INTELLIGENCE ANALYST GUIDE

A Digest for Junior Intelligence Analysts

Coordinated by Ionel Nițu

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Ionel Nițu
(coordinator)

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MOTTO: „I suppose that if we in intelligence were one day given three wishes, they would be to know everything, to be believed when we spoke, and in such a way to exercise an influence to the good in the matter of policy." **(Sherman Kent)**

Authors Foreword

Most of the notions emphasized by the current Guide is the result of the analysis of the most significant bibliographical references in this domain, as well as of the lessons learned stemming from authors experiences, who are ex and current intelligence analysts within the national intelligence community.

Therefore, the content of this volume exclusively reflects – as it has to – the authors' points of view, and it cannot generate any responsibility for the institutions they are or were part of.

However, both the bibliography used as well as the elements "extracted" from authors' professional experience must be critically read and eventually completed with complementary or "alternative" judgments offered by the bibliography attached to the Guide.

Even though most of the presented notions are currently used by the Romanian intelligence community (being similar to the ones used by the Euro-Atlantic intelligence services or security institutions), the conclusions from the present Guide have no juridical value.

The presented definitions cannot be used, under any circumstances and in no situation, for judicial procedures, be it litigious, contentious or criminal.

The Authors

They are, in the same time, experts in intelligence analysis, involved in training and teaching the intelligence services analysts, as well as authors of different intelligence studies.

The Argument

The Authors

MOTTO: *„A journey of ten thousands li[1] starts with the first step."* (Chinese saying)

It is universally accepted that the current era of globalization of information and dissolution of monopolies over knowledge and over the circulation of ideas (from the private, academic or institutional spheres) – characterized by an unprecedented multiplication and a wider and faster access to data and information – calls for the re-evaluation of the "classical" paradigm of information processing.

The effects of this trend are sharply felt by intelligence agencies[2], confronted with a genuine informational "flood", as a result of the "explosion" of open sources and of the fluctuations in the new security environment.

The exponential increase of information supply (information overload) tends to redirect decisional efforts from information searching to refining the analytical arsenal.

The idea of such a transformation became a must of the moment, especially because the analytical capability has lately become an essential factor in the "competition" with the others actors operating on the "informational market", special services or private analysis structures[3].

As an expression of the concern to optimize analysis, the present Digest has been drawn up in order to offer to the intelligence analysts possessing an incipient level of expertise a working tool meant to facilitate the assimilation of the main landmarks of the analytical methodology in the field.

As nowadays there is a variety of methodologies in use, derived from theories and / or paradigms of the security researches that inspired them, it is for each reader to evaluate, according to his personal capacity and preferences, the relevance of each technique for the issue he/she has in view, the potential of their usage being limited only by the individual imagination.

The authors had in mind to systematize the scientific (academic) points of view and approaches regarding the intimate workings and the "technology" of the intelligence process in its analytical perspective. In the meantime, they intended to offer those elements needed for the establishment of a standardized language that can be assimilated at the level of the internal intelligence system and, implicitly, to facilitate a desirable "conceptual interoperability" in relation to the analytical methodology used by allied / partner intelligence services.

Last but not least, the authors of the current Digest are aware of the "perishable" character of the bibliography that was used, some of the aspects being liable to adjustment / improvement at any time, depending on future developments. This is the reason why, to the extent the reader deems as necessary, he/she may extend or complete the themes suggested in the current work by personal research.

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[1] Li – a traditional Chinese unit of distance

[2] Generally, the concept of intelligence has the following meanings: *1. in the most general sense* – the process by which the information relevant for national security is gathered, analyzed / processed and shared with the decision-makers*; 2. in restricted sens(es)* – a. the entire institutional framework (structural and operational) needed to carry out this process; b. the product obtained at the end of this process, used to support national interests and goals; c. activities aimed at protecting the above-mentioned process and the obtained information.

[3] This undeniable tendency – visible especially during the latest years – to "privatize" intelligence gathering, processing, and dissemination (*merchandising intelligence*) is a reflex of the emergence of non-state actors and of privatizing the intelligence security.

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Foreword

Florian COLDEA

One of the few certainties within a less predictable security environment is that of intelligence analysis taking an essential role in reducing the incertitude generated or amplified by the informational age.

There is no secret that the substantial alterations of the security situation – new risks and vulnerabilities (inter-connected and inter-dependent), new actors (non-state actors with global agendas and sophisticated methods of action), new battlefields (cyber environment) – are demanding consistent re-assessments of the reactions the intelligence services are supposed to produce. Their margin for error is progressively reducing, together with the window of opportunity for a profound change of the mentalities, processes and practices they operate with – which is an essential way of efficiently managing the unpredictable and complex challenges the services are facing.

Within a more and more competitive environment, the relevance of the security structures depends on their capacity to adapt to the threats they are supposed to manage, to know and understand those threats, to anticipate their consequences and their impact on national security, by early warning actions and accurate prognosis.

Therefore, intelligence analysis capacity to categorize the risks becomes essential, together with the opportunity to evaluate and issue warnings regarding the probability of new threats emergence, to propose the most efficient measures to counter the above-mentioned risks in order to diminish the impact of the strategic surprise and adequately manage its consequences.

For that reason, the development of SRI analytical capability is one of the main objectives of the institutional transformation process started in 2007 and it is constantly pursued in this framework.

The progress achieved is obvious by the standardization of analysis, the augmentation of the available information integration capability and the increase of the multi-source analysis products, the enlargement of the open sources capabilities, the improvement of the dissemination process and of the relations with customers, the co-operation with academia and other intelligence partners.

The expectations are at the same level with the challenges. Additional measures are needed in order to improve the professional skills of all analysts' categories, to better coordinate the sectorial analytic products, to play a more active role in intelligence collection and dissemination and, last but not least, to increase the share of strategic assessments and prognosis.

The rapid and (sometime) unpredictable developments of the security environment require continuous adjustments of analysis instruments and methodologies in use, as well as monitoring a larger spectrum of domains of interest – geopolitics, economy, technology, demography, ecology, etc. Sharing best practices with internal and external partners, being connected to the Euro-Atlantic intelligence community and cooperating with the scientific and academic environment represent top concerns for analysts eager to improve their knowledge and abilities in order to meet the new challenges.

The need for a dedicated and intensive training of intelligence analysts have lead to the implementation - within the National Intelligence Academy - of a new undergraduate and graduate (master) programs, which have been adequately designed as to meet the academic requirements and the specific needs of a XXI century intelligence service.

I am therefore grateful to the authors of this volume for offering to the junior analysts not only essential landmarks regarding the analysis process, but also our institutional vision for this domain and the new evolutions in the Service's area of responsibility.

. Beyond theoretical explanations, the current guide's actuality and utility for the future analysts - but also for other categories of intelligence experts or for individuals interested in the topics developed herein - deriving from the authors suggestions, having a validity already confirmed within the Euro-Atlantic intelligence community.

I hope the volume will represent a reference point for the national intelligence academic initiatives and, in the same time, a road opener for the efforts in creating and training SRI analysts.

Within the current environment - dynamic, volatile, unconventional, asymmetric and globalized - it should be probably the case to reflect more thoroughly over Peter F. Drucker assertion: "the best way to predict the future is to create it" and why not, to try to transform it into reality.

MOTTO: *„An inferior mind is happy when it thinks like the majority. A mediocre mind is happy when it thinks like the minority. A superior mind is happy when it thinks."* (A.A. Milne)

Conceptual determinations for intelligence. National security intelligence

Marin IONIȚĂ

The semantic diversity featuring the concept of *analysis* makes the defining of *intelligence analysis* difficult. Therefore, before attempting to grasp the specific nature of the *analysis*, several remarks are necessary for clarifying its position in the sphere of knowledge.

In the broad sense, the analysis is one of the constitutive mechanisms of knowledge, and it encompasses *all the conscious / rational activities enabling any knowledge acquirement*, in its most general meaning. From this perspective, the analysis is present in every process related to acquiring knowledge, both in its basic format (essentially unconscious) as well as in its specific dimension (when the act of knowledge follows a systemized, pre-determined path).

From this *psychological view*, the analysis can be defined as the complex process of intellectual (thinking) activities whose result is reflected in a new cognitive, and thus relevant, content. More precisely, the analysis represents a series of logical operations for the decomposition[4] of the whole in its elements, process that continues through *synthesis*, i.e. through a combination of the same elements, depending on the connections found and revealed in the first stage of the approach.

In a second understanding, the analysis represents a specific approach to knowledge, autonomous among the epistemic matters within diverse fields of activity (economic, financial, socio-political, military etc.).

In this view (in which we can talk about a diversity of analytical "species": „economic analysis", „financial analysis" etc.), the purpose of the analysis is the scientific diagnose / assessment of some segments of the social reality, in order to elaborate explanations (as substantiated as possible) about their nature and causal resorts.

Lastly, *a third meaning* of the analysis is of strictly methodological nature, including a series of scientific ("analytical") techniques and methods, through which elements of knowledge in a determined field are produced and assessed.

Based on these clarifications, intelligence analysis can be defined as a specialized approach of knowledge acquirement (in the second meaning of analysis) about a determined issue - the national security - by using, in specific ways, well-known methods and techniques, analytic ones included, to elaborate substantiated explanations, assessments and prognoses, useful in supporting political decision.

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[4] This meaning is revealed by the Greek origin of the term analysis itself: *analysis* (in Greek) means exactly „dismantling into pieces" / „breaking into components", in our case of a significant whole; similar, synthesis comes from syn („together") and tesis („to set, to place, to position"), so „to set together" separate elements in order to generate an entity comprehensible by itself.

In the above-mentioned understanding, analysis represents a *sine qua non* constitutive element for intelligence domain and a necessary condition to obtain unbiased and factual answers, transformed in national security intelligence products, based on which the customer can take accurate decisions depending on the developments impacting his/her responsibilities.

As product of the intelligence cycle, the national security intelligence brings new pieces of knowledge about situations / phenomena / facts / realities that represent or can become threats or sources of risks to the national security.

The new content of knowledge can not be limited to the simple counting, verifying and, maybe, systematizing the primary data and information. Their transformation into information of national security is achieved following a complex process of analytical evaluation of their relevance and utility, activity which we generally name as „*informational process*".

The specifics of the national security intelligence in comparison with other intelligence products are pointed out by the following features:

• it has a certain relevance at national security level (it pertains to a risk or a threat to the national security or to the opportunities to promote certain security interests);

• it brings new pieces of knowledge regarding facts, phenomena, events - that represent / can become threats or risk sources to the national security - or regarding its initiators / holders.

From this point of view, the national security intelligence is correlated with the informational needs of the customers, in the sense of achieving a full convergence between their interest of being informed and the content of the information;

• it is a product obtained by special means – secret investigation methods and specific ways of data processing.

In the context of the current informational boom and of the possibility of real time access to open sources information - whose ratio has significantly increased in comparison with the information obtained from secret sources - the customers for national security intelligence can have an exact, but subjective knowledge about the situation in their area of responsibility.

This situation does not limit, however, the importance of the information from secret sources, its value arising not only by the way of acquiring it (which is a guarantee by itself), but also by offering a neutral and objective perspective on potentially dangerous situations and phenomena which cannot be perceived by other means;

• opportunity and celerity, given the complex and dynamic developments in the security environment.

The national security information has always a well determined *purpose*, the intelligence structures playing the role of delivering the information - *in order to support the decisional process of the authority factors* - while the customers receive it - *in order to have the necessary knowledge to decide an action option adequate to a certain reality* (based on the "need to know" concept);

• the capacity to identify the insightful causes of the emergence of some problematic situations for the national security, as well as the "hidden" connections with the most diverse environments/interested groups that contribute/influence/favor risk evolutions.

From the structural point of view, the national security intelligence necessarily consists in the following determinations of quality nature reflected in the **Figure 1.**

Figure 1. The national security intelligence

THREATS INDICATORS	ASSESSMENTS ON:
▪ **The type of source** ▪ **The reference field** ▪ **The preliminary assessment** (Comparing the intelligence piece to the referred national security law system)	▪ **The nature of the threat** (external, internal, political, economic, military, social, environmental etc.) ▪ **The form of the threat** (attitudes, gestures, events, human actions) ▪ **The stage of the threat** (latent, possible, probable, imminent) ▪ **The type of the planned actions** (open, covered, mixed, violent, non-violent)

THE NATIONAL SECURITY

THE ASSESSMENT OF THE DEGREE OF DANGER FOR THE THREATS	CONSEQUENCES ANTICIPATION
▪ **The reality of the threat** (the real capacity to endanger the aimed national values) ▪ **The amplitude and the intensity of the threat** (the resources estimated to be involved in materializing the danger) ▪ **Risk factors and vulnerabilities that might be exploited**	▪ **The state of affairs that might result** ▪ **The anticipated effects of the resulted state of affairs on the national security** ▪ **The efficient prevention measures** ▪ **Opportunities of accomplishing the security interests**

The role of analysis within the intelligence cycle

Adrian ENE

The intelligence work aims at fulfilling two complementary goals, more precisely: **(1)** identifying, preventing, countering and removing the threats and risks to the national security and **(2)** promoting Romania's national values and interests and supporting the security interests shared with its allies.

Taking into consideration the ways to accomplish these goals, the intelligence work can be represented as a layered structure, where the analytical process is involved, to a various extent or degree, in every stage of the intelligence cycle – operational (collection), tactical and strategic.

Even though there are opinions persisting among experts that the analytical process belongs to the tactical and, mostly, to the strategic levels, the analysis has a significant presence even in the operational work (gathering and collection of information).

In fact, analysis has different roles within each of the three layers, the analytical process being specifically shaped, also with regard to the ways of using dedicated methodological tools.

Therefore, if at an *operational* level the methods and techniques are used to organize and systemize, verify etc. basic information and data, on a *tactical* and *strategic* level the analytical effort is carried out on elaborated, verified and partially integrated information, in order to make a new informational product, suitable for being disseminated to the customers.

Figure 2. Intelligence cycle

Understanding the characteristics of the analytical process in each of the three layers doesn't exclude, but on the contrary, certifies the role of the analytical section as a middle structure in the intelligence cycle (**Figure 2**), respectively as a pivot between the intelligence collection and dissemination. The efficiency of this process can be noticed if, based on the assessments issued by the analysts, tuning and remodeling are carried out in the operational domain, and also in the relationship with the customers.

Types of analysis within the intelligence cycle

George PETCU

Presenting the ways in which the analytical processes are individualized in all mentioned domains requires an in-depth approach. Therefore, we have to move into details with **the 3 types of analysis** - *strategic*, *tactical* and *operational* – and highlight their specificity (**Figure 3** contains the main characteristics and the scope, stages and specific forms of the intelligence analysis).

Figure 3. National security intelligence analysis

REPRESENTS
- A complex, dynamic process
- A specific way of thinking and acting;
- An ensemble of methodologies

SCOPE
- To obtain clear intelligence products;
- To avoid stereotypes and misunderstanding;
- To make alternative decisions (real, pertinent analysis);
- To warn the customers about analytical limits.

BASED ON
- The value of intelligence
- The quality of the human resources (managers, analysts);
- *Competence and experience*

STAGES
- Define the problem
- Generate hypotheses
- Evaluate the validity of the sources (level of specialization, objectivity, motivation to manipulate), the content (through analogies and comparisons) and the novelty of the information
- Find possible alternatives and establish the probable one

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

FORMS
a) Intelligence products that can be:
- operational: regarding emergencies
- tactical: about evolutions/threat indications on national security issues
- strategic: prognoses/alternative analyses about meaningful changes in the character or the level of a threat (probability; gravity/consequences)
b) Strategies; programs; operational plans

Strategic analysis basically represents a multi-sectorial and multi-source approach of the phenomena with significant impact on the national security (on a political, military, economic and social scale), having a consistent dimension of prediction and anticipation.

Its result is reflected in assessments and prognoses aimed both to support strategic decisions or to help manage situations / events with a major impact to the national security[5].

There is a (faulty) tendency of assimilating this type of analysis with the long term analyses, due to the preconception that strategic mutations are, invariably, the result of a lengthy process. However, recent developments in the security environment show that major changes (so called "strategic surprises") can often "suddenly" intervene, emerging in short periods of time, with a similar impact to the ones with a "historical" long term development.

The term *strategic intelligence* has been introduced by Sherman Kent in his work "*Strategic Intelligence for American Foreign Policy*" (1949), being defined as "*the knowledge that the policy and military decision-makers must have in order to ensure the national welfare*"[6].

Most of the definitions provided by the literature in the field emphasize the role of strategic intelligence in drafting security strategies (on a national or sectorial scale), respectively identifying ways of countering threats, risks and vulnerabilities against the national security.

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[5] Adda Bozeman, *Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft*, Pergamon-Brassey's, Washington DC, 1992.
[6] Richard Russell, *Sharpening Strategic Intelligence: Why the CIA Gets it Wrong, and What Needs to be Done to Get it Right*, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.6.

Bruce Berkowitz and **Allan Goodman** – *strategic intelligence is aimed at providing officials with an overview of the security milieu and long term projections in order to plan the required measures for countering threats to the national security*[7].

Richard Russell – *strategic intelligence is the synthesis of information gathered through secret sources (human, interception of communications, satellite acquired data etc.) and/or open sources (media, radio, TV, internet etc.), with relevance to the policy makers with attributions in establishing and implementing major national objectives*[8].

Brent Scowcroft, formed adviser on security aspects of the US president, claimed that, in order to be relevant, *a strategic analysis must provide the customer with a general view on the factors which cause the evolution of the assessed issue, the evolution tendencies and the possibilities which can be taken into account during the process of enacting the decisions*[9].

The main roles currently assigned to this type of analysis are strategic warning and state level decision-making support, which implies *maximizing the accuracy of prediction and reducing the surprise effect* (the uncertainty regarding possible courses of action), at the same time facilitating the implementing of preventive / defensive measures (*post factum*) related to the evolution of the major risk factors and threats to the security.

The requirements to render the specified goals operational are:

• A multidisciplinary approach. Each organization, society, institution, social group has its own history, culture, dynamics diversity, which must be assessed. An important role within this context is the use of history, which offers knowledge on action patterns, which can enhance the accuracy of predictions;

• An active and open approach (without "presets" or any kind of conditions). A requirement of methodological-managerial nature needed in strategic analysis consists in stimulating the creativity of analysts in choosing the subjects and / or the approach. This augments the chances to identify internal / external tendencies by taking into account extended temporal predictions.

The risks which could be the subject of a strategic analysis are generally inter-connected, without belonging to a single domain / field. Such an approach implies assessing the causal factors (from various areas of activity) and evolutions / finalities. For example:

a) *regional / global risks*

▪ political and security developments in a state's area of strategic interest (political-economic dissensions with a potential to alter internal and regional stability, augmenting of inter-ethnic tensions on a regional scale, large scale financial-banking crises, propagation of autonomist / secessionist tendencies etc.);

▪ major imbalances with regard to the potential and military capabilities from an area of strategic interest for a state or a coalition/alliance;

▪ tensions and conflicts (active or latent) which could be (re)activated or extended with consequences in a regional area;

▪ risks associated to the globalization process which derive from the capacity of certain factors to produce "domino effects", by affecting through "chain reactions" segments, domains or the overall state economy (the oil price evolution, sudden devaluation of the European / US currency, the explosion of the interest rates and the crash of the credit systems, the modification of the global balance of the commercial exchange);

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[7] Bruce Berkowitz şi Allan Goodman, *Best Truth – Intelligence in the Information Age*, Yale University Press, 2000, p.63.

