PROCLUS

COMMENTARY ON PLATO'S *TIMAEUS*

VOLUME V

Book 4: Proclus on Time and the Stars

EDITED AND TRANSLATED BY
DIRK BALTZLY

CAMBRIDGE

PROCLUS

Commentary on Plato's Timaeus

Proclus' Commentary on the dialogue *Timaeus* by Plato (d. 347 BC), written in the fifth century AD, is arguably the most important commentary on a text of Plato, offering unparalleled insights into eight centuries of Platonic interpretation. It has had an enormous influence on subsequent Plato scholarship. This edition nevertheless offers the first new English translation of the work for nearly two centuries, building on significant recent advances in scholarship on Neoplatonic commentators. It will provide an invaluable record of early interpretations of Plato's dialogue, while also presenting Proclus' own views on the meaning and significance of Platonic philosophy. The present volume, the fifth in the edition, presents Proclus' Commentary on the *Timaeus*, dealing with Proclus' account of static and flowing time – an aspect of Neoplatonic metaphysics that has already attracted significant scholarly attention. In this volume we see Proclus situating Plato's account of the motions of the stars and planets in relation to the astronomical theories of his day. The volume includes a substantial introduction, as well as notes that will shed new light on the text.

Dirk Baltzly is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tasmania and Adjunct Research Professor at Monash University. His recent publications include *Reading Plato in Antiquity* (co-edited with Harold Tarrant, 2006); *Proclus: Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, vol. III* (Cambridge, 2006); and *Proclus: Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, vol. IV* (Cambridge, 2009).

PROCLUS

Commentary on Plato's Timaeus

VOLUME V

Book 4: Proclus on Time and the Stars

TRANSLATED WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY

DIRK BALTZLY

University of Tasmania and Monash University

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521846585

© Dirk Baltzly 2013

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2013

Printed in the United Kingdom by Clays, St Ives plc

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

ISBN 978-0-521-84658-5 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLS for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Richard Charles Baltzly and Linda Knight Baltzly

ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλὰ μαθήσεαι

(Theognis, *Eleg.* 1.35)

Contents

Acknowledgements *page* viii
Note on the translation x

Introduction to Book 4 **1**
The structure of Book 4 1
The eighth gift of time: Eternity and the higher time 3
The ninth gift: visible time and the planets 12
Platonic exegesis and contemporary astronomy 16
The greatest gift of all: the four kinds of living creature 28
Conclusion 33
Works cited 34

On the *Timaeus* of Plato: Book 4, Proclus on Time and the Stars **37**
Analytical table of contents 39
Translation 42

References 269
English–Greek glossary 273
Greek word index 294
General index 342

Acknowledgements

The project to translate Proclus' *Commentary on the Timaeus* received initial financial support from the Australian Research Council in the form of a Discovery grant spanning the period 1999–2004. The translation team supported by this grant included Harold Tarrant (Vols. I and VI), David Runia and Michael Share (Vol. II) and Dirk Baltzly (Vols. III, IV and V).

Support for my work on this volume in particular has been provided by the USA's National Endowment for the Humanities through a fellowship at Princeton's Institute for Advanced Study in the northern hemisphere academic year 2010–11. I am enormously grateful to the NEH for this support. As for the Institute for Advanced Study, words fail me. If there is a heaven for scholars, it looks very much like the Institute. Heinrich von Staden is, as everyone knows, the soul of kindness. My time at IAS was also shared with Stephen Menn, from whom I learned a great deal. Marian Zelazny and the staff at the Institute made the transition from Melbourne winter to Princeton summer and back again administratively frictionless.

I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to Harold Tarrant. He read a complete draft of this volume – as he did with Volume IV – and provided invaluable feedback, both on matters of philosophical import and also on matters of accuracy in translation. Alan Bowen has helped me with the thorny astronomical portions of Proclus' text. I enjoyed testing out some of Proclus' readings of Plato with the Greek reading group at Princeton on Plato's *Timaeus*. I thank John Cooper, Melissa Lane, Hendrik Lorenz, Donald Morrison, Alexander Nehamas, Christian Wildberg and the Princeton PhD students who participated. I think they were not wholly persuaded that Proclus has grasped the mystagogy of the divine Plato. This volume has benefited from the attention of a most capable research assistant, John Burke, who prepared the Greek word index and caught yet more mistakes and infelicities on my part in the process. In addition L. Elaine Miller and Anuradhi Jayasinghe both read the introduction and gave me some helpful comments on it. Finally, I would like to thank Jo North who copy-edited the manuscript for Cambridge University Press.

This book is dedicated to my mother and father, who, between them, taught primary and secondary students in the Maysville school district for 60 years. Such has been their ethic of service that I would love and respect them even if I had not had the great good fortune to be their son.

Note on the translation

In this translation I have sought to render Proclus' text in a form that pays attention to contemporary ways of discussing and translating ancient philosophy, while trying to present the content as clearly as possible, and without misrepresenting what has been said or importing too much interpretation directly into the translation. I have not sought to reproduce Proclus' sentence structure where this seemed to create a barrier to smooth reading, for which reason line and page numbers will involve a degree of imprecision. The French translation by A. J. Festugière is an invaluable starting point, and it is still a useful and largely faithful rendition of Proclus' Greek.[1] However, my collaborators in this series and I consider it worthwhile to try to make the philosophical content and arguments of Proclus' text as plain as possible. To that end, we have not hesitated to break lengthy sentences into smaller ones, shift from passive to active voice, or provide interpolations that are indicated by square brackets.

In all five volumes in this series, the text used is that of Diehl.[2] Deviations from that text are recorded in the footnotes. Neoplatonism has a rich technical vocabulary that draws somewhat scholastic distinctions between, say, intelligible (*noêtos*) and intellectual (*noeros*) entities. To understand Neoplatonic philosophy it is necessary to have some grasp of these terms and their semantic associations, and there is no other way to do this than to observe how they are used. Volumes in this series mark some of the uses of these technical terms in the translation itself by giving the transliterated forms in parentheses. On the whole, we do this by giving the most common form of the word – that is, the nominative singular for nouns and the infinitive for verbs – even where this corresponds to a Greek noun in the translated text that may be in the dative or a finite verb form. This allows the utterly Greek-less reader to readily recognise occurrences of the same term, regardless of the form used in

[1] Festugière (1966–8). All the volumes in this series are enormously indebted to Festugière's fine work, even if we have somewhat different aims and emphases. Our notes on the text are not intended to engage so regularly with the text of the *Chaldean Oracles*, the *Orphic Fragments*, or the history of religion. We have preferred to comment on those features of Proclus' text that place it in the commentary tradition.

[2] Proclus (1904).

the specific context at hand. We have deviated from this practice where it is a specific form of the word that constitutes the technical term – for example, the passive participle of *metechein* for 'the participated' (*to metechomenon*) or comparative forms such as 'most complete' (*teleôtaton*). We have also made exceptions for technical terms using prepositions (e.g. *kat' aitian*, *kath' hyparxin*) and for adverbs that are terms of art for the Neoplatonists (e.g. *protôs*, *physikôs*).

This policy is sure to leave everyone a little unhappy. Readers of Greek will find it jarring to read 'the soul's vehicles (*ochêma*)' where 'vehicles' is in the plural and is followed by a singular form of the Greek noun. Equally, Greek-less readers are likely to be puzzled by the differences between *metechein* and *metechomenon* or between *protôs* and *protos*. But policies that leave all parties a bit unhappy are often the best compromises. In any event, all students of the *Timaeus* will remember that a generated object such as a book is always a compromise between Reason and Necessity.

Our volumes in the Proclus *Timaeus* series use a similar system of transliteration to that adopted by the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle volumes. The salient points may be summarised as follows. We use the diaeresis for internal breathing, so that 'immaterial' is rendered *aülos*, not *ahulos*. We also use the diaeresis to indicate where a second vowel represents a new vowel sound, e.g. *aïdios*. Letters of the alphabet are much as one would expect. We use '*y*' for υ alone as in *physis* or *hypostasis*, but '*u*' for υ when it appears in diphthongs, e.g. *ousia* and *entautha*. We use '*ch*' for χ, as in *psychê*. We use '*rh*' for initial ρ as in *rhêtôr*; '*nk*' for γκ, as in *ananke*; and '*ng*' for γγ, as in *angelos*. The long vowels η and ω are, of course, represented by *ê* and *ô*, while iota subscripts are printed on the line immediately after the vowel as in *ôiogenês* for ᾠογενής. There is a Greek word index to each volume in the series. In order to enable readers with little or no Greek to use this word index, we have included an English–Greek glossary that matches our standard English translation for important terms with its Greek correlate given both in transliterated form and in Greek. For example, 'procession: *proödos*, πρόοδος'.

The following abbreviations to other works of Proclus are used:

in Tim. = *Procli in Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, ed. E. Diehl, 3 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903–6).

in Remp. = *Procli in Platonis Rem publicam commentarii*, ed. W. Kroll, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1899–1901)

in Parm. = *Procli commentarius in Platonis Parmenidem* (*Procli philosophi Platonici opera inedita* pt. III), ed. V. Cousin (Paris: Durand, 1864; repr. Olms: Hildesheim, 1961).

in Alc. = *Proclus Diadochus: Commentary on the first Alcibiades of Plato*, ed. L. G. Westerink. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1954). Also used is A. Segonds (ed.), *Proclus: Sur le premier Alcibiade de Platon*, vols. I et II (Paris, 1985–6).

in Crat. = *Procli Diadochi in Platonis Cratylum commentaria*, ed. G. Pasquali (Leipzig: Teubner, 1908).

ET = *The Elements of Theology*, ed. E. R. Dodds, 2nd edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963).

Plat.Theol. = *Proclus: Théologie Platonicienne*, ed. H. D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink, 6 vols. (Paris: Société d'édition "Les belles lettres", 1968–97).

Hyp. = *Procli Diadochi hypotyposis astronomicarum positionum*, ed. C. Manitius (Leipzig: Teubner, 1909).

de Aet. = *Proclus: on the Eternity of the World*, ed. H. Lang and A. D. Marco (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

Proclus frequently mentions previous commentaries on the *Timaeus*, those of Porphyry and Iamblichus, for which the abbreviation *in Tim.* is again used. Relevant fragments are found in:

R. Sodano, *Porphyrii in Platonis Timaeum Fragmenta* (Naples: Instituto della Stampa, 1964).

John Dillon, *Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973).

It is now possible to add a collection of fragments by Proclus' teacher.

S. Klitenic Wear, *The Teaching of Syrianus on Plato's Timaeus and Parmenides* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2011).

Proclus also frequently confirms his understanding of Plato's text by reference to two theological sources: the 'writings of Orpheus' and the Chaldean Oracles. For these texts, the following abbreviations are used:

Or. Chald. = Ruth Majercik, *The Chaldean Oracles: Text, Translation and Commentary* (Leiden: Brill, 1989).

Orph. fr. = *Orphicorum fragmenta*, ed. O. Kern (Berlin: Weidmannsche, 1922).

Majercik uses the same numeration of the fragments as E. des Places in his Budé edition of the text.

Finally, we are now able to add a remarkable new reference work on late antique philosophy to our list of standard abbreviations:

CHPLA = Lloyd Gerson (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity*, 2 vols. (Cambridge University Press, 2010).

References to the text of Proclus' *in Timaeum* (as also of *in Remp*. and *in Crat*.) are given by Teubner volume number, followed by page and line numbers, e.g. *in Tim*. II. 2.19. References to the *Platonic Theology* are given by book, chapter, then page and line number in the Budé edition. References to the *Elements of Theology* are given by proposition number.

Proclus' commentary is punctuated only by the quotations from Plato's text upon which he comments: the lemmata. These quotations of Plato's text and subsequent repetitions of them in the discussion that immediately follows that lemma are in bold. We have also followed Festugière's practice of inserting section headings so as to reveal what we take to be the skeleton of Proclus' commentary. These headings are given in centred text, in italics. Within the body of the translation itself, we have used square brackets to indicate words that ought perhaps to be supplied in order to make the sense of the Greek clear. Where we suppose that Greek words ought to be added to the text received in the manuscripts, the supplements are marked by angle brackets.

Introduction to Book 4

THE STRUCTURE OF BOOK 4

Book 4 of Proclus' *Timaeus Commentary* continues the structure introduced at the opening of Book 3. Proclus takes Plato's dialogue to provide an account of ten gifts bestowed on the visible cosmos by its creator, the Demiurge.[1] Each of these gifts makes a progressively greater contribution to the goodness of the Demiurge's creation, rendering it ever more perfect and its life ever more divine and blessed. Book 2 (Volumes III and IV in this series) deals with the first seven gifts of the Demiurge:

1. Being perceptible due to the presence of the elements (*Tim.* 31b).
2. Having its elements bound together through proportion or *analogia* (31c).
3. Being a whole constituted of wholes (32c).
4. Being spherical in shape so that it is most similar to itself and similar to the paradigm upon which it is modelled (33b).
5. Being self-sufficient or autarchês (33c).
6. Rotating upon its axis makes it similar to the motion of Intellect (*Tim.* 34a, cf. *Laws* 10. 898a).
7. Being animated by a divine World Soul (*Tim.* 34b).

Book 4 (the present volume) provides the last three Demiurgic gifts to the cosmos:

8. Time, in virtue of which it is a moving image of eternity had by its intelligible paradigm, the Living Being Itself (*Tim.* 36e–37a).
9. The heavenly bodies in it, which Plato describes as the 'instruments of time' and Proclus as 'sanctuaries of the gods' (*Tim.* 39d; *in Tim.* II 5.28).

[1] Kutash (2011) argues that this notion of the ten gifts structures the entirety of Proclus' dialogue – not merely the commentary subsequent to the introduction of the gifts at *in Tim.* II 5.17–31. I agree that the notion of the ten gifts structures Proclus' commentary in the present volume and the previous two in this series (Book 3). I have some hesitation about the manner in which Kutash thinks that it organises the material in volumes I and II. Moreover, I think that the influence of the ten gifts as an organising principle peters out in Book 5 (the sixth and final volume in this series).

10. All the living things within the visible cosmos make it an even more perfect or complete imitation of its paradigm since the Living Being Itself contains four genera of living things: celestial, aerial, aquatic and terrestrial living things (39e–40a).

Proclus' commentary in Book 4 does not exhaust the tenth and final gift of the Demiurge. The present volume contains his account of the celestial genus of living things. The final section of the present work begins his discussion of the sub-lunary gods, a topic that continues in Book 5. The nature of the breaks between the books, however, finds some rationale in Plato's text. At 40d4–5 Timaeus says that he is finished discussing the visible and created gods. He next turns to a genealogy of the 'traditional gods' such as Ouranos, Okeanys and Tethys, referring to them initially as 'daemons'. In fact, Proclus' discussion in Book 4 is a sort of preface to the discussion of the traditional gods taken up in Book 5, for at the end of Book 4 he raises the question of why Plato called these gods '*daemons*'. So Book 5 actually starts with the first substantial discussion of these traditional gods – beings whom Proclus now denominates 'sub-lunary' or 'generation-producing *gods*'. Allowing for ten pages that form this transition to Book 5, the sections of Book 4 dedicated to each of the Demiurgic gifts are roughly equal – about fifty pages each.

The subject matter of these sections, however, is not as sharply separated as the architectonic implied by the notion of the ten gifts might suggest. The planets involved in the ninth gift come about for the sake of 'distinguishing and preserving the numbers of time' (*Tim.* 38c6–7). Proclus in fact treats this gift as tantamount to granting the cosmos a second kind of time, which he calls 'visible time'. Thus there is a strong connection between the seventh and eighth gifts. Moreover, the Sun, Moon and planets – which are the principal means through which the numbers of visible time are manifested – are themselves members of the class of celestial living beings. Since celestial living beings are the first among the four kinds of living thing granted to the cosmos in the tenth gift, there are strong connections here too. In this introduction, I'll take up three issues that arise in Book 4.

First, Proclus' insistence that the ten gifts bestow *progressively greater* blessings upon the cosmos might seem initially puzzling. After all, Plato himself says that the visible cosmos could not be made eternal in the same manner in which its intelligible paradigm is. So the gift of time looks a bit like a prize for being runner-up. How can the world's temporality be a greater benefit to it than the fact that it is animated with a divine World Soul (the sixth gift)? Doesn't time simply measure the activities of the World Soul and the things that transpire in the cosmos that it enlivens? As we shall see, however, this objection treats time all too passively – as

if it were nothing more than a metric of events that take place in the world. Proclus' view of time makes it much more elevated and much more active.

Next, there is a series of puzzles about Proclus' treatment of Plato's account of the motions of the stars and planets. Proclus' commentary was written several centuries after the composition of Plato's text. The study of astronomy did not stand still in the intervening years. Proclus and the other Neoplatonists regard Plato's text as revealing a divine truth intimated to its author by the gods themselves. Yet Plato's dialogue contains an account of the movements of the stars and planets – and perhaps even the Earth itself (40b8)! – that is not quite that of the astronomical theories of Proclus' own day. How should a Platonist weigh the apparently competing accounts of the 'modern' models, which include epicycles and eccentrics, against the authority of Plato?

Finally, the place of the tenth gift as the final one in the order of exposition – and thus the most important – also raises a puzzle. How can it be that adding kinds of living creatures to a cosmos that is itself a living creature, endowed with soul and intellect (*Tim.* 30b8), should make it ever so much better? Given the correlation between unity, simplicity and divinity on the one hand, and multiplicity on the other, it seems strange to think that adding multiplicity to the cosmos should be the best present that the Demiurge can give. Proclus' solution to this puzzle will come back again to the various notions of whole and wholeness that run through the entire *Timaeus Commentary*.

In the following sections I shall provide a brief overview of these three issues.

THE EIGHTH GIFT OF TIME: ETERNITY AND THE HIGHER TIME

The Neoplatonists' views on time have been the subject of a significant body of secondary literature.[2] Indeed, this is one of the most closely scrutinised aspects of Neoplatonic metaphysics. This is perhaps for two reasons. First, one of the earliest investigations of the subject proposed parallels with twentieth-century discussions on the distinction between static and flowing time or McTaggart's A and B series.[3] Thus it was initially thought that the Neoplatonic view of *time*, at least, might have more connection with contemporary metaphysics than other features

[2] For the period 1949–92 see Scotti Muth (1993). For 1990 to the present, the De Wulf–Mansion Centre maintains an online bibliography at http://hiw.kuleuven.be/dwmc/ancientphilosophy.

[3] Sambursky (1962), 17–20.

of their philosophy. The second reason for this scrutiny has to do with our sources. The scholarly discussion of the individual Neoplatonists' views on time has been encouraged by the existence of Simplicius' *Corollary on Time*.[4] This is an extensive digression in which Simplicius breaks the flow of his *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* (773.8–800.25) to discuss competing views on the nature of time among his predecessors. This discussion includes valuable information about subsequent Neoplatonists' critical reception of Plotinus' views about time and eternity (*Ennead* III.7), as well as Iamblichus' alternative to the Plotinian view. Proclus is discussed only briefly and Simplicius believes that he holds 'pretty much' the same view as Iamblichus (795.4–6).

The fact that Simplicius' discussion appears in the context of a commentary on *Aristotle's* treatment of time is, I think, significant in explaining the attention given to the views of the Neoplatonists on time. To be blunt: Aristotle's discussion of time is much closer to the problems and presuppositions that animate contemporary work on the subject than Plato's *Timaeus* is. What Simplicius relates about his predecessors is tantalising for us moderns because the *context* in which he presents it dictates that he emphasise those aspects of the Neoplatonists' views that are relevant to the Aristotelian puzzles about time. These puzzles, in turn, are puzzles that we moderns can readily understand. But in fact we don't get very far trying to understand the views of Iamblichus, Syrianus and Proclus on time by approaching them via Aristotle's puzzles about time. This fact was brought home to me by reading Steel's magisterial essay on the Neoplatonic doctrine of time.[5]

Steel begins by noting Albert the Great's complaint that Aristotle's account of time doesn't get at what is *really* important: the relation of time to eternity. If you ask a modern philosopher what the relation is between these two, then – assuming that he or she is willing to grant that there is such a thing as eternity – the answer will simply be that they are opposite and incompatible *ways* in which *objects* exist. Abstract objects like numbers or sets exist timelessly, while concrete particulars all exist in time. Except for discussions of God's relation to time in philosophy of religion, contemporary work on the philosophy of time does not have much to say about eternity. Likewise, Aristotle himself did not give much attention to the nature of eternity. Perhaps the closest we get to an account of it on Aristotle's part is that it is 'the fulfilment (*telos*) of the whole heaven, the fulfilment which includes all time and infinity' (*Cael.* I.11, 279a26). Taking this seriously, we would say that the relation between eternity and time, then, is that the former includes the totality of the latter: eternity is simply everlastingness. But this seems

[4] Translation in Urmson and Siorvanes (1992). [5] Steel (2001).

slightly at odds with Aristotle's remarks in the previous lines (279a11–23), which suggest an atemporal notion of eternity.[6] So Albert the Great's complaint about the absence of a discussion of the really important issue about time – its relation to eternity – points to a strong similarity between Aristotle's approach to the philosophy of time and that of contemporary philosophers.

Although there was a tradition of commenting on Aristotle's *Physics*, the Neoplatonists did not begin by theorising about time from Aristotle's puzzles in *Physics* 4.10. Rather, they started from Plato's *Timaeus*. The key fact about time that needs to be explained, by their lights, is how it can be true that time is – as the divine Plato tells us – an *image* of eternity, one that is *mobile* according to number, while eternity *remains in one* (*Tim*. 37d1–7). None of these three ideas in Plato's text is perfectly clear. The Neoplatonists started their elucidation of Plato's view of time with the first clause. Since the paradigms of which images are images were regarded as causes by Platonists, eternity is thus prominent among the *causes* of time. While Aristotle asks about what time *consists in* – motion? the numerable aspect of motion? – he does not inquire after its *causes*. This latter question, however, is utterly central to the Neoplatonists' accounts of time. The reason for this difference lies in the different methodologies of Aristotle and the Neoplatonists. Aristotle's discussion of the nature of time is *aporetic*: it begins from a set of puzzles that emerge when we push to their logical conclusions common-sense beliefs about time (*Phys*. IV.10). Plotinus, Iamblichus and Proclus, however, take as their point of departure reflections on Plato's *Timaeus*. This *inspired text* itself tells us that the ways that we commonly speak about eternity (and presumably thus about eternity's image – time – too) involve fundamental confusions (*Tim*. 37e5). So the Neoplatonists would think that *of course* we should investigate time by interpreting Plato's works rather than by means of Aristotle's aporetic method. We can't rely too much on common sense and our ordinary ways of talking. We know that our everyday platitudes about time are not a good starting point because Plato tells us that our ordinary usage is riddled with confusions and Plato's text is inspired. Plato's dialogues thus have a primacy for the Neoplatonists that they do not have for modern philosophers of time, who tend to pursue a methodology much closer to Aristotle's. When we seek to understand the nature of time, we take truisms about time, as well as our best theories in physics, as starting points for theorising.[7] If we

[6] For discussion, see Sorabji (1983), 125–7.

[7] Four-dimensionalism and presentism are competing views of time, but recent books by proponents of each seek to show how their preferred view derives support from platitudes about time as well as showing that their theory is consistent with the theory of relativity. Cf. Sider (2001) and Bourne (2006).

want to understand the views of Proclus and the other Neoplatonists on time we must first consider some of the key comments in Plato's *Timaeus*. To the extent that Plato's text is alien to contemporary philosophical theorising about time, so too are the views of the Neoplatonists.

Some aspects of Plato's discussion of time in *Timaeus* 37c6–38b5 seem familiar enough. He remarks that time came into being with the heavens (38b6) and that prior (*prin*) to their existence there were no divisions of time, such as days, months or years (37e1–2). Reading this, we might short-circuit the problem about how one could speak coherently about what occurs *prior* to time by imagining that Plato is only expressing a kind of mutual dependence between things that undergo change and the time in which changes take place. It is not that there was some sort of quasi-time *before* the Demiurge created the heavens and thus inaugurated real time.[8] Rather, if the story of the cosmos' creation is read non-literally, this aspect of Plato's discussion of time simply points to the fact that there is some sort of intimate connection between time and change. So this thread in Plato's text looks much like the considerations upon which Aristotle constructs his definition of time as 'the measure of motion with respect to before and after'.

The less familiar aspects of Plato's discussion involve the relation of time to eternity and the relation of the visible cosmos to the Living Being Itself upon which it is modelled. As noted above, Plato calls time a movable image of eternity. Temporal existence is the best that the Demiurge can do to make the visible cosmos resemble its eternal paradigm. The former 'goes along according to number' while the latter 'remains in one' (37d5–8). This passage suggests that time itself has one or more non-temporal explanations or causes: the eternity that characterises the Living Being Itself and the Demiurge's activity in creating something that can resemble in some ways that eternity. This aspect of Plato's discussion looks far stranger from a modern perspective. Yet it was this aspect that primarily motivated Neoplatonic theorising about time from Plotinus onward.

It was clearly part of Plato's view that the visible cosmos is itself a living being, which has its life in virtue of a World Soul. Plotinus understood Plato's realm of Forms as having a kind of life as well.[9] Plotinus' innovation with respect to time and eternity was to connect these two things with the *life* of the soul and that of intellect respectively (III.7) So when Plato says that time is an image of eternity, Plotinus

[8] Or at least Proclus and the other Neoplatonists did not think so. This reading was defended in antiquity by Plutarch and Atticus (cf. Proclus, *in Tim.* I 276.31–277.7 and III 37.7–38.12) and again in the modern era by Vlastos (1968).

[9] Cf. III.8.8; V.1.7; VI.6.8.

understands this to mean that the life of the soul is an image of the sort of life had by the intelligible Forms. This is one way to explicate the cryptic claim that time is an image of eternity. But it is not an explanation that was accepted by the subsequent Platonic tradition.

Proclus gives a variety of reasons for rejecting Plotinus' view, but the very first one in his list is that it fails to be consistent with Plato's *Timaeus*.[10] (The priority of this objection illustrates my claim that the Neoplatonists take this dialogue to be the primary evidence which any adequate theory of time must account for.) If time were identified with the discursive life of the World Soul, then the Demiurge would have conferred time upon the cosmos at the point at which he made it ensouled. But in the progressive addition of Demiurgic gifts that Proclus supposes to structure Plato's dialogue, time comes *after* the visible cosmos' ensoulment and it is granted by the *Demiurge*, not by the World Soul. Thus time cannot be the life of the World Soul or any consequence of psychic activity. Proclus' objection thus rests not only upon the idea that the *Timaeus* is the ultimate arbiter for views about the nature of time, but also upon his view about the structure of that work – specifically that each of the ten gifts of the Demiurge is a greater and greater contribution to the sensible cosmos' divinity.

Neither would the subsequent Platonic tradition rest content with the idea that eternity is the life of intellect. While Plotinus supposed that the realm of Forms was also in some sense a realm of intellects with its own life and the realm of being, there is no rigorous treatment in Plotinus of the relations between Being, Life and Mind (or Intellect) as these things pertain to the intelligibles. It was left to subsequent Platonists – perhaps beginning with Porphyry, but certainly and especially Iamblichus – to systematise the intelligible stratum of Plotinus' ontology that lies between the One and soul. Part of that systematisation resulted from thinking carefully about the relative priority of different predicates. Plato said that the intelligible Living Being Itself was eternal. But if it is eternal, then Eternity[11] is something distinct from it and prior to it. Proclus puts the point this way:

[10] *in Tim*. III 21.14–24.31. This textual criticism probably derives from Iamblichus' *Timaeus Commentary*; cf. fr. 63 (Dillon) = Simplicius *in Phys*. 793.23, ff. Cf. Joly (2003).

[11] In what follows, I'll write 'Eternity' with a capital letter where the context suggests we are talking about some specific intelligible principle, like a Form. While this convention works well enough for Plato, with someone like Proclus the matter is more complicated because there are different orders of intelligible things. In fact, it turns out that for Proclus Eternity is not a Form – it is higher than the intelligibles and among their causes. Even so, the use of the capital letter indicates that we are in a context where we are looking for a specific intelligible, belonging to some order or other, rather than just talking about eternity in the abstract.

If the Living Being is, and is said to be, eternal as a result of participation, but Eternity has not been said to participate in the Living Being, nor been found to be derived from it eponymously, then it is obvious that the former is secondary and the latter is simpler and more fundamental, since Eternity does not participate in the Living Being due to the fact that [Eternity] is not a living thing, for neither is visible time something living . . . For this reason, Eternity is something greater than [the eternal Living Being], for that which is eternal is neither identical to Eternity nor something greater than Eternity. Just as everyone says that what is ensouled or is endowed with intellect comes after soul or intellect, so too surely that which is eternal is secondary to Eternity. (*in Tim.* III 10.11–21)

Thus Plotinus must be wrong: Eternity cannot be the life of the Living Being Itself nor of any other eternal intelligible object. If these things *are eternal*, then they are *not Eternity itself*, nor is their activity the source of Eternity. Eternity is something higher in which they participate. Iamblichus located Eternity perhaps in the Good or perhaps in the One-Being. In any event, it is among the 'hidden' things that are 'beyond Being' – that is, above intelligibles like the Living Being Itself. Proclus follows Iamblichus (and Syrianus) in this respect and identifies Eternity with 'the single comprehension (*mia periochê*) of the intelligible henads' (III 12.14–15). As such, Eternity is not merely responsible for 'the changeless continuation (*anexallaktos diamonê*, 12.18)' of the things subsequent to it. It '*arranges* them, forming them, as it were, and by this very fact at the same time *makes them* to be wholes'. This active role for Eternity foreshadows a similarly active role for its image – time. As we shall see, on Proclus' view time does not merely provide a metric for the changes that take place in time: it actively orders what takes place.

Let us now turn away from eternity to the question of time. Temporal things participate in time. This is what makes them temporal. Proclus accepts Iamblichus' general account of the metaphysics of participation. This involves a distinction between, on the one hand, an unparticipated monad (or paradigmatic cause), and on the other hand, the participated Form which results from the former and which in turn accounts for the character of the things that participate in it. Proclus states this principle in the following terms:

For in every order there is an unparticipated unit at the head, prior to the things that are participated. There is also an appropriate and connate number corresponding to the unparticipated things, and from the unit the dyad results, just as is the case with the gods themselves. (*in Tim.* II 240.6–10 = fr. 54 (Dillon); cf. *ET* prop. 53)

This principle applies to time as well. In his *Corollary on Time*, Simplicius explains how Iamblichus applied this line of reasoning to the case of time:

he seems to postulate a single ungenerated 'now' that is prior to those that are participated, and from this [results] the things that are transmitted to the participants. As in the case of the now, so too in the case of time. There is one time prior to temporal things, and there are several times that come into being in what participates – cases in which doubtless one [time or event?] is past, another is present, and another is future. (*in Phys*. 793.3–7)

This distinction between the unparticipated monad of time and participated time in Iamblichus has been characterised as a difference between static and flowing time. Sambursky argued that it approximated McTaggart's A and B series.[12] Sorabji, however, correctly pointed out that Iamblichus' higher-order time was posited on the basis of very different philosophical considerations and served a very different purpose within Iamblichus' Neoplatonism.[13]

Proclus accepts a similar distinction between the unparticipated monad of time and the time whose passage gets enumerated when we say that another day has gone by.

We seek the cause of the existence of numerable time. This, therefore, is something that itself remains immobile, unfolding what gets counted in accordance with itself. If, generally speaking, visible time (*emphanes chronos*) is mobile [or such as to flow (*kinêtos*)] . . . it is necessary for there to be time that is immobile in itself, in order that there should be the kind of time that is mobile [i.e. that which can flow]. That time which exists in the former respect is time as it truly is in itself, and that through which [there is another time] in the things that participate. The latter is mobile along with these participants, extending itself into them. (III 26.21–30)

Just as the unparticipated monad of Eternity belongs above the intelligibles, so too the unparticipated monad of time is an *intellectual* nature that is *prior* to soul (III 27.19–25). Hence Plotinus was wrong here too:

[12] Sambursky (1971).

[13] Sorabji (1983), 12. Sorabji concedes that there is some resemblance between Iamblichus' notion of flowing time and McTaggart's A-series, but thinks that we ought not credit Iamblichus with anticipating the modern distinction unless there is clear evidence that he has anticipated McTaggart's notion of the B-series as well. Sorabji argues that he did not. I am inclined to go further than Sorabji: because Iamblichus' distinction seems to be a consequence of applying more general principles about participation to the case of time, it does not seem quite right to say that he anticipates even McTaggart's A-series. McTaggart's distinction arises from reflections on tense. If we suppose that a philosophical distinction consists not merely in the drawing of a boundary that isolates a class, but in the reasons for isolating it, it seems to me that it is a mistake to credit Iamblichus with even half of McTaggart's distinction. What Iamblichus was doing was part of a very different philosophical project, with only tenuous connections to that of McTaggart.

time is not the life of the soul or any other result of psychic activity. Time – at least the unparticipated monad of time – is prior to the soul and provides the participated time in virtue of which the soul's activities are measured. Proclus does appeal to a parallel argument to the one above concerning the eternal character of the intelligibles: since soul's activities take place in time, it is not the source of time (III 22.1–8). But this is not the first consideration that he advances against Plotinus' view. The principal objection to making soul the source of time is that this does not fit Plato's text:

> In the first place, Plato – the person with whom we all wish to agree on matters pertaining to the divine – said that time was established by the Demiurge when the cosmos *already* had an arrangement both in terms of its soul and its body. He did not say that time was established *within* the very soul, as he did when he said that the harmonic ratios were set up within the soul by the Demiurge. (III 21.13–18)

The evidential priority given to consistency with the Platonic text again illustrates the way in which the Neoplatonic view of time is grounded in the authority of the *Timaeus* rather than in reflections on our common-sense views about time, as Aristotle's account is.

This is not to say that Proclus' view of time is a simple explication of Plato's obvious intention in the *Timaeus*. It is a consequence of unparticipated time's intellectual status – prior to all soul and to the visible cosmos – that it is a *cause* of changes in the lower psychic and visible realms. Perhaps this is an idea that is consistent with Plato's *Timaeus*, but it is surely far from obvious that it is one that his spokesman, Timaeus, expressly intends. It is also a view that finds only dubious support among our common-sense remarks about time. When we say things like 'Time has not been kind to this battered copy of *Proclus Diadochus in Platonis Timaeum Commentaria*' we do not literally mean that it is *time* that has caused its pages to become brittle. It is the exposure of the acid in the paper to humidity or UV light that has caused the pages to become brittle. While this exposure takes place *in time*, it seems implausible to think that *time itself* is a cause, distinct from the presence of the acid and the exposure to humidity or UV light. Proclus, however, argues that time is shown to be a substance, not a mere accident, by its status as an important cause of change.

> Furthermore, if time was not a substance (*ousia*), but was instead an accident (*symbebêkos*), it would not have exhibited the creative power that it actually does, whereby it makes some things come to be eternally, while others have a limited temporal duration. (III 23.22–4)

Thus time does not merely *measure* the lifespan of this book: it is among the *causes* of its lifespan. Proclus uses this observation as a further argument against the Plotinian view that time is a product of soul. Soul makes things move or change. Time, however, 'is what has aroused (*egeirein*) the products of creation toward their own ends and is the measure of the wholes and what provides a certain eternity [for the world]' (III 24.1–2). So when we consider our decrepit book, soul provides the *life* (i.e. the source of specific changes that take place in it), while time provides the *span*, so to speak.

