



DEFENCE MINISTRY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

**ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTS RELATED TO
U.S. MILITARY-BIOLOGICAL ACTIVITY**



U.S. Department of State proposals for implementation of Biosecurity Engagement Program -BEP in 2016

U.S. Department of State

Request for Proposals
Program Office: Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (ISN/CTR)
CFDA: 19.033
Funding Opportunity Title: Global Biosecurity Engagement Activities
Announcement Type: Cooperative Agreement - Initial
Funding Opportunity Number: ISN/CTR-16-001
Deadline for Applicants: February 12, 2016

ELIGIBILITY
 Eligibility is limited to not-for-profit organizations subject to 501 (c)(3) of the tax code and educational institutions.

Cost Sharing or Matching
 This program does not require cost sharing, however proposals which demonstrate cost sharing will be welcomed.

Other Special Eligibility Criteria
 Not Applicable

CONTACT INFORMATION

For assistance with the requirements of this solicitation, please contact:
 Daniel Jackson, Program Advisor
 Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction
 U.S. Department of State
 Email: JacksonDR@state.gov
 Phone: (202) 647 6946

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Department of State's Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (ISN/CTR) is pleased to announce an open competition for assistance awards through this Request for Proposals (RFP). ISN/CTR invites non-profit/non-governmental organizations and educational institutions to submit proposals for projects that will advance the mission of the Department's Biosecurity Engagement Program (BEP). ISN/CTR has approximately \$40,000,000 available in the current fiscal year to award multiple grants and cooperative agreements in this field. ISN/CTR prefers projects that cost less than \$500,000, though awards may involve multiple projects that cumulatively exceed \$500,000.

II. BACKGROUND AND PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

The Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), part of the Department's Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN), sponsors foreign assistance activities funded by the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADRP) accounts, and focuses on mitigating proliferation risk in frontline states and regions where the terrorist threat is on the rise, such as South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa.

ISN/CTR administers the Biosecurity Engagement Program (BEP) program as part of the CTR portfolio. BEP's mission involves institutionalizing biorisk management best practices and securing life science institutions and dangerous pathogens, decreasing the risk that scientists with dual-use expertise will misuse pathogens, and promoting adoption of and compliance with comprehensive international frameworks that advance U.S. biological nonproliferation objectives, including United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the World Health Organization's International Health Regulations, and the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) / International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards.

BEP generally funds activities in three priority pillars and has a focus on long-term sustainability. The first pillar increases biosecurity and biosafety through technical consultations, risk assessments, and training courses that develop expertise to create a sustainable culture of laboratory biorisk management. As a part of BEP's biosafety efforts, the program also sponsors efforts to train foreign law enforcement and security forces on approaches for detecting, investigating, and disrupting bioterrorism plots. The second pillar of engagement focuses on infectious disease detection and control and strengthening the capacity for public and veterinary health systems to detect, report, and control disease outbreaks. The third pillar of engagement focuses on scientific engagement to enhance global health security and foster safe, secure, and sustainable bioscience capacity through joint scientific collaborations designed to help prevent, detect, and respond to biological threats.

Objectives

- By the end of the award's period of performance, the recipient will have successfully developed and implemented a project or projects to advance BEP's mission by:
 - Promoting biorisk management practices
 - Securing life science institutions and pathogens in priority regions
 - Decreasing the risk that scientists with dual-use expertise will misuse pathogens
 - Promoting the detection, disruption, mitigation, and investigation of biological terrorism plots
 - Partnering with non-scientific interlocutors such as policymakers, law enforcement, military, and diplomatic audiences to promote biorisk management
 - Promoting the adoption of and compliance with comprehensive international frameworks that advance U.S. biological nonproliferation objectives

Funding Priorities
 While global in scope, ISN/CTR focuses its resources on prioritized countries to maximize its aim of reducing biological risks. During the current fiscal year, BEP's highest priority countries for engagement are Iraq, Turkey, and Yemen. BEP's second highest priority countries are Afghanistan, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Uganda. The program will also consider project proposals for other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Ukraine, sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America. Of note, legal restrictions prevent ISN/CTR from providing assistance to certain countries, including developed states, state sponsors of terrorism, and gross violators of human rights.

