archived.

Many thanks for the heads up – much appreciated.

From: Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF)
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2016 3:44 PM
To: Nizich, Ivana (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Upcoming Events: Who Is Mr. Putin?, 2016 Election, and more


FYI, you have to RSVP and there are limited spaces left.

From: Nizich, Ivana
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2016 3:09 PM
To: Nellie Ohr; Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF); Wheatley, Joe
Subject: RE: Upcoming Events: Who Is Mr. Putin?, 2016 Election, and more

Many thanks Nellie. If my (b) (6) again, I will try to attend.

Best regards.

DUPLICATE



From: Nellie Ohr (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, April 11, 2016 8:32 PM
To: Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF)
Subject: "...the US had crossed a red line and was prepared to take harsh action...."

This message has been archived.

Hi Lisa,

Thanks for putting me in touch with Joe and Ivana. I enjoyed talking with them and am thinking about potential future conversations.

The following line from an interview with Belkovskiy was interesting. Not that we're ever sure where Belkovskiy is coming from, but he seems to be saying VVP is newly afraid of US investigations.

When asked why Peskov reacted so strongly to the Panama papers, Belkovskiy said it is because these are not just another expose of a Timchenko or Rotenberg. Rather:

"the US is using its intelligence and police capabilities to get at the women and Putin's closest friends, all his "children," if you will. It became evident that the US had crossed a red line and was prepared to take harsh action against people who are very close to Putin."

[Belkovskiy seems to be implying that VVP thinks the Panama papers originated with US intelligence and police???? Or maybe he is referring to the fact that US law enforcement agencies have said they will start looking into the information contained in the Panama papers? In any case, Belkovskiy thinks VVP fears there is a new push to get at people close to him].

Below is the whole issue of Wayne's notes, containing the interview

-----Original Message-----

From: Wayne Allensworth <(b) (6)>
To: Wayne and Stacy Allensworth <(b) (6)>
Sent: Mon, Apr 11, 2016 6:28 pm
Subject: Internet Notes 11 April 2016

Internet Notes 11 April 2016

Belkovskiy on Putin's assets/Putin's money, dissatisfaction in his entourage, the National Guard. 1
More from Stanovaya on the Natsguard. 3
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France seizes money owed Russian companies (Yukos). 7
South Ossetia to hold referendum on making joining the Russian Federation easier. 8
Terrorists killed in thwarted attack on Stavropol police station. 8

Belkovskiy on Putin's assets/Putin's money, dissatisfaction in his entourage, the National Guard

<http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/27664912.html>

Belkovskiy says that when he mentioned Putin being worth \$40 billion, for one thing that was back in 2007, so Putin's assets have undoubtedly grown since then. Second, he was talking about assets, not about cash. Belkovsky doesn't think the sum of \$2 billion mentioned in the Panama papers has anything to do with Putin personally—it's cash his friends have made from machinations with Rosneft shares. Roldugin seemed caught off guard when asked about the money—he did not immediately deny everything—that's because earlier, Putin's friends (people like the Kovalchuks, Timchenko, the Rotenbergs, Roldugin) thought they were untouchable because of Putin. They tend to think in terms of conspiracies and believe there is one directed against Putin, them, and Russia, rather than there simply being people who are not afraid to make inquiries. The new reality is that Putin has been transformed into a full scale enemy of the West and that damages the interests of his friends, who are on the one hand convinced they are being targeted because they defend the Rodina, and on the other still don't quite believe that a catastrophe is taking place.

Q: On the one hand, there is talk that there must be dissatisfaction in Putin's entourage—their interests are being threatened—but on the other, there does not appear to be any split among them. What's going on? Is the National Guard a sign that there is division and Putin has to create a new power structure that is subordinate only to him?

Belkovskiy: In my opinion, there is dissatisfaction in Putin's entourage—the life strategies of the majority are linked to the West, not only in the sense of assets, but in terms of health care, their children's futures, so it's more than economic interests. They understand that nothing fundamental regarding relations with the West will change as long as Putin is president—so in that sense, the specter of a palace coup hangs over the Kremlin. Question is, what will such a coup look like? But Putin's creating a Natsguard wasn't related to dissatisfaction in his circle—he'd been planning to create one since 2013, long before Crimea and relations with the West deteriorated to the low point we have seen recently. Putin needs several parallel power structures, each loyal to him personally and capable of neutralizing others if necessary. In this case, the Internal Troops used as the base of the Natsguard were created to parallel the army, with the army assigned international tasks, the Natsguard domestic ones. We should not forget that Putin sees a "color revolution" and the "Arab spring" as models for the West to overthrow him as well.