Several factors explain this rather extraordinary conclusion on the part of Proclus. On the one hand, there is the insistence that time plays a parallel role for the visible cosmos that Eternity plays for the intelligible one. Since Eternity or Aeon is among the highest causes – being not merely among the henads, but the comprehension or *periochê* of the henads – Eternity does not merely endow the intelligibles with their eternality. It 'includes in a transcendent manner the essences and henads of the intelligibles' (III 24.17–18). Eternity 'arranges them, forming them, as it were, and by this very fact at the same time makes them to be wholes' (III 12.21–2). So if time is to play a similar role for temporal things that Eternity plays for the eternal ones, it will need to do more than just measure their duration.

But why think that Eternity plays such an active role among the intelligibles in the first place? Dodds first considered the possibility that the substantial role for Eternity in Iamblichus and Proclus owed something to its identification with Aeon in the *Chaldean Oracles* (fr. 49 = *in Tim.* III 14.3–10).[14] Great gods *do* things: they don't merely lend their effects a single quality like eternity. So Neoplatonic efforts to weave together Plato with the Oracles may have given Iamblichus and Proclus a reason to accord Eternity a very active role.

Even if we leave aside this potential motivation, there are other features of Neoplatonic metaphysics that lend credence to the idea that time should play an important causal role in ordering the visible cosmos. Time is a perfectly general and universal ingredient in every causal interaction. When the pages of a book become brittle through acidification, time passes. When the stars move along their courses, time passes. In Neoplatonic metaphysics, the more general the feature, the closer it is to the One and thus the higher it is as a cause. Simply being is more general than being a wombat. Hence Being is a higher, and thus more powerful, cause than Wombat Itself. Given the omnipresence of time in all that happens, it is only natural to suppose that time is among the highest of all causes.

[14] Dodds (1963), 228.

THE NINTH GIFT: VISIBLE TIME AND THE PLANETS

On the one hand, Plato's text tells us that time is an image of eternity. On the other, he says it came into being with the heavens. If Eternity transcends the things that are eternal, then time should similarly transcend the things that are temporal. However, the idea that time came to be with the heavens suggests that in some sense it is there – in the heavens.

Proclus utilises the distinction between the unparticipated monad of time and participated time to accommodate both aspects of Plato's discussion. The higher time is 'hypercosmic' and intellectual, while the lower time is 'encosmic'.

> Having now provided such a distinction between these two kinds of time and the conceptions that pertain to the single and simple kind of time, Plato intends to deal with the remaining kind and to make the text at hand about the multifarious kind of time that is participated in a divisible manner – an [objective] toward which the theory about the planets makes a contribution (for it is through motions of these things dancing around the Sun that the kind of time that is understood in conjunction with [them] is produced). This introduces the ninth Demiurgic gift to the cosmos. (III 53.16–26)

Proclus finds further evidence of this distinction between the two kinds of time in Plato's specific choice of terminology. At 37c6, when he first broaches the topic of time, Timaeus tells us that the Demiurge gave *thought* (*epinoein*, c8) to what he could do in order to make the visible cosmos more like its intelligible model. At 38c3, however, Plato writes that the Demiurge generates the planets as instruments of time 'as a result of his reasoning (*logos*) and discursive thought (*dianoia*)'. Proclus is quick to fasten on this distinction between non-discursive intellectual apprehension (*noêsis*) and discursive thought and reasoning (*dianoia*) as evidence that Plato intends to distinguish higher, intellectual time from the lower, flowing time (III 53.27, ff.). This will probably strike most modern readers as the sort of molehill-to-mountain construction project that is characteristic of the Neoplatonic commentary tradition. It is, however, entirely consistent with their methodology for reading Plato. Each dialogue has a *skopos* or objective and every aspect of the dialogue may be interpreted in terms of it. There is nothing about a Platonic dialogue that is merely accidental: every aspect contributes to the communication of Plato's divinely inspired philosophy. This episode also illustrates the manner in which Plato's dialogue – indeed, every detail of Plato's dialogue – was regarded as the primary and most salient evidence for the construction of a correct theory of time.

A similar attention to detail is present in Proclus' discussion of the relation between time and the heavens. Proclus notes that Plato tells us that time came to be together *with* (*meta*) the heavens (38b6). This shows that neither the heavens nor time came to be in the sense of having a beginning.[15] Whatever comes to be in that sense comes to be *in* (*en*) time (III 50.2–4). But clearly there could be no coming to be of time at some moment of time. Thus the claim that time came to be together with the universe indicates only that the visible universe is the first thing to participate in time with respect to both body *and* soul. (Soul itself is, of course, a prior participant. But the visible cosmos is the first participant that shares in time with respect to both its body *and* soul.) Plato's words, correctly understood, affirm that both time and the universe are ungenerated and can never be destroyed.

Specific aspects of the visible cosmos 'preserve and distinguish the numbers of time' (*Tim*. 38c6). Thus, different heavenly bodies make known the numbers of various temporal periods such as a day, a month or a year. This is not to say that a day or a year *is* the motion of the sphere of the fixed stars or the completion of the Sun's cycle. Rather, the day or the year is the transcendent god in which each day or year participates:

> The Month Itself or the Year – the individual period, that is – since it is always one is itself a specific god who determines the measure of a motion in a manner that is motionless. After all, from whence does it come about that these periods are always *the same* unless it is from some cause that is *unmoved*? And from whence does the *difference* between their complete cycles (*apokatastasis*) come about other than from *differences* among the unmoved causes? And from whence do we get the *incessant* character [of their rotations] that repeats again and again to infinity unless it is from the *infinite powers* in these [causes]? (III 88.30–89.4)

This metaphysical conclusion finds a welcome agreement in both the 'sacred tradition'[16] and Plato's *Laws* (x 899b2).

Where we have numbers, we have a unit or a monad in terms of which those numbers are defined. That is, two is twice the monad; three thrice the monad and so on. The monad of the numbers of time is the Platonic Great Year (39d2–7). This number is:

> a measure by which all the other measures have been encompassed and in terms of which the entire life of the cosmos has been defined, as well as the diverse articulation of bodies and the lifespan that takes place across the all-perfect period. (III 91.13–16)

[15] See pp. 20–2 of Introduction to Volume II in this series for an extended discussion of Proclus' arguments against the literalist reading of the universe's creation.

[16] It appears that there *may* have been rituals associated with the Oracles celebrating the Seasons, Months, etc.

Here too Proclus is keen to go beyond an approach that is *doxastikos* – that is, one that relies on sense perception. He is critical of attempts to calculate the length of time it takes for the stars in the heavens to come back to the very same place and argues that we should take a more elevated (*epistêmonikos*) approach to the matter. The Platonic Great Year should instead be thought of in terms of a number or power that extends to every aspect of the life of the cosmos. Its procession, its bending back toward its starting point, and its convergence upon itself mean that it temporally figures the atemporal "process" of remaining, procession, and reversion. At least in the context of the *Timaeus Commentary*, Proclus seems largely uninterested in calculating the number of solar rotations corresponding to this 'whole or universal period of time'. What is genuinely important is how the monadic unit of visible time mimics Eternity:

> the time that belongs to the period of the universe [i.e. the Great Year] *is* complete [unlike a day or a month] because it is not a part of anything [i.e. of any greater duration]. Rather, it is universal or total (*holos*) in order that it may imitate Eternity. The latter is indeed wholeness in the primary manner, but the one which conveys its wholeness simultaneously to every substance. But time does so in conjunction with duration, for temporal wholeness is the articulation (*analixis*) of the wholeness which remains in a concentrated form (*synespeiramenôs*) in Eternity. (III 92.18–24)

Proclus thus eschews entering into the existing debate on the actual length of a Platonic Great Year[17] and concentrates on the contribution that the Great Year makes to the completion or perfection of the visible cosmos. Plato's dialogue is philosophy of nature – to be sure – but it is a *higher* philosophy of nature. It does not omit discussion of the paradigmatic causes of that which takes place in nature, as Proclus alleges that others do (*in Tim.* I 2.1, ff.). Unlike, say, the question of the physical composition of the heavenly bodies (*in Tim.* II 42.5–51.1; III 114.9–115.4), this is one of those cases where Proclus seems anxious to concentrate on the higher causes rather than dwelling on the astronomical details.[18]

The same emphasis on higher paradigmatic causes is also evident in his treatment of the planets and their motions. Each visible planet is both a living being (*zôion*) and also divine. However, the visible planetary creature is merely the lower life of the god that is its cause. Each planet, Proclus insists, has a double life: one intellectual, the other divisible in terms of the body (III 71.28). In virtue of the former, it is a god,

[17] For this thriving industry, see Callataÿ (1996).

[18] Lernould (2001) argued that the theological aspect of Proclus' treatment of the *Timaeus* largely dominates his treatment of Plato's dialogue as a work of *physiologia*. For a useful corrective, see Martijn (2008), especially 6–7.

while in virtue of the latter, it is a living being. Keeping in mind what the planets really are (in Proclus' view) perhaps helps to explain why he is so opposed to astronomical theories that make use of epicycles and eccentrics in order to explain the complex motions exhibited by the planets. Even if one could envision a coordinated system of such nested circles that would describe the motion of the visible body of a heavenly god around the universe, it is hardly proper to imagine that divine souls are associated with bodies that get shunted around by such mechanisms.

> In fact, none of these hypotheses [purporting to explain planetary motion by eccentrics or epicycles] satisfies the standard of the probable. Some stand opposed to the simplicity of divine things, while others that have been contrived among the more recent [theorists] posit a motion for the heavens like it were a machine. (III 56.28–31)

Plato's concern in his discussion of the planets, then, is not principally with the movements of the visible living creatures in the heavens, but rather the nature of the divine intellectual souls upon which these planetary creatures depend.

The idea that Plato's dialogue, properly interpreted, addresses higher concerns than those of contemporary astronomy is clear from Proclus' initial comments on *Timaeus* 38e6–39a4.[19]

> You might say that the **oblique** motion of the Different shows the obliquity of the [circle of] the Zodiac (for the motion of the planets is one that takes place with reference to the poles of the zodiac, to put it in technical terminology – for such a definition is not without some value for those who are discussing the celestial bodies). However, the more enlightened (*epoptikôteros*) alternative is to say that it shows the cause of genesis and the deviation (*parallaxis*) that pre-exists in the things in the heavens, for genesis participates in Difference and variety derives from the revolution of the Different, while Sameness derives from the [circle of] that Same that is always invariant. (III 73.27–74.7)

Some of Proclus' terminological choices here call for comment. First, he is rather casual about the technical terminology. When he says that the motion of the planets is κατὰ γὰρ τοὺς τοῦ ζῳδιακοῦ πόλους . . . (ἵνα μαθηματικῶς εἴπωμεν), he must realise that the more common way to put the point is to say περὶ τοὺς τοῦ ζῳδιακοῦ πόλους – terminology he knows well since he uses the phrase six times in his own astronomical work, the *Hypotyposis*. The use of κατὰ here is probably meant to pick up on the first words of the lemma: κατὰ δὴ τὴν θατέρου φορὰν πλαγίαν οὖσαν. So the conventional language of astronomy is at the beck and call of Plato's divinely inspired text. Moreover, the term *parallaxis* has

[19] The lemma begins: 'They [sc. the planets] started to turn according to the motion of the Different which was oblique . . . '

an established astronomical sense in which it refers to the apparent difference in the location of a heavenly body resulting from the different positions from where the observations are made (cf. Proclus, *Hyp*. 4.53), as well as the more general sense of deviation or mutation. It seems to me that here Proclus plays with that double sense: the *real* parallaxis in the heavens is the pre-existent cause of sub-lunary changes. This cause is associated with the motions of the planets and thus the rotation of the World Soul's circle of the Different with which they are associated. (Recall that this invisible and non-spatial psychic circle is "positioned" relative to the circle of the Same at the angle the ecliptic makes with the celestial equator (*Tim*. 36d1–4).) Rather than entering into competition with the theories of the astronomers, Plato's dialogue points to a higher, 'more enlightened' perspective from which we can see the more general truths about the cosmos. These observations about the manner in which Proclus transposes Plato's claims about the actual motion of the visible planets into a higher theological key bring us to our next topic. This transposition takes the Platonic text out of competition with contemporary views about astronomy and also reinforces the point that Platonic *physiologia* is the most elevated form of natural science.[20]

PLATONIC EXEGESIS AND CONTEMPORARY ASTRONOMY

Some conflicts with contemporary astronomical theory, however, could not be avoided. Plato's dialogue provides an unambiguous order for some of the planets. The Earth is in the centre and above it we find in order: the Moon, Sun, Venus and Mercury (38d1–3). This order agrees with the order of whorls in the Myth of Er in the *Republic* (616e–617b) and with the *Epinomis* (986a–87b). From about 200 BCE, however, the so-called 'Chaldean order' became much more widely accepted. This order places the Sun in the middle with a triad of heavenly bodies on either side: Moon–Mercury–Venus, Sun, Jupiter–Saturn–fixed stars.[21] This appears to be an issue where one must decide between contemporary astronomy and Plato, for they appear to be quite incompatible. A second issue also arises in Proclus' *Commentary*: that of the precession of the equinoxes. We will discuss Proclus' response to both these specific problems after looking at the general question of the place of developments in astronomy for interpreters of Plato.

[20] Cf. *in Tim*. 1 2.5, ff.

[21] Cf. Macrobius, *in Som. Scip*. 1.19 for a discussion of the competing orders and the claim that the Chaldean order has become the dominant one.

Physical astronomy and philosophical hyperastronomy

As Segonds (1987) pointed out, Plato's philosophy stresses the importance of studying the heavens for overcoming the confused thinking that results from the soul's embodiment (*Rep.* VII 527d; *Tim.* 90d; *Epinomis* 678d). So a good Platonist has reason to attend to astronomy. But, on the other hand, Plato's own astronomical speculations were very much part of the infancy of the study. If one both takes Plato's clear advice to study the heavens and also holds that Plato's writings are divinely inspired – as the Neoplatonists did – then following the first bit of advice at least seems to throw doubt on the authority of Plato's texts. What is a Platonist to do?

Pythagoreanising Platonists such as Adrastus and Theon sought to read subsequent astronomical developments like epicycles into the vague places in Plato's text.[22] (Eccentrics were clearly out of the question, since the myth of Er insists that the whorls upon which the planets are mounted are all homocentric.) But the Iamblichean insistence on explicating Plato from Plato frowns on this approach, so another tactic was developed. Whatever role Iamblichus himself might have played in this interpretative strategy, we can see it stated most clearly in Proclus.

Proclus' *Exposition of Astronomical Hypotheses* serves both as an introduction to the underlying assumptions of Ptolemy's (second century CE) astronomy and also as an occasion for Proclus to distinguish the properly philosophical approach to the heavens from the merely mathematical or physical ones.

> My friend, the person whom the great Plato deems a true philosopher is happy to abandon sense perception and the entire errant Being of the heavens and to study astronomy beyond the heavens (*hyperastronomein*) – up there [in the intelligible realm] – and to investigate Speed Itself and Slowness Itself in true number. (*Hyp.* 1.1.1–1.2)

As Segonds has shown, this description of truly philosophical astronomy is really a cento of near quotations and allusions from Plato's dialogues. Hyperastronomy – the proper business of the philosopher – then studies, not the bodies in the heavens or the mathematical models that might 'save the phenomena', but the *hypercosmic causes* of these things.

Hyperastronomy is not simply an option that one might take instead of conventional astronomy. We *must* ascend to such hypercosmic causes if we wish to understand, for the hypotheses of the astronomers fail by their own lights. If the point of astronomy as Ptolemy and other astronomers practise it is to provide an account of the physical causes whereby the

[22] Theon 188.25–188.1 (Hiller) cited in Segonds (1987), 321.

planets are moved by regular circular motions on a series of spheres, then Proclus thinks that their effort fails. Near the end of the *Exposition*, Proclus presents the proponents of epicycles and eccentrics with a dilemma.[23] Either these things are real or they are merely conceptual constructions, adopted for the purpose of making predictions (or postdictions) of the positions of the heavenly bodies. If the former, then the astronomers have *not* in fact shown the movements of the heavenly bodies to be regular, but instead they are irregular and filled with changes. If, however, the epicycles or eccentrics are merely conceptual, then the astronomers have unwittingly slipped from dealing with physical bodies to dealing with mathematical concepts and are providing causes for natural motions on the basis of things that have no existence in nature. The argument behind the first arm of the dilemma is nicely summarised by Proclus in the *Timaeus Commentary*.

The hypothesis of eccentric circles, according to Proclus, 'destroys the common axiom for natural things: that all simple motion is either around the centre of the universe or away from the centre or toward the centre' (146.21–3). If a planetary body is moved on an eccentric orbit, then the centre of the universe (i.e. the Earth) is not the centre around which it rotates. The hypothesis of eccentric orbital circles was invoked to explain changes in the velocity or brightness of heavenly bodies, as well as the inequality of the astronomical seasons.[24] Proclus' criticism is that this proliferates the natural motions in the universe because we are now postulating a heavenly body that has something other than the three natural motions: going around the Earth in a circle, going straight down toward the Earth, or going straight up away from the Earth. It is true one can correctly describe the planet's motion as describing a perfect circle around *some* point. But the fact that this point is not the *Earth* means that our inventory of natural simple motions is now greatly expanded – at least if one insists that all simple natural motions are to be defined by reference to the centre of the universe where the Earth is stationed. It is presumably on the basis of the primacy of the cosmic centre and Earth's location there that Proclus claims that the astronomers have failed at their task.

This may not be a fair criticism, since astronomers do not seem to take themselves to be committed to the task of explaining the movements of the heavenly bodies in terms of regular circular motions *around the central Earth*. Geminus, for instance, says only that 'it is assumed generally in astronomy that the Sun, the Moon and the five planets undergo circular motion with regular velocity in the opposite direction to the cosmos'

[23] *Hyp.* 7.50.3–53.1 [24] Lloyd (1973), 61–5.

(i.e. to the fixed stars).[25] Proclus presumably feels justified in enforcing this additional constraint upon them because of the special status of the centre of the universe (*in Tim*. II 106.15–23) and the fact that the Earth is 'the first and most senior of the gods' (*Tim*. 40c2) means that it must be stationed there (*in Tim*. III 143.14–25). Once again, I think we see here the evidential primacy of Plato's inspired text.

The hypothesis of epicycles brings with it the same problems as eccentrics. After all, even if the system in question locates the centre of the deferent[26] on the centre of the cosmos, it is nonetheless the case that the planet that moves on the epicycle has a putatively natural motion that is not *simple* circular motion around the universal centre (or simple linear motion toward or away from it). In addition, Proclus raises difficulties about the manner in which the deferent and epicycle are combined. Do the spheres that account for the epicycles have a similar or different composition from the deferent sphere? If the former, then why are they moved in different ways? If the latter, then we are proposing to explain the *natural* motion of the heavenly body as a function of the motion of spheres that have different composition and thus lack natural community (*sympatheia*) with one another (*in Tim*. III 146.24–8).

Given that the astronomers cannot save the phenomena by appeal to spheres that move with a simple *geocentric* motion, Proclus thinks we should accept that there is, in fact, an irregular aspect to the motions of the heavenly bodies.[27] As a good Platonist, however, he cannot allow that their movements are *irregular* in a manner that implies a genuine 'wandering' incompatible with their divinity. Plato, after all, expressly warns us against this kind of impiety (*Laws* VII 821b–822c) and Proclus takes this warning seriously (*in Tim*. III 56.21–5). The planetary motions of progression, station and retrogradation are to be explained in terms of acts of *will* on the part of the divine souls that rule over each of the heavenly bodies (III 117.9–19). While the fixed stars exhibit only two perfectly circular motions – rotating on their individual axes and moving with the movement of the Same – planetary divine souls have a movement that is 'regularly irregular or irregularly regular' (III 57.6). This irregularity or *anomôlia* is not the kind that is incompatible with divinity. It isn't the consequence of anything like human indecision or revisions of a plan in light of new information.[28] We can know this because

[25] *Elementa astronomiae* 1.19.1–3 Ὑπόκειται γὰρ πρὸς ὅλην τὴν ἀστρολογίαν ἥλιόν τε καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ε πλανήτας ἰσοταχῶς καὶ ἐγκυκλίως καὶ ὑπεναντίως τῷ κόσμῳ κινεῖσθαι.

[26] That is, the large circle upon whose circumference the epicycle is located.

[27] Pedersen and Hannah (2002) credit Proclus with being the first to call into question the presupposition that celestial motion must be circular.

[28] Cf. Geminus, *Elementa astronomiae* 1.20.5–7 for the contrast between the perfectly regular and circular motions of the heavenly bodies and human fallibility.

planets do the same complex dances again and again. As Proclus says, they have 'apokatastasis' – that is, cycles that bring them back to the same relative position with the other heavenly bodies at regular intervals. The planetary souls move the associated heavenly bodies within their planetary depths (i.e. have apogee and perigee), as well as moving forward or backward in their orbits or standing stationary, because this pattern is a middle term between the perfectly regular and exclusively circular motions of the fixed stars and the very irregular rectilinear motion that is supposed to be characteristic of the sub-lunary realm. Moreover, the regularly irregular motion of the planets serves as a *paradigm* that the much more irregular motions in the sub-lunary regions imitate imperfectly. In technical Neoplatonic terminology, the regularly irregular planetary motions 'antecedently comprehend' (προλαμβάνειν) the sub-lunary ones by having them in a 'causal-anticipatory way' (κατ' αἰτίαν).

There is continuity between different orders of being in Proclus' metaphysics (III 122.1–25). If A and B are in some sense opposed (as regularity and irregularity are) then the metaphysics of procession requires that there be an intermediate between them that is 'both A and B'. Thus there must be a sequence from entirely orderly or πάντῃ τεταγμένων to the entirely disorderly or πάντῃ ἀτάκτων that goes via an intermediate stage of orderly disorder or τεταγμένη ἀνωμαλία.[29] Nature abhors vacuums and gaps. So the self-initiated spiralling motion of the planets is not an affront to the divinity of the heavens. It is precisely what the continuity of the cosmos *requires*. The real explanation of complex planetary motions is thus ultimately metaphysical or theological, appealing to the necessity of a middle term between extremes of just the sort that we find in the case of the planets.

Astronomers who invoke eccentrics and/or epicycles to give a quasi-mechanical explanation[30] of such matters are misguided. This is not to say that astronomy of the sort that we find in Ptolemy is *entirely* pointless. Their models should be regarded instrumentally since they 'analyse the complex motions [of the planets] into simple ones so that through them we might more easily get hold of the points at which these complex motions make a complete cycle (*apokatastasis*) since the grasp [of these facts] doesn't come about easily from the motions themselves but is built up only from simplifications' (III 145.25–7).[31] We can use

[29] At *in Tim.* III 80.5–10 Proclus specifies more exactly the nature of this regular irregularity: the planets' motion is that of the spiral. This is an intermediate motion between the strictly circular motion appropriate to the fixed stars (79.14) and the rectilinear motion that is found in the realm of Becoming. Cf. 148.31 for the idea that the length of a spiral can be calculated from straight lines and circles.

[30] Cf. III.56.30–1, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ μηχανῆς ὑποτίθενται τὴν κίνησιν τῶν οὐρανίων.

[31] Reading ἐκ τῶν ἁπλῶν with Schneider for the manuscripts' ἁπλανῶν.

these models to retrodict the positions of the planets for the purposes of casting horoscopes, but it is a mistake to regard them as explanatory.

Proclus and Ptolemy on the planetary order

By the time of Proclus, Ptolemy's works were by far the most influential and authoritative source for astronomy and astrology. In Chapter 1 of Book 9 of the *Syntaxis* (or *Almagest*) he takes up the question of planetary order. He notes the ancient consensus that Saturn, Jupiter and Mars are the outermost of the planets, while the Moon is closest to the central Earth. On the order of the remaining planets, he observes the disagreement between the Platonic–Pythagorean order and 'that of the more ancient astronomers', i.e. the Chaldean order. He notes that one argument in favour of the former – that we never see the Sun eclipsed by Mercury or Venus in the same manner in which we witness lunar eclipses – is hardly decisive. Measurements of the distances to the planets would settle the matter of their order, but since we don't have a visible parallax for any of the stars, this method is not available to us. Having no better basis for making a decision, Ptolemy opts for the Chaldean order on the grounds it is *more natural*. Putting the Sun at the mid-point separates Venus and Mercury (who always appear near the Sun) from those planets that can appear at any elongation from the Sun.

Ptolemy's *Planetary Hypotheses* take up the question again, and Ptolemy again notes that 'we cannot settle this matter with certainty'. He does, however, present new arguments to explain the fact that there are no observed occultations of the Sun by anything other than the Moon, thus further clearing any obstacle to the Chaldean order. More importantly, he provides a calculation of planetary distances. However, this calculation in fact assumes the Chaldean ordering and then works out the distances based on the minimum and maximum distances of the Sun and Moon that were computed in the *Syntaxis* and the ratios of the greatest to the least distance for Mercury and Venus. So the Chaldean order is a hypothesis utilised to work out the planetary distances. Thus one cannot, strictly speaking, infer the order from the distances calculated in this manner – a point that Proclus makes in his discussion of the Chaldean order (*in Tim.* III 63.20).

Nonetheless, Ptolemy also gives another argument based on planetary motion. The motions of the Moon and Mercury are similarly complex, involving both an epicycle and a centre for the deferent that orbits the Earth.[32] In the *Planetary Hypotheses* this fact is attributed to their mutual proximity to the air, for 'spheres nearest to the air move with many kinds

[32] See figure 3 in Jones (1990), 8.

of motion and resemble the nature of the element that is near them'.[33] This resort to physical factors to explain planetary motions contrasts with Ptolemy's purely mathematical method in the *Syntaxis*.[34] Proclus' *Timaeus Commentary* does not discuss this argument, though it does discuss the calculation of planetary distances. Perhaps this omission may be explained. Proclus presumably would not have given much credence to this argument since he rejects eccentrics wholesale. Such eccentrics are incompatible with the centrality of the spindle of Necessity in the *Republic*'s myth of Er, and moreover, Proclus argues that they would necessitate either void or spheres that pass through one another (*in Remp*. II 227.28–229.7).

Given his efforts to show that considerations offered for the Chaldean order are not decisive, you might expect that Proclus would defend the Platonic order. This is not so however. There is one bit of evidence about the order of the planets that *is* decisive: the testimony of Julian the Theurgist.[35]

> The theurgist, however, obviously deems that the matter stands thus when he says the god integrated the Sun's fire into their *midst* as a seventh and made the six other Zones dependent upon it – [an assertion] it would not be licit to remain unpersuaded by.[36] (III 63.21–4)

Proclus goes on to explain the Platonic order given in the *Timaeus* as a result of the fact that Plato was attending to the way in which the Sun and Moon are associated, since they come from the same hypercosmic cause.

[33] *Planetary Hypotheses* 1.2.3, Goldstein (1967), 7. [34] Taub (1993), 111–12.

[35] Julian the Theurgist was the son of Julian the Chaldean. The Chaldean Oracles were believed to have been dictated by the gods to Julian, either directly or through the medium of his son. The son himself was a wonder-worker of prodigious repute who conjured rainstorms, stopped plagues and cast thunderbolts at the emperor's enemies. See CHPLA, 161. This passage seems to be drawn from a prose work by Julian the Theurgist that Proclus quotes at several points with variations. Lewy (1956), 123–5 draws them all together and translates the combination as follows: 'The demiurge bent heaven into a curved shape, and attached to it the great multitude of the fixed stars, forcing fire to fire, so that they may not move through wearisome strain, but by a fixture that is not subject to vagaries. He sent underneath six planets, and in their midst the seventh: the fire of the Sun; and he suspended their disorder on the well-ranged girdles of the spheres.' Given the identity of the writer, this must be treated as a divine revelation about the order of the planets that, as Proclus says, it would be impious to disbelieve.

[36] ᾧ μὴ θέμις ἀπιστεῖν. I am unsure how much to read into Proclus' way of putting this point. It seems just possible that the order of the planets – considered now as the visible bodies of the heavenly gods – are merely matters for *pistis*. *Pistis* or *doxa* is the cognitive attitude that correlates with sensibles and it is inferior to the attitudes we may have toward more intelligible objects. Hence, nothing too important is at issue in the question between the Platonic and Chaldean orderings of the planets.

Presumably the fact that the Moon's light is borrowed from the Sun makes this evident, since Proclus goes on to say that Eudemus reported that Anaxagoras was the first to assume this.[37] In a related passage in the *Republic Commentary*, Proclus argues that Plato was simply speaking in terms that his contemporaries would understand.

> Thus, Plato too followed the astronomers of his time, by which it is also clear that the father of the myth did not announce all things as he himself saw them, but rather he added such things as were most widely accepted at the time – as is doubtless the case with the claim that the Sun is seventh from the sphere of the fixed stars and immediately above the Moon. For it is not only here [in the myth of Er] that one finds this idea, but he also appears to say this in the *Timaeus*. I also know that some astronomers say that the Sun is in the middle of the seven planets, although this has not been demonstrated through assumptions that are altogether necessary. How, in general, they have tried to do this, we have discussed sufficiently in the *Commentary on the Timaeus*. Nonetheless, when one hears from the Chaldeans among the theurgists that 'the god then integrated the Sun among the seven and made the six other Zones dependent upon it', or one hears from the gods themselves that 'god established the solar fire in the place of the heart' (*Or. Chald.* 58), then might you not fear that – as Ibycus said – 'I have traded honour among men for sinning against the gods.' (A line that Socrates also quotes in *Phaedrus* [242d1]). While I adhere to what has been revealed by the gods, I also say that on these matters Plato conformed with the astronomy of his time, for Aristotle too thought this, adhering to the astronomical views of those around Callippus. (*in Remp.* II 220.1–21)

So while Plato's wisdom is divine, it is more indirect than that of other divine revelations, such as the Oracles or Julian. In any event, the true value of Plato's distinctively Pythagorean natural philosophy lies not in its attention to the specific *spatial* relations among heavenly *bodies*, but to the *non-spatial* relations among their *intelligible causes*. Remember that, on Proclus' view, Plato communicates the point that the Sun and Moon stem from the same hypercosmic cause by (merely apparently?) giving them spatial positions proximate to one another.

Proclus' attitude in these matters follows that of Iamblichus (fr. 70 = *in Tim.* III 65.7–66.8). According to Iamblichus, the Platonic order of the planets is due to the causal role that the planetary gods play in relation to Becoming. The Sun and Moon (whose light is borrowed) are the Father and Mother of Becoming respectively, while Mercury and Venus work in close association with the Sun. The specific causal roles that they play in relation to the sub-lunary realm of Becoming appear

[37] Plato himself reports that Anaxagoras thought that the Moon's light was dependent upon the Sun (*Crat.* 409a9–b1 = A76; cf. B18). It is unclear whether Anaxagoras took this as evidence that the Sun was positioned immediately above the Moon. Heath (1981), 85 mentions this evidence from Proclus.

to be adapted from astrological notions of planetary influence. Neither Proclus nor Iamblichus says so *explicitly*, but it seems to me that their general strategy is to read Plato's claims about spatial order as claims about associations among causes. This affords Plato a 'higher truth' to reveal through his claims about the order of the planets: claims that are only seen as mistaken by those who view these things as *doxastikôs* rather than *epistêmonikôs*.

The precession of equinoxes

Comparing his own observations with those of earlier Greek astronomers, Hipparchus (second century BCE) noted that the star Spica had moved 2° relative to the position of the autumnal equinox. Hipparchus concluded that the equinoxes move relative to the signs of the Zodiac at a rate of 'not less than 1/100th of a degree a year'. Two and a half centuries after Hipparchus, Ptolemy's observations confirmed this movement in the longitude of the stars relative to the equinoctial and solstitial point. He also added that it takes place around the pole of the ecliptic (*Syntaxis*, VII.2–3).

Since this movement is a motion of the sphere of the fixed stars relative to the solstitial and equinoctial points, we could think of it in two different ways. We could suppose that the position of the equinoctial point simply changes. Perhaps the Earth moves ever so slowly. Alternatively, we could suppose that the sphere of the fixed stars slips ever so slightly eastward. The latter is certainly Ptolemy's understanding of the observations (*Syntaxis*, VII.4). Hipparchus' own understanding of the phenomenon of precession may have been cosmologically neutral.[38]

Such an additional stellar motion, however, is not in any way hinted at in Plato's *Timaeus*, so Plato's text looks incomplete relative to the state of contemporary astronomy. Moreover, from the point of view of Proclus' metaphysical hyperastronomy, the assignment of *multiple* motions to the sphere of the fixed stars would be very undesirable. Since the sphere of the fixed stars is the highest heaven, it would be fitting for it to have only a single motion. Simplicity in motion correlates with degree of perfection and the sphere of the fixed stars is the most perfect or most complete (*teleiôtatos*), since this sphere contains the entire sensible cosmos. The occupants of the highest sphere of the visible heavens – the individual star-gods – should then have two motions, rotating with the sphere while each also turns upon its own axis (*in Tim.* III 123.11–20). Accordingly, Proclus argues that Ptolemy is simply wrong: the observations do not support the claim that the sphere of the fixed stars has any additional

[38] Siorvanes (1996), 290.

motion. Proclus presents two arguments. The first is that Ptolemy's view makes predictions that are not empirically verified. The second is an appeal to various authorities.

Proclus thinks that if Ptolemy's account of precession were correct, then Ursa Major should not now be visible.[39] On the basis of *Iliad* 18.487–9 Proclus assumes that Ursa Major is (at least from the latitude where the Greeks live) a circumpolar constellation (i.e. one whose stars never dip below the horizon). This is in fact true. He assumes that Homer lived about 1500 years before him. A rough figure for precession is one degree eastward motion every 100 years. (In fact, on Hipparchus' figures it is 1° 15′, which is doubtless why Proclus says 'more than' 15 degrees.) Since the path of the ecliptic lies at an angle to the celestial equator, precession should result in observed changes in latitude as well as changes in longitude in a star's position relative to the equinoctial and solstitial points. In short, Proclus thinks that if the stars were moving in the manner and at the rate at which Ptolemy says, Ursa Major should not be continually visible by now – that is, during Proclus' lifetime. But it is. Therefore Ptolemy's view of precession is mistaken.

However, the Ptolemaic theory of precession does *not* in fact have the observational consequence that Proclus attributes to it. This is because the extent of the change in stellar position is not uniform. It depends on the star's declination. The change of 1° 15′ per century is a maximum, not a minimum. It appears that Ptolemy was aware of this fact (*Syntaxis*, 7.3, 19.1–10).

Proclus also appeals to authorities to reject Ptolemy's interpretation of precession (*in Tim*. III 124.26–125.4; 125.17–31, ff.). First, he notes that the *Chaldean Oracles* speak of the forward motion of the stars. (Presumably, he thinks they speak *only* of the forward motion of the stars and not, in addition, of any other motion.) Julian the Theurgist denies that the fixed stars wander. Thus Ptolemy is wrong. Second, the Egyptians and Chaldeans had many, many more observations to work with and *they* agreed with Plato. Finally, Proclus insists that the Chaldeans were master astrologers, but they did not utilise the 'notional signs' that Ptolemy introduces to compensate for the fact that the constellations of the Zodiac are on the move through the ecliptic.