[8] Richard L. Russell, S*harpening Strategic Intelligence – Why the CIA Gets it Wrong and What Needs to be Done to Get it Right*, Cambridge University Press.

[9] Woodrow J. Kuhns, *Intelligence Failures: Forecasting and the Lesson of Epistemology,* in „Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael Handel", edited by Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2003, p.96.

■ ecological risks (the tendency of certain states to amplify the industrial polluting activities in order to obtain immediate benefits);

■ risks that affect the critical infrastructure or the energy security of a state or of a region;

b) *internal risks*

■ economic struggles which affect the military potential and which erode the state institutions authority;

■ social risks (epidemics / pandemics, dysfunctions in the medical insurance system, labor market dysfunctions, deficiencies of the social protection system);

■ events which can affect constitutional values (augmenting of extremist activities);

c) *asymmetrical risks* - those strategies or actions aimed against the national security interests, different from the "classical" confrontations (terrorism, psychological and / or informational warfare, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction etc.);

d) *transnational risks* – organized crime, drug trafficking, massive refugee flows –

Tactical analysis (mono-source, applied to a situation[10]) processes national security information regarding evolutions or threat indicators identified inside a certain issue or domain pertains to predictable consequences or to effects of certain actions which constitute risks and threats or to elements that could support the interests of Romania or of its allies.

legal or illegal – characterized by a strong interconnection.

In comparison with the strategic level, *the tactical analysis aims at approaching certain sectorial problems or developments* (economic, financial, social – health, inter-ethnic, educational – military, terrorism and organized crime) *which could affect national security interests*. The analytical process is being carried out by assessing data and information about the involved actors, targets, spatial and temporal coordinates and tangible effects of risk manifestation.

Given its features, the tactical analysis limits itself to assessing and sharing information about sectorial issues with the customers. The highlighting of the multiple links with the evolutions outside analytical field is of secondary concern.

This particularity doesn't exclude the possibility of underlying certain assessments with a high predictive-evaluative character, following the analytic processing of the data and information with relevance to the sector / domain in question.

The relation between the two types of analysis continues to represent one of the most litigated subjects within the intelligence community. The need for certain conceptual "clarifications" requires a certain explanation, which could be structured on two distinct levels: the one of "epistemological legitimacy", respectively the one on the predominance of usefulness in relation to the expectations of the intelligence customers.

There is an agreement that both tactical and strategic approaches represent distinct, autonomous, legitimate and necessary intelligence activities. The two types of intelligence analysis fundamentally differ by having different degrees of essence / integration in the analytical process.

This aspect reflects the "natural" advantage of strategic analysis in relation with the tactical one. The first is based on the assessment of an extended database and on multiple themes which go beyond the limits of a sectorial approach.

The specificity of strategic analysis resides in its capacity to generate connections, value judgments, trends, macro-level evolutions, offering explanations for certain situations which would be otherwise impossible to be assessed from a strictly tactical perspective.

There isn't a current need for imposing a strict delimitation between the two analytical levels, due to the existence of multiple interferences.

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[10] In contrast with the *trend analysis*, which is specific to strategic analysis.

The strategic analysis could represent as well a product of compacting tactical analysis into a strategic component - different in comparison to the first in terms of quality but based on it - as an assessment factor for previous tactical analyses accuracy and validity or for the way they integrate into a comprehensive picture. It could be useful to establish, in time, a relationing model strategic – tactical analysis, including from the perspective of re-analysing and remodeling of the current tactical analyses.

However, regarding the other side of the relations between the two analysis types – „**warning on current facts**" vs. "**focusing on strategic analysis**" – it is important to mention that the predominance of one or the other of the two perspectives in dissemination has manifested according to the occurring developments in the security situation, at a certain moment.

In time, there was perceived a need for a conceptual "decantation" between the two types of analysis.

Starting with the 80s a certain balance had prevailed between the tactical and the strategic level, as all the intelligence about different events or crisis management was defined as tactical warning, while the intelligence of predictive / estimative nature was defined as strategic analysis.

During the Cold War the analyses focused on the identified vulnerabilities of the "opposing camps" had a strategic impact, influencing the national strategies for those domains, even though the above-mentioned analyses could be perceived as actionable intlligence.

After the Cold War, the consistent developments within the security environment (the end of the Cold War, the emergence of the asymmetric risks and threats etc.) had determined a decrease in the use of the strategic analysis, as a result of the:

▪ increase in the customers requirements for tactical analyses, useful for decision-making with the purpose of countering the threats in specific situations;

▪ decrease in the analysts experience regarding the strategic domain, taking into account the compartmentation of intelligence work and the increasing specialization of the analysts;

▪ reduced use - due to time, expertise, customer requirements limitations - of the multidisciplinary sources, including the open ones, essential in supporting strategic analysis.

During the last years, the requests for information coming from the decision-makers have been focused both on "actionable intelligence" (respectively tactical analyses required for making punctual decisions), and on strategic intelligence (as a result of the complex evolutions in the security domain).

The intelligence community, as a whole, including the military intelligence, is prone to modify its approach: a "tactical" event (in the military sense of the word) or an "operational" one (in the sense used by the intelligence community) can have a significant strategic and political impact. As an example, hostage taking in conflict areas could reshape a state policy in what regards attending missions under an international mandate.

As previously stated, **the analytical effort is a reality which can be noticed even in what concerns the collection of intelligence**. At this level, the analysis consists in assessing raw data to see if the product respects the cumulative criteria for national security intelligence.

The mandatory content of the national security intelligence includes: subject (who?), action (what?), modus operandi (how?), location (where?), time (when?), and the reason (why?).

From this point of view, analysis can be considered as a stress test aimed at differentiating data / information relevant for the national security from various pseudo-informational products based on amorphous data and rumors.

Operational or primary analysis is focused on assessments in relation with the authenticity and the thoroughness of raw data (first notice data), by significantly contributing to their selection and, subsequently, drawing up the national security intelligence.

The operational analysis is basicly a process running at the edge of the operative area (more precisely intelligence collection area) and the analytical one (more precisely intelligence dissemination area). In the same time, this type of analysis:

▪ is involved in all the stages of the intelligence gathering (research, identification, collection and verification), including by specifying the intelligence requirements (which could be continuous or sequential);

▪ is applied to all the collected data, no matter how they are assessed in terms of reliability, which is the relation with the intelligence source or the attributes proved by the source.

This type of analysis has as main goals the detailed analytical research, the assessment of the dynamics and the operational situation trends and the assessment of the national security state, in the segment / area / domain of competence.

In most of the cases, the gathered information is fragmentary, ambiguous and prone to divergent interpretations. Therefore, the information analysis represents a vital component of the intelligence activity. Its purpose, in a limited sense, is to issue evaluations referring to the capacity, intentions and (current or future) actions which can affect the security interests.

It is important to mention that the success of effective operations in the informative-operational domain depends on the presence of analysis during the research-investigation process.

The main criteria for assessing the raw data - in order to determine the extent to which reality has been adequately described, to detect any changes that may have occurred during observing, interpreting and transmitting the data and, also, to identify any conceptual errors that resulted in the alteration of reality - are:

▪ **reliability (accuracy)** – refers to the degree of conformity of the information content to the *pre-existing level of knowledge*, the capacity of new information to comply with the previous knowledge of a certain reality. It can be built a scale with multiple reliability levels (how reliable is the information). For example, such a scale can comprise the following levels of reliability: *absolute reliability* – the information content is confirmed by other independent sources and by previous knowledge; *relative reliability* – the information content is confirmed by other independent sources and in part by previous knowledge; *novelty* – the information content is neither confirmed nor contradicted by other independent sources or previous knowledge; *partly inaccurate* – the information content is contradicted by other independent sources and partly by previous knowledge; *inaccurate* – the information content is contradicted by other independent sources and by previous knowledge;

▪ **completeness of information** – the capacity to integrate in a coherent manner the following content parameters: *subject, action, object, modus operandi, place, time and motivation*;

▪ **conclusiveness** – it establishes the degree to which the information contains enough elements to describe *the object and the action in a specific context*.

A piece of information is essentially conclusive if, by analyzing the context in which the action takes place, it is possible to fully understand its causes and its underlying significance and thus facilitate the assessment of the probable consequences (developments).

In order to assess the information for national security from the viewpoint of its documentary values it is necessary - apart from the above-mentioned criteria - to establish the degree of **relevance** attached to it by the recipient of the intelligence product.

The relevance is reflected by the effect intelligence products have on the recipients / customers, i.e. by the degree to which they fulfill recipients expectations in the decision-making process.

It is however important to note that the value of this indicator is dependent on the interaction between the significance of the message and the recipient's knowledge level /database. National security intelligence acquires a pragmatic value (usefulness) only to the extent that there is a genuine and complete connection between its content and the customer's prior knowledge of the topic in question.

<div align="center">*</div>

The above mentioned paragraphs were determined by the need for conceptual clarifications regarding the generic theme of the intelligence analysis, in order to make possible the presentation of a typology of this type of work - strategic, tactical and operational analysis.

Going beyond the particularities of each of the three types of analysis, we can now approach the intelligence analysis from a general point of view, referring essentially to the qualitative features of the intelligence analysis concept.

> The methodological aspects regarding the intelligence analysis stages are presented in Chapter 3 of the current Guide, which is also dedicated to the most used analysis techniques and methods.

CHAPTER 2 - The intelligence analyst – distinctive features, typology, structural and formative dimensions

General considerations. The role and functions of the intelligence analyst

Marius PERIANU

The need to organize, categorize and interpret the data and information gathered during the collection process is a common concern that permeates all areas of social life, impacting both the public and private sphere. The analyst's presence is therefore necessary in order to take full advantage of the gathered information, by actively analyzing it and eventually generating, at the end of a complex process, value-added products from an epistemic point of view and useful intelligence from a decision-making perspective.

Unlike analysts from other fields (social, economic, financial, political etc.), intelligence analysts operate with knowledge elements / data and information on various subjects (originating from open sources, but mostly from secret sources) and provide explanations, predictions, projections etc. of direct relevance to national security, designed to support political decisions.

The essential role played by intelligence analysis within the broader intelligence cycle endows the analyst with a distinct professional identity, which relies on certain mental skills and competences (as in the case of field officers), as well as on the willingness to acquire systematic knowledge and an integrating view on reality.

Consequently, *the analysts' responsibility for delivering intelligence products* is emphasized by the complexity of the analytical work, which entail (regardless of the association with one of the three types of analysis):

• assessing primary intelligence by quantifying its relevance and credibility[11], identifying its key elements and determining its value for the customer;

• identifying the real causes of the changes which occurred in their (intelligence) area of responsibility, anticipating trends and developments, as well as projecting alternative scenarios;

• working with contradictory / antagonistic assumptions, suppositions or information, while facing the constant danger of dealing with subjective judgments, disinformation and "politicized" information[12].

The complex nature of the analyst's role as part of the intelligence flow (**Figure 4**) calls for a detailed comprehension of every issue within the specific area of expertise, both from a historical /documentary perspective (dysfunctions, vulnerabilities, previously noted risks, adopted measures) and from the viewpoint of new elements, as pointed out by various intelligence sources.

Figure 4. The analyst as part of the intelligence flow

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[11] Evaluating the source or the transmitter.
[12] The risk of delivering to the beneficiary the desired information rather than the accurate and objective conclusions of the analysis.

At the same time, the analytical process requires the use of scientific methods designed not only to ensure a coherent performance, but also to avoid any inherent biases or thinking patterns, which are likely to intensify in stressful situations.

The work performed in stressful situations is generally carried out against the background of an increasing speed in processing large databases in a short period of time or whenever there is a major intelligence deficit regarding the causes or the consequences of a certain event, shortly after it takes place. If the latter occurs, the assessments are prone to be saturated with analyst's subjective / biased interpretations, which are not significant for the analyzed issue.

Likewise, intelligence analysts are required to regularly assess the operational situation they are monitoring and according to any new aspects and changes, to quantify the corresponding risk level (*what do we know?*), to offer projections regarding the possible developments (*what can happen?*) and to determine the need for acquiring new elements of knowledge (*what we don't know?*).

Within the intelligence product, the analyst should identify *the most adequate means to convey their message* so as to avoid any misinterpretation of the results /conclusions of the analysis and any misunderstanding thereof. Similarly, analysts should provide the customer with products including *alternative courses of action / solutions* designed to increase the efficiency of the latter's decisions.

All the aforementioned responsibilities / characteristics put the intelligence analyst in a position of actual "arbiter" of value judgments, thus endowing him / her with an important role in the decision-making process. In this capacity, the analyst is subject to a number of pressures generated by the amount of information and the accelerated dynamics of the security environment, as well as by the internal tensions generated by the need to efficiently convey the security message to the customer.

Intelligence analysts' typology

Cristian CIOBANU

The categories of analysts within the intelligence services. The classification of analysts into three categories (operational, tactical and strategic) results in their specialization in different fields (*operations, tactical analysis and strategic analysis*) and in the identification of the optimal correlation between their skills and the specific activities they need to perform.

The operational analyst is in charge with drafting operational plans in a specific manner (organized cooperation), by processing relevant information regarding each case or situation and thus ensuring *the first assessment of the operational situation and the expertise in certain specific fields / areas of interest.*

The tactical analyst. Unlike the operational analyst, the tactical one (as well as the strategic analyst) *uses information certified as relevant to national security and validated in the intelligence-operational field*. Tactical analysts operate with data and information related to a given area / field, which essentially point to immediate or medium-term risks and vulnerabilities and to sequential national security matters.

For the tactical analyst, the outcome of this situation triggers various responsibilities, centered on the **in-depth assessment of already structured information**, the verification of such information by contrasting it with contextual elements obtained from open sources and the identification of new aspects incorporated into *new national security intelligence*.

The strategic analyst is different from the previous types of analysts both by having his own thematic area and making use of a relatively different methodology.

● **The first aspect to highlight the particular nature of the strategic analysts' work** is reflected by the use of extended / diversified databases (both in terms of volume and sources).

This enables them to make multiple associations in order to determine the cause of certain developments, which would be impossible to explain by resorting to the conceptual and methodological instruments of tactical or operational analysis.

From this perspective, the strategic analyst's goal is to detect, based on a number of specific indicators, the important changes in the nature or magnitude of threats (their likelihood and the severity /extent of the consequences), which call for the reevaluation of the "defensive measures" designed to avert or prevent such threats and to limit their consequences, and to promptly communicate to the decision makers the findings of such analyses.

This is the main reason why strategic analysts must possess certain abilities: *a relevant experience* in security domain and in tactical and operational analysis processes, as well as a *significant general knowledge* so as to enable multiple associations among various domains that are relevant for the intelligence work.

The relevant experience can be defined as the accumulation of knowledge capable of favoring creativity, as opposed to the "routine" perspective, which is unyielding and repetitive, unable to identify those elements that transcend the boundaries between various fields.

Similarly, *the significant general knowledge* means the ability to acquire structured /organized knowledge in as many areas as possible (economy, law, administration, culture, religion, history etc.) in order to highlight the defining elements that come into play – sometimes in an apparently inexplicable manner – in certain events, reactions, situations etc. which are relevant to national security.

Since not even highly predictive strategic analyses can be entirely accurate, regardless of how thorough the underlying assessments are, it may be necessary to further reevaluate and correct these analyses depending on the circumstances. That is why the strategic analyst must have a pro-active attitude characterized by:

▪ *the ability to construct alternative explicative hypotheses*, which would implicitly reduce the uncertainty in understanding certain evolutions of the security environment;

▪ *introducing and / or adapting new instruments* that would allow a deeper understanding of the validation process of existing information and the design of projections regarding future courses of action.

Given the specific nature of the obtained analytical products, *the methodology employed by the strategic analyst tends to favor analytical methods and techniques with a marked inductive* (reasoning from particular to generic cases) *and predictive character* (estimates on the possible "future"), as well as a general description of the specific risk or threat.

● **The second fundamental characteristic of the activity of strategic analysts is the specific nature of intelligence products**. These are meant to offer explanatory perspectives, estimates and forecasts needed to project or reshape the main guidelines in foreign/domestic policies, relevant to national security for a medium or long-term perspective (even in decades).

The main objective of the strategic analyst is, therefore, to provide the decision makers with an intelligence product designed to support them in identifying or setting up strategies/ policies in the national security domains, as well as in establishing the proper courses of action as to reduce the disrupting potential of certain risk factors.

Therefore, through the results of their work, strategic analysts are true catalysts for change in the decision-making sphere that has a strategic impact, as they supply useful forecasts for political, economic or social decisions as well as for exploting strategic opportunities.

The psychological profile of the analyst

Cristian CONDREA

Among the skills and abilities that an analyst should possess are the following:

● objectivity – the analyst should be able to carry out a thorough analysis of information and come with solid and accurate reasoning to support his / her judgments.

This quality is meant to ensure both the scientific basis of analysis and the credibility of intelligence products for the customers;

● celerity – the capacity to provide real-time analytical products for customers, useful in the decision-making process;

● adoption and consistent use of a set of rules throughout the entire analytical process, so that the analyst should be able to manage an important amount of information, to recognize trends and identify the deceiving attempts (misinform or intoxicate);

● teamwork abilities – an analyst should be flexible to working within various task forces set up within or between different departments;

● receptivity to the feedback offered by customers.

The complete set of *abilities*, *characteristics, skills* and *knowledge* types that an analyst needs are shown in **Figure 5**.

Figure 5. Basic competencies of the intelligence analyst

A high degree of performance in intelligence analysis[13] implies the existence of certain psychological characteristics of the analyst according to the following categories:

a) *mental abilities*[14].

Analytical performance implies a continuous interconnection of various types (forms)

- **communication** (active listening, oral, graphic / visual)
- **teamwork** (leadership ability, influence, acceptance of different points of view)
- **thinking** (sinergia/simbioza în cazul grupului, ordanarea informaţiilor, recunoaşterea tiparelor, aplicarea de raţionamente – inductive, deductive)

- **intelligence community**
- **government strategies and policies**
- **customers** (intelligence requirements, level of knowledge, dissemination opportunity)
- **targets / topics of interest** (particularities regarding the culture, language, history, geography, politics, economy, technology, military / security situation)

Abilities   Knowledge

Skills   Characteristics

- **critical thinking**
- **PC knowledge**
- **oral** (publicly or in different formats) **and written expression skills**
- **good knowledge of foreign languages** (writing, speaking, reading, translating)
- **research** (definition of problems, construction of research strategies)
- **collecting and use of intelligence** (collection / selection, monitoring, organization, analysis / synthesis, interpreting, dissemination, coordination, assessment)
- **projects / processes management** (planning, implementing, monitoring, negotiating)

- **displaying an active curiosity**
- **possessing a powerful internal motivation**
- **continuously cultivating the observation abilities**
- **passionate for reading**
- **tenacious in identifying solutions**
- **capable to assess phenomena / situations from different perspectives**
- **displaying creativity in connecting the dots**
- **analyzing the situation to deal with as a problem to solve**
- **concentration ability**

of thinking. Their modus operandi gains specificity according to criteria such as: the suggested activities (algorithmic thinking – heuristic thinking), purpose (reproductive thinking – productive, critical thinking), evolution (diverging thinking and converging thinking) and logical activities (inductive and deductive thinking), which are detailed in **Table 1 (ANNEX).**

The functioning of all these "types" of thinking, relevant to the analysis process requires certain *cognitive abilities*, which are considered essential in order to be successful in this field (**Table 2 - ANNEX**);

b) *Skills*[15]

According to the type of activities specific to the analytical process they are part of, those skills can be:

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[13] Knowing the psychological profile of the analyst offers the opportunity to set up minimum standards of selection and performance, which are useful not only to human resources specialists, but also to analysts and their superiors in the process of professional training and evaluation.