Comment: We've seen a number of commentators say that Putin partly had in mind creating a militarized structure under his personal control that he could fully rely on in an emergency. I buy that. What about the claim that he wants to neutralize/create a counterweight to an ambitious Shoygu? My view has been that Shoygu looked like a credible elite successor for Putin if it comes to that—maybe Putin thought so, too, but doesn't want anything happening in that regard without his consent and approval. Nothing should happen prematurely, so to speak...And the more he thinks about that, maybe the less likely any such scenario has of coming to pass. The very idea that someone could be seen by elites as a viable alternative would make Putin suspicious, I think.

Q: Why did Peskov, then Putin, react to the Panama papers and recent leaks (about the apartments; See, for instance, the 31 March notes)?

Belkovskiy: Because in those cases, we aren't talking about business figures like the Rotenbergs or Timchenko—Roldugin and the women involved in the apartments story are people especially personally close to Putin. Putin's nervousness is also because accusations are coming from US officials. He can skip commenting on remarks made by a Belkovskiy, but by officials in the US Treasury Department or Obama's Press Secretary, well, that's something else again, because it means the US is using its intelligence and police capabilities to get at the women and Putin's closest friends, all his "children," if you will. It became evident that the US had crossed a red line and was prepared to take harsh action against people who are very close to Putin.

Q: What is this leading to? There seem to be two roads—one would be to cut off relations with the West, with Putin including in his close circle only those who don't have interests or relatives abroad; another tack would be to try and ease tensions and maintain Russian influence in the West, while trying to control the situation domestically...

Belkovskiy: Putin has long been trying to win the love of the West. He wants an agreement, especially with the US, on dividing up spheres of influence Yalta-style. At this point, it does not occur to Putin that there's no going back to that world—he thinks that he only has to wait until Obama is gone, until Merkel is gone, people who he thinks have something personal against him, then the West will understand that it should remove sanctions against Russia, it will understand that Ukraine cannot be a contemporary European state—and it appears that the West is growing disappointed with Ukraine. So Putin thinks he can resolve all these complex issues in the next few years. He will remain in power, while the Western leaders will be replaced. Putin does not have a sense of tragic pessimism—he is nervous because he does

not want to see the property of people he considers part of the larger Putin family to be arrested. His nervousness does not mean that he will order a nuclear strike on Washington or anything. Putin is no strategist, but a tactician, so one can't analyze his actions as if he's thinking years ahead. Putin may or may not initiate new conflicts that could force the West to negotiate with him.

As far as domestic affairs, the task is to fully control the political system, to not allow any outside interference and to prevent any "Arab spring" or "color revolution" on Russian soil, so the regime won't go soft. On the other hand, there will not be any mass repressions, either. Mass repressions are only possible in an ideologically driven society and today's Russia is not that. There's no social base for mass repressions.

Comment: The last point is one I've made many times, only I'd add that a country that skews older demographically is not a likely place for mass repressions, either. Putin's not thinking strategically is another point I've made a number of times, but Belkovskiy has been saying that for years as well. Another frequent Belkovskiy point is the stuff about Putin wishing to conclude a "Yalta-2" agreement.

More from Stanovaya on the Natsguard

See the 8 April notes.

<http://politcom.ru/print.php?id=20967>

...One of the "versions" explaining the creation of the National Guard is that Putin is creating a counterweight to the FSB. The new structure's functions will overlap with those of the FSB, in part in combatting terrorism. But it's doubtful that Putin was trying to create competition between power structures—the president has more than once made it understood that he thinks "siloviky wars" undermine the effectiveness of the state. No, we are talking about boosting the National Guard at a time of increased domestic tensions in the context of international tensions. Nevertheless, competition among the siloviky may be a result regardless of what Putin intends...