Proclus is alone among the Platonic philosophers and astronomers in simply denying the precession. Theon of Alexandria (fl. 364) before him accepted the precession, as did Simplicius and Ammonius after him. Simplicius claims that Ammonius observed Arcturus right where it should be given Ptolemy's observations and the lapse of time (*in Cael*. 462.20). Simplicius himself notes just the metaphysical considerations that I alluded

[39] *in Tim*. III 125.4–16; cf. *Hyp*. VII 234.7–23.

to above: *if* the sphere of the fixed stars were really *fixed*, then we would have a nice, tidy progression – one simple movement for the sphere, two for each fixed star, and then each planet would have three (its own, that of the sphere containing it, and the motion of the universe). However, because of the observations, Simplicius accepts precession and posits a sphere uninhabited by stars outside the sphere of the stars. This final 'blank' sphere moves the sphere of the fixed stars and all that it contains 'with a simple motion to the east' (462.26). Simplicius learned to live with this additional complication, but apparently Proclus couldn't. Is this an intellectual scandal? Was Proclus simply being 'whimsical' or 'dogmatic'?[40]

It is important to put this in context. Proclus stands among a very small number of philosophers and astronomers who actually *address* the question of precession. We have, in fact, mentioned most of them already. It is notably absent from the writings of Geminus, Cleomedes, Theon of Smyrna, Manilius, Pliny, Censorinus, Achilles, Chalcidius, Macrobius and Martianus Capella where discussion of it would seem to be salient.[41] So it is not the case that Proclus stands out as someone who denies precession while everyone around him accepts it. The evidence we have on the matter suggests that very few, even among the educated, were aware that there was an issue to be resolved one way or the other.

It is also true that the precession has implications for astrological practice. Proclus is not mystery-mongering in appealing to the astrological practices of the Chaldeans as an objection to precession. Ptolemy stands at the head of the method that is now called 'tropical astrology' where the signs of the Zodiac are identified not with the constellations – which shift, thanks to the precession – but with regions of the ecliptic. In *Tetrabiblos* I.22 Ptolemy pegs the first degree of Ares to the vernal equinox and identifies the twelve signs with divisions of 30° each.

> [I]t is reasonable to reckon the beginnings of the signs also from the equinoxes and solstices, partly because the writers make this quite clear, and particularly because from our previous demonstrations we observe that their natures, powers, and familiarities *take their cause from the solstitial and equinoctial starting-places, and from no other source*. For if other starting-places are assumed, we shall either be compelled no longer to use the natures of the signs for prognostications or, if we use them, to be in error, since the spaces of the zodiac which implant their

[40] Sambursky (1962), 145–9 and Taylor (1928), 209 cited in Siorvanes (1996), 285. To the list of critics we might add Bouché-Leclercq (1899) who, having just discussed Proclus' view, contrasts his school with the Aristotelian one in the following terms: 'Le grain de folie mystique qui travaille les cerveaux platoniciens n'entre pas dans l'école d'Aristote' (p. 115).

[41] Evans (1998), 262.

powers in the planets would then pass over to others and become alienated. (trans. Robbins (1940))

This is a substantive theory about how astrology works and one that the friends of real, as opposed to merely notional, signs might reasonably reject. Moreover, the shift to tropical astrology represents a discontinuity with the earlier, Chaldean sidereal tradition. Ptolemy himself seeks to downplay the extent of discontinuity in his discussion of the Chaldean system (*Tetrabiblos* 1.21), but any reader insightful enough to see the manner in which he utilises precession to argue for the tropical frame of reference will see the extent of the innovation. The Christian Origen (*Philocalia* 23.18) grasped the implications of precession and urged it as an objection against astrology.[42]

Careful examination of the evidence we have for the practice of casting horoscopes in the time period after Ptolemy supports Proclus' contention that most astrologers had no need of his innovations.[43] Commenting on the conservatism in astrological practice, Jones remarks:

> The real objection to Ptolemy's precession theory was not astronomical in nature but astrological. Change the frame of reference for a horoscope, and you will find the Sun, Moon, and planets not only at different degrees, but often in different zodiacal signs possessing radically diverse qualities and influences; and when the equinoctial and solstitial points shift, this affects also the division of the zodiac by the ascendant and the other cardinal points. The interpretation of the horoscope will be utterly different. But the old methods resulted in successful astrological predictions, did they not? (1990, 38)

Citing the passage from the *Timaeus Commentary* that we have been concerned with, Jones concludes that Proclus' scepticism was reasonable in context. Even by Proclus' day, horoscopy based on Ptolemy's system could not claim a track record of success that would allow it to compete with (what nearly everyone at the time regarded as) the well-documented success of the older precession-free theory.

Throughout this introduction I have been urging the view that Proclus is best understood as a philosopher who accords Plato's dialogues a kind of evidential primacy over nearly every other consideration. This explains the peculiar emphasis on time's relation to eternity as well as his curiously non-physical interpretation of planetary order and his theory of planetary motion. Curiously, however, the rejection of precession,

[42] Cf. Hedgus (2007), 32.

[43] 'The spread of Ptolemy's tables during the first two centuries after Ptolemy, as evinced by the extant copies on papyrus and the planetary almanacs dependent on Ptolemy, seems to have had surprisingly little effect on the methods of generating horoscopes.' Jones (2009), 32.

which initially appears to be a shining example of putting Plato first,[44] actually turns out to be a well-founded conservatism about astrological practice.[45]

THE GREATEST GIFT OF ALL: THE FOUR KINDS OF LIVING CREATURE

At *Timaeus* 39e4–9 the visible cosmos is made more like its intelligible paradigm by the introduction of the four kinds of living being. The paradigm – Living-Being Itself – had four Forms of living creature present to it and the Demiurge now introduces sensible counterparts to these four intelligible kinds into the cosmos that he (timelessly) creates. Given the opposition between unity and divinity, on the one hand, and multiplicity on the other, you might wonder how the Demiurge's gift of more kinds of living being makes the sensible cosmos more divine.

One obvious thought is that by putting the stars and planets in it, he puts *gods* in it (inter alia). Surely *that* must contribute to making it divine and blessed? But Proclus' view is in fact more subtle than that. By putting visible counterparts of the four genera of living beings in it, the Demiurge bestows the final form of *wholeness* upon the cosmos. In this case, *adding* more things equates to making it more *unified* because of the kind of whole that these additional things make up.

Proclus famously distinguishes three notions of wholeness.[46] Some wholes are wholes-prior-to-the-parts. Other wholes are wholes-in-the-parts, while yet others are wholes-of-parts. We can see this triadic understanding of wholeness illustrated earlier in the *Timaeus Commentary* at II 196.25, ff. where Proclus applies this threefold distinction among wholes to the genesis of the World Soul by the Demiurge.

The Demiurge makes the soul one whole, prior to its division into parts – i.e. prior to the introduction of the portions that correspond to the number series 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 27 and the means that fill the intervals between them (*Tim.* 35b4–36b5). Prior to this division, the Demiurge

[44] Cf. Segonds (1987), 331: 'Les astronomes se trouvent donc tout simplement ruiner l'ordre de l'Univers, et le choix entre des hypothèses qui finissent par contredire l'ordre du monde et, au contraire, les enseignements parfaitement clairs des Dieux eux-mêmes ou de Platon, n'est pas vraiment difficile. C'est l'autorité des Dieux qu'il faut suivre, c'est enseignement de Platon qu'il faut défendre, puisque l'on ne viole pas l'ordre de l'univers en le faisant.'

[45] Siorvanes (1996), 292–3 reaches a similar conclusion about Proclus' reasonableness in rejecting precession, though for somewhat different reasons. He thinks that Proclus was justified on grounds of theoretical simplicity and economy.

[46] See *ET* prop. 67. For discussion, see Baltzly (2008).

mixes the two kinds of Being, Sameness and Difference (the divisible and indivisible kinds) into an intermediate mixture (*Tim.* 35a1–35b3) which forms the substrate of the 'soul stuff' that he goes on to divide out in portions. This is supposed to correspond to the whole-*before*-the-parts, since 'the Demiurge does not destroy the whole when he uses it up in the parts' (*in Tim.* II 195.32–196.1). It is thus analogous to the transcendent and unparticipated Form that is the paradigmatic cause of the participated Form. It communicates F-ness to its effects without being divided among them. It 'remains in itself'. Similarly, this soul-mixture retains its wholeness in spite of being 'parcelled out' in portions corresponding to the number series just enumerated. What is true of a material thing, like bread dough divided into portions, is not true of the immaterial *ousia* of the World Soul. Proclus says that this is because the Being, Sameness and Difference from which it is composed is both divisible and indivisible. So it is divided into portions (in one sense) but also remains a whole. It is thus a whole-prior-to-the parts.

The phase of the psychogony corresponding to the portioning out into the sequence 1, 2, 3, etc. establishes the whole-*of*-the-parts. It is the harmony – i.e. the ratios – between the portions that makes this a whole essentially constituted by these parts. The Demiurge makes just the requisite amount of soul stuff to constitute these parts for 'the whole-of-parts is neither more nor less than the appropriate parts' (*in Tim.* II 236.2–3).

The phase of the psychogony where the Demiurge forms a continuous strip of the psychic stuff, then splits it down the middle, and joins the two strips end to end, constituting the circles of the Same and the Different, corresponds to the whole-*in*-the-parts. The relevant consideration here seems to be that the three ingredients (Being, Sameness and Difference) as well as *all* of the harmonic ratios are *in each* of the circles. This notion that the whole in its entirety is in each part is the distinctive characteristic of the 'whole-in-the-parts'. A whole-in-the-parts is something that resembles the unity of the intelligible world, where 'each is in all and all is in each'.

In the discussion of the wholeness conferred upon the universe in the tenth gift, Proclus applies these different notions of wholeness to the universe itself rather than just the World Soul. The visible universe gets the first kind of wholeness – the wholeness-prior-to-the parts – when the Demiurge makes it a living being endowed with soul and intellect (*Tim.* 30b8). Proclus writes:

> when that which was moved in a discordant and disorderly fashion was arranged and received order, then soul, intellect and divine unification *supervened* (ἐπιγενομένης). (*in Tim.* III 97.22–4)

This is a case of wholeness-prior-to-the-parts, because although these features may presuppose a certain arrangement, they are not *constituted* by it. They are prior.[47]

The visible universe is also a whole-composed-*of*-parts. But it is not composed of just any parts: the universe is a whole composed from *whole parts*. Proclus places significant weight on *Tim*. 33a7 where Timaeus says that the Demiurge made the universe 'a single whole, composed from wholes' (ἕνα ὅλον ὅλων ἐξ ἁπάντων). The visible universe enjoys the second kind of wholeness because of the harmony that is established between these parts as a result of their being bound by proportion. The following passage illustrates this phase of the creation of the universe:

> As the dialogue goes on, he then gave the second kind of wholeness to it when the double revolutions [of the circles of the Same and the Different corresponding to the celestial equator and the ecliptic] were set up, and the elements [in the world's body] were bound together by proportion, as well as when the circles of the soul were arranged in terms of the monad, the triad, the tetrad and the heptad, for the universe is composed out of these things as parts. In fact, these things essentially constitute the universe as the universe. (*in Tim*. III 97.24–9)

Elsewhere Proclus argues that the heavenly spheres that make up the greater part of the universe are such that (a) they couldn't make up anything but the universe and (b) the universe couldn't be made up of anything but them (II 62.17–24). The essentially constitutive character of the universe's parts means that they are harmonised – just as the portions within the World Soul are harmonised – and thus it too is a whole-of-parts.

The third form of wholeness – the whole-*in*-the-parts – arises as a result of the fact that the parts that make the universe a whole-*of*-parts are themselves wholes. This means that they are such that every part of the whole is in each one. As such, each such whole is itself a (micro) cosmos and the whole (*in Tim*. III 99.5).

> In any case, in the words at hand (*Tim*. 39e4–6) he gives the third form of wholeness to it, for it is necessary for each part of it to become a whole or for each part to have all things in a manner that is appropriate to itself, so while

47 Compare *in Parm*. 826.37–827.1 where certain qualities which supervene upon bodies (τὰ ἐπιγιγνόμενα τοῖς σώμασι) come about by virtue of rational-forming principles (*logoi*) since the mixture of these bodies is not sufficient for them. Such rational-forming principles are like Aristotelian Forms in providing an internal origin of change and development. They may presuppose a certain material composition for their presence, but they have a causal efficacy above and beyond that of the matter. This is particularly true in the Neoplatonic adaptation of the notion of rational-forming principle, since here matter – considered in itself, and not simply as a qualified kind of proximate matter – is causally inert.

the heaven [has all things] in a celestial manner, the air [has all things] in an aerial manner, and the Earth terrestrially. This is the whole-*in*-the-part, and it is through [exhibiting] this [kind of wholeness] that what includes all the living beings [sc. the cosmos] is assimilated to a greater degree to the paradigm [sc. the Living Being Itself]. (III 97.24–98.6)

On Proclus' understanding, then, the creation of the four kinds of living being within the visible cosmos (*Tim.* 39e4–9) is simply a specific case of a more general endowment. The Demiurge endows the visible cosmos with the wholeness-in-the-parts in a very general sense. He does this in a very specific sense in making the four kinds of living being.

In the case of the kinds of living being, Plato's text distinguishes four kinds based on where they reside: celestial, aerial, aquatic and terrestrial (*Tim.* 39e10–40a2). Proclus considers the relation of this division, based on habitation, to the division between gods, angels, daemons, demi-gods and mortal creatures that he thinks is part and parcel of Platonism. He rejects the view that this passage assigns gods to the celestial region, daemons to the air, demi-gods to the water and mortal creatures to the Earth, as *Epinomis* 984b might suggest (III 107.30–108.5). Instead, he follows Syrianus[48] in locating *all* these ranks within *each* of the four kinds of living being – though he maintains silence, in this passage, on whether there are any mortal, celestial creatures.[49] He is clear, however, that there are gods, daemons, heroes and even mortal creatures (i.e. birds) that are found in the aerial kind. It is consistent with what he writes here that all should be present in the aquatic and terrestrial kinds too.[50] In fact, if he wants to carry through with the idea that in engendering the four kinds of living being within the visible cosmos the Demiurge introduces the kind of wholeness characteristic of a whole-in-the-parts, he *must* think this. It is characteristic of a whole-in-the-parts that all that is in the whole of which it is a part is in the part in a manner appropriate

[48] 108.5–28 = Syrianus, *in Tim.* fr. 19 in Klitenic Wear (2011). I disagree with what I take to be Klitenic Wear's reading of this passage, for it appears that she assigns only mortal creatures to the terrestrial kind and only spirits and fish to the aquatic kind.

[49] Proclus might point to the fact that the Timaeus assigns each human soul to a heavenly body. Alternatively, he seems to take seriously the Orphic notion that the Moon is 'another Earth'. Cf. *Orph.* fr. 91 (Kern) quoted at II 48.15 and III 142.15 and mentioned again at II 282.11 and III 172.21.

[50] *in Tim.* III 108.13–16 τὸ δὲ ἔνυδρον πάντων τῶν διαλαχόντων τὸ ὕδωρ γενῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν ὕδατι τρεφομένων, τὸ δὲ πεζὸν τῶν τὴν γῆν κατανειμαμένων καὶ ἐν γῇ συνισταμένων τε καὶ φυομένων ζῴων. If the notion that the rank of god is manifested in the terrestrial case causes you alarm, recall that the Earth is itself 'the very first and most senior of gods of all such gods as have come to be within the heavens' (*Tim.* 40c2–3). Proclus claims that the physical, terrestrial body is not that which is most truly the Earth, but it is nonetheless the final manifestation of the intelligible Earth and filled with life (*in Tim.* III 135.20).

to it. If the tenth gift bestows this kind of wholeness upon the visible universe, then each of the four kinds of living being must exhibit all the ranks – gods, daemons, demi-gods and mortal creatures – that occur in the visible universe.

In any event, the status (*taxis*) of god as opposed to daemon is a relational notion, according to Proclus, so we may expect some terminological fluidity. At the conclusion of Book 4, Proclus raises the question of why Plato refers to what Proclus regards as 'sub-lunary gods' as *daemons* (*Tim*. 40d6–7). Here too he thinks that Syrianus' teaching solves the problem:

> He [sc. Syrianus] says that there are daemons among the celestial beings as well as gods among the things in the sub-lunary realm. But all [the members of] the genus up there are called 'gods' because he calls the form (*idea*) of the celestial gods a genus (*genos*) (and daemons too have been brought in through this term). However in this case [i.e. in the lemma under discussion] the entire plurality [of superior beings are referred to as] daemons. In the former [context], the property that is distinctive of divinity predominates, while here it is the property that is distinctive of daemons – a fact which, when looked upon in isolation, led some people to separate the divine and the daemonic in terms of the celestial and the realm of Becoming. But it is requisite to station both [kinds] in both [places], and although the divine [kind] abounds up there and the daemonic down here, nonetheless the divine [sort] does exist down here. (III 154.32–155.9 = Syrianus *in Tim*. fr. 20 (part) in Klitenic Wear (2011))

The immediate effect of what the Demiurge does is that none of the parts that compose the visible god that is the universe are themselves exempt from divinity. There are gods (as well as daemons) *everywhere* – even here in the sub-lunary region. Syrianus and Proclus anticipate that some people might object to the idea that gods could be present to the gross matter of the sub-lunary region. In response, our Platonists point to the success of theurgical animation of statues. Here the theurgist fashions matter in such a way that it can participate in a god. Are we to believe that the *Demiurge* is unwilling or unable to do just what the theurgist does? Of course not!

These implications of the tenth gift of the Demiurge to the visible cosmos are not insignificant to Proclus' view of matters. When modern interpreters wrestle with the problems of Plato's *Timaeus*, questions about the meaning and significance of 40d6–e2 do not loom large.[51] Yet this passage provides Proclus with occasion for one of his relatively rare allusions to the problems that beset his world (III 152.32–153.16). He

[51] The index locorum for the 600-page *Oxford Handbook of Plato* (Fine (2008)) yields exactly zero citations of *Timaeus* 40d–e.

comments that people – and I think we may assume that Saffrey was correct and that Proclus means specifically *Christians*[52] – more easily forget the gods that are nearest to them. Every cult or sect agrees that there is a single first principle that is divine, and they call upon this highest god for aid. Some of them stop there with only the one god, while others acknowledge that there are additional gods and also daemons, but forget about heroes. All of these people neglect the gradations of divinity that are more proximate to them. Proclus claims that the greatest task for philosophy is to fill in all the stages of procession so that we know both the intermediates and the *final* terms. In short, Proclus thinks that too many people ignore the divinity that is immediately present to us even in the region below the Moon. Proclus claims that Plato's own words alert us to this very danger.

> Plato right at the beginning celebrated and announced the generation of the sub-lunary gods as divine and intellectual, there being no need whatsoever of any such [corresponding] indication in the case of the celestial gods. (III 152.27–30)

The implication of the last remark is that there is no need to stress the fact that the stars and planets are gods. Every right-thinking person – leaving aside, of course, the Christians[53] – knows *that* already. But even right-thinking Platonists (e.g. Plotinus) may have failed to appreciate the extent to which the gods are present right here in the sub-lunary region.[54]

Lane Fox (1987) documents the evidence that pagans in late antiquity sincerely hoped for a direct manifestation of the gods and believed that this was possible. Proclus' interpretation of the tenth gift of the Demiurge locates a basis for such hope in the inspired text of Plato's *Timaeus*.

CONCLUSION

Throughout his commentary on this portion of the *Timaeus*, Proclus treats Plato's words as the best guide to the truth about the nature of time and eternity. It is truly an inspired text and thus has evidential primacy in providing an account of the nature of time. Where Plato discusses the motions of the stars and planets, or alludes to the Great

[52] Saffrey (1975), 558–9.

[53] Cf. III 71.5–8 where Proclus claims that in *Tim.* 38e3–6 Plato provides an account of the fact that each planet is a living being, dependent upon a divine soul, 'for those who are capable of seeing it'. Festugière asks who might be deemed incapable of seeing this, and the answer, of course, is the Christians. Cf. Clement, *Protrepticus* 6.67.2.10 where Clement complains that those who regard the stars and planets as gods confuse God with God's works.

[54] Shaw (1995) argues that Iamblichus was anxious to restore divinity to the realm of material things in response to Porphyry and Plotinus.

Year, Proclus seeks to understand his words as referring primarily to the intelligible causes of these things. Plato's text is altogether more "elevated" and thus not in direct competition with writers like Ptolemy. While the Demiurge's population of the visible cosmos with various divinities does not occupy modern readers of the dialogue to any great extent, Proclus regards this as a key part of Plato's text. The basis of this difference is not hard to understand. Proclus regards the goal of living as assimilation to the divine. Plato's account of the population of the cosmos with all the kinds of living things – and especially gods and daemons – assures us that the gods that we seek to become like are everywhere. We are not severed from the divine even here in the realm of Becoming.

Works cited

BALTZLY, D. (2008). 'Merological Modes of Being in Proclus'. *Ancient Philosophy* 26(2): 395–411.

BOUCHÉ-LECLERCQ, A. (1899). *L'astrologie grecque*. Paris: Leroux.

BOURNE, C. (2006). *A Future for Presentism*. Oxford University Press.

CALLATAŸ, G. D. (1996). *Annus Platonicus: A Study of World Cycles in Greek, Latin and Arabic Sources*. Louvain: Institut Orientaliste, Université Catholique de Louvain.

DODDS, E. R. (1963). *Proclus: The Elements of Theology*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

EVANS, J. (1998). *History and Practice of Ancient Astronomy*. Oxford University Press.

FINE, G., ed. (2008). *The Oxford Handbook of Plato*. Oxford University Press.

GOLDSTEIN, B. R. (1967). 'The Arabic Version of Ptolemy's Planetary Hypotheses'. *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 57(4): 3–55.

HEATH, S. T. (1981). *Aristarchus of Samos: The Ancient Copernicus*. New York: Dover.

HEDGUS, T. (2007). *Early Christianity and Ancient Astrology*. New York: Peter Lang.

JOLY, E. T. (2003). 'Time is not a Product of the Soul: Proclus versus Plotinus'. *Laval théologique et philosophique* 59(2): 225–34.

JONES, A. (1990). *Ptolemy's First Commentator*. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society.

(2009). 'Ancient Rejection and Adoption of Ptolemy's Frame of Reference for Longitudes', in *Ptolemy in Perspective: Use and Criticism of his Work from Antiquity to the Nineteenth Century*. ed. A. JONES. Dordrecht: Springer, 11–44.

KLITENIC WEAR, S. (2011). *The Teachings of Syrianus on Plato's Timaeus and Parmenides*. Leiden: Brill.

KUTASH, E. (2011). *The Ten Gifts of the Demiurge: Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*. London: Duckworth.

LANE FOX, R. (1987). *Pagans and Christians*. New York: Knopf.

LERNOULD, A. (2001). *Physique et Théologie: Lecture du Timée de Platon par Proclus*. Pas-de-Calais: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.

LLOYD, G. E. R. (1973). *Greek Science After Aristotle*. New York and London: Norton.

MARTIJN, M. (2008). *Proclus on Nature: Philosophy of Nature and its Methods in Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*. Leiden: Brill.

PEDERSEN, S. and HANNAH, R. (2002). 'Celestial Dynamics at the Crossroads: Proclus' Reassessment of Plato in the Light of Empirical Science'. *Antichton* 36: 65–79.

ROBBINS, F. E. (1940). *Ptolemy: Tetrabiblos, Edited and Translated into English*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

SAFFREY, H. D. (1975). 'Allusions antichretiennes chez Proclus: le diadoque Platonicien'. *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 59: 553–62.

SAMBURSKY, S. (1962). *The Physical World of Late Antiquity*. New York: Basic Books.

SAMBURSKY, S. and PINES, S. (1971). *The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism*. Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities.

SCOTTI MUTH, N. (1993). *Proclo negli ultimi quarant'anni : bibliografia ragionata della letteratura primaria e secondaria riguardante il pensiero procliano e i suoi influssi storici (anni 1949–1992)*. Milan: Vita e Pensiero.

SEGONDS, A. (1987). 'Proclus: Astronomie et philosophie', in *Proclus: Lecteur et interprète des anciens*, ed. J. PÉPIN and H. D. SAFFREY. Paris: Éditions du CNRS, 319–34.

SHAW, G. (1995). *Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

SIDER, T. (2001). *Four-dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time*. Oxford University Press.

SIORVANES, L. (1996). *Proclus: Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

SORABJI, R. (1983). *Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages*. London: Duckworth.

STEEL, C. (2001). 'The Neoplatonic Doctrine of Time and Eternity and its Influence on Medieval Philosophy', in *The Medieval Concept of Time: Studies on the Scholastic Debate and its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. P. PORRO. Leiden: Brill, 3–31.

TAUB, L. C. (1993). *Ptolemy's Universe: The Natural Philosophical and Ethical Foundations of Ptolemy's Astronomy*. Chicago: Open Court.

TAYLOR, A. E. (1928). *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

URMSON, J. O. and SIORVANES, L. (1992). *Simplicius: Corollaries on Place and Time*. London: Duckworth.

VLASTOS, G. (1968). 'The Disorderly Motion in the Timaeus', in *Studies in Plato's Metaphysics*, ed. R. E. ALLEN. London: Routledge, 379–420.

On the Timaeus *of Plato: Book 4*

Proclus on Time and the Stars

Analytical table of contents

I. The eighth gift of the Demiurge: time 42
A. The transition to eternity: *Tim.* 37c6–d2 42
1. General discussion 42
2. Lexis 46
B. The relation of Eternity to Time: *Tim.* 37d3–7 51
1. The common conception of Eternity 52
2. Aristotle's account of Time and Eternity 53
3. The Platonists' account of time 54
a. Eternity and the Living Being Itself 54
b. Eternity is not among the five genera 56
c. Proclus' account of Eternity 57
4. Lexis 60
C. The nature of Time 68
1. Mistaken views about time 68
a. Time is neither a concept nor an incidental cause 68
b. Time is not a consequence of soul's thinking 70
2. Proclus' account of what time is 75
3. Appendix: specific criticism of "the physicists" 85
4. Earlier Platonists on the sense in which time is 'an image of Eternity' 86
D. The parts and forms of time, *Tim.* 37e1–4 88
1. What are days, nights, etc.? 88
2. What are the tenses? 91
3. Problem: why do the heavenly gods need time? 94
4. The harmony of Plato and the Theurgists 96
E. The proper limits of tensed language 97
1. Explication of *Tim.* 37e4–38a1 97
a. General observations 97
b. The source of our confusion about tensed language 99
2. Explication of *Tim.* 38a1–9 102
3. Explication of *Tim.* 38a9–b5 105
F. The relation between time and the heavens 108
a. Lexis for *Tim.* 38b6–c2 108
G. Summary of the teaching on time 112

II. The ninth gift of the Demiurge: the stars 113
A. Explication of *Tim.* 38c3–6 113
1. Visible and invisible time 113
2. The contributions of the planets toward visible time 115

3. The procession of time 118
a. Two puzzles about the order of procession resolved 119
B. Explication of *Tim.* 38c5–d1 121
C. The planets and their movements 123
1. The order of the planets 123
a. The Platonic ordering 123
b. The astrological ordering of the planets 125
2. The equal speeds of the Sun, Mercury and Venus 128
a. The mathematicans 128
b. Porphyry and Theodore of Asine 129
c. Iamblichus 132
3. Mars, Jupiter and Saturn 135
D. The influence of the planets 136
E. The lives of the planets 140
F. The motions of the planets 144
1. General remarks 144
2. The relative speeds of the planets 146
3. The spiral motion of the planets 152
4. The primary role of the Sun, *Tim.* 39b2–c1 154
a. General interpretation 154
b. Lexis for *Tim.* 39b2–c1 158
5. Night and day 161
a. General interpretation 161
b. Lexis for *Tim.* 39c1–d2 167
6. The Platonic Great Year 169
7. Conclusion of the discussion of time 173

III. The tenth gift of the Demiurge: the cosmos is filled with all the kinds of living being 176
A. Introduction, *Tim.* 39e4–6 176
B. The Living Being Itself, *Tim.* 39e7–9 179
1. General interpretation 179
2. Lexis: what does the phrase ὅ ἐστι ζῷον mean? 181
a. Proclus' explanation 181
b. The agreement of Plato and Orpheus 182
c. Two corollaries 186
d. The views of Amelius, Numenius and Iamblichus on this passage 187
C. The forms within the Living Being, *Tim.* 39e10–40a2 189
1. The discourse mirrors its subject matter 189
2. Why are there four forms? 190
3. What are these forms? 193
4. Assorted observations 198
D. Composition of the celestial genus, *Tim.* 40a2–4 201
E. Shape of the celestial creatures, *Tim.* 40a4–5 206
F. The position of the celestial creatures, *Tim.* 40a4–7 208
G. The motions of the celestial genus, *Tim.* 40a8–b4 212

1. General interpretation – the two motions 213
2. Lexis 215
3. Related topics 216
a. Correlations between motions and order 216
b. The forward motion of the fixed stars 217
c. Against the precession of the equinoxes 219
H. Fixed stars and planets, *Tim.* 40b4–8 221
1. Lexis 221
2. General interpretation 222
3. Assorted considerations 224
a. Composition of heavenly bodies and spheres 224
b. The possibility of planetary satellites 225
c. The planets and time 225
d. Celestial fire again 226
e. Planetary satellites resolve Aristotle's question 227
I. The Earth, *Tim.* 40b8–c3 229
1. Order of exposition 230
2. What is the Earth? 231
3. The sense in which the Earth is 'our nurse' 233
4. The interpretation of ἰλλομένην 234
5. The Earth is guardian and creator of both day and night 237
6. The Earth is most senior among the gods 239
7. What it means to say the Demiurge 'contrived' the Earth 245
J. The dances of the stars, *Tim.* 40c3–d4 246
1. The scope of this discussion 248
2. Mathematical interpretation 249
3. Philosophical interpretation 254
K. Conclusion of the discourse on the visible gods, *Tim.* 40d4–5 256

IV. The traditional gods 257
A. Sub-lunary gods and daemons, *Tim.* 40d6–7 257
1. How these beings are known 257
2. Why are the sub-lunary gods called daemons? 259
3. Where does the daemonic order fall? 262
4. Are there irrational daemons? 264

I. THE EIGHTH GIFT OF THE DEMIURGE: TIME

A. The transition to eternity: *Tim.* 37c6–d2

When the Father who generated the universe regarded (*noein*) it as something in motion and alive, an image of the eternal gods, he was delighted and rejoiced in it, and then gave some thought to what could be done in order to make it even more like its paradigm. So in as much as its model was itself an eternal living being, he thus set about to produce a universe that had the same character to the extent that this was possible. (*Tim.* 37c6–d2)

1. General discussion

The single [Creator] who invariably (*kata tauton*) creates the things that are wholes all at once (*athroôs*)[1] both generates and brings about the reversion of his products upon himself, and both perfects and assimilates them to their paradigms. [This happens] either via one and the same power which is both generative and such as to call creations back to their cause (*anaklêtikos*), as well as perfective and assimilative – a view pleasing to some among the older [interpreters] – or via different ones, according to other [interpreters]. It is as if the intermediate position amid the disagreement and opposition between these men were nothing of any moment, for neither would those who are for unifiying [these functions] be willing for the one [Creator] to be without a trace of plurality, nor can those who distinguish [among the Creator's powers] bring themselves to say that the number of these powers is irregular or such that one could be left out, and the latter party would instead willingly declare that [the number of powers] is comprehended by its own proper monad and unified by it. As a result, some of them say that these powers are a 'tetradic monad', while others say that on the contrary it is a 'unified tetrad' or, if you like, a 'monadified tetrad'.[2] Now it is clear since the Demiurge under

[1] Ὁ μὲν εἷς καὶ ὅλα δημιουργῶν ἀθρόως κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀπογεννᾷ τε καὶ ἐπιστρέφει καὶ τελειοῖ καὶ ἀφομοιοῖ τοῖς παραδείγμασι τὰ ἑαυτοῦ δημιουργήματα. Both the adverbs – ἀθρόως κατὰ ταὐτὸν – go with the participle. The discussion of the creation of the World Soul (*in Tim.* II 102.7) opened with the claim that the Demiurge brings forth all these products all at once and throughout eternity (ἀθρόως καὶ διαιωνίως). The introduction to the discussion of eternity now reiterates this point. The 'wholes' that the Creator produces should be understood in relation to the three moments in Timaeus' discussion of his creative activity (II 2.9–3.6). Though 'whole' is a term that takes on different meanings in different contexts for Proclus, at this point it likely refers to the idea that the Demiurge is responsible for the universal, general or 'whole' aspects of creation. These wholes include the elements considered in their totality, the psychic substance from which the World Soul is formed, the World Soul itself, and the spheres that make up the heavens.

[2] It is not easy to assign names to the parties in this debate, but it appears that the resolution of the question of the singleness or diversity of the Demiurgic powers here finds a parallel

discussion here is also a single one, it is obvious that he implants all in one go (*homou men*) the *assimilative* power in the junior creators who come after him when he directs them to imitate his own power with respect to their own creation.[3] On the other hand, they receive the *generative* power all in one go (*homou de*) at such time as he might move them to generate and fashion living things.[4] Additionally, they would receive the power to *call creations back to their cause* at the same time as he bids them to receive once again those portions of the universal (*holos*) elements and to recycle them (*anakalein*) into these universal elements again when the things that have been composed from them decay.[5] On top of all these, a *guardian* power [is also implanted in the junior creators], doubtless a result of the fact that the Demiurge directly establishes the Rulers of the Cosmos[6] as guardians of the numbers of time and the Earth as the guardian of day and night.[7] Therefore, just as I was prompted to say from the beginning, the Demiurge is that from which all things come, and he has *established* it all together with himself and has *assimilated* it [to himself], *perfected* it, and caused it to *revert* upon him.[8] Their order has not been run together as a result of the fact that they have been revealed "all at once" as it were, but rather the order is to a greater degree preserved and rendered continuous. And in as much as this happens, the inferior things are not denied the leadership of their betters, nor are the things that are more perfect denied the authority requisite to them over those beings that are less perfect than they are. After all, one thing is not called forth prior in time to another, nor do the secondary beings remain unprovided for,

in the resolution of the question of One, Being, Sameness and Difference at the limit of the intellectual order in *Plat. Theol.* II 69.15–70.11. This makes some sense. The Demiurge is equated with the limit of the intelligible order of gods. Proclus could doubtless find one (or more than one!) correlation between the greatest kinds onto the four powers that are under discussion here.

3 ὅταν αὐτοῖς παρακελεύηται μιμεῖσθαι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν περὶ τὴν αὐτῶν γένεσιν. Cf. *Tim.* 41c5–6 μιμούμενοι τὴν ἐμὴν δύναμιν περὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν γένεσιν.

4 ἡνίκ' ἂν κινῇ ζῷα αὐτοὺς ἀπεργάζεσθαι καὶ γεννᾶν. Cf. *Tim.* 41d1–2: ἀθανάτῳ θνητὸν προσυφαίνοντες, ἀπεργάζεσθε ζῷα καὶ γεννᾶτε.

5 There is not as close a textual parallel here, but it seems likely that Proclus has in mind the Demiurge's instructions to the young gods that continue the previous passage: τροφήν τε διδόντες αὐξάνετε καὶ φθίνοντα πάλιν δέχεσθε. (41d2–3).