The recipient shall leverage relevant subject matter experts to create, develop, and implement projects that advance the BEP mission.

- Below is a sample list of the types of biosecurity projects ISN/CTR will consider for funding:
- Projects that promote biorisk management practices such as technical consultations, risk assessments, and training courses that develop expertise to create a sustainable culture of laboratory biorisk management.
 - Projects that secure life science institutions and dangerous pathogens;
 - Projects that decrease the risk that scientists with dual-use research expertise will misuse pathogens;
 - Projects that promote the detection, disruption, and investigation of potential bioterrorism plots;
 - Projects that strengthen the capacity for public and veterinary health systems to safely, securely, and responsibly detect, report, and control infectious disease outbreaks;
 - Projects that promote joint scientific and other collaborations designed to help prevent, detect, and respond to biological threats; and
 - Projects that promote the adoption of and compliance with comprehensive international frameworks that advance U.S. biological nonproliferation objectives

III. ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
 Eligibility is limited to not-for-profit organizations subject to 501 (c)(3) of the tax code and educational institutions. Direct funding for both U.S. and non-U.S. institutions is available under this announcement.

IV. APPLICATION AND SUBMISSION INFORMATION
 Award Period: 12 months

'...ISN/CTR has approximately \$40,000,000 available in the current fiscal year to award multiple grants and cooperative agreements...'

'BEP's highest priority countries for engagement are Iraq, Turkey, and Yemen.' BEP's second highest priority countries are Afghanistan, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Uganda. The program also consider project proposals for other countries in the Middle east and North Africa, South Asia, Ukraine, sub-Saharan Africa, Southwest Asia and Latin America. ...'

Biosecurity Engagement Program -BEP



U.S. Department of State Biosecurity Engagement Program

Implementing Partners Workshop Washington, DC – November 9, 2015



Post 9/11 Biothreats



Presidential Priority

President Barack Obama September 26, 2014

- Biological threats have also grown -- from infections that are resistant to antibiotics to terrorists that seek to develop and use biological weapons
- All of us, as nations, and as an international community, need to do more
- We'll work together to improve biological security



Geographic Priorities

Anticipated FY16 Funding Levels

- Middle East & North Africa – 50%
- Global projects – 6%
- Sub-Saharan Africa – 5%
- South Asia – 28%
- Ukraine – 1%
- Southeast Asia – 10%



U.S. President B.Obama's interest in Program

Publication on Greek Banking News edition website (6 September 2023)



Ρωσία: Η Ουκρανία έχει κεντρικό ρόλο στο πρόγραμμα βιολογικού ελέγχου των ΗΠΑ

'Russia: Ukraine plays central role in U.S. biological control program'

Η Ουκρανία κατέχει κομβική θέση και συνιστά ειδική περιοχή γεωγραφικού ενδιαφέροντος στο βιο-πρόγραμμα του State Department, όπως αποκαλύπτεται σε έγγραφα που επιβεβαιώνουν την εφαρμογή του «Προγράμματος Βελτίωσης της Βιοασφάλειας» από το Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών των ΗΠΑ, ήδη από το 2016.

'...Ukraine, as evidenced by documents supporting the implementation of the U.S. Department of State's Biosecurity Engagement Program, has a central position in the U.S. Department of State's bioprogram and represents an area of special geographic interest...'

Publication on Romanian edition Flux 24 (6 September 2023)



Moscova: Avem dovezi că Obama este implicat în laboratoarele secrete americane

'Moscow: we have evidence that B.Obama is involved in U.S. secret labs'

Fostul președinte american Barack Obama a participat la promovarea programelor biologice militare în străinătate de către Departamentul de Stat, Moscova are dovezi în acest sens, a declarat generalul locotenent Igor Kirillov, șeful forțelor ruse de apărare împotriva radiațiilor, chimice și biologice.

'...Former U.S. President B. Obama was involved in the State Department's promotion of military biological programs abroad, Moscow has evidence of this....'