There may be some corrections to the creation of the new structure through amendments to the federal law on the Natsguard. The creation of the Natsgyard was not just a reaction to the political situation, both domestic and international, but to the weakness of the MVD—but moving the Internal Troops to the Natsguard will only further weaken the ministry and make Kolkoltsev appear vulnerable to apparatus foes, which could open to the door to more reforms of the power departments, reforms that could have an impact on the investigative bodies...

Rossiia TV on Navalniy's "Secret correspondence"

Comment: The first attack was on Kasyanov. Now it's Navalniy's turn. The aim is what Belkovskiy mentioned—prevent a "color revolution" and foreign interference in the elections, control the political process...

<http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2741466#> <<http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2741466>>

From Dmitriy Kiselev's program...It's about Navalniy (described as a "corrupt recidivist") e-mailing (and apparently in Skype conversations with) another Kremlin enemy, William Browder (a "swindler" who "inspired the Magnitskiy list"), with VGTRK's Yevgeniy Popov describing the "secret correspondence" as revealing channels between the Russian opposition and the US and UK. Former Berezovsky security man Sergey Solokolov (Comment: I'm not sure where he comes into this story—as an informant on goings on in the UK?) says the correspondence was picked up off of servers set up by the CIA and the MI6 as a channel for their agents ("Freedom"—Navalniy and "Soloman"—Browder) for plotting the overthrow of the Russian constitutional system (Operation "Drozh" or "Tremor")...The special operation "Drozh" dates back to 1986 and then-CIA Director William Casey, who planned the overthrow of the system in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Part of the plan was to gain control over financial flows and assets.

Former MVD investigator Pavel Karpov (Comment: He was involved in the Magnitskiy affair) says that Browder and Navalniy work parallel to one another, as well as together...They first made contact in 2006, when Browder was already banned from entering Russia and Navalniy was a young Yabloko activist.

Browder wanted Navalny to help him with "greenmail projects"—Navalny was initially skeptical. Browder told Navalny he would be a "hero of the minority shareholders" and would accumulate "reputational capital"...Eventually Navalny agreed and Browder suggested he start with VTB. Browder's target list included Gazprom, Rosneft, Sberbank, Lukoil and Surgutneftegaz. But Navalny needed money, so Browder got him in contact with banker Vladimir Ashurkov (Comment: I think Ashukrov, who at one time worked for Alfa, was a channel for Alfa money to the non-systemic opposition. I think Alfa supported the "protest wave" in 2011-2012; See the notes from 11 January; 17 May 2015; 29 December 2014; and 6 November 2014 for more on Ashurkov). The report reproduces correspondence it claims was from an MI6 controller who channeled R100 million to Navalny and company.

When Magnitskiy (portrayed here as engaging in fraud himself) was arrested, Browder asked for Navalny's help. Navalny suggested that they play up Magnitskiy's suffering, something Russians would respond to. But the Western controller (MI6 "Agent Belt") was unhappy—the story wasn't generating enough interest, so the best thing to do was use connections to see to it that medical aid to Magnitskiy was cut off. Then Magnitskiy died. Sergey Kurginyan chimes in to say that the person most interested in seeing Magnitskiy dead was Browder. Browder subsequently began his campaign to get the US to set up a "Magnitskiy list"—Navalny conducted the information campaign in Russia.

Another Browder-Navalny project was the information attack on Prosecutor General Chayka, beginning with the allegedly illegal businesses of his son (See, for instance, the 7 December 2016 notes; Comment: Recall that Chayka blamed Browder for the kompromat)—this followed investigators searching the offices of Browder's firms on Cyprus.

Navalny has posted on the story: <https://navalny.com/p/4819/>

So supposedly a leak of information from the CIA identifies me as "Agent Freedom"—Kiselyov and his writers made up the dialogue...Who did they consult as "experts"? The former head of Berezovskiy's security service and Pavel Karpov, implicated in Magnitskiy's death, that's who. Karpov has defended Chayka as well. It's all a fantasy...

Here's more: <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/navalny-to-sue-media-holding-vgtrk-over-browder-link-accusations/565407.html>

According to Alexey Kovalyov, former employee of the state-run RIA Novosti news agency that is now headed by the TV anchor Kiselyov, editors of the agency received instructions on Monday not to cover the story due to it "probably being fake." Kovalyov cited the email sent to the editors that was shown to him by one of the employees.