6 Cf. *in Remp.* II 17.5 and *in Tim.* I 101.5, as well as Iamblichus *Myst.* II 3.15 for the use of this terminology to denote the planets in the neoplatonic tradition. It is presumably derived from its similar use in astrology.

7 On the heavenly bodies generally as the guardians of the numbers of time, cf. *Tim.* 38c3–6. For the special role of the Earth with respect to day and night, *Tim.* 40c1–2: φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν νυκτός τε καὶ ἡμέρας ἐμηχανήσατο.

8 That is to say, the four powers enumerated at the beginning (1.11–12) all find their source in the Demiurge, even if some of these powers are manifested via the young gods or divinities such as the celestial gods or the Earth.

nor are those things with greater seniority standing idle or being fruitless simply because those [secondary beings] that will be receptive of their providential activities have not existed

We, however, who are unable to conceive or to any greater extent explain the eternal beneficence of the Father of Wholes[9] with respect to the cosmos, we are inclined to envisage and to teach that at one moment he creates something, but at another moment he adds further adornments to it, while at yet another moment he perfects it, and at another time he renders things similar – which is surely the effect that the present words of the philosopher tend to have upon us, for the universe has already participated in motion and life according to the teaching we have about it (since the soul now dwells with it, possessing its own distinctive acts of understanding (*gnôsis*) – acts of understanding through which it both knows intelligibles and the things within the cosmos, preserving this along with itself, not only teeming with motion and life but communicating this to the entire mass (*ongkos*) of the body). Because of this fact alone, or primarily because of it,[10] the universe has been created as a product that is an image of the intelligible gods – one which delighted the Demiurge and in which he rejoiced (*Tim.* 37c7) and which he proceeded to make more perfect and similar to the intelligibles by making it eternal in a sense (*hoion aidios*), for the intelligible is eternal (*aidios*) in the strict and primary sense, while that which unfolds in parallel with the procession of time [is eternal] in a secondary sense. The word 'always' (*to aei*) has two senses: the one eternal, the other temporal.[11]

For what reason, then, does he introduce this eighth gift of the Demiurge on top of all of the [other] things that have been given to the whole cosmos previously? Surely it is because [this eighth gift] is greater and more perfect, and confers upon the image the highest degree of similarity toward its paradigm. Once one sets out to convey in language the

[9] Cf. Iamblichus, *Myst.* 1 21.12; Proclus *in Tim.* 1 100.9; 110.24. The phrase πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων in Proclus probably has as its background *Tim.* 33a7 where Timaeus calls the universe ἕνα ὅλον ὅλων ἐξ ἁπάντων and thus it is equivalent to 'Father of the Universe'.

[10] The ensoulment of the universe is the seventh of the ten gifts of the Demiurge to the visible cosmos that are enumerated at the opening of Book 2 of the commentary (II 5.17–31). The ensoulment of the universe plays a particularly crucial role in making it like its paradigm, since the ensoulment provides the basis for the intellectual activity that it manifests and the Paradigm is, of course, intelligible.

[11] Proclus does draw a distinction between being everlasting and being eternal, but he does not mark this distinction by any terminological one, such as that between *aiônios* and *aidios*. Nor does he think that the sort of eternity conferred upon the visible universe is simply a matter of existing at every time. See *in Tim.* 1 253.31–254.8 where he chides Aristotle for offering such a proposal. Rather things that are eternal in the latter sense 'are brought forth for the whole duration of time from their own causes and their entire being is [concentrated] in their coming into being' (254.7–8, trans. Runia and Share).

genesis of the things that are wholes, it is necessary to go from those that are less perfect to those that are more so. For in a way, this very same fact occurs in the parallel case where the things that exist in themselves and those that are immanent in others are opposed to one another. This is because among the things that are established in themselves and never in any way come to be the accidents of other things, it is necessary to say that those that are more dignified come first and that it is in virtue of them and because of them and by them that those subsequent to them are manifested. However, among the things that are participated by others, the things that are less complete presuppose [those that are more so] and become like an underlying subject for what is more perfect and what has been accustomed to arrive later.[12] Such, then, is the entire purpose of words at issue.

The next thing is to say what sort of being time is, and what were the reasons why the Demiurge of Wholes brought it forth together with the soul and the heavens,[13] and what are the sort and extent of the goods for which it is responsible. This is particularly important since even many of the friends of Plato[14] have taken time to be some indistinct sort of form or merely the numerable aspect of motions, not understanding that among the ten things that the Father has doubtlessly given to the cosmos, each

[12] This rather involved argument is meant to provide a metaphysical parallel for the fact that Timaeus' order of presention bestows what Proclus regards as gifts of ever increasing value to the cosmos. But this order of presentation, which saves the best for last, runs contrary to the order of emanation in which higher causes are superior. I think Proclus' first move (lines 13–15) is to blame this on language. Then he offers what I take to be an additional consideration (καὶ γάρ πως). If we look at characteristics not as causes, but as things that individuals have a share in, then those that are less complete or fully specified (e.g. being an animal) presuppose and come before what is more specific (e.g. being a wombat). That is, being a wombat is one way of being an animal and, viewed from the point of view of *participated* forms, the genus *is* matter for the species. (Not, of course, viewed from the point of view of unparticipated or paradigmatic forms!) But what is less complete is less perfect, given the multiple meanings of *teleion*. Hence the order of the gifts makes sense if we look at it from this point of view.

[13] The Greek '*to ouranos*' is, of course, singular. However, 'the heavens' is idiomatic in English while 'the heaven' is not. The singular without the direct object in English – 'heaven' – carries eschatological connotations that are not appropriate. So in most cases I will translate '*to ouranos*' as 'the heavens'. This concession to idiomatic English should not be taken to imply that Proclus thinks that what is up there is just a chance collection of celestial spheres with some associated visible bodies. 'The heaven' has a unity that is prior to the spheres that it encompasses.

[14] The 'friend of Plato' who assumes time merely to be measure of motion is, of course, Aristotle. It is unclear whether Proclus has in mind someone else who regards time as 'some unclear sort of form' or whether this is meant to be another way of describing Aristotle's view. I suspect the latter, for one might justifiably regard the role played by 'number' or 'measure' in Aristotle's account of time as 'the number or measure of motion with respect to before and after' as unclear and perhaps related to form.

subsequent gift is greater than one that came before it in every respect. If, therefore, he has *already* ensouled and made it a blessed god (*Tim.* 34b8), and *after* this he gave time to the universe, it is clear from this that time and life [lived in a] periodic manner that is defined in temporal terms[15] must be something greater than the soul and the blessed life that results from the soul. Consequently, if it were something of this sort, time would not turn out to be such as the many say, but rather will be possessed of an essence more divine and superior to that of souls and of psychic goods. This is a point we will urge again later (27.18) through more considerations.

2. Lexis

Passing on now to the specific terms, let us say that [in order] to **regard** (*noein*)[16] the life, motion and order of the universe and the way in which it has been given form, [the Demiurge] does not look to the cosmos itself[17] (for in general the cosmos is not an intelligible object throughout the whole of itself, but is rather the object of opinion, thanks to its mass, and apprehended 'together with irrational sense perception' (*Tim.* 28a2). Moreover, the Demiurge is not led to look somewhere outside himself in his activity of cognition (*noêsis*), but has been reverted entirely upon himself. Rather, since he cognises (*noein*) himself and possesses in himself the genetic and providential causes of wholes, he contemplates both the essence and the perfection of his own products by virtue of the fact that he cognises himself.

Plato says that the cosmos has been created as an **image of the eternal gods** – not that it is an image of the *encosmic* gods (for he does not speak

[15] Cf. *ET* 198 and 199.

[16] Proclus does not state the word in the form in which it appears in the lemma, but it is clear that this is the first term to be scrutinised in the lexis section of this lesson. Plato uses the verb ἐνόησε, probably because he likes the effect of coupling it with ἐπενόησεν in the next clause – 'thinking about' or 'regarding' (*noein*) the fine job he had done so far, the Demiurge 'gave some thought' (*epinoein*) to how the universe might be an even better image of its model. However, Proclus regards the verb *noein* as a technical term for the kind of cognition or understanding that one has of intelligibles. Moreover, it would not do to have the Demiurge contemplating his product rather than the intelligible paradigm upon which the product is modelled. It is pretty clear that this is just what Plato imagines, since he is not obsessive about technical terminology nor about the idea of causation as by-product of self-contemplation as Proclus is. However, Plato's syntax perhaps affords Proclus a loophole: Ὡς δὲ κινηθὲν αὐτὸ καὶ ζῶν ἐνόησεν. The Demiurge regards the visible universe *as* something in motion and alive – not by looking at it, but by looking to the causes within himself in virtue of which the product is alive and in motion.

[17] Festugière is right to reject Diehl's emendation in εἰς αὐτὸν ὁρῶντα τὸν κόσμον. All the manuscripts have αὐτόν and it makes sense.

merely about the corporeal-formed aspect of the universe, but about the living being that is 'endowed with soul and intellect' (30b8), which surely includes the encosmic gods within itself too), but rather that it is an image of the *intelligible* gods, for it has been filled up with their divinity and the processions of the encosmic gods into it are like 'canals'[18] of a sort or illuminations (*ellampsis*) of the intelligible gods. The cosmos receives these processions not merely in virtue of its celestial part, but thanks to all the parts of itself, for there are presences of earthly, aquatic and aerial gods in the earth, the seas and the air.[19] Therefore the cosmos has been filled with divinity throughout the whole of itself and because of this it is, throughout the whole of itself, an image of the intelligible gods, not receiving the intelligible gods themselves (for images do not receive the transcendent essence of the gods which are wholes),[20] but rather having illuminations channelled to it from thence, since it has been organised by a secondary order of beings that have been derived from the intelligible gods to whom they stand in a symmetrical [relation].

[The fact that] by [the words] **the *eternal* gods**[21] he means the entirely *intelligible* gods and not those [eternal gods] in it [sc. the

[18] The terminology derives from the *Chaldean Oracles*, cf. frs. 65, 66, 110 and Proclus *in Tim.* II 107.7 and 130.27.

[19] Cf. Iamblichus, *Myst.* I 9.

[20] οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ ἀγάλματα τὰς οὐσίας τὰς ἐξῃρημένας τῶν ὅλων ὑποδέχεται [τῶν] θεῶν. This is one of those contexts in which it is difficult to decide between 'whole' or 'universal'. It is tempting to keep the second occurrence of τῶν and translate 'the essence of the gods of the wholes', i.e. the elements and heavenly spheres. Festugière suggests that Proclus is here relying on a specific sense of ἀγάλματα – the statues of the gods that are purportedly brought to life by practitioners of the telestic arts. Cf. Lewy (1956), 247–8.

[21] The exegetical issue taken up here is also discussed by Taylor (1928), 184–6, albeit in a slightly different manner. The lemma says that the universe is an image of the eternal gods. What are these eternal gods? Taylor thinks that nothing in the dialogue has prepared us for such an announcement, but is hesitant to identify them with the four forms within the Paradigm (*Tim.* 39e7) as Martin (1841) and Archer-Hind (1888) do. He offers two possible solutions. The first is to either read θεῶν as the genitive plural of θέα and to understand Plato to be saying that the Demiurge made the cosmos an image of his eternal objects of contemplation. The other alternative is to simply bracket θεῶν. Cornford (1957), followed by Zeyl (2000), relies on the broader associations of ἄγαλμα and translates 'a shrine for the eternal gods'. This means that the Demiurge makes the universe a temple within which the planetary and astral gods dwell.

Proclus' concern in this passage is rather different. He is not concerned that Timaeus makes the universe an image of some, as-yet-unidentified gods. Since Proclus reads the *Timaeus* as a part of the systematic Platonic philosophy, there is no question that there are gods in the background who have not yet been explicitly mentioned. The problem is simply to identify which of the many gods in the Platonic philosophy are meant here. Proclus thinks that there are gods *within* the cosmos who are eternal (in the derivative sense). The fact that Plato immediately goes on to mention the Paradigm is supposed

generated cosmos] is one that he made evident by immediately adding the following words **so in as much as its model was an eternal living being**, since when he says this, it is clear that it is the intelligible [living being that is at issue]. Now that the gods in question are also intelligible, we may infer on the basis of the method of division, for they must be taken to be things that are either *prior* to the Living Being Itself, or else they are *in* the Living Being Itself (like the monads of the four forms [of living being] up there,) or else they are *posterior* to it. To rank them *prior* to the Living Being Itself would be absurd (for they would then include the Eternity to which he has not yet said the universe has been made similar). Nor is it possible to rank them *within* the Living Being Itself, for if, as he says (30c4), the universe is not an image of any of the *partial* forms that are encompassed by the All-perfect Living Being, these [forms] could not be those eternal and intelligible gods [that we are seeking], for the forms (*idea*) found within the partial forms (*eidos*) encompassed by the All-perfect Living Being are not *gods*. It remains, therefore, that the eternal gods come *after* the Living Being Itself, all of them falling between the intelligible paradigm and the Demiurge, for the universe seems to be like them all to the extent that the form of each of them includes the wholeness of the cosmos. This fact, then, has been demonstrated and those who assume that these everlasting gods are forms included *within* the Living Being Itself do so in vain. He does not wish the universe to be made similar [merely] to these forms. After all, how could Plato intend to refer to the universe as an image of those forms to which even the constituent parts (*plêrôma*) of the universe have not yet been assimilated in the course of the dialogue? In fact, he does do this later as the dialogue proceeds, at the point at which he introduces the partial (*merikos*) constituents of the universe.[22] Consequently,

to show that these are not among the eternal gods at issue. The universe must be an image of gods who are both eternal and *intelligible* as well, for the paradigm is an intelligible paradigm. But this does not narrow the field very much since there are lots of intelligible gods. Proclus homes in on the intelligible gods at issue in the lemma by process of elimination. They cannot be intelligible gods that are *higher* than the Paradigm, for what's beyond the Paradigm is Eternity and the cosmos has not yet been assimilated to Eternity. Nor can the intelligible gods at issue be the four forms of living thing *within* the Paradigm (*Tim.* 39e7), for though these are intelligibles, they are not gods. And in any event, the assimilation of the parts that make up the universe to these intelligible forms takes place when the Demiurge gets the young gods to populate the world with the terrestrial, aquatic and aerial species of living things. It remains that the eternal gods of whom the universe is an image at this point in the dialogue are located *after* the Paradigm but prior to the Demiurge.

[22] This is the familiar opposition between partial or 'part-like' demiurgy and universal or 'whole-like' demiurgy; cf. *in Tim.* II 2.9 and the contrast immediately above with the 'universal' or whole-like elements at III 2.7.

he could not have said [in the lemma under discussion] that the universe has *already* become an image of these forms, but rather he would have had to say instead that it *will* become one. In any case, the cosmos is an image of the intelligible gods when it is taken together with soul and intellect [bestowed upon it] and the divinity that has subsequently visited upon it. But it is a moving and living image, filled with divinity; [one **6** which] serves all the things within itself and within that which preserves everything, and is filled all at once with all the good things that derive from the Father. In particular, it receives motion predominantly from nature, while from soul it receives life and motion, and from intellect it receives cognition (*noêsis*) and life and the fact that it is a receptacle (*hypodochê*) of the encosmic gods. It is from them – the encosmic gods – that it is at last rendered an image of the intelligible gods in the truest sense.

Again, it is clear from this how Plato establishes the Demiurge as among the foremost of those who practise theurgy (*telestai*) since he portrays him as statue-making for the cosmos.[23] This is parallel to the way in which Plato earlier established the Demiurge as author (*poiêtês*) of divine names and one who reveals the divine characters – names and characters through which he completed and perfects the soul [of the universe].[24] These [activities] are the things that those who are truly conductors of the Mysteries do: producing the statues [of gods] through characters and names that have the power to bring them to life[25] and bringing it about that they live and undergo motion. So the Father of Wholes is quite rightly delighted with his own creation, and rejoices in it because he has made it more like its paradigm. He is delighted and amazed – not with what has proceeded and has been made this way because of him – but rather he is delighted and amazed with his own capacity to have brought about from what was 'moved in a disorderly and discordant manner' (*Tim.* 30a4–5) a universe that is well-ordered, ensouled, and endowed with intellect and filled with god. Just as in knowing himself, he knows the cosmos, so too in being amazed at his own creative power, he makes

[23] The term that Plato uses at 37c7, *agalma*, can mean either an image of some unspecified sort or a statue in particular. This prompts Proclus to connect the Demiurge's activities in making the cosmos an image of its eternal paradigm with the activities of the *telestai* who make statues that "channel" the presence of the gods to us. The same comparison is drawn at *in Tim.* I 273.11–16. On the "animating" of statues of the gods, see Lewy (1956), 248–9.

[24] Cf. *in Tim.* II 255.11–256.14 for the Demiurge as author or 'poet' of the names and characters of the circles of the Same and the Different which bring to completion the composition of the World Soul. For the use of names and characters in theurgic rituals, see Lewy (1956), 252–3.

[25] διὰ χαρακτήρων καὶ ὀνομάτων ζωτικῶν.

that which he creates something delightful and a veritable image of the eternal gods, for in a sense, the universe has been said to be an image (*agalma*) as a result of the fact that the god is delighted (*agallesthai*) in it. He was delighted, however, not by rejoicing in something situated *external* to himself (for being intellect, how would he look outside himself?), but rather [he was delighted by the fact that] his own boniform will is fulfilled and in the procession of the beneficent power itself in a sharing and provision of more perfect goods that is without envy.[26] This is a fact that Plato himself has indicated sufficiently when he said **and rejoicing he considered how** [the cosmos] **might be made even more like its paradigm**, for he rejoiced primarily in virtue of the cognition that is internal to himself by virtue of the fact that it is simple, unimpeded,[27] such as to simultaneously encompass the intelligible universe in a single thought, and by virtue of the fact that it has been made well-disposed to him[28] through its perfect rest and unity. He rejoices in a secondary manner, if it is lawful to say so, because of the aptitude (*epitêdeiotês*) of those things that receive the abundance of goods that proceed from him.

You can also see from this how Plato imparts [to the reader] the three causes of the particpation (*metousia*) in those goods that proceed into our cosmos from the Father. The most primary [among these causes] is that which results from the power of the *efficient* cause (for it is he [sc. the Demiurge] who now produces time, desiring all the first, middle, and final goods because of the selflessness that is proper to him and his surplus of fertility[29]). Second [among these three causes] is the *aptitude* of the thing that is to receive [the procession from the efficient cause] (for the one who bestows the good things is then delighted when the thing that has a share [in these goods] is aptly disposed to serve as a receptacle for them). The third cause is the commensurability (*symmetria*) that arises from both and, as it were, their symbiosis (*sympnoia*) and

[26] This recalls *Tim*. 29e2 where the Demiurge is said to create the cosmos because he is good and free from envy.

[27] The suggestion that pleasure might consist in the unimpeded activity of a natural state in Aristotle's *NE* 1153b10 becomes solidified in the commentary tradition; cf. Alexander *Quaest*. 134.29, ff.

[28] καὶ φιλοφρονουμένῃ διὰ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸ στάσεως καὶ ἑνώσεως τελέας. An unusual idea. It seems that the stable and unified character of the *noêsis* renders the *noêsis* well-disposed toward the person who has it. Presumably people who are well-disposed toward us are something to rejoice in, so the Demiurge's intellection provides a similar reason for him to rejoice in it. I fail to see how Festugière's translation accommodates the passive participle: 'et qui répand ses bienfaits grâce à la fixité et la parfaite unité qu'elle présente relativement à l'objet'.

[29] Cf. *in Tim*. I 25.16. The γόνιμη περιουσία that is responsible for the procession of higher causes to lower effects is a common theme in the *Platonic Theology* as well. Its presence here with διὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀφθονίαν again recalls *Tim*. 29e2 to his audience.

concord (*symphônia*). After all, it is for this reason that – even though the gods always hold out to everyone all the good things that are coordinate with the particular essences of those [gods] – nonetheless not all of these goods are always received, because we fail to possess the aptitude or are in a state somehow incommensurate with the power of the things that are offered. If, then, we want the divine to delight in us – since it is surely natural for it to delight and rejoice on account of us, even if it is always disposed in the same manner – we must make ourselves aptly disposed to be a receptacle for those things that are good for us which are extended by him to us, lest the gift of god should be inoperative upon us, in spite of its being of such a nature as not to be hindered by anything. These, however, are matters for a different undertaking – one worthy of a more thorough examination. For the moment, let us see how the universe has become more similar to its paradigm with the birth of time.

The fact that the Paradigm is eternal in the primary sense makes it clear in advance to everyone that unless the visible universe had received a kind of secondary eternity, it would be less like the intelligible [universe]. It is also not difficult to see that what has a genesis in change is not only not eternal apart from time, but could not stand even for a minute.[30] **8** Consequently, in order that it may be made more like the intelligible [Paradigm, the universe] needs a *certain sort* of eternity – one whereby it is eternal, but not by having eternity simultaneously present to itself (as the intelligible has it entirely present) – it needs [instead] the totality of time.[31] Moreover, if one were to investigate the nature of time, one would know more clearly not only how time contributes toward making both the whole cosmos and the greater parts of it *eternal*, but also how it assists each and every one of them toward *perfection* and *happiness*. This is just what we intend to reveal as our interpretation proceeds, as we scrutinise the constituent parts of time.

B. The relation of Eternity to Time: *Tim.* 37d3–7

Now since the nature of the Living Being was eternal, it was not possible to confer this in an entirely-complete manner upon that which was generated. So he contrived to make a sort of movable image of eternity,

[30] καὶ ὅτι τὸ ἐν μεταβολῇ τὴν γένεσιν ἔχον τοῦ χρόνου χωρὶς οὐκ [ὅτι] ἀίδιον, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀκαρῆ διαμένειν οἷόν τ' ἦν, οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιδεῖν. Cf. *in Tim.* I 346.21 where τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔνυλον ἀεὶ τρεπόμενον καὶ ῥέον similarly could not stand for a minute.

[31] οὐκ ἔχοντι δὲ ὁμοῦ παροῦσαν αὑτῷ τὴν ἀιδιότητα, καθάπερ τὸ νοητὸν πᾶσαν ἔχει, χρόνου τοῦ σύμπαντος. The genitive phrase at the end of this sentence is not easy to understand apart from Proclus' later references to the 'entire supply of time' or 'the fullness of time'. Cf. III 50.26–30 ὥσπερ τὰ νοητὰ τὴν σύμπασαν δύναμιν τοῦ αἰῶνος ἑνωτικὴν οὖσαν καὶ συνεκτικὴν ἤδη καὶ ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀθρόως καὶ ἑνιαίως ὑποδέχεται, οὕτω καὶ ὁ κόσμος τὴν σύμπασαν τοῦ χρόνου χορείαν μεριστῶς καὶ διῃρημένως.

and at the same time that he arranged the heavens he made of eternity remaining in one, an eternal image proceeding according to number. It is surely this that we have called time. (*Tim.* 37d3–7)

1. The common conception of Eternity

That the Living Being Itself is the plenum (*plêrôma*) constituted from the plurality of intelligible living beings and that it is always the same and changeless – these are among the propositions that have frequently been considered and accepted by those philosophers and there is no dispute among the philosophers who follow Plato about what has been pointed out. However, what eternity is, and what it is for time to imitate eternity in a manner that involves motion – this[32] *is* something that it is utterly difficult to conceive and interpret authoritatively. It is nonetheless necessary to relate the more useful of the things that the older philosophers found acceptable on these two points and to endeavour to add whatever we are able toward a clear and distinct resolution to the investigation of the matter before us.

The majority of people have some conception or awareness of time.[33] Looking to the motion of the things in the sub-lunary realm or that of
9 the celestial [bodies], they have some notion[34] that time has *something* to do with motion – whether it be the number of motion or the dimension (*paratasis*) of motion or some other such thing. The more gifted among them proceeded to a consideration of eternity and observed that there was not merely motion in the universe but an *eternal* motion that was orderly and circling around in a manner that was always the same. From this observation these people were prompted [to recognise] that this invariant, eternal [character] belonged to the things that were moved, not as a result of the things themselves, but as a result of something else. Now, this something else is either unmoved or else it is something that is itself in motion. If the latter, then either it is in motion at some time or there is no such time and it has always been in motion. If it is in motion *at some time* [and not at all times], then how is it responsible for the fact that [the heavenly bodies] *always* move in the same way? If, on

[32] It is not clear to me why Diehl brackets the δὲ in line 23 rather than the one in 24. Surely it answers the μὲν at line 18 and serves to mark the contrast between what is easy and undisputed about this passage, on the one hand, and what is difficult and controversial on the other. Surely the presence of ὅμως at 24 renders the δὲ there superfluous. In spite of the difficulty and attendant disagreement, Proclus will go on to recount the views of the ancients and add whatever he is able.

[33] On common notions concerning time, see Van den Berg (2009).

[34] κινήσεώς τι τὸν χρόνον εἶναι νομίζοντες, οἷον ἀριθμὸν ἢ παράτασιν ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον. Cf. the *nomima* of the lovers of sights and sounds concerning the nature of Beauty in *Rep.* v 479a–d.

the other hand, [the putative source of the heavens' motion] is always in motion, then once again the eternal character of *its* motion will be due to something else. So we will either be left with an infinite regress or we will come to something that is *motionless* that is responsible for the eternal motion of the things that always moved. The activity of this motionless thing will no longer be temporal but rather eternal, for the distinctive characteristic of things that are temporal is that they always *come to be*, while it is characteristic of things that are eternal that they always *are*. The common conception is thought to mean that the word 'eternity' (*to aiôn*) is derived from 'to be always' (*to aei on*),[35] just as the word 'time' (*to chronon*) is derived from 'dance'[36] (*choreia*) which is motion and has its existence in coming to be. Because of these things, most people – and all of those who are wise – seem to me to grasp time, and those who are wise at least have grasped the primary concept about eternity as a result of looking to the nature that is always being moved and that which is always stable (*monimos*). However, it is now necessary to say what each of these is and it is especially important to do so in terms of the teachings of the divine Plato.

2. *Aristotle's account of Time and Eternity*

Now Aristotle defined time as the number of motion, not the number *with which* we count, but that which *gets counted*.[37] Given this definition he quite plausibly inquired what it is that does the counting, since time is that which gets counted (for these things are relatives (*pros ti*) and if the one exists, then so too does the other),[38] but his resolution of this problem is insufficently bold since he said that some *soul* is that which does the counting,[39] for it is necessary for there to be that which *does the counting* eternally prior to the eternal number [that gets counted] in order that it should always make it, since what comes to be [as a result of the counting] always exists. Having defined time as the countable [aspect] of motion he also says that Eternity is intelligible: since the word 'eternity' (*aiôn*) has been derived eponymously from always being (*to aei on*) and because it possesses and contains all the time there is. As a result of this he says that everything is dependent upon Being and Life, some things

35 The same etymology is given in Aristotle, *Cael.* 1 9 279a27.

36 Simplicius has a slightly different version of this ancient wisdom according to which χρόνος is derived from χορείᾳ τινὶ τῆς ψυχῆς περὶ τὸν νοῦν (*in Cat.* 351.34).

37 Aristotle, *Physics* IV 11, 219b5–8: ἀριθμὸς ἄρα τις ὁ χρόνος. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀριθμός ἐστι διχῶς (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ τὸ ἀριθμητὸν ἀριθμὸν λέγομεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν), ὁ δὴ χρόνος ἐστὶν τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ οὐχ ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν.

38 Cf. Aristotle, *Cat.* 6a36–7: Πρός τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον·

39 *Physics* IV 12, 223a21–29.

in ways that are indistinct, while others [show this dependence] more clearly.

3. The Platonists' account of time

At present, however, it is necessary for us to see as clearly as possible what eternity is and what time is according to Plato, and not to accept [an account of] time which is merely [an account of] the image of time, nor to accept that intelligible eternity is simply some god, but to determine exactly in what order of intelligibles it has first been established. *This* is the thing that is particularly special about Plato's science (*epistêmê*).

It is antecedently obvious to everyone that eternity is something more dignified, fundamental and stable (as it were) than the Living Being Itself – even though the latter is indeed the most beautiful and perfect among the intelligible living beings, as Plato said at first (30d2). If the Living Being is, and is said to be, eternal as a result of participation, but Eternity has not been said to participate in the Living Being, nor been found to be derived from it eponymously, then it is obvious that the former is secondary and the latter is simpler and more fundamental, since Eternity does not participate in the Living Being due to the fact that [Eternity] is not a living thing, for neither is visible time something living. Nor is it [sc. Eternity] some other living thing [coordinate with the Living Being], for it has been shown that since the Living Being is eternal, it is one of a kind.[40] For this reason, Eternity is something greater than [the eternal Living Being], for that which is eternal is neither identical to Eternity nor something greater than Eternity. Just as everyone says that what is ensouled or is endowed with intellect comes after soul or intellect, so too surely that which is eternal is secondary to Eternity.[41]

a. Eternity and the Living Being Itself

'What then could eternity be', someone might say, 'if it is more dignified than the Living Being Itself – something which he has already said to be "the most beautiful among the objects of thought and perfect in every way" (*Tim.* 30d2)?' More precisely, it is most beautiful since even if it has received the highest degree of beauty through its extensive participation, it has not similarly received the highest degree of the good for it was not

[40] Accepting Diehl's emendation in line 18 μονογενὲς τὸ αὐτοζῷον αἰώνιον <ὄν>. Cf. *Tim.* 31a8–b3 and Proclus' commentary on this passage at 1 458.1–6 where he argues that the uniqueness of the cosmos indicates that it is an image of Eternity and the One-Being.

[41] That is to say, just as what is *ennoun* or *empsychon* is dependent upon the prior existence of *nous* or *psychê*, so too what is *aiônion* is dependent upon an *aiôn* that is prior to it.

said to be *the best*. Consequently, it would then be possible for it to be subordinate to that which is best. In addition, it was not said to be the most beautiful of all the intelligibles *simpliciter*, but to be the most beautiful of all of the *living beings* that are objects of thought. Therefore [eternity] is not itself a living being, but if it is indeed life, it is infinite life. With respect to the next point, it is not in fact necessary that what is perfect in every way should be the very first [in order], for what is perfect has everything, so it has beginning, middle and end.[42] But that which is superior to this division [into first, middle and last] would then be superperfect (*hyperteleios*). Therefore nothing prevents Eternity from being ranked higher than that Living Being which is the most beautiful and perfect in every respect (there being many living things that are the object of intellection) if Eternity is in fact *best* and *superperfect*.[43]

11

The next thing to observe is that the Living Being Itself has been given a more honoured status than the plurality of living beings that are intellectualised (*nooumenos*). It is because of this fact, then, that he says: 'the most beautiful among the objects of thought and perfect in every way' (*Tim*. 30d2). Moreover Eternity is also superior to the plurality of intelligible (*noêtos*) living things (for the latter are things that are eternal, but eternal things *participate* in Eternity) and is not coordinate with the plurality of them. In fact, they stand opposed to it in a sense, for it unifies

[42] It is difficult to find a form of words in English that brings out the argument here since this trades on the dual sense of *teleion* as perfect or complete and lacking nothing. Proclus argues that what is totally complete/perfect (*to kata panta teleion*) need not be the thing that is most primary or basic. Granted, it has everything and so has what is first, middle and end. That is, there's nothing missing. But somehow things that transcended the multiplicity of beginning, middle and end, could nonetheless be superior to this.

[43] Proclus makes use of existing mathematical terminology here. A number is *hyperteleion* or superperfect if the sum of its factors is a number greater than itself. Thus 12 is a superperfect since $6 + 4 + 3 + 2 + 1 = 16$. Superperfects stand opposed to perfect numbers which equal the sum of their factors. In the Pythagorean tradition, perfects are equated with symmetry and thus, of course, beauty. By contrast superperfects (as well as their opposites, deficient numbers) are equated with vice, disease and inappropriateness. For the definition, see Nicomachus, *Arith*. 1 §14. The moral and aesthetic connotations that are already present in Nicomachus are further elaborated by Asclepius in his commentary on Nicomachus' *Introduction to Arithmetic* (106.25 ff.) and summarised briefly in Elias, *in Porphry. Isagog*. 24.31 ff. There is thus evidence that these negative moral and aesthetic associations had a long history within the Pythagorean–Platonic tradition. This makes it initially somewhat surprising that Proclus is willing to use *hyperteleion* as an epithet for Eternity. However, his point in doing so emerges when we consider the fact that he is proposing to rank Eternity before the *Autozôon* which Plato has described as all-perfect or *pantelon*. How can there be anything beyond perfect? By being superperfect! Presumably he would be able to reassure any listeners who were acquainted with the Pythagorean associations around *hyperteleion* that this case was quite different.

the plurality and it has been said to remain in the One,[44] in as much as it has itself not been pluralised. The Living Being Itself, however, *includes* all such intelligible living things[45] and for this reason it stands in need of Eternity in order to have a share in unification, continuity, and motionless, changeless life through it. It is doubtless for this reason that when Plato adds that it [sc. the Living Being Itself] is eternal (*Tim.* 37d1–3), he does not say that it possesses plurality in itself, but rather refers to it in the singular. This signifies the unity that is especially present in it due to Eternity, since the entire essence (*ousia*) of the intelligible living things is made manifest as a single nature.

b. Eternity is not among the five genera

Of course if these things have been said correctly, then it could not be the case that Eternity is some particular genus of Being, as some have thought – for instance, Being or Rest or Sameness (for these things are parts of the Living Being Itself and each of them possesses a sort of opposite as it were: the first opposed to not-Being, the second to Motion and the last to the Different. But Eternity is opposed to nothing. In any event, all these things at least are similarly eternal, viz. Sameness, Difference, Rest and Motion, which would not be the case if one among them *were* Eternity, for it is not the case that Rest is similarly Rest and Motion,[46] but all the intelligibles are eternal and always existent in the same way. Therefore Eternity is not opposed to any thing, either among these [forms] nor among those things that come after them, for even time – which might seem to be in some relation of opposition to Eternity – is, in the first place, not caught up with the same things as Eternity, but rather deals with things that are unable to receive maintenance from the Eternal. Secondly, time is an *image* of Eternity, not an *opposite* to it, as has already been stated – and as we shall provide an additional demonstration later.[47] Therefore Eternity cannot be either

[44] Cf. *Tim.* 37d6: μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνὶ.

[45] At *Tim.* 31a4–5 the Paradigm or the intelligible Living Being is said to περιέχον πάντα ὁπόσα νοητὰ ζῷα. That which includes a plurality of things in such a way as to nonetheless be one thing, must stand in need of some unifying principle that is prior to it. Thus Eternity is prior to the Living Being.

[46] The argument seems to require that we accept Kroll's proposal here of οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως στάσις ἡ στάσις καὶ [ἡ] κίνησις for the text's οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως στάσις ἡ στάσις καὶ ἡ κίνησις. This argument is parallel to the one at *in Parm.* 1171.23 that the One can be neither Motion nor Rest. Proclus regards this as a general argument schema: πολλάκις κοινὸν περὶ τούτων κανόνα ὄντα τοιοῦτον.