[14] In the view expressed herein, *abilities* indicate relatively stable psychological and physical abilities, allowing the individual to carry out various types of activities. Given its nature, the analysis activity requires *mental abilities*. These abilities define the process of thinking that is central in reflecting reality: making use of abstraction and generalization, the analyst extracts and processes information on categorial and determinative relations into judgments, arguments and concepts.

[15] The skills are behavioral patterns that have become automated components of activity by practice. They refer to what an individual has to do as part of the analysis activity.

(1) *formative* (active learning, learning strategies) – they are employed in the personnel training process.

(2) *resolutive* (specific to scientific knowledge, ability to solve complex problems, active listening) – they are manifest in daily activities (in all analytical aspects: operational, tactical and strategic).

(3) *regulatory* (time monitor and management ability) – they refer to all those automatic processes established as a result of the coordination and control processes that ensure the quality of the analytical activity;

c) *personality traits (specific characteristics, relevant for the analysis activity and professional interests -* **Table 3 - ANNEX**) *and related psycho – characterial elements having implications in this process (***Table 4 - ANNEX**)[16].

The psychological profile of the intelligence analyst includes the following personality types[17]: 1) *investigatory* (analytical, cautious, critical, complex, curious, intellectual, introspective, accurate, rational, reserved); 2) *realist* (social skills, conformist, perseverant, sincere, unostentatious, normality); 3) *conventional* (caring, conformist, thorough, defensive, efficient, methodical, persistent, practical); 4) *artistic* (complex, expressive, idealist, imaginative, impulsive, independent, creative, original, sensitive and forthright);

d) *working style*[18]

Practice has shown that the profile of the ideal analyst implies a balanced combination between the following working styles: *perfectionist, perseverant and balanced*;

e) *motivational aspects of the analyst.*

Similarly to other occupational categories, we can emphasize the following needs whose fulfillment ensures professional satisfaction: need of self-accomplishment, of exploiting one's own potential, of professional recognition, of social statute, of professional diversity, of professional independence.

Factors influencing the analytical process. Psychological limits and analysis errors

Manuela MICU, Corin VÎLCEANU

The dictum "*errare humanum est*" is as suggestive in the field of intelligence analysis as it is for any other knowledge domains. Actually, cognitive psychology postulates that most mental processes are not conscious experiences and that perception, memory and information processing related mechanisms are functioning most frequently a priori to any conscious channeling or even independent of it.

Human perceptions and the way they process information are strongly influenced by education, experience, cultural values, job requirements, organizational norms, as well as by the nature of information received. They all make up lenses (*models, patterns, analytical presuppositions*) through which they relate to

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[16] Professional preferences show an inclination for certain activities; to know them when selecting personnel facilitates the placement of the individual within an organization.

[17] In order to identify them *Holland's theory on professional interests and carrier choices* was employed; Holland's theory sets up a hexagonal model, including six personality types, according to professional interests (realist, investigatory, artistic, social, intrepid and conventional.

[18] It is defined as a relatively constant complex made up of various types of behaviors resulting from the interaction of different characteristics of one's personality, the type of activity we are involved in, requirements and the influence of the environment.

objective reality and which may distort one's perceptions, offering only a subjective presentation of what people think they know about the external world.

When incapable of assimilating the complex nature of reality, individuals use simplified mental patterns of the objective world to which they add information they receive in time; the informational input and one's own pattern of thinking are not always compatible.

It is necessary to underline the difference between *cognitive errors* (due to the psychological limits of the analyst as a human being) and *other types of errors* (having a different etiology from cognitive ones, respectively social, organizational or cultural).

Psychological limits of the analytical process

● *Memory vulnerabilities*

The mental configuration of the analyst is influenced by memory, whose functioning determines the strengths and vulnerabilities of the analytical process.

According to Richard Heuer, storing mental lay-outs in the long term memory and activating them in the analytical process allows the analyst to identify patterns in the mass of data that it analyzes that would otherwise go unnoticed[19].

The information stored may determine an awareness of their existence without any effort on the part of the analyst; on the contrary, updating them may require considerable time and effort. In both cases, the factors that influence updated information, influence analysis as well.

Among them, Richard Heuer identifies: *the quality of being the first information stored on a particular subject, its credibility, the attention paid to that information, the importance given to it when it is stored*.

The limits that memory sets in the analysis process may seem as:

▪ *difficulties in understanding the complexity of a problem*, because the number of elements simultaneously introduced in the active memory is of 7 +/- 2.

For example, when selecting an option, first the arguments and then the counterarguments are considered, without being able to simultaneously evaluate them;

▪ *interpretation errors*, given the fact that memory tends to operate with categories (classes of elements).

On the one hand, the access to information regarding relatively similar phenomena results in a tendency to include such information in the same information category (by memorizing it as a single concept), which finally generates the correct understanding and usage of the information.

On the other hand, the lack of a suitable category so as to include data or real facts entails the incapacity to memorize such information and, implicitly, the impossibility to have it represented by using a specific set of data and to update it later on.

● *Limits of the cognitive mechanisms*

The viewpoint according to which analysts cannot be wrong is unrealistic. While "objective" inadvertencies can be generated during an analytical process due to lacking data or incomplete information, various dysfunctions could be generated by certain mental patterns targeted at "fitting" reality in order to obtain the necessary elements which are to be processed into intelligence products.

Such mechanisms provide a distinct category of errors, commonly known as cognitive errors, which are different in manifestation, and they can have major consequences on the analytical process. In essence, such judgment deficiencies are triggered by our own strategies designed to simplify the way information are processed and they are meant to influence, at different levels, information analysis, assessment of the arguments, understanding of the causal relations, estimate of the alternatives and assessment of the action options.

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[19] Heuer, R.J., *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, Washington DC, Central Intelligence Agency for the Study of Intelligence, 1999 [online], disponibil la: http://www.cia.gov./csi/books/19104.

The cognitive error can be compared to an optical illusion, where the distortion element continues to influence the analyst, even though he / she has been warn about its existence and nature. Thus, despite of analysts' efforts to remain as objective as possible, the risk of failure in the intelligence analytical work cannot be eliminated for good. The errors which mostly affect analytical efforts are:

▪ **the mirror image**, generated by the analyst's incapacity to understand foreign cultures and ideologies without overlapping them to his own standard values and mental set. In such situations, it is unlikely that the analyst could correctly anticipate behaviors and reactions in predetermined contexts, given his reduced capacity to sympathize with individuals/entities with different cultures and/or mentality;

▪ **the background noise**, a situation in which the analyst fails to identify and extract the relevant information from a significant range of data;

▪ **failure to identify disinformation attempts**, resulting in inducing wrong analytical conclusions after uncritically assuming false information, especially created/launched in order to determine the orientation of the developments of a certain situation in a pre-established sense.

▪ **the mental inertia** makes the analyst ignore the information that is different from his evaluation set.

The available data which substantiate the national security information process are often incomplete, a situation in which the temptation to resort to the convergent thinking/judgment occurs, favoring speculative interpretations.

Therefore, the analysis often appears as a well-argued "informed speculation". Nevertheless, in order to remain credible, any speculation should be: (1) based on expertise (the analyst should have thorough knowledge about the issue); (2) supported by logic, well-argued and convincing evidence; (3) validated by the future.

(*A more complete presentation of the cognitive errors types can be found in* **Table 5 - ANNEX**)

Ethics and deontology in intelligence analysis

Andreea RĂDUȚU

Thinking Aloud
Yes

MOTTO: „*An action can only be justified by making reference to a certain set of values.*" (O. Cotruș)

The intelligence analyst work, similar to other professions or lines of work, is regulated by national laws (applicable to the general intelligence work) and internal normative acts, specific to the intelligence analysis domain.

The expression *intelligence process ethics* is described as an *oxymoron* by the most of the authors[20], but it is considered as valuable in supporting the efforts to improve the intelligence services professionalism and control upon their activity.

The ethics is different by the law: while the law is always formal, the ethics could be informal, functioning according to principles not necessarily officially codified; the law is

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[20] William M. Nolte, *Ethics and Intelligence*, in JFQ / July-September 2009, available at: www.ndupress.edu.

applied by a judicial system, while the compliance to the ethical norms is usually the privilege of the professional groups or the organization.

The main layers of analysis regarding intelligence process ethics are:
- the relation between ethics and law;
- the institutional and individual levels of ethical responsibility;
- the ethical approaches of the intelligence process[21].

The *ethical responsibility level* can be individual or institutional. The intelligence services are responsible by the ethical approach of the organization as a whole and they have the duty to establish ethical parameters for the employees to comply with[22]. In turn, the analysts, as any other intelligence officers, have to adopt a professional conduct fully according to the relevant ethical norms and principles for the intelligence analysis.

The analytical work especially values axiological principles such as *thruth, accuracy, precision, objectivity*. All these are ethical lanmarks of intelligence analysis, together with the definitory coordinates of the relation with the customer: *trust, confidentiality, availability*.

From this perspective, the ethical and deontological code of the intelligence analyst is not a manual with procedures as well as not a disciplinary instrument. Such a code brings an essential contribution to: **(1)** ensuring the ethical conduct of an analyst by establishing and promoting the adequate professional culture, by educating the personnel in the spirit of this culture, by preventing behavioral deviations and by encouraging high-quality specific activities; **(2)** maintaining a balance between the citizens' rights, the public authorities' interests, and the rights and obligations of the intelligence personnel.

According to the aforementioned definitions, the following principles could be formulated:

❏ *Acknowledging the high degree of responsibility, as part of its role within intelligence.* This principle implies an impartial evaluation of intelligence products, with a view to the serious social implications that arise from the analyst's activity which reflect in the documents sent to the customer.

The conclusions of the analysis must never interfere with unfunded opinions and assumptions (induced opinions / taken from outsiders), or with any pressures, more or less explicit, meant to „reshape" the analysis products according to certain circumstances;

❏ *Accurately self-evaluating one's own "analytical" limitations.* Once we take responsibility for the end analytical product, there is a need for an accurate evaluation of the limitations in knowledge and understanding that any analyst faces within the security issues he / she deals with. The consequences of this approach may be reflected in the analyst's decision not to express his / her opinion on a certain topic which he / she either has no knowledge about, or has partial data;

❏ *The imperative need for convergent responsibility.* Within each stage of the analytical / dissemination process, every time the supervisor interferes with the content of the product, he / she must take explicit responsibility for all the changes and must communicate to the issuer the arguments that support such an intervention.

This is also necessary when reviewing the end intelligence product. When performed in a judicious manner, this operation can become one of the most efficient ways of preventing any distortion inherent to any of the stages specific to issuing an intelligence product. *Unfortunately, under certain circumstances, such distortions may affect the very process of reviewing the product.*

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[21] Michel Andregg, *Ethics and Professional Intelligence, The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*, Oxford University Press Inc., 2010.
[22] Toni Erskine, *As Rays of Light to the Human Soul. Moral Agents and Intelligence Gathering*, in Intelligence and National Security, 2004, available (21.03.2009) at: http://www.informaworld.com.

In order to prevent such occurrences, the analyst has to discuss directly with the working group members (if such a group was formed) and with the supervisor who performs the reviewing activity, whenever there are significant differences between the initial text and the final draft resulted from the internal evaluation process, so that it can be sent to the customers;

❑ **Tenacity in supporting his / her assessments.** The analyst must support his / her opinions (based on a thorough knowledge of the issue under investigation) no matter how "inadequate" the conclusions might "sound", under certain circumstances.

The analyst must take a similar approach in his / her attempt to reconsider / reformulate the conclusions, whenever new elements arise, if those could alter initial data.

This approach can be encouraged by promoting different types of activities that force analysts to face alternative perspectives, analytical debates, concurrent analyses, interdisciplinary debates, or to seek advice from experts outside the intelligence system. This approach is all the more necessary as the customers of the intelligence product often request that it includes alternative scenarios, in order to reduce uncertainty;

❑ **Creativity and innovation.** In order to ensure the adaptability of the intelligence system to consecutive challenges from the security environment, the preoccupation of intelligence structures to support creativity and innovation is a *sine qua non* condition.

The antithesis of routine and excessive red tape, creativity (and its complimentary, innovation) manifests in the field of intelligence analysis through the capacity of emphasizing hypothesis, projects, themes from outside the "standard paradigm" and by using atypical methodologies, which prove useful to the analytical process.

*

The aforementioned issues are only part of the elements that can shape a set of deontological principles specific to intelligence analysis. We do not claim that these issues cover the entire deontological framework, and the reason why they were formulated is to emphasize a certain approach of the analytical phenomenon specific to intelligence services that transcends current legislation.

CHAPTER 3 - Methods and techniques in the intelligence analysis

General considerations. The fundamental stakes for the intelligence analysis

Sanda MURĂRESCU

The attention paid to the systematization and theorization of intelligence analysis consecrates the idea that it should distance itself from empirical approaches and claim the status of scientific knowledge. This should also include, depending on the selected analytical matrix, measurements, calculation, comparisons in terms of quantity/quality, explanations and forecasts.

However, the dichotomy *science versus art* represents a recurrent topic in academia debates on the nature of the analytical process. The supporters of the first approach are contending the "artistic" nature of analysis and are requesting the compliance of the analytical processes with the scientific methodology strictness. Their main argument regards the fact that the "analytical art" depends on the cognitive abilities of the individual dubled by his / her "luck" in finding a mentor and it is performed through a series of trial and error processes which lead to untested and unvalidated results (including the positive ones) from a methodological point of view[23]. By contrast, *the science* of intelligence analysis can be studies, perfectioned and applied through scientific processes, tested, verified and replicable.

The supporters of the second approach are saying that the theorization generates restrictions and creates useless complications because, however, "only those who don't know how to cook are in need of cooking books and only those having not enough experience are in need of instruction manuals"[24].

In the intelligence services work, the intelligence analysis implies the call for analytical methods (conventional or non-conventional), complying with the scientific strictness, as well as continuous knowledge and experience ("expertise"), and imagination and intuition.

Be it about ways of using information resources or procedures to systematize data and knowledge, (quantitative and qualitative) investigation methods or mathematic, static, dynamic tools and electronic calculation techniques – the accurate development and success of an objective and analytical activity is highly conditional to their use, in order to generate a consolidated diagnosis regarding a significant development impacting national security.

The diversity of topics, themes and issues tackled in the analytical effort, as well as the ways to approach them and elaborate the information documents for customers makes the predetermined use of analysis methods and techniques impossible. Therefore, the methodology – so necessary and important in any knowledge effort – should be flexibly used.

The above mentioned conclusion represents, as a matter of fact, the most important characteristic of the analytic process in *intelligence*, insofar as most of the processed data and

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[23] Johnston, Rob (2005) - *Analytic culture in the US intelligence community – a ethnographic study,* Washington DC: Center for the study of intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, pp.17-21.
[24] Laquer, Walter (1995) - *The uses and limits of intelligence*, New Jersey: Transaction Publishing, p. 294.

information is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and lack of thoroughness. Therefore, special attention should be paid to the ways in which various methods or techniques are used in the fields where the degree of uncertainty and ambiguity of the databases is lower. The awareness of these limits implies:

(1) *assessing, as objectively as possible, the risks generated by the use of analytical methodology on incomplete databases*, which requires a careful selection of the methods and techniques in terms of the specific/particularities of the processed data;

(2) *adopting a highly critical perspective over the validity of the analytical judgments* involving incomplete, confusing information elements, and favoring thus the recognition of the limits that can sometimes essentially mark the analytic efforts.

The precariousness of data which are subject to the analytic process as well as the 'natural' limits of the used methods and techniques favor one of the greater temptations the intelligence analyst faces: the elaboration of speculative explanations by 'breaking' the applicability/ validity limits of the used method and sliding towards intuitive, unsubstantiated approaches.

In many situations, the "base" for these speculative constructions is explained by the use of the so-called "specific techniques and methods", an expression specific to the professional jargon, without any content and which can "justify" any kind of conclusion.

In fact, the fundamental challenge characterizing the security intelligence analysis does not consist in the use – 'in a specific, particular manner', which is not encountered in other fields – of a set of consecrated methods and techniques, but in their intelligent (versatile, flexible) use, depending on the above-mentioned limits.

Structural and functional stages of information analysis

Mihai DINU, Marius PERIANU

The specific structure of the analytic process dynamics prompts – in a descriptive elaboration – a series of stages (**Figure 6**) which ensure both the rigorous systematization/organization of the information substance and a correct and efficient use of the analytic abilities.

The secret intelligence analysts called to solve problems whose knowledge found at an incipient stage is frequently facing the necessity to put together conclusions based on data processed under pressure, with the purpose of releasing a judgement allowing decision making or establishing conclusions based on insufficiently elaborated elements, and unclear facts. The judgement is used by the analysts in order to eliminate the gaps from their knowledge, being the main method of facing the uncertainty and getting beyond the available information.

❑ **Defining the problem.** As a first stage of the analytic process, the problem definition plays a major role in the analytical process, as this moment marks the delimitation of the study subject. It depends on the theme relevance (selected by the analyst or suggested by the customer), the operational context variables and the objective limits that characterize both the gathered data (in the current database and the documentary fund) and the customer's prior knowledge on the chosen topic.

Figure 6. Intelligence analysis stages

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS STAGES - Iterative (Cyclic), Multidirectional Process

Understanding the customer's needs to know is of special importance to the analyst. Direct communication could represent an efficient way of orienting the analytical efforts.

This stage – a necessary process for the three main *intelligence* analysis types (operational, tactical and strategic) – implies different forms and complexity degrees, depending on the characteristics of each analytical 'species'.

However, regardless of the peculiarities of the ways in which a problem is defined, it is worth noting that the correct (or, on the contrary, incorrect) identification of the analysis subject will have an essential impact on the entire analytical process.

An inaccurate perspective in phrasing the problem will generate multiple difficulties in arguing the work hypotheses and supporting relevant facts, as 'the identification of a pseudo-problem' risks to lead to the extraction of the arguments supporting a false hypothesis.

❑ **Generating hypothesis.** At this level, all plausible hypotheses that can be built on a subject should be taken into consideration, in order to reduce them to a finite number of work hypotheses. In order to avoid or counter-balance the analyst's potential preconceived ideas, alternative hypotheses should be released, resorting to:

▪ **the situational logic.** It resides in perceiving the analyzed situation as a unique configuration of facts, relationships and factors which has to be understood in their own specific context, trying to identify as exactly as possible the cause-effect relationship or, when dealing with purposive behaviors, means-ends relationships.

Thus, starting with the known facts of the present situation and, respectively, an understanding of the unique forces at work at that particular time and place, the analyst seeks to identify the logical antecedents or consequences of this situation, developing a scenario ('plausible narrative') working both backwards (to explain the origins of the present situation) and forward (to estimate the future outcome).

