

Np
355.00994
A938



THREATS TO AUSTRALIA'S SECURITY

Their nature and probability

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA



Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence

Threat to Australia's Security

—Their Nature and Probability

Australian Government Publishing Service
Canberra 1981

© Commonwealth of Australia 1981

ISBN 0642 06861 5

Cataloguing-in-Publication data:

Australia. Parliament. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence.

Threats to Australia's Security

—Their nature and probability.

1. Australia—Defenses

2. Title

3. Australia—Military Policy

355.0094

Aus

TERMS OF REFERENCE

To monitor 'the implementation of the Australian Government's announced defence programs'.

(26 February 1980)

MEMBERS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE

Chairman—Mr R. F. Shipton, M.P.

Deputy Chairman—Mr R. Jacobi, M.P.

Senator R. C. Elstob

Senator F. I. Bjelke-Petersen

Senator R. Hill

Senator G. D. McIntosh

Senator J. R. Martyr

Senator K. W. Sibraa

Senator B. C. Teague

Mr K. C. Beazley, M.P.

Mr J. J. Carlton, M.P.

The Hon. J. D. M. Dobie, M.P.

Mr P. D. Falconer, M.P.

Mr K. L. Fry, M.P.

Mr A. C. Holding, M.P.

Mr D. F. Jull, M.P.

The Hon. R. C. Katter, M.P.

Dr R. E. Klugman, M.P.

Mr S. A. Lusher, M.P.

Mr R. M. McLean, M.P.

The Hon. W. L. Morrison, M.P.

Members of the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters (Sub-Committee C)

The following members of the above Committee investigated the terms of reference and reported to the whole Committee:

Chairman—The Hon. R. C. Katter, M.P.

Deputy Chairman—The Hon. W. L. Morrison, M.P.

Senator B. F. Kilgariff (until 23 September, 1981)

Mr K. C. Beazley, M.P.

Mr J. J. Carlton, M.P.

Mr P. D. Falconer, M.P.

Mr A. C. Holding, M.P.

The following were members of the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters until 18 September 1980:

Senator the Hon. R. Bishop

Mr J. L. Armitage, M.P.

The Hon. G. M. Bryant, E.D., M.P.

Mr M. J. Neil, M.P.

Mr G. G. D. Scholes, M.P.

Mr J. R. Short, M.P.

CONTENTS

	<i>page</i>
Introduction	vi
Abbreviations	ix
1. Potential for global conflict and its implications for Australia	
Factors for stability in global outlook	1
Uncertainties in the central balance between the superpowers	3
Areas of tension that could disturb superpower balance	8
Trends in the 1980s in the global situation	9
The great powers and Australia's region	9
Uncertainties caused by nuclear proliferation	12
Immediate threats to Australia arising out of general war	13
Powers theoretically capable of posing a nuclear threat	14
Possible motives to attack Australia as a consequence of a war between the superpowers	15
The nuclear risk to the joint Australian/United States facilities	17
Likely warning time and deterrence to general/nuclear war	22
Australia's alliance with the United States	23
Issues that need to be addressed	26
2. Invasion of Australia	
Level of capability needed to pose such a threat	30
Powers capable of posing a threat of invasion	31
Who could have a motive for invading Australia?	35
Warning times	37
Deterrent to invasion	40
Issues that need to be addressed	42
3. Intermediate level threats	
Capability needed to pose an intermediate level threat	43
Who could have capabilities or motives to pose an intermediate level threat?	44
Warning times	45
Deterrent to intermediate level threats	45
Issues that need to be addressed	46
4. Low level contingencies	
Who could have capabilities or motives to pose low level contingencies?	48
Warning times	49
Deterrents to low level contingencies	49
Issues that need to be addressed	50
5. Conclusions	52
Annexes	
A list of persons and organisations who assisted in the work of the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters	55
B The ANZUS Treaty	59
C Japanese consideration of invasion of Australia, March, 1942	62

Introduction

1. At a meeting on 26 February 1980, the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence directed its Sub-Committee on Defence Matters to monitor 'the implementation of the Australian Government's announced Defence programs'. The Sub-Committee subsequently called for submissions through newspaper advertisements and direct contact with interested organisations and persons, and commenced its public hearings on 2 April 1980. After the general elections the Sub-Committee was reconstituted on 4 December 1980 with a revised membership and the same terms of reference. At a time of increased interest in defence matters, the Sub-Committee has provided a bipartisan forum which has also given those not involved in government an opportunity to participate in the defence debate.

2. In the course of its hearings to date the Sub-Committee has identified a widespread misunderstanding amongst the public as to what constitutes a 'threat' to Australia's security. Some of this misunderstanding derives from the simplistic way in which defence issues are frequently discussed. As a result most Australians have no framework or set of criteria with which to judge the adequacy of Australia's defence. It is the Committee's view that no analysis of a defence program can proceed without a thorough understanding of the types of threats and contingencies which may be faced by the Australian Defence Force.

3. The purpose of this report is to canvass the concept of 'threat' within the Australian context. It is intended as a forerunner to further reports covering particular aspects of the terms of reference and seeks to provide a framework for public discussion of the subsequent issues. In this context the report presents conclusions without making formal recommendations.

4. If this report has any particular target it is the reasonably well informed citizen who has made no special study of defence, and who has the impression that because of its vast coastline and small population Australia is fundamentally indefensible. Such a person will find substantial reassurance in this report, and will, it is hoped, develop an informed interest in defence matters.

5. A report published by a Parliamentary Committee has an advantage over a Government paper in that it can canvass the delicate matter of Australia's relationships with its neighbours and allies without compromising Government policy. For example, there has sometimes been misinformed comment that individual countries within our region might pose a threat to Australia's security. Official constraints, however justified in the cause of diplomacy, have tended to leave the public in a state of ignorance or uncertainty. It is the Committee's hope that a frank discussion of such matters will dispel unnecessary fears, lead to an informed and balanced appreciation of Australia's regional relationships, and improve the climate of understanding between Australia and its neighbours.

6. What then do we understand by 'threat'?

7. Threat has to be judged in terms of both the capabilities and the intentions of a potential enemy, or combination of enemies. Statements of military capability are based on maximum theoretical capability in terms of a country's order of battle. They outline what countries are physically capable of doing with particular elements of their order of battle, and industrial infrastructure, viewed independently.

8. Intentions are a much more complex matter of study than measurable capabilities. There would probably be ample warning of a change in the attitude of a foreign government towards Australia if it contemplated mounting an attack. Strains in relationships

arise and tensions develop under those circumstances. Any act of war is a major decision for any government, and the use of military force is not a course adopted lightly by one nation against another. Nevertheless, motives or intentions can change much more quickly than a nation's capabilities to wage a war. To change a nation's capabilities for war is a slow and costly process. Also, with modern surveillance techniques and the ready availability of information on the acquisition of modern weapons systems, such changes in capabilities become very obvious to a potential opponent.

9. For the purposes of this report, threats to Australia can be classified under four headings: potential for global conflict and its implications for Australia; invasion of Australia; intermediate level threats to Australian interests; and low level contingencies. A chapter is devoted to each type of threat. It is difficult to choose an ideal classification as any one of the abovementioned threats could develop as an outcome of a general war between the superpowers (sometimes referred to as global war). General war and nuclear war have been discussed together and in depth in Chapter 1 because of an inherent difficulty in preventing the escalation of a general war into a nuclear conflict.

10. In subsequent chapters, the Committee considers a much wider range of potential threats to Australian interests which may arise as an outcome of a general war or as more localised conflicts. Because the possible range and nature of such conflicts is more widespread, the assessment is necessarily more tentative, highlighting the difficulties of defence planners in a medium power with extensive interests.

11. In each chapter the Committee considers the level of capability needed to pose the type of threats, who has the capability, who may have the motive, the likely warning time and possible deterrents. At the end of each chapter the Committee lists some of the consequential issues that need to be addressed. Substantial space has been devoted to the issues concerning global conflict because of the immensity of the subject. However the Committee wishes to draw attention to the importance for Australian defence planning of the issues canvassed in Chapters 3 and 4. These deal with intermediate level threats and low level contingencies which may require an Australian response independent of the actions of our allies. Therefore they have implications for the structure and capacity of our Defence Force.

12. In its work on its reference to date, the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters has received a large volume of evidence and documents. It has met on 45 occasions since February 1980. Despite an intervening election, it took over 1800 pages of public evidence in the 12 months period from April 1980. It has also taken a considerable amount of 'in camera' evidence.

13. The Committee has not had access to the various threat scenarios on which Department of Defence contingency plans are based. However, as indicated in the list of witnesses in Annex A, the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters has had the benefit of hearing the views on related matters from witnesses from the Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs. Representatives of the Governments of Western Australia, Tasmania and the Northern Territory have also placed their Governments' views before the Sub-Committee, mainly in regard to low level contingencies. The Sub-Committee has also received information from a wide variety of non-departmental sources.

14. In the belief that Australians living in the remote parts of the continent feel more vulnerable than those living in the more populous south-eastern part of Australia, the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters has placed some emphasis on taking evidence in northern and north-western Australia. As part of the Joint Committee, members of the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters also visited the Joint Australian-United States facilities at North West Cape, Pine Gap, Nurrungar and Smithfield. In addition, the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters has attended several Defence Force exercises including

two visits to HMAS *Melbourne*. The Sub-Committee is grateful to all those with whom it came into contact, for making these visits so worthwhile.

15. The Committee would like to thank all those who contributed their time, knowledge and experience to this inquiry. Special appreciation is due to those who appeared in person before the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters, and to those individuals and organisations who made the effort to provide written information.

R. C. Katter, M.P.

Chairman

Sub-Committee on Defence Matters

ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ALCM	Air-Launched Cruise Missile
ASDF	(Japanese) Air Self-Defence Force
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
CEP	Circular Error Probability
CG	Guided Missile Cruiser
CL	Light Cruiser
CSE	Central Studies Establishment, Department of Defence, Canberra
DD	Destroyer
DDG	Guided Missile Destroyer
FF	Frigate
FFL	Light Frigate
GSDF	(Japanese) Ground Self-Defence Force
ICBM	Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
LST	Landing Ship, Tank
MIRV	Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle
MRV	Multiple Re-entry Vehicle
MSDF	(Japanese) Maritime Self-Defence Force
MX	Multiple-sited missile system (experimental)
NTMV	National Technical Means of Verification
RDF	Rapid Deployment Force
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
SDF	(Japanese) Self-Defence Force
SLBM	Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
SS	Submarine
SSBN	Ballistic Nuclear Submarine
SSN	Nuclear Submarine
VTOL	Vertical Take-Off and Landing Aircraft

CHAPTER 1

Potential for global conflict and its implications for Australia

1.1 Since the Second World War the world has lived with a fear of nuclear destruction through superpower conflict. 'Successive Australian governments have acknowledged that the principal insurance against such a threat has been the conventional and nuclear power of the United States of America, supported by alliances with friendly powers such as under the North Atlantic and ANZUS treaties. These alliances have not continued without their occasional disagreements and difficulties, as one would expect of the relationships between countries most of whom have had democratic governments and open societies. However, in the absence of a fundamental change in the relationship between the superpowers, the democracies must continue to bear the unwelcome burden of arms for defensive purposes, and accept the difficult task of gaining agreement between democracies on a united response to a threat from a totalitarian government.

1.2 This chapter considers the threats to Australia that might result from a 'general war' between the superpowers and their allies, in which nuclear weapons would be used. It includes consideration of contingencies which might involve a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union on a small number of targets in Australia. Most strategic analysts agree that any general war involving significant conventional forces of the superpowers would most likely escalate into a nuclear war, and that it would be unrealistic to believe that any resort to limited nuclear war by the superpowers could be contained before the rapid onset of full-scale nuclear war. Some analysts refer to such a conflict as 'global war' in their belief that the war would quickly spread to many parts of the globe. For reasons outlined in other parts of this report, it is difficult to envisage a serious strategic threat to Australia or to Australia's area of primary strategic concern which is unrelated to a major breakdown in the existing world order or which is unrelated to Australia's alliance with the United States.

1.3 In the absence of more lasting solutions to the problems of world conflict, Australia has an obvious interest in a stable central balance between the superpowers and in the isolation of any regional conflict to prevent its escalation to general war. Governments of all parties have sought to encourage such a stable central balance. It should be noted that general war need not affect all areas of the globe equally. Except insofar as Australia hosts facilities associated with the United States nuclear war deterrent, any hostile attention to Australia early in a nuclear war would be unlikely or incidental. Australia would be seriously affected by the inevitable disruption to world order, damage to commerce and to the economies of our major trading partners.

Factors for stability in global outlook

1.4 There is much in the present superpower strategic relationship to promote stability or at least to reduce the chance of major conflict. Of outmost importance is the commonality of interest, that of avoiding mutually destructive war between the superpowers, and the equivalence of their strategic forces. Other positive factors are: the will and determination of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

(NATO) to maintain that equivalence, the likelihood of continuing strategic arms limitation negotiations; the tacit alignment of China with the West; the degree of economic interdependence of the great powers; and the knowledge that each superpower has of the other's capabilities.

1.5 It has been said that the Soviet Union has been encouraged to increased adventurism by a lack of Western resolve in recent years; nevertheless, the Soviet Union has a real interest in the continuation of the Strategic Arms Limitation process. Some of the factors bearing heavily on the Soviet leadership to exercise restraint in strategic matters include:

- (a) the Soviet Government's awareness that it could not win an unrestrained nuclear arms race, over the longer term, against the superior technological and industrial capacity of the United States, and the firm Soviet interest in the greater predictability which maintenance of the Strategic Arms Limitation process would bring to decisions on the new development and deployment of weapons;
- (b) the effect of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on its standing in the Third World in reducing any optimism regarding Soviet peaceful intentions among Western and neutral countries, and on the availability of Soviet forces for other purposes;
- (c) the Soviet requirement to deploy substantial forces along the Chinese border;
- (d) major economic and political problems in the socialist states of Eastern Europe, requiring increasing Soviet attention; and
- (e) the broadening of trade between East and West and Soviet reliance on access to Western technology.

1.6 The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) process has been supported by past and present United States governments, although the administration of President Reagan has not yet made a firm commitment as to the timing of resumed negotiations (desired by the Soviet Union), or as to the fate of the unratified SALT II Agreement (which is being unofficially observed). In any case, the Reagan Administration faces a number of constraints on any pressure to adopt a course of unbridled expenditure on nuclear weapons including the following factors:

- (a) The SALT negotiations offer the only practicable alternative to unrestricted nuclear competition, which would destabilise the strategic balance and increase the risks of devastating destruction in a nuclear war. Furthermore, a failure to impose ceilings on Soviet weapons via SALT would obviate any marginal advantage to the American side accruing from the deployment of weapons system such as the MX missile.
- (b) The economic costs that would be related to a situation of strategic instability are very high; the United States economy already faces a burden of unprecedented high defence expenditure.
- (c) Any failure by the United States to lock the Soviet Union into a nuclear arms control agreement would still have to take into account that the United States no longer has the ability to achieve a 'usable' predominance in strategic arms over the Soviet Union, as was the case from the late 1940s to the 1960s.
- (d) The European allies of the United States, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, have pressed the United States to undertake arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union in connection with the deployment of new United States theatre nuclear weapons in Europe. The United States has agreed to enter into such discussions before the end of 1981 and it would then be difficult to separate negotiations over European theatre weapons from those which are

subject of renewed SALT talks. (The United States already has thousands of forward-based 'tactical' nuclear weapons capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union, whereas comparable Soviet theatre weapons, unless upgraded, cannot reach targets in the United States.) Further pressure for such arms control discussions has arisen from internal dissension in Western Europe over the upgrading of nuclear weapons in the NATO theatre.

- (e) A number of allies of the United States are keen to preserve some benefits of the detente period, particularly for economic reasons, and many of these allies have shown a reluctance to respond to United States' encouragement to increase defence expenditure.
- (f) Any failure by the United States to agree to a resumption of the SALT negotiations could be seen as handing a propaganda victory to the Soviet Union.

1.7 Overall, there is a clear comprehension by both superpowers of the awesome consequences of escalation to nuclear conflict. Just one of the forty-one United States nuclear strategic submarines, which are currently considered invulnerable to a Soviet first strike, has sufficient warheads (160) to obliterate every Soviet city with a population greater than 150,000. (These cities account for about one-third of the Soviet population).¹ The threat of general devastation which a nuclear war would entail not only deters nuclear aggression, but it also serves as a very powerful deterrent against some acts of conventional aggression. However, whatever confidence of continuing stability these circumstances provide is confined more to the core of the superpower relationship than to its periphery.

Uncertainties in the central balance between the superpowers

1.8 While there are several factors which impel the superpowers towards maintaining and enhancing stability in their relations, opportunities will inevitably arise, in circumstances where the vital interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are not engaged, for either superpower to gain some political advantage at the cost of regional disturbance if not conflict. It is such peripheral disturbances in the superpower relationship that may cause considerable concern, even though the core of the relationship remains essentially stable. The following paragraphs outline some of the factors in the global outlook—many of them uncertainties—that could become the focus of superpower tension, or at worst involve the superpowers on opposite sides in hostilities.

1.9 The greatest danger that could arise from 'peripheral' disturbances in the superpower relationship is that they might not remain peripheral. Major powers have frequently been drawn into wars which they had not sought. For example, the doctrine of 'limited nuclear war' endorsed in President Carter's Presidential Directive No. 59 of 25 July 1979, carries this danger. Under such circumstances, there is the danger that a local dispute in, for example, the Middle East or in any of the other areas of tension, could quickly escalate into a general United States-Soviet war. This was stated in testimony before the United States Senate Armed Services Committee in January 1980, when the Commander of the Strategic Air Command, General R. H. Ellis, said that so-called 'limited and regional nuclear options' could be used in response to Soviet conventional military activity in the Middle East-Persian Gulf region.²

1.10 Official Soviet statements have often been made to the effect that the USSR would respond to a nuclear attack with its own nuclear weapons. In Soviet military doctrine, the distinction between the use of conventional and nuclear weapons in war is

unclear. Furthermore, Soviet spokesmen have said consistently over the years that the Soviet Union makes no distinction between 'limited' and 'general' nuclear war:

'The idea itself of introducing "rules of the game" and of artificial limitations "by agreement" is based on an illusion and is without foundation. It is hard to imagine that nuclear war, if launched, could be held within the framework of the "rules" and not grow "into" general war.'³

'For the achievement of victory in a present day nuclear war, if it is unleashed by the imperialists, not only the enemy's armed forces, but also the sources of his military power, the important economic centers, points of military and state control, as well as the areas where different branches of armed forces are based, will be subject to simultaneous destruction.'⁴

1.11 Some Western analysts have argued that it would be possible to limit a nuclear exchange to so-called 'Counterforce' targets related to an opponent's ability to wage war, as distinct from merely targeting population centres. As many 'Counterforce' targets in the Soviet Union such as missile silos, airbases, military barracks, stockpiles of war material, command and communication centres are near population centres, Soviet fatalities resulting from such a 'Counterforce' attack would amount to several millions in the civilian population (depending on which of the large variety of Soviet 'Counterforce' targets are chosen and the level of fall-out protection assumed). Given casualties of this magnitude and the problem for the Soviet leadership of distinguishing unlimited war from a comprehensive 'Counterforce' attack—which could involve up to several thousand targets—then the notion of limiting nuclear exchange to a surgical 'Counterforce' strike would seem to be quite unrealistic (see also para 1.44).