[47] Cf. 17.17–18.12 for Proclus' discussion of what *is* implied in saying that time is an image of Eternity and 32.32–34.13 for his discussion of Iamblichus, Porphyry, Amelius and Numenius on this question.

one genus of Being [considered individually] nor the collection of all the genera of Being taken together, for if there were plurality in Eternity, it would stand in need of the unification that results from 'remaning in one' (*Tim.* 37d6). But being eternal is a matter of remaining in one. As a result, [if Eternity were the collection of all the kinds of Being] it would both remain in one and not remain: it would remain in as much as it is eternal and the cause of the unification that is present to things that are, but it would not remain in one in as much as it is something compounded out of a plurality. 12

In addition to these [considerations] the intellect that is composed from these genera and thinks its products is present to everything [just as Eternity is].[48] But the concept (*ennoia*) of Intellect is one thing, while that of Eternity another, just as the concepts of soul and time are different. For while the activity of Intellect is changeless cognition (*ametabatos noêsis*), the activity of Eternity is indivisible everlastingness (*aidiotês ameristos*). The things [that engage in these activities] have also been distinguished from one another in this manner. However, those who have collapsed everything into the same level, and place only one Intellect between Soul and the Good, are compelled to say that 'intellect' and 'eternity' have the same meaning.

c. Proclus' account of Eternity

What, then, is eternity if it is neither some one among the genera of Being nor that which arises from the five [genera] taken together, since all these things are eternal or not far from eternity? What can it be other than the single comprehension (*mia periochê*) of the intelligible henads? – I mean by 'henads' the forms of the intelligible living beings and the genera of all of these intelligible forms. In any event, the single comprehension of them and of the highest gradations of their pluralities is also

[48] πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πᾶσι νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ ἐκ τῶν γενῶν καὶ νοεῖ τὰ ἀποτελούμενα. As Festugière notes, this is very obscure. His translation takes πᾶσι with τούτοις: 'Outre tout cela, ce qui est composé des Genres de l'Être est un Intellect, et il intellige en fait les êtres dont il est la cause.' This is certainly possible, but this leaves the line of argument somewhat obscure. If we see these two datives playing different roles, then the transition to the difference in the activities of intellect and Eternity makes more sense. Both *nous* and Eternity play some role in making the intelligibles the kinds of things that they are. Could they be the same thing? If their activities make different results to the intelligibles, then the answer must be No. It is unclear who is the target of the criticism in the final sentence. Perhaps Proclus thinks that anyone, like Plotinus, who does not create a stratified order of intellects within the intelligible realm is open to such a charge.

the cause of the unchangeable continuation (*anexallaktos diamonê*)[49] of all things. It is not *in* the many intelligibles themselves, nor is it something that is a result of them being taken as an *aggregate*, but rather it is present to them in a *transcendent* manner, and by itself arranges them, forming them, as it were, and by this very fact at the same time makes them to be wholes.[50] The manifold form of intelligibles has not been introduced immediately after the Good which is entirely without a hint of plurality, but rather there are intermediate natures which are, on the one hand, more unified than the plurality of what is all-perfect, but, on the other hand, exhibit within themselves a hint (*emphasis*) of the birth-pangs of the generation and maintenance of wholes. The number and character [of these henads] the gods know in a manner that is divine, but which the mystical tradition of the *Parmenides* teaches in a manner that is human and philosophical. However, the precise exegesis of these matters we will put off until we deal with that dialogue.

For the moment, however, we point out that the Eternal is above the All-perfect Living Being and that it is proximately above it – facts that are indicated through the very words of the philosopher. On the one hand, since he says that it [sc. the Living Being] is eternal (*Tim.* 37d1), it must be secondary to Eternity. On the other hand, since there is nothing eternal prior to it, it would have to be positioned immediately after Eternity. How does it follow that there is nothing eternal prior to the All-perfect Living Being? I would say that it is because there exists nothing *temporal* prior to the All-perfect Living Being's *image*, but rather it is the case that both the cosmos participates in a primary way (*prôtôs*) in time and the Living Being Itself participates in a primary way in Eternity. If Eternity stands to time as the Living Being stands to the cosmos, then – 'alternating the proportion' as children say when they are doing geometry – as Eternity stands to the Living Being, so time stands to the cosmos. Furthermore, the cosmos *is* the first thing to participate in time (for generally speaking there was no such thing as time prior to the arrangement of the heavenly bodies (*Tim.* 38b6)), and hence the Living Being Itself is likewise the first participant in Eternity. But if time is not identical with the *perceptible* living being that is the universe (for time came into existence along with it, but what has come

13

[49] It is likely that ἀνεξάλλακτος is a Proclean neologism. We find the word first attested in his works and subsequent usages are largely confined to the Neoplatonic tradition. As here, it is frequently conjoined with verbs associated with rest or stability.

[50] Or perhaps 'by this very fact constitutes them as universals' (καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο <τῷ> ἅμα ὅλα εἶναι ποιοῦσα). Though the details of this account of the role of Eternity are difficult, its general import is clear. Eternity is situated above the level of the henads and plays the role of an intermediate through which plurality is manifested from the One – from which it is absolutely absent – to the henads which are plural in number.

to be along with something is not the same as that with which it has come to be), then neither is Eternity the same thing as the *intelligible* Living Being. As a result, Eternity is not even a living thing, lest there be *two* intelligible Living Beings, for it has been demonstrated that the Living Being Itself which is right after Eternity is one of a kind.[51] So if Eternity is not a living thing, it will not be a living thing other than the Living Being Itself. So in general, Eternity is not a living thing [at all] – for [it would have to be] either different from the Living Being Itself or the same. But it is not possible to say either of these, as we have demonstrated. The first is impossible because the Living Being is one of a kind. The second alternative is impossible because time is not the same as that which is temporal. And if [Eternity] is subject to participation by the Intelligible Living Being, but it does not itself participate in the Intelligible Living Being, then it would be prior to the Living Being Itself. While Eternity is an intelligible god, it is not yet a living thing, for [Eternity must be a god,] if the Living Being Itself is in fact a god, and the latter [clearly is the case] if the cosmos is in fact a god (*Tim*. 34b). Up there [among the intelligibles] that which is subject to participation by something that it does not itself participate in is entirely more universal (*holikôteros*). Furthermore, it is clear that the mode of participation is not equivalent in the two cases [i.e. in the intellible and sensible realm], for the association (*koinônia*) and unification among the intelligibles which we have just now – abusing the language – called 'participation' is one thing, but the participation that takes place in the case of sensible things down here is quite another. The position (*taxis*) that Eternity has in relation to the Living Being Itself has thus been made clear: that the former is above the latter, and proximately above it, and it has also been made clear that it is the cause whereby the intelligibles are always the same and invariable. (For if someone were to make Rest the cause of this, there is nonetheless, on the one hand, the cause that is at the same level and is to do with activity rather than the invariability, on the other hand, there is also that cause which is transcendent.)[52] Finally, it has been

14

[51] It seems that we must read ὑπ' αὐτοῦ προσεχῶς rather than the text's πρότερον. Cf. Festugière's translation: '…le Vivant-en-soi qui est immédiatement sous l'Éternité'.

[52] ὅτι τοῦ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν ἐστὶν αἰτία τοῖς νοητοῖς (καὶ γὰρ εἰ τὴν στάσιν τούτου τις αἰτιῷτο, ἀλλ' ἡ μέν ἐστι συντεταγμένη αἰτία καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν παρεχομένη μᾶλλον τὸ ὡσαύτως, ἡ δὲ ἐξῃρημένη). Festugière takes τούτου with αἰών and supposes that what is referred to here is 'le Repos de l'Éternité'. In view of the μέν … δέ that follows he amplifies this to insert: 'encore est-il qu'il ya a deux sortes de Repos, l'un qui est cause coordonnée et qui présente davantage l'uniformité dans l'ordre de l'activité, l'autre qui est cause transcendante'. It is certainly possible that Eternity might have its own Rest, as Soul has its own Motion, Rest, Being, Sameness and Difference. Proclus certainly

made clear that Eternity is a comprehension (*periochê*) or unification of many intelligible henads. It is for this reason that Eternity was said by the Oracles to be 'father-begotten light' since the unifying light surely shines upon all things:

> For [Aeon] alone, copiously plucking the flower of intellect from the strength of the Father has the power to cognise the Paternal Intellect <and> to impart <Intellect> to all sources and principles, and to whirl them about[53] and keep them forever in ceaseless motion. (*Or. Chald.* 49, trans. Majercik)

Since it is saturated with Paternal Divinity, which the Oracles call the flower of intellect, it illuminates all things with intellect and the thought that is invariably the same, and the activity that is revolved around the first principle of all things in a manner that is filled with love (*erôtikôs*). But these are matters that I unfold 'in the inaccessible recesses of thought' (*Or. Chald.* 178).[54]

4. Lexis

Once more pursuing it from every direction, let us take hold of the philosopher's conception behind the words **of the eternity that remains in one**. Let us consider what sort of thing is meant by this 'one'. Is it then the Good, as the most theologically inclined[55] of the interpreters supposed? But the Good is not able to remain in itself due to its simplicity – a simplicity about which we have learnt in the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides* (138a2–b5) where he said that it is neither in itself nor in another. In general nothing is *in* the Good nor *with* it, due to the fact that it transcends anything that one might suppose to be

goes on to describe the Being of Eternity (15.11–13). But it seems equally possible to take the genitive τούτου and the verb αἰτίαομαι to attribute causal responsibility *for* the invariable sameness of the intelligible *to* Rest. I suspect that Eternity is, for Proclus, a higher cause than Rest. So the next clause means that Rest is a *coordinate* cause to the other intelligibles of the stability of their activity, while the *transcendent* cause of their invariable sameness is Eternity.

53 Reading καὶ δινεῖν for καὶ τὸ νοεῖν in line 10 with all three editors of the *Oracles*.

54 This is one of the fragments that Tardieu and Lewy (1978) found doubtful, so perhaps it is better to give it the sense that Festugière does whereby it amounts to the admission that this interpretation of *Or. Chald.* 49 is Proclus' own inspired insight – 'Mais ce sont là choses que je développe seulement dans les plus secrètes retraites de ma pensée.' Another possibility is that this alludes to the 'unwritten evening classes' that Proclus held (Marinus, *Vit. Proc.* 22, 547–53). On this subject, see Lamberton (2001), 453.

55 Diehl initially took this interpreter to be Iamblichus, but in the corrigenda to volume III supposes this to be a reference to Syrianus, not Iamblichus. Dillon (1973) 343, however, argues that this is unlikely. Hence he includes *in Tim.* III 14.16–19 as fragment 61 of Iamblichus' *Timaeus Commentary*. The most detailed study of Syrianus' view on time – Klitenic Wear (2008) – concurs with Dillon's judgement on this matter.

coordinate with it. Moreover, it is not typically called 'good' or 'one' but rather '*the* Good' or '*the* One', with the inclusion of the definite article to show that we should conceive its monadic [i.e. singular] superiority above and beyond all the natures that are known by us. But in the text at hand it is not said that Eternity remains in *the* One, but that it remains in one. Consequently, Eternity is not in the Good.

Well then, do the words **of the eternity that remains in one** reveal Eternity's being unified, as it were, and its remaining in its own one, and the fact that it does not proceed into plurality, nor number in general, in order that it may be the cause of unification for the plurality of intelligibles? Or is this also true, as we ourselves say – that [eternity remains in one] in order that it may provide stability and wholeness to itself prior to providing it to the things that are eternal (for this is what it is to remain in one), having the whole and its very existence present to it simultaneously and unchangeably. In any event, every divine thing originates its activities from itself, so that Eternity will establish itself and sustain itself invariably in the one that is prior to the things that are eternal. Thus the cause of continuation (*diamonê*) is not Being (*to on*), as Strato the physicist[56] said, but rather it is Eternity [that is the cause] – not, however, of a continuation that is always coming to be, [but rather Eternity is the cause whereby things continue] unchangeably in one substance, as Timaeus said. And if Eternity exhibits a dyad – though this is something that we would often be happy to conceal (for the 'always' is invariably connected to 'being' [in the phrase 'that which always is'] and 'that which always is' (*to aei on*) just is eternity (*aiôn*)) – then it seems to possess the monad of Being prior to it and the One-Being,[57] and to remain in this one, as our teacher [Syrianus][58] too thought concerning this 'one'. It does this in order that it may be a one prior to being a dyad, since it is hardly likely to have departed from the One. The dyad within it which presents a premonition of plurality is united to the One-Being in which Eternity remains. However, the plurality of

[56] Strato of Lampsacus was the head of Aristotle's school after Theophrastus. He is thought to have died somewhere between 287 and 269. *in Tim.* III 15.8–11 = fr. 40 in Wehrli. Strato's book *On Being*, seems to have caught the attention of the Neoplatonists. The only evidence we have for its content comes from Proclus and Damascius.

[57] The One-Being (*to hen on*) alludes to the second hypothesis of the *Parmenides* (142e–155e). As *in Tim.* I 230.6–14 indicates, one question that occupies the Neoplatonic interpreters is the relative rank of the *to hen on* and 'that which always is' or the 'always-existent' (*to aei on*). Syrianus and Iamblichus seem to have had slightly different views on this subject, and Proclus' own view seems somewhat different again. See Introduction pp. 8–10.

[58] III 15.11–16.1 = Syrianus, *in Tim.* fr. 17 (Klitenic Wear). Her commentary has a useful diagram representing the various levels in question.

intelligibles is united to Eternity Itself which includes and sustains all of their highest gradations in a manner that is transcendent and unitary.[59] It is clear, then, that the concepts of the One-Being and the Eternity differ from one another, for 'to be always' and simply 'to be' are entirely different. In any case, if something always is, it exists *simpliciter*, but not the contrary – it is not the case that if something exists, this thing exists always. Therefore 'to be' is more universal (*holikôteros*) and generic than 'to be always' and because of these facts the former [sc. the One-Being] is closer to the cause of everything – of the things that are, of those henads that are present in the beings, of generation itself, and of matter. These three things then are in order: 1) the One-Being as the monad of things that are, 2) Eternity as a dyad that possesses Always together with Being, 3) the Eternal that participates in Being and Always and is not the thing that always is in the primary manner, as Eternity is. The One-Being is the cause of being *simpliciter* (*to einai monôs*) to all such things as <are>[60] in any way, whether they genuinely are (*ontôs*) or whether they fail to
16 genuinely be (*ouk ontôs*).[61] Eternity, by contrast, is the cause of things' continuation in being (*diamonê en to einai*). Strato ought rather to have said this, and not defined Being (*to on*) as the continuation of things that are, as he has written in his book *On Being*, thereby transferring the distinctive feature (*to idion*) of Eternity to Being. [Parity of reasoning shows that] in the case of generated things that 'to come to be' is not the same thing as 'the continuaton of becoming'. Rather, the distinguishing feature of becoming is to exhibit now one thing and now another, while the distinguishing feature of the continuation of becoming is the time in which the genesis comes to be. But time plays the same role as regards Becoming that Eternity plays with respect to Being (*ousia*). However, let our exposition of the greatest of the eternal gods that have remained in one cease at this point.

Why did he use the past tense in the phrase **the nature of the Living Being *was* eternal** rather than the present tense, if indeed present tense (*to nun*) is better adapted to eternity than that which has already happened

[59] Cf. 12.17–22 above where Eternity is equated by Proclus with the single comprehension of the highest gradations of the intelligibles' plurality.

[60] Reading οὖσιν in the lacuna at 15.32 with Diehl. Cf. 15.15–16 καὶ ὅπερ ἐπὶ ταύτης ὁ χρόνος, τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αἰών.

[61] Cf. I 233.2 and II 128.1 where Proclus gives the following four-fold division: (1) the noetic realm = what genuinely is (*to ontôs on*); (2) Soul = that which is not genuine being (*to ouk ontôs on*); (3) Sensible things = that which is not genuinely not-being (*to ouk ontôs ouk on*); (4) Matter = that which is genuine not-being (*to ontôs ouk on*). The One-Being will be the cause of the existence of 1–3, while the One alone is the cause of matter; cf. *ET* prop. 59.

is?[62] He has of course used the past tense in other places as well, as when he says about he who is good always [sc. the Demiurge] that he *was* good (*Tim*. 29e1). This form of diction does not signify that the Demiurge was this way from some time, but that he was always this way. This shows that when it comes to things that are divine, the ends are prefigured in, and coincide with, the beginnings prior to the entire sequence. Now [i.e. in the text at hand], however, is an opportune moment to use the past tense. After all, since he "creates the cosmos" [only] in a hypothetical sense, [then in the narrative order of the hypothetical creation] prior to the actual ordering there would be no time. Instead, therefore, the intelligibles and such things as are present with them possess a priority of value [rather than a temporal priority], so for this Plato has used the past tense, **was**. But his use of the present-tense participle of 'to be' (*ousa*) [to complement the past tense finite verb] comes to the rescue of this weakness, for he has made it substantial (*ousiôdês*) as well. The sentence about Eternity was thus no less appropriate to [its subject matter] than the present tense, since he gave his sentence completeness through the use of [a past-tense verb], while introducing substantial being alongside this through the use of the present participle of 'to be'.[63] Enough, however, about these little points of grammar.

Why was it **not possible to confer this [eternal character of the model] in a manner that is entirely-complete upon that which was generated**? It is because the universe is generated. You might say that it has its existence in the process of change, while that which is completely eternal is changeless and ungenerated. Since these natures are opposed to one another, if one were to impose 'that which is eternal in an entirely-complete manner'[64] upon 'that which has come to be', this would not make it changeless but would rather destroy its nature. If the Eternal cannot be present in an entirely-complete manner to what is **17** sensible, is it therefore present in some manner or other? How could we fail to agree with this? That which participates in the image of eternity

[62] The question is why we have ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῴου φύσις ἐτύγχανεν οὖσα αἰώνιος at *Tim*. 37d3 while Timaeus goes on to make the point that the past and future tense of verbs are not properly applied to that which always is at 37e3–5.

[63] Recall that Eternity (*aiôn*) is equated with what always is (*aei on*). Presumably the use of the past tense conveys the connotation of 'always', since if Plato saw Socrates last Tuesday, then it is henceforth *always* the case that Plato saw Socrates on that day. The 'is' part of the composite is provided by the present tense participle of the verb 'to be'. I suspect that this making of interpretative mountains out of grammatical molehills might reflect something in the content of Porphyry's *Timaeus Commentary* – a response, perhaps, to a puzzle raised about Plato's use of language within the school of Longinus.

[64] τὸ δὲ παντελῶς αἰώνιον – that is, to be eternal in the manner in which the Paradigm or the All-perfect Living Being is. On the use of modes or manners of being that Proclus expresses with such adverbial phrases, see Baltzly (2008).

participates in *some* way in eternity too, even if it is not in the same way as that which participates in Eternity in an unmediated way. Generally speaking, it is always the case that the higher causes order and have authority over those that are subordinate. Consequently, Eternity is present in a way to those things that are ordered by time. On the one hand, All-Perfect Limit[65] is together (*suneinai*) in a unitary manner only with intelligible beings, but on the other hand it is nonetheless able to be present (*pareinai*) to encosmic beings in a manner that is pluralised thanks to the divisible perfection and determinate measures of life and especially through the Being of the celestial souls. The cosmos itself receives Eternity's indivisible presence and illumination, not in such a way that it is itself as Eternity is, for it is not said to *be* eternal, but to be *able* [to receive Eternity's indivisible illumination in a divisible way].[66] This special good, therefore, that belongs to the divine cause and comprehension (*periochê*) is also in Eternity, wherefore it doubtless includes, by virtue of a preliminary causal concatenation, the things that are divisible and opposed in a way to its own nature.[67] That is enough on such matters.

In what sense is time said to be an **image** of Eternity? Is it because, while Eternity *remains* in the[68] one, time *proceeds* in accordance with number? This contrast, however, is more indicative of the dissimilarity between time and eternity than their similarity, for it oppposes almost all

[65] Perhaps a synonym for the Eternity. Cf. *Plat. Theol.* III 62.5.

[66] Diehl's text is: καὶ δέχεται αὐτὸς ὁ κόσμος οὐχ ὡς ἔστιν † αὐτὸς ὁ αἰών, διὸ μηδ' αἰώνιος εἶναι λέγεται, ἀλλ' ὡς δύναται τὴν ἀμέριστον αὐτοῦ παρουσίαν καὶ ἔλλαμψιν. His note reads: priore loco αὐτὸν s, sed debuit τὸν αιῶνα. That's one solution. But Harold Tarrant suggests instead reading οὐχ ὡς ἔστιν αὐτὸς <ὡς> ὁ αἰών which yields our text by haplography. For the philosophical point supplied in the square brackets, see II 100.19. The universe is eternal by existing at each moment that there is in eternal time. Forms, such as Eternity itself, are eternal by receiving the whole of time simultaneously or, as we would put it, by being timeless.

[67] This is pretty obscure: θείας ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο αἰτίας καὶ περιοχῆς ἐξαίρετον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι, διόπερ δὴ καὶ τὰ μεριστὰ καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπεναντία πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν κατ' αἰτίας ἐπιπλοκὴν περιέχει. Festugière translates: 'En cela donc aussi, il faut voir le privilège d'une cause et d'un principe compréhensif divins, c'est pourquoi elle enveloppe, en vertu d'une connexion causale, même les êtres divisés et qui sont comme en contradiction avec sa propre nature.' I find this perplexing. Does 'il faut voir' mean that Festugière is taking θείας as a verb rather than with αἰτίας καὶ περιοχῆς? But what then of 'd'un principe compréhensif *divins*'? And where is ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι? I suspect that the divine and comprehensive cause is the eternal Living Being upon which the visible cosmos is modelled. The 'special good' that is the cosmos' beginningless and endless temporal existence must be in some sense prefigured in the timelessly eternal cause.

[68] Given the emphasis that Proclus has just placed on absence of the definite article in the lemma at 14.27–8 (νυνὶ δὲ οὐκ "ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ" μένειν ὁ αἰὼν εἴρηται, ἀλλ' "ἐν ἑνί") it is somewhat surprising to find here μένει μὲν ὁ αἰὼν ἐν τῷ ἑνί.

these things to all [others]: going out to remaining; numerical sequence to being in one; the image to the thing itself. Hence it is surely better to say that the god has introduced these two – I mean Eternity and time – forth as measures or metrics of different things; the one of beings that exist intelligibly, the other of encosmic beings. Therefore just as the cosmos has been said to be an image of the intelligible, so too the cosmic metric has been denominated an image of the metric of the intelligible. Eternity, however, is a measure in the way the one or the unit is, while time is a measure in the way that number is.[69] Each of these two performs some measuring, but while the first measures those things that are made one, as well as the continuation (*diamonê*) of things that are, the other measures those things that are numbered and the dimension (*paratasis*) of things that come to be. These apparent oppositions do not really reveal some sort of dissimilarity between the measures themselves, but reveal that secondary things have been brought forth from those that are senior to them, for procession comes from Rest (*monê*), while number comes from the One.

18

But perhaps time is also an image of Eternity for this reason too – because it is such as to produce the completeness of encosmic things in the same way that Eternity is [responsible for] the completeness of the things that are, as the 'Connectors' or 'Guardians' are.[70] Just as those things which are incapable of living in accordance with intellect are brought forth under the order of Fate lest, as a result of having abandoned the divine, they should become completely disorderly, so too those things that have proceeded from Eternity and have not been enabled to participate in the whole of stable perfection, simultaneously and forever the same,[71] are perfected[72] under the authority of time, and are prompted by it toward their own proper activities. Because of this

[69] We need to keep in mind that in the Pythagorean tradition, one or the unit is not itself a number: it is the source of number. When eternity 'measures' something unified and calls it one, it is not counting it. We count or measure things in accordance with number only where we have a plurality.

[70] These are divinities within the system of the Chaldean Oracles. The Connectors (*sunoxeis*) protect various parts of the universe and serve to create harmony within it. Cf. Majercik (1989) and Brisson (2003).

[71] Reading ταὐτα for ταῦτα in ἅμα καὶ ἀεὶ ταῦτα τελεῖ with Festugière. Since intelligibles are the things that participate directly in Eternity, Proclus presumably connects this with the idea of things that are invariably the same or ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ.

[72] οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ προελθόντα τοῦ αἰῶνος καὶ μὴ δυνηθέντα μετέχειν τῆς ἑστώσης τελειότητος ὅλης ἅμα καὶ ἀεὶ ταῦτα τελεῖ μὲν εἰς τὴν ἐπικράτειαν τοῦ χρόνου, διεγείρεται δὲ παρ' αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὰς προσφόρους ἑαυτοῖς ἐνεργείας. As it stands, the text leaves it a complete mystery what the subject could be for τελεῖ. If, however, we read a passive τελεῖται parallel to the διεγείρεται with the coordinate δὲ then the τὰ προελθόντα can clearly serve as the subject for both.

they have been enabled to achieve the ends that have been appointed to them through a certain regular temporal cycle.

It is a good thing that he called the Demiurge's creation of time a '**device**' (*epinoia*), for to grant to things that are by nature not eternal a temporal everlastingness that is foreign to them, and to give perfection to those things that are not perfect, and to give a regular circular motion to things that are disposed to go in a straight line – well, this seems close to qualifying as a 'device' or 'contrivance'. It is for this reason that in the text that follows (*Tim.* 37e3) he describes the god as having *contrived* the generation of the parts of time.

But in what sense is the image of Eternity said to be **movable**? Is it because it is everywhere in motion and the whole of time is in motion? No, this is impossible, for nothing undergoes motion in *every* respect,[73] not even things that undergo substantial change, for the underlying substrate remains in these cases. To a far greater extent, then, will the things that undergo the other kinds of change[74] remain [unchanged] with respect to their essence, whether they undergo growth, or alteration, or are moved locally. If the things that undergo change did not remain [the same] in some respect, then their motion would be destroyed along with them, for every change or motion is a change *in* something.[75] Therefore nothing undergoes change in every respect, just as we said, and this is especially the case with such things as are eternal – things which surely must be ensconced in their appropriate first principles and must remain in themselves if they wish to be continually preserved. An image of Eternity is especially obliged somehow to possess stability and to be always invariant. As a result it is impossible for time to be itself subject to change (*kinêtos*) in every respect if it is not to be different from everything else. Some aspect of it must then remain of necessity if it is in fact true that everything that moves is moved with respect to some aspect of itself which remains. * * *[76] Accordingly there is a monad of time dependent upon the Demiurge that *remains* [in itself], but

[73] οὐδὲν γὰρ καθ' ὅλον ἑαυτὸ κινεῖται; literally, 'undergo motion throughout the whole of itself', but in this context what is meant is radical Heraclitean flux.

[74] As in Aristotle, the word '*kinêsis*' is contextually sensitive. Following the remark about substantial change (ὅσα μεταβάλλει κατ' οὐσίαν) we shift to a context where '*kinêsis*' refers not to local motion – one species of change – but rather the genus of which substantial change, growth, alteration and local motion are species.

[75] Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 3.2, 202a13–16. Since the change is *in* the subject that undergoes it, if a subject were changing in every way, we would have no stable subject in which the change could exist. Thus there would be no change in the first place. Hence nothing undergoes change in every respect at any time.

[76] Our manuscripts have τι μένον ἑαυτοῦ το ἔχον. Since it is hard to see any connection between το ἔχον and what comes before, Diehl supposes that something has fallen out. Something more than <τοῦ> is required since ἑαυτοῦ already conveys the idea that

because it is full of the capacity to measure, and because it wishes to measure both the motions of the psychic substance as well as those of natural and corporeal substances – existence as well as their activities and affections – time also *proceeds* in accordance with number. Since time remains [in itself] by virtue of its own *internal* activity that is indivisible, it is by means of its *external* activity being contained by the things it measures that it proceeds according to number – that is to say, in accordance with specific intellectual forms,but especially in accordance with the very first number itself which, as Parmenides would say, plays a leading role among intellectual (*noeron*) beings analogous to the role that the One-Being plays among intelligible (*noêton*) beings. It proceeds therefore in accordance with this number and this is why it assigns the proper measure to each of the encosmic forms.

Furthermore, one might say with more precision[77] that time as it *truly* is proceeds in accordance with number, numbering the things that participate in it, since it is an intellectual number – one which Socrates spoke of somewhat cryptically at the point at which he said that 'in that which is truly number' (*Rep.* 529d1–5) there exists Speed Itself and Slowness Itself. It is by means of these [forms] that there is a difference among the things that are numbered by time between those that undergo motion more swiftly or more slowly. It is for this reason that Timaeus has not produced a long speech about that [higher] number, since the day before Socrates had revealed all this perfectly, but rather he speaks about that which has proceeded from it, for since the former is that which is truly number, Timaeus said that the latter time proceeds in accordance with it.[78] Let it therefore be admitted that it proceeds in accordance with

this aspect with respect to which a thing undergoes change is something that belongs to it.

77 Literally, 'closer' as in 'closer to the facts about the matter at hand'. Cf. II 139.13 and 140.11.

78 Here again Proclus uses the dramatic date of the *Timaeus* as a reason for connecting the two dialogues rather more intimately than modern interpreters would perhaps be inclined to do. Because of the conversation that Socrates led the day before, Timaeus can now say that time is a movable image of Eternity proceeding according to number and have his listeners recognise that the number in accordance with which it proceeds is none other than the true number of the previous day's conversation. The corresponding passage in the *Republic Commentary* is worth quoting at length:

> Furthermore Eternity is not a number either but is instead prior to all number since it 'remains in one' as Timaeus says (37d6), for number is up there wherever there is Difference, but Eternity is prior to Difference and prior to the All-perfect Living-Being. But since visible time circulates according to number, as Timaeus says (38a7) the number for the circle would have to be prior to this since it is such as to bring every period to the completion of its cycle. And if this number were in the realm of generation,

intelligible[79] number on the one hand, but, on the other, it also proceeds in accordance with that by which it *numbers* the things that participate in time. Correspondingly, the time that is in the participants proceeds in accordance with that which *numbers it*, since it is the very thing that gets counted – something that possesses an image of substantial time, through which all things get counted by the greater or smaller numbers
30 that determine their lifespan. So, for instance, an ox lives this long but a man that long, while the Sun or the Moon return to the start of their cycles in such and such a time, and Saturn and the other planets complete
20 their cycles in accordance with other measures.

C. The nature of Time

1. *Mistaken views about time*

a. Time is neither a concept nor an incidental cause

Time, therefore, is a measure of motions [or more broadly changes], not in the sense of that *by means of which* we measure (for it is the concept (*ennoia*)[80] that is concerned with time that does this, not time itself), but

> then once again there would have to be another number in accordance with which it comes to be and so on to infinity. But if there is a number that is the sole cause for time always being circulated according to number – a number that is itself intellectual and thus time in the sense of something that is dancing intellect (*choronoon*; cf. 28.1 below) – it is something that is cause whereby the cosmos dances (since the circular completion of the cycle [of the cosmos] is said to be a dance) *** in book VII of the Republic *** Socrates refers to it as 'true number' and says Speed Itself and Slowness Itself are in it. (*in Remp*. II 17.13–18.4)

79 In view of the fact that we have just been told that time is an *intellectual* number (αὐτὸς ὢν νοερὸς ἀριθμός) at line 16 and in view of the fact that time plays a role among the *intellectual* beings that is analogous to the role that the One plays among the intelligible beings (19.11) and that it is a specific *intellectual* form (19.9), it is very tempting to emend νοητὸν to νοερὸς here. On the other hand, as Festugière points out, this 'true number' is one in which we find Speed Itself and Slowness Itself. These are presumably *intelligible* forms.

80 It is not entirely clear, but the target of this criticism may be the Stoics. Proclus will later characterise their view as one that makes time something that exists merely in thought (95.10–11 οἳ μὲν κατ' ἐπίνοιαν ψιλὴν αὐτὸν συνιστάντες ἀμενηνὸν καὶ ἔγγιστα τοῦ μὴ ὄντος = SVF 2.521 (part)). The ground for Proclus' criticism is that time is, on the Stoic view, an incorporeal and all incorporeals lack the capacity to cause things. While it is true that our sources do list time among the incorporeals, it is unclear how well this fits with the Stoics' more widely reported definition of time as interval of the world's motion (cf. Simplic. *in Cat*. 350.16: διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως = SVF 2.510 (part)). Nonetheless, the general thrust of this section is to argue against any view of time that fails to recognise time's *active role* in structuring the cosmos.

rather in the sense of that which is such as to produce and to delimit the lifespan and all other changes among the things that are located in time or as that which measures these temporal beings in relation to their paradigms and assimilates them to the latter. [With respect to this latter role], just as its own assimilation to Eternity refers back to paradigmatic causes of inclusion and measure, so too the things that have been completed or perfected by time point back toward a more dignified imitation of the eternal first principles by means of the circles they spell out together. Moreover, how could it be, if Time is a god so great and venerable, that He should [simply] be the measure of motion (as that by means of which we count) or the countable [aspect] of the motion of the bodies that circulate [around the heavens], or more generally [any bodies in] motion, as it has appeared to certain persons who lacked an awareness of time's power or its creative presence in the case of all things? And when they say that time is the cause of corruption rather than genesis, or the cause of oblivion (*lêthê*) rather than preservation (*sôtêria*), or that it is [a cause of these things] incidentally and not *per se*,[81] then these people are like those who are entirely asleep and who can therefore neither consider what psychic and corporeal benefits result from time, nor calculate the extent to which the entire heaven and all generation is afforded good things throughout itself due to time and time's agency. But the Theurgists would not say such things, since they doubtless say that He[82] is a god and have given us the invocation whereby it is possible to move this god to appear to us in person,[83] and they celebrate this god as

[81] The argument is directed at opponents who, generally, deny that time is a cause. Even when they concede that things decay 'through the passage of time' they qualify this concession by making it an incidental cause. We may speak of, for instance, mental acuity declining through ageing, but strictly speaking it will be specific chemical processes in the body that cause this. 'Ageing' is just a way of gesturing toward these as-yet-unknown causes. Proclus, of course, disagrees with this idea.

[82] It seems that Chronos is the subject here, but there is a disagreement about whether Chronos and Aion were in fact equated in the Chaldean system. See Majercik (1989), 213 for references. Certainly Proclus says that this god is *eternal* – not that he is Eternity. Whatever may have been the teaching of the *Oracles* on the relation between Time and Eternity, Proclus will be strongly motivated to read them as drawing such a distinction since this accords better with Plato.

[83] καὶ ἀγωγὴν αὐτοῦ παρέδοσαν ἡμῖν, δι' ἧς εἰς αὐτοφάνειαν κινεῖν αὐτὸν δυνατόν. Lewy (1956), 230 regards this as a theurgical technique of 'leading' one of the gods of time to a 'self-manifestation'. Such a self-manifestation is achieved through invocation. Cf. Iamblichus, *Myst.* 112.4–5 Αὐτοφανὴς γάρ τίς ἐστι καὶ αὐτοθελὴς ἡ διὰ τῶν κλήσεων ἔλλαμψις. At 89.18 Proclus says that conjunctions, invocations and self-manifestations for the Month and the Year regarded as gods have been handed over from the 'sacred tradition'. Viewed in light of this passage, this probably means the *Oracles* or Julian the Theurgist's prose works. See also Lewy (1956), 445.