Comment: I would not be surprised that Navalny was in contact with Browder and others—he gets support from somewhere, I think in the past, at least from Alfa, but Vesti Nedeli just made up the "Agent Belt" stuff.

Navalny wants a criminal case opened and says he is ready to sue:

<http://newsru.com/russia/10Apr2016/freedom.html>

British journalist Shaun Walker noticed how many errors there were in the English of the supposed MI6 handlers:

Rus TV running whole programme on @navalny <<https://twitter.com/navalny>> recruitment by MI6, featuring "leaked" emails full of article mistakes.

— Shaun Walker (@shaunwalker7) 11:43 - 10 апреля 2016

<<https://twitter.com/shaunwalker7/status/719189006567751680>>

Solovey on the latest propaganda

http://m.vk.com/wall244477574_16696

A roundup of the latest propaganda...Offshore accounts of Russian state banks were necessary to prevent the Americans from buying up Russian media...Roldugin's offshore accounts were meant to buy instruments for Russian musicians... CIA agent Navalny corresponded with hi foreign contacts via e-mail...Syria is ready to off contracts worth \$500 million for Russian companies to help rebuild the country...

Kadyrov wants more from Moscow

<http://grani.ru/Politics/Russia/Regions/m.250435.html>

Kadyrov wrote a letter to Putin requesting more help from Moscow for a number of projects in Chechnya. He especially emphasized that he wanted Moscow to transfer 100% of the shares in Chechenneftekhimprom to the republic administration; to help with moving 25,000 people out of an area damaged by a landslide last year; and financing for refurbishing the Grozny airport. Official sources say that Putin has assigned Dvorkovich the task of handling these issues (and Dvorkovich assigned various government ministries and departments to formulate proposals on those issues). Chechenneftekhimprom includes various oil fields, refineries, oil extraction equipment and more. Putin ordered the government to look into a transfer of shares last December, but nothing happened. The Chechen administration requested funds for the airport back in 2014. The government allocated R2 billion for relocating the people in the disaster zone, but only 3869 of them have been moved.

France seizes money owed Russian companies (Yukos)

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/france-seizes-700m-of-money-owed-to-russian-companies-over-yukos-lawsuit/565364.html>

France seized \$700 million in payments to Russian space companies Roscosmos and Russian Satellite Communications in connection with the case of former shareholders of defunct oil company Yukos, The American Lawyer magazine reported Monday.

In total, France has seized Russian assets worth \$1 billion following the Kremlin's refusal to pay damages to former Yukos shareholders.

In July 2014, The Hague international arbitration court ruled that Russia must pay \$50 billion for expropriating the assets of Yukos.

The seized assets include \$400 million owed by French-based satellite provider Eutelsat to the Russian Satellite Communications company and \$300 million owned by French space launch provider Arianespace to Russia's Roscosmos space agency, the magazine reported, citing the Shearman & Sterling legal firm which represents the Yukos shareholders.

A representative of GML — which owns the Hulley Enterprises and Yukos Universal companies that won the lawsuit against Russia — confirmed to the RBC newspaper that the seized assets are related to Roscosmos and Satellite Communications.

However, he didn't confirm the figures cited by The American Lawyer.

According to GML's representative, Russia has appealed the seizure of money owed to Roscosmos and Satellite Communications in French courts. Rulings are expected this month.

South Ossetia to hold referendum on making joining the Russian Federation easier

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/disputed-south-ossetia-will-hold-referendum-on-joining-russia/565394.html>

South Ossetia is due to hold a constitutional referendum, the results of which will make it easier for the disputed region to become one of Russia's regions, the republic's president Leonid Tibilov said, TASS reported Monday.

"We are discussing possible dates [for the referendum] at the moment. There's no specific date yet, but it will happen in the near future. Before August," the president said in an interview to TASS.

The referendum will center on changing the republic's constitution in a way which would make future incorporation into the Russian Federation easier.

South Ossetia is a breakaway region unrecognized by international community. In 2008, Russia and Georgia fought a five-day war over the territory, which is now recognized by Russia and a handful of other states as an independent nation.