Publication on Yemen Houthi movement Ansar Allah website(6 September 2023)



روسيا: أمريكا تخطط لتوسيع شبكة مختبراتها البيولوجية في العالم

'Russia: America plans to expand its network of biological laboratories around the world'

أكدت وزارة الدفاع الروسية، اليوم الأربعاء، أن الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية تخطط لتوسيع شبكة المختبرات البيولوجية التابعة لها في العالم. ووفقاً لموسكو، يأتي هذا في إطار "سياسة الدفاع البيولوجي" الشبيهة من قبل واشنطن، التي تولي اهتماماً خاصاً لتنفيذ برامجها البيولوجية في دول الشرق الأوسط، وجنوب شرق آسيا وأفريقيا.

'...As part of its biological defence policy, Washington is planning to expand its network of biological labs worldwide <...> to implement biological programmes in Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa ...'

Publication on Syrian edition Step News (6 September 2023)



روسيا تتحدث عن برنامج "خطير" للسلاح البيولوجي في 4 دول عربية

'Russia says there is a dangerous biological weapons programme in 4 Arab countries'

قال رئيس قوات الدفاع الإشعاعي والكيميائي والبيولوجي في روسيا إنجور كيريلوف، إن الولايات المتحدة "تولي اهتماماً خاصاً لتنفيذ برامجها البيولوجية في الشرق الأوسط وجنوب شرق آسيا وأفريقيا".

روسيا تكشف عن برنامج خطير للسلاح البيولوجي

'...The United States is particularly focused on implementing its biological programs in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Middle East countries under attack: Iraq, Yemen, Jordan; Southeast Asia: Indonesia and the Philippines; Africa: Kenya, Morocco, Uganda....'

Publication on Lebanese An-Nahar edition websire (6 September 2023)




موسكو تتهم واشنطن بتطوير برامج بيولوجية في العراق واليمن والأردن

'Moscow accuses Washington of developing biological programs in Iraq, Yemen, and Jordan'

وقالت مصادر محلية من أبناء مدينة عفرين، في حديث لـ"العربي الجديد"، إن ثلاثة مدنيين أكراد من عائلة واحدة، وهم: "فرحان الدين بشمرك، ومحمد بشمرك، ومحمد فرحان الدين بشمرك"، قُتلوا اليوم الإثنين، وجرح ثلاثة آخرون، بينهم شخص أصيب بجروح خطيرة، إثر خلاف شب بين مجموعة مُسلحة وعدد من الأشخاص

'...Chief of Nuclear, Radiation, and Chemical Troops I. Kirillov said the United States is focusing on its biological programmes in Southeast Asia and Africa, as well as in countries in the Middle East, including Iraq, Yemen, and Jordan. In addition, Russia have documentary evidence of the U.S. Department of State's involvement in the implementation of the biodefence engagement programme since 2016. These documents show Washington's desire to use third-party contractors to conceal the client and purpose of the ongoing research....'

Publication on Chinese Sina Weibo microblogging website (6 September 2023)



【世界各地的美国生物实验室长期构成生物威胁】 #俄罗斯#辐射、化学和生物防护部队司令伊戈尔·基里洛夫中将在记者会上说：“鉴于#美国#没有能力控制自己的生物设施，世界各地美国#生物实验室#是长期的生物威胁源头，对其所在国的居民来说尤其是这样。乌克兰就是一个例子，其境内运行着数十个脱离国际监管的此类设施。” 基里洛夫说，美国当局似乎也不知道本国生物实验室的确切数量。他举例说，2023年3月，加州里德利市一处废弃工业建筑内发现了一家存放着致病微生物的“地下”实验室，美方至今未查明实验室的真正所有人和活动目的。他说，

'...The United States lacks proper control over the results of its dual-use R&D...'



U.S. investigates illegally operating biolab

Opening of an investigation against the activities of Prestige Biotech

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
Congress of the United States
 House of Representatives
 SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC
 2157 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
 WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6143
 August 23, 2023

The Honorable Christopher Wray
 Director
 Federal Bureau of Investigation
 935 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
 Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Director Wray,

According to recent reports, a Chinese company called Prestige Biotech, Inc. (Prestige) was operating a dangerous and unlicensed laboratory in Fresno County, California. These reports indicate that the laboratory was conducting potentially dangerous experiments. It is highly concerning that an unlicensed laboratory by a Chinese company on American soil was apparently conducting dangerous research involving COVID-19 and other viruses.