'older', 'younger', 'unrolled in a spiral' and 'eternal'.[84] He is eternal not merely as an image of Eternity, but as antecedently comprehending and cognising in an eternal manner the sum total number for all the things in the cosmos that undergo motion, thanks to which he draws round all the things that are moved and brings them back to the beginning of their regular cycles, whether they be swift or slow. In addition to this, they [celebrate this god as] limitless (*aperantos*) on account of its power (for that which comes round again and again is an infinite potentiality (*apeirodynamia*). Together with these [epithets of Time], they also [celebrate this god] as a spiral form (*Or. Chald.* 199*)[85] since He is such as to measure things that undergo rectilinear motion as well as those that are moved in a circle, and since the helix includes in a unified manner both what is straight and what is moved in a circle. In view of these facts, we must not follow those who would reduce time to a bare conception (*epinoia*) or to some incidental property.

b. Time is not a consequence of soul's thinking

But neither should we follow those more worthy men who are getting closer to the facts of the matter about time's distinctive property, if they say that it is something that results from the World Soul's discursive activity;[86] that is,[87] while the *soul* is itself present all at once and exists changelessly, nonetheless its *activity* measures the celestial rotations and the periods of other souls by means of time. We must not commit ourselves to this position, even if these people are not too far off the real truth.

In the first place, Plato – the person with whom we all wish to agree on matters pertaining to the divine – said that time was established by the Demiurge when the cosmos already had an arrangement both in terms of its soul and its body. He did not say that time was established *within* the very soul, as he did when he said that the harmonic ratios were set up within the soul by the Demiurge. Nor, unlike the case where he said the god 'framed the corporeal inside' (36d9) of the soul in order that the soul should rule and have the body for its slave (34c5), does he

[84] Tardieu and Lewy (1978), 680 argue that these terms do not derive from the *Oracles* themselves, but rather from Julian the Theurgist's prose work.

[85] The planets, whom Proclus calls the Rulers of the Cosmos, have a special role in the production of visible time. Their paths through the heavens are spiral in form (*Tim.* 39a6).

[86] It seems likely that Proclus has Plotinus in mind here, probably on the basis of III 7.11, 43–45 Εἰ οὖν χρόνον τις λέγοι ψυχῆς ἐν κινήσει μεταβατικῇ ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλον βίον ζωὴν εἶναι, ἆρ' ἂν δοκοῖ τι λέγειν; On Proclus' objections see Joly (2003).

[87] Retaining ἢ with Festugière.

teach that the god brought about or engendered time too *in* the soul. Instead it was *after* he had spoken about the essence, harmony, power and motions of the soul, as well as its various acts of understanding – having brought about the completion of both body and soul in addition to all these things – it was *then* that he brought in the single essence of time in order that it might preserve, measure and assimilate all these things to their paradigmatic principles. After all, what benefit would the things within the cosmos obtain if they possessed everything in the best manner, but nonetheless failed to maintain them *always*?[88] How would it benefit [the cosmos] to have imitated in some manner or other the form of the paradigm, were it not to unfold everything within it to the greatest extent possible and to receive in a divisible manner its indivisible cognition (*noêsis*)? Due to these facts, the philosopher has doubtless established a *Demiurgic* cause for the procession of time – not a *psychic* one.

22 Next if you were to look at the facts of the case, you would have to say that if the soul engendered time, then the soul would not participate in such a way as to be made complete or perfected by it. However, it is not hard to see that, at least with respect to its activities, the soul *is* made complete and measured by time. This is so since everything that does not already have the entirety of its activities simultaneously and all at once requires time to achieve its perfection and to return to its starting point – time through which it accumulates for itself all those goods that are appropriate to it, which is something that cannot be done in a manner that is indivisible or atemporal. As we said earlier [17.23], there are these two measures of the continuation or of the perfection of the things that are: eternity and time. The first is the single comprehension of the intelligible henads that does not admit of being made plural. The second is a boundary or limit and a Demiurgic measure of the things that have proceeded from up there – a measure of their continuation forever, or for a long time or for a short while. If the soul grasped all the things that it knows in the same manner as Intellect or the gods [grasp the objects of their knowledge]– that is, by means of a single conception that is always the same, cognising them in an unchangeable manner – then while soul might perhaps have engendered time, it would not itself have stood in need of time in order for the soul to be complete. However, as things stand, it cognises in a manner that is discursive and goes in a complete cycle (*apokatastatikôs*), and while one particular soul requires the whole of time [for its activities], another soul perhaps gets by with a part of time for its intellectual life or for its generation-producing (*genesiourgos*) life.

[88] Cf. *Symp*. 206a: the object of eros (and thus ultimately of all striving) is to possess the good *forever*.

But as a general rule, nothing that is its own cause stands in need of its own products for its own completion or perfection, for if it did, it would thus be both complete and also incomplete prior to its establishing the [product] which is secondary to it. On the one hand, it would have to be complete in order that it might generate, since nothing incomplete is productive of anything else. But on the other hand it would also have to be incomplete, since it would never have participated in that which completes it. It is absolutely absurd to say that causes presuppose the very things that have proceeded from them. This, therefore, is the greatest proof to you that time is not a product of the soul. Instead, soul is the first thing to participate in time.

After this it is necessary to think that inanimate things also participate in time.[89] They [sc. plants] participated in time not only when they were growing (just as they did in the case of their specific form and condition (*hexis*)),[90] but even now when they seem to be entirely devoid of life, they
23 nonetheless participate in time. It is not like the case where they are said to live [simply] because they have been placed in the same class with things that are universal[91] and in sympathy with the universe. Rather, they specifically participate *per se* in some part of time and by virtue of this fact they are, qua inanimate things, always in a condition of passing away until they are completely destroyed, for a thing does not exist when its time is no longer present. A builder could tell you the amount of time that a wall will stand, and the tailor can tell you how long a cloak or some sort of garment will last, and similarly for each of the craftsmen in the case of his own creative endeavours. And if it is not possible to speak as definitively as this in the case of nature's productive acts, nonetheless there is the seer who is concerned with all things in as much as he is able to view the temporal interval that has been assigned to things from the entirety [of time].

In addition to this, since all the psychic and corporeal changes, motions, rests – in general, all oppositions that we find among the things

[89] The argument of this paragraph is that time cannot be a product of soul since time is present to things that do not participate in soul. There is an obvious escape route from this objection: to say that time is a product of the soul is not yet to say that everything that is in time or has a lifespan determined by time itself has a soul. It is enough if such things are part of the cosmos ensouled by the World Soul. Proclus seeks to close off the escape route by insisting that individual things have their own specific lifespans which may sometimes even be known. Thus since they have their 'own time' allotted to them, they cannot be in time just by virtue of being in a world that is in time.

[90] Cf. II 24.11–13.

[91] συντέτακται τοῖς ὅλοις. Perhaps this means placed in the same class with the elements or with the spheres of the fixed stars. Proclus refers to both of these as 'wholes' or 'universal things' and they have a kind of life since they have a principle of motion internal to them.

in the encosmic realm – are measured by time, it is necessary for time to be something that transcends all of them, for that which is participated by a plurality of participants (and dissimilar ones at that!) exists *per se* in a pre-existent manner (*proüphestôs*),[92] always one and the same, before it is participated in by the participants. This is especially true when it is something that is found indivisibly in everything everywhere, as the present moment is everywhere, being a unity that is numerically partless and not specific to any of the things that are said to be *per se* existents. This is a fact which Aristotle also saw and which he took to show that the present moment is something indivisible and incorporeal, one and the same thing everywhere.[93]

Furthermore, if time was not a substance (*ousia*), but was instead an accident (*symbebêkos*), it would not have exhibited the creative power that it actually does, whereby it makes some things come to be eternally, while others have a limited temporal duration.[94] Some of these latter things have shorter periods, while others with weaker natures have longer ones. Nonetheless time bestows upon all things the allotted measure of continued existence that is suitable and appropriate for them. If, then, there exists this *creative* substance [for time], then it can be neither soul as a whole nor some part of soul, for the conception (*ennoia*) of soul is one thing, but that of time another, and each is not the cause

[92] This seems to be the kernel of the objection. Since time is participated in uniformly by everything in the world (since it is always 'now' for everything everywhere) the cause from which time arises must be such as to transcend all the things that are in time. There is an unstated premise that Soul – or perhaps Soul's products or activities – is not sufficiently transcendent to play this role. Thus time is not a product of the soul.

[93] Diehl, and following him, Festugière, take this to refer to *Phys*. VIII 10, 266a10 and ff. The conclusion here, however, is that the *first mover* must be something partless and without magnitude. Aristotle certainly says that time is the same everywhere *Phys*. IV 12, 220b5–6 (καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ πανταχοῦ ἅμα) and in one of the senses of 'the present' that he differentiates, it too is indivisible. The present in the strict sense is a limit of time, not a duration itself. As such, it is analogous to an indivisible point (*Phys*. IV 13, 222b10–20).

[94] It is hard to know exactly how to render '*ousia*' in this context. On the one hand, the argument seems to be directed against a view about the ontological status of time – that it is an accident of something (for instance the life that belongs to the World Soul) as opposed to a *substance*. But on the other hand, the argument proceeds by asserting that time has a Demiurgic or creative power and this means that it must have a different *essence* from soul. In any case, what follows seems to be an unfair criticism of the view under discussion. One need not hold that time is an *accident* of something by holding that time is the life of the Soul. Indeed, it seems not implausible to attribute to Plotinus the view that Soul's life is its internal *activity* which, when it is externalised, comes to constitute time. Assuming, however, that the proponent of the view that time is a psychic product is committed to making time an accident, Proclus effectively recycles his earlier argument against this view from 20.1–6.

of the same things but of different things. After all, soul is what provides life and moves everything. (It is because of this that the cosmos, in as much as it consorts with soul, has been filled with life and has
24 participated in motion.) Time, however, is what arouses (*diegeirein*) the products of creation toward their own perfection and is the measure of the wholes and what provides a certain eternity [for the world].[95] It could not be inferior to soul if soul too participates in it, and even if soul does not participate in time with respect to its *essence*, it surely does
5 so with respect to its own discursive *activities*,[96] for the World Soul has been said to be active in a manner that is unceasing and to live wisely (*emphronôs*) 'throughout all time' (*Tim*. 36e4). The remaining alternative, then, is for time to be a substance and not something that is secondary to soul.

Above all, one must consider that if Eternity was itself either a prod-
10 uct of Intellect or some intellectual power, it would also be necessary to say something of this sort about time as a product of soul. But if Eternity is a transcendent measure of the plurality of the intelligibles and a comprehension (*periochê*) of the eternality and perfection of all things, how could time fail to have this status in relation to the soul and the
15 psychic order, differing in that respect by which all the [other] things that also proceed differ from the causes that remain in them?[97] For, in the first place,[98] Eternity surely manifests a greater superiority over the things that it measures than time does [over that which it measures], for it includes in a transcendent manner the essences and henads of the intelligibles, while time does not measure the *essences* of the first souls [i.e. those of the heavenly bodies] since it is something that has instead been
20 integrated with them and produced alongside them.[99] (Some Platonists

95 The advocate of the Plotinian view will surely answer that it is precisely by enlivening everything that the Soul has given individual things the lifespans and ends that they have. Proclus, by contrast, seems to insist that if there is a difference in how long the things that Soul animates live, the source of this difference must be prior to Soul.

96 See above 22.1–8.

97 ταύτῃ διαφέρων, ᾗ καὶ τὰ προελθόντα πάντα τῶν μεινάντων αἰτίων. That is to say that time and Eternity play analogous roles in relation to the effects that proceed from them, though the nature of the effects is of course different in each case, since time is itself secondary to, and an effect of, Eternity.

98 As Festugière rightly notes, the ὅ τε γὰρ in line 15 is followed by τά τε νοητὰ μᾶλλον, etc. in line 24. Proclus is providing two ways in which the cases of Eternity and time are not parallel, with a not untypical Proclean digression in the middle.

99 Proclus' own view is that souls are eternal with respect to their essence but their activities take place in time; cf. *ET* prop. 191 and *in Tim*. I 278.15; II 243.23. This position is subsequently criticised by Damascius; cf. *in Parm*. IV 13.1–5 and Steel (1978).

say that [time does not even measure the soul's] intellectual *activities*,[100] even though Plato clearly shows the single, World Soul to have initiated a 'divine life, filled with wisdom *throughout all time*' (36e4–5).) Secondly, the intelligibles are more closely united with Eternity than the things within the cosmos are united to time – indeed, so much so that even some of the more theoretical philosophers assumed it to be nothing other than the one, universal intellect.[101] However, no one in his right mind would wish to reduce time to the things that are in time because of the great distance and difference between them.

2. Proclus' account of what time is

Now if time is not some aspect of motion, nor something attendant upon psychic activities, nor generally a product of soul, nor as some young hotheads[102] with respect to divine matters say that the circle of the Different is psychic time, while the circle of the Same is Eternity (for I have heard such things even from Theodore [of Asine] when he was trying to philosophise) – doubtless they did this in order that they might be ranked as superior to time and eternity in terms of the [image of the] charioteer [from the *Phaedrus*].[103] Anyone keen to correct their

[100] Note that here we have 'Platonists' in the plural. I suspect that Proclus has in mind those Platonists whom Iamblichus (*De An.* ap. Stobaeus I 365.7–18) regards as accepting – more or less consistently – the Plotinian viewpoint on the undescended soul: Numenius, Plotinus, Amelius and Porphyry. He certainly links the idea that soul produces time with the idea that its activities do not take place in time; cf. *in Alc.* 237.5–8.

[101] Perhaps Proclus has Plotinus in mind. See above 12.9–12 and Smith (1996), 198. The point of what follows is this: though time and eternity play a similar role to one another, nonetheless there are differences between them. While it is ultimately a mistake to equate Eternity with the eternal intellect that it unifies, it is at least not a gross error. No one in his right mind, however, would equate time with temporal things. This shows that eternity is more united to its own products than time is to the temporal things that are its products.

[102] ὥς τινες νεανιευόμενοι κατὰ τῶν θείων πραγμάτων λέγουσιν. The use to which other members of the Platonic tradition put this term suggests that Festugière's translation – 'comme le disent certaines gens qui lancent des doctrines révolutionnaires contre les choses divines' – may be rather too polite. Cf. Plutarch, *adv. Colotem* 1118c4 and Simplicius' vitriol at Philoponus (*in Cael.* 26.11). Proclus is not merely suggesting that Theodore is an innovator – though in the Platonic commentary tradition this is bad enough! – but I think something rather worse.

[103] (τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἤκουσα καὶ τοῦ Θεοδώρου φιλοσοφοῦντος), ἵνα δὴ αὐτοὶ κατὰ τὸν ἡνίοχον τεταγμένοι κρείττους ὦσι καὶ χρόνου καὶ αἰῶνος. This passage raises two issues. First, the means whereby Proclus knows of Thedore's views on this matter and, second, what exactly these hotheads believed. Festugière translates: 'j'ai entendu de telles paroles dans la bouche de Theodore quand il donnait ses leçons de philosophie' which suggests a more direct acquaintance than the words necessitate. (For doubts about whether Proclus knew Theodore's works except via the testimony of Iamblichus, see O'Meara (1974). For more general concerns about Proclus' account of his predecessors, see

assumption would never include these parts of the soul in the same [category] with time or Eternity, but would insist that the circle of the Different *inclines* toward things that are in time, while the circle of the Same *moves in agreement* with the things that are eternal.[104] – In any case, since we will not approve any of these [options], what could time really be? It is perhaps not sufficient to say that it is a measure of the things within the cosmos, nor to [merely] say of which of the goods [that the cosmos enjoys] it is the cause. Instead we must grasp its defining characteristic to the extent that this is possible.

Isn't it best to say that, since it is a substance and such as to perfect the soul and present to all things, it is an intellect? Not only an intellect that is at rest, but also one that undergoes motion: remaining stable with respect to its internal activity (thanks to which it is genuinely eternal) but undergoing motion with respect to its proceeding externally – an external procession through which it defines every transition (*metabasis*). For while Eternity is at rest with respect to its own internal activity and also with respect to the activity that it exercises in relation to the eternal things, by contrast time was generated both at rest and in motion – in one respect imitating Eternity, in another respect being distinct from it. Could something be simultaneously intelligible and generated?[105] Could something be simultaneously divisible and indivisible?[106] But of course we have already admitted all these things to ourselves in the case of the soul's essence and we would not otherwise be able to completely overcome this [mysterious] intermediate [character of the psychic essence] unless in some manner we resort to opposites in its case. What, then, is there to wonder at if we see the nature of time as unmovable in one sense, but mobile in another? Or rather, it is not merely we who see it this way, but prior to us the philosopher too [saw it this way], since he suggested by the [word] 'eternal', on the one hand that its intellectual

Tarrant (2004).) The use of δή raises the suspicion that Proclus is inferring the reasons for the identification of time and Eternity with the circles of the Different and the Same respectively. On the second issue, I think it is not possible to say anything too definitive. Proclus tells us that Theodore had views on the nature of the 'sub-celestial arch' and the 'super-celestial place' mentioned at *Phaedrus* 247b–c which he expressed in his work *On Names*. It is also clear from what follows in Proclus' commentary that Theodore had much to say about the genealogy of the gods from the *Timaeus*. But the question of how time and eternity line up with the good and bad horses or the charioteer in the *Phaedrus* must remain a purely speculative matter.

[104] Cf. *Tim*. 37b6–c3 and Proclus' views on the gnostic activities of the two circles in the World Soul at II 309.6–314.30.

[105] Proclus construes the grammar of *Tim*. 37a1–2 in such a way that it says that soul is an *intelligible* that exists always and also the best of the things that have *come to be*. See II 293.20–27 for his explanation of how this can be the case.

[106] Cf. *Tim*. 35a1–4 and Proclus' summary of his own reading at II 152.20–26.

monad remains in the same [state], but on the other, indicated by the description 'in motion'[107] that its activity is carried outward and participated in by both the soul and the entirety of the cosmos? We must not suppose that when he called time an *eternal* image of eternity, he meant merely that it is an image of eternity. (For what would have precluded him from simply saying that it is an image of eternity, not an eternal [image of eternity]?). Rather, he wished to make this very thing clear: that time possesses an eternal nature – not in the same manner in which **26** the Living Being Itself was said to be eternal, for while the latter is this way by virtue of both its essence and its activity, time is eternal in the first way [sc. in its essence] but mobile [with respect to its activity] by virtue of its gift to what is external to it.[108] For this reason, it is not only Plato but also the Theurgists who call it 'eternal' (20.22). Plausibly so too, for if, on the one hand, there is something that is solely mobile in itself and is the sole cause of motion for the things that participate in it (i.e. the soul, since in any case it moves both itself and other things), and if, on the other hand, there is something that is solely immovable (since it both preserves itself in a changeless condition and is the cause whereby other things remain invariably the same), then it is necessary for the intermediate between these extreme terms to be present to the things that are moved as a result of soul. Of these highest forms, the one is immobile in both respects [sc. both in its essence and in its activity], while the other is mobile both in terms of its own nature and also in terms of the gift [it provides] to others. So the intermediate must be simultaneously immobile and yet undergoing motion – immobile in itself, but in motion among the things that participate in it – and time is just such a thing. If, then, time in the participants is a number in the sense of what gets counted, what will be the number in the sense of what enumerates the former? Surely, to say that this is the partial soul is absurd, for the number that thus enumerates the time in the partial soul is a secondary by-product (*hysterogenês*), just as that which in our case counts the fingers [as five] is [a secondary by-product]. Therefore this thing is not what *makes* the fingers five in number, but rather that which enumerates those things that have come to be by the agency of nature. We seek the cause of the existence of numerable time. This, therefore, is something that itself remains immobile, unfolding what gets counted in accordance with

[107] On the one hand, it is an eternal image; αἰώνιον εἰκόνα at *Tim.* 37d7. On the other, it is a movable image; εἰκὼ δ' κινητόν at 37d5.

[108] ὁ δὲ χρόνος τῇ μὲν αἰώνιος, τῇ δὲ ἔξω δόσει κινητός. The latter clause needs to be understood with reference to 25.28–30 where Proclus implies that Plato's use of the term 'mobile' indicates τὴν ἔξω φερομένην αὐτοῦ καὶ μετεχομένην ἐνέργειαν ὑπό τε ψυχῆς καὶ κόσμου τοῦ σύμπαντος.

itself. If, generally speaking, visible time (*emphanes chronos*) is mobile [or such as to flow (*kinêtos*)], and if in the case of everything that is mobile there is something else that is immobile[109] (for the motion is not something mobile, but rather the thing that undergoes it is), it is necessary for there to be time that is immobile in itself, in order that there should be the kind of time that is mobile [i.e that which can flow]. That time which exists in the former respect is time as it truly is in itself, and that through which [there is another time] in the things that participate. The latter is mobile along with these participants, extending itself into them.

27 Time, therefore, is on the one hand eternal, being a monad and essentially a "centre" in virtue of the fact that its activities have remained in it. On the other hand, it is simultaneously something continuous, a number and a circle in virtue of what proceeds and is participated in. Thus time is a certain intellect that is in the process of proceeding. On the one hand, it has been situated within Eternity and for this reason it is itself said to be eternal, for otherwise it could not have helped to bring about a more complete assimilation of the things within the cosmos to their paradigms unless time was itself something that previously transcended them. On the other hand, however, time also proceeds [from its source in Eternity] and flows freely out over those things that are preserved by it. It is for this reason, I think, that the most exalted among the Theurgists also praise this god, as Julian does in the seventh book of his work *On the Zones*, and have celebrated it by those names through which it is manifested among the participants, where it makes some things older, some younger, and

[109] Reading ἄλλο τι ἀκίνητον for ἄλλο τι ὂν κινητόν at line 25 and ἀκίνητον again in the lacuna at 27 between καθ' ἑαυτὸν and τὸν χρόνον. In each case it is easy to see how such a transcription error could have arisen. Moreover, the argument of the passage seems to require something like this. Proclus has just identified time as intermediate between Intellect that is changeless in both its internal and external activities, and the soul which moves both itself and the things that it animates. In between these we need something that is moving and immobile or changeless. The phenomenal time is that which is located in things and which Aristotle correctly defines as the numberable aspect of change, in the sense of what gets counted. At lines 15–22, Proclus turns to the question of what does the counting. By this he does not mean the soul that does the enumerating, but rather the numbers by which the denumerable time gets counted. I take it that his rather opaque comments on fingers and what comes to be by nature illustrate this point. By means of our souls, we count them as five, but the numbers by which we enumerate them are not the soul or a by-product of the soul. What makes them five is not our act of counting, but something in nature that makes the number of fingers five. If the phenomenal time that is in the participants flows, then there must be a static time, since in the case of everything that moves, there is something that is not mobile. This is illustrated even in the simple case where it is not the motion that is mobile, but rather the thing that undergoes the motion.

where it brings all things around in a cyclical way.[110] It would indeed be absurd for time, which is an image of eternity, to be merely a temporal image established within the things that are numbered by it, for how could such a thing be an image of so great a god as Eternity if it is located in a subject – or rather if it [simply] appears in a subject, and is itself an accident of an accidental property?

If Intellect is secondary to Eternity and Soul is, in turn, an imitation (*mimêma*) of Intellect, how can time fail to be something superior even to Soul Itself and more substantial than it, since time is an image of Eternity? Consequently, as Intellect stands to Soul, so too will Eternity stand to time, and vice versa. Thus time is prior to Soul as Eternity is prior to Intellect and while Soul would have a share of time, time would not participate in Soul, for neither does Eternity participate in Intellect, but rather vice versa. Time, therefore, is something that has an intellectual nature and it carries the things that participate in it around in accordance with number, whether these things be souls or other things. Time is eternal not only in its essence, but also in its internal activities which are always the same. It is, however, mobile [in virtue of its external activity] which is the sole respect through which it is subject to participation by things external to it – its own gift that extends along with (*synekteinein*) and adapts (*ephormazein*) the participants. Soul, however, is entirely in motion, both in virtue of its internal activities, (which take place discursively) as well as in virtue of its external activities (through which it moves the bodies [that it animates]).

It seems to me that those who properly cognised (*noein*) time's nature thusly named it '*chronos*' which is sort of '*choro-noon*', since they wished to say that time is like intellect dancing (*chorein noun*).[111] Perhaps they shortened the name to 'chronos' as a disguise. Or perhaps it was because it is simultaneously stable and dancing, remaining stable by means of one aspect of itself, but dancing by means of another aspect (as if time has a half that is intellect and a half that is dedicated to dancing). Hence, by putting together a part of each, they signified the amazing and creative nature of this god. It also seems that since the Demiurge took Intellect as his point of departure in ordering the universe, since he is intellectual, in the same way time takes the soul as its point of departure in completing

[110] On these epithets for time in the *Oracles*, see above 20.21, ff. Proclus here returns to the same point discussed earlier. Those who fail to recognise the power that Time exercises are making a serious mistake and the absolute nadir of this unfortuante tendency is located in the Epicurean philosophy.

[111] The same neologism is used at *in Remp.* II 17.23. The notion that the most primary cause of time is an intellect that makes divine souls 'dance' around the heavens is attributed to Syrianus at *in Parm.* 1217.13–27 (= *in Parm.* fr. 8 in Klitenic Wear).

the universe, since time is hypercosmic. The fact that time is not only encosmic, but also – far prior to this – hypercosmic is obvious, if in fact the role that Eternity has in relation to the Living Being Itself is the same as that which time plays in relation to this cosmos here. [And this is, in fact, the case] since the cosmos is a creature endowed with soul and intellect and, in general, an image of the Living Being Itself, just as time is an image of Eternity. If, therefore, time is such a 'dancing intellect' (*choro-noon*), then it dances while nonetheless remaining at rest. And because of the fact that it remains, its dances are infinite in number and such as to cyclically return to the same starting point. After all, since it is the first among the intellects that have danced around the whole of creation, then insofar as it is essentially intellect and has [a character that is] always the same, it has been said to be eternal. But insofar as it dances, it revolves the souls, natures and bodies [in the universe] in a circle and – to put it briefly – periodically returns everything to its starting point. While the cosmos is simply moved in as much as it has shared in soul, it is moved in an *orderly fashion* because it participates in intellect (for that's why he said in the *Laws* (897b1–2) that 'when the soul takes as its partner divine intellect, then [everything] it guides is correct and filled with wisdom).[112] The cosmos is moved in a manner that is *periodic* by virtue of the fact that it will move from the same [place] to the same [place], thereby imitating, one might say, the rest (*monê*) of intellect within itself because of the way in which time imitates Eternity. This is what has made it rather like its paradigm [sc. Eternity] 'that remains in the one' (37d6) – the fact that [the cosmos is regularly returned to one and the same [state] as a result of the temporal cycle.[113] Moreover, on the basis of all these things you will have all the causes[114] of time according to Plato: the Demiurge is the *efficient* cause of time, but Eternity is its *paradigmatic* [cause]. Its *final* [cause] is the rotation (*periagôgê*) of the things that are
29 moved in accordance with their periods back to one [starting point] (for, that which cannot remain in the One may yet take it upon itself to rotate around again to one [and the same point] and through this achieve the One that was sought, which is the same thing as seeking the Good).

[112] Proclus does not quote the passage accurately. The *Laws* says that when soul adheres to divine intellect, then it guides all things to an outcome that is correct and *happy*, not filled with wisdom: νοῦν θεῖον προσλαβοῦσαν τὴν ψυχὴν ὀρθὰ καὶ ἔμφρονα παιδαγωγεῖν) compared to Plato's (in the OCT, at least) νοῦν μὲν προσλαβοῦσα ἀεὶ θεὸν ὀρθῶς θεοῖς, ὀρθὰ καὶ εὐδαίμονα παιδαγωγεῖ πάντα. The correct text for the *Laws* at this point is a matter of dispute. Proclus' casual quotation, I think, contributes nothing toward a resolution.

[113] διὰ τῆς κατὰ τὸν χρόνον κυκλήσεως.

[114] In Proclus' account of the Platonic causes, these three are the primary ones (*in Tim.* 1 3.4). To these are often added the formal and material causes.

The procession of time is not some single linear process,[115] like a line drawn indefinitely in either direction. Rather it is something definite and *circum*scribed (*perigegramenos*), dancing *around* (*peri*) the Father of wholes and the monad of time, spelling out the strength of creation, and bringing it about that a complete revolution is performed again and again. In fact, it is performed countless times. [This is] a hypothesis that is demanded not only by what is reasonable, if one must call that which is necessary 'reasonable' – for from what source is the complete revolution of time present to the things that participate in time if it is not the case that the thing they participate in has this power and distinctive property of motion? Nor would one want to say that the reasonable status [of this view] has been attested to simply by the derivation of the word through which the consensus and superlative competence of the Name-givers have been revealed to you. Rather, the voice of Plato himself has said that 'these are forms of time that have come to be, imitating Eternity and *revolving* according to number' (*Tim.* 38a7–8), for among the things that are in motion, time is the first thing to be moved in a circle, proceeding into the things external to it in virtue of its own activity and the first to return to its starting point after the entire unfolding of its own power. As a result of this, it brings the cycles of the other things back to their starting points too. Since the soul is that which participates in time in the primary manner, time draws the soul around with the entirety of what proceeds from it, while it is by means of certain parts of itself that time carries round in a circle other [particular] souls, natures, the celestial revolutions and, in addition, the final things – the entire realm of Becoming – for it is due to the fact that time itself is *circulated* that all things are carried around in a circle, though some of these circles are faster or slower than others.[116] And further to time's circular motion – if the Demiurge himself makes time a movable image of eternity and establishes this in accordance with his own act of cognition concerning Eternity, then it is necessary that its movable aspect of time is circular and related to dancing, in order that it should not abandon Eternity and that it should spell out the Father's cognition concerning Eternity. Generally speaking, since the motion of time is such as to include all motions, its motion must be determined far prior to the things [whose **30**

[115] ἡ πρόοδος αὐτοῦ μία τις καὶ ἐπ' εὐθείας. More literally, 'a single something that goes in a straight line'. Time plays a role in defining the Platonic Year that brings all the heavenly bodies back around to their starting points.

[116] Festugière seems right to amend the punctuation here. Read the full stop after μακροπορώτεροι in line 26 rather than after περιάγεται in line 25. κύκλοι δὲ ἄλλων ἄλλοι βραχυπορώτεροί τε καὶ μακροπορώτεροι continues the thought that τὰς οὐρανίους περιφορὰς καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν γένεσιν are carried around by time's circular external activity. καὶ γὰρ αὖ πάλιν renews a much earlier line of argument.

motions are] measured by it.[117] After all, it is not the case that what lacks measure measures the things that are; rather, the primary measure measures them, just as Infinity (*apeiria*) does not limit things, but rather they are limited by the most primary Limit.[118] Time, however, is not moved by virtue of soul, nor by nature, nor by what is corporeal and visible, for the motions thus brought about would be divisible ones and would not be such as to include the wholes.[119] And furthermore, these motions too would participate in irregularity to a greater or lesser degree, and would themselves stand in need of time since all these [sorts of] motions are in time and are not observed in the phase of procession as things able to provide a metric for wholes but are instead observed among the properties of lives or orbits or affections. The motion of time, though, is pure and undifferentiated and is a procession that is not capable of different degrees – one that never slackens and is well-ordered, equal, similar, and the same – for it transcends regularity and irregularity and is present to both of them equally. [Time's procession or flow] does not undergo alteration because the motions that it measures undergo alteration. Rather, it remains separate from all that lacks regularity and is such as to stimulate motions that are naturally whole, as well as being such as to bring them back around to their starting points and able to provide a metric for them. While on the one hand it stands in an unmixed relation to the things that are measured by it in virtue of the fact that its intellectual activity has its own unique property, on the other hand it also proceeds in a manner that is discursive and self-motive. In this respect it is proper to the psychic order (*diakosmos*) and, while it does inhere (*enyparchein*) in the things that are delineated and brought to completion by it (by virtue of its being the primary-effective (*protourgos*) cause of nature), it does not inhere in *any particular one of them* in virtue

[117] The issue in what follows is the "rate" of time's flow and what determines it. Plato's text tells us that time is a moving or movable (*kinêton*) image of eternity. The adjective can have either sense. It seems to me that Proclus starts this puzzling section by taking the modal sense: time is a movable image of eternity. So what, then, sets it in motion, or having set it in motion determines the speed at which it passes? It cannot be that the things in time – whether psychic or corporeal – do this, for their motions are what get measured by it. They don't, in turn, measure time's flow. It will turn out (30.19–20) that time's flow is a product of its own intellectual activity.

[118] These are, of course, the two all-pervasive principles anterior to the One in the metaphysics of both Proclus and Iamblichus. Cf. *ET* prop. 90 and *in Tim*. 1 476.4, ff. for Proclus and *in Tim*. fr. 7 (Dillon) for Iamblichus.

[119] The argument here seems to be that if soul or nature or some specific motion of the planets were the motion that determined the rate of time's flow, then time's flow would be 'partial' or perhaps 'particular' or 'specific to one thing'. Importantly, it would not be such as to provide an external measure of passage that included among the things that it measured the 'rate-setting' motion in question.

of the fact that it is fitting and appropriate to *all of them*. After all, it was necessary that the measure of the wholes should be in a way like all things that it measures and stand in a relation to them that is like kinship (*syngenês*) while still not being the *same* as them. Therefore the motion of time proceeds – revealing, articulating and discriminating in a divisible manner the indivisible power that has remained [within it]. It is parallel to the case where some particular number has received all the forms of the monad [i.e. unit] separately and, reverting upon itself, is made to come full circle, for it is surely in the same manner that the motion of time, when it has proceeded in accordance with the measures within the temporal monad, connects the starting point to the ending point (*peras*)[120] and does this over and over infinitely (*apeirakis*). This motion *has* an order (*taxis*) and is itself divine, though it is not an order that *gets ordered*, **31** as the philosopher Iamblichus[121] said, but rather an order that assigns an order [to the things that are in time]. Nor is it something that follows after those who go first, but it instead stands as the initial leader (*archêgos*) of the things that have been produced.[122] Nonetheless, time's motion is not measured by anything that has extension (for it would be absurd to say that things that possess a nature and a value that is more senior are measured by things that are posterior [to them]). The procession which it has been said to articulate comes solely from the temporal monad and, significantly prior to this, from both the Demiurge and from Eternity itself – the thing of which it is, of course, said to be an image and in relation to which it has been rendered movable (*Tim*. 37a5).[123] Or at the

[120] προελθοῦσα πέρας ἀρχῇ συνάπτει. Perhaps an allusion to Alcmaeon fr. 2: τοὺς ἀνθρώπους φησὶν Ἀ. διὰ τοῦτο ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὅτι οὐ δύνανται τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶι τέλει προσάψαι.

[121] Cf. Dillon (1973), fr. 63. Simplicius' *Physics Commentary* (793.23–794.20) quotes a longer passage from Iamblichus' *Commentary on the Timaeus* which includes Proclus' lines at 30.32–31.4.

[122] It is not easy to bring out all the semantic associations of the terminology used here. There are associations with the ordering of military formations ('ranks') with τάξιν μὲν ἔχουσα . . . , οὐ τὴν ταττομένην, . . . ἀλλὰ τὴν τάττουσαν. These associations are amplified with οὐδὲ τὴν ἑπομένην τοῖς προηγουμένοις, which one could translate as 'nor does it follow those who are in the van of the column'. (Similarly for ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχηγὸν which can mean the 'founder of a family', as well as 'chief captain'.) But this military terminology also bears astronomical associations since the same verb that can be used for being in the van of the column is used to refer to one planet getting ahead of another in retrogradation. Similarly 'followers' has an astronomical sense in which it connotes positions that follow the daily movements of the heavens eastward. This vocabulary is used extensively in the subsequent discussion of the stars and planets whose motions define the parts of visible time.

[123] In this context, time's motion is presumably its flow. So Proclus is here reiterating the point that what determines the 'rate' of time's flow is itself something that is intellectual and thus exempt from flow or change.

very least, it is said to moving in comparison with Eternity Itself which is entirely without motion (*akinêtos*). It is as if someone had said that the soul is divisible in the realm of bodies in comparison with Intellect. It is not the case that it is simply this – but only that it would seem to be this
15 way when compared with Intellect. In comparison with the divisible kind of Being, soul is indivisible. So too, since time is indeed *eternal* by nature, it has nonetheless been at the same time said to be *movable* considered in relation to Eternity itself. Because of time's order and the continuity in its procession, there is no great need to regard 'the prior and the posterior'[124] in its case in the way that some thinkers have, for [time does
20 not flow] 'merely through a transition (*metabasis*) of motions' (as in the case of the things that are moved due to the heavens), nor is there some unfolding of a living thing's lifespan (as there is in the case of soul), nor [is time's flow] due to the trajectory of some corporeal process of coming to be (as there is in the case of nature), 'nor is there any other such thing' that may be observed in an indeterminate fashion in its case (for these [distinctive kinds of change] are the distinctive features of orders that
25 have been established after time). Rather, [in the case of time] 'there is a causal sequence (*kat aitiôn proêgêsis*), as well as an interweaving of the acts of production by means of [time's] continuity,[125] and a primary-effective (*prôtourgos*) activity, as well as an actuating power (*dynamis energêtikê*) for various and sundry motions.' Therefore time is movable, not in itself, but due to the fact that participation in time is manifested in motions, and
30 time measures and demarcates these motions. It is as if someone were to say that the soul is divisible in the realm of bodies to the extent that there is something in the realm of bodies that participates in it – something whose cause the soul includes – and this something is divisible. It is in this way that time is moving: in as much as it possesses the cause of the
32 activity that proceeds outward from it and which is observed in a divisible manner in these motions and is subject to being divided along with them. Therefore as the motions come to be temporal because of participation

[124] The phrases marked in quotes here and below indicate where Proclus is quoting, or nearly quoting, from the longer section of Iamblichus' *Timaeus Commentary* that we know from Simplicius' *Physics Commentary*.

[125] Simplicius gives Iamblichus' text here as: ἀλλὰ κατ' αἰτίων προήγησιν καὶ συμπλοκὴν συνεχῆ τῶν ἀπογεννήσεων καὶ πρωτουργὸν ἐνέργειαν καὶ δύναμιν ἐπιτελεστικὴν τῶν κινήσεων καὶ κατὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ἀφοριζόμεθα (Dillon, fr. 63, 24–5). Proclus' text reads: ἀλλὰ κατ' αἰτίων προήγησιν καὶ συμπλοκὴν τῷ συνεχεῖ τῶν ἀπογεννήσεων καὶ πρωτουργὸν ἐνέργειαν καὶ δύναμιν ἐνεργητικὴν τῶν ποικίλων καὶ παντοδαπῶν κινήσεων. The first difference is probably explained by the fact that Proclus wishes to assign a role to both the order *and* the continuity that he identifies in time's procession (31.12). The second variation may have to do with Proclus' earlier use of ἐγερτικὴ to describe time at 30.16.

[in time], in the same manner time comes to be movable because of the fact that it is participated in by these motions.

3. Appendix: specific criticism of "the physicists"

Observing this [reciprocal relation just noted] in isolation (*monos*), the physicists supposed time to be [simply] the numerable [aspect] of motion,[126] since they were unable to appreciate the cause of this fact. [Several things need to be said about this.]

First, it must be said that the universe was not created to be solely in motion: there must also be some aspect of it that remains entirely at rest lest rest should undergo motion. At any rate, it was shown in the *Theaetetus* (182a, ff.) that it is impossible for something to be moved [or changed] in a manner that is entirely-completely (*pantelôs*). Accordingly, since participated time is in the motion by virtue of the fact that it is stretched out alongside the motion, there must be something that is at rest prior to this [kind of time]. If this [prior time] is inactive, this is impossible. But if it is in action, then [one of two things must be the case]. Either it will undergo change, in which case something else will be required for the measuring of its change, or it will be active in a manner that involves no change (*akinêtôs energein*). This latter, however, is the unique property (*idiôma*) of time as it really is.

Second, since it is part of the common conceptions that the Month is a god and that the Seasons (*Hôrai*) are goddesses whose rites we have inherited[127] and since we also say that Day and Night are goddesses whose invocations we possess[128] (for they have been handed over by the gods themselves), it is necessary *a fortiori* then that Time itself should be a god since it is such as to *include* the Month, the Seasons, Day and Night.

[126] As Festugière notes, Proclus includes Aristotle among the physicists whose views come in for criticism here. Cf. 9.23–25.

[127] Is this simply a matter of the Months having invocations within the system of Julian the Theurgist? There are, of course, a multiplicity of long-standing cultic practices around the *Horai*. Perhaps the *Horai* began as generalised guardians of growth in Hesiod, but over the course of time this becomes a cult of the Seasons for both Greeks and Romans. Festugière says in his note on this passage that there is, to his knowledge, no cult of the Months. In his exhaustive study of the cult of the Seasons, Hanfmann (1951), v.1 251–2 notes that months are frequently depicted along with the seasons. Thus Proclus might have found some support for the idea that their worship was incorporated together with that of the *Horai*. It is clear from *in Remp*. II 16.8–10 (ὡς οὖν ὁ Μὴν ἐπὶ σελήνης θεὸς ὢν ὑφίστησι τὸν ἀριθμούμενον μῆνα τῆς περιόδου τῆς σελήνης, καὶ ὡς αἱ Ὧραι τὰ μέτρα τὰ ἐμφανῆ γεννῶσι τῶν ὡρῶν, κτλ.) that Proclus thinks that *Mên* (an Anatolian divinity associated with the Month and perhaps incorporated in the Sabazian cult) is a god whose role is parallel to that of the *Horai*.

[128] Cf. 20.24 above and 89.17–22 following.

Third, if time is something that is in fact subject to being counted, it is necessary that what does the counting (*to arithmoun*) should pre-exist prior to what gets counted (for these things are said to be [what they are] in relation to one another and what does the counting pre-exists (*proÿparchein*) prior to that which gets counted). That which potentially counts is prior to what is potentially counted, while that which actually counts is prior to what is actually counted.[129] Accordingly, this is what time is in reality: the Number Itself which [counts] each of the numbers of all of the periods [of time found within the cosmos].

Fourth, if something participates in soul, then it participates in time, but not vice versa, for inanimate things participate in time [but not in soul]. Therefore one must place time above and beyond soul [in the order of being]. But since Soul Itself by itself is prior to the participants, it must be even more the case that Time Itself is above and beyond (*epekeina*) the things that participate in it.

4. Earlier Platonists on the sense in which time is 'an image of Eternity'

How, then, would such a thing be an image of Eternity?[130] Let us go **33** over the ground again since the idea of these things is hard to grasp. The divine Iamblichus says that it [is an image of Eternity] because it exhibits the one and infinity of Eternity, and because of its being already and simultaneously everywhere, and the fact that it remains in the present, and the fact that while it is itself unmeasured, it is nonetheless a metric of intelligible beings – [all these features] it exhibits in the form of a circular unfolding and continuity and succession, and by distinguishing beginnings, middles and ends, and in the fact that it is not absent[131] from the things encompassed by it to any great extent. Just as it is not movable *simpliciter*, but is rather movable only [considered] in relation to Eternity, so too it is not an image *simpliciter*, but rather one might justifiably call the entire thing (*to synolon*) an image of Eternity, for while it is truly Being, and such as to measure, encompass, and return motions to their starting points, it is nonetheless generally said to be an image of Eternity. It would seem to be itself the first of the things that are images,

[129] At least I think that this is Proclus' point. His expression is very elliptical: τοῦ μὲν δυνάμει τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν, τοῦ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν. If visible or moving time – the kind that the physicists concern themselves with – is ὁ ἀριθμός κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον (Aristotle, *Phys*. 4.11, 220a25) one might wonder whether it is actually counted or potentially countable. I think this very terse statement is meant to show that, whichever is the case, that which does the counting is prior to what gets counted. Cf. *Phys*. 4.12, 223a21–29.

[130] 32.32–34.6 = Iamblichus, *in Tim*. fr. 64. My translation follows that of Dillon.

[131] Reading διακρίνειν and ἀπολείπειν for διακρίνοντι and ἀπολείποντι in lines 7 and 8 with Dillon.

for the All-perfect Intellect is not strictly speaking an image of the First [i.e. the One] (for how could anything be similar to that which entirely lacks form?), while among the things below Intellect and the indivisible nature,[132] time would seem to be the very first. Generally speaking, if to be an image is to be among the things that participate (for the image seeks to preserve the impression of something else that is senior to it, from which it receives the unique property (*idiôma*) of the form), it follows that there is no place for images either in the sphere of the most primary Beings (for in as much as they are the most primary, they do not participate but are rather participated in by other things – though they do not come to be in the participants, but instead bring it about in some other manner that these things revert upon them) or among sensibles alone (for the things that are intermediate also participate in those that are primary and it is not only the sensibles [that do so] since the sensibles are assimilated to the primary things by means of the reflections (*emphasis*) from the intermediate things). Therefore time has correctly been said to be an image of Eternity, as the whole cosmos is said to be an image of the Living Being Itself, both with respect to its soul and to its body.

If, on the one hand, as Porphyry[133] and certain other Platonists supposed, only sensible things participated in the things that are genuinely Being (*ta ontôs onta*), then one would seek images among these [sensible] things alone. But if, as Amelius[134] wrote – and prior to him, Numenius[135] – there is also participation among the intelligibles, then one would expect to find images among them too. But if in fact the divine Plato placed images neither among the things that are most primary, nor solely among the sensibles, then Iamblichus would be triumphant on this matter (as he is in pretty much all issues) in bidding us to accept the fact of participation in the intermediate beings as well as among those that come last.[136]

34

[132] Not Nature as a hypostasis, of course, but rather the indivisible kind of Being (*Tim.* 35a2–3) that is characteristic of the intelligibles.

[133] 33.31–3 = Porphyry *in Tim.* fr. 78, Sodano (1964).

[134] Cf. Brisson (1987a), 835–6 for a discussion of this passage as evidence for Amelius' views.

[135] *in Tim.* III 33.33–4 = Numenius, fr. 46c, Des Places (1973).

[136] In his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 1079a3–4, Proclus' teacher Syrianus raises as one of the four standard problems about Plato's forms the question of whether they are participated by incorporeal things as well as sensibles (*in Metaphys.* 109.1–3). Syrianus goes on to relate the views of Numenius, Cronius, Amelius and – if we accept Usener's emendation of Syrianus' text – Iamblichus in terms very similar to those used by Proclus. (Dillon draws attention to this and thinks that it allows us to gauge the extent of the dependence of Proclus' commentary upon Syrianus.) It seems to me that Syrianus' response to this question dodges the hard issue about whether all

For the present, let these things be enough concerning Eternity and the image of Eternity that is simultaneously movable and yet always the same and invariant. The Father of wholes, when he brought this image forth in accordance with intellectual forms, placed it over the products of his own creation since it was not possible for it to abide the all-perfect measure of Eternity. Let us turn ourselves to the [task] that remains – that of examining the words that come next.

D. The parts and forms of time, *Tim.* 37e1–4

Before the heavens came to be, there were no nights or days, no months or years. He contrived the genesis of the latter at the same time as the former were established together. These things are the parts of time, and both 'was' and 'will be' are forms of time that have come about. (*Tim.* 37e1–4)

It is entirely clear to everyone that, prior to the heavens coming to be (in this context I mean by 'the heavens' that which is considered in conjunction with the soul and entire life of the heavens), there was an indivisible [kind of] Being (*Tim.* 35a1) that remains in Eternity, just as Eternity remains in the One (*Tim.* 37d6). There were no parts of time proceeding or being subject to participation. However, what a day or a night is, and what a month or a year is, and how these are *parts* of time, as well as the question of why 'was' and 'will be' have been said to be *forms* of time but not parts – these matters will require a longer account and deeper examination.

1. What are days, nights, etc.?

If, therefore, we were to say that day is air being illuminated by the Sun, then, in the first place, we would only be saying what happens *in a day*, but not *what a day is* (for when we say a day is long or short, we surely do not predicate an increase or lessening to the air). Furthermore, how this would be a part of time is difficult to even imagine. If we were to say that the day is the temporal extension determined by the Sun going from the east to the west,[137] we will perhaps avoid the previous objection, but

forms participate in forms such as Likeness or Sameness. Though this is the example with which Syrianus opens the question (109.6), his own view – and perhaps that of Iamblichus? – seems to be 'Soul and the sensible realm' participate in the first and best of the intelligibles (109.14–16). Of course, we also find the general principle that 'each thing participates in the mode proper to its order of being' (109.10–11). Proclus certainly thinks that intelligible beings participate in henads, though this is a one–one relation, not a one–many relation (ET 135).

[137] It seems possible that Proclus is alluding to Stoic definitions of the day, night and other temporal periods. Since they treat time in general as the interval (*diastêma*) of

will instead fall foul of even more intractable difficulties. For if, on the one hand, we just were to say that the interval itself considered without its relation to the Sun's motion is the day, then there appears to be a puzzle about how it is not day everywhere, since the interval itself is everywhere the same thing.[138] But on the other hand, if we were to take the interval together with the combination that it has in relation to the Sun's motion in a simple sense,[139] then there will *always* be day in the heavens and there will be no night. (And how would a *part* of time be able to be everywhere anyway? – for day and night have clearly been called parts of time in the present text.) On the other hand, if we don't consider simply the conjunction of the temporal interval with the Sun's rotation, but instead were to say that the day is [when and where there is] the [temporal interval of the Sun's passage] from east to west, while night is [when and where] the [temporal interval of the Sun's passage] from west to east [takes place], then the heavens [considered as a whole] will possess neither the day nor the night which are said to be parts of time, and obviously neither [will it have] months or years. We deem it better, however, to say that time is both that which remains throughout the whole of itself and everywhere present to the cosmos with respect to all the parts of procession, for the present instant is one and the same thing that is everywhere the same. We say that it is necessary for the day and all other such parts of time to be same everywhere, even if they are subject to participation in a divisible or differentiated manner by sensible created things. It is because some people look to such [sensible created things] that they have recourse to meanings for words that are more customary than they are accurate.

Now, according to the philosophy that our father [Syrianus][140] espoused, these things are not here for the sake of the destruction of the appearances[141] – for let Timaeus say those things which most

the world's motion, one might plausibly suppose that periods of time might be similarly defined. Cf. SVF 2.510.

138 The temporal interval during which it is daylight in Australia is one and the same temporal interval the world round. Thus it is day the world round.

139 That is, we simply say that day is the temporal interval during which there is solar movement, then once again it is daytime all the time.

140 III 35.25–36.33 = Syrianus, *in Tim*. fr. 18 (Klitenic Wear).

141 *ta phainomena* or things that are evident to common sense. Proclus has just shown that common-sense definitions of 'day' or 'night' will not allow us to understand Timaeus' words. This is not because Timaeus is abandoning common sense. Rather, Timaeus is leading the soul up toward what is abstract and invisible from what is visible. This transition is facilitated by his use of the plural nouns, 'days' and 'nights'. To think of these in the plural is already to think about an abstract, invisible thing that can be *repeated*. We have days – plural – when we have another instance of the same kind of thing. But the kind, of course, is not the same as any of its instances. The true

people are in the habit of saying – but instead, referring these [terms] to superior hypostases, let us go on, as our teacher was in the habit of doing, to make day and night creative measures of time since they stimulate everything and roll together both the manifest and invisible life as well as the motion and order of the sphere of the fixed stars, for these [creative measures] are truly parts of time and are present to everything in the same manner. They antecedently comprehend (*prolambanein*) the primary-effective (*prôtourgos*) causes of the apparent day and the apparent night, since each of these is something different in visible time. It is to this fact that Timaeus looks when he mentions the way in which time came to be simultaneously with the heavens because he uses the plural forms of 'days' and 'nights', as well as 'months' and 'years'. Surely these are accessible to everyone, for their invisible and uni-form (*monoeidês*) causes are prior to what has been multiplied and the sequential rotations go on to infinity, since motionless things exist prior to things that undergo motion, and those that are intellectual are prior to those that are sensible. Therefore the most primary notion of day and of night must in each case be thought to be something of this sort.

As for the month, it is what rolls together the lunar sphere and the entire completion of the revolution of the Different – a truly divine temporal measure.[142] A year, however, completes and renders continuous the intermediate universal creation[143] – something with respect to which the Sun is seen as possessing great authority and as measuring all things

part of time, a day, is a 'creative measure' (35.30) in the sense that it makes each of the many days a day. Syrianus will go on to claim that this distinction between the invisible and uniform cause and the many visible days is accessible (*procheiros*) to everyone (36.6). Hence Timaeus' language does not 'do away with the appearances'. Rather, it encourages us to reflect on what we commonly say so as to raise our souls up to an invisible cause.

[142] μὴν δὲ τὸ τὴν σεληνιακὴν σφαῖραν καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ἀποτελεύτησιν τῆς θατέρου περιφορᾶς συνελίσσον. The meaning of συνελίσσον here and above at 35.30 with reference to night and day is unclear. Given that the hours of night and daylight vary each day, depending on the time of the year, perhaps it means something suitably vague like 'giving each one its due proportion in any given day'. In the present passage, Festugière takes θατέρου as 'the other [star], i.e. the Sun'. This is certainly tempting. The phases of the Moon that determine the lunar month are a joint product of the Sun and the Moon's motions in relation to the Earth.

[143] The sense of this is unclear. I suspect, however, that what Proclus has in mind is the idea that the Platonic Great Year is constituted from a series of solar years. The Great Year (*Tim.* 39d2–7) is the temporal period defined in terms of all the stars and planets returning to the same point in their respective revolutions. In principle, one could think of this temporal period as consisting in so many months. But the fact that people discuss it as consisting in so many years, marks the solar year out as a special, intermediate phase in the universal creation – i.e. in the completion of a Platonic Great Year.

together with time. There is no day or night without the Sun, nor is there the month and *a fortiori* the year without it, nor any other measure for things that go around the cosmos. I am not talking here merely about visible creation – for among these measures of time [like the month and the day that we've just been discussing], the visible Sun is the cause. Rather, even when it comes to the invisible and highest creation, the truer Sun measures all things along with time since it is quite simply 'the time of time'[144] according to the oracle of the gods about it. That Plato too did not merely know these visible things alone, but also the divine things which bear the same names is, I think, clear from what is in the tenth book of the *Laws* (899b2), for he shows that all things are full of gods, and brings forward an argument that therefore we may say that the Seasons and the Months are likewise divine in as much as they have divine lives and divine intellects presiding over them – things which the universe has too. If, then, in the text at hand now, Plato speaks in particular about those things that are apparent to us (*ta phainomena*), this is nothing to be surprised at, because now [unlike in Book X of the *Laws*] he aims to do natural philosophy. Let these things, therefore, be the *parts* of time, some of which pertain to the sphere of the fixed stars, while others pertain to those that go around the poles of the ecliptic, and others still belong to various gods or attendants to the gods,[145] or to mortal or immortal living beings or to regions of the universe that are higher or lower.

2. What are the tenses?

'Was' and 'will be', however, he says to be *forms* of time and not parts in the manner of days and nights, months and years. Over these divine orders have been established to fill out the whole series of time and it is because of this fact that they have been called parts of time.[146] 'Was' and 'will be' however are inevitably seen generally in the case of each of these. Hence they are a sort of form that, for instance, doesn't possess any specific matter. (I mean such as diurnal or nocturnal or what have you.)[147] If then these are forms of time that have come to be along

37

[144] *Or. Chald.* fr. 185 (Majercik); cf. below 55.30–1.

[145] It will emerge that these 'attendants' are invisible planetary satellites. See below III 131.1–18 and Siorvanes (1996), 268–71.

[146] The parts of time stand in part/whole relations to one another that establish a series of dependencies. If we think that wholes are prior, then we will say that there are no months without years, days and nights without months, etc. 'Was' and 'will be', however apply universally to all parts of time. Yesterday and last night *were*, as well as last year. Next year, next month, etc. *will be*.

[147] διόπερ εἴδη τινά ἐστιν, οἷον ὕλην ἰδίαν οὐκ ἔχοντα· λέγω δὲ ἡμερινὴν ἢ νύχιον ἢ ἄλλην τοιαύτην. The point is that the past and future tense are precisely not forms like

with the heavens, then there was no such thing prior to the genesis of the heavens. But if 'was' and 'will be' were not, then neither was there any change because the prior state (*to proteron*) and the subsequent state (*to hysteron*) exist in every change. And if there was no change, then there was no discordant motion (*plêmmelês kinêsis*).[148] Therefore the followers of Atticus[149] argue in vain that there was time prior to the generation of the heavens, but that there was no *orderly* time, for wherever there is time, there too is the past (*to parelthon*) and future (*to mellon*), and where these are, there too in every case (*pantôs*) are 'was' and 'will be'. But in addition, 'was' and 'will be' are forms of time that are generated by the Demiurge and it is for this reason that he calls them 'generated'. Therefore time was not anything prior to the creation. It is necessary, then, for this much-celebrated "discordant motion", if it exists, to be either not in time at all, or more generally for there to be no specific time at which it came about. But when it comes to motion it is surely necessary that there be a time in which it comes to be, a time at which it is past, one in which it is present, and another in which it is future. Therefore, it is not possible for there to be motion prior to the creation of time, nor for there to be disorderly time, since even disorderly time would have to have a 'was' and 'will be', as well as past and future. If it were to have to consist in the present tense alone without the past and future, then it would be eternity and not time at all and the [disorderly and] wrongful motion will be eternal which is indeed impossible. Or if [the so-called disorderly time] lacks even the present tense, as well as lacking past and future, then it would be a sort of time that is completely-and-entirely 'no-when'.[150] As a result, there would be no motion or else there would be "atemporal motion", which even *they* would say is the most impossible of all. Aristotle[151] too has satisfactorily demonstrated that all motion or change takes place in time – the orderly as well as the disorderly – and that in general each

'snub' – Aristotle's favourite example of a form that presupposes a very specific matter, being concavity in a nose. 'Nocturnal' is not very selective about its matter, since presumably anything that happens in the dark is nocturnal. 'Past', however, can apply to past nights, past days, past years and so on.

[148] That is, when Timaeus 30a4 talks about things undergoing motion in a discordant and disorderly manner, this is not meant to imply that there was ever really a time when there was pre-cosmic chaos. Proclus here returns briefly to his extended campaign against literalist readings of the creation in the dialogue. See *in Tim.* I 381.26–387.5.

[149] Cf. Atticus, fr. 31 (Des Places).

[150] παντελῶς οὐκ ἦν τότε τις χρόνος; the use of παντελῶς contrasts this disorderly time with the manner in which the all-perfect Paradigm participates in Eternity in a similarly, but positively, παντελῶς manner at 16.29 above.

[151] Diehl takes this to be a reference to *Cael.* 1.10, 280a6, ff. It seems more likely to me that Proclus has in mind *Phys.* 4.14, 222b30–23a15.

kind of motion has both the previous state and the subsequent one in order that it can be that which it is said to be (i.e. motion) and not rest instead of motion. As I said before (37.16), Plato has clearly taught us that there was no 'was' or 'will be' prior to creation when he spoke about days and nights, and in this way [he has also clearly taught us that] these things (namely, 'was' and 'will be') are generated forms of time. These people [sc. those around Atticus], however, say that the discordant motion was ungenerated. Consequently, if there was some sort of time then, it too was ungenerated. Consequently, 'was' and 'will be' would also be ungenerated. [But this is not what Plato tells us.] Therefore there was no 'was' or 'will be' prior to the generation of the cosmos, but these things are simultaneous with the cosmos, since the time which serves as the number for orderly or disorderly motion indifferently is one and the same thing. Therefore through these considerations this [conclusion] has been shown once again as a corollary of these approaches. **38**

Now, if you wish to contemplate these as the forms that they in fact are – and this was just how it seemed to our teacher [Syrianus] when he was dealing with these matters – then take a complete cycle and a wholly-complete evolution (*holotelês choreia*) of time, some of which has already become past, while some of it is yet to come, and you will see the 'was' and 'will be' as things that are forms (*eidos*) of time. However, whenever we do not understand it thusly, but instead take the verbs in a divisible manner, the wholly-complete and holy form (*idea*) of time is not made apparent to us in the case of each ['was' and 'will be']. We see instead a particular accidental feature in some of the things that are in the process of coming to be and subject to change. That is, unless the 'was' indicates the perfective (*telesiourgos*) order of time, while the 'will be' indicates the revelatory (*ekphantorikos*) order in the same way that the present tense 'is' indicates the connective (*sunektikos*) order. After all, time *reveals* the things that are 'not yet', *connects* the things that are present [to what is past and what is future], and *perfects* [or completes] the things that have come about, introducing suitable limits to their cycles. Let these things be said on our behalf concerning the parts and the forms of time.

We have remarked earlier (18.12–19) on the term 'contrived', that time is a work of the Demiurge and, in fact, a divine contrivance through which the things that undergo change nonetheless will persist throughout and will be included within perfection, eternity, and the preservation of measure and comprehension.[152]

[152] δι' οὗ τὰ μεταβάλλοντα δι' ὅλου μένει καὶ τελειότητος καὶ ἀιδιότητος καὶ φρουρᾶς καὶ μέτρου καὶ περιοχῆς περιλήψεται. Festugière suggests, not implausibly, that περιλήψεται plus genitive is equivalent to 'will participate in'. He supplies an adjective for φρουρᾶς and treats the entire list as things in which beings subject to change

3. Problem: why do the heavenly gods need time?

Now, someone might say, 'How can it not be that things that are divine
39 are their own measure?' and in particular 'Isn't it the case that those divinities that orbit the heavens determine their own motion?' I would very much agree with this too, for the things that are enmattered and corruptible possess both their existence and the extent of that existence from other things, while, in contrast, things that are divine possess it
5 from more primordial causes and from themselves.[153] It is for this reason that, at the point when he started to discuss the revelation of time in the realm of the heavens, he said 'the stars came to be for the sake of *cooperating*[154] in the production of time' (38e4) and, furthermore, that they were '*instruments* of time' (41e5), and on a third occasion he said that they had come to be for the sake of 'defining and preserving the numbers
10 of time' (38c6). The fact that the stars *cooperate* in the production of time shows that time has an existence that is *prior* to them, while the fact that time is *revealed* in the realm of the cosmos shows that it is present *through them* (for since time is in them, it is revealed through their motions).[155] Furthermore, the fact that they are instruments of time sort of indicates
15 the same thing in a different manner insofar as the whole of time – both that which remains [in the cause] and that which proceeds – was produced by the Father himself and the Creator of all things toward the measuring of the things within the cosmos. However, the celestial [gods] contribute toward the creation of the partial measures that are included within the single time [of the cosmos] and in particular each one [of these celestial

participate through time: 'recevront une part de perfection, d'éternité, de protection divine, de measure, et seront pour une part contenus dans les causes'. On the basis of τὰς φρουρητικὰς περιοχάς at 312.16, I prefer to think that the last two genitives are governed by φρουρᾶς. Through time, changeable particulars each have their own measure or lifetime through which they exist and a stretch of time within which they are included in an orderly way.

153 Cf. Proclus' understanding of the sense in which the sensible cosmos is generated. It has its existence from other sources. Soul, by contrast, is both generated and ungenerated. It is capable of reversion upon itself and thus self-constituted, as well as being constituted by the causes prior to it. Cf. *ET* prop. 189.

154 Plato's verb here is συναπ-εργάζομαι and the English 'cooperate' doesn't quite convey the sense that the work thus performed is subordinate and involves *finishing off* what someone else started. This connotation of prior activity is essential to the argument that follows, but I cannot think of any concise English translation that conveys the precise meaning.

155 So time has its existence both from higher causes and also from the celestial gods. Thus the question that opens this section is well motivated, but betrays a partial perspective. The divine beings that orbit the heavens do determine their own measures, so time is not something just "thrust upon them" from above. They cooperate in time's production, just as self-constituted beings cooperate in their own existence. But this does not in itself show that they do not also have higher causes.

gods] contributes in a more instrumental fashion to the establishment of [the measure of time] that is appropriate to it, for in general the entire secondary creation [of particular things] has its status in relation to the single and indivisible creation.[156] Each of the individual heavenly [bodies] is said to help bring about its own measure. For example in the case of the Sun, though it contributes to all [temporal] measures due to its commanding status, it nonetheless contributes in a special way to the year since the year is its own individual (*idion*) measure – a measure which it helps to create in conjunction with the Demiurge and the universal time (*holos chronos*). The Moon, on the other hand, contributes particularly toward the constitution of the month, while the fixed stars contribute toward day and night, while the impact (*typos*) in the case of the remaining [heavenly bodies] is also obvious. Of course, there is no night, nor *a fortiori* any day separate from the Sun, nor a year without the [movement of] the fixed stars through the Zodiac, and similarly in the case of the other heavenly bodies, but nonetheless these other [temporal] measures are particularly appropriate to other things. The stars could also be said to be instruments of time insofar as it has a creative status (*axia poêtikê*) in relation to them since it puts Becoming in order through them as if through instruments. By means of this it is also clear that time is not merely the participated [time] and the number of motion, if the Rulers of the Cosmos[157] [i.e. the seven planets] in fact have the rank of instruments in relation to it, but that it is an invisible god with an eternal essence that is *active* with respect to every motion throughout the entire cosmic cycle, employing these gods instrumentally as more partial measures than itself.

The claim that 'the stars were created in order to distinguish and preserve the numbers of time' (38c6) clearly means that the one time that proceeds from the Demiurge and his will remains one, whole and undifferentiated – even though by dint of the motions of these [heavenly bodies] it comes to be plural in number and appears as if it were divided and differentiated, so that the measure that is appropriate to each one is, as it were, separated from the whole of time and always preserved by virtue of the regular and orderly movement [of each heavenly body]. In fact, however, it is the other way around: the heavenly gods are actually preserved by the numbers of time and they have a share in a definition (*diorismos*) for the periods and returns to the starting point which they make [thanks to the numbers which determine them]. Simultaneously, however, we [should also say that] the numbers of time are preserved through the circular motions [of the heavenly bodies] since we seek to

[156] See above on 36.13. [157] See above on 2.10.

draw conclusions about things that are invisible from things that are visible.

4. The harmony of Plato and the Theurgists

It is not merely Plato who concurs with these things, as we said earlier [20.22], but also the Theurgists since they praise the encosmic gods as eternal, limitless, young and old, having a form that is spiral. And in addition they regard them as having their essence in eternity, remaining always the same, and as infinite in power. How else have the things that go around [sc. the stars] assisted the infinity of visible time other than [by having these encosmic gods] circularly draw things back into the same state, while ageing and making them new, and recalling them through time into the appropriate measure, since time is such as to include things that undergo both circular and rectilinear motion? Such is the character of the helix and it is for this reason that time too is celebrated as having a spiral shape as I said earlier [21.2]. Since this is so they [sc. the Theurgists] do not merely celebrate time as a god, but also Day itself and Night, as well as the Month and the Year – and plausibly so too, for there must be an entirely unmoved cause for things that are carried around eternally and formally differentiated from one another. In any case they have provided the conjunctions, invocations and sacred rites for these things.[158] It is also necessary not merely to consider all these matters superficially,[159] but to worship as divine the invisible and unmoved things that are prior to the moving objects that are obvious to everyone. This is a view for which Plato too is evidence since in the *Laws* (899b) there is a discussion of these gods, as I said earlier [36.22]. Furthermore, the Greeks have provided us with rites of the Month,[160] while the Month is celebrated by the Phrygians in Sabazion hymns in the midst of the rites of Sabazios.[161] The reason is that whatever people first apprehended as able to provide a metric for eternal rotation, they assumed to be a god

[158] See below at 89.16–23 where these are discussed further.

[159] ἐπὶ δακτύλων πάντα ταῦτα μόνον σκοπεῖν; cf. 89.20 and *in Remp.* II 16.3, 169.2, 172.18, 233.25. In all cases, the phrase occurs in a context where we have something numerical, like the Perfect Number, and we are advised not to treat it merely as something to be totted up, but to look for its deeper significance. One is reminded of Lactantius, *Divine Institutes* 5.23 where he accuses pagan piety of being 'worship by the fingertips' or superficial and lacking in moral seriousness; MacMullen (1981), 63.

[160] See above 32.17.

[161] A syncretist cult whose celebrations we first learn about in Demosthenes, *On the Crown*, 259, ff. and Theophrastus, *Characters* 28. In these reports, a snake is the central element. By the imperial period, Sabazios seems to have become a cosmic deity by a variety of accretions and associations. Among these are *Mên* and hence the association with the Month. There are also Orphic connections, which may explain the salience that Sabazios has for Proclus. See Johnson (1984).

and honoured it through sacred rites and worship, as they did with the Seasons (*Horai*). They were able to know these things [sc. the months and the seasons] on the basis of the results brought about by them, even if they could not similarly know the year. The Theosophers,[162] however, were able to celebrate the year as a god, though it was not easy for everyone to know this god and worship it due to the difficulty of comprehending the period that was measured by it. There were parallel difficulties in the case of universal time, due to ignorance of the single period [of the heavenly bodies], so it would have been difficult for just anyone to have tracked down the fact that it exists and is a god. And yet, if it is in fact the case that an unmoved cause exists prior to an eternal motion, then it once again follows that what determines everything in a unified manner and what numbers that which gets counted must exist prior to the eternality [of the motion].

E. The proper limits of tensed language

1. Explication of Tim. *37e4–38a1*

. . . which [forms of time] we forget about when we incorrectly apply them to eternal Being. For we say that 'it was' and 'it will be' when actually the word 'is' alone applies according to true speech. (37e4–38a1)

a. General observations

First, it is worth reiterating that he once again equates *eternal* Being with *intelligible* Being so that we will be more clearly persuaded that he meant for the cosmos to have been generated as an image of the intelligible gods at the point at which he said that it had come to be as an image of the eternal gods. **42**

Next, one must observe how Plato goes right back to the true conceptions of things, since he sees that human beings neither think nor say anything sound with respect to these issues, and at the same time purifies the usage of the words through which the teacher must achieve recollection in the thoughts of those who are naturally apt [at recollection]. Therefore, on the one hand, it [merely?] seems[163] that, due to its even-handed character, the statement [in the lemma] brings only

[162] We have an Orphic hymn addressed to the Seasons and the Year (18), so perhaps the Theosophers Proclus has in mind are the Orphics.

[163] The δοκεῖ μὲν at line 6 is answered by δύναμιν δε at line 10. The rebuke to our ordinary use of temporal language in relation to the atemporal intelligibles merely seems to be a mild one since the one who points out this mistake engages in it too. In fact, however, this is a serious error. Our language is tantamount to the Giants' attack on Olympus,

a light charge against people's ordinary usage of words, for the term 'incorrectly' is one that does not typically amount to serious censure, especially when it applies both to those who are charged and to the one who brings the charge. But on the other hand, the statement does have a penetrating and striking character,[164] for consider that if human beings attempt to apply that [temporal being] which the Demiurge has allotted to the final stages of creation (due to their inability to receive the superior comprehension [that is Eternity]) to those beings which remain in eternity, then they engage in a kind of war of the Giants – countering by their utterances the will and power of creation, crudely striving to hurl rocks and trees back up into heaven.[165]

For what reason, therefore, are 'was' and 'will be' terms that do not apply to the intelligibles? It is because the very measure of the intelligibles [sc. Eternity] is both motionless and immobile and this measure makes what is measured by it such as to wholly transcend change (*metabolê*). For what reason, then, does 'it is' alone apply to eternal being **according to true speech**? Because what it [sc. eternal being] is, it always is. It neither loses anything nor does it gain: not with respect to Being or Life or the act of cognition (*noêsis*) – much less with respect to its very unification (*henôsis*). Is it therefore the case that of these three terms – 'was', 'is', and 'will be' – it is not fitting to apply the extreme terms in the case of the intelligibles, but only the middle term. Or is it the case that none [of these terms may, in fact, be used]? The reason for the latter[166] is that the sense of 'is' that is coordinate with 'was' and 'will be' is not fitting for the intelligibles, but only [the sense of 'is'] that transcends all of these. Only the sense of 'is' that has no trace whatsoever of time and is itself determined in accordance with the eternal measure ought to be assigned to the gods and the intelligibles. The case is parallel to that of [the meaning of the word] 'always' where there was[167] one sense that was eternal and another that was temporal. So too there is a dual sense of 'is' where one sense applies to genuine Being, while the other applies to things

since by our words we effectively deny the will and power of the Demiurge who has distinguished temporal from eternal being.

[164] It may be that these are terms used to distinguish specific rhetorical effects. Thus we find the following comment on the style of Demosthenes from the Athenian rhetorician Sopater (4th century) in his *Diairesis Zêtêmatôn* 8.206–7 δεύτερον εἴποις ἂν τοιοῦτον πληκτικὸν καὶ δριμὺ καὶ Δημοσθενικῆς μετέχον βαρύτητος. Proclus would, of course, have been familiar with the terminology of the rhetors since he had such training himself and there were skilled rhetoricians associated with the school.

[165] Cf. *Sophist* 246a7–9.

[166] . . . ἢ οὐδαμῶς; οὐδὲ γὰρ κτλ. It is clear that what follows the γάρ gives Proclus' reasons for supposing that, in a certain sense, none of the three terms applies to the intelligible realm.

[167] Proclus discusses the dual sense of ἀεί at 3.9 above.

within the cosmos. Therefore, when Plato says that **the word 'is'** ***alone*** (*monos*) **applies according to true speech**, by changing the position of the word *monos* we may discover a more scientific (*epistêmonikôteros*) [or more precisely correct] statement.[168] [Such a transposition yields the statement] that 'that which solely is' applies [according to true speech] – that is, the sense of 'is' that is independent (*kath heauto*) and transcends relation to the forms of time that are coordinate with one another. 43

b. The source of our confusion about tensed language

How then did it turn out that human beings came to be so mistaken as to project back up toward the intelligible gods terms that are not at all fitting for them? The general cause is the forgetting (*lêthê*)[169] about divinity that in our case supervenes upon the shedding of [the soul's] wings, falling down, and association with mortal bodies. It was for this reason that Plato said: **we forget about** [this fact] **when we incorrectly apply them** [sc. tensed words] **to eternal Being**. But those who practise theurgy are surely not affected this way: it is not licit for them. Rather, they celebrate Time himself as a god, and they regard one [time god] as 'connected with the zones', as we said, and another as 'independent of the zones'.[170] It measures the period of the third of the aetherial [heavens]. Yet another is set over the intermediate one among these

[168] Proclus has in mind changing Plato's original word order τῇ δὲ τὸ ἔστι μόνον κατὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον προσήκει for τῇ δὲ τὸ μόνον ἔστι προσήκει. He thinks that the latter better conveys the sense that only the non-temporal 'is' – the one that stands apart from the coordinate past, present and future tenses – applies to genuine Being.

[169] This notion of the soul's forgetfulness is, of course, Platonic. Cf. *Phdr.* 250a and *Rep.* 621a. Doubtless because of this, it also figures in the *Chaldean Oracles* (fr. 109). Such is Proclus' enthusiasm for this subject that the contrast between the theurgists, who do not abuse temporal language, and ordinary people who do quickly turns into a digression on assorted temporal gods in the works associated with the *Oracles*. Proclus eventually returns to the topic of the confused ideas of 'the many' at 44.2 below.

[170] See 27.10 and 32.18 above. This material may be drawn from Julian's work 'On the Zones', i.e. on the orbits of the heavenly bodies. Putting these passages together we seem to have five strata of time gods in Proclus' understanding of the Chaldean system. (1), and most proximate to us, will be those gods 'connected with the zones', i.e. those gods dependent upon the planetary orbits such as the Year, the Month, etc. (2) that which is independent of the zones, i.e. this god or gods transcend the motions of the planets. Proclus perhaps thinks of these as unparticipated monads of the gods in (1) or perhaps as corresponding to the sphere of the fixed stars. The next three gods are difficult to square with the three realms of the Chaldean cosmology delineated at II 57.10, ff.: the Empyrian (i.e. intelligible); the Aetherial (i.e. the order of the fixed stars and planets); and the Hylic (i.e. the sub-lunary). Thus I think we must suppose that here a further division of the aetherial region is intended. If (2) corresponds to the sphere of the fixed stars, then (3) Archangelic Time is a god beyond that which presumably

cosmoi, a certain Archangelic time. Another one [that is called] Commanding time rules over the very first of the aetherial [heavens], while above all these is another Fontal [time god] that directs and rotates the empyrian cosmos and also determines its period. This god proceeds from the Fontal Goddess who gives birth to all life, as well as all motion. This goddess brought forth Fontal Time and instituted it as a measurement for all moving things and the periods of every one of them right down to the final stages of creation. After all, these too [sc. the final stages of creation] are also measured by periods even though they are composed of things that are capable of being entirely destroyed. Plato himself teaches us in the *Phaedo* (71d4, 77c8) that everything that is alive comes to be from that which is dead and that all that is dead comes to be so from what was living. Insofar as there is a time period for all things, there is also[171] a return to the starting point even for things that have come to be – not merely for those things that are indestructible – for it is also the case that we have a certain period for an individual thing that has gone from non-existence and into non-existence [again], if a period is in fact a movement from the same [state] to the same [state].[172] Time, therefore, is such as to measure everything, right down to the last things, and defines periods for every one of them. He adds time to the things that undergo change in order that, through the period established by going from this state back to the same state – a period that time determines for each thing that undergoes change – they may imitate the continuous rest of Intellect in itself.[173]

44

The multitude frequently mix up the diverse composition (*systasis*) of things and do not distinguish between those things that are in some sense proper to things that are and those proper to things that come to be. It is ignorance about eternity and time in particular that brings

determines its rate, while (4) Commanding Time rules over this hypercosmic rate-setter. (5) Fontal time seems to correspond to the function of Eternity for Proclus, since the empyrian cosmos corresponds to the realm of intelligibles. The Fontal Goddess who gives birth to all life and motion is Hecate. The terminology for these gods seems to be fluid; cf. *in Parm.* 647.6–9 τὰ τοῖς Ἀσσυρίοις ὑμνημένα, Ζῶναι καὶ Ἄζωνοι, καὶ Πηγαὶ καὶ Ἀμείλικτοι καὶ Συνοχεῖς, δι' ὧν ἐκεῖνοι τὰς τάξεις ἑρμηνεύουσι τῶν θεῶν.

171 Retaining the καὶ deleted by Diehl at 43.27.

172 Souls, of course, have their own periods of incarnation. What Proclus seems to have in mind here is the causal role in returning things to their starting points. Thus a city or a tree goes from not having existed, to existing for a while to not existing again. This is the apokatastasis for these individuals. Time does not merely act as a cause with respect to the cycles of the heavenly bodies, but right down to individual perishable things.

173 Deleting ὁ αἰὼν at line 33 in accordance with the suggestion of Schneider that is listed in Diehl's apparatus. For the τοῦ νοῦ τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ μονὴν, see above 28.26.

about this profound confusion and illicit use [of words].[174] Of course, a certain similarity among the things in question contributes too, for the final stages [of creation] are not separated from the things that are most primary. They depend upon those [that are most primary] and proceed in accordance with these <intermediate [stages]>[175] and take on the form of images. Similarities have a terrible power when it comes to those who lack understanding – a power that can lead into fallacious reasoning, divert them from one thing to another, persuade them to interact with images as if they were paradigms, and prompt them to think that a fundamental essence is nothing over and above what is in fact merely the visible image of this essence. Therefore, when we see in the things here a mixture of Being in relation to Not-Being – for instance, when we say that a thing 'is', then in a sense there is a predominance of Being, but when 'were' or 'will be' are uttered concerning something, there is a sense in which Not-Being predominates – we transfer this to the eternal order of beings where in fact nothing is passing by nor is anything about to be, nor in general is there any change. [In that realm],[176] there is no procession of time, nor is there any hint of the kind of being that corresponds to privation.[177] There is only true Being (*alêthês ousia*), genuine Being (*to ontôs on*), and that which is always the same. There everything is in the now and things are already finalised simultaneously – not as one thing in another, nor as the same things existing in their [respective] subjects, since in their case where, as is said, beauty and goodness are the totality of their existence, being Good is in no way separate from just Being.

[174] Saffrey (1975), 558 supposes that this is a veiled allusion to Christians. It seems to me, however, that it is perfectly general in its scope and could include Atticus and Plutarch as well.

[175] Diehl provides τὰ μέσα at line 9 and Festugière helpfully points out that time is the intermediary through which sensibles participate in Eternity (*in Tim.* III 16.33, 25.24, 26.9). This mediating role for time is associated with Iamblichus at 33.25 and 34.6.

[176] Festugière reads ὅπου in the lacuna at line 19, simply repeating it from the previous occurrence in line 18. My translation reads as if I supposed ἐκεῖ, but this is not so. Festugière's is surely the simpler hypothesis for the missing word. It is simply that another iteration of 'where . . . ' makes for awkward English.

[177] μηδὲ τοῦ ὄντος τοῦ κατὰ στέρησιν ἔμφασις. Presumably Proclus has in mind the idea that there is no privation or absence of anything such that this lack could provide the potential for things to be some other way later. Since time does not proceed, there will be no later. But, from the other side, there will be no need for anything to come later, since all is eternally present in the intelligible realm. Festugière translates: 'ni même trace fugitive de ce comporte qui une négation'.

2. *Explication of* Tim. *38a1–9*

Was and will be are properly spoken about with respect to the Becoming that passes in time, for these two are motions. But that which is changelessly always the same neither comes to be older nor younger on account of time.[178] It has not come to be at some past time, nor has it now come to be, nor will it ever be in the future. None of the features that Becoming has brought to sensible things pertain to what is perpetual. Instead these are forms of time which imitate eternity and are circulated in accordance with number. (*Tim.* 38a1–9)

He says that these three things pertain to Becoming on account of time. First, the 'was' and the 'will be'; second, to become younger and older; third, to have come to be at some time or to have come to be now or to come to be at some point in the future. Among these three, the divine Iamblichus[179] says that time brings about the first one in as much as it proceeds from Being, while it brings about the second in as much as it springs from Life, and time produces the third in as much as it is dependent upon the intellectual order.

Though these things have been stated [by Iamblichus] in an exceedingly wise manner, ask yourself, first, whether it is necessary to consider these things as three rather than as two. [Or can one take them] in such a way as to implicitly understand 'younger or older' with 'to have come to be at some past time' as well as 'to be coming to be now' and 'to come to be in the future' in order that [younger or older] should accord not only with the [tenses of the verb] 'to come to be', but so that they accord with all the parts of time and all the parts of Becoming since it would

[178] Proclus has διὰ χρόνον οὐδὲ γενέσθαι both in the lemma and subsequently at 45.5, 46.11 and 47.19, while the OCT has διὰ χρόνου.

[179] Proclus *in Tim.* III 45.5–11 = Iamblichus, *in Tim.* fr. 65 (Dillon). Dillon regards Iamblichus' view as puzzling. Of the three hypostases – Being, Life and Intellect – the third seems to have the smallest extension among the things in the realm of being. Only some things are *ennoun*, while a wider extension are alive, and all things participate in Being. Yet the tenses of 'to come to be' seem to be equally wide in extension with the tenses of 'to be' that are mediated from the uppermost hypostasis, Being, to the realm of Becoming by time. Dillon's solution is to suggest that Intellect corresponds to individuals under a sortal term, with strict criteria of individuation, while Being and Life produce mass terms – some more existence; some more life. He grants that this is speculative, but sees no better hypothesis.

Perhaps this might be a better explanation: while it is true that fewer *individuals* within the realm of Becoming are endowed with intellect, and yet more are alive, and all share in Being, the focus of the discussion now is the cosmos as a whole. It, however, is alive and endowed with intellect when considered as a whole (*Tim.* 30b8). Thus perhaps Dillon's initial assumption that the three hypostases are progressively more limited in their extension is not true in this context.

be wrongful to refer these [notions of younger or older] to the gods.[180] Next, going back to the start of this entire passage, consider whether only the two things would correctly be said of the realm of Becoming (I mean 'was' and 'will be') or whether that which forms an intermediate between these two (I mean 'is') would also apply to the realm of Becoming. The term itself has not been used on this occasion [at the start of the lemma] lest the homonymy of the word should again introduce confusion into the discussion, for the eternal [sense of] 'is' does indeed apply to the intelligibles. Moreover, while[181] it is clear to everyone that though each one of the images participates in a way in the paradigm, the entire cosmos participates in a different manner in the intelligible [Living Being Itself]. Consequently, if genuine Being is up there, Being would be here in some other manner. The word 'is', however, is not counted together with 'was' and 'will be', both because that which *is* in the strict sense is not in the realm of Becoming and because even what *is* in a secondary sense is a result of the intelligible realm [in a way that what was and what will be are not], so that it would be more pertinent to it. It is [not enumerated along with 'was' and 'will be'] in addition because the objective here is to say what the distinctive features of each of the two natures amounts to; not to see whether one of them has a share in something that is ranked beside the other. This is in fact the case with 'was' and 'will be', even if they are particularly characterised by Not-Being – the one being related to 'what no longer is' and the other to 'what is not yet' – that each one nonetheless surely participates in Being in some manner, for were this not so, they would not have been named after it even by derivation (*parenklisis*).[182] Nonetheless, it is due to the predominance of Not-Being in them that they are solely appropriate to Becoming but are not in any way suited to genuine Being. And here's yet another reason:[183] the monad of 'is' is more akin to Eternity and to the

20 25 30 **46** 5

[180] In other words, Proclus proposes to treat 'younger and older' as things that a subject can be both said to 'come to be' or 'to be' in the past, present or future tenses. The point of this scholastic disagreement with Iamblichus is not easy to see. Perhaps it is that there is one sense of 'younger' or 'older' that it *is* illicit to apply to the gods – the sense conjoined with tensed language of being or becoming. But we can say that some gods are 'older' than others in a distinct sense of timeless priority in procession. For the sense of προσυπακουεῖν as 'implicitly understand', see LSJ II.

[181] Festugière recommends καὶ μὴν πρόδηλόν ἐστι <μὲν> at line 23 to answer οὐ συνηρίθμηται δὲ ('however') at 27.

[182] Cf. *in Crat*. 41.12–15 where naming by derivation is illustrated by the relation between κρανίον and κάρα or κνημίς and κνημή. Cf. Damascius, *in Parm*. 305.27 and 307.18.

[183] καὶ ἄλλως δὲ continues the list of reasons initiated at 45.28 (διότι τε . . . καὶ διότι καὶ) for why 'is' is not numbered along with 'was' and 'will be'.

intelligibles while the dyad of 'was' and 'will be' is related to Becoming and time.[184]

This strength of the temporal activity is surely great because it arranges together what is no more with things that are, as well as arranging that which is yet to be with what is now present.[185] All these things come to be continuous in accordance with time, and that which exists presently is dismissed through time into 'what was'. But even when this happens, what was present is not carried away into the realm of what is not in any way at all. Rather, on account of time, these things have in some manner been ranked alongside those things that are.[186] How, then, are 'was' and 'will be' said to be **forms of time** and proper [only] in the case of things that have come to be? Or is it the case that there were some forms of time – those that are simpler and are merely temporal progressions and extensions that are such as to measure the things that are wholes – and also some other forms of time that ranked along with the things that have come to be in time? After all, 'there was a time' is not the same as 'there was a was', just as downward is not the same in the case of place as it is in the case of the Earth. The first is a single simple thing, while the other is composite and two-fold. The former is that which includes, while the latter is that which gets included. So too in the case of 'was' – the one that is temporal includes and measures and is simple. However, that which is associated with becoming in time is included and measured. It *participates* in time, but it is not [*identical* to] time. It is obvious that all Becoming is included by time, just as time itself is included by the intelligibles. It follows from these facts that time is said to proceed *according to number* (*Tim*. 37d7), in as much as it makes its

[184] It is hard to be certain but I suspect that the present tense is a monad, while past and future correspond to the dyad, because the latter pertain to a time that is defined *in relation to* the present moment. So 'x was F' is true if and only if there is a time, t, such that t is past in relation to the time of utterance and x is F at t.

[185] Earlier we observed the active power of temporal passage in bringing about effects. Time's passage does not merely measure a process in which I grow old and grey: it plays an active role in arranging the events across my lifespan. Here is another demonstration of this god's active power. It can connect, on the same time line as it were, things that are no longer (i.e. past events) with what is and this again with what is yet to be (i.e. future events).

[186] Proclus seems to credit time with lending some measure of being to past events. Compare how Lucretius supposes that facts about the past are made true by the continued existence of the atoms that constituted the objects involved in those past facts. Proclus seems to credit time itself with the power to preserve truth-makers for past tense statements. In what follows, past time is likened to the place where Earth is. It is the place that determines where down is, though we may say that down is toward the centre of the Earth. Similarly, specific events are in the past, but an event's pastness is not determined by its relation to those events, but by its residing in past time in the same manner in which the Earth resides in the centre.

procession in accordance with the intellectual forms and measures that are in it. Becoming, however, might be said to proceed *in time* (38a1) in as much as it gets measured, arranged and brought to a conclusion by time. Once again, time is said to move in a circle in imitation of Eternity (38a7) – just as the heavens are said to be spherical in imitation of Intellect (33b5; 34a2) – and it is said to have 'was' and 'will be' and as many things as are cognate with these[187] as forms, since it is obvious that there are simple and originary [higher order sources] for the things that are carried into Becoming. After all, since time has in itself the measures **47**
of all Becoming, it inserts images and impressions into the things that proceed in accordance with it. Becoming, therefore, is getting past its prime (*parakmazein*) and due to this fact it requires time to reinvigorate it. With respect to its origin Becoming is also incomplete and needs time to make it more complete and older. The intelligible, by contrast, is always complete, always in its prime and is always the same and invariant. From this it follows that even up there one thing is older [or more senior]

But Zeus was the elder (*Iliad*, 13.355)

and also younger [or more junior]

in their midst, queenly Hebe poured them nectar (*Iliad* 4.2)

but these [higher order senses of 'older' and 'younger'] have not come about in their case through time. And this is the point that Plato adds, quite precisely, since it does not pertain to what is intelligible to become older or younger over time. In general what is ungenerated does not come to be, nor has it come to be, nor will it come to be. In brief, even if Becoming is not Being, it nonetheless has a share in Being. Yet it is in no way legitimate for Becoming to infect Being. It follows from this that it is not correct to transfer to things that genuinely are what pertains to the things in Becoming due to time.

3. *Explication of* Tim. *38a9–b5*

And in addition to this, we also say things like this: (a) that what *has* come to be *is* what has come to be, (b) that what is *coming to be is* coming to be, and (c) also that what *will* come to be *is* what will come to be, and (d) that what *is not is* what is not. None of these things is said with precision. But perhaps the present moment would not be the proper time to be particularly scrupulous about what one says concerning these matters. (*Tim*. 38a9–b5)

[187] Presumably these will be verbs other than 'to be' that are likewise tensed.

First Plato criticised the common usage of the Greeks for transferring words that are proper to genuine Being to the realm of Becoming, but
48 now he blames the majority of people for making what is proper to the intelligible realm [sc. the verb 'to be'] coordinate with Becoming.[188] Their transgression is double – or if it is really just one mistake, it is a very big one. Whenever they say that what *has* come about *is* what has come
5 about and that what *will* come about *is* what will come about, then they illicitly attach the distinctive feature (*to idion*) of the essences of eternal things to those that are generated (for this term 'to be' pertains to those divine things above, just as 'to come to be' pertains to sensible things). They also incorrectly mix up the parts of time [in cases (a) and (c)] and ruin the order among them when they bring the past and the present
10 to the same [statement]. But when they say (b) that what is coming to be *is* [what is coming to be], they are guilty of falling only into the first mistake. Though this is a significant error, there is one that is even greater (if it is lawful even to mention it); that is, to say (d) that Not-being *is*. If Becoming is an intermediate between Being and Not-being, it is a lesser transgression to transfer what belongs to Being to Becoming
15 than it is to transfer it to Not-being. There might be, however, a single excuse offered on their part – one that appeals to nature – for the [kind of] Not-being that is in [the process of] Becoming has a share in Being[189] just as the temporal [realm] in general also participates in Eternity, so that Not-being seems, to those people who are not accustomed to make the ascent toward Eternity and the genuine Being that transcends every
20 kind of extension and division, to *be*.[190] Furthermore, the present tense

[188] Diehl posited a lacuna in line 27 – Πρῶτον μὲν *** ὡς τὰ τῇ γενέσει πρέποντα ῥήματα τοῖς ὄντως οὖσι προσφέρουσαν τὴν συνήθειαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων διήλεγχε, νυνὶ δὲ ὡς τὸ εἶναι συντάττοντας τῇ γενέσει τὸ προσῆκον τοῖς νοητοῖς αἰτιᾶται τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων – in which he proposed ἐζητήσαμεν but Festugière's construction of the sentence seems to me to obviate the need to think that something has fallen out.

[189] Cf. *in Tim*. I 233.2 and II 128.1 where Proclus claims that sensibles or the realm of Becoming is 'that which is not genuinely not being', while matter *is* genuine not being (οὐκ ὄντως δὲ οὐκ ὂν τὸ αἰσθητόν, ὄντως δὲ οὐκ ὂν τὴν ὕλην). The temporal realm in general participates in Eternity by always receiving the power of coming to be (cf. I 279.7, II 100.19). This does not make every individual thing in it eternal. In a parallel way, participation in time rescues the kind of Not-Being that characterises sensibles in general from complete Not-Being. Moreover, time's presentness makes individual things within the realm of Becoming present, while past time and future time afford them a kind of being. Moreover, time's continuous passage renders the different grades of Being had by past, present and future events coordinate and comparable. Cf. above 46.6–11.

[190] Tarrant wisely pointed out to me that these inexperienced people find themselves in the same position with respect to being that other similarly inexperienced people find themselves in with respect to genuine pleasure and the 'true and real above' at *Rep*. IX 584e.

tends to conserve and confine the Becoming that is carried along in motion [so that what is present might seem to *be*].[191] There is nothing to be surprised at, then, if human beings who wish in some manner to confine what is past among the things that are,[192] should dare to say that what *has already* come about *is* what has come about. Wishing to make what is yet to come about coordinate with the things that [presently] are [the case], they might also dare to say that what *will* come about *is* what will come about. Through these two ways of speaking, Not-being is in a certain manner able to be coordinate with or able to be present to things – both because of the participation in Being and because of the presence of temporal extension. Both of these things, after all, would seem to carry with them Being.

The starting point [for Plato's discussion] of ordinary usage arose from some such [considerations]. Nonetheless, the correction of these matters [so briefly alluded to by Plato] has an element of confusion to it and is not accurate or scientific. It is for this reason that Plato – after having indicated to the extent that is proper to the inquiry at hand (which is after all more of a physical nature) – said that a full examination of these matters belongs to a different business. While most of the interpreters think this is logic (for it is in logic classes that we customarily inquire whether 'that which is not' is potentially an object of belief), the divine Iamblichus[193] takes it to be a theological issue and I am persuaded by him,

49

[191] πάλιν τὸ ἐνεστὼς τοῦ χρόνου τὴν ἐν κινήσει φερομένην γένεσιν εἴωθε σῴζειν καὶ διακατέχειν. Festugière translates: 'En outre, l'être créé entraîné dans le mouvement nous apparaît usuellement comme conservé et solidement tenu par le moment présent du Temps.' In his note he explains: 'Difficile à traduire, mais profond. Tout change et nous changeons aussi. Mais l'objet que je regarde actuellement – traduisant Proclus – est là, devant mes yeux, dans cette succession d'instants présents, qui en font réellement un objet *stable* devant ce sujet *stable* que je suis.' I think he has made this harder than it has to be. The subject is τὸ ἐνεστὼς τοῦ χρόνου which has an established sense in grammatical texts of the present tense of a verb (cf. LSJ, q.v. B III.2). When we say, 'John is 60 years old' we assign a fixed number to what is in fact a continuous process. Though John's age as measured in years won't change until his next birthday, nonetheless he ages continuously throughout every moment of every day of the intervening year. From Proclus' point of view, every present tense predication similarly arrests an underlying process of becoming.

[192] ἐν τοῖς οὖσι; that is to say, it should come as no surprise that when human beings confront the class of things that are (in any sense whatsoever) and single out the past events among this vast class, they go on to use the present tense with respect to them and say, 'These things that have come about *are* what has come about.'

[193] Proclus, *in Tim*. III 48.29–49.19 = Iamblichus, *in Tim*. fr. 66 (Dillon). The discussion of 'not being' is a theological matter because both the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist* are, in Iamblichus' view of things, theological dialogues. That the *Parmenides* is theological is common ground for Neoplatonists. In addition, however, Iamblichus takes the *skopos* of the Sophist to be the sub-lunary Demiurge; cf. *in Soph*. fr. 1.

for in both the *Sophist* (237b–41d) and also the *Parmenides* (155e–57b) Plato provides a lengthy account of all the various [senses of] not-being. Doubtless it is to these works that Timaeus declares the issue at hand to be appropriate. For the moment, however, [he engages in two other tasks]: just as he distinguishes and separates from one another *things* that always are from those that come to be and pass away, as well as things that are images from those that are paradigms, and those that are eternal from those that are in time, so too he also wished to provide the appropriate ways of *referring* to both groups of things lest the [terms] that are attributed to Becoming because of time be carried over to the sort of Being that is simpler and more divine or the special goods that belong to superior things be mixed together with that which is carried into the realm of motion and change. The deeper investigation of these matters he allocates to a more appropriate moment. This [methodology] was customary for Plato himself and, prior to Plato, to the Pythagoreans. Indeed, it was that [approach] which Aristotle too pursued even more successfully, namely, dealing with philosophical problems in a manner that is suitable for the purposes of the sort of business one is engaged in.

F. The relation between time and the heavens

Therefore time has come to be together with the heavens so that having come to be simultaneously they might be dissolved together, if there were ever to be a moment when the dissolution of them should come about, and by virtue of the paradigm of the eternal nature in order that the one[194] should be as similar to the other as possible; for while the paradigm *is* in a way that is entirely eternal, the heavens are such that 'was' and 'is' and 'will be' applies to them throughout all time. (*Tim.* 38b6–c2)

a. Lexis for Tim. *38b6–c2*

Plato says that **time has come to be together with the heavens** – which is endowed with soul and intellect – doubtless because the cosmos is the first thing that participates in time both with respect to soul and with respect to corporeality. The words **so that having come to be simultaneously they might be dissolved together, if there were ever to be a moment when the dissolution of them should come about** clearly show that the heavens are incapable of generation or destruction. For if the heavens had come to be, they came to be *in time*. But if they

[194] Proclus has here and at 50.24: ἵνα ὡς ὁμοιότατος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ κατὰ δύναμιν ᾖ. Plato: ὡς ὁμοιότατος αὐτῷ.

came to be *with time*, then they did not come to be *in time*, for neither has time come to be *in time* lest there should be time before time.[195] Therefore, if it came to be together with time, then it has not come to be [at all], for everything that has come to be is such as to be subsequent in time (*metagenês*) to time [itself]. The heavens, however, are in no sense a younger sibling (*metagenês*) compared to time.[196] Conversely, if everything that undergoes dissolution gets dissolved at some time, and if time could not be destroyed in some portion of itself, then time could not be destroyed. As a result, neither can the heavens be destroyed, for this too is indestructible given that time is indestructible. And in yet another sense, time is indestructible due to the simplicity of its nature[197] – unless someone wished to call the cause of its procession and reversion to the Demiurge its generation and dissolution. On this line of reasoning the heavens too would have a generation and dissolution in the causal-preparatory mode (*kat' aitian*) [of being].[198] Therefore the situation is as if someone who wanted to say that the orbits of the [circle of] the Different were odd in number expressed this by saying that the number seven co-existed with them in order that if ever the number seven becomes even, the number of orbits would become even too.[199] This would signify that the number would not change to be even. Doubtless what is said now must be taken in a parallel fashion and one must think

[195] Cf. Alexander, *in Metaphys.* 688.2–5.

[196] I have translated the same word, occurring in close proximity, in two different ways in order to illustrate the semantic range that I think Proclus is exploiting in this argument.

[197] This second line of reasoning is not fully developed, but I suspect it amounts to this. In spite of the fact that days, months and years are *parts* of time, they are inseparable parts. That is, time's continuity means that it cannot 'fall apart at the joints'. Now Proclus argues elsewhere that what is indivisible (e.g. the soul) is indestructible (*in Remp.* II 212.2–9). Thus the simplicity of time's nature guarantees that it is indestructible.

[198] A thing exists in the *kat' aitian* mode of being when it is antecedently comprehended (*prolambanein*) in its paradigmatic cause. This manner or mode of being *x* is contrasted with *x* existing *kata methexin*. Cf. *ET* 195 and Baltzly (2008). If a person wanted to say that the cosmos, existing *kata methexin* is subject to generation and destruction because the causes of its procession and reversion exist *kat' aitian* in the Demiurge, Proclus concedes that there is some sense in this. Procession and reversion, of course, form a cycle. And there is a cycle of life from death and death from life from the *Phaedo* (77c) which Proclus has just discussed at 43.25. One would want to qualify the similarities between these cycles, of course. Given these limitations, it is unsurprising that Proclus does not pursue this concession too far.

[199] The orbits of the circle of the Different are the result of the division of this circle into seven smaller circles to accommodate the seven planets (*Tim.* 36d2). Proclus' point is that the person who says that time and the heaven are paired together in order that they might be destroyed together no more commits himself to the possibility that they really should be destroyed than does the person who says that the oddness of the number of planets and the number seven are paired together in order that both should change to even together. Cf. *in Tim.* II 56.1–11.

that the various aspects of the indestructibility of both the cosmos and of time have this nature due to the indestructibility of time.

One reason, therefore, for saying that time has been generated together with the heavens is in order that the universe might be indestructible and everlasting. A second reason is that so it can be as similar as possible to the Paradigm, for he says that the heavens are the 'one thing' to which the 'other thing' (which is the Paradigm) is to be made as similar as possible.[200] How, then, does the universe become more similar to the Living Being Itself due to time? Just as the intelligibles already receive the entire power of eternity – a power which is such as to unite and connect things – simultaneously, all at once and in a unified manner, so too the cosmos has admitted the entire circling motion (*choreia*) of time in a manner that is separate and divided.[201] Due to this, the cosmos **was, and is, and will be**. It does not have [all] three [tenses] in the whole of time, and has each one in a portion of time, but also has each of the three in the whole of time due to the period that is past, <the period that is present> and the period that is future.[202] [The cosmos also is made more like the Living Being Itself due to time] because,[203] although its nature is that of generated things, it had what is complete in the process of

[200] See above note 194.

[201] Cf. I 297.7 and II 100.15 for the same treatment of the visible universe's reception of the infinite power of the Paradigm's eternal character.

[202] Accepting Diehl's suggested addition at line 33: οὐκ ἐν τῷ σύμπαντι χρόνῳ τὰ τρία ἔχων, ἕκαστον δὲ ἐν μορίῳ χρόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τριῶν ἐν τῷ σύμπαντι χρόνῳ διά τε τὴν φθάσασαν <καὶ παροῦσαν> καὶ τὴν μέλλουσαν περίοδον. One way in which the cosmos could possess the three tenses is by virtue of the fact that every moment of time at which it exists individually has the properties of futurity, presentness and pastness *at some point in time*. Proclus seems to want more than that, however. What that something more consists in is not easy to glean. Perhaps it is the idea that the cosmos has a past history, a present state and a future state. The cosmos was, is and will be by virtue of there being a body of past facts about how it was, a body of present facts about how it is, and body of future facts about how it will be. Hence the contrast between 'parts' of time and periods. It is not the case that the past *period* will be and is. Hence οὐκ ἐν τῷ σύμπαντι χρόνῳ τὰ τρία ἔχων. Yet if we think of the cosmos' career we can always say which bits were, which are and which will be. Hence ἕκαστον τῶν τριῶν ἐν τῷ σύμπαντι χρόνῳ. The desire to endow the cosmos with all three tenses via ὁ σύμπας χρόνος rather than through individual moments and their temporal properties reflects the general Neoplatonic preference for more universal causes.

[203] I think καὶ ὅτι here goes back to line 26 where a question was posed and an initial answer was given with ὅτι. The key to this second means whereby time renders the cosmos similar to its Paradigm is the notion of *completeness*; cf. 52.8. Recall that among the terms that Timaeus uses for the Paradigm or the Living Being Itself is All-perfect or Totally-complete Living Being (*Tim.* 31b1). The explanation of the sense in which the cosmos has τὸ ἐν τῇ γενέσει τέλειον κατὰ πᾶν τοῦ χρόνου μόριον, however, takes us back to the three tenses. Thus the distinction between these two answers is pretty vague.

Becoming with respect to every part of time. On the one hand, it *is*, since it has a share in Being in the entire present revolution of time. And it also *was* * * *.[204] And it *will be*, since there will be no moment when the circling motions of the whole of time cease – rotary motions which connect the cosmos to intelligible causes and bring it into conformity with them. If the universe [lit. the heaven] is in the entirety of time, it surely also was, is and will be and exists at each subsequent future time because it is *indestructible*. It has also existed at all past times because it is incapable of being *generated*, for either each [of the three tenses] is present in a similar manner to every time or else there will not be time infinitely into the future nor will [the present] have come to be from an infinity [of past times]. Those people who say that it [sc. the universe] came to be at some time and will at some time not be are ridiculous when Plato grants to it the entirety of time in both directions equally.[205] You can also see that he now grants the three [tenses] to it and does not exempt it from Being (*to on*). Therefore it is clear from [the text] above (37e5) where he assigned 'is' to the eternal nature and not to Becoming that there exists [a sense of 'is'] that entirely transcends all temporal dimension and a *per se* eternality that has been assigned to the intelligibles. Next he concedes to sensible things a sense of 'is' that belongs in the same family with 'was' and 'will be' and that has come to stand alongside genuine Being (*to ontôs on*) by participation.[206]

If the nature of time is, in fact, an intermediary between Eternity and the heavens (as the divine Iamblichus says and I am persuaded by his view) so that it directs the latter and makes it conform to the former – if this is so, then how is it that time has been established as a gift to the universe?[207] How can it be that what *does* the including and perfecting and which assimilates the image