Despite the wide applicability allowing the integration of a large volume of relevant details, this kind of approach can face certain difficulties in applying the cause-effect and means-ends matrixes to realities beyond the analyst's conceptual frameworks (to understand through 'empathy', for instance, the decisions, action pattern and organization system of foreign governments and the mental of foreign leaders);

▪ **the application the 'consecrated theory'.** It specifies that when a situation satisfies a given set of conditions (a result of generalization based on the study of many examples of previous phenomena), it will follow, probably, a similar scenario to those envisaged by previous elements of similar nature.

Although it is 'less time-consuming' (respectively offering the analyst the possibility to sort through a mass of less significant details by identifying the key elements of a problem), this kind of approach runs the risk of ignoring evidence that is truly indicative of future development of the 'radiographed' phenomenon;

▪ **comparison to similar past situations.** When a historical situation is deemed comparable to current circumstances, analysts use their understanding of the historical precedent to fill gaps in their understanding of the current situation.

Reasoning by comparison/similarity is a convenient 'shortcut', when neither data nor theory is available. Nevertheless, this kind of reasoning runs the risk of affecting the perception over the present situation by relating it to the historical precedent, all the more as the analyst is inclined to achieve understanding by reducing the unfamiliar to familiar.

❑ **Selecting information.** The natural reaction of *intelligence* structures to complex security challenges is that of focusing efforts towards increasing information volume, when, in fact, the premises of a really efficient activity are created based on an additional infusion of relevance, respectively of the analytical value added to information.

To that end, the analyst should:

▪ not limit to the regular flow of data. It is advisable to develop guidelines to adjust the information collection, when necessary, in order to be able to assess as many hypotheses as possible, including those which – from various reasons - have not been taken into account by the issuer;

▪ should undertake efforts to "circumvent" his/her own horizon of expectation - understood within this context as a set of assumptions, which can affect the analytical conclusions -, as the events meeting these expectations are usually easily perceived and processed, while those contradicting them tend to be ignored or distorted from the very moment of their perception.

Expectations have different sources – experience, professional training, cultural and organizational norms – predisposing analysts to highly subjective approaches in the process of understanding, organizing and interpreting information.

In the intelligence analyst's case, the impact of pre-existent expectations and images on perception is significantly greater, as the intelligence analysis frequently consists in handling situations about which there are incomplete/equivocal information.

Therefore, *judgment should be suspended during the information integration process for each hypothesis*, since the first impression (which is not necessarily the correct one) tends to persist even after a significant increase in the relevant information volume, further affecting the perception accuracy.

Such an attitude is all the more worth being taken into account as a significantly greater amount of information is needed to invalidate a hypothesis than to enunciate it.

❑ **Assessing hypotheses.** The rigorous selection of work hypotheses is needed in order to prevent the analyst's temptation to elaborate a 'convenient' analysis using empirical reasoning and/or applying counter-productive work 'strategies', such as:

● *satisfactory hypothesis* – selecting the first identified hypothesis that appears 'good enough', without reviewing all the other possible hypotheses to really identify the optimal one;

● *facile hypothesis temptation* - neglecting/ignoring really important hypotheses and focusing on a narrow range of work hypotheses on marginal aspects of the analyzed situation;

● *convenient option* – non-critically assuming the hypothesis deemed as the most widely supported/approved;

● *avoiding arguments* – the subject description is accompanied by a simple enumeration of the possible versions which may explain a phenomenon/situation, without

elaborating on the arguments justifying both their selection and differentiation according to the degree of probability.

Usually, the most likely hypothesis is not the one with the most evidence for it, but the one with the least evidence against it or against which less conflicting evidence has been found. This is the reason why, *during the hypothesis selection, the analyst should eliminate the improbable or less probable ones rather than try to confirm the accuracy of the probable ones.*

Thus, a well-conceived analytical product makes an inventory of all rational hypotheses, quotes arguments supporting the reasoning behind their selection, hierarchies them using scale representation expressions of (un)certainty and also synthetically justifies the dismissal of the less likely alternatives.

❑ **Ongoing monitoring of new information.** As sudden changes can occur anytime, with an impact on the security environment morphology or new information can be obtained, changing significantly the perception over a pre-existing situation, the analytical conclusions cannot be considered but the expression of an 'experimental', 'work' radiography.

In order to reduce premises for distorted perceptions, the analyst should pay a special attention to the way in which new information interact with the results of previous processing. Any discrepancy represents the first hint that the understanding of facts needs to be adjusted (at best) or is incomplete or inaccurate. *From this perspective, the analyst should monitor the evolution of an examined topic and constantly assess the opportunity to build alternative hypotheses*[25].

Concluding, given the inherent difficulties associated to the human processing of complex information, a management system has to:

- encourage the products which are clearly separating the suppositions by the deductive series and specify the uncertainty degree and source reflected in the conclusions;

- encourage the analyses which periodically re-examine the managed issues, in order to avoid the traps of a subjective approach;

- underline the procedures which present and elaborate on different points of view;

- present to the customers both the limits, as well as the capacities of secret intelligence analysis and to define a set of realist expectations, for comparison, in order to judge the analytical performance.

Analysis methods. Typology, characteristics

Bogdan PRISECARU, Adrian ENE

The analytical methodology does not represent a secret given that there is a significant amount of resourses which can be accessed without major costs especially within the virtual environment. Therefore, it is important the way the methods are incorporated to a working model as functional and adjusted to organization requirements as possible.

No intelligence analysis method can offer a certain guarantee for success, given the analyst faces, in most of the situations, incomplete data, a reduced time to react and he / she is involved in a lot of projects and working groups covering a diverse spectrum of topics.

However, the practical work showed that there is a chain of five steps to be followed within an analytic process[26]:

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[25] Heuer, R.J., *op.cit.*
[26] Campbel, Anthony, coord., *An Intelligence Analysis Primer – Six Steps to Better Intelligence Analysis,* Ottawa, 2008.

(1) *defining the issue*, which could be an idea, a theme, a problem, a theory, a group of similar units from which to extract the elements to compare, historical or biographical information;

(2) *establishing a set of significant comparable elements.* It involves to specify the key elements of the current situation and to identify one or more similar historical precedents, which could clarify present understanding;

(3) *extracting the essential features of the identified elements and performing analogies.* As higher the number of the potential analogies is, as the probability to select the proper one is increased. A special importance is attached at this stage to the analyst background – previous knowledge and experiences – which are conditioning the correct perception of differences and similitudes between the two situations;

(4) *constructing the matrix* which logically and intelligibly organizes those features;

(5) *formulating hypotheses, prognoses or predictions* which can result from correlating the analysis units.

According to the type of analysis (strategic, tactical or operational), it could be implemented a number of methods, their choice being an attribute of the analyst. In the following sections, four methods often used in intelligence analysis are described, but they cannot be taken as strict rules. The interpolation of the stages contained within these methods or their complementary use could be useful when the analyst is performing the above-mentioned steps.

I. Content Analysis. Derived from the communication science theory and used mainly in the social sciences, the method consists of a set of techniques used in the objective and systematic identification of the messages' features. Specifically, it takes into account[27]:

(a) text element analysis - isolated or in inter-dependence, in order to establish the meaning of the message.

From this point of view, three types of semantic analysis can be used, respectively: 1) *trend study* (consisting in contrastive considerations of the messages sent by the same emitter at different moments); 2) *contingency analysis* (focuses on the interdependence between the text elements of the same message); 3) *performance analysis*, the messages are commensurate on a 'normative standard';

(b) evaluation of the emitter (speaker, writer etc.), by distinguishing his/her intentions, motivations, and concepts, either using the representational pattern (based on the correspondence between the emitter's intention and message content), or through instrumental pattern (focused on the concordance of three elements: emitter's intention – message content – other factors, such as the social context).

As for the last element, the communication is conceived at the instrumental level, so the message is included into a social persuasion process, a reason why the analyzed data should be corroborated with the 'extra-textual' data;

(c) evaluation of the receiver's reactions. From this point of view, the content analysis focused on the receivers' feedback can establish the impact over the public of the messages published by media.

The content analysis consists of the following ***steps***[28]:

(1) establishing the general theme and corpus on which the analytical methods designed to confirm or not a hypothesis will be applied;

(2) establishing the theoretical framework for the analytical process, a step during which mentions are usually made on:

• the modality in which the researcher approaches and defines the *textual features* that will make the subject of the researcher's activity, so that the research theme meets its goal;

• the existence or non-existence of a significant link among the analyzed aspects;

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[27] Chelcea, S.; Mărginean, I.; Cauc, I., *Cercetarea sociologică. Metode şi tehnici*, Bucureşti, Ed. Destin, 1998.

[28] Neuendorf, Kimberly A.: *The Content Analysis Guidebook Online* (2002), available online at: http://academic.csuohio.edu/kneuendorf/content/.

• the delimitation of the *analytical units*. An analytical unit is the minimal component that, preserving its autonomy, is interpretable at the level of the research object.

For instance, at the level of a single article, one cannot establish if that newspaper completely informs its reader, so that the 'insufficiencies" of an article can be 'compensated' in another article. Therefore, it is necessary all the published articles in a certain period of time be analyzed, the analysis unit being in this case 'the set of articles published in the X newspaper during the Y period';

(3) elaborating of a set of rules governing the analytical activity (operationalization).

Generally, three significant types of prescriptions operate in this step, respectively:

(a) *related to the classification* (a system of **categories** on which the texts are going to be classified, designed to function as a filter for the texts is established);

(b) *related to the* **registration units**, resulted from the disintegration of the analytical units, segments which, through their distribution in one of the system's categories, can serve to a quantitative analysis. Fragmentation can reach the level of words or sentences, but the measurement unit could be similar to the analytical unit;

(c) *related to* **context units**, meaning those entities at an immediate superior level of the registration unit. The context can be *immediate* (phrase for word, paragraph for phrase, etc.) or *general* (newspaper's attitude, for example);

(4) proceeding to the content analysis itself, through the set of rules established in the previous step over the relevant corpus;

(5) interpreting the selected data. According to the conclusions drawn, the interpretation is followed either by a confirmation or denial of the working hypothesis from which the analysis started.

II. Contextual Analysis resides in studying a particular problem, as a part, a subsystem, which is later integrated into a general plan (collective, institutional, historical), through an inter-disciplinary/multilateral assessment of the political, military, social, cultural and economic data.

This kind of approach integrates a problem into more comprehensive processes and phenomena, so that correct premises should be identified, making possible the issuance of highly likely hypotheses and forecasts on the potential evolution of the analyzed topic. To that end:

• it resides in understanding the past, the historical evolution of the analyzed phenomenon. Similar precedents are identified, their origin and the real dimensions of their importance being also mentioned. The difficulty is, here, in establishing – based on the concord principle and extrapolation of the past - the configuration of future phenomena;

• it operates by establishing typologies, *patterns* aimed at consolidating the predictive dimension of the analytical product. At this point, the present characteristics of the studied phenomenon, its importance and relationship with the architecture it is part of must be identified and understood.

III. Trend Analysis is a method of observing/examining the evolution of certain *patterns* (relationship matrixes) in a well-established time frame, in order to identify the manner in which they change and develop. This analytical method allows analysts to establish the changes, their aim and nature – quantitative or qualitative, positive or negative (from the perspective of their impact on the security environment)[29].

After identifying the threat signs, diagnosing the cause and establishing the vectors, the matrix study can be used to forecast the approximate moment when the assessed threat level rises to critical as well as to estimate the implications, before its materialization.

The trend analysis can be applied to political science, engineering, demography, but it especially efficient in the financial, banking and information technology fields. As for the

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[29] Heur, Richards J.; Pherson, Randolph, *Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis*, CQPress, Washington DC, 2011.

financial-banking sector, the trend analysis can be identified in the efforts to understand and assess the changes on the market, as it offers a dynamic picture of all temporal dimensions.

Experts have already identified several *types of trends*: upward, downward and horizontal (depending on the graphical representation of positive, negative and linear developments) and short-, medium- and long-term trends (according to the temporal criterion)[30].

IV. Comparative Analysis determines the existence of identical or divergent elements among two or many analysis units, in order to elaborate hypotheses on a phenomenon evolution[31].

Analysts use their understanding of the historical precedent to fill gaps in their understanding of the current situation, starting from the premises that:

• unknown elements of the present are assumed to be the same as known elements of the historical precedent;

• the same forces are at work;

• the outcome of the present situation is likely to be similar to the outcome of the historical situation;

• corrective action is required in order to avoid the same failures as in the past.

Thus, the present situation is interpreted from the perspective of a more or less explicit conceptual model, generated by the analysis of similar situations in different periods and locations and which is based on a single or few cases.

By using this kind of analysis, one can notice juxtapositions, similarities or differences which orient the perception over the studied phenomenon and facilitates the elaboration of plausible hypothesis regarding its future evolution.

However, the most productive use of comparative analysis is to suggest hypotheses and to highlight differences between the approached units by contrast. Comparison can suggest the presence/influence of variables that are not readily apparent in the current situation, or stimulate the imagination to conceive explanations/possible outcomes that might not otherwise occur to the analyst.

Despite the above-mentioned benefits, the implicit admission of the lack of sufficient information to understand the present situation and the lack of a relevant theory to relate the present situation to many other comparable situations increases significantly the potential for error. As constant analogies run the risk to prove accidental, this type of analysis should be cautiously used.

In a comparative analysis, the analytical process consists in making use of logical tools as well as classifications, definitions, analogies, observing the following *principles*:

• comparison can be validated only if it is made among comparable elements that can be thus analyzed;

• terms should be analyzed using their real connections, considering the social, economic, political and cultural context they resulted from;

• the initial significance as well as that resulting from the subsequent evolution of the analyzed elements should be taken into account[32].

There are two methods – originating from the economic sciences and successfully implemented in business – which can be also implemented in order to provide a more adequate decision support: SWOT analysis and cost-benefit analysis.

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[30] *Ibidem*.

[31] *How to Write a Comparative Analysis*, available online at: www.fas.harvard.edu/wricntr/documents/ComparativeAnalyisis.html.

[32] Lor, Peter, *International and Comparative Librarianship,* chapter IV – *Methodology in Comparative Studies*, project, April 2011.

V. SWOT Analysis – internal and external strong points and vulnerabilities. Considered as an efficient instrument in the audit and forecasting activity, respectively in managing the incipient steps of operation planning, the SWOT analysis is largely used in the past years, being applied mainly in the strategic management[33].

Facing a complex situation that has to be settled in a definite time, the analyst has to limit his efforts, respectively to focus on the high-impact events, using SWOT as an identification framework for these critical issues. However, in such a situation, the SWOT results have to be validates through analytical methods.

The SWOT analysis consists in identifying and extracting the essential aspects of the problem, respectively their organization on the following dimensions:

(1) Strengths – strong points, qualities (e.g.: expertise in a certain domain, personal relations. prestige);

(2) Weaknesses – weak points, gaps (e.g.: lack of some knowledge or any other resources, costs, the power of target)[34];

(3) Opportunities – opportunities derived from the circumstances around the phenomenon (e.g.: open sources, internet, training classes, assumed action model);

(4) Threats – threats against the evolution of the analyzed situation or phenomenon (e.g.: an inappropriate context, which can become destructive)[35].

When elaborating the analysis report, it is important to maintain a general format:

● elaborating a narrative part (one-two pages), which should be well organized and contain the most recent data on the analyzed entity;

● drawing the table comprising the most significant positive (**S**) and negative (**W**) internal aspects, as well as the most influential positive (**O**) and negative (**T**) external aspects.

The items in the table should be concise, relevant descriptors; their distribution means that a single category can contain more than one or none of the identified elements (for instance, the obvious advantages of a certain situation cannot be relevant for the analysis objective).

The distributed descriptors in the negative categories (W and T) need a special attention, being examined including from the perspective of diminishing their harmful potential of manifestation or even to be turned into advantages/qualities.

The goal of this method is to isolate the basic problems, in order to facilitate a strategic approach of the situation as a whole. The accuracy of the identification process of the items susceptible to appear in the SWOT table is critical.

VI. Cost-Benefit Analysis. It can be made through systematical consideration of the ratio between benefits and costs, on which the decision makers can select, from a range of options, the action modality allowing the most appropriate use of the resources[36].

Initially conceived as a systematic assessment technique of the efficiency of the impact of the social intervention strategy, this method is nowadays preferred especially in the economic field, given the fact that it allows the solution classification according to efficiency and the quantification of the costs.

Beyond the situations where the efficiency prevails, the cost-benefit analysis is a useful tool for a comprehensive assessment of any action, being able to answer, by extrapolation, the need to rationalize all decision types.

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[33] Heur, Richards J.; Pherson, Randolph, *op.cit.*

[34] **(1)** and **(2)** represent issues which internally characterize the analyzed situation or phenomenon.

[35] **(3)** and **(4)** represent extrinsic factors in relation to the analyzed situation/phenomenon.

[36] Tevfik F. Nas, *Cost-Benefit Analysis: Theory and Application*, Sage, 1996.

The application of that method **assumes the identification of all significant effects of an action option, their classification in costs and benefits** - *ex post* concepts (describing what happens next), **respectively the selection of a decision** by applying the Kaldor-Hicks Criterion – according to which an action should be carried out only if the benefits triggered the improvement of the initial situation, additional to the full compensation of what was lost[37].

For the decisions on managing the public spending, this method is the main analytical framework and assumes the systematic enumeration of all tangible and intangible costs and benefits (often difficult to quantify). The cost-benefit analysis was intensively used after the World War Two, including the description of the final balance of various action projects as well as of rules to chose between various options according to the decision-makers' preferences.

In some cases, the cost-benefit analysis allows the assessment of the impact of a projected situation or action, both at *domestic* level (the effect over the players and parameters of the situation), and at *foreign* level (the effect over the variables outside the operational framework). Some other times, the analysis is applied sequentially, only over some steps or elements.

The work methodology consists of **5 steps**:

(1) *identifying the project/projects to be analyzed;*

(2) *establishing all effect categories;*

(3) *assessing the impact*, to which a monetary value is associated: favorable effects will be registered as benefits, the other as costs (a move that takes into account including their evolution over time);

(4) *calculating the net benefit* (through the difference between the total benefits and the total costs);

(5) *selecting the most efficient project*.

When applying the method precaution is needed in taking into consideration circumstances, respectively the contextualization of the matter. The basic rule used is the selection of the action variant, which brings the highest net benefit. If any of the projects is estimated to bring a negative net benefit, the most efficient solution is the lack of action.

Besides measuring/comparing the costs and benefits, the analyst has to focus on the impact a plan/project has over their distribution. Therefore, a set of questions to clarify the distribution impact is available:

● *for the benefits*:

(1) Which is the operation's target or objective, who should benefit of it?

(2) Who actually benefits? (An answer which sometimes is very difficult to be found out)

(3) How much is the operation's total benefit?

(4) Which is the benefit distribution among those involved?

(5) Which is the distribution of the investments and resources relevant to the current and potential beneficiaries?

● *for the costs*:

(1) Who should pay for the operation's costs?

(2) Who currently pays for the operation's costs?

The identification of the responsible persons or groups should take into consideration not only the immediate, but also the indirect effects.