We are committed to investigating the origin of COVID-19, but also assessing the federal government's ability to keep America safe from biological threats and assessing legislative solutions regarding biosafety and biosecurity. Assessment is critical to bolstering our ability to prepare for and prevent future pandemics.

'...Dear Director Wray, according to recent reports, a Chinese company called Prestige Biotech, Inc. (Prestige) was operating a dangerous and unlicensed laboratory in Fresno County, California. These reports indicate that the laboratory was conducting potentially dangerous experiments.'

Information about Prestige Biotech

Tricia D
 @patriciamdavis

Prestige Biotech registered in Nevada:
 "The company has 2 contacts on record. The contacts are Xiuqin Yao from Las Vegas NV and Zhaolin Wang from Las Vegas NV."
 Also "Barry Zhang Cpa & Associates LLC" is listed as registered agent.
[bizapedia.com/nv/prestige-bi...](https://bizapedia.com/nv/prestige-biotech)

Prestige Biotech registered in Nevada: 'The company has 2 contacts on record. The contacts are Xiuqin Yao from Las Vegas NV and Zhaolin Wang from Las Vegas NV'. Also 'Barry Zhang Cpa & Associates LLC' is listed as registered agent.

«...Numerous goods currently stored at 850 I St. Reedley has caused trouble to you and your colleagues in administration

Numerous goods currently stored at 850 I St. Reedley has caused trouble to you and your colleagues in administration. First of all, I would like to express my deep apologies.

Illegal activity of Prestige Biotech



Letter from the House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic subpoenaing the FBI, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, D.P.M.
 CHAIRMAN

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
Congress of the United States
 House of Representatives
 SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC
 2157 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
 WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6143
 Majority (2023): 225-5074
 Minority (2023): 225-9091

September 7, 2023

The Honorable Xavier Becerra
 Secretary
 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
 200 Independence Avenue, S.W.
 Washington, D.C. 20201

Dear Secretary Becerra,

On August 23, 2023, we wrote to you asking for documents and information regarding highly concerning reports stemming from a dangerous unlicensed lab operating in Fresno County, California.¹ According to reports, this lab was conducting dangerous research involving COVID-19 and other viruses.² As of today, the Department has failed to respond.

To properly carry-out the Select Subcommittee's missions, including assessing the government's ability to keep America safe from biological threats and assessing legislative solutions regarding biosafety and biosecurity, we must have the full cooperation of federal agencies. If the Department fails to comply with our legitimate oversight requests, we will be forced to evaluate the use of the compulsory process.

Therefore, we write to you today to reiterate our requests in our previous letter. Please provide the following documents and information as soon as possible but no later than September 14, 2023:

1. All documents and communications, between or among employees or contractors of the Department, specifically including but not limited to those in the custody or control of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and/or the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), regarding Prestige Biotech, Inc. or Universal Meditech, Inc.
2. All documents and communications between or among the Department and other federal, state, or local government entities, including but not limited to the FBI, the California Department of Public Health, the California Department of Toxic Substance Control, the Office of the Governor of California, Fresno County, or the

¹ Letter from Brad Wenstrup, D.P.M., et al., Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, to Xavier Becerra, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services (Aug. 23, 2023).
² Daniel Gliglich, *Secret biological lab uncovered in Reedley containing bioengineered COVID-19 mice*, THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY SUN (July 27, 2023) available at <https://sjvsun.com/news/fresno/secret-biological-lab-uncovered-in-reedley-containing-bioengineered-covid-19-mice/>.