1.12 The realisation that a limited nuclear war may very quickly escalate to an unlimited war, has led to a stress on maximising 'damage limitation' capabilities. The most ambitious way of limiting damage to oneself is to develop a capability to launch a massive pre-emptive strike to totally disarm an opponent's nuclear forces. An obvious deterrent to such a pre-emptive strike is the knowledge that a proportion of the adversary's strategic nuclear forces would survive (para 1.7 refers).

1.13 It has been asserted frequently that the attainment by the Soviet Union of strategic nuclear equivalence with, and even superiority to, the United States has encouraged errant Soviet behaviour; a so-called 'window of opportunity' for the Soviet Union until such time as the new American arms acquisition program is fully implemented. Leaving aside the difficulties of trying to measure and equate the asymmetric military capabilities of the two superpowers, it is at least debatable whether the growing strength of Soviet strategic arms has conferred a political or military advantage which it can exploit during the next few years. Tables 1-1 and 1-2 show that the Soviet Union has a larger number of delivery systems than the United States with a greater total explosive yield, but this is not an adequate guide to the strategic balance.

1.14 The new emphasis on 'damage limiting' strategies for fighting (as well as deterring) a nuclear war places a premium on maximising warhead numbers (as distinct from the number of delivery systems) and their yield/accuracy, as well as on the reliability and readiness of their delivery systems, and on minimising the vulnerability of those systems. In each of these areas the United States seems to have a substantial advantage over the Soviet Union. Furthermore, with the exception of the current generation of ICBMs, the United States nuclear forces are well protected from a Soviet first strike.

TABLE 1-1
Strategic Balance—1981-82

	<i>Predicted levels for 1985</i>					
	<i>Present levels</i>		<i>With SALT II</i>		<i>Without SALT II</i>	
	<i>US</i>	<i>USSR</i>	<i>US</i>	<i>USSR</i>	<i>US</i>	<i>USSR</i>
<i>SALT II limits</i>						
MIRV'ed ICBMs 820	550	820	495	820	700	1 400
MIRV'ed SLBMs 1200	520	200	690	380	700	470
	1 070	1 020	1 185	1 200	1 400	1 870
Bombers with ALCMs 1320	135	..	200	..
	1 070	1 020	1 320	1 200	1 600	1 870
	Land based					
Missiles with single warhead or MRVs						
ICBM 2250	500	580	500	420	350	..
	Sea based					
Missiles with single warhead or MRVs						
SLBM 2250	760	..	540	..	710
Bombers without cruise missiles	350	150	210	100	145	150
Total operational delivery vehicles	1 900	2 500	2 030	2 250	2 090	2 730
Total warhead numbers	9 200	8 000	11 700	9 000	13 800	12 000

Source: Department of Defence, tabled in House of Representatives *Hansard*, 5 May 1981, p. 1951.

TABLE 1-2
Nuclear Strategic Forces

Type	Number of delivery vehicles deployed	Total warheads	Total explosive (Mt)	Against targets hardened to 2000 pounds per square inch	
				Total kill with single shot (a)	Total kill with double shot (a)
USA(b)—					
ICBM	1 054	2 154	1 442	693	581
SLBM	656	5 088	299	200	196
Heavy bombers . . .	345	2 440	1 592	1 280	930
Total	2 055	9 682	3 333	2 173	1 707
USSR(b)—					
ICBM	1 380	5 220	5 000	1 628	1 333
SLBM	932	1 620	805	62	60
Heavy bombers . . .	155	270	570	76	62
Backfire	100	200	200	148	93
Total	2 567	7 310	6 575	1 914	1 548
Without backfire . . .	2 467	7 110	6 375	1 766	1 455
France(c)—					
ICBM	none				
SLBM	80	80	80	none	none
Heavy bombers . . .	none				
UK(c)—					
ICBM	none				
SLBM	64	192	38.4	none	none
China(c)—					
ICBM	4	4	4–12	none	none
SLBM	none (but one SLBM submarine without missiles)				
Heavy bombers . . .	none				

(a) These estimates are a function of accuracy and yield. If one US re-entry vehicle was assigned to each hardened USSR silo target, it is probable that a total of 2173 silos would be destroyed. If two re-entry vehicles were assigned to each hardened silo target, only half as many silos could be targeted, but of those, a higher proportion (totalling 1707) would be destroyed.

(b) *Evidence*, (Mr R. H. Mathams), 9 February 1981, p. 1342.

(c) *The Military Balance, 1980–81*, pp. 25, 21, 62.

TABLE 1-2

Soviet strategic missile delivery capability, September 1980 (Estimates)

<i>Vehicle</i>	<i>Number of vehicles deployed</i>	<i>Number of warheads per delivery vehicle</i>	<i>Total delivery capability (number of warheads)</i>	<i>Total yield per delivery vehicle (Mt)</i>	<i>Total delivery capability (Mt)</i>	<i>Estimated CEP (m)</i>
MIRVed vehicles—						
SS-17	150	4	600	2	300	300–600
SS-18	240	8	1 920	4	960	300–600
SS-19	300	6	1 800	3	900	300–450
SS-N-18 ^a	144	3	432	0.6	86	500–1 000
Sub-total	834		4 752		2 246	
Non-MIRVed vehicles—						
SS-9	8	1	8	20	160	1 000–1 300
SS-11	580	1 or 3	1 160	1 or 0.6	464	1 000–1 800
SS-13	60	1	60	1	60	
SS-18	60	1	60	15	900	1 000–2 500
SS-N-6 ^a	464	1 or 2	696	1 or 0.4	325	1 400
SS-NX-17 ^a	16	1	16	1	16	500
SS-N-8 ^a	326	1	326	1	326	1 000–1 500
Sub-total	1 514		2 326		2 251	
Total	2 348		7 078 ^b		4 497	

^a SLBM.^b Of these, 6 266 are independently targetable (5 028 on ICBMs and 1 238 on SLBMs). ICBMs carry 83 per cent of the total megatonnage, and SLBMs carry the remaining 17 per cent.Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook, 1980*, London 1980, p. xxvii.

1.15 The Soviet Union's weapons program, like its United States counterpart, has its own internal momentum. Given the long lead times, it is determined in part by the long-term expectations of the possible achievements of the other side. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has to take account of the capabilities and intentions of China and the allies of the United States who have substantial military power of their own, including nuclear weapons in the cases of Britain, France and China.

Areas of tension that could disturb superpower balance

1.16 Europe remains crucial for the superpowers, but the clear divisions there between the two alliance systems and the involvement of the full might of the nuclear arsenals and massive conventional forces on each side ensure a measure of stability. A breakdown there would mean almost certainly a full-scale war. This was demonstrated when, with a Soviet invasion of Poland in prospect, the United States made it clear that there was no question of Western Military involvement and that the Western response would be confined to political and economic measures. There is likely to be continuing instability in Eastern Europe. Even within the Soviet Union there are considerable uncertainties associated with the need to replace an ageing leadership, growing economic difficulties and problems associated with the non-Russian minorities who potentially out-number the Russians.

1.17 In northern Asia tensions continue between the Soviet Union and China and to a lesser extent between the Soviet Union and Japan. The Korean peninsula is the geographical point at which the strategic interests of the major powers in northern Asia intersect. Although the military and political balance in the Korean peninsula remains stable at present (and apparently it is not in the interest of the major powers to disturb it), domestic factors within the two Korean states could have unpredictable consequences. The North maintains a strongly hostile attitude to the South. This situation of regional tension is likely to continue at a time when the Soviet Union continues to strengthen its capabilities in North-East Asia and as co-operation between China, and the United States and Japan is enhanced.

1.18 The Middle East and South Asian regions, including the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa and the north-western Indian Ocean, represent perhaps the most dangerous flash points because of the unstable interaction there of regional tensions and hostilities and superpower strategic interests. In addition to such long-standing rivalries as those between Israel and the Arabs and between India and Pakistan, and the overriding concern of the Western Alliance regarding the security of oil supplies, the region is further inflamed by the strong tensions between several rival Arab states, the war between Iraq and Iran, frequent crises in Lebanon and by the Iranian revolution.

1.19 The superpowers have always worked to ensure that their allies or clients in the Middle East are not subjected to serious defeats. The history of that involvement of the superpowers in the region indicates that the United States and the Soviet Union will only work for a solution to the Arab-Israeli problem if a serious situation threatens to draw the two superpowers into an actual conflict. This is a situation that they have always sought to avoid.⁵

1.20 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent pressures on Pakistan from the Soviet Union and other powers regarding Pakistani support for the Afghan rebels, as well as continuing Soviet efforts to build up and exploit its influence among radical Arab states and in the Horn of Africa, have had a further destabilising impact on the whole Middle East-South Asian area.

1.21 Southern Africa remains another area of tension. South Africa's racial policies and its continued occupation of Namibia continue to make it the target of African states, and of international opinion generally. The efforts of radical states to enforce

harsher measures, including economic sanctions, against South Africa are now creating problems between the West and the non-aligned countries. This will continue to provide opportunities for the Soviet Union 'to fish in troubled waters' which the West will feel compelled to counter, and the overall level of tension is likely to be raised.

1.22 Any substantial efforts by the Soviet Union or its surrogates to increase their influence in the Western Hemisphere also runs the risk of causing superpower tension. This was illustrated by the 'Cuban Missile Crisis' of 1962. The interests of the great powers in South East Asia is dealt with in a separate section commencing in para 1.25.

Trends in the 1980s in the global situation

1.23 Internal economic factors can be of overriding importance for the stability of particular countries and this can have an important impact upon neighbouring countries or major trading partners, and in the case of major powers such as the United States, upon the international scene as a whole. President Reagan considers that he has come to office with a firm mandate for change in United States foreign policy. He is giving expression to a more assertive stance internationally, which emphasises the overriding importance of the global strategic relationship with the Soviet Union. This is a relationship that the Reagan Administration believes can best be managed by:

- (a) renewing United States military strength through increased defence expenditures, particularly in the conventional sphere, and arms sales and other defence assistance to 'endangered' countries; and
- (b) improved consultation and co-ordination within the Western Alliance, linking progress in the central United States-Soviet relationship, particularly on strategic arms limitation, with improvements in Soviet attitudes in other areas, such as Soviet support for revolutionary groups in Third World countries. The net effects that the new policies of the Reagan Administration may have on stability and the global strategic outlook remain uncertain.

1.24 The following appear to be the likely trends in the global situation in the 1980s which have implications for Australia and its region:

- (a) a continuing high level of strategic nuclear competition and military expenditure between the superpowers, but within the framework of restraint;
- (b) continuing and perhaps increased superpower tensions and competition in regions of instability and confrontation, with the recurrent risk of escalation (paras 1.16-1.22 refer);
- (c) continued tensions between the Soviet Union and the Western Alliance, China, and to a lesser degree, the larger part of the non-aligned group;
- (d) less emphasis on a bi-polar structure internationally, giving third powers, or groups of powers, more room to manoeuvre;
- (e) increased nuclear proliferation (paras 1.34-1.37 refer); and
- (f) an international agenda largely devoted to the political and economic concerns of Third World countries, and to international economic issues with important consequences for stability on a global and regional level; of utmost importance in this regard is the continued security of oil supplies.

(For likely developments in South East Asia see para 1.31.)

The great powers and Australia's region

1.25 The character of great power involvement in South East Asia has changed markedly since the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam. Intensified Sino-Soviet rivalry has been brought into sharper focus through the events of Indo-China, particularly in regard to the close relations established between the Soviet Union and Vietnam, and Soviet support for Vietnam's operations against the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea.

1.26 Although it appears to have less strategic importance to Soviet military planners than many other regions in the world, including East Asia, South East Asia has become increasingly significant in terms of Soviet global priorities. The USSR regards the extension of its influence in South East Asia as a natural expression of its superpower status. In South East Asia its disposition to exert influence is reinforced by a number of factors: its alliance with Vietnam; its interest in containing China and to a lesser degree containing Western influence in the region; and its long standing policy of maintaining access to the Indian Ocean for its Pacific Ocean fleet. The USSR would like to dominate the region in ideological terms without being involved in active military operations. For their part, the ASEAN countries have continued to view the Soviet Union with considerable caution, not least because of Soviet support for Vietnam, and the Vietnamese invasion and continued occupation of Kampuchea.

1.27 In the wake of the Vietnam War the United States, whose influence was once predominant, has had no significant military presence in mainland South East Asia, and the threshold of any future involvement of United States ground forces in the region is likely to be very high. The United States continues to maintain bases in the Philippines, which are significant for the support of the United States Seventh Fleet. It is evident that support for the five members that comprise the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) will be an important element in the emerging policies of the Reagan Administration. The ASEAN countries are seen by the Reagan Administration as friends of the United States in terms of global confrontation with the Soviet Union. However, these countries in varying degrees are reluctant to identify themselves publicly as allies of the United States, particularly in the broad context of United States global policies.

1.28 The policy of the Reagan Administration towards South East Asia has involved: a firm restatement of the United States' intention to retain its military strength in the Pacific area; proposals for the expansion of economic aid and concessional arms transfers to Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia; and political support for President Soeharto's government as part of an effort to build up bilateral relations with Indonesia. In general, ASEAN countries have reacted cautiously but favourably to United States policies under the leadership of President Reagan. They have welcomed the assurances of support and promises of greater supplies of conventional arms.

1.29 China regards South East Asia, particularly the ASEAN countries, as an area of prime strategic, political and to some extent, economic interest. As a result it has sought to strengthen and expand its relations with those countries. The main factors behind China's bid for improved relations with those countries have been the continuing Sino-Soviet dispute and also the desire to check Vietnam's influence in the region. However, China has continued to give some support for regional insurgency movements, albeit at a reduced level. It has sustained the fears of some ASEAN countries of China's long-term intentions. Indonesian and Malaysian suspicions remain particularly strong in this regard. Such concerns are linked to past and present support for the Communist Party of Indonesia and the Communist Party of Malaya. The status and loyalties of overseas Chinese is another concern to several governments in the region.

1.30 The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978 had significant effects on the area of Australia's strategic interests. It prompted increased cohesion on political matters among the ASEAN countries as well as being an important consideration in China's 'lesson' to Vietnam in February 1979. The events of Indo-China have given a new emphasis to concerns of the ASEAN countries regarding both internal stability and external threats. Prior to the mid-1970s the defence capabilities of the ASEAN countries related primarily to internal security. There is now more of an emphasis on external defence capacity without being necessarily at the expense of the

internal security role (the distinction cannot be clearly made). Defence expenditure by the ASEAN countries has doubled in the past five years but this was from a low base due to the rundown of defence spending in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It should be borne in mind that ASEAN is not a defence organisation or a military alliance and it is not likely to become one in the near future, although the regular contacts on a broad range of matters provide opportunities for consultations on matters of defence interest.

1.31 In South East Asia, the following are likely to be factors with strategic implications in the foreseeable future:

- (a) Indo-China will continue to be the focus of great power rivalry in the region, particularly between the Soviet Union and China, which will retain potential for having a most serious impact on the region; however, rivalry between the superpowers in South East Asia is unlikely to affect their vital interests (as it continues to do in Europe and the Middle East);
- (b) Vietnam's current serious economic problems are unlikely to force it to modify its policies in Indo-China (particularly in relation to its domination of Kampuchea and Laos) as long as the Soviet Union continues to provide economic assistance on a massive scale; however, large-scale overt aggression by Vietnam against Thailand is considered unlikely;
- (c) China and the Soviet Union can be expected to continue to exploit any openings that will strengthen their position in relation to each other and to other powers in the region; for example, the Soviet Union has gained access in Vietnam to former United States naval and air facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang respectively, and a Soviet radio intercept station has also been established near Cam Ranh Bay;
- (d) there is the possibility of further large-scale Chinese military action against Vietnam (there has been animosity between the two countries for centuries);
- (e) the United States, under President Reagan, is likely to pursue various supportive policies towards the ASEAN countries, and is likely to encourage Japan to play a more active, political role in the region;
- (f) there will be generally favourable economic prospects in the ASEAN region (especially in Singapore and Malaysia) but they will be accompanied by some continuing serious social problems associated with population pressure, urbanisation, unemployment, unequal distribution of income and need for land reform; this may be complicated by communal tensions in Malaysia and to a lesser extent in Indonesia;
- (g) despite any likely leadership changes in the ASEAN countries, their Governments are likely to continue to pursue similar domestic and foreign policies as at present;
- (h) there will continue to be insurgency problems but these are unlikely to threaten the stability of the ASEAN region;
- (i) some outflow of refugees from Indo-China is likely to continue; and
- (j) there will be increased potential for disputes over the settlement of maritime boundaries, ownership of islands (particularly in the South China Sea) and, certainly, passage through straits and archipelagos in the area.

1.32 In the South West Pacific the political transition to independence of several small states has been peaceful and smooth, with the exception of Vanuatu.⁶ On present indications, their record of political evolution and political stability is expected to continue in the foreseeable future but there are risks of tensions, for example, in Fiji and New Caledonia. In each there are peculiar communal situations which have potential for trouble. In Fiji the leadership on both sides is moderate and anxious to avoid conflict, and there are good reasons to believe that existing understandings of power

sharing and economic development will persist. In New Caledonia there has been majority electoral support for the Territory remaining under French rule, but there is also strong and growing support for independence among the indigenous Melanesian population, which now constitutes 44 per cent of the total, and which sees a change in political status as offering remedies for economic and social disadvantages. Following a visit by the Secretary of State for Overseas Departments and Territories, M. Henri Emmanuelli, during the period 6 to 21 August 1981, the Council of Ministers of the Government of France issued a statement regarding New Caledonia which said:

'The permanence of outmoded structures underlines the unacceptable state of inequality among the various ethnic groups, on economic, social, political and cultural levels. This situation calls for a radical change of policy, based mainly on determined acceleration of land reform, and development of a package of measures within the framework of a plan for Melanesian development, including economic and cultural aspects.'

1.33 Although the South West Pacific states can be considered low on any Soviet list of priorities, Australia and New Zealand cannot take the pro-Western attitudes in the region for granted. So far the Soviet Union has no foothold among the small states, which in most cases have very limited economic resources. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has been attempting to expand its influence in the region. It has been offering to develop fisheries resources, oceanographic and hydrographic services, and has shown interest in the self-determination process in the French territories. (For comments on the ANZUS obligations of the United States in the area of Australia's primary strategic concern, see para 1.67—1.73.)