(3) Which is the operation's total cost?

Sometimes, the estimation includes psychological, social and economic costs not reflected by the spending, as they are generated by the operations themselves.

(4) How are the costs distributed among those responsible for the respective operation?

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[37] Developed by John Hicks and Nicholas Kaldor in the articles „The Foundation of Wellfare Economics" and „Wellfare Propositions in Economy and Interpersonal Comparison of Utility" published in *The Economic Journal*, vol.49, No.195 and 196.

(5) Which is the current distribution of the resource investment for the people who pay in the present as well as in the future?

Building on the premises that the decision-making is a rational process, the cost-benefit analysis uses mainly the monetary values as measurement standard. The fundamental goal of using this method is to establish in what conditions the resource investment in an action is advantageous.

In intelligence analysis, this method can be used including by giving numerical values to the main effects, generated by hostile entities, with impact on the national security.

(*Another analytical methods used in the intelligence activity can be found in* **Table 6 - ANNEX**)

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In order to anticipate and possibly shape the future the promotion of national security strategies requires sufficiently accurate and consolidated prognoses regarding: the economic trends, technological development, the development of warfare procedures and types (especially for the atypical warfare, such as the war against terrorism), the evolution of different types of informational aggressions etc.

Prognosis. Lately, the attention has increasingly focused on the predictive and anticipative component of the analytical products, therefore we consider appropriate to describe more comprehensibly the ***prognosis*** as a 'macro-method' (that includes a whole set of methods and techniques) able to satisfy the current requirements for the national security intelligence analysis[38].

The prognosis aims at identifying potential future events, the possibility of their occurrence as well as their potential impact on national security interests, reporting some estimates/accurate predictions in due time, offering the policy-makers the basis for taking defensive measures in order to prevent and counter some imminent or potential threats.

Gathering information reduces the surprise effect (the uncertainty over potential action directions) and facilitates the implementation of some pre-emptive or defensive (*post factum*) measures related to the development of the major risks and threats.

In order to achieve an authentic prediction, the analyst has to *identify the parts of an event/phenomenon as well as the convergent* (which prompts the existence of a prediction based on the cause-effect principle) and *divergent phenomena* (which 'inhibit' the prediction).

Divergent phenomena (coups d'état, killings, terrorist actions, difficult to forecast because of the conspiring and illegal nature of the preparation aspects) – occurring beyond the countries' will – generates difficulties in launching a forecast. These specific events can be described as probabilities, but cannot be anticipated to the same extent with more significant phenomena (breaking out a world war, the collapse of the Nazi Germany or the USSR, the surge of the conflict between two states, new foreign policy directions of certain countries, a political regime fall etc.).

The correct drawing up of the prediction depends on the identification of the forces acting over an entity, both at present and estimative, on forecasting the changes they suffered over time, respectively the adequate argumentation in drawing up an opinion.

When making a prognosis, the analysts focus on a threat they consider to be plausible and with an increased nuisance value based on some indexes/variables (the spatial and temporal components; trigger mechanism; manifestation ways and forms; favoring and

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[38] Niță, Cristian, *Prognoza*, Editura I.N.I, 1997.

inhibiting factors; the emergence/manifestation probability; the potential impact on the national security etc.), with the help of which the projections on a potential occurrence of the events can be established/announced[39].

The correct identification of the key factors that could influence the analyzed problem, respectively the substantiated presentation of the potential evolution scenario and modalities to counter the future effects, offers the customers the possibility to act in order to obtain the envisaged result, to change it into a favorable one.

The elaboration of a prognosis assumes the next steps:

(a) *identifying variables*.

Example: in the country X, the analysts assumes that *security forces loyal to the Power represent the key of the regime survive*. What would happen if the social discontent caused by lessening the living standard, which the government hides in the official statistics, worsened?

(b) *estimating the potential influences of the identified variables*.

Example: even if the security forces represent the 'regime key', what would happen if exercising these competences (such as information collection) was influenced by the development of the 'seeds of mistrust' among the young officer who then could ignore the orders of the 'senior officers' to counteract the potential public turmoil?

(c) *identifying those trigger events that could prompt alternative directions and dynamics*.

Example: a real threat against the regime could be triggered/activated by certain factors, such as: (1) a greater media coverage of the corruption acts involving the political elite representatives; (2) the collapse of the basic food distribution networks; (3) the increase of the uncertainty degree on the personal safety of the military and /or administrative elite.

(d) *evaluating some indicator that could signal the increase or decrease of the threat against national security*:

● *political developments*, respectively the ruling system transparency, the legitimacy of the state institutions, the institutionalization degree, presence of the non-military interests in the *status-quo*, the army support etc.;

● *military/security development*, especially the assessment of the state control over the security factors, the security forces professionalism and their efficiency, the existence of a challenge launched by non-state armed groups and criminal groups, of the weapons of mass destruction proliferation, etc.;

● *economic development*, especially the assessment of some factors with a potential impact over the decision-making process – labor forces and unemployment rate, inflation and commercial balance, macro-economic policy and economic stability, infrastructure and the insurance of the primary resources;

● *social developments*: the social cohesion, criminality, health, demographic stability;

● *external developments,* respectively the involvement in multilateral organization, regional relations, geo-strategic vulnerabilities, international alliance/partnership.

(e) *elaborating alternative scenario on shaping the future starting from the identified variables and indexes*.

The main objective of the analytical prospect for the future is to reduce the potential of a free, uncontrolled evolution of the situations, through a strong evaluation of a larger number of potential options. Translated in the specialized language, the forecast aims to substantiate, in present, the adoption of those decisions able to prevent undesirable evolution of the risk factors from taking shape in future.

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In elaborating an anticipative study or product which aims at offering an as much as possible correct image on possible developments of a certain subject, there are mainly used two methods: scenario analysis and Delphi.

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[39] Flyvbjerg, Bent, *Curbing Optimism Bias and Strategic Misrepresentation in Planning: Reference Class Forecasting in Practice*, European Planning Studies Vol. 16, No.1, January 2008.

The Scenario Method. The scenario is generally used to study the potential manifestation conditions of a situation starting for a set of hypotheses, each scenario representing a distinct potential future. The scenario offers the information users an image of the likelihood of the event, if they focus on a certain direction of the action from a complex situation that cannot be quantified[40].

In the intelligence field, the scenarios represent 'paragon-patterns' of the analyzed objective/event, the goal of a scenario being to highlight the major factors influencing the future in order to anticipate and give an appropriate answer.

Scenarios have to provide answers for two types of questions: **(1)** *how and why is a hypothesis generated?* **(2)** *what are the action possibilities, in every steps, to prevent, change or facilitate a certain evolution?*

The 'scenario elaboration' pursues the creation of a logical set of events through which, starting from the current situation, to anticipate, step-by-step, the future evolution of an event, the potential critical points, evolution alternatives, respectively their evaluation according to one or more criteria.

The capacity to develop valid scenarios depends on the training domain and the training level the analysts, types of models and criteria they employ, as well as the extent in which the essential plausibility condition is observed (even if the limits of this concept are rather relative).

The main steps in the scenario developing process are[41]:

• establishing an initial supposition, which consist in choosing the desirable state towards which the events might head ('referent future');

• highlighting the factors that will impose, in the major points of the evolution, the choice of the potential variants;

• studying the context in which the system will develop (the identification of the essential factors and their impact over the respective system);

• knowing the system structure;

• establishing - based on the detailed knowledge of the system structure – its general development trend, starting from the premises that no voluntary exogenous actions are exerted over it. The selection includes contrasting variants which were reached through exaggerating certain values of the parameters, in order to better study their importance – worst or best case scenario etc.

According to their character, scenarios can be: **descriptive and prescriptive**.

● *The descriptive approach especially uses the extrapolation method*, starting from the identification of the present variables and the evaluation of the indicators, which could trigger alternative directions and dynamics. As a rule, the descriptive scenarios are used to make short- and medium-term predictions over organizations/societies that resist the changes and do their best to maintain their evolution over some processes where a disruptive factor, that might completely destabilize the current situation, does not exist or is less likely to appear.

However, this type of approach is not useful in creating a long-term projection, as it does not take into account the driving factors, which could establish alternative evolution directions (for example, the new technological discoveries or evolutions in the analyzed domain).

● *The prescriptive approach* aims at elaborating some *anticipative projects/scenarios*, respectively the description of the sequence of the events that could lead to the envisaged model and the establishment of the action strategies/behaviors, which should be adopted in order to prevent/counter potential risks and threats.

[40] Moniz, Antonio, *Scenario Building Methods as a Tool for Policy Analysis*, IET, UNL-FCT, European Science Foundation, September 2005, available online at: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8094/.
[41] Kosow, Hannah; Gabner, Robert, *Methods of Future and Scenario Analysis*, DIE Research Project "Development Policy: Questions for the Future", Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, Bonn, 2008.

The main methods used in 'writing a scenario' are:

(1) *The empirical model*, which is built either on analogical arguments or on historical arguments and assumes the use of the previously obtained knowledge in order to settle the newly emerged problems. The analyst interprets the new situation by reporting it to a previously similar case (a similar model) using information and knowledge regarding that situation (model duplication).

(2) *The contextual application*, which is used to identify the plausible concordance of the events in a certain domain and establish the relationship between that concordance and the potential events in a different area.

The method was used especially in the evaluation of applied technology (for example, projections on developing the microchip technology, respectively the manufacturing of a miniaturized video-surveillance device, needed to prevent criminality).

(3) *The Cross Impact Analysis*, that aims at identifying and examining all ways in which a factor can influence its manifestation environment, as well as the impact over another phenomenon occurring in a different environment but related to the first one.

The use of GPS technology allowed the development of high precision ammunition and determined modifications in the military information activity and the change of combat tactics.

Subsequently to the conclusion of scenarios, the activity of information analysis supposes the monitoring of the evolution of variables which can modify the current situation as well as the identification of indicators which can prove the unfolding of a particular scenario or a combination of scenarios. On the one hand, this fact will call for the redefinition of the information priorities, taking into consideration the dynamics of the situation (and, implicitly, the recalibration of the information mechanism) and, on the other hand, for the establishment of potential action directions which the information beneficiaries should take into account.

The Delphi Method. Often compared/associated with the scenario method, this type of approach is, however, preferred out of reasons to improve the precision/accuracy of forecasts. It is used for: elaborating a comprehensive list of future potential events, estimating the probable date of the emergence of a new event/phenomenon, highlighting the structure of needs and resources which can appear in the future.

The main stages of method implementation are: enouncing the analyzed theme; establishing the investigation leadership group; elaborating the list of experts to be consulted; making the consulting group familiar with the issues to be approached (preliminary material, minimum bibliography, theme scoring etc.); the rounds (the method unfolds in 4-6 rounds until obtaining a certain degree of opinion 'convergence')[42].

Round I – The participants fill in individually a questionnaire on the events most likely to occur, based on which a list of potential future events is elaborated.

Round II – The participants answer questions about the probable date of the emergence of an event or the importance/opportunity of future goals and the ways to accomplish them. The processing of the answers consists in gathering data, arranging the obtained range, respectively choosing the central (median) and the most frequent value or calculating the weighted average opinions in order to finally obtain the dispersion and the quadratic average deviation.

Round III – The participants whose answers situate outside the intervals are asked to substantiate their opinions or to review them, the coordination group introducing an ordering/classification of the received answers. At the end, the statistical measures characterizing the new dynamic series are recalculated.

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[42] Green, Kesten C., Armstrong, J. Scott and Graefe, Andreas Monash, *Methods to Elicit Forecasts from Groups: Delphi and Prediction Markets Compared*, MPRA Paper No. 4999, November 2007, available online at: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4999/.

Round IV – The participants are informed about the results of the previous rounds, being subsequently asked to formulate a new estimate.

Starting with the Round III, the degree of opinion convergence is measured, the investigation continuing until the number of participants sharing the same opinion or similar opinions is considered big enough. At this moment, the results are centralized.

The methodological element characteristic to the Delphi method is the permanent re-informing of experts. The questionnaires are conceived so as to exercise a retrogressive influence on the results registered during the initial stages.

Techniques to avoid mental stereotypes and stimulate creativity – typology, characteristics

<div align="right">

Felicia RĂDOI

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❑ **Questioning assumptions (preconceptions)**

The analyst should ponder – in any situation – the validity/correctness of the working hypotheses, pre-elaborated or uncritically assumed in order to substantiate a rational explanation for a problem.

Experience tells us that when analytical judgments turn out to be wrong, it usually is not because the information was wrong; it is because an analyst made one or more faulty assumptions that went unchallenged.

❑ **Sensitivity Analysis.** It is essential for the analysts to objectively assess their ultimate judgment *sensitivity* (in terms of availability/'permeability') to changes in any of the major variables or driving forces in the analysis. If an analyst cannot think of anything that would cause a change of mind, his or her mind-set may be so deeply entrenched that the analyst cannot see the conflicting evidence.

❑ **Identify Alternative Methods**. It is advisable for the analysts to identify alternative perspectives for his/her own data interpretation models, looking for contrary points of view rather than views supporting his/her own ideas.

Some models suppose that a part of the people involved in the analysis process should not belong to the section/office which elaborated the analytical product, but to be analysts with no specialized knowledge in the subject – a fact which allows them to easily identify assumptions, hidden alternatives as well as to appreciate whether the conclusions are properly argued.

❑ **Looking from a Different Perspective**. Another factor which can affect the quality of the analytical process derives from the analyst's incapacity to approach familiar data from a different perspective. The chess player can assess very well his option but he finds it a lot more difficult to see the chess pieces from multiple perspectives, including from the adversary point of view, and to anticipate the latter's reaction to his next move.

By knowing alternative perspectives, one can approach the same problem from different perspectives, a fact which requires the formulation of different questions. These techniques can break the existing mindset if the analysts assume atypical (different and unusual) roles.

❑ **'Thinking Backwards'**. As an intellectual exercise, the analyst starts from the assumption that a totally improbable event has actually occurred, and subsequently, by hypothetically putting himself in the future, tries to explain himself 'how this could have happened', thinking what must have happened six months ago to set the stage for that outcome and so on, back to the present.

Thinking backwards changes the focus from '*what might happen?*' to '*how can it happen?*'. By putting himself in the future, the analyst has a perspective which allows him

not to limit himself to assess the situation variables and to discover that he can construct a plausible scenario for an event previously considered to be unlikely.

This technique is particularly helpful in the analysis of events that have a low probability but very serious consequences should they occur.

❑ **The Crystal Ball**. It functions similarly to the previous technique. The analyst imagines that a perfect 'intelligence source' (such as the crystal ball) has told that a certain assumption was wrong – he must then develop a scenario to explain the 'logical rut' which represented the basis of the respective assumption. If the analyst can develop a plausible scenario, then it means that the assumption is open to some questions.

❑ **Role Playing**. This technique is commonly used to overcome constraints and inhibitions which limit the range of one's thinking. The analyst's simple attempt to imagine how a leader or another foreign entity will think and react is not sufficient. The analyst should become, in a sense, the person/entity whose role is assumed. Only by 'living' this role, the analyst can break his mental set and relate facts and ideas in ways that differ from habitual patterns.

Some group interaction can make this technique more efficient, with different analysts playing different roles, usually in the context of an organized simulation. By changing roles, the participants see the problem in a different context.

❑ **The Devil's Advocate**. The person who assumes this role defends a minority point of view; he or she may not necessarily agree with that view. The goal is to expose conflicting interpretations and show how alternative assumptions and images can outline a plausible alternative, requiring an additional need to substantiate the dominant point of view.

❑ **Learning from Surprises**. Analysts should keep a record of unexpected events and think hard about their significances and consequences. It is important for the analysts to consider whether these surprises, however small, are consistent with some alternative hypotheses.

One unexpected event may be easy to disregard, but a pattern of surprises may be the first clue that understanding what is happening requires some adjustment, is at best incomplete, and may be quite wrong.

❑ **The Deferred Judgment**. The principle of deferred judgment consists in separating the idea-generation phase of analysis from the idea-evaluation phase, with evaluation deferred until all possible ideas have been brought out. This approach runs contrary to the normal procedure of thinking of ideas and evaluating them concurrently. Idea generation should be a freewheeling, unconstrained, uncritical process, respectively that a judgmental attitude dampens the imagination, whether it manifests as self-censorship of one's own ideas or fear of critical evaluation by colleagues and supervisors.

❑ **The Cross-fertilization of Ideas**. Ideas should be combined with each other in order to form more and even better ideas. If creative thinking involves forging new links between previously unrelated or weakly related concepts, then creativity will be stimulated by any activity that brings more concepts into juxtaposition with each other in fresh ways. To that end, the interaction with other analysts is more advisable.

The end purpose of dissemination in the intelligence work

Cătălina COSTEA

Dissemination is a specialized activity which involves the elaboration and transmission of intelligence products to legal customers competent in the field of national security. At the same time, dissemination involves an ongoing relation between the intelligence producer and the customer, as seen in the classical representation of the intelligence cycle (**Figure 7**).

Figure 7. The classical representation of the intelligence cycle

The most important element of the communication process between the intelligence producer and the customer is represented by the transfer of intelligence on national security matters – such as warnings, risk estimates, reports and evaluations – meant to support the decision making.

However, the particular "selective permeability" of the relationship between the intelligence producers and their customers is suggestively highlighted by academia classical theories (**Figure 8**).

Figure 8. The policy-intelligence relation

As far as the policy-intelligence relation is concerned, dissemination's main objective consists of influencing the evolution of the operational context in accordance to national interests.

The dissemination of classified data to legal customers is governed by the „need to know" principle. Those who need access to classified information in order to fulfill their official responsibilities must be vetted, according to the law. Putting this principle into practice correctly contributes to the limitation of risks of unauthorized dissemination of classified information.

The quality of customer is possessed by the categories of individuals / officials as stated in the law, representing the institutions which are a part of the national defence and security system, as well as the partner or allied structures, within consecrated cooperation formats by international law (conventions, protocols etc.).

Dissemination is also meant to contribute to the constant feeding of the intelligence agency's own system, because it helps upgrade data bases, identify new information needs and deal with the customers' feed-back.

Legal customers send requests of information or feed-back remarks as a way to orientate the intelligence agencies' activity and improve the dialogue with the intelligence producers.

It is generally accepted that the intelligence agency has fulfilled its duty the very moment the authorized customer gets the intelligence report. His/her feed-back – meant to confirm, deny or comment upon the content of the analytical product or ask for more information – will initiate a new intelligence cycle, leading to the elaboration of a new intelligence product.

There are times when the managers of the intelligence agencies find themselves compelled to identify informative needs, requests and priorities and offer authorized customers the intelligence that they need, but haven't asked for.

The relationship between intelligence agencies and legal customers may sometimes be affected by the *cognitive dissonance syndrome*. It appears when the customer gets intelligence which differs from his/her perception on a certain topic or his/her decision based on this perception. There are some ways to avoid this syndrome, such as:

▪ *systematic organization of seminars, conferences and even intensive courses*, meant to improve the customers' knowledge on the intelligence agency's competencies, and find ways to improve communication, as a way to insure the efficiency of the feed-back mechanism;

▪ *setting of informal task-forces or round tables on strategic topics*, that must involve intelligence, government and academia analysts, as well;

▪ *use of oral briefing*, as an efficient way to clarify any aspect which is not clear;

▪ *standardization of analytical concepts* used in the cooperation process with partner or allied intelligence services.