Место дислокации базы BMC США (Naval Air Station Lemoore)

Biolab - 850 I St, Reedley, CA 93654, USA

US Naval Air Station - 700 Avenger Ave, Lemoore, CA 93245, USA



Classification of results of civil dual-use research in field of biosecurity

Creation of a journal to classify publications that may be dual use

UNCLASSIFIED

The Journal of Chemical and Biological Defense (JCBD)

Peer-Review of Classified Life Science Research

Morgan Minyard

Approved for Public Release:
Distribution is unlimited



UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Definitions of classified

Top Secret: Unauthorized disclosure of this information could cause **exceptionally grave damage** to the national security

Secret: Unauthorized disclosure of this information could cause **serious damage** to the national security

Confidential: Unauthorized disclosure of this information could cause **damage** to the national security

UNCLASSIFIED

Examples of dual-use researches to be included in the Journal

UNCLASSIFIED

Publish sensitive Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC)



DURC is not a new concept

In 2001 Mousepox research by Australian scientists intended to cause mouse infertility and control the population


Virus became more lethal

Research was published but under controversy that terrorists could use it

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UNCLASSIFIED

Share data with other need-to-know researchers



Journal of infectious Disease recently published articles reporting a new type of *Clostridium botulinum* toxin

Purposely did not release the genetic sequence data

Benefit from location to publish data or announce analysis tools

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Current option for researchers



Reports do not undergo a traditional, scientific peer-review process

Difficult to obtain reports

Mostly just a warehouse for reports

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Peer-review process missing for classified research

Classified research results lack the peer-review process seen in academia

Classified research is research that is expected to have a severe negative impact on national security if revealed

Researchers have a clearance and need-to-know



Potential categories for publishing

Classified Unclassified, but potential misuse

UNCLASSIFIED

Journal's application

UNCLASSIFIED

Benefits to authors and readers

Create recognizable metrics to enhance investigator careers

Provide professional recognition for meritorious technical efforts

Advance opportunities to identify new research partners or performers

Motivate individuals to enhance the quality of research

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Future journal for authors, intelligence community, and policy makers



The Journal of Chemical and Biological Defense (JCBD)

"Enhancing chemical and biological defense through the presentation of peer-reviewed, cutting edge, classified research."

UNCLASSIFIED

U.S. DoD's new strategy for countering weapons of mass destruction

U.S. National Defense Strategy

October 27, 2022

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OSCAR PEREZ
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

...in a "decade decade," one stamped by dramatic
...and our environment. The defense strategy that
...the American people to provide a clear picture
...years ahead—and we owe them a clear and
...and security goals.

...details the Department's path forward into that
...the American people to promoting global security,
...and defending our democratic values
...and its strategic reviews—the NDS, the Nuclear Posture
...and ODSR—in an integrated way, ensuring tight
...cohesion. The NDS directs the Department to act
...with the People's Republic of China (PRC)
...The NDS further explains how we will collaborate
...robust deterrence as the face of Russian
...against threats from North Korea, Iran, violent
...challenges such as climate change.

...strategic competitor for the coming decades. I have
...to increasingly coercive actions to reshape the land-
...to fit in our national preferences, alongside a keen
...and the rapid modernization and expansion of
...of Security Strategy notes, the PRC is "the only country
...of order, and increasingly, the economic
...to do so."

...and evidence assumes of Ukraine underscores its
...to Russia's assault on Ukraine also dramatically
...leverages the power of our values and our military
...Together, we have established a strong, unified
...strength of NATO.

...is not acceptable. The 2022 NDS lays out our
...and our nation's security, even as we manage the
...It builds on my 2021 Message to the Force, which
...is taking care of one people, and succeeding through



National Biodefense Strategy and implementation Plan for countering biological threats, enhancing pandemic preparedness and achieving global health security

...ing the biodefense
...ing biological threats and
...tion to inform
...prise.

...high analyses and
...and, and deliberate
...illness and detection
...tical incidents.

...ing, and risk assessment
...issues, and information
...timely biodefense
...covery.