Uncertainties caused by nuclear proliferation

1.34 The dangers of nuclear proliferation add yet another worrying dimension to the uncertainties in the global strategic outlook, particularly to the complex circumstances of the Middle East and South Asian areas. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974 but did not pursue an active nuclear weapons program. More recently there have been clear indications that Pakistan has been making a major effort to acquire a nuclear explosive capability. This has in turn prompted India to reconsider the pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. In the Middle East, Israel is reliably considered to have either assembled nuclear weapons or to have the ability to do so quickly, and concern has been expressed about the longer-term nuclear intentions of countries such as Iraq and Libya. Colonel Gaddafi's earlier attempt to purchase a nuclear weapon from China (and subsequent interest in the development of a nuclear weapon in an Islamic country), despite Libya's ample supply of modern conventional weapons, illustrates the bizarre possibilities in nuclear proliferation.

1.35 Nuclear proliferation in the South Asia-Middle East area would have serious repercussions. Not only would it exacerbate regional tensions and rivalries and encourage pre-emptive strikes, but it could threaten the containment of proliferation on a global basis and the framework of the international non-proliferation regime. While the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has some 115 parties and continues to attract adherents, there are several states remaining outside the Treaty which either have a nuclear capability or which may perceive it necessary to develop nuclear weapons. These include France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, Brazil and Argentina.

1.36 The probability of nuclear weapons being used outside the superpowers' central relationship is probably greater than the chances of them being used by the superpowers. There are a number of 'adversary pairs' in the world in which there is a nuclear component or potential capability on either one or both sides. States falling into this category would be: North and South Korea; China and Taiwan, India and Pakistan, Israel and the Arab states; South Africa and the black nations; Brazil and Argentina.

The nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan, and Brazil and Argentina, are well advanced.⁷

1.37 There has been general recognition by Australian governments that nuclear proliferation poses a threat to Australia in the long term, as well as to both regional and global stability. Like the majority of the other signatories to the Treaty, Australia wishes to have the assurance that its neighbours will not develop nuclear weapons and that existing unstable areas will not be subject to local nuclear arms races with the attendant risks of the use of nuclear weapons and the inevitable involvement or intervention by outside powers. To date, both the superpowers have adopted rigorous policies against proliferation. If this were to break down, it would have serious implications. Furthermore, continued unrestrained nuclear weapons development by the existing club of five nuclear powers could provoke ambitions to have nuclear weapons among non-nuclear weapon states, or at least would serve as an ostensible justification for those ambitions. Australian Government policy on Non-Proliferation was stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon A. A. Street, M.P., on 4 December 1980, when he said:

‘The Government is determined to maintain its strong support for the goal of disarmament and the negotiation of balanced and verifiable measures on arms control. We will continue to give the highest priority to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons particularly through our continued support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty which would ban the testing of nuclear weapons by all states in all environments and through the development of an international consensus on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.’⁸

Immediate threats to Australia arising out of general war

1.38 Australia’s geographic position is such that it is unlikely to become automatically or immediately involved in a conventional conflict associated with a general war. This situation is made more likely by the fact that Australia no longer has a ‘forward defence’ posture and has relatively limited deployment overseas. Apart from perhaps the use of the Darwin airbase by United States B52 bombers, Australia contains no major staging points for the conventional forces of its allies (although the facilities at HMAS Stirling, Cockburn Sound, have been offered.) The Australian Government has rejected an invitation to become part of the United States Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), and the Australian forces are not part of any allied integrated force positioned for early involvement in a conflict between the superpowers. Given the likely short duration of a general war (which is likely to escalate to a nuclear war), and its likely concentration in the northern hemisphere, it seems unlikely that Australia would be directly threatened with invasion.

1.39 Furthermore, Australia would be unlikely to find its forces engaged during the initial stages of a war, except in limited activity in its immediate environment. Any more active overseas involvement would be by deliberate decision by the Australian Government after hostilities commenced and this is a subject beyond the scope of this report.

1.40 With regard to the question of fallout in Australia resulting from a major nuclear exchange in the northern hemisphere, the then Director of Scientific and Technical Intelligence in the Joint Intelligence Organisation has stated:

‘The immediate effect on Australia of a major nuclear exchange in the northern hemisphere would be negligible; in the longer term, levels of radioactivity in the southern hemisphere will increase as a result of fallout transferred from the northern hemisphere, but the effects of this could be relatively easily reduced by appropriate protective measures. In any event the amount of fallout would probably only be about twice that received in Australia from

the combined atmospheric testing in the northern hemisphere during the early 1960s.⁹ (but see also paras 1.2 and 1.41)

For the nuclear risk to the joint Australian/United States facilities, see paras 1.52 to 1.61.

1.41 The damage that Australia would suffer in the first instance in a general war, aside from that associated with a possible nuclear attack, would be large scale disruption to our economy because of the massive destruction inflicted on some of our trading partners, and the dislocation of world trade. The longer-term effects on the world of a large-scale nuclear war, including unpredictable genetic damage, are likely to be even more serious than the short-term effects. The enormity of destruction is indicated for example, in the *Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons: Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations* which describes some of the effects from a large-scale nuclear exchange in the following terms:

‘. . . There is very little reason to believe that the political and social situation in any country would be unchanged after a large nuclear war. Many nations among those we know today would probably disappear. Others might be virtually depopulated by famine and mass migration. The system of international security would have been destroyed, and so would to a large extent the traditional pattern of those states, nations and societies which might survive.’¹⁰

Powers theoretically capable of posing a nuclear threat

1.42 The methods by which nuclear weapons could be delivered against Australia include:

- (a) inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) systems;
- (b) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) systems;
- (c) long-range strategic bombers (potentially with cruise missiles); and
- (d) short or medium range surface to surface missiles from surface ships or submarines.

Table 1-2 shows, in outline, the extent of the nuclear strategic forces of the five nuclear powers. There are many factors which outweigh theoretical capabilities in the difficult decisions on the choice of targets and delivery systems in a nuclear war.

1.43 As indicated elsewhere in this report, the nuclear strategies of the superpowers place a premium on the number of warheads, which are heavily committed to ‘Counter-force’ targets, as distinct to being committed to ‘city busting’. Nevertheless, Mr R. H. Mathams, then Director of Scientific and Technical Intelligence, Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO), said in March 1978:

‘Although the likelihood of strategic nuclear attack against Australia is not great it is none-the-less finite . . .

The most significant trend for Australia in strategic forces development is the large number of nuclear warheads available to the USSR, which now has sufficient warheads to adequately target the US and retain substantial reserves for use against secondary targets. We cannot determine the priorities the USSR attaches to targets in Australia, but joint US-Australian facilities would probably rank high, depending on Soviet perceptions of their strategic importance.

In descending order of probability, Australia might receive strategic nuclear attacks against: US facilities in Australia; Australian defence establishments; industrial complexes and urban centres . . .’¹¹

In the very unlikely event of a nuclear attack on Australia, about half a dozen nuclear weapons could be sufficient to disable this nation because of the concentration of population and industry in a few cities.

1.44. Both superpowers have large numbers of nuclear weapons capable of being delivered by missile against targets around the globe. It has been estimated that by 1985, in the absence of a strategic arms limitation agreement (SALT II), the Soviet Union will possess 12 000 nuclear warheads compared with the United States 13 800. At that time the USSR might be expected to have 2 730 nuclear weapons delivery vehicles.¹² There have been other estimates which assume that, due to the factors of reliability and readiness, perhaps not more than 60 per cent (1 638) of these delivery vehicles would be available for use at any one time. Whether any of these vehicles would be devoted to Australian targets, rather than targets in North America, Europe or China would depend on Soviet priorities at the time (see paras 1.54 and 1.80.) In this regard it has to be borne in mind that both superpowers have a large number of potential targets. For example, during the later years of the 1970s, in the Pentagon's Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) 5D for fighting a nuclear war there were reportedly some 40 000 potential nuclear targets in the Soviet bloc. Of these over half were Soviet military targets compared with some 15 000 economic-industrial targets and some 2 000 leadership and control targets.¹³ It is in Australia's interests that the superpowers agree to limit the number of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

1.45. Britain, France and China each have an independent nuclear missile capability which has been designed for deterrence against Soviet nuclear attack. In theory, it would be feasible for the capability to be redirected against other countries. Britain had 64 and France had 80 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in 1980. At that time China had an estimated four inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with a range of 3 200 to 3 800 nautical miles, and one SLBM submarine without any missiles.¹⁴ (See also Table 1-2.)

1.46. It should be noted that the Soviet Union has not given nuclear weapons to other countries, including those in the Warsaw Pact. Unfortunately, a number of other states appear to be in the process of developing a nuclear weapons system (paras 1.35 to 1.36 refer). However, the delivery systems are likely to be designed for possible use against nearby adversaries, rather than to cover inter-continental distances. Although it would be against the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it would not be impossible for a nuclear power to give a nuclear weapon or an associated delivery system to a regional power.

Possible motives to attack Australia as a consequence of a war between the superpowers

1.47. An argument can be put that in a nuclear war the Soviet Union may have a motive to destroy Australia's capacity to support or succour the United States (after the latter has been severely damaged in such a war), particularly as the Soviet Union is likely to need only an insignificant part of its nuclear arsenal to incapacitate a few Australian cities. This chapter has already cast some doubts on such a notion, and most speculation on whether Australia would be a target in a general war between the superpowers hinges on the perceptions, particularly likely Soviet perceptions, of the roles of the three joint Australian-United States defence installations. According to an answer to a question on notice given by the Minister for Defence, the Hon. D. J. Killen, M.P., on 10 October 1978¹⁵, the designation and functions of these three installations (there are other joint installations), are:

- the North West Cape Naval Communications Station:

'The function of the station is defence communication: in particular, communications for the submarines and surface vessels of the USN and RAN. The station is located at North West Cape Western Australia.'

- the Joint Defence Space Research Facility:

'The function of the facility is defence space research. It is located at Pine Gap in Alice Springs.'

- the Joint Defence Space Communications Station:

'The function of the station is defence space communications. It is located at Nurrungar, near Woomera.'

1.48 The Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon. A. A. Street, M.P., responding on 20 August 1981 to a question on notice, said regarding joint installations at North West Cape, Pine Gap, Nurrungar and Smithfield:

'The JDSRF [Joint Defence Space Research Facility] and the Joint Defence Space Communications Station (JSDSC) at Nurrungar are not parts of a weapons system. Nor would it be correct to describe the functions of the TRANET Station at Smithfield, or the defence-related facilities as "part of a global nuclear weapons system". The primary function of the Naval Communication Station at North West Cape is the relay of very low frequency communications to United States submarines, including fleet ballistic missile submarines. As such it has an important role in that element of the United States nuclear weapons system.'¹⁶

1.49 Official discussion of the purposes of the facilities has been sparse. This has been a major inhibition on public debate on the matter in Australia. Most available public information in Australia has come from official and unofficial sources in the United States. The Committee is not in a position to provide any additional information as to the functions of the joint facilities, which could be regarded as coming from any official source. However, it has had available to it a range of non-departmental views, including one from Dr Desmond Ball, who has expressed the following opinions:

North West Cape

'North West Cape is presently one of the most important links in the US global defence network. According to official brochures, the base "may serve several purposes. However, its main reason for existence is to maintain reliable communications with submarines of the US fleet serving in this area of the world [i.e., the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans]"—and, in particular, "to provide communication for the US Navy's most powerful deterrent force—the nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine". The VLF facility for communicating with the American submarines is the largest and most powerful of the three principal VLF stations in the US world-wide submarine communication system—the other two are Jim Creek, Washington, and Cutler, Maine.'¹⁷

Pine Gap and Nurrungar

'The two specific facilities are involved in so-called overhead surveillance—Pine Gap and Nurrungar—which are evidently involved in a range of satellite intelligence programs. There are four in particular: gathering intelligence by infra-red means principally useful from the point of view of picking up Soviet missile launches, therefore for early warning; gathering intelligence by photographic means, the normal reconnaissance satellite program taking pictures; gathering intelligence by interception of signals, radar emissions, other electronic emissions, interception of communications; and fourthly, the communication of this intelligence back from Australia to the United States.

Some of these operations are extremely critical and could not be done anywhere else because of technical and geographic reasons. This applies most specifically to Pine Gap. There is no doubt about the value of the intelligence they get from these places. In the case of the infra-red intelligence, for example, Australia is only one of two places where this intelligence is passed down to the ground, the other one being in Buckley, Colorado. In the case of signals intelligence there have been some of what I think are probably the biggest intelligence breakthroughs of the late 1970s; Listening in on Soviet microwave communications, I think, was probably the biggest technical intelligence coup certainly of the 1970s. And again, that had to be done from Australia for technical reasons. . . . There is no doubt that SALT was predicated on adequate and detailed verification capabilities. You would not have had

SALT unless you could have had a lot of the intelligence which comes down through satellites to the Australian ground stations. Intelligence coming through satellites to Pine Gap is not used just for counting numbers of missiles in the Soviet Union or the numbers of radars or whatever. It is also used for locating where they are and for allowing more accurate targeting in the development of American nuclear war fighting capabilities rather than just simple nuclear deterrence capabilities.¹⁸

The principal means of monitoring SALT are basically photographic and signals. Photography to take photos of silos as they are being dug, possible mobile missiles as they are being moved around, and signals to listen in to missile telemetry to know whether the Soviets are putting on an eleventh MIRV warhead on the SS18 rather than the ten which they are allowed; or listening in to radar emissions, as the only item in fact that the Soviets have been pulled up in breach of SALT before the Standing Consultative Committee was when they used radars with their SA5 missile in an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) mode which is banned by SALT. That was picked up by monitoring their radar emissions¹⁹

. . . . On the signals intelligence side, you cannot do some specific intercepts other than through bases in Australia there were intercepts of microwave communications which the Soviets did not believe possible and so they were not coding their microwave [the CIA] also had to send those signals back from Australia to the United States without the Soviets knowing that anything like that was going on. That requires a site in the middle of a continent like Australia which is electronically very, very quiet²⁰

1.50 It would seem from what has been said above, that the Soviet Union is likely to think that the North West Cape installation (which obviously is a facility for communicating with submarines), Pine Gap and Nurrungar are connected in one of the following ways with the American strategic forces:

- (a) communications (in the case of North West Cape, including fire orders to ballistic missile submarines);
- (b) early warning;
- (c) target information; and
- (d) signals intelligence.

1.51 It can be argued that at least the first two functions mentioned above mean that the facilities would be first order targets in a general war. In the case of North West Cape, the facility would be one of the few elements of the powerful United States submarine-launched ballistic missile system open to Soviet attack. On the other hand, there is a more optimistic view that North West Cape may be spared to obviate destruction of one important means of United States control of the individual commanders of its SLBM force, each of whom has the weaponry to destroy those cities which account for one third of the Soviet population. Such an optimistic view is different to that expressed in frequent Soviet statements such as the examples quoted in para 1.10. In the case of any joint installation connected with early warning, it would be very important for the Soviet Union to deny United States access to this if the United States developed any anti-ballistic missile capability.

The nuclear risk to the joint Australian-United States facilities

1.52 There have been few statements by the Government on what it considers to be the nuclear risk to Australia. On 25 March 1980, the Minister for Defence, the Hon. D. J. Killen, M.P., said:

'I might add that in the event of hostilities, risks for nuclear attack arise for Australia as an ally of the United States, whether or not it may be hosting particular United States facilities. Recognising this, successive Australian governments—I repeat, successive Australian governments—have taken the view that our primary concern should be to support the effectiveness of the United States deterrent to war itself. In this, we honour as well our responsibilities as an ally.'²¹

For the Committee's views on whether Australia could be a nuclear target, irrespective of Australia hosting joint Australian-United States installations, see paragraph 1.80.

1.53 In a speech in the House of Representatives on 5 May 1981, the Minister for Defence the Hon. D. J. Killen, M.P., agreed with an assessment given on 14 April 1981 by the Leader of the Opposition, the Hon. W. G. Hayden, M.P., to the National Press Club, following Mr Hayden's visit to the joint facilities in March 1981. Mr Killen said:

'I welcome particularly the honourable member's statements about the facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar and that the requirements of his party's policy are met at both facilities. The honourable member [Mr Hayden] said: "In certain conditions, industrial centres and military installations in Australia could—I repeat, could—become nuclear targets. Pine Gap and Nurrungar would be unlikely targets and, in our view, Smithfield [TRANET station 112, Smithfield, South Australia] not at all". I agree with this assessment.'²²

1.54 The Sub-Committee on Defence Matters receive a number of opinions regarding the risk of Soviet nuclear attack on the joint installations including the following:

(a) Mr Robert Mathams, the former Director of Scientific and Technical Intelligence, Joint Intelligence Organisation, Department of Defence, said:

'... my view would be that the Soviet Union would certainly consider the North West Cape installation (which obviously is a communications facility and involved with the command of submarines) and probably the other two facilities to be in some way connected with American strategic nuclear forces. As a result, they would feature on the Soviet target list. But I have never been able to assess if they would be near the top or bottom of the list. One could argue quite cogently for either depending on what one believes to be Soviet perceptions.

However, let us accept that there is a finite risk of their being attacked. We should next consider the circumstances that might lead to their being attacked. My belief is that they would be attacked only in circumstances of superpower conflict. I do not accept the hostage or blackmail threat theory. I think that theory cannot be sustained, in the light of improvements in nuclear weapon capability and the knowledge that each superpower has of the other'.²³

(b) Dr Desmond Ball had this opinion:

'I have no doubt in my mind whatsoever that those three installations would be targeted by the Soviet Union. However, that should not be the whole point of the question. At least three other issues should be addressed. One is that whilst they would be targets in the event of a nuclear war, I do not see a nuclear war as being very likely. One could argue that the existence of these installations deters the outbreak of a nuclear war. But one still has to come to the conclusion that if a nuclear war does come, those stations are going to be targeted.

A second point is that the consequences of them being targets really are not so great. I do not like the idea of nuclear bombs falling on Australia, but the vision that some people have of what it would involve seems to be quite exaggerated. I cannot imagine any scenarios involving nuclear bombs falling on Australian cities. It seems that one draws the line at those three installations, but one has to include those installations as targets'.²⁴

'... There is no doubt that the notion of limited controlled nuclear wars has been gaining acceptability. I think to that extent the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons becomes somewhat greater and the possibility of North West Cape, Pine Gap and Nurrungar being targets becomes somewhat greater. I would still put the possibility of a general nuclear war and even the growing possibility of limited controlled nuclear war over to one side in terms of practical considerations in the foreseeable future. I am very disturbed by the way the developments are tending, but I do not think the most horrendous prospects are really that imminent'.²⁵

1.55 Taking into account the assumptions made in paragraphs 1.49 to 1.50, it would be prudent for Australian defence planners to assume that the joint facilities at North West Cape, Pine Gap or Nurrungar are on the Soviet target list and might be attacked in the course of a nuclear conflict between the two superpowers. In other words, there is

a finite risk that one or all of the facilities would be attacked during a Soviet-United States war that involved their nuclear strategic forces.

1.56 It may be possible to give some definition of that risk if two further assumptions are accepted. The first of these is that, if the facilities were attacked, the Soviet objective would be limited to destruction of the actual facilities; the second is that any attack would be likely to occur only in circumstances of a major conflict between the United States and USSR which would be preceded by a period of increasing tension and, possibly, a period of conventional warfare.