The dynamics of the security environment marks out certain limits of the present intelligence-policy relationship. Recent analyses undertook by intelligence experts both from the euro-Atlantic area and our country disclose certain „systemic dysfunctions" of the traditional intelligence cycle.

These dysfunctions are caused by the separation between the customer and the intelligence process, and the gap between the provided intelligence and the customer's needs.

In order to overcome these difficulties, some experts consider that the intelligence activity should focus on a target-centric approach[43], implying the use of teams made up of analysts, field officers and customers, which can better benefit from the advantages of IT development and globalization.

However, the customers are considered part of the intelligence cycle, within the Anglo-Saxon intelligence community, for example.

This re-conceptualization of the intelligence work would contribute to the build-up of a common image of the target (objective), where all the participants could extract the necessary elements in order to finish their missions, as well as contribute to the development of an as much as possible accurate image.

The intelligence product - part of the intelligence work

Clara VELICU, Simona DUMITRU

MOTTO: *„Be optimistic: if you no longer like the text that you have just written, say to yourself that you have made a progress!"* (Didier Husson, Olivier Robert)

The importance of intelligence within the information flow is given by the fact that, *using its analytical apparatus, the intelligence service is assessing the potential of an*

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[43] Clark, R.M., *Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach*, CQ Press, 2006.

informational content for supporting decision-makers, revealing in this way its dimension of national security intelligence.

The information cannot reach its scope outside a specific communication context (sender – channel - receiver) and a set of prior knowledge belonging to the receiver which facilitates the understanding of the message.

The meaning of an intelligence message is given both by its quantitative dimension (by the **new cognitive product** for the receiver) *and its qualitative coordinates: structural* (focused on **signification**), *semantic* (articulated by the **relevance**) *and pragmatic* (emphasized by **utility**).

Writing an intelligence paper is an organized activity, driven by specific criteria and rules concerning both the argumentation of the message and the form of the document. Intelligence papers usually mention facts, events and situations in order to point out dysfunctions, vulnerabilities, risks and threats to the national security or, sometimes, opportunities to promote national interests.

Thus, the elaboration of an intelligence paper involves – even from the planning stage – some writing competencies that have to do with organizing ideas, establishing the dimensions of the text and of the practical way to put it on the paper.

Inherent to the written communication, the content planning can be structured function of the answers to questions such as: (1) *what do I want to say?* (2) *to whom?* (3) *how?* (4) *what are my responsibilities?* (5) *how well will I be understood?* (6) *with what effects on the recipient?*

Stages in the elaboration of an intelligence paper
(1) *Identify the national security topic.*

The extraction of the relevant issues (as far as the national security is concerned) out of the whole range of available data represents a complex analytical maneuver, based on the analyst's experience and abilities – intuition, creativity, imagination and critical thinking.

On the other hand, it is equally important to tailor the topic both to the customer's agenda and expectations and to the evolutions of the operational context.

An intelligence product usually elaborates on:

(a) The emergence of a new threat indicator or a new situation that might affect national interests;

(b) Changes in the operational context of a certain national security issue that request emergency measures;

(c) The persistence of a certain threat indicator which is capable to determine new risks to the national security;

(d) The opportunity to promote specific national interests.

Thus, „identifying the topic" is eventually a real decision making process that not only implies analyst's in-depth expertise in the issue, but also his/her capacity to anticipate risk evolutions, trends and changes that go beyond the obvious.

(2) *Establish the authorized, competent customer.*

As mentioned before, dissemination involves respecting the „*need to know*" principle – the customers receive only intelligence reports on topics that have to do with their lawful responsibilities.

(3) *Draw the „analytical matrix.*

In this stage, the analyst must go through the next steps: **(a)** searching the data bases for useful information; **(b)** making an inventory of the aspects which are not entirely known, in order to send requests for information to the operative structures; **(c)** drawing the matrix consisting of a list of known, unknown (not entirely explicit) aspects and facts which are most likely to happen;

(4) *Go through the analytical process and evaluate the threat/risk to the national security.*

The analyst must be very concerned about how to: **(a)** lay out the facts objectively; **(b)** present aspects which are essential for the understanding of the situation; **(c)** make a hierarchy of the potential risks and establish their likelihood.

Then, the text of the analytical paper must be planned, in accordance with the main idea (the intelligence message) that came out from the analytical process.

The intelligence paper is usually a complex, well-supported text. It can involve more than one writing style at a time: narrative – presenting a sequence of events which happened at a certain time in certain places; descriptive – showing essential and background elements; informative – giving analytical conclusions, offering explanations to certain events, phenomena, situations, attitudes.

It is preferable that the text starts with the enunciation of the main idea, which should represent the reference point in the organization of the document, thus facilitating its understanding by the customer.

Afterwards, the *ideas must be connected and put in the right order. Reading the text over and over again* allows the analyst to identify and fix any errors.

The numbering of the chapters / sub-chapters represents an alternative way to organize the text, making its content even more clear;

(5) *Choose the title and*, eventually, *write the abstract.*

▪ Deciding the *(sub) title* is a very important step, as it plays a fundamental role in synthesizing the content of the intelligence paper, showing its importance and getting the customer's attention.

The subject (or the title) of the analysis should be synthetic, not descriptive. It can be „telegraphic", just like the titles on the bands used by the news channels.

The chronology of the analytical writing imposes *an initial definition of the title*, generating and maintaining analyst's necessity to avoid losing the main idea of the product. As opposed to the general idea, the most important thing in the title is not the subject of the analysis, but the *verb,* which expresses the nature and the intensity of the action. From this perspective, the permanent comparison of the title with the central idea of the analysis is a guarantee of the balance and the symbiotic relationship between the two components.

It is worth mentioning that the reading of any intelligence product is objectively performed, following the "key" indicated by its titles or sub-titles.

An uninspired or approximate choice of the terms used in titles/subtitles may discredit the whole message, even though it might be well-supported.

▪ *The abstract* is especially useful for large documents, because it helps the customer better understand the main ideas;

(6) *Elaborate the final form of the analysis*.

This is the stage when the document gets an adequate graphical form, in compliance with generally accepted editing rules.

A major role in finalizing the document is played by:

• *the graphical marking* (with specific characters or colors) of important, meaningful paragraphs, in order to underline specific details or nuances;

• *the revision of the final form*, by applying a set of reevaluation procedures which might lead to rethinking and rewriting the text.

The landmarks mentioned above are useful tools for the elaboration of an analytical product, but even rigorously respecting these landmarks does not guarantee the writing of perfect texts. Nevertheless, going through these stages is a necessary – but not a sufficient – condition for the elaboration of intelligence papers.

The quality of the analytical product is given not only by the thoroughness of the information which it is based on, but the analyst's capacity to identify and present risks and threats in a specific security context, even though they might not seem relevant or obvious at a first glance.

Requirements in writing intelligence documents

Roxana FRÂNCULESCU

Writing such an analytical text is an ongoing process, with several stages, which involves the selection and organization of the informational content in order to establish the most suitable way for transmitting the message. It therefore demands for the analyst to comply to certain rigors, such as:

Accuracy implies that the situation must be presented as exactly as possible, avoiding any imprecision or inexactitudes, especially about the names of persons, institutions and places, dates, numbers, measure units, special terms etc. *If not, the risk of sending the distorted message to the customer increases.*

Even though it is better to send an intelligence paper which does not include inexactitudes, confusions or unclear aspects, there are times when the analyst is compelled to present certain factual elements (regarding the operative context) which are not entirely verified, but extremely important.

In such a situation, there should be clearly stated both the utility of the document, and the knowledge gaps determined by to impossibility to clarify everything at the writing moment.

Concision refers to the idea that the message must be as short and concentrated as possible, in order to increase its impact on the receiver. Certain details should be included only if they contribute to the relevance of the analysis.

Clarity implies that there should be eliminated: any ambiguities in the presentation of the facts; words that have more than one meaning; excessive use of technical terms, so that the message may be understood by people who are not experts in the field.

In this respect, the analyst should:

● include in the analytical paper only the amount of information necessary to send an intelligible message which is in accordance with the „need to know" principle;

● use terminology adequate to the topic and avoid ornate language;

● clearly state the ideas;

● precisely mark the subordination or coordination relations between terms and sentences.

A very important role is played by connectors, words that mark: an enumeration („first", „second" etc.); *addition* („more than that", „as well", „at the same time" etc.); *alternative* („on one hand", „on the other hand" etc.); *temporality* („after", „before" etc.); *causality* („because", „as", „due to"); *scope* („in order to", „with the purpose of" etc.); *consequence* („as a result of", „as a consequence of", „thus" etc.); *comparison* („compared to", „unlike", „similar to" etc.); *opposition* („nevertheless", „though", „on the contrary").

Writing errors may decrease the value of an analytical product: an inadequate term may generate the opposite effect or indicate a biased approach; a vague or incorrect expression may lead to ambiguity; the use of neologisms and jargon may be a sign of an insufficient knowledge of the analyzed phenomenon.

Though rich in information, a wrongfully conceived, organized and written text (confuse, prolix, vague, boring or discursive) may send a false or not enough well-supported message, thus discrediting the whole intelligence paper.

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The above-mentioned set of exigencies can be summed up to the following rules:

▪ Use primarily „forceful" nouns and verbs and moderately adjectives and adverbs;

▪ Use simple sentences that state a single idea - subject, predicate, complement (the sentence should not consist more than 18-20 words);

▪ Use simple, short and powerful words.

The analytic language must be concise, sometimes even telegraphic. Short sentences,

simple words and concepts, verbs in the active voice are to be found in every analytical product;

▪ Avoid, if possible, the bureaucratic, juridical, technical language, and any clichés as well;

▪ Read the document loudly, in order to identify the potential „breaches".

The observance of these rules does not guarantee the formal „perfection" of a text, which is deeply influenced by the analyst's personal style. Therefore, it isn't possible – and not even desirable - to establish universal rules for efficient writing.

Frequent errors in writing intelligence papers

Adrian ENE

The most common sources for errors – which may lead to the altering of the form or content of an intelligence text or may make it unsuitable to be disseminated - are:

▪ *the incapacity to identify disinformation* – misleading messages are treated as useful information;

▪ *the conversion of dissemination into a fetish* – dissemination is considered to be the scope of the intelligence activity, not a means to support decision making;

▪ *the inexact threat evaluation* – on the long run, over or under evaluation of threats may diminish the intelligence agency's credibility and its capacity to actually contribute to the decision making;

▪ *the exceedance of competencies* – intelligence agencies disseminate aspects which are not relevant to the national security or send them to the wrong recipient;

▪ *the confusion during crisis situations* – caused by the lack or the flood of information, leading to difficulties in the settlement of the situation;

▪ *the use of thinking or writing stereotypes*;

▪ *the grammar errors, the lack of syntactical cohesion* (inadequate order of words in a sentence, ornate language, improper use of logical connectors) and *the semantic incoherence* (inadequate terms, exceedance of neologisms, wooden language) *of the text*.

Most commonly, such errors are a result of skipping stages.

If the analyst decides to skip or formally approach a certain analytical step, the result of his/her work might be seriously flawed. The above mentioned steps do not represent a methodology, but useful tools for intelligence analysis and efficient writing of analytical papers. However, going through each and every one of these stages does not guarantee the success.

The use of analytical methodology will neither automatically eliminate the doubts or unpredictable evolutions, nor influence the validity of predictions.

As a matter of fact, the most important investment for intelligence analysis is represented by the training of analysts, as it is commonly known that **the best analytical method is a good analyst**.

Ionel Nițu

MOTTO: „The construct for the Revolution in Intelligence Affairs comprises two distinct but related elements - a cultural shift that sees the Intelligence Community embrace the need to change and a procedural shift that enables the Community to objectively evaluate alternative responses to change and to incorporate them in a continuous manner." (Deborah Barger)

The premises

During the last years, the intelligence agencies work continuously adapted in connection to the security environment mutations, the analytical component of the intelligence process being exposed, as well, to a continuous transformation and paradigm adaptation, taking into account the following factors:

- the compression of the reaction as well as data processing time, so the intelligence product to be available in time for being used to support national strategies (on medium and log term) or point decisions (with short term implications);

- the ability to extract the relevant intelligence from a large amount of accessible data ("the background noise") and, accordingly, to interpret and integrate that intelligence, based on multi-source analysis and a multi-disciplinary approach toward the strategic issues;

- the ability to give a adequate shape to the intelligence product by suitably using diverse analysis methods and techniques in different circumstances, so to eliminate the situations where the analysis fails due to the analytical process inherent limits.

Taking into account the above-mentioned considerations and the assessment of the day-to-day work within an intelligence analysis department, I think that *three factors become critical in the continuous reform and modernization process of the intelligence analysis in the framework of the intelligence communities and agencies*.

The three factors derive from the three very important categories / areas in defining a reform process of the national security intelligence analysis, namely:

- **P**rocess (the analysis activity, with his entire set of methods or means, internal procedures and standards, but also, with its various types of organization);

- **P**roduct (the results of the analysis activity, the products which are sent to beneficiaries / users and the feedback or the requests for information from the intelligence consumers);

- **P**ersonnel (the intelligence analyst, as well as the process of its selection and training).

The need for an integrated approach of the three factors results from the fact they cannot be analyzed separately:

- it is not feasible to solely improve the analytic process (for example by implementing new scientific methods for analysis, creating new working methodologies or extending the cooperation with the academia), in the absence of professional analysts. The improvement of the analysis process cannot be an objective by itself if it doesn't reside in the augmentation of the predictive dimension, as well as of the analytic products quality;

- it is not desirable human resources training exclusively, in the absence of an increase in the quality of the analysis process and without the two above-mentioned objectives to be materialized in intelligence products improvement and diversification;

- it cannot be achieved an increase in the quality of the analytic products, in order to meet the increasingly complex and diversified customers needs, in the absence of improving the other two factors: the analysis process and the personnel.

The first P – The Process

As long as the intelligence work has as main purpose, generally speaking, to reduce consumers inherent – "natural" uncertainty, specific to the complex national security issues, as well as their induced uncertainty (by manipulation and disinformation operations), the analysis process is mainly oriented to transform the results of the intelligence work into a specific contribution to state's and citizens security.

▪ *From a functional perspective*, intelligence analysis must have a pivotal role between national security intelligence collection and processing, and dissemination (information).

Any explicative model used in the intelligence studies starts with the intelligence cycle. The classical cycle implies certain logic, even a linear one: request / planning – collection – processing / analysis – dissemination. Analysts and managers from different intelligence agencies with significant traditions are proposing new versions of the classical intelligence cycle where, given the informational flood, the analysis is not only a part of the overall process, but a necessary input to every stage of the cycle.

Therefore, in the launching stage of the intelligence process (the result of either a consumer request, or the internal planning process), the analysis should contribute to the orientation of intelligence collection, the precedence of the objectives etc. Within the collection stage, selecting the targets and risks to be monitored implies an analysis on the priorities of the state and the hierarchy of national security risks. Within the processing stage, the analysis becomes self-referential when it has the objective to assess its own product (along a specific period, taking into account the ratio between the predictions and the effective developments etc.). Furthermore, while disseminated to the intelligence consumers, the analysis is playing a critical role regarding the shape and content of the intelligence product, the feed-back assessment, the identification of ways to consolidate the cooperation between the producer (analyst) and consumer (intelligence customer), and even regarding the development of a common language for them.

▪ *From the methodological perspective*, it is necessary to improve the analysis processes and products by continuously adapting the structure and the working methods, in a way that the final product to be obtained as fast as possible, at a high quality level and efficiently (cost-benefit ratio).

In order to eliminate the situation where the intelligence analysis is failing due to the limits of the analytical process, **an integrated strategy for intelligence analysis should envisage to**:

- **theoretically (re)design the analysis domain**, for creating new instruments for work standardization, and developing the methodology extensively (the increase in the number of research methods, including by implementing new methods and techniques used by private intelligence structures - benchmarking, reengineering, risk and strategic management, competitive intelligence etc. - as well as by enlarging their domain for applicability) and intensively (refining/perfecting the used research methods). There also could be extremely useful to import methods from other sciences, especially social sciences, applicable in the current intelligence work.

The necessity of developing a conceptual apparatus for intelligence analysis is build on the concern regarding the elimination of the confusions generated by the absence of consensus on the used / operable notions and concepts in intelligence analysis;

- **implement lessons learned mechanisms**, in order to allow the inventory and sharing (even since the educational process) of the factors influencing analysis work (analysis

errors, limits or deficiencies determined by some other factors, such as the psychological ones, the timelines, etc.);

- **cross-disciplinary address the security problems / phenomena and elaborate multi-source analytical products**;

- **value open / public sources**, taking into account that the "open society" and the flood of available information is facilitating the use of "unclassified" methods in motivating and implementing the security policies;

- focus the analysis work on the development of the capacities and capabilities needed for elaborating **predictive / anticipative intelligence products**, in order to allow vulnerabilities identification and the countering of the risks challenging national security;

- **push for the use of intuitive-predictive techniques** (opportunities analysis, reduced probability assessment, scenario method, concurrent hypotheses analysis, conflicting decisions analysis - corresponding to the strategic intelligence) in order to meet customers requests and needs, focused on assessing the implications and emphasizing the uncertainties.

I would support the idea regarding the need for a conceptual apparatus for intelligence analysis with Johnston' findings[44], who - after hundreds of interviews and multiple participations to US working teams, immediately after 9/11 / didn't identified any standard analytical method for intelligence analysis.

The author is mentioning that "*the most common practice is to conduct limited brainstorming on the basis of previous analysis, thus producing a bias toward confirming earlier views. [...] None of the analytic agencies knows much about the analytic techniques of the others. In all, there tends to be much more emphasis on writing and communication skills than on analytic methods. [...] Most training is on-the-job.*"[45]

I think that as the operatives have to learn human sources approaching and recruiting techniques, the analysts have to know and use analysis methods.

A particular importance for this complex approach, although a new concept within the domestic intelligence community, **has the meta-analysis, which could also be called "the analysis of analysis"**. From this perspective, the concept of meta-analysis designates:

- on the one hand, the assessment - mainly in terms of efficiency / operatively - of the degree of harmonization between the methods and techniques employed during the analytical process and national security data and information to be processed with a view to elaborate intelligence products;

- on the other hand, the complex theoretical approach meant to: identify the intimate mechanisms that define the analytical process specific to the intelligence area and to (re)configure the used conceptual and methodological instruments in order to improve analysis and prognosis by stimulating critical thinking.

Johnston[46] endorse the foundation of an "*Improvement Performance Infrastructure*", able to measure the actual and ideal analytical performances, to compare them (in order to reveal the performance lacks), to intervene (with the aim of improving the analysis) and, subsequent, to measure once again the performance (to evaluate the efficacy of the interventions).

▪ *From a structural point of view*, the proper projection of the analytical levels' attributions is essential for setting up networks of communication between the intelligence structures (gathering and analysis) and for establishing various efficient response mechanisms.

The IT platforms have, from this perspective, a major role. They aim at facilitating the interaction (especially as far as the *task-forces* are concerned), improving the operability (in receiving and recognizing the value of the inputs used in elaborating the intelligence

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[44] Rob Johnston (2005) - *Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community. An Ethnographic Study*, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC.
[45] Ibidem, p. 3.
[46] Ibidem, p. 85.

produces) as well as in augmenting the interaction between the analysis and intelligence gathering.