Terrorists killed in thwarted attack on Stavropol police station

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/3-suicide-bombers-dead-in-thwarted-attack-on-russian-police-station/565392.html>

Three suicide bombers have died in an attempted attack on a police station in Russia's Stavropol region, the Interfax news agency reported Monday.

The militants attempted to gain entry to the building of the Novoselitsky district department of the interior building in Russia's North Caucasus region.

"During the attempted attack, two militants were killed and one managed to detonate a device," Interfax reported, citing a statement from the regional prosecutor Yury Turygin. The statement confirmed that all three attackers died in the attempt. No police officers or civilians have been reported injured but the building and nearby police cars suffered some damage, Interfax reported.

From: Nellie Ohr (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, April 1, 2016 6:21 PM
To: Wheatley, Joe (CRM)
Cc: Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF); Nizich, Ivana (CRM)
Subject: Re: email intro

This message has been archived.

Hi Joe, Looking forward to hearing from you on Monday. I'll be out between about 10:30 am and 2 pm, but otherwise home at (b) (6). You can always leave a message and I'll get back to you at a convenient time for you. My cell phone is (b) (6) but I don't always hear it.
---Nellie

-----Original Message-----

From: Wheatley, Joe (b)(6) - per CRM
To: Nellie Ohr <(b) (6)>
Cc: Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF) (OCDETF) (b) (6); Nizich, Ivana (b)(6) - per CRM
Sent: Fri, Apr 1, 2016 5:18 pm
Subject: Re: email intro

Hi Nellie--Sorry for not replying sooner! Ivana and I have been traveling and we're catching up on email. Is it ok if we get back to you on Monday about some good dates/times to talk?

All the best,
Joe

Sent from my iPhone

On Mar 28, 2016, at 1:25 PM, Nellie Ohr (b) (6) wrote:

Lisa, thank you! Joe and Ivana, I look forward to chatting with you sometime. My schedule is quite flexible.
--Nellie

-----Original Message-----

From: Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF) (OCDETF) (b) (6)
To: Nizich, Ivana (b)(6) - per CRM >; Wheatley, Joe (b)(6) - per CRM >; Nellie Ohr (b) (6)
Sent: Mon, Mar 28, 2016 12:57 pm
Subject: email intro

Hi Nellie, Joe and Ivana -

Hope you each had a happy Easter, if you celebrate it!

I wanted to connect the three of you, as I know you have a shared love for (b)7(e) - per CRM .☺

Nellie, hopefully Bruce mentioned this to you already, but I asked him if you might be willing to meet with Joe and Ivana, both of whom I believe you may know from his prior stint at OCRS. I told Ivana when I met with her last week that your impressive knowledge on all things (b)(7)(e) - per CRM might be of assistance on some things that they are working on currently.

I'll let the three of you take it from here.

Best,
Lisa

From: Ohr, Bruce G. (OCDETF)
Sent: Thursday, January 4, 2018 6:09 PM
To: (b) (6) Nellie Ohr
Subject: Fwd: Follow up to our conversation

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Shaw, Cynthia K. (JMD)" <cshaw@jmd.usdoj.gov>
Date: January 4, 2018 at 4:53:11 PM EST
To: "Ohr, Bruce G. (OCDETF)" <bgohr@jmd.usdoj.gov>
Subject: RE: Follow up to our conversation

Hi Bruce,
Can you obtain (b) (6)

[Redacted]

Thanks,
Cindy

From: Ohr, Bruce G. (OCDETF)
Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2018 11:45 AM
To: Shaw, Cynthia K. (JMD) <cshaw@jmd.usdoj.gov>
Subject: Follow up to our conversation

Cynthia –

Thank you for taking the time to chat with me this morning. As requested, here is a short description of my question:

As you may have heard, the Senate intelligence committee and House intelligence committee requested to interview me in connection with their investigations of possible Russian interference in the 2016 elections. Shortly after receiving the Senate request, a series of stories broke in the press about my alleged connections to Chris Steele, the author of the so-called Trump dossier. (b) (6)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

My question has to do with (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Are

there any guidelines for (b) (6) in order to satisfy any possible ethics concerns?

Thank you for your help!

- Bruce