TABLE 1-3

US and Soviet Strategic Ballistic Missiles


	US SLBMs			Soviet SLBMs		
	<i>Polaris A-3</i>	<i>Poseidon C-3</i>	<i>Trident C-4</i>	<i>SS-N-6</i>	<i>SS-N-8</i>	<i>SS-N-18</i>
Date introduced	1964	1970	..	1968	1973	..
Number deployed (estimates for Sept. 1980)	80	432	88	464	326	144
Number of MIRVs . . .	3(MRV)	10	8	1 (or 2 MRV)	1	3
Range (nautical miles) .	2 500	2 500	4 000	1 300– 1 600	4 300	4 050
Propellant	s	s	s	1-st	1-st	1-st
Throw-weight (kg) . . .	500	1 000		700	700	
CEP (m)	900	500	500	1 000– 2 500	1 000– 1 500	550– 1 000

Key: *Propellant fuel*: l = liquid, l-st = liquid-storable, s = solid, st = storable.

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1980*, (London, 1980)



<i>US ICBMs</i>			<i>Soviet ICBMs</i>					
<i>Titan II</i>	<i>Minute-man II</i>	<i>Minute-man III</i>	<i>SS-9</i>	<i>SS-11</i>	<i>SS-13</i>	<i>SS-17</i>	<i>SS-18</i>	<i>SS-19</i>
1963 54	1966 450	1970 550	1966 8	1966 580	1969 60	1977 150	1976 300	1976 300
1	1	3	1	1 (or 3 MRV)	1	4	1 or 8	6
6 300	7 000	7 000	6 500	5 700	4 400	5 000	5 500	5 000
1 4 000 1 300	s 1 000 400	s 1 000 300	1 7 300 1 000– 1 300	st 1 000 1 000– 1 800	s 500 1 300	1-st 3 200 300–600	1-st 7 300 300–600	1-st 3 200 300–450



1.57 The Soviet Union would have a number of options available to attack the joint facilities. These include designation of a single ICBM to one or more of the facilities, or less likely a MIRVed missile with sufficient warheads to destroy each of the three installations. Tables 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3 give details of Soviet strategic missile capabilities. Rather than use a missile such as the SS18 which Soviet strategic planners are more likely to allocate against 'hard' targets such as United States missile silos, the Soviet planners are more likely to allocate an SS11 against the joint facilities if they are to be attacked. The SS11 is relatively inaccurate and would thus be designated for 'soft' targets such as the joint facilities in Australia. It has an explosive yield between 0.5 and 1 megaton and has a Circular Error Probability (CEP) of about 800 metres. (The CEP is the radius of a circle centred on the target, within which 50 per cent of the weapons delivered will fall. It is a measure of the accuracy of the weapons). For optimum damage to the sorts of equipment and buildings at each of the facilities the warheads are likely to be set to detonate at an altitude of about 900 metres above the centre of the area of the facility. This would minimise fallout as distinct from a weapon set to detonate at ground level.

1.58 In the eventuality of such attacks the immediate damage effects could be expected to be as follows:

- (a) *North West Cape*: complete destruction of the communications station and the nearby town of Exmouth;
- (b) *Pine Gap*: complete destruction of the facility; marginal damage (broken windows, small fires, etc.) to Alice Springs (which is approximately 20 kilometres away);
- (c) *Nurrungar*: complete destruction of the facility; damage to windows, tiled roofs and wooden buildings plus 'spot' fires in Woomera Village.

1.59 If the assumptions in paras 1.56 to 1.57 are correct, then in each of the abovementioned cases there would be little, if any, local fallout. Nearly all the post-explosion, airborne debris would be carried into the stratosphere with subsequent gradual precipitation over the southern hemisphere. Australian urban areas would not be noticeably affected.

1.60 Casualties would be confined to three facilities and nearby inhabited areas, but these would be drastically reduced if the opportunity were taken during the period of tension (which would precede escalation to a nuclear war) to evacuate non-essential people from the facilities as well as from Exmouth and from Woomera Village. Evacuation of Alice Springs would not be necessary but might be undertaken if required. Relatively simple precautions in Alice Springs and Woomera Village, such as white-washing and taping windows, installing shutters, cleaning up combustible material and constructing simple shelters would significantly reduce non-lethal casualties that might be caused by heat or dislodged roofing. Casualties from fall-out are not expected from the use of an air burst as described in para. 1.57.²⁶

1.61 Australia uses the Joint Naval Communications Station at North West Cape for the very low frequency message traffic with the RAN's submarine force; this facility seems to be at risk in a nuclear war.

Likely warning time and deterrence to general/nuclear war

1.62 While it may take only forty minutes for an ICBM to travel from the Soviet Union, nuclear war is not likely to occur without a considerable period of warning, because such a momentous step would be preceded by severe crisis and confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. There seems to be insufficient understanding, let alone certainty, in the defence communities of either superpower, of how to limit war or even of how to stop it once it had broken out. That there would be

general destruction in an unrestrained nuclear war is well known, and therefore deterrence and avoidance, in circumstances of confrontation, of actions that could escalate to nuclear war have become essential components of the strategies of both the superpowers and their major allies.

1.63 The deterrent to a Soviet nuclear missile attack on Australia is part of the same deterrent against any action that might lead to an outbreak of general or nuclear war referred to in para. 1.7. It is the established 'balance of terror', the fervent desire to avoid 'mutually assured destruction', and the belief that neither superpower can hope to attack the other without suffering unacceptable destruction itself.

1.64. Nevertheless, it should again be noted that a continuing and uncontrolled race in nuclear armaments between the superpowers based on rapid and inexorable technological improvements is destabilising to the international environment because it carries the risk of a pre-emptive strike. The United States strategic doctrines of 'limited and regional nuclear options' referred to in para 1.9 increase the unpredictability of general nuclear war.

1.65. Should limited nuclear war be seen as a serious option by the strategic planners of both superpowers, then the possibility that the facilities in Australia could be targets in a hostage-type exchange, exclusive of other elements of the American war fighting capability, must be considered. It is difficult to imagine the actual circumstances for such an exchange, but its possibility suggests a further Australian interest in ensuring that 'limited nuclear war' and 'damage limitation strategies' are not pursued by the superpowers.

1.66. This report has already indicated (in para 1.10) that the Soviet Union has stated publicly and often that it does not accept that nuclear war can be limited. Whilst this situation prevails, it tends to support the notion that deterrence to nuclear attack on Australia is inseparable from deterrence to global or nuclear war in general. In those circumstances it is likely that if the Soviet Union considered certain places in Australia important enough to target for nuclear attack, the Soviet Union would take into account that the United States is committed to defend its allies against nuclear attack. This was indicated, for example, by former President Nixon at Guam on 25 July 1969.²⁷ However, there is no formal legal requirement in any American agreement with Australia to do so. This leads the Committee to make some further comments on the significance of Australia's alliance with the United States.

Australia's alliance with the United States

1.67. In other parts of this report, the deterrent value of Australia's alliance with the United States is presupposed. It is, therefore, useful to consider the obligations assumed by the ANZUS partners, and Australia's current contribution to that alliance. This could assist in an assessment of whether or not the United States would come to Australia's assistance if a particular threat developed.

1.68. The obligations assumed by the ANZUS partners under the ANZUS Treaty are defined in its Articles II, III, IV and V. (See Annex B.) Briefly, the commitments are: self help to develop the capacity to resist armed attack; co-operation to develop individual and joint military capacity; consultation when any party considers its own or another party's security to be threatened in the Pacific; and action in accordance with constitutional processes to meet an armed attack on any of the partners in the Pacific area.

1.69. Article IV patently does not of itself commit the United States to the use of military force were Australia subjected to armed attack. Neither does it define in precise terms what is meant by 'armed attack'. This leaves open the possibility that the United

States would decide to act by means other than the application of military force. Assistance could be provided, for example, through the supply of military equipment to Australia, or by diplomatic pressure on the aggressor, or by economic and political sanctions against the aggressor or by all these means.

1.70. However, Article IV clearly envisages the option of the use of military force by the United States. Moreover, the deterrence factor would increase to the extent that any aggressor would have to consider that the more effective an intended act of aggression against Australia, the more likely would become United States involvement in Australia's defence. It has been the judgement of successive Australian governments that the United States would see it in its own fundamental national interest to prevent Australia being overwhelmed by armed force and would act in whatever way was necessary to prevent this.

1.71 In considering the overall scope of the Treaty, it is important to recognise the lack of precision in some elements in the Treaty and also the nature of the overall relationship between Australia and the United States. Thus it may be possible to distinguish:

- (a) the generally identifiable geographic scope of the commitments of the parties under Articles IV and V of the ANZUS Treaty (i.e. in relation specifically to armed attack);
- (b) the provisions of Article II which define in general terms, and without specific restriction of geographic area or circumstances the commitment of the partners. The partners 'by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack'. (Government to government agreements on the establishment of the joint Australian/United States defence facilities refer in their preamble to this article and, as has been noted previously, it is the formal foundation for wide areas of defence co-operation—see also para 1.74);
- (c) the provisions of Article III which allow any party to call for the consultation on virtually any matter, wherever occurring, which it sees to have the potential to give rise to threat to it or to other parties of the Treaty in the Pacific Area;
- (d) other elements in the international relationship between Australia and the United States, which are not intergal to the ANZUS relationship.

1.72 The geographic area to which the commitments are limited is not specifically defined by the terms of the Treaty. There are indications that the Australian Government was happy at the time the Treaty was signed that the area be defined in wide terms as the 'Pacific Area', without further definition. The notion was that to define the defence area with precision might invite an aggressor nation to believe that, outside such defined area, it was free to move as it wished. On the other hand, Article V of the Treaty leaves in no doubt that the metropolitan territories of the Parties are subject to the commitments undertaken in Article V and that these commitments extend as well to armed attack on their island territories, armed forces, ships and aircraft in the Pacific. On a strict reading the Treaty does not embrace Australia's island territories in the Indian Ocean.

1.73 There is general acceptance that the ANZUS Treaty does not apply in different ways to different parts of Australia's metropolitan territory, which includes the Australian littoral on the Indian Ocean. Article IV, because of Article V, clearly applies equally to the West, North and South of Australia as it does to Australia's Pacific littoral.

1.74 Along with the specific commitments relating to the treaty area, the ANZUS Treaty allows also, formally, for consultation and co-operation among the partners in relation to developments anywhere which any of the partners see to have the potential

to give rise to threat to one or more of them in the Pacific. For example, while Australia's surveillance activities in the Indian Ocean are individual nation (Australian) efforts, they are consistent with the objectives accepted by Australia and the other ANZUS partners under articles of the ANZUS Treaty.

1.75 Article II encourages defence co-operation in research, training, logistic support, communications and the exchange of intelligence and technology which benefits Australia in terms of cost saving and enhanced capability. Political co-operation among the partners is illustrated by the meetings of the Foreign Ministers at the ANZUS Council.


1.76 It is evident that neither superpower would engage in strategic arms limitation negotiations unless it was confident that it could adequately monitor its opponent's compliance with details of the subsequent agreement. The SALT agreements were predicated on adequate and detailed verification capabilities. It would seem that the part played in this regard by the joint United States-Australian facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar is vital. As a politically stable ally, Australia is a secure host for the joint facilities even though some of the functions performed by these installations in Australia could be carried out in other countries, closer to the Soviet Union. For other functions, Australia is ideal for technical and geographic reasons (see for example, para 1.49 regarding the location of Pine Gap).

1.77 As the margin of the independent advantage of the United States over the Soviet bloc has been reduced, Australia's contribution to the maintenance of the central balance has become more important. As well as contributing substantially to what is called America's National Technical Means of Verification (NTMV) which is the means of monitoring the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces, Australia makes a further substantial contribution by hosting, at North West Cape, an important part of the command and control system of the American SLBM force. The importance of the facility for United States general purpose warfare was indicated by the reported intense activity there during the mining of Haiphong in late 1972, and the station's enhanced alert during the 1973 Israel-Arab war. In May 1978 it was revealed in *The Australian Financial Review* that the United States had planned to replace certain equipment at the North West Cape base without formally notifying the Australian Government. There is always the possibility of institutionalised defence arrangements being altered imperceptibly by developments in military technology.

1.78 Australia has declined to join the United States Rapid Development Force (RDF) and its attitude toward facilitating its deployment into the Middle East area has not yet been made clear. The availability of naval and air support facilities in Australia may somewhat reduce American requirements for such facilities in the Gulf countries themselves when undertaking operations in the Persian Gulf area, but Australian bases are too remote from the Middle East to be very satisfactory for this purpose. Nevertheless, the United States has found it convenient to use Darwin for B52 reconnaissance flights over the Indian Ocean, and to use Australian ports for rest and recuperation.

1.79 This section of the report has given some reasons why Australia is important to the United States and has commented on American obligations to come to Australia's assistance. Although these obligations, like those in most treaties of this nature, are not clearly defined, it would seem there is little doubt that the potential diplomatic, military and economic measures of the United States have a deterrent value against any hostile action beyond Australia's capabilities to defend itself. Nevertheless, if United States resources were fully occupied in a major confrontation with the Soviet Union, then Australia would have to be prepared to fend off any threats from other powers with only incidental help from its American ally. Some of the advantages and risks to





Australia associated with our contribution to the American alliance have been outlined, and the next section poses some fundamental questions in this regard.

Issues that need to be addressed

1.80 Some fundamental questions have been raised in this chapter in regard to the risks to Australia's security associated with Australia providing defence-related facilities to the United States:

- (a) In general war between the superpowers, would the joint facilities located at North-West Cape, Pine Gap and Nurrungar be nuclear targets?

The answer to this question is that the facilities are likely to be on Soviet target list. However, how high on the target list would depend on Soviet perceptions at the time, particularly as to the role of the facilities. (See para 1.54).

- (b) In a general war would the presence of the facilities attract hostile attention to other centres in Australia, particularly areas of high population density?

The answer to this question is probably no. If for no other reason this unlikelihood can be attributed to the need of the Soviet Union (which like the United States has less nuclear warheads than potential 'counterforce' targets) to concentrate on targets which are of a higher priority than Australian cities.

- (c) In a limited nuclear war would the Australian targets be likely to be attacked in a process of 'hostage swapping'?

The answer to this question is probably no. It is difficult to envisage any joint facilities being selectively destroyed in a limited nuclear conflict between the superpowers, by way of warning to the United States, because it would be virtually impossible to prevent such a limited use of nuclear weapons from escalating into a general nuclear exchange. Furthermore, it could be argued that in a limited war it could be foolish to blind certain aspects of an opponent's information or communications system. In regard to the Naval Communications Station at North West Cape, it would probably be risky to degrade the effectiveness of an opponent's primary weapons system (para 1.51 refers). However, such calculations are influenced by the availability of ever-improving alternative communications to the region of conflict. It could also be argued that Australia's position as an ally might invite attention to any United States conventional facilities, should these be established in Australia.

- (d) If the facilities were not in Australia, would Australia be a nuclear target in any case, whether it was a member of the Western Alliance or not?

The answer to this question is that it will be very unlikely (but see statement by the Hon. D. J. Killen, in para 1.52). It should be understood that it is the presence of the joint facilities and the role they could be called upon to play in the event of war between the superpowers that provides the risk of nuclear attack. This raises the question of whether or not the presence of the facilities is justified. The justification is derived from the limited dangers of their presence and their contribution to the central balance and to arms control. It can be argued that by improving the effectiveness of American communications and verification systems, Australia is helping to decrease the possibility of nuclear war.

- (e) Are the risks associated with nuclear attack on Australia more than outweighed by the advantages of hosting the facilities as part of the alliance with the United States?

There are many nations regarded by the United States as part of the broader Western Alliance but which do not act as host nations for joint facilities. The hosting of joint facilities is not necessarily part of the ANZUS obligations. The

benefits and disadvantages of the operation of the joint facilities have been previously canvassed (paras 1.52-1.61), as have the benefits Australia derives from the alliance with the United States (para 1.67-1.75). The ANZUS Alliance acts as a deterrent against those potentially hostile actions against Australia which are of such a magnitude that they are beyond Australia's own capabilities. Critics of the American alliance agree that any policy of non-alignment will need a much higher defence expenditure by Australia.²⁸

1.81 Other issues that need to be addressed are:

- (a) Would it be possible without serious breaches of security, for the Australian Government to make public, to a greater extent than it has done so far, the nature and functions of joint Australian/United States facilities, in order to enhance community understanding and support for them?
- (b) With continuing improvements in technology, will the role of the joint installations become more or less significant in the next ten years? Will there be scope for greater Australian participation in their operation?
- (c) What should be Australia's role in helping to maintain the central balance between the United States and the Soviet Union? This raises several aspects in addition to the joint facilities hosted by Australia. Their detailed discussion is mostly beyond the scope of this report but the following need to be considered:
 - (i) the role of the Australian Defence Force in the security of its area of strategic interest; for example, in the absence of a conventional threat to Australia, should Australia become more involved with defence co-operation in the region; and
 - (ii) as the world becomes increasingly a single strategic theatre, how can Australia contribute to an international attempt to reduce tension and preserve peace between the superpowers, including arms control and possible contributions to United Nations or allied peace-keeping efforts in other areas?
- (d) Is Australia giving effective support for strategic arms limitation and for nuclear non-proliferation?
- (e) Is Australia in a position to receive timely information on the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other powers in Asia?
- (f) Is there any likelihood of a situation where Australia would have to acquire nuclear weapons? The possible counter-productive consequences of any steps toward this, in stimulating a regional arms race, would need to be carefully considered.
- (g) Should Australia in times of increased global tension give more emphasis to civil defence, particularly to those counter-measures which need not be very costly, such as for example informing the public of the location of buildings which would act as suitable shelters, and the provision of routine instruction on action to be taken if nuclear attack is imminent?
- (h) What would be the role of Australia, including its armed forces, in the aftermath of a general nuclear exchange between the superpowers? As indicated in this report, a likely precondition of invasion of Australia would be a major disruption or breakdown in the existing world order, as a consequence of a war between the superpowers or other situations which pre-occupied the resources of the United States. Another consequence of such a disruption could be an influx of refugees landing on Australian shores.