...abilities to
...naturally occurring infectious
...sity and globally. The
...of low-state actors from
...religion purposes,
...of mass destruction
...to disrupt plans, degrade
...seeking to use biological
...recess and biotechnology, its
...serves innovation, and
...Developmentally and
...and technology while
...in diseases
...prevent local biocidents

...prise preparedness to
...pects of biocidents, including
...to have to support biodefense, promoting a
...and global health infrastructure, developing
...ability, establishing risk communications,
...ing commanders, and collaborating across
...and international science and technology
...manufacturing, to support biodefense.
...health infrastructure
...response, and recovery plans and capabilities,
...tion plans and promote consistent, plain
...expedite desired response actions, and
...development, testing, evaluation,
...tion, and administration of countermeasures.
...disease through community mitigation
...sation, waste management, environmental
...pathogens during a biological event.
...share across the United States, including the
...port international response and recovery

...SE STRATEGY 11

NATIONAL BIODEFENSE STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

FOR COUNTERING BIOLOGICAL THREATS, ENHANCING PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS, AND ACHIEVING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY
OCTOBER 2022

U.S. Department of Defense's Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

October 27, 2022

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OSCAR PEREZ
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

STRATEGY FOR
COUNTERING WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION
2023

U.S. Department of Defense

In the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS), I laid out a vision for focusing the Department on safeguarding and advancing vital U.S. national interests. Critical to successful implementation of the NDS is understanding how specific security challenges, such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD), impact the security environment.

Some state actors view WMD as both capable of limiting U.S. strategic choices and deterring the execution of U.S. operations. As stated in the NDS, the People's Republic of China (PRC) poses the pacing challenge for the Department while the Russian Federation remains an acute threat across the spectrum of WMD. The PRC continues its rapid nuclear weapons modernization and expansion, and Russia has threatened nuclear weapons use and deployed a disincentive campaign on biological weapons use to support its illegal invasion of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations remain persistent threats as they continue to further pursue and develop WMD capabilities. Since the release of the Department's *Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Strategy in 2014*, collectively, actors are integrating WMD into their military strategies in manners that greatly increase the risk of miscalculation in a crisis or employment in conflict.

The risks to the Department and the nation are real and urgent. Addressing them requires the Defense Department to account for WMD across the spectrum of conflict and in concert with our Allies and partners. This strategy articulates the vision for how Combatant Commanders, the Military Departments and Services, and other DOD Components will, consistent with the NDS, address WMD challenges in their plans, activities, and capabilities. We will sustain and broaden our work, in collaboration with other U.S. departments, agencies, allies, and partners, to deter CBRN use. If deterrence fails, we will field a force that is resilient and prepared to prevail in a CBRN-contested environment.

This strategy lays the foundation for the Department to confront the complex and demanding challenges presented by WMD. It also reinforces, complements, and integrates our guidance provided in the Nuclear Posture Review, the Missile Defense Review, and the Biodefense Posture Review by clarifying the role of the CWMD mission within the Department's overall approach to integrated deterrence and conflict. I am confident that the Department possesses the ingenuity and determination necessary to outpace current and future threats.

'...the People's Republic of China poses the pacing challenge for the Department while the Russian Federation remains an acute threat across the spectrum of WMD...'
'...North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations remain persistent threats...'

First, the Department will defend the homeland from WMD attack.

Second, the Department will deter WMD use against the United States and its Allies and partners.

Third, the Department will enable the Joint Force to prevail in a CBRN-contested environment.

Fourth, the Department will work to prevent new WMD threats.

The Department's methods for implementing the four strategic priorities—referred to in this CWMD Strategy as the "Ways"—explain how the Department will use its collective "Means" to do so. The six "Ways" for DOD implementation are:

- Develop credible options to deter WMD use and assure Allies and partners;
- Build a Joint Force that can campaign, fight, and win in a CBRN environment;
- Enable Allies and partners to counter WMD proliferation and use;
- Degrade actor capability to develop, acquire, or use WMD;
- Take action, as part of whole-of-government efforts, to prevent proliferation and respond to use of WMD; and
- Pursue advanced research and development efforts to counter future chemical and biological threats.

'...Develop credible options to deter WMD use and assure Allies and partners; Build a Joint Force that can campaign, fight, and win in a CBRN environment; Enable Allies and partners to counter WMD proliferation and use; Take action, as part of whole-of-government efforts, to prevent proliferation and respond to use of WMD; and Pursue advanced research and development efforts to counter future chemical and biological threats...'