The second „P" – The Personnel

According to the "3P Project", is indispensable to implement a functional model of professional training (as far as the intelligence analysis is concerned) **having as priorities the training of newly employed individuals and trainers** (given that they will have a major role in identifying the existing training needs as well as in upgrading the existing training programs).

As far as the new employees are concerned, the selection of personnel and recruitment policies are essential. After their employment, their intense and staged training is indispensable.

The training has to start from the premise that "*what most people know about this job is mostly false. It is the duty of the organization and its recruiters to present its correct image and to work in order to destroy the already established myths*"[47].

▪ *From a functional perspective*, the imperative of developing the analytical capabilities (tactically and strategically) in order to identify the best methods for linking the existing capabilities to the priorities of national security is a fact. This is *sine qua non* goal for the intelligence agencies, most of which having various and extensive programs for training the individuals involved in the analytical activity.

Modernizing this critical component of the analytical intelligence aim at identifying the needs of the analyst's own needs of selection and professional development, within the framework of his/her career within an analytical department.

The selection methods have to shift from a passive attitude (publishing the educational offer and taking any *Resume* or application into account) **to an offensive one**: selection on specialized websites, information campaigns in the Universities training the specialists the intelligence agencies need, taking part in job-related activities etc. For some posts (such as top posts) head hunting companies might help.

▪ *From a structural perspective*, it is important to have various **psychological tests** (**focused on the vocation-aptitudes**) starting with the selection process. Also, **professional tests (based on competences and knowledge)** can support the recruitment process. Later on, work diagnoses might be extremely helpful, focusing on: the psycho-professional profile of the analyst (as well as on the features for shaping future generations of analysts) and the identification of the performance criteria (allowing the identification of significant elements in assuring the analysts' efficiency as well as their activity's evaluation criteria).

Nonetheless, **developing experience-exchange mechanisms** (between various analytical departments and, also, between areas of intelligence gathering and analysis) **and generalizing the good practices** might contribute at optimizing the analytical process, broadening the analysts' knowledge horizon and avoiding the errors as far as their shaping is concerned.

▪ *From a relational perspective*, is vital to have permanent exchanges of opinion, projections, experience etc. with similar structures within Western intelligence services **as well as connections to academically research linked to the national security**. Keeping the analysts updated with the realities of the security context as well as the fundamental researches in related fields (economy, international relationships, administrative studies etc.) make possible a proper understanding of the security evolutions they have to evaluate periodically. **Attending scientific conferences, seminaries and round-tables keep the analysts' minds open, allow them to have initiative and a pro-active attitude** (in regards to their study object), **to be creative and, in the same time, equally, to practice their critical approach**.

▪ *From a cognitive perspective*, given the inherent difficulties of processing complex information, analysts have to be encouraged to clearly separate the assumptions by

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[47] Ibidem, p. 78.

deductions and to specify the degree and the incertitude source involved in the meta-analysis which periodically reexamines the key problems in the context. **The analysts have to be stimulated to be innovative as well as rigorous**, to use the analytical instruments (scientifically validated), to underline the methods presenting various view points and to present (in intelligence products for the decision-makers) not only the limits but also the virtues of analysis.

▪ *From a managerial perspective*, is important to create an organizational medium for stimulating the analysis and assuring the training in intelligence-related analysis, focused on the endeavor to widen the analyst's mental model.

Given that the analyst has to estimate – based on the available information, his own experience and his own psychological abilities (intuition, creativity, imagination) – the evolution tendencies of the threat indicators or their emergence, there is a risk for the intelligence analysis to be limited by the mental human capabilities and to wear the burden of using "mental fixations" or "lens"[48].

The following are the reasons for which **they have to be developed**:

- **modern policies for the selection of the intelligence analysts** (used by Euro-Atlantic Services) **and for stimulating the performances** (individual or teamwork);

- **programs (as diversified as possible) for the training of the analysts**, by means of experience exchanges with other Services, connection to trends of scientifically research in expertise areas, attending seminaries and conferences as well as stimulation of individual permanent training.

Work's satisfaction is very important not only for gaining the optimal status in the performance of the analysts but also for limiting the numbers of resignations in the intelligence agencies. For these reasons, **creating an optimal working environment (based on meritocracy, able to stimulate the professional performances and the access to the management positions) is a must**. The non-provoked resignations – also known as "deserting"[49] – have consequences both in keeping the secrecy of the classified information (known by the analysts) as well as in regards to the finances, given the high costs needed for the specialization of this special category of personnel[50].

The third P – The Product

National security has a multidimensional character, requiring an integrated and interdisciplinary approach. Its accomplishment is possible only within the frameworks of the existence of suitable institutional mechanisms between the forces and the *levers* aiming at defending and promoting the national interests.

Countering the actual complex threats implies the implementation of an integrated way of response, involving political, social, diplomatic, informational, military and other categories of elements. It requests:

- improvement of the relationships with the beneficiaries of national security information in order to have an efficient feed-back, capable of (re)orientate, subsequently, the intelligence activity;

- strengthening of the cooperation between the specialized structures within national security;

- opening communication and cooperation channels between the intelligence analysts and the academic scholars or researchers (having an expertise that might contribute to improving the analyses and assessments).

▪ *From a methodological perspective*, it is obvious that, in the current context, the activity of the institutions involved in assuring the security climate has to be organized in a

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[48] Richards Jr., Heuer (1999) - *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Washington, pp. 45-99
[49] Johnston, Rob (2005), op. cit., p. 86.
[50] Ibidem, p. 87.

manner which allows the analysis structures to adapt and to face the new challenges (revealed by risks and threats' extension, in regards to the national security).

Given that the demands to inform the decision-makers are based on actionable intelligence (tactical analyses needed for taking specific decision in various areas) as well as on strategic intelligence (as a consequence of the complex evolutions in the security domain), **in the process of reform of the intelligence analysis all the analysis types have to have an equal importance**.

The classical terminology might lead, in a first phase, to wrong conclusions: intelligence as analytical product is actionable in itself. One might choose a specific course of action or, on a strategic level, might determine (given the available evaluations) the advantages or disadvantages of a certain state policy, the assumed risks and the way that specific policy has impact over national security.

One of the unwanted effects of the relationship between the producer and the consumer of intelligence, the excessive-information, generates by default certain selection difficulties in the "news-ocean" of the data which reflects correctly a certain reality. The national security reality goes progressively from the black and white, concrete reality, to the area of perception, to images on the reality that various actors involved in security build.

In comparison with these changing realities, the tactical intelligence can be an anchor, a substrate of reality, while the strategical intelligence is trying to make a prediction, a transversal vision of all layers of reality. From this point of view, both are vitals and reinforce each other.

The failure analysis of information activity to foresee a surprise (for example: attacks of 11th September 2001, Indian nuclear test in 1998) reveals the importance to be attached to the same extent, strategic assumptions and estimates based on technical indications, the occurrence of minimum tactics indicators which enter at discrepancy with strategic assumptions being able to point out a possible surprise.

▪ *In terms of structure*, analysis activity involves both support management decision taking at the leadership level, by making available to beneficiaries of products designed to substantiate the adoption and effective implementation of measures to promote national interests.

There are many forms in which information activity is done to inform beneficiaries, but most often support remained, despite technological developments, paper. There are few services (especially in Anglo-Saxon system) currently practice direct networking between producer ("briefer") and consumer (makers of state).

Some analysts believe that the consumer should be careful to catch between the moments when he's willing to listen and when he's going to take a decision. Beneficiaries have been and won't be interesting (for example, ex-president of Unites States, Jimmy Carter) to show importance to the intelligence products and do not count them. That doesn't mean they are good or bad politicians.

Beyond the concrete forms of development of this relationship is important to build a real partnership based on mutual trust between producer and consumer, allowing the quick and accurate knowledge of the needs of the consumer and capture of relevant reactions so useful for planning the intelligence activities, but also understanding the strength and limits of this kind of activity.

"So, only through a partnership between producers and consumers, often difficult and tortuous one which always must be validated, supported and defended can intelligence define in an effective way those competitive advantages so much needed in strategic knowledge, the only can decide a victory or failure of the state in security field"[51].

▪ *From a relational perspective*, a reform in the field of intelligence analysis need to aim at **the imperative of adaptation of analytic product both consumers needs and its**

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[51] Maior, George Cristian, coord. (2010) – *A brains war. Intelligence, Information Services and Strategic Knowledge in the XXI Century,* RAO Publishing House, Bucharest, p. 31

security agenda to its physiological profile. The implementation of various methods such as neuro linguistic programming or distance personality study can be extremely useful for adequacy of the message to the beneficiary profile.

There are necessary to be implemented clear standards and high exigencies both in ensuring objectivity and credibility of analytical products, and in editing them. These must be two-ply by various auditing and evaluations mechanisms of intelligence products, which can offer monthly rigorous internal perspective about possible errors or efficiency of informing action.

The role of intelligence consumer within the information cycle is very important, assuring the efficiency of the activity of national security. In this respect, one might prospect various typologies of settling the relationship between the producer and the consumer as well as getting the feed-back (allowing permanent adjustments of information's gathering and analysis).

The reality (within the current democratic society) shows that intelligence services have to empathize with the decision-makers. This means that they have to put themselves in interlocutor's shoes (the consumer's shoes), to identify their needs (justified needs, related to national security objectives and matching the legal attributions) and to try to accomplish them.

The empathy and the fair attitude and the relation between the producer and the consumer (natural in democracy) suppose that the producer tries to persuade the consumer, knowing or his/hers needs or supposing his/hers misinterpretations or difficulties, understanding his/hers legal, political and public agenda's boundaries and knowing, as well, the producer and consumer's limits, originated in their human condition.

As a former analyst said (one of the few who had the opportunity to become, after a while, beneficiary): "we have to understand that we all make mistakes". We admit so easily the idea that our predecessors were wrong, and history is full of accepted errors (producers and consumers of intelligence), but we do not except that, maybe in this moment, it is possible that someone make mistakes (in an intelligence product) or a beneficiary (adopting to certain decisions)

It is possible that now (when you read these lines) an analyst commits an understanding error or a decedent assumes, today, several decisions, including one to be wrong or to generate perverse effects (unplanned) in future.

<p style="text-align:center">*</p>

One of the aims of any project for changes within the intelligence analysis domain should be ***the development of an analytical culture in the national intelligence community***, in order to implement measures that generate added-value in the products and process of analysis, as well as the enhancement the professional training level of analysts.

The development of an analytical culture needs certainly time, given to the fact that in the most part of the post-communist period the main institutional objective were targeting to products (intelligence activity outcomes) and not to processes and much less to personnel. According to Treverton, **the analysts should become a dynamic for changing**, working successively in other security agencies, employing personnel from outside and organizing brainstorming with personnel as routine actions, not as an exception. "They should spend time outside not in their offices, sharing assessments with other experts and verifying their agendas with decision makers"[52].

Adjusting the analytical component of the intelligence process to the security environment changes requires development of an analytical culture on three levels:

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[52] Treverton, Gregory F. (2003) - *Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 246.

- at individual level, through reshaping the training and developing programs and attending courses / change of experience with other structures of the security national system, foreign services and academic environment.

In order to value the potential and developing new competencies and skills of analysts require a coherent program for carrier developing that resulted in well-shaped character of some stages as initializing, training, and permanent development;

- at institutional (organizational) level, through reshaping the current practices in the intelligence analysis domain, as well as developing an analytical culture. In this domain, a critical area is represented by developing mechanisms and assimilating the outcomes of some processes and lessons learned that draw out the needs of changing through assessing the previous errors and mistakes;

- with regard to the external environment, through: supporting the analysts' attendance both as observers and as lecturers at activities, courses, programs conducted by the academic and scientific community; encouraging the analysts' attendance at change of experience with their counterparts in the foreign partner services, community or Euro-Atlantic security organizations, symposiums, seminars and other forums of foreign co-operations; developing the intra-institutional co-operation through flexible mechanisms of co-ordination and developing tools for timely communication between analysis and operational sectors.

I'm essentially supporting on the one hand, a permanent adjusting of the intelligence analysis (on the three above-mentioned levels) in order to cope with the challenges in the security risks domain and, on the other hand, to introduce scientifically confirmed tools in: the analytical process (methods and techniques from other disciplines), products (adjusting the message to the beneficiary's profile and the consumers' profile too) and the personnel selection and training process.

As for the analytical managers (on different levels) (subject non-approached in this dissertation), I consider they should be permanent focused on the improvement of the performances from the prospective of the three key factors and **they should advance from the stance of delivering analytical products to delivering knowledge**.

They are not leaders (heads) of departments any more, but also of knowledge. Their authority will be lesser and lesser formal and bureaucratic and increasingly anticipative and informal. They should not indicate the way to do but the way forward of the structures and personnel they lead.

They should encourage the dynamic forms of organization and ensure the transition from the hierarchical rigid structures to flexible working groups, since **the modern intelligence services are lesser pyramidal and increasingly "network-centric" type**[53]. Any intelligence analytical manager should stop his current activity to prospect the future of the structure he leads and to encourage its actions toward reaching the desirable futures.

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[53] Clark, Robert M. (2007) - *Intelligence Analysis: A Target – Centric Approach*, CQ Press, Washington DC.

Afterword

Ion GROSU

Although once a niche domain mainly managed by specialized military personnel, intelligence studies underwent a conceptual change with the end of the Cold War, in terms of military dimension and emergence of new threats. This paradigm shift has generated a "demilitarization" of the security studies.

Furthermore, especially after 9/11, intelligence services became more visible to the public, including as a result of civil society's pressures for more transparency in the intelligence activity.

These two developing trends generated a progressive increase in public's access to intelligence mechanisms, goals and studies, as part of the security culture.

On another level, the development of the information society contributed to the modernization of the intelligence analysis. The unlimited access to open sources determined an evident paradox: the difficulty of efficiently handling ever-growing amount of information in a smaller period of time by using "traditional" analytical methods. Solving this paradox required the restructuring of the entire analytical arsenal of intelligence services.

The authors of the current guide were faced with a double challenge: exposing and explaining the widest possible spectrum of analytical techniques and methods, some of them well-known, others of late occurrence, while following an accessible and non-conventional approach. Occasionally, other aspects related to the analytical activity are dealt with, such as the ideal profile of the intelligence analyst, from a psycho-sociological perspective.

Given the authors' purposes, stated in the *Argument* of this guide, this study was, *ab initio,* an intellectual approach mainly addressed to the beginner analysts. Furthermore, although the young analysts are the main target of this study, this guide exceeds the pedagogical purpose, as its name might suggest.

Against this background, the study is not merely a guide or, better said, represents more than a guide. First of all, the guide is not (and does not intend to be) *a manual* (such as a *handbook* or a practical guide, meant to facilitate the learning of various applied analytical techniques). It is rather a *propaedeutic* to any initiation in the analytical intelligence "technology".

As expressed in the motto, it is ambitious and *over-reinforced* or "necessary but not sufficient" without a continuous and multidisciplinary training - beyond the borders of collection - of the analyst, without scientific method or self-knowledge and recognition of self limitations. With regard to the limits, the analyst is "condemned to know everything", as Sherman Kent stated, and has only one option: to be aware of "what he doesn't know" and to discover "what he doesn't realize he doesn't know".

The increasing complexity of security issues entailed a gravity shift of the intelligence analysis center from the tactical and operational analyses (focused on "punctual information") to strategic assessments and prognosis, in order to offer a comprehensive image on the risk dynamics.

Simultaneously, the preeminence of several actors relevant for national security (private sector, academics and media) significantly weighed in the decision makers and public opinion's expectations on the intelligence services' activity. This also contributed to the security agencies' endeavors to re-conceptualize intelligence analysis.

It is what the authors are trying to achieve in this pioneering project. As suggested by the first chapter's motto, a premium is put on defining and clarifying concepts and patterns of intelligence analysis.

Above and beyond the style (a noticeable attempt to get rid of the bureaucratic, full of clichés and unappealing language), the attention is drawn to the maieutics-derived approach

by which the analyst is invited to discover the truth that is latent in himself or, to put it in Socrates' words, things that "he doesn't know that he knows"[54].

All these methodological particularities can be noticed from the beginning of the paper aimed - as already mentioned - at finding the right place of the analysis within the intelligence cycle, and, to a larger extent, within the wider national security intelligence framework.

In the attempt to offer a definition of the intelligence analysis (given the inherent difficulties: the notion of analysis itself has several meanings, the partial understanding of the analysis of national security information), the authors have succeeded in clearly pointing out the elements specific to intelligence analysis, as a process and a product of the intelligence activity.

Conceptual delimitations (some of them uncommon to the theoretical approaches within the national intelligence community) give the authors the possibility to accomplish a classification of the intelligence analysis using structural-functional or complexity degree criteria. Against this background, three analytical types are defined and *in extenso* explained: strategic, tactical and operational analysis.

Another implicitly emerging idea of the book is that it is not enough for the analyst to have well-defined cognitive and psychological skills. The analyst must have, even if in an early stage, a predisposition for avoiding uniformity.

The analyst's efficiency depends not only on his native and learned skills, but also on the instruments he uses (analytical concepts, tools and techniques). There are no universal solutions and the best assessments are the result of various combined techniques, according to the specificity and complexity of the approached issue.

On the other hand, the intelligence analyst is part of a complex institutional mechanism demanding flexibility and permanent adaptation of the organizational set of rules and processes. Otherwise, intelligence services would be unable to react in real time and respond to the current rapidly changing security challenges.

History offers multiple examples on the lack of preoccupation for a flexible paradigm to efficiently tackle the security environment's mutations, which posed major difficulties in decision making. In this context, it becomes obvious that a superficial approach (or a "simulated" one) will generate, sooner or later, the same kind of repercussions.

The conclusion is that intelligence structures have no alternative but to adapt to security developments, which tend to be one step ahead the endeavors for intelligence institutional reform. Intelligence analysis should follow the same pattern of transformation. Given that "tomorrow, today will be yesterday", the intelligence products are meant for long and medium term decisions and the role of analysis is essential in figuring out this tomorrow's great "puzzle".

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[54] As far as the analytical approach advance mainly under the astrological sign of "*savoir faire*", in the proximity of an instrumental knowledge (I know to act but I cannot explain how I am doing it) and not under the sign of the theory (I can explain accurately how I act).