END NOTES

1. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) *World Armament and Disarmament—Yearbook 1979*, Stockholm, 1979, p. 14.
2. United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Military Posture: Department of Defence Authorisation for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981*, Part 1, 25 January 1980, Washington, 1980, pp. 11-12.
3. Georgi A. Arbatov, 'The American Strategic Debate: A Soviet View', *Survival*, vol. 16, No. 3, May/June 1974, pp. 133-4. Arbatov was commenting upon US Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger's statement of 10 January 1974 announcing the American policy of 'limited strategic options.'
4. Colonel M. Shirokov quoted in Leon Goure and Michael J. Deane 'The Soviet Strategic View', *Strategic Review*, vol. 8, No. 1, Winter 1980, p. 81.
5. See Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, *THE MIDDLE EAST—Focal Point of Conflict*, Parliamentary Paper No. 82/1977. Chapter 4, 'Superpower Rivalry in the Middle East'.
6. For details on the problems associated with the secessionist attempts in Vanuatu and on Papua New Guinean and Australian involvement, see *Evidence* of 21 August 1980.
7. Mr R. H. Mathams, *Evidence*, 9 February 1981, pp. 1333-4. Both Brazil and Argentina are parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967), which prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America.
8. When presenting 'The Report of the Australian Delegation to the United Nations Committee on Disarmament' to the House of Representatives, *Hansard*, p. 428.
9. R. H. Mathams 'Strategic Weapons and Their Effects' in the *Report on Civil Defence Study conducted at Canberra, A.C.T. 20-22 March 1978*, Department of Defence (Natural Disasters Organisation) Annex B, p. 4.
10. United Nations General Assembly, *Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons: Report of the Secretary-General*, 12 July 1980, (A/35/393; E.81.I.11) p. 84.
11. 'Strategic Weapons and their Effects' in the *Report on Civil Defence Study conducted at Canberra, A.C.T. 20-22 March 1978*, Department of Defence (Natural Disasters Organisation) Annex B, p. 3.
12. Australian Department of Defence; quoted in House of Representatives, *Hansard*, 5 May 1981, p. 1951.
13. Dr Desmond Ball, *Counterforce Targeting. How New? How Viable? The Australian National University Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Reference Paper No. 67*, pp. 6-7.
14. *The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, 1980-81*, London, 1980.
15. House of Representatives, *Hansard*, pp. 1658-65.
16. House of Representatives, *Hansard*, 20 August 1981, P. 659.
17. Dr Desmond Ball, *Current Affairs Bulletin*, 'American Bases: Implications for Australia's Security', October 1978, p. 6.
18. *Evidence*, pp. 1565-67.
19. *Evidence*, p. 1568.
20. *Evidence*, p. 1569.
21. House of Representatives, *Hansard*, p. 1137.
22. House of Representatives, *Hansard*, p. 1943.
23. *Evidence*, p. 1356.
24. *Evidence*, p. 1561.
25. *Evidence*, pp. 1561-64.
26. cf. Commonwealth Directorate of Civil Defence, *Survival from Nuclear Attack: protective measures against radiation from fallout*, Canberra, 1964.
27. See 'Informal Remarks with Newsmen, July 25, 1969', *Public Papers of the Presidents: Richard M. Nixon, 1969*, Washington, 1970, pp. 548-9.
28. See for example Mr Max Teichman, *Evidence*, 28 July 1980.

CHAPTER 2

Invasion of Australia

2.1 This chapter considers the possibility of a threat of a major assault on Australia, using conventional warfare, from a power or powers which have the aim of seizing considerable territory and resources, or the complete conquest of Australia. A threat of such a magnitude, were it ever to eventuate, would threaten the survival of Australia, and would require full mobilisation and an extensive national commitment of resources to counter it.

Level of capability needed to pose such a threat

2.2 Australia has no powerful neighbours across a land frontier and it does not threaten any other power. Surrounded by a large expanse of ocean it is relatively remote from the main areas of superpower competition. Furthermore, Australia's remoteness, particularly its main population centres on the south-eastern part of the continent, makes it difficult for a conventional enemy to gain strategic surprise, and may add the requirement for an aggressor to secure staging bases. This factor plus Australia's size means that any notional enemy has to overcome the problems of a long line of communications.

2.3 On balance, from the viewpoint of its defence, Australia gains considerable advantages from its geographical position, as any potential aggressor would need to possess a wide range of capabilities—quite apart from motives—to undertake an invasion of Australia. Some of the more important of these capabilities are described in the paragraphs that follow.

2.4 A notional enemy contemplating invasion of Australia could be expected to consider a ground force approximately three times as large as the land forces Australia could field against such an enemy. This is only a general yardstick which ignores several other factors such as surprise, relative technology and equipment levels of the opposing forces. Nevertheless, an Australian force which, for example, consisted of one regular division and two well-trained reserve divisions would cause a potential enemy to think in broad terms of a requirement for at least nine divisions, unless, of course, there were such other compensating factors as would allow the attacker to reduce this ratio of superiority.

2.5 The transportation of such an invader's considerable ground force would require a large concentration of troop transport vessels—a large target for maritime strike forces—requiring a large escorting force of warships and aircraft. In this regard it is interesting to consider the Japanese appreciation of March 1942 regarding the feasibility of an invasion of Australia, which was the basis for a *General Outline of Policy on Future War Guidance*. Among the reasons causing the Japanese to reject invasion were: it would require twelve Army divisions requiring 1 500 000 tons of shipping and the protection of the main body of the Combined Fleet; the drastic reductions required on other fronts; and the 'national character' of Australians who 'would resist to the end'. (See Annex C for more details and source.)

2.6 A notional enemy would have to be capable, perhaps through diplomatic means, of obtaining and then securing against attack, port and airfield facilities, probably in the Indonesian/Melanesian island chain to our north. He would also need to be capable of commanding the maritime and air approaches to Australia, which would require a large naval force, including a maritime airpower component, and large air forces based in the

adjacent islands. These same maritime bases would, of course, have to continue to secure the lines of supply of the invading force for the duration of the hostilities.

2.7 An invasion of Australia would involve a very difficult military operation—an amphibious landing—requiring an across-shore capability, unless the enemy was able to seize and maintain an Australian port or airfield.

2.8 An invading power's air force would need to be capable of achieving local air superiority, and should include ground attack, reconnaissance, anti-submarine and transport elements. The invading ground force would have to be balanced and highly mobile, with armoured fighting vehicles and supported by troop-carrying helicopters. Part of the force might require a paratroop capability.

2.9 Considerable logistic problems would need to be overcome after an invasion force had been landed. For example, as a relatively mobile force it would require about 150 tonnes of fuel and 200-250 tonnes of water for each 10 000 men per day.¹ Unless the invasion force was to 'wither on the vine' it would require the continuous support of a large tonnage of ships and transport aircraft. Because of the long distances involved, its lines of communications would be vulnerable to interdiction.

2.10 Finally, an invader, if he is to be successful, would require an occupation force sufficient to hold, control and presumably exploit the occupied area. This is unlikely to be a cost effective undertaking as the attitude of the civilian population could be expected to be actively hostile, and far from submissive.

Powers capable of posing a threat of invasion

2.11 Leaving motives or intentions aside, there would be only two nations at present which have the military capabilities to mount a major conventional assault against Australia. These are the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has a much lesser ability to project force over sea than the United States, and for a conventional military invasion of Australia the Soviet Union would probably require an intermediate staging base in South-East Asia to provide an attacking force with effective air cover and to keep its shipping operational. Of the superpowers, only the United States has sufficient aircraft carriers to provide an adequate degree of air superiority for a successful invasion of Australia.

2.12 It is frequently asserted that the Soviet Union has developed a naval capacity for deep water operations and a heavy airlift capability that allows it to project military power and political influence to areas remote from the theatres of its primary strategic interest. While the Soviet Union's large armed forces are well adapted to project power across the Soviet Union's land borders, they are not well designed to undertake an opposed landing on a distant continent, as indicated by some further details of Soviet oversea projection capabilities:²

- (a) *Carriers*. The USSR has three *Kiev* class aircraft carriers (including one undergoing trials). The 43 000 ton *Kiev* and her sister *Minsk*, carry 16 KA-25 anti-submarine helicopters plus 14 Yak-36 VTOL combat aircraft (which, because of weight restrictions are not believed to have a significant offensive capability). The *Minsk* has been stationed at Vladivostok. There are also two *Moskva* class anti-submarine cruisers which normally carry from 18 to 20 KA-25 helicopters.
- (b) *Amphibious lift*. The Soviet amphibious lift capability consists of 28 vessels capable of open-ocean transit including 14 *Alligator*-class tank landing ships (LSTs) able to carry 25 to 30 armoured personnel carriers, (APCs); 13 *Ropucha*-class LSTs able to carry 19 APCs; and the new *Ivan Rogov*, able to carry 40 tanks and supporting vehicles. The *Ivan Rogov* and 10 of these LSTs have sometimes been stationed at Vladivostok.

- (c) *Naval infantry*. This is a force of 12 000 assigned to Soviet fleets and river flotillas to provide the Soviet Navy with a limited amphibious assault capability. The main purpose of the Naval Infantry is to secure the coastal flanks of Warsaw Pact ground troops in Europe although presently two of the five regiments are assigned to the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Theoretically, these forces could also be used in a seaborne attack outside of the European theatre, but their small size, lack of organic air power and tanks would place them at a serious disadvantage in any assaults on heavily defended positions.
- (d) *Airborne forces*. There are eight paratroop divisions of about 7500 men each, whose primary purpose is for use in a support role in the European theatre. For distant overseas deployment, they would be severely handicapped by the Soviet Navy's lack of true attack carriers.
- G (e) *Air transport*. The Military Transport Aviation service possesses about 1300 transport aircraft. These aircraft are capable of moving a significant quantity of troops and material over relatively long distances but are deficient in airborne refuelling capability and would be very vulnerable to hostile airpower.

Details of the strength of the Soviet Pacific Fleet are contained in Table 2.1.

TABLE 2-1

Strength of Soviet Pacific Fleet

Major Combat Vessels and Aircraft (at June 1980)

Submarines	Ballistic Missile submarine	Delta-class SSBN	10	30
		Yankee-class SSBN	11	
		Hotel-class SSBN	3	
		Golf-class SSB	6	
	Cruise missile submarine	Charlie-class SSGN	17	23 110
		Echo II-class SSGN		
		Juliet-class SSG	6	
		Whisky Long Bin-class SSG		
	Attack submarine	Echo I-class SSN	13	57
		November-class SSN		
Surface vessels	ASW Aircraft carrier	Kiev-class CVSG	1	1
	Cruisers	Kara-class CG	2	11
		Kresta II-class CG	3	
		Kresta I-class CG	1	
		Kynda-class CG	2	
		Sverdlov-class CL	3	
	Destroyers	Krivak II/I-class DDG	7	27 79
		Kanin-class DDG	3	
		Kildin-class DDG	1	
		Kashin-class DDG	4	
		Kotlin-class DDG	2	
		Kotlin-class DD	10	
		Skory-class DD		

Surface vessels	Escort ships	Riga-class FF		
		Grisha-class FFL	40	
		Petya-class FFL		
		Ivan Rogov-class LPD	1	
	Amphibious vessels	Ropucha-class LST	10	57
		Alligator-class LST		
		Polnochiny-class LCT	46	
		Other landing vessel		
	Patrol boats	Nanuchaka-class PGG		
		Osa-class PTG	55	318
		Other missile-carrying patrol boats		166
		Poti-class PCE	111	
Aircraft	Mine Warfare vessels	T-58 MSF	50	95
		T-43 MSF		
		Yurka-class MSF		
		Other mine warfare craft	45	
	Bombers	Tu-16 Badger	110	
		Tu-22 Blinder		
	Fighters	YAK-36 Forger	12	
	Patrol/ASW aircraft	Tu-95 Bear F		382
		Il-38 May		
		Be 12 Mail	120	
		Ka-25 Hormone		
	Tankers/Reconnaissance/ Electronic Warfare	Mi-14 Haze A		
		Tu-16 Badger	80	
	Others (Utility)	Tu-95 Bear D		
		Various	60	

Source: Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security 1980*, Tokyo, 1980, pp. 34, 35.

2.13 The overseas deployment forces available to the Soviet Union provide a substantial capability for aiding friendly forces abroad, but only a modest capacity for long-range intervention against a well-armed opponent. The Soviet Union is capable of building up its amphibious assault forces, but as is shown elsewhere in the report it would be unrealistic to imagine that the USSR would do so for the purpose of invading Australia. There is little evidence to indicate a recent build-up in the overseas projection capabilities of Soviet Naval Infantry and Airborne divisions and/or of the Soviet Union being in a position to concentrate, so far from home, its small carrier force in order to gain local air superiority over Australian beaches.

2.14 Regional powers such as China, Japan, India, Vietnam and Indonesia, although they have large armies, currently do not have the capacity to mount a credible conventional attack on Australian territory as they do not have the air, sea and logistic

capabilities that were mentioned (in paragraphs 2.5—2.8) as being a prerequisite. Except for Indonesia, each of these countries would have long lines of communication which would be vulnerable and would reduce the forces available for operations against Australia.

2.15 Indonesia has sometimes been mooted as a possible aggressor, particularly by part of the Australian media which contemplates a drastic change of direction in Indonesia's Government, or Indonesia acting in concert with another great power against Australia. There are serious limitations on the strategic military capabilities of Indonesia. Although Indonesia has numerically large armed forces they suffer major deficiencies which would make the risk of external operations prohibitive. As indicated by Indonesia's operations against Malaysia during 'Confrontation', and by Indonesia's East Timor experience, the Indonesians would need to improve their capacity for external operations before attempting such undertakings against larger neighbours.

2.16 Indonesia is acquiring some new ships and aircraft, but limitations persist in naval and air support, weak logistic backing and operational planning, and execution of operations above battalion level. According to some estimates, even with massive external aid and a determined effort to this end, Indonesia would be expected to take some ten years to fully rectify this situation. Any re-equipment of the Indonesian armed forces on a large scale would be readily detected at an early stage.

2.17 Ignoring other factors, Japan has the best economic potential—of the five regional powers mentioned above—to embark on a large-scale military build-up; however, this comment is far outweighed by the cogent points (in paragraphs 2.26—2.27) dealing with the absence of Japanese motives. Japan could not hope to control supplies of resources that would give it the sort of independence it would require to mount a major re-armament program for offensive operations. At present Japan's armaments production in many areas is made under licence and is still high cost compared with NATO production. To a degree Japan would also be dependent on the co-operation and defence technologies of her allies. It would be subject to the sorts of influence that the United States could bring to bear if it did not approve of the direction or extent of Japanese re-armament.

TABLE 2-2
Current strength of the Japanese self-defence forces

<i>Item</i>		<i>Strength at the end of Fiscal 1979</i>
GSDF	SDF Personnel Quota	180 000
	Basic Units	
	Units deployed regionally in peacetime	12 Divisions 1 Composite Brigade
	Mobile Operations Units	1 Mechanised Division 1 Tank Brigade 1 Artillery Brigade 1 Airborne Brigade 1 Training Brigade 1 Helicopter Brigade
	Low-Altitude Ground-to-Air Missile Units	8 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Groups
MSDF	SDF Personnel Quota	42 278

<i>Item</i>	<i>Strength at the end of Fiscal 1979</i>
Basic Units	
Anti-Submarine Surface-Ship Units (for mobile operations)	4 Escort Flotillas
Anti-Submarine Surface-Ship Units (regional district Units)	9 Divisions
Submarine Units	5 Divisions
Minesweeping Units	2 Flotillas
Land-Based Anti-Submarine Aircraft Units	16 Squadrons
Major Equipment	
Anti-Submarine Surface Ships	59
Submarines	14
Operational Aircraft	About 190
ASDF SDF Personnel Quota	45 492
Basic Units	
Aircraft Control and Warning Units	28 Groups
Interceptor Units	10 Squadrons
Support Fighter Units	3 Squadrons
Air Reconnaissance Units	1 Squadron
Air Transport Units	3 Squadrons
Early Warning Units	—
High-Altitude Ground-to-Air Missile Units	6 Groups
Major Equipment	
Operational Aircraft	About 410

Source: Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan, 1980*, Tokyo, 1980, p. 104.

Who could have a motive for invading Australia?

2.18 An act of war is a decision of utmost significance for any government, and the use of military force is not a course adopted lightly by one nation against another. Worthwhile rewards must appear to be in prospect from military action, and there would need to be apparently favourable strategic circumstances. There would need to be compelling reasons or inducements before one nation decided to attack another and to accept all the consequences—military, political and economic—of that action. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the leadership of a nation will always act rationally in this regard and this leads to uncertainty in defence contingency planning.

2.19 As already argued in this report, a decision to attack Australia by the Soviet Union or any other power would not be expected unless as a consequence of a preceding serious deterioration in relations between the two superpowers, and even then Soviet action is most unlikely to be in the form of a major invasion.

2.20 An event so dramatic as a trans-oceanic invasion of another country has enormous implications for the whole world. The development by a major power of a strategic motive to attack Australia would tend to engender equal and opposite strategic motives on the part of other powers which would be affected. A further discouragement to invasion of Australia would be that such action would seriously detract from the potential invader's capabilities in other areas, leading perhaps, to vulnerability of much more important interests. For example, during the Second World War, Japan had an army of 51 divisions that until the very end of the war, 40 of these divisions either were pre-occupied in China or were guarding the frontier with the Soviet Union.

2.21 Although the Soviet Union might further develop a desire to detach Australia from its alliance with the United States, the Soviet Union would be unlikely to be motivated to allocate so much of its resources in an attempt for such a small gain, and thus risk a reaction from the United States. There are easier, less direct ways for the Soviet Union to bring pressure to bear upon Australia than by invasion. This was emphasised by the Chief of the Defence Force Staff on 18 March 1981 when he stated:

'If they are going to invade Australia they have enormous distances to cover from their bases. They might get operating bases by invading some intermediate country but this is all pie in the sky. Australia could be brought to heel in many other ways, but not by mass armed invasion. I am not dealing with the aftermath of a nuclear war where one could envisage unarmed invasion—that is a different question.'³

2.22 The possibility has been raised of powers wishing to exercise direct control over Australia's resources and industries, or of denying them to others, developing a motive for invading Australia.⁴ To achieve such an aim would necessitate complete conquest of Australia: occupation of a limited area would leave the occupying force highly vulnerable to counter-attacks and irregular warfare, a state of affairs which would not be conducive to efficient exploitation of natural resources. As a trading country, Australia has been willing to make its resources available on commercial terms and instances of denial of one of our resources have been rare.

2.23 Australia's relations with neighbouring countries and most regional states are good despite some relatively minor irritations that develop from time to time. In fact, there are currently no serious disputes with any member of the international community which, in the foreseeable future, could develop into motives for warlike actions against Australia.

2.24 Given Indonesia's current strategic situation, its internal security commitments, and the policy orientation of President Soeharto's government to economic and social development, Indonesian national policy is likely to avoid external commitments which could involve it in large-scale and open-ended military operations. Bearing in mind Indonesia's experience during 'Confrontation', a military attack by Indonesia on any of its neighbours is a remote possibility in the foreseeable future. Indonesia would be particularly reluctant to take any kind of military action against Australia, which is well placed to employ a variety of countermeasures. In fact, Indonesia wants a stable eastern and southern flank, so that it can devote full attention to the latent external threat to its security it sees coming from communist countries to its north.

2.25 From time to time there has been speculation that war could develop between Indonesia and Australia because Australia would feel obliged to assist Papua New Guinea if the latter became subject to Indonesian aggression. Quite apart from other factors, there is little likelihood of Indonesia adopting a policy toward Papua New Guinea similar to that which she adopted toward East Timor because Papua New Guinea is recognised by Indonesia, by Australia, and by the world community as a sovereign state. There are no indications that Indonesia has a desire for territorial aggrandisement with respect to Papua New Guinea. However, the implications of the continuing unsettled security and political situation in West Irian cannot be ignored within the context of examining potential sources of conflict in which Australia might become involved, in spite of the efforts so far of the Government of Papua New Guinea to contain the effect on public attitudes and political opinion in that country.

2.26 Japan is the other regional power most often speculated upon as a potential aggressor against Australia. The anti-militarist attitude which has dominated Japanese world views since the Second World War (after it was enshrined in the postwar constitution), is showing signs of modification. It remains strong nevertheless and is supported by general recognition of the economic value of spending no more than one per

cent of GNP on defence whilst under the American nuclear umbrella and by an acute perception of the dangers of war in the nuclear age. There is a more critical view of the American alliance now in Japan and pressure from the United States on Japan to assume greater responsibility for its own defence. The Japanese have, however, eschewed invitations to defend vital resource trade routes at a distance from Japan. The focus of Japanese interest has been on expanding Japanese capabilities to defend its maritime approaches. This limited area of strategic concern pre-occupies both those who support and oppose a continued American relationship. The Japanese have sought to protect access to resources by developing a variety of sources. Circumstances are unlikely to arise that would permit Japan to alter their essentially defensive outlook to seek a capacity to project massive power at a distance.

2.27 Although more recently there has been some willingness to discuss re-armament issues in Japan, that is a far cry from any indication that Japan is considering a major re-armament which would be likely to affect Australia adversely. Australia would be concerned were a close military relationship to be established between Japan and a regional power closer to Australia, though this, on current assessments, seems unlikely. One can hypothesise a Japanese decision to re-arm on a major scale and one can investigate the implications for Australia (we would be particularly interested if Japan acquired aircraft carriers); but the decision to re-arm with weapons primarily suited for offensive operations would itself attract a good deal of contention within Japan. Furthermore, as its implications became more evident, it would attract a great deal of attention in North East Asia where Japan sits in uncomfortable proximity to other substantial powers—particularly the Soviet Union.

2.28 It is also difficult to visualise one of the other regional powers such as China, India or Vietnam contemplating an invasion of a country so remote as Australia. Quite apart from a lack of capability, each of them has a serious dispute with a formidable neighbour, and each of them has serious economic challenges.

Warning times

2.29 In a submission incorporated at a Sub-Committee hearing on 18 March 1981, the Minister for Defence, the Hon. D. J. Killen, M. P., stated:

‘Periodic assessments of Australia’s strategic position continue to conclude that the prospect of major direct assault on Australia is remote and improbable.’⁵

Since 1979 testimony from the Department of Defence has indicated ‘that there is no assumption in defence planning, or in defence funding, that our defence force should be capable within five years of resisting unaided a major threat’.⁶ This would undoubtedly be based on such factors as already mentioned in this paper. This policy was confirmed by the Chief of Defence Force Staff, Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot, at a subsequent hearing on 18 March 1981 when he said:

‘. . . from what I have said I think it is clear that to raise the sort of force which would be required for a mass invasion of Australia could not possibly be done in under five years by other than the Superpowers. It just would not be possible.’⁷

2.30 Where there is political instability, tension or military confrontation, a detailed course of events can be difficult to predict with reasonable confidence beyond a few years or even less. However, there is much continuity in Australia’s strategic circumstances in relation to the military capabilities of potential aggressors, and Australia could be expected to have a reasonable warning time against a mass invasion. Whether such warning time would be enough to allow for smooth expansion of our Defence Force—including the provision of long lead-time items of equipment—is another matter.

2.31 Not faced by powerful neighbours in close proximity, Australia's strategic situation is very different from, for example, that of Israel or Sweden, two countries with whose high level of defence readiness Australia has sometimes been unfavourably compared. Israel's three million Jews are surrounded by 130 million Arabs. It does not consider its boundaries secure against sudden attack from hostile neighbours. Although Sweden's national boundaries and independence are not opposed as are Israel's, Sweden's geographical location between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries necessitates a high deterrent posture. Israel and Sweden are greatly disadvantaged by their geographical locations, while Australia enjoys the advantages of being an island remote from centres of conflict. This was emphasised in testimony by the Chief of the Defence Force Staff:

'We are a long way from the centres of superpower rivalry. The areas of superpower rivalry are probably East Asia/Korea, the Middle East and the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Australia is not one of these areas. It would be ridiculous for those two superpowers, if they wanted to subjugate the country, to think of major invasion.'⁸

2.32 The Committee has already questioned the Soviet Union's ability to launch a sudden invasion of Australia. But even given that the superpowers have the capability, it is difficult to envisage the circumstances in which they would exercise it. A period of sustained and massive deterioration in current relationships would have to take place and presumably this would serve as its own warning time. Furthermore, the search for intermediate bases is likely to cause the Soviet Union to show its hand and thus give additional warning.

2.33 Even for an economically advanced regional power such as Japan, it would take at least five years to develop a capability to invade Australia. Other regional powers are more likely to take ten or more years. Defence contracts are very competitive and highly publicised, therefore the acquisition of the means necessary to invade Australia would give clear warning.

2.34 On 29 March 1979 the Hon. D. J. Killen, M.P., Minister for Defence, pointed out that the 'second tier' of maritime powers (like France and Britain, they are in most cases friendly to Australia) did not possess blue-water capabilities significantly greater, if any greater at all, than Australia's own. He went on to say:

'There is no way that a member of this second tier of maritime powers could acquire the kind of maritime strength necessary to dominate the sea approaches to Australia without its naval program becoming blindingly obvious, and without the process taking that country an appreciable span of years, and I stress the word "years".'⁹

2.35 Critics of the assumption that there is no major invasion threat sometimes mention a study completed in 1975 by the Central Studies Establishment (CSE) of the Department of Defence which analysed warning times associated with major conflicts, 1939-1973. The study found that the average time from the first indication of impending war to the firing of the first shot was 14.3 months. However, it can be argued with justification that this finding has little relevance to Australia, because the study tended to relate to contiguous states with long histories of friction rather than to cases of trans-oceanic attack. It is understood that the CSE study was not intended to have any predictive value.

2.36 Before an invasion of Australia could become a possibility, the world situation and Australia's relations with the notional enemy power, would have to alter substantially from the current state of affairs; it would probably require dramatic change of government in the other country. This is likely to give several years warning, but earlier in this report the Committee has noted some elements of uncertainty in the global strategic outlook.

Deterrent to invasion

2.37. This report has already drawn attention to the advantage of Australia's geographic position which is a formidable natural deterrent which imposes the need for an enemy to acquire significant maritime capabilities. Even if Australia were conquered, its control would be an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.

2.38. In a period of no imminent or foreseeable threat, the concept of deterrence should be central to Australia's defence planning, thus increasing the cost and risk of aggression against Australian territory. This process requires the identification of possible aggressive acts and the operations involved in responding to such acts in ascending order of cost and risk to the enemy. It requires us to plan national resource organisation and military operations so as to allow the least prospect of an enemy impeding our contingent force expansion, and to raise the enemy's costs and risks to the highest possible level. By its mere existence, the Australian Defence Force reduces the prospect of armed attack. This deterrent factor is enhanced if Australia is seen to have the capability to mobilise its reserves of manpower and material, even if they are never used in war.

2.39. Australia, for the foreseeable future, will restrict itself to relatively small standing forces backed up by relatively small reserve forces. In the event of a serious defence emergency, the Army may have to depend on the large-scale mobilisation of untrained manpower. The highly equipment-oriented Navy and Air Force will have to fight with the hardware in Australia at the time. This makes the time available for defence preparation critical. This may be achieved by the concept of disproportionate response.

2.40. 'Disproportionate response' is a concept, within the context of strategic deterrence, which advocates progressively incorporating into the Australian Defence Force specific capabilities that would cause a potential aggressor to respond disproportionately in terms of cost in one or all of money, time, material and/or manpower in order to gain the advantage. For example, it is conceivable that the purchase by Australia of some extra submarines might force a potential enemy to need anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities costing many times as much as those extra submarines. In addition to this extra cost incurred, the potential aggressor would need to extend his force preparation time greatly, since these capabilities require complex command and control facilities and procedures, logistic support, trained crews, and so on. If, in this example, the enemy is not deterred, Australia would still have the option of raising its level of deterrence by adding more of the same capability or others specially chosen in the light of their ability to cause the potential aggressor to make a disproportionate response.

2.41. It is true that deterrence may fail for any number of reasons—irrationality, miscalculation of the costs, or acceptance of the military costs in order to achieve non-military strategic objectives. Accepting this, care should be taken to ensure that the concept of disproportionate response is not only applied in the context of deterrence but is also taken into account when considering the military requirements for the actual defence of Australia. To be cost-effective, preparations should be suitable both for deterrence and for actual defence. Australia's force structure could well be tilted in favour of deterrence at the early stages when the likelihood of threat is low and potential enemies lack military capability to match their aggressive intentions. As threatening intentions are perceived to be reflected in the potential enemy's emerging force structure, then forces would have to be developed along more balanced lines to be credible in the context of Australia's actual defence.

2.42. There are some well known military factors which require disproportionate effort on the part of an adversary. The Committee has already alluded to the fairly well accepted yardstick for combat ratios requiring an attacker in ground operations to have a 3:1 advantage over a defender. Such a yardstick cannot be applied to encounters on

the sea or in the air. In any case, there are many qualifications to this numerical concept such as the relative morale of the adversaries, the use of surprise, superior tactics and application of technology. Such factors—sometimes referred to as ‘combat multipliers’—obviously influence relative combat power so that relative numerical strength is not necessarily of paramount importance. ‘Combat multipliers’ are particularly significant to Australia with its relative shortage of military manpower. In the defence of Australia, we need to exploit superior use of firepower, mobility, knowledge of terrain, a high state of readiness, deception and electronic warfare. Most importantly, we need to have effective command arrangements and intelligence as to the enemy’s intentions and order of battle.

2.43 Application of the concept of disproportionate response to deterrence is particularly relevant to our maritime forces, since it would be most unwise if Australia were to adopt a military posture which did not give priority to destroying an invading force on the high seas or in the air before reaching Australia. Giving priority in the first instance to capabilities designed to keeping an enemy at arm’s length means giving priority to maritime forces, especially in the provision of high-cost advanced technology with long lead-times. To be effective as a deterrent, such capabilities must be ‘in being’ and be seen by a potential aggressor to be capable of imposing unacceptable risks and costs on his forces.

2.44 The role of the Army as a deterrent is less easily understood by many people. The Army (including the Army Reserve) has to be of sufficient size and capability to deter and, if necessary, repulse any landing forces which might be brought against Australia. In view of the generally accepted requirement for a three-to-one superiority to attacking over defending forces, it would be wise strategy for Australia to be capable of confronting the notional invader with a force large enough to compel him to assemble an invasion force so big and cumbersome that it presented, while in transit, an unacceptably vulnerable target to Australian maritime defence forces.

2.45 Another component in the deterrent Australia could offer to a notional invader would be a capability to strike against his home bases (in the case of a regional power) or forward operational bases with air and sea power. This would seem to be the principal justification for Australia’s two strike and reconnaissance squadrons of F-111C aircraft.

2.46 The peacetime force-expansion base is the link between our deterrent force structure and our ultimate force structure for the defence of Australia. Ideally, the level of our deterrence should be escalated ahead of what is judged to be an emerging threat; the deterrent component of our overall defence posture should then more closely reflect the balanced force structure for fighting a war in the defence of Australia, against what would be by then an evident threat.

2.47 An essential element in the total deterrent to invasion would be the national will to resist.¹⁰ A potential invader who could foresee a prospect of prolonged popular resistance in the form of guerilla warfare, even if he should succeed in destroying the Australian regular armed forces, would certainly think again before he proceeded with his plans. Development of the Army Reserve and other elements of the infrastructure for territorial defence or irregular resistance, would provide visible evidence of the national will to resist. For this reason the Committee has been pleased to note that the Department of Defence has started to implement a suggestion of the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters for a more visible territorially based presence in north-western Australia, as foreshadowed by a Government announcement to establish NORFORCE.

Issues that need to be addressed

2.48 The following are some major issues that need to be addressed (on some of these issues the Committee will have more to say in later reports):

- (a) agreement as to the area of Australia's strategic interest. This Committee considers Australia's area of primary strategic concern to be Australia and its territories, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and near lines of communication. Also of strategic concern are the adjacent maritime areas, Papua New Guinea and the other South-West Pacific states and territories, and the South-East Asia Region, more specifically the countries of ASEAN and Indo-China;
- (b) the deterrent capability of the Australian Defence Force and its capacity for timely expansion to meet a threat;
- (c) the adequacy of Australian mobilisation planning, including the wide array of economic resources not encompassed within the portfolio of the Minister for Defence;
- (d) the development of the 'territorial' defence concept and the associated infrastructure, particularly in Northern Australia, as a contribution to deterrence;
- (e) the likelihood and extent of allied support and whether there is a need for greater self-reliance (this report has already considered the American alliance, see for example, para. 1.77 (e)); and
- (f) the question of closer defence co-operation or association with other regional powers and/or ASEAN.

Endnotes

1. *Evidence*, 2 May 1980, p. 172 (Brigadier H. J. Coates).
2. Statistics from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance, 1980-1981*.
3. *Evidence*, 18 March 1981, p. 1678 (Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot).
4. Robert O'Neill, 'The Strategic View—Fears and Phobias', in *Australia's Resources Future*, ed. by Peter Hastings and Andrew Farran, Melbourne, 1978, pp. 219-228.
5. *Evidence*, 18 March 1981, p. 1658.
6. *Evidence*, 25 July 1979, p. 2091.
7. *Evidence*, 18 March 1981, p. 1682.
8. *Evidence*, 18 March 1981, p. 1677 (Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot).
9. House of Representatives *Hansard*, 29 March 1979, p. 1325.
10. Robert O'Neill, 'Insurgency and Sub-National Violence', in *New Directions in Strategic Thinking*, edited by Robert O'Neill and D. M. Horner, Sydney George Allen & Unwin, 1981, p. 203.

CHAPTER 3

Intermediate level threats

3.1 Under this heading the Committee considers threats such as:

- (a) lodgements on Australian territory that are limited (including in time); the areas that appear to be more vulnerable as targets for limited lodgements would be offshore islands and territories as for example the Cocos Islands, or the Torres Strait Islands, or areas of northern and north-western Australia such as Cape York Peninsula, Arnhem Land, parts of the Kimberley or Pilbara regions and Australian territory in Antarctica;
- (b) major raids: targets for this level of threat are more likely to be military bases, key civil installations and facilities and the joint United States/Australian defence facilities. To be regarded as intermediate level threats, such raids would need to be on a continuing basis, or comprise seize-and-hold operations against major facilities or resource installations;
- (c) external aggression against a regional country, the security of which is highly important to Australia; this would apply particularly to states and territories in the Indonesian/Melanesian archipelago and to New Zealand, (see also paragraphs 1.30-1.32);
- (d) blockade of an Australian port or ports including by the relatively economical device of laying mines; and
- (e) disruption of out lines of shipping communications, or closure of a strait either in isolation or in the context of Western lines of communications. As Australian trade is important to other powers and is mostly carried in foreign ships, it is difficult to envisage such a contingency occurring except as part of a more general conflict.

3.2 To be regarded as an intermediate level threat, it would have to have limited objectives (against Australia) under policy limitations as to the extent of the destructive power that might be employed and the extent of the geographical areas that might be involved. A response to most of the intermediate level threats mentioned would be likely to involve a substantial expansion of the Australian Defence Force.

Capability needed to pose an intermediate level threat

3.3 The capabilities needed by a notional enemy to carry out one of the intermediate level threats mentioned in paragraph 3.1 vary and in some cases are of a specialist nature such as, for example, the use of 'special forces' for raids or technical capabilities for minelaying. In order to effect a limited lodgement on the mainland, or even to seize a significant island territory, the notional enemy is likely to require the following capabilities:

- (a) naval and air forces required for at least local superiority to cover the lodgement; in some cases they might have to be similar in magnitude to those already described as a requirement for mounting the first stages of a full-scale invasion. Any limitation of the requirement might result from the short time scale implied by limited lodgement, such as the reduced requirements for reinforcements and supplies;
- (b) transport and protective forces from embarkation points to the part or parts of Australian territory selected for attack require a formidable naval and air capability, unless this is provided by another power or complete surprise is achieved;

- (c) the ability to sustain and protect the force against inevitable countermeasures, for the duration of the operation.

Who could have capabilities or motives to pose an intermediate level threat?

3.4 If it had the motive, one of the superpowers would be capable of posing intermediate level threats to Australia. For example, the Soviet Union showed it was able to project military power to a very distant country when it intervened in the post-independence civil war in Angola. However, the circumstances were very different to an opposed landing on Australia. (See paragraph 2.12 for some Soviet limitations in capabilities for such a task). Certainly the Soviet Union and even some currently friendly European powers such as Britain and France, would have the capability, if not the motive, to impose some of the lesser intermediate threats mentioned in paragraph 3.1, but at considerable cost to their diplomatic standing and capabilities in regions more relevant to those powers. In order to launch a major raid against Australian territory, (as distinct from a limited lodgement), a hostile power would have to possess significant maritime capabilities.

3.5 Countries such as Japan, China, India, Indonesia and Vietnam could conceivably enhance some elements of their current capabilities so as to be able to pose one or more of the intermediate level threats against Australia, particularly if assisted by a superpower. Leaving aside motives, such action would entail a diversion of resources and military capability from other areas. (Other reasons why these powers are unlikely to take hostile action were covered in paragraphs 2.22 to 2.28.)

3.6 The question of foreign countries developing a motive for armed action against Australia is at this time hypothetical. As already indicated Australia does not have serious disputes with any other members of the world community. Even the issues raised by the extension of national claims over the resources of the oceans under the evolving Law of the Sea, are being settled to a large extent peacefully, at least so far (when a comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty enters into force the question of settling maritime boundaries is likely to pose some challenges to relations between states in the region).

3.7 Although difficult to visualise at this stage, countries could develop motives for mounting intermediate level threats against Australia for several possible reasons:

- (a) in a period of great tension between the superpowers there might be a temptation to weaken Australia's commitment to the Western Alliance by posing intermediate level threats against Australia;
- (b) a hostile country might wish to achieve short-term or long-term political or economic concessions from Australia, the nature of which it is difficult to specify at this time; such a country might have, or more likely contrive, serious disagreement with some aspect of Australia's domestic or foreign policy. A foreign power might wish to gain control of an Australian territory in order to increase its right to resources, including off-shore resources. Some of our island territories, such as Christmas Island or the Cocos Islands, might be seen to have strategic value as bases, as well as conferring rights to adjacent maritime resources which may be so evident at this time;
- (c) A foreign power might one day see the need to control directly the resources of an under-utilised or less populated part of Australia. This might perhaps occur if the situation ever arose where Australia were for some reason reduced to a condition of great internal disorder, and unable to satisfactorily supply foreign markets or organise a unified national defence against a power which sought to obtain supplies by force;

- (d) in the event of serious ideological or other divisions—contrived or real— within Australia, a foreign power might attempt to exploit these divisions to its own advantage. External attacks are likely to be more successful when the country which is the object of attack is debilitated by internal disorder.

3.8 As already indicated the term 'limited lodgement' could be taken to mean that the lodgement was to be limited in terms of space or time. For example, a notional enemy could aim to seize the Kimberley region and have the annexation accepted by world opinion, as perhaps reflected by lack of support for Australia's case in the United Nations. However, it is difficult to envisage such an operation being so neatly limited in practice. Australia is an island continent far removed from other countries, with a relatively homogeneous population, and it would be very difficult for any Australian Government which retained control of the populated south-east and south-west to acknowledge the alienation of any of the mainland parts of the country. The logic of the situation would compel the notional enemy to choose between a full-scale invasion or withdrawal.¹

3.9 With the exception of New Zealand, the island states of the South Pacific have very small defence forces, or none at all. This state of affairs is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. There is likely to be an expectation, including in South West Pacific states, that Australia (and New Zealand) undertake the major burden of defence against external threats to the Melanesian and Polynesian states should such threats eventuate. Joint action with the defence forces of New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Fiji might be especially significant in this context. Current defence needs in the South Pacific are small, because there is little evidence of external powers posing a security threat to the region. A willingness and perceived capability on the part of Australia and New Zealand to use their forces in the common interest of all of the South Pacific states helps to ensure the continuance of a secure environment.

Warning times

3.10 Warning times for intermediate level threats would be less than for a major invasion, but leaving aside, for the moment, any prospect of a global war, these threats would be considered years away rather than months. This is because Australia does not have serious disputes with any foreign power nor can we at the present time foresee any issue with any country which might develop into armed hostilities.

3.11 An intermediate level action against Australia could be expected to be preceded by a substantial period during which relations with the notional enemy state deteriorated. If the hostile state were other than one of the superpowers, it would in most cases take a considerable period to build up its capability to mount such an operation. If the hostile state were closely allied to a superpower, it could be assisted to build up its capability more quickly or be provided with technical and logistic support for warlike operations.

3.12 As with the case of a major invasion it is difficult to envisage intermediate level threats arising against Australia short of a situation where the existing world order was seriously disrupted, and where the attentions of Australia's main allies were totally pre-occupied with serious military threats or large-scale economic disruption.

Deterrent to intermediate level threats

3.13 Taking into account that intermediate level threats may call for a greater need for Australian self-reliance, the military deterrents to these threats are not greatly different to those for invasion. Australia's naval and air forces must be seen to be

capable of destroying the attacking forces while moving to or from Australia or of destroying their lines of communication with their home bases, and should pose an unacceptable risk for any regional state contemplating hostile action. Ground forces with strong offensive air and transport support, which could be rapidly deployed over long distances and be capable of destroying the attacking forces after they have landed in Australia, also have an important deterrent role. The deterrent effect is enhanced if our ready reaction forces demonstrate the ability—preferably in co-operation with allies—to make rapid deployments to those parts of Australian territory that are more vulnerable to intermediate threats. Furthermore, the capability to strike at the notional enemy's home or forward operational bases constitute a very significant deterrent.

3.14 If Australia were seen to have an effective and integrated surveillance system, potential intruders or aggressors would be more likely to feel that their planned incursions or raids would be detected at an early stage. In addition, in the sparsely populated northern parts of Australia, an enhanced presence of 'territorial' forces—lightly equipped and highly mobile—would play an important role in surveillance and reconnaissance and limiting the scope of enemy operations until the full strength of Australia's ground forces could be brought to bear on any lodgement on the Australian mainland.

3.15 Any regional power considering a lodgement in Australia would have to give serious consideration to the ANZUS Alliance and the possibility that the United States might intervene. Australia's standing in the world community could also play an important part in deterrence. If it were taken into consideration that Australia was likely to be supported by allies, who would see an attack on this country as a threat to their own interests, then a potential enemy would hesitate before taking hostile action. An increased vulnerability to attack is one of the consequences for a state which has become diplomatically isolated because its policies are unacceptable to world opinion (as, for example, present day South Africa or Iran).

3.16 Australia would be able by diplomatic means to arouse international condemnation of enemy action in regard to sea communications to this country. A potential enemy posing a threat to our sea communications would be aware that our trade is carried mainly in foreign-owned ships and ought to be deterred from interference in the belief that Australia would be quickly able to internationalise such a conflict.

Issues that need to be addressed

3.17 The following are some major issues that need to be addressed, perhaps in future Committee inquiries:

- (a) the diplomatic and other non-military means of avoiding deterioration of Australia's relations with any country to such a level that that country sought a redress of its grievances by armed force;
- (b) whether the Australia Defence Force is at a level of strength and capability sufficient to deter a considered or irrational resort to force by any country with which Australia might have a dispute;
- (c) the need for greater self-reliance against intermediate threats (compared with major assault on Australia) and the extent of allied support;
- (d) whether there is adequate provision for an effective and integrated system of intelligence and surveillance to deter incursions on Australian territory;
- (e) the potential for greater co-operation, or alliances, with other regional powers; and
- (f) whether Australia is giving sufficient support to the new states of the South Pacific.

Endnote

1. Robert O'Neill, 'Australia as a Target for International Violence', *United Service (A.C.T.)*, October 1974, p. 10.

CHAPTER 4

Low level contingencies

4.1 In this chapter the Committee considers low level contingencies. Australia may be confronted by one or several of the following situations:

- (a) sporadic attacks against key civil facilities and installations (which are sometimes referred to as vital points, as the orderly life of a modern society depends on them) for example, power stations, petroleum refineries, water supply pumping stations and computers;
- (b) attacks against isolated military facilities;
- (c) harassment of our shipping, fishing activities, and offshore exploration and exploitation;
- (d) sporadic intrusions into Australia's air space by military aircraft or smugglers;
- (e) military support for the illegal exploitation of our offshore resources;
- (f) the planned introduction of exotic diseases or the support of illegal migrants or drug-runners;
- (g) harassment of our nationals or a threat to their safety in overseas countries including seizure of overseas property and Australian embassies;
- (h) external support for dissident elements in, or military pressures against, a regional country the security of which is important to Australia;
- (i) covert or overt overseas support for Australian dissident or minority groups in Australia who might be encouraged to resort to terrorist action;
- (j) overseas based terrorist groups using violence or threats of violence in Australia or on an Australian aircraft; and
- (k) large-scale but non-violent intrusions into Australia's proposed Exclusive Economic Zone for the purpose of poaching scarce resources.

4.2 Generally, the low level contingencies described in this part of the report are those threats which can be dealt with within the peacetime organisation and structure of the Defence Force.

Who could have capabilities or motives to pose low level contingencies?

4.3 Any group or organisation trained in the use of small arms and explosives would be capable of mounting most threats mentioned in para. 4.1. To pose a serious threat to national security, such a group would be likely to require overt or covert support from an overseas organisation or state. This assistance could be in the form of logistic and training support, as well as transport for insertion and extraction of activists (unless infiltrated on normal international transport).

4.4 A motive to pose the sort of threats we have classified as low level contingencies could be developed by any state, organisation or minority group which strongly disagreed with any aspect of Australian national policy in any of a large number of areas—including Australian attitudes to minorities of certain organisations in Australia or overseas. In recent years some isolated actions by a minority group in Australia have demonstrated the potential for such development. In May 1979, the Hon. Mr Justice R. M. Hope, completed a Protective Security Review for the Australian Government. He stated in his report that:

'The present absence in Australia of national terrorism is likely to continue. Although from time to time polarising issues will arise in Australia, and domestic violence will wax and wane accordingly, it is not likely that the essential consensus of Australian society, and the unchallenged legitimacy of its governments, will be fractured in the foreseeable future.'

The Committee agrees with this assessment, although it has not taken formal evidence on this matter.

4.5 With regard to international terrorism directed against Australia, Mr Justice Hope indicated that acts of international terrorism within Australia were not likely to diminish, and might increase. In assessing the long-term outlook, Mr Justice Hope said that, although the prospect of ethnic-based international terrorism within Australia in the long-term was very much guess-work, it was likely that the problems stemming from the Middle East might increase, and that those stemming from Yugoslavia would continue at the then current level. Mr Justice Hope also mentioned the possibility of greater instability in South East Asia in the future providing a higher risk of exposure of Australia to what he called 'the transnational character of modern terrorism'. The possibility of what he referred to as 'the new mercenaries' employing nuclear weaponry and biological warfare was raised, but Mr Justice Hope concluded that 'this is very much speculation'.²

4.6 Australia has been relatively free from such acts as hijacking of international aircraft. To a large measure this is probably due to Australia's remoteness from established centres of terrorism but this situation could change.

Warning times

4.7 It would take relatively little time for a hostile power or organisation to mount a low level type threat, once they had made the decision to do so. In that sense, a low level threat could arise with little or no warning. However, threats even of this kind do not arise without antecedent causes and developments and the Committee has already indicated that at this stage Australia does not have minority groups prepared to resort to terrorism on a significant scale. If perpetrated by agents of a foreign government, actions of this kind would constitute acts of war, and there would be the danger that the situation could develop into a full-scale war. Therefore, it is difficult to envisage a foreign state undertaking such action without a much greater degree of tension existing than exists now, or in the foreseeable future, between any country and Australia. Similarly, deterioration in Australia's relations with an ethnic or ideological movement based outside Australia would provide warning of an externally-directed terrorist campaign.

4.8 In a submission incorporated at the hearing on 25 July 1979, the Department of Defence stated:

' . . . some lesser contingencies (e.g. terrorist activities involving a military response to assist civil authorities) are recognised as being likely to occur without identifiable pre-conditions. However, for the most part, the contingencies under study are seen as being possible initial actions against Australia resulting for example, from a deterioration in regional relationships or from disputes in maritime resources zones.'³

It would seem that the Department of Defence would expect to have some warning time for most low level contingencies.

4.9 The development of a situation in which a minority group within Australian society perceived itself as being oppressed to such a degree that it felt compelled to resort to terrorism as a justifiable or effective response, would also provide warning time of a likely outbreak of terrorism.

Deterrents to low level contingencies

4.10 Effective deterrents to the low level threats mentioned in this report include:

- (a) an effective civil and military surveillance capability which is integrated under a central control, which also has quick access to suitable reaction forces;

- (b) strong and efficient anti-terrorist capability, including in the airlines industry;
- (c) continued provision for the lawful redress of grievances within Australian society;
- (d) foreign policy directed toward avoiding serious deterioration of Australia's relations with other countries; a deterioration which could provoke them to instigate campaigns of low level aggression;
- (e) provision for adequate protection of vital points in Australia's civil and military infrastructure which might prove attractive targets; and
- (f) an enhanced presence of 'territorial' type forces in Northern Australia which could report on or react to low level incursions.

4.11 Referring to the role of the Defence Force in dealing with low level threats, the Department of Defence said in evidence given on 25 July 1979 that the reaction of the Australian Defence Force to any contingent situation would be dependent on a number of factors:

'Firstly, there would need to be positive direction from the highest level of government authorising a military response to the situation. Actual force elements utilized in the situation, and the manner of their utilization, would be determined on a basis of military and other judgement depending on the nature of the event, i.e. its type, scale and location. In general, our studies indicate that the present force-in-being could cope with credible situations which may arise with scant warning. Certain elements of the force-in-being provide us with highly competent and flexible capabilities that could be deployed in contingent circumstances. These capabilities include maritime patrol aircraft, naval ships of various types and components of our land forces which, with tactical air transport, can be quickly deployed to remote areas.

Difficulties may arise if incidents became widely dispersed, concurrent or protracted.

However, such circumstances suggest a concerted campaign of harassment with overtones of increasing seriousness and escalation of threat, for which some substantial warning time could be expected'.⁴

4.12 The important question arises whether the Australian Defence Force should be structured with some emphasis on deterring low level contingencies. The Department of Defence stated in a submission that:

'... it is important to realise that inferences which may be drawn from the study of specific contingencies exercise limited influence, guiding rather than dominating the force development process. Developing the core force against specific threats or contingencies of threat would risk the unacceptable distortion of that force to meet what could be the wrong threat, in the wrong place and at the wrong time'.⁵

Issues that need to be addressed

4.13 The following are some of the issues that need to be addressed in regard to low level contingencies:

- (a) the adequacy of arrangements for the collection, assessment and dissemination of intelligence regarding low level contingencies; the adequacy of co-ordination between the several Australian intelligence services, as well as with those of relevant countries, to give timely warning of such threats;
- (b) the effectiveness of present arrangements for coastal surveillance;
- (c) the organisation that should be responsible for Australia's coastal surveillance; whether the present arrangements could be improved and greater deterrence achieved if the responsibility were allocated to the Defence Force;
- (d) whether the current forces available for ready reaction to low level contingencies would be adequate if Australia came under increasing threat;

- (e) whether Australia has a sufficient presence in some of the more isolated parts of her territory, so that potential intruders are aware that any incursions or raids are unlikely to go undetected;
- (f) the adequacy of planning and provision of manpower for the protection of vital installations such as dams, pipelines, oil storage tanks and refineries, electricity generators, communications facilities, airfields and information centres;
- (g) whether the right priority is being given to lower level contingencies—in deciding the development of the Defence Force in the shorter term—in view of the fact that that they require of an adversary less military capability and preparation time, as well as a greater degree of self-reliance on Australia's part, as distinct from a global war or major invasion (but note also paragraph 4.12);
- (h) whether the Defence Force is doing sufficient in its role of deterrence by exercising in pre-emptive deployments to Northern Australia and Australia's territories; and
- (i) the role of active diplomacy, trade, aid and defence co-operation with regional states as an essential ingredient to meeting low level threats.

Endnotes

1. Protective Security Review, *Report* Canberra, 1979 p. 23.
2. *ibid*, pp. 23-26, *passim*.
3. *Evidence*, 25 July 1979, p. 2106.
4. *Evidence*, 25 July 1979, p. 2107.
5. *Evidence*, 25 July 1979, p. 2108.

Conclusions

1. In the introduction to this report the Committee identified its target audience as 'the reasonably well informed citizen who has made no special study of defence, and who has the impression that because of its vast coastline and small population Australia is fundamentally indefensible.' The Committee's study of the nature and probability of threats to Australia's security will provide some reassurance to such a person that Australia can be defended, and that its defence preparations in themselves make a substantial contribution through their deterrent effect towards reducing the number and level of threats to its security that Australia might possibly face. The Committee's conclusions deal firstly with the threat of full-scale invasion of the continent (perhaps the most long standing, yet in today's world least justified fear of many Australians) and with intermediate level threats that fall short of such an invasion. The more conceivable but still unlikely event of a general or nuclear war is then dealt with, followed by the most conceivable yet potentially least damaging threat of low level emergencies.
2. Because of Australia's remote location and lack of land frontiers with other nations, because of its own not inconsiderable capacity to deter potential aggressors and because its alliance with the United States of America involves the threat of American retaliation, Australia is a difficult invasion target. Currently only the United States would have the physical capacity to launch a full-scale invasion of Australia, and it clearly lacks any motive to do so. The Soviet Union would require South-East Asian staging bases and additional equipment to mount a successful invasion, and it is difficult to envisage any conditions outside general war that would make such a move worthwhile.
3. In the unlikely event that another power should develop a motive or intention to invade Australia such an assault would involve a very difficult military operation (paras 2.2 to 2.10 refer). Even for an economically advanced regional power, it could be expected to take at least five years to develop such a capability. Other regional powers would require at least ten years. Nevertheless, the Australian Defence Force needs to continue to sustain a technological level relevant to those of regional powers to include long lead-time capabilities which act as a deterrent to hostile action. Australia also needs to maintain the skills relevant to operations in the region and to have the capability for timely expansion of its forces.
4. Large-scale attack on Australia is therefore regarded as remote and improbable in the foreseeable future. It could be expected that such an eventuality would be preceded by a period of warning which is likely to include a severe crisis or confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States.
5. Although there is no discernable threat of invasion of Australia on which force structure can be based, there is the danger that the emergence of such a threat may take less time than is likely to be required to obtain long-lead items of important equipment and increased trained manpower. This places a heavy responsibility on our intelligence agencies and those responsible for planning for a smooth expansion of Australia's Defence Force. A nation that spends relatively little of its gross national product on defence requires a relatively large and competent intelligence effort.
6. Warning times for intermediate level threats would be less than for a major invasion, but leaving aside, for the moment, any prospect of a global war, these threats would be considered years away rather than months. This is because Australia does not have serious disputes with any foreign power nor can we at the present time foresee any issue with any country which might develop into armed hostilities. As with the case of a major invasion, it is difficult to envisage intermediate level threats arising against

Australia short of a situation where the existing world order was seriously disrupted, and where the attentions of Australia's main allies were totally pre-occupied with serious military threats or large-scale economic disruption.

7. There are currently several elements that contribute to an uncertain global strategic outlook (paras 1.8 to 1.22 refer). A deterioration in the global relationship between the superpowers, or possible conflicts in the region—which might attract the support of one or both of the superpowers—could affect adversely Australia's strategic prospects. It is difficult to envisage a serious strategic threat to Australia which would be unrelated to a major breakdown in the existing world order or to Australia's alliance with the United States.

8. There is likely to be continuing and perhaps increased tension and competition between the superpowers, particularly in regions where there is instability or confrontation. Nevertheless, on all rational calculations nuclear war between the superpowers should be regarded as an unlikely eventuality, given the immense devastation engendered in such a conflict which would negate any conceivable benefits to the belligerents. The dangers of nuclear proliferation add yet another worrying dimension to the uncertainties in the global strategic outlook. Unrestrained nuclear weapons development by the existing nuclear powers may serve as an ostensible justification for the ambitions of other states to have nuclear weapons.

9. Australia's security depends substantially on the maintenance of the global balance between the United States and the USSR and their allies. This balance would be catastrophically upset by nuclear war between the superpowers. Even if it were not directly targeted, Australia would be affected by a general nuclear war between northern hemisphere powers. The disruption of the world order which would result from such a war could leave Australia exposed to enormous problems including an overwhelming influx of refugees. This would be at a time when the breakdown in international trade would have catastrophic consequences for Australia's economy. Even if Australia were not seriously affected directly by radioactive fallout from the northern hemisphere, there would be ecological consequences for the whole world which would necessarily affect Australia.

10. The joint Australian-United States facilities at Pine Gap, Nurrungar and North West Cape are likely to be on the Soviet nuclear target list. How high on the target list is likely to depend on Soviet perceptions at the time, particularly as to the role of the facilities and the alternatives available to the United States. The presence of the installations can be justified in terms of their contribution to the central balance between the superpowers, and because it can be seen to confer additional advantages on Australia in its alliance with the United States. Nevertheless, it could be argued that it is the presence of the installations, not the existence of the alliance, which may make Australia a nuclear target. However, it can also be argued that the risks associated with nuclear attack on Australia are outweighed by the advantages Australia derives from its alliance with the United States. The ANZUS Alliance is likely to act as a deterrent against those potentially hostile actions against Australia that would be beyond Australia's own capabilities. Any policy of non-alignment would need a much higher defence expenditure by Australia.

11. A conventional war between the superpowers and their allies is also unlikely because of the likelihood of its escalation into nuclear war. Although in circumstances of such a war, Australia would be likely to employ her forces in a complementary role with allied forces, especially in our own region, the contingency of global or nuclear war is not seen as a major factor that should determine the structure of the Australian Defence Force.

12. Australia is more likely to suffer low level contingencies than the intermediate level threats mentioned in this report, or an invasion. These low level threats could arise at short notice and could give rise to challenging problems. There is uncertainty regarding the extent and timing of allied support for several contingencies in the regional environment that may confront Australia. This calls for continuing emphasis on self-reliance by Australia and the possession of well-balanced defence forces.

13. Irrespective of whether or not significant threats to Australia develop, the Australian Defence Force must be capable of undertaking foreseeable tasks, such as making a contribution to surveillance in peacetime, supporting the law enforcement agencies against terrorism and contributing to United Nations and other peacekeeping forces. Generally, our forces should be able to display our capability in our neighbourhood. This can be demonstrated by competence in military exercises with allies and with regional associates.

14. Overall the Committee's conclusions as to the nature and probability of threats to Australia's security are cautiously reassuring. However, the Committee cannot stress enough that the relative absence of short and medium-term threats arises not only from Australia's fortunate geographical isolation, but also from the success thus far of the war prevention strategy of the Western Alliance and from the comparative strength of Australia's own defence forces within our own region. Indeed, the primary aim of a defence strategy is to prevent war, not to fight it. Hence reassurance as to Australia's security is available only so long as the perilous balance between the superpowers is maintained, or alternatively their armaments dismantled, and also so long as we continue to play our part in contributing to the Western Alliance and improving our own self-reliance within our region.

By Order of the Committee

R. F. Shipton, M.P.

Chairman

ANNEX A

List of persons and organisations who assisted the work of the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters.

Witnesses

The Committee is grateful to all those who appeared in person before the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters. The following persons appeared before the Sub-Committee, in most instances after having presented a written submission (dates of hearings and relevant page numbers in official transcript of public evidence are shown in parenthesis):

ARMSTRONG, Mr J. M.—Chief, Animal Health Division, and Chief Quarantine Officer (Animals), Department of Agriculture, Government of Western Australia (1.9.80) pp. 1206, 1255-1260.

ARMSTRONG, Mr P.—Senior Clerk, Inspection and Boat Registration Branches, Harbour and Light Department, Government of Western Australia (1.9.80) pp. 1206-1274.

ATTWOOD, Mr N. J.—at the time evidence was given, Acting Secretary, Department of Defence, Canberra (18.3.81) pp. 1633-1806.

BALL, Dr D. J.—Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra (10.2.81) pp. 1398, 1505-1573.

BEAVIS, Mr C. J. F.—Sales Manager, Industrial Products, Westinghouse Brake and Signal Company (Aust.) Pty Ltd—(appearing as a private citizen) (29.7.80) pp. 629-702.

BENSON, Mr J. A.—Assistant Secretary, Executive Secretariat, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra ('In Camera' hearing).

BINSALLEH, Mr A. J. J.—Councillor, Broome Shire Council, Broome, W.A. (13.8.80) pp. 791-812A.

BROOK, Mr J. H.—Assistant Secretary, International Legal Branch, Legal and Treaties Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra (21.8.80) pp. 1106-1126.

BROOMHALL, Mr K. L.—at the time evidence was given, Acting President, Shire of West Kimberley, W.A. (13.8.80) pp. 868-898.

BROWN, Mr M. N.—Shire Clerk, Shire of Wyndham-East Kimberley, Wyndham, W.A. (14.8.80) pp. 953-977.

BROWNE, Mr N. J.—Assistant Shire Clerk, Shire of West Kimberley, W.A. (13.8.80) pp. 868-896.

COATES, Brigadier H. J., M.B.E.—at the time evidence was given, Director-General of Operations and Plans—Army, Department of Defence (Army Office), Canberra (2.5.80) pp. 158-208.

COLE, Mr B. W.—Councillor, Shire of Wyndham-East Kimberley, Wyndham, W.A. (14.8.80) pp. 953-977.

DADSWELL, Captain T. A., A.M.—at the time evidence was given, Aircraft Carrier Project Director, Department of Defence (Navy), Canberra (2.5.80) pp. 209-252.

DANES, Mr G. P.—Senior Pilot and Acting Base Manager, Trans West Airlines, Derby, W.A. (13.8.80) pp. 899-926.

ECCLES, Mr P. B.—First Assistant Secretary, Coastal Services Division, Commonwealth Department of Transport, Canberra (29.7.80) pp. 727-788K.

EVANS, Air Vice-Marshal S. D., A.O., D.S.O., A.F.C., Chief of Joint Operations and Plans, Department of Defence, Canberra (21.8.80) pp. 1128-1202B.

EVANS, Commander F. G., M.B.E., V.R.D., R.A.N. (Rtd)—Federal President, The Navy League of Australia (28.7.80) pp. 344-396.

FINGER, Mr M. R., C.B.E.—Director-General, Department of the Chief Minister, Government of the Northern Territory, Darwin, N.T. (14.8.80) pp. 1029-1104I.

GORHAM, Mr G. R.—Assistant District Engineer, Public Works Department, Government of Western Australia (14.8.80) pp. 928-952.

GRAZEBROOK, Commander A. W.—Federal Vice-President, The Navy League of Australia (28.7.80) pp. 344-396.

GUSTER, Mr A. F.—First Assistant Secretary, Satellite Project Office, Postal and Telecommunications Department, Canberra (11.9.80) pp. 1294-1326.

HAMILTON, Mr R. N., O.B.E.—at the time evidence was presented First Assistant Secretary, Strategic and International Policy Division, Department of Defence, Canberra (21.8.80) pp. 1128-1202B.

HAMILTON, Mr R. A.—Director, Office of Regional Administration and the North West, Government of Western Australia (1.9.80) pp. 1206-1274.

HARRISON, Mr R. P.—General Manager, Woodside Petroleum Development Pty Ltd (1.9.80) pp. 1275-1292.

HAYNES, Mr D. L.—Shire Clerk, Broome Shire Council, Broome, W.A. (13.8.80) pp. 791-812A.

HENDERSON, Mr I. M. H.—Assistant General Manager, Woodside Petroleum Development Pty Ltd. (1.9.80) pp. 1275-1292.

HILL, Mr D. L.—Chief Operations Officer, Western Australian State Emergency Service (13.8.80) pp. 813-858; (1.9.80) pp. 1206-1274.

HOBBS, Mr J.—Deputy President, Shire of Wyndham-East Kimberley, Wyndham, Western Australia (14.8.80) pp. 953-976.

HUDSON, Commodore M. W., R.A.N.—at the time evidence was given, Director-General Naval Plans and Policy, Department of Defence (Navy), Canberra (2.5.80) pp. 209-252.

JOHNSTON, Mr I. D.—Kimberley Regional Administrator, Government of Western Australia, Kununurra, Western Australia (14.8.80) pp. 928-952.

KAHN, Brigadier C. N., D.S.O.—Deputy Chief of the Army Reserve (15.5.80) p. 293.

KANE, Mr V. J.—First Assistant Secretary, Policy Division, Postal and Telecommunications Department, Canberra. (11.9.80) pp. 1294-1326.

LANE, Mr T.—Officer-in-charge, Kununurra, Commonwealth Department of Transport, Western Australia (14.8.80) pp. 928-952.

LANGTRY, Colonel J. O., D.C.M., (Retired List)—Executive Officer, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra (23.4.80) pp. 110-156; (10.2.81) pp. 1398, 1574-1629.

LONGDEN, Mr N.—Businessman, Derby, Western Australia (13.8.80) pp. 922-926.

LOOSLI, Rear-Admiral R. G., C.B.E.—at the time evidence was given, Chief of Naval Operations and Plans, Department of Defence (Navy), Russell Offices, Canberra (2.5.80) pp. 209-252.

LYON, Mr M. E.—at the time evidence was given, First Assistant Secretary, South East Asia and South Pacific Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra ('In Camera' hearing).

McAULAY, Mr R.—Police Commissioner of the Northern Territory, Darwin (14.8.80) pp. 1029-1104I.

MACBRIDE, Colonel D. J.—Chief Engineer of Headquarters, Third Military District, Victoria Barracks, St Kilda Road, Melbourne, Victoria (appearing as a private citizen) (29.7.80) pp. 704-726.

MCDONALD, Mr C. E.—Assistant Secretary, Papua New Guinea and South Pacific Branch, South East Asia and South Pacific Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra (21.8.80) pp. 1106-1126.

MCDONALD, Mr P. J.—Surveillance Services Officer, Coastal Surveillance Branch, Commonwealth Department Of Transport, Darwin (13.8.80) pp. 899-921.

MCGAURR, Mr A. D.—Director of Cabinet Office, Premier's Department, Government of Tasmania (28.7.80) pp. 397-472.

MCHENRY, Mr R. W.—Co-ordinator General, Department of the Chief Minister, Government of the Northern Territory, Darwin (14.8.80) pp. 1029-1104I.

MCINTOSH, Mr J. L.—Manager, Dampier Mining Company Ltd, Yampi, Western Australia (13.8.80) pp. 859-866.

MCKENZIE, Captain R.—Naval Officer Commanding Northern Australia, Darwin (14.8.80) pp. 978-1028.

McLAUGHLIN, Mr N. E.—Chief Inspector, Department of Fisheries and Wildlife, Government of Western Australia (1.9.80) pp. 1206-1274.

MCNAMARA, Mr C. R.—Executive Officer, Premier's Department, Government of Western Australia (1.9.80) pp. 1206-1274.

MAITLAND, Major-General G. L., A.O., O.B.E., E.D.—Chief of the Army Reserve (15.5.80) pp. 293-341.

MARSHALL, Mr G. R.—Senior Assistant Secretary, Strategic and International Policy Division, Department of Defence, Canberra (21.8.80) 1128-1202B.

MATHAMS, Mr R. H.—former Director of Scientific and Technical Intelligence, Joint Intelligence Organisation, Department of Defence, Canberra (9.2.81) 1328-1395E.

MEDLAND, Mr G.—Councillor, Broome Shire Council, Broome, Western Australia (13.8.80) pp. 791-812A.

MILLAR, Dr T. B.—Professorial Fellow, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra (2.4.80) pp. 2-54.

MORRIS, Mr A. G.—at the time evidence was given, Acting Deputy Director-General, Department of the Chief Minister, Darwin (14.8.80) pp. 1029-1104I.

NEWHAM, Air Vice-Marshal J. W.—Chief of Air Force Operations, Department of Defence (Air Force Office) Russell Offices, Canberra (2.5.80) pp. 253-290.

NOBLE, Mr C. J.—Chairman, Australia Defence Association (28.7.80); pp. 473-539.

O'BRIEN, Mr D. B.—Manager, Ord River District Co-operative Ltd, Kununurra, Western Australia (14.8.80) pp. 928-952.

O'CONNOR, Mr M. J.—Secretary, Australia Defence Association, Vic. (28.7.80) pp. 473-539.

O'DONNELL, Mr K. M.—Area Co-ordinator, Pilbara and Kimberley Regions, Western Australian State Emergency Service (13.8.80) pp. 813-858.

O'NEILL, Dr R.—Head, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra (17.4.80) pp. 56-107; (10.2.81) pp. 1398, 1530-1573.

PALTRIDGE, Mr G. F.—Director of Emergency Services and State Fire Commissioner, Premier's Department, Government of Tasmania (28.7.80) pp. 397-472.

PEEK, Vice-Admiral Sir Richard, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.C., R.A.N.—Former Chief of Naval Staff, Council Member, The Navy League of Australia (28.7.80) pp. 344-396.

POWER, Mr K. W.—Chief Planning Engineer, Telecom Australia (11.9.80) pp. 1294-1326.

PRICHETT, Mr W. B.—Secretary, Department of Defence, Canberra ('In Camera' hearing).

REID, Mr P. B.—President, Shire of Wyndham-East Kimberley, Wyndham, W.A. (14.8.80) pp. 953-976.

REID, Dr P. G. A.—President, Broome Shire Council, Broome, W.A. (13.8.80) pp. 791-812A.

ROBERTSON, Dr G. A.—Officer-in-Charge, Kununurra Region, Department of Agriculture, Government of Western Australia (14.8.80) pp. 928-925.

SIMMONDS, Group Captain A. J.—Officer Commanding Royal Australian Air Force in Darwin, R.A.A.F. Base, Darwin (14.8.80) pp. 978-1028.

SMITH, Mr R. J.—First Assistant Secretary, Legal and Treaties Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra (21.8.80) pp. 1106-1126.

SYNNOT, Admiral Sir Anthony, K.B.E., A.O., R.A.N.—Chief of Defence Force Staff, Department of Defence, Russell Hill, Canberra (18.3.81) pp. 1633-1808.

TEICHMANN, Mr M. E.—Senior Lecturer in Politics, Monash University, Melbourne, Vic. (28.7.80) pp. 540-586.

TELFORD, Mrs B.—Councillor, Broome Shire Council, Broome, W.A. (13.8.80) pp. 791-812A.

TEMME, Mr G. P.—Assistant Secretary, Legislation Branch, Policy Co-ordination Division, Department of Defence, Canberra (21.8.80) pp. 1128-1202B.

TROWBRIDGE, Mr M. F.—Councillor, Shire of Wyndham-East Kimberley, Wyndham, W.A. (14.8.80) pp. 953-977.

VAUX, Mr L. J.—Supervising Engineer, Long Distance Network, Transmission Planning Branch, Telecom Australia (11.9.80) pp. 1294-1326.

WALKER, Mr J. D.—Member of Executive Committee, Defence Manufacturers Association of Australia (29.7.80) pp. 588-628I.

WALSH, Mr F. S.—Executive Director, Defence Manufacturers Association of Australia (29.7.80) pp. 588-628.

WESTERWAY, Mr P. B.—Acting First Assistant Secretary, Broadcasting Planning and Operation Division, Postal and Telecommunications Department, Canberra (11.9.80) pp. 1294-1326.

WILKINSON, Lieutenant-Colonel T., A.M.—Commander, 7th Military District, Larrakeyah Barracks, Darwin (14.8.80) pp. 978-1028.

WILSON, Inspector H.—Regional Police Officer, Western Australian Police Department, and Liaison Officer with the State Emergency Service (1.9.80) pp. 1206-1274.

WITHERS, The Hon. W. R., M.L.C.—Kununurra, W.A. (14.8.80) pp. 928-952.

YOULL, Commander S. J., R.A.N.—at the time evidence given, Staff Officer Plans (Co-ordination) Department of Defence (Navy), Russell Offices, Canberra (2.5.80) pp. 209-252.

YOUNG, Captain, H. L., (Retired List) Kununurra, W.A. (14.8.80) pp. 928-952.

Written Submissions (without testimony)

The Committee is grateful to the following individuals and organisations who provided submissions and/or documents to the Committee, but have not given oral evidence:

ARTHUR MURRAY & SONS, West Brunswick, Vic.

BLOOD, Mrs Kay, Berrigarra Station, W.A.

COLE, Mr N. H., N.H. Cole and Associates, Mineral Industry Consultants and Advisers, Sydney, N.S.W.

DROUYN, Mr P., Surfers Paradise, Qld.

FIRKINS, Mr P. C., JP, Vice-Chairman, Australian Defence Association (W.A. Division).

GELBER, Professor H. G., Department of Political Science, The University of Tasmania.

GARDNER, Mr S. J., M.B.E., E. D., Ph.C., Ingham, N.Q.

HEAP, Mr G. J., Deakin, A.C.T.

HEYTING, Squadron leader, J., R.A.A.F., Balmain, N.S.W.

HOINS, Mr L., Propartners (Australian) Pty Ltd, Cairns, Queensland.

HOPKINS, Major-General, R.N.L., C.B.E. (Rtd), Walkerville, S.A.

McPHAIL, Mr G. K., Burwood, Victoria.

MACK, Dr Andrew, Discipline of Politics, School of Social Sciences, The Flinders University of South Australia.

THE REGULAR DEFENCE FORCES WELFARE ASSOCIATION, Canberra, A.C.T.

RUSSELL, Mr J. B., Glebe, N.S.W.

TEAKLE, Mr W. F., Jondaryan, Qld.

WONDER, Mr J., Sydney, N.S.W.

Security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America

The Parties to this Treaty,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,
Noting that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan Area,
Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific Area,
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and
Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,
Therefore declare and agree as follows:

Article I

The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article III

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

Article IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article V

For the purposes of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

Article VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article VII

The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

Article VIII

Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area.

Article IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the signatories have been deposited.

Article X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice.

Article XI

This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of each of the other signatories.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE at the city of San Francisco this first day of September, 1951.

FOR AUSTRALIA:

Percy C. Spender

FOR NEW ZEALAND:

C. A. Berendsen

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Dean Acheson

John Foster Dulles

Alexander Wiley

John J. Sparkman

RATIFICATIONS

Australia—29th April, 1952

New Zealand—29th April, 1952

United States of America—29th April, 1952

Japanese consideration of invasion of Australia, March 1942

In their original war plan drawn up in 1941, the Japanese did not contemplate invading Australia. The overwhelming success of their arms in the first weeks of the war encouraged them to consider the possibility, and the question of invasion of Australia was intensively studied during late February/early March 1942. In a *General Outline of Policy on Future War Guidance* agreed on at an Imperial General Headquarters Army/Navy liaison conference on 7 March 1942, invasion of Australia was rejected on the basis of the following reasons put forward by the Army General Staff:

'Australia covers an area about twice the size of China Proper and has a population of about 7,000,000. Its land communications are by no means well developed. If the invasion is attempted, the Australians, in view of their national character, would resist to the end. Also, because the geographic conditions of Australia present numerous difficulties, in a military sense, it is apparent that a military venture in that country would be a difficult one.

According to the Army's study, the invasion would require the main body of the Combined Fleet and an infantry force of 12 divisions. The shipping required for the Army alone would amount to 1,500,000 tons. The progress of invasion might require the Army to make additional commitments of large strengths. Amassing the huge force necessary for the invasion would mean a far-reaching reduction in our military preparations against the Soviet Union in Manchuria, and a drastic cut at the fronts in China, which would be a serious drawback in our over-all strategic structure. The invasion would also force an extensive change in the over-all operation of our shipping, and this would lead to a serious handicap in the material build-up of our national power.

Japan is now about to complete the conquest of the Southern Area, according to the original plan, and from now on, our total national power must be concentrated in the prosecution of a protracted war, in accordance with the basic war guidance policy adopted prior to the outbreak of the war. It is vital, at this point, to develop resilience in national power and war potential under a sound plan. Consequently, the ships requisitioned by the Army will be gradually released, as the Southern Area Operations come to a close. The present plan calls for reducing the tonnage of requisitioned ships by half; from 2,100,000 tons at the outset of the war, to 1,000,000 tons by the eighth month, after the commencement of the hostilities.

In the light of the above-mentioned circumstances, to alter the plan already in force, and to employ a force larger than the one employed in the Southern Area since the outbreak of the war; to suddenly invade Australia, which lies 4,000 nautical miles away, would be a reckless venture, and is beyond Japan's ability. Above all, what must be most guarded against in a war is to carry the offensive close to the enemy, beyond one's capability, and have the offensive checked. The proposed invasion of Australia is risking the dangers warned against by the history of war.'

Source: Hattori, Takushiro, *Dai To-A Senso Zenshi*, Tokyo, 1953, Part III, p. 292.

THREATS TO AUSTRALIA'S SECURITY