Strategy's Priorities

2023 STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

FACT SHEET

THE BIG PICTURE

The United States, its Allies, and partners are facing a dramatically changing security landscape - one with both legacy weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities and novel threats enhanced by emerging technologies; renewed competition with two states armed with a suite of WMD capabilities; and adversaries who seek to use WMD tools to deter, coerce, and gain the upper hand.

The 2023 Strategy accounts for the current and emerging WMD challenges and threats consistent in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, and expands on the need for tailored methods to address them. These efforts focus not only on preventing and mitigating WMD threats, but also on preparing U.S. military forces to withstand, operate through, and recover from WMD attacks in close consultation with Allies and partners.

THE PRIORITIES

DEFEND the Homeland from WMD attack	DETER use against the United States, its Allies, and partners	ENABLE the Joint Force to prevail in a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) environment	PREVENT new WMD threats
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THE IMPLEMENTATION

- Provide credible options to deter WMD use and assure Allies and partners;
- Build a Joint Force that can campaign, fight, and win in a CBRN environment;
- Enable Allies and partners to counter WMD proliferation and use;
- Degrade actor capability to develop, acquire, or use WMD;
- Take action, as part of whole-of-government efforts, to prevent proliferation and respond to use of WMD; and
- Pursue advanced research and development efforts to counter future chemical and biological threats.

THE TAKEAWAY

The Department must confront the complex and demanding challenges of WMD head-on, within the Department's overall approach to integrated deterrence and conflict, and with ingenuity and determination. As part of that effort, the Department will plan, campaign through, fight, and win in a WMD-contested environment.

FOR MORE INFORMATION
Visit <https://www.defense.gov>

U.S. Department of Defense



People involved in American biological-military dossier



Thomas Wohl

Vice-President of Black&Veatch, official representative of the company in Ukraine within DTRA projects.

Supervised the implementation of the electronic PACS system (accounting, management and control of biological agents and materials) in the national health care system of Ukraine.

Responsible for the development of special software, provision of training programmes for local specialists, and subsequent technical support of the system's operation.



Kevin Olival

Vice President of Research at EcoHealth Alliance.

Renowned expert in the field of emerging infectious diseases. He coordinated Pentagon research on the diagnosis, surveillance and prevention of zoonotic diseases in the AFU, as well as the spread of zoonotic diseases among mammals, the search for new strains of bat coronavirus and mechanisms of animal-to-human transmission with total funding of \$11.8 million..



Tatyana Kiryazova

Executive Director of the Ukrainian Institute for Public Health Policy.

She supervised joint US-Ukrainian research in the HIV/AIDS laboratory at the Mechnikov Anti-Plague Research Institute of the Ministry of Health of Ukraine. As part of this activity, she maintained contact with representatives of the Boston Medical Centre, Massachusetts, USA.

Workplace address: Ukraine, Kiev, B.Khmelnitskogo str., [redacted]



Mikhail Usaty

Deputy head of the sanitary-epidemiological department of the AFU medical forces.

Ensured access to various facilities of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine for Black&Veatch representatives.

Informed the American side about changes in national legislation within the framework of joint projects. Within the framework of the "One Health" concept, participated in joint seminars on "Microbiological Laboratory Planning".

Registration address: Ukraine, Odessa, Dnepropetrovskaya str, [redacted]



Elena Strutinskaya

Assistant of the Department of Biological and General Chemistry, VNMU named after M.V. Lomonosov named after M.I. Pirogov. M.I. Pirogov.

Organised the process of blood collection from Ukrainian servicemen for further study, supervised the work of American epidemiologists with the DPC of the Ministry of Health, planned the process of transferring blood samples abroad. Visited Ukrainian hospitals (Kyiv, Lviv) in preparation for the research. Address of residence: Ukraine, Vinnitsa, D.Galitskogo str, [redacted]



Gluzd Aleksandra

Lead virologist at the Centre for Health Protection

Performed practical testing at the National Virology Reference Laboratory of Ukraine for COVID-19 of Ukrainian residents and AFU servicemen. She carried out their subsequent processing and dispatch of bio-samples to third countries. She is on the list of Ukrainian specialists who have participated in US-funded research projects.

Address of residence: Ukraine, Kiev, Chuguevskiy per, [redacted]