ANNEX – tabels

Table no. 1 – Mental skills (thinking forms) involved in the analysis process

Algorithmic thinking	**Heuristic thinking:**
• is based on pre-shaped, conservative, habitual operations, on a rigorous passage from a state to another within the compulsory succession of events. Making each and every iteration correctly leads to solving the whole problem; • is rigid and strictly established; • it implies a cautious attitude, meant to preserve the *status-quo* of some relationships between different entities; • is efficient both in the case of familiar, usual, common situations, where the person is well informed, and in that of solving well-defined issues, when the relationship between the data and the conditions of the problem, as well as the relationship between the partial and the final results, can be properly formulated.	• implies operations now being worked out, which are about to be discovered, its deployment having a tree-like feature; from every knot, the subject has to choose a way out of more possible ways, and the final result will have a low degree of certitude; • is plastic and innovative; • is based on attitudes of initiative, independence, creativity and audaciousness; • is efficient in new, original, uncertain situations, when one is not fully informed and does not know the results or the ways to get there, which have to be discovered; • proves to be extremely productive when the analyst faces less determined or even badly defined issues, in which the relationship between data and conditions, between the partial and finals results, is about to be discovered.
Reproductive thinking: • its main objective is filling out certain information gaps; • is simplistic and its operations are automatic and stereotyped.	**Productive thinking** implies: • the use of older information/methods to analyze new situations; • the discovery of a new principle of linking data, other than an already known one; • drawing up multiple possible solutions and explorations of the problems.
Divergent thinking: implies that the analysts search as many solutions as possible for the problems they have to solve	**Converging thinking:** • goes backwards, from diversity to unity, from dissociation to synthesis; • has the tendency to spread, diversify and multiply and it is a landmark of the person's intellectual flexibility and mobility • comprises skills like: condensing many semantic structures into a very limited number; establishing concepts starting from the features of the objects and phenomena; restraining and naming correctly the classes/relations; re-establishing the logical order among a multitude of terms.

Inductive thinking:
- implies analysis processes that go from particular to general, from the multitude of features to concepts, relations, rules; the concepts, relations and rules are produced by inductive thinking, and their setting up implies abstractions and generalizations, differentials and simultaneous assimilations;
- catches the regularity, the features that are common, constant, unvarying. Starting from stimuli, the subject builds a response scheme to which he/she adapts;
- facilitates the extraction and elaboration of a general conclusion out of a multitude of particular cases.

Deductive thinking:
- is characterized by a thinking process that goes backwards than the one implied by the inductive thinking, namely from general to particular;
- is an excellent tool to control concepts, relations and rules obtained through inductive thinking. By deductive thinking, starting from a series of rules already established, the analyst may get new information. This has a rigorous and systematic character, leading always to a certain conclusion.

Table no.2 – The main cognitive skills involved in analysis process		
Skill	**Particularities / Meaning**	**Field**
Writing	The ability to communicate information and ideas in writing, in order to be well understood by other people. This implies knowing the meaning of words and the difference between them, the grammar rules and also the ability to structure coherently /logically sentences and phrases.	It is used to write down notes, reports, syntheses, assessments, articles, letters, memoirs etc.;
Understanding written language	The ability which implies reading and understanding written words and phrases, understanding correctly and rapidly the text as a whole, as well as each of the paragraphs.	It is especially used in activities implying reading drafts, articles, books, manuals, work instructions etc.
Swiftness in structuring information (mental-resolute mobility)	• The ability to receive information rapidly, which initially seem to be non-organized and meaningless; • It refers at the same time to the extent to which different information (visual or audible) may be combined and organized rapidly in order to shape up a meaningful thorough concept.	It is especially used when understanding synthetically a bunch of information
Focus	A person's skill to focus on a task, even when the task is boring, without being distracted by external stimuli	It is required when studying and drawing up materials on a noisy background, i.e. during listening to the radio or TV or colleagues discussing.
Distributive attention	• The ability which involves using information from several sources instead of focusing on one source; • This skill implies shifting from two or more information sources (verbal, visual, audible, tactile)	It is mainly used when reading a document and listening to a TV station or radio at the same time, when rapid shifting from one task to another (interpreting a material, stopping suddenly to verbally give relevant information from another context)
Fluency of ideas	• It refers to all the ideas expressed on a given matter; • It does not refer to the originality of the ideas (quality, correctness or creativity).	It is used in searching alternative solutions to a given problem
Information ordering	The ability to follow a given rule in order to order objects, words,	It is used in arranging several sentences into a paragraph,

Skill	Particularities / Meaning	Field
	sentences, events or actions in a certain sequence. This highlights the ability to perceive cause-effect relations, to understand and comprehend a situation, to understand social situations and concepts, but also the attention to details, and logical and sequential-algorithmic thinking. The mental organization of information involves grasping the essential elements from a whole, structuring them from an anticipatory perspective.	sorting out information on a given criterion (numerically, alphabetically, chronologically), assembling information into a sequence in order to describe a possible scenario.
Oral communication	• The ability to communicate verbally so that the meaning is fully understood; • It implies knowing the meaning of every word, as well as the way they can be used, individually or combined, in order to communicate de right message, using properly the non-verbal language given the context of the communication and the meaning of the information to be transmitted.	It is needed in interpersonal discussions, in making a presentation, in motivating and asserting an opinion, in describing an event / person, in defusing negative affective situations.
Flexible structuring	It is the ability to spot or recognize a known pattern (geometrical form, object, word) from a material, to differentiate the essential from the unessential.	It is used to read a material "through the lines", to grant *hic et nunc* meanings to materials studied before an event.
Verbal understanding	It is the ability to listen and understand the spoken language, the meaning of words, sentences and phrases enounced by other persons.	It is used for listening and understanding lectures/indications, events descriptions/places, people, messages/pieces of news/TV or radio documentaries etc.
Deductive reasoning	It is the ability to apply general rules to particular issues, in order to find logical answers.	It is needed in proposing logic inferences based on the study of certain information, in identifying critical factors in the development of an event / phenomenon etc.
Expressing/memorizing capacity	• It refers to the semantic and verbal-logical memory, namely to the capacity to store, recognize and reproduce objectively information/events.	It is required in memorizing as many information as possible about a certain field of activity.

Skill	Particularities / Meaning	Field
	• Involving with responsibility in solving specific daily tasks leads to a mnemonic system which, over time, will increase memory capacity.	
Inductive reasoning	It is the ability to combine distinct information or specific answers, in order to set up rules or general conclusions.	It is required in: - searching and finding a logical explanation about the possible relations between events/facts/information which seam to have no connections whatsoever; - diagnosing/auditing a situation, dissonant actions of an individual or organization; - establishing and testing hypotheses of a scenario; - assembling elements, facts, behaviors in order to create an integrated context (puzzle-like).
Taxonomical flexibility	• The ability to produce several rules, in order for each of them to show how to group several things in a different way. • It is about the number of rules rather than producing the best rule	It is used in activities of classifying information according to different criteria (urgency, importance, frequency etc).
Originality	The capacity of come up with brand new ideas on a subject or a matter, the ability to provide creative solutions and to develop new ways of working, other than the standard ones.	It is used in elaborating and developing new methods and techniques for analysis, synthesis and prognosis.
The rapidity of the perception	The ability to compare rapidly and precisely letters, figures, objects, images, people, which may come up simultaneously or consecutively.	It is required in rapidly "scanning" a text in order to spot typing errors, identify highlighted elements in a text, diminish the visual illusions when exploring certain images etc.

Table no. 3 – Personality features and professional interests	
Responsibility	Feature specific to reliable people, sensible about their peers and tasks; it implies discipline and thoroughness, the respect for rules and orders, perseverance and devotion in fulfilling the goals. Active involvement, from this perspective, proves maturity and willingness to perform, by granting the appropriate meaning and importance to each task.
Social conformity	The willingness to adhere to rules and social behavior policies, which at organizational level can be translated into the respect for standards and norms imposed by the organization. A social and compliant behavior for the internal working norms, for orders and regulations, for managers' warnings to avoid mistakes and increase the quality of work, to remain objective and to grant proper meanings to every context are mature attitudes through which the personal goals overlap the organizational ones.
Perseverance	The ability to maintain an optimum effort level, regardless of the task, and to constantly improve one's performance in order to avoid self-sufficiency and limitation.
Control over the tendency to make risky/hasty decisions	The ability to profoundly reflect before making any decisions; it implies calm and self-control in analyzing and granting meanings for situations with increased risk.
Obtaining information through conversation	The ability to make the most of the verbal language as well as the nonverbal language, in order to obtain information on a given issue, by conversation. This ability implies understanding situations and the capacity to make the interlocutor provide the desired information.
Self-control	The ability to remain calm and balanced in difficult or stressing situations (of discomfort, conflict and danger) through emotional control; it could be associated with self-discipline, organizing skills, goal-orientation and rigorousness.
Open-mindedness	The ability to have an open attitude, receptive to new ideas, contexts, circumstances and environments; it also implies varied and mainly intellectual interests, scientific curiosity, the search for complexity and generating new ideas, easily accepting changes and innovations.
Coordination skills	The ability to structure working plans and activities according to the others' programs, working style and rhythm, which implies an efficient time and resources management; it can also imply some mentoring skills, resorting to a complex range of behaviors, from the supportive to the authoritarian ones.
Capacity of being socially receptive	The ability to correctly understand social situations, by respecting the others' opinions and feelings, as well as by evaluating the consequences of all the social actors' actions (me and the others); it implies social intuition, versatility, verbal fluency, empathy and adaptability.
Self-fulfilling wish	The ability to set up high standards and fulfill tasks as good as possible; it can also be linked to the need to be appreciated, high academic, vocational and professional aspirations.
Assertiveness	The ability to support opinions in line with the non-verbal language, especially used to lead to acceptance and attitude changing, in accordance with the expressed opinions; it also implies adopting an active and voluntary behavior, by taking over the initiative in the relations with other people.
Social trust	It means expressing an open, positive attitude towards people and situations, regardless of the results of the previous personal experiences. This does not mean a lack of maturity, but a high capacity to find real

	plausible explanations for attitudes with low social desirability.
Behavior flexibility	It reflects the high capacity to adapt to different situations, depending upon the degree of complexity, affective load and novelty; it also implies the desire and the possibility to react flexibly and adaptively to the expectations and changing standards of the others.
Verbal reasoning	The ability to verbally present one's own arguments and conclusions, which implies using logical reasoning in explaining the complicated aspects or answering to critics regarding complex/highly abstract thinking or conclusions.
Interdependence	Attitude which shows self-confidence, openness and the maturity to act correctly, innovatively and with a minimum supervision, within an environment mainly unstructured.
Kindness	It implies showing warm, open, supportive behavior attitudes, within different environments and contexts, without pursuing a personal objective. This dimension of one's personality is involved in the social relations.
Ability to recover tonus	The ability to rapidly and effectively recover after stressing situations, so that the person will be prepared for another stressing or soliciting activity.
Sociability	Essential trait in structuring the social oriented behavior implying personal development by continuous modeling and moderating of behaviors according to the commonly agreed norms.
Ability to negotiate	It implies the manifestation of a constructive attitude focused on discovering optimal solutions by appealing to flexible, renouncing and accepting behaviors when faced to different points of view.
Contribution to the personal development of the others	It implies mentoring activity aiming at the personal development of the group/team members as a premise to work effectiveness.
Persuasion	The personal capacity to present information so that to influence the others' opinions

Table no. 4 – Psycho-behavioral traits with implications for the analytical process		
Scrupulousness	It is the result of the relationship between personality dimensions, such as responsibility, social conformism, control over the tendency to make hasty decisions and self-control.	These describe the prototype of a disciplined, methodical, systematic, persistent person, oriented towards assuming the tackling and solving of issues. Such a person is also scrupulous and trusting, with a well structured system of attitudes and values and able to efficiently manage all types of situations.
Openness	It reflects the capacity to collect data, the willingness to accept new experiences, the capacity to cooperate, the wish for accomplishment and independency/ autonomy.	This dimension represents a fundamental parameter of the effectiveness of the analytical activity. It emphasizes the personal ability to shift from willingness to actions and ideas, on one hand, to values and affects, on the other. Thus the analyst is able to subtly distinguish between the objective and subjective features of an action and accordingly place himself in the context.
Emotional stability	It is the result of the interaction between traits such as assertiveness, the capacity to restore tonus, the verbal argumentation and the capacity to negotiate	In the analytical activity, the emotional equilibrium tends to oscillate function of the personality characteristics previously enounced. A low emotional instability can be contextually exploited in order to analyze some situations.
Extroversion	It is sustained by subordinated factors such as social receptiveness, social trust and sociability.	The analytical activity mainly implies an individual work style. But the features listed in this table constitute premises for an effective teamwork. These features can be useful in the young analysts' integration and adaptation to the specifics of the analytical activity.
Agreeability	It implies behavioral flexibility, kindness, the capacity to negotiate and the willingness to contribute to the others' personal development.	Similar to extroversion, the above mentioned traits don't constitute obligatory premises for the success of analysis. However, they may be exploited in the training process by the trainer or other persons interested in teaching.

Table no. 5. Cognitive errors facilitated / induced by the analyst's mental stereotypes	
Pre-defined reasoning	It represents the basis used for evaluating new information function of previous analytical experiences and processes.
Prematurely expressed opinions	They are generated by the necessity to simplify and identify the significant information and usually lead to precipitate and often incorrect conclusions.
The presupposition that the confirmation of a hypothesis necessarily leads to the invalidation of another	The validation of a certain analytical assessment is used as an argument to reject less accepted hypotheses.
Inadequate analogies	They are the result of a false perception of similarity between an event and other past situations, based on inconsistent considerations, concepts and data.
Superficial valuing of "historical" conclusions	It may be the case of: analysis not critical enough, failure in identifying causality, hyper-generalization of some causal factors, and inappropriate extrapolation of previous positive/negative results.
The presumption of unity in action	It is based on the false assumption that other people's actions are more planned, centralized or coordinated than they really are. This type of hypothesis doesn't take into account the accidental causality or the occurrence of hazard.
Excessive compartmentalization	It may lead to a reduced willingness to consider potentially viable alternatives just because they exceed the analyst's field of expertise.
The lack of empathy	It refers to one's incapacity to comprehend others' perceptions on certain events, facts, phenomena relevant to national security.
The „mirror imaging"	The (unjustified) transfer of one's perception to explain – by using analogy – the activity of another person. It usually happens because of the analyst's tendency to be self-oriented. Most frequently, it appears in closed analytical systems.
Self-limitation	It is the result of the analyst's reluctance to keep up with the newest trends within his field of expertise.
The "rational player" hypothesis	The analyst wrongfully assumes that another person will act rationally, in a manner that is consistent with his own thinking patterns/standards.
The prejudice of proportionality	It implies the presumption that any action is proportional to its purpose (the principle of effectiveness).
The choice to ignore information that contradicts accepted opinions	The rejection of data which are in conflict with conclusions already agreed upon. It may also be seen as an effect of the analysts' desire to be by all means consistent with their previous analysis.
The exaggerated positive thinking (the "Poliana" Complex)	It refers to the analyst's tendency to be overconfident with regard to his own abilities and the accuracy of his reasoning.
The exaggerated negative thinking (the "Cassandra" Complex)	The analyst is excessively skeptical / pessimistic about his reasoning, based on his previous analytical failures or his natural predisposition.
Excessive crediting of available information	The analyst is rather influenced by existing or accessible information than by data requiring an effort of processing/accessing, though the last ones may be the right premises for correct decision-making. The single fact that information is easy to reach does not

	necessarily make it the most relevant.
"Fetishizing" familiarity	Analysts tend to mainly value well-known or common perceptions. Already known information is more easily accepted than data coming from new/unfamiliar situations. Repetition and its effect – the familiarity of information – are often more significant in creating one's system of beliefs than any type of analysis or argument.
"Narcosis" of the most recent information	The increased daily information flow obstructs the retention of all these data. Consequently, analysts tend to act according to the rule that the newest information excludes the old one.
Ignoring the median flow	The two particular moments when information is paid the greatest attention are the early and the last stage of reporting. For this reason, the first and the last information within a project, problem, research plan, document, study session or meeting will be better retained and will be considered more relevant. By contrast, the information placed in the median part of the project can be ignored or disregarded only because of its place in the informational flow.
„... perseverare diabolicum est"	Analysts tend to accept ideas consistent with their own convictions and reject opposite points of view, even though that might lead to promoting false or illusory explanations. For this reason, an analyst should always check his own assumptions, which may be subject to analytical errors.
Exacerbation of „privileged intelligence"	The information considered secret, special, rare or restricted will be considered more trustful than easily collected information. This may affect the analytical process, by concentrating the whole argumentation on only one type of information source.
Lack of consistency	It refers to the difficulty to similarly evaluate different situations / cases (for example, the information received from a particular source can be preferentially treated compared to information received from another source, without a rational justification).
Superficiality	It is about the tendency to process information simplistically, especially when time is an issue. The available "techniques" in these situations are the use of stereotypes, the production of hasty assessments, the "skimming through" databases.
Inertia	The incapacity to give up thinking stereotypes which are automatically used even if in new and different situations.
"The herd instinct"	It refers to uncritical conforming to dominant opinion of the affiliation group.
Asymmetrical attribution	Analysts tent to attribute their success to their knowledge, abilities and talents, and their mistakes/failures to external factors or bad luck. At the same time, they consider that the success of other analysts is determined by luck, whereas their mistakes are entirely their fault.
Temptation to communicate "the expected true"	The results of the analyst's activity tend to comply with the customer's expectations.
Hasty generalizations	It has to do with focusing on a single part of an issue in detriment to the issue as a whole.
The "mirage" of the dominant feature	It refers to drawing up general conclusions on the grounds of singular situations.

Table no. 6 – Other analytical methods used in the intelligence activity	
Quantitative analysis	It implies identifying and inventorying indicators with relevance for a specific operational situation, mainly by using the redundancy principle. It is usually applied to data which show the frequency, volume and percentage of different issues or operational phenomena (the area where they manifest, the structure of people categories involved, the structure of diffusing areas etc).
Capacity analysis	It is based on drawing up a frame to assess the capacity of an entity (person, group or organization) to achieve a certain goal, by identifying the factors which can affect / facilitate the entity's action capacity under specific circumstances (time/space/situation). The main purpose of capacity analysis is to provide enough data to the decision makers so that they can found their options on the relative feasibility of some action alternatives. If the entity is a state, the capacity analysis implies efforts to measure and assess the tangible and intangible factors which affect its capacity to act at a specific moment, in a specific place or situation. While the tangible factors are empirically verifiable and quantitatively measurable, the intangible factors can not be exactly measured, usually being the result of subjective opinions.
Causal analysis	It highlights the connections between phenomena on the cause-effect matrix. The causes can be identified by induction, considering the cause as a complex of phenomena, as well as by deductive interpretation. - *inductive reasoning* implies the transit from specific to general. It suggests several solutions, without being able to offer the best choice between the alternatives taken into consideration. - *deductive reasoning* is about the transit from general to specific. It offers solutions based on evident external manifestations, without being able to draw pertinent conclusions, for example regarding somebody's real action intentions.
Case analysis (or case study)	It refers to the analysis – function of a collection of characteristics considered as essential – of a specific process, event or phenomenon (may it be social, political etc), respectively of a specific case (social component/unit, individual activity or human personality).
Goal-means analysis	It involves systematic steps to connect the rationally selected techniques (means) with the established objectives (aims) in order to obtain the maximum level of goal achievement.
Risk analysis	Its main goal is to isolate, from the very beginning, developments that might imply any risk. This type of analysis consist of two parts, respectively: • *the risk estimate*, in order to accurately identify possible implications – prior to or after the exposure to danger -, respectively to set up the valid security standards for the protection of the exposed elements. This also consist in identifying the danger, estimating the amplitude of exposure, shaping the reaction, comprehensively characterizing the risk, by mainly taking into account the worst case scenario; • *the use of the cost-benefit methods*, by comparing the benefits of an action to its potential risks. Similar to costs and benefits analysis, the process of decision-making is formally tailored to the final task – choosing the best alternative, respectively the alternative with the best score when comparing the total amount of expected benefits to the total amount of risks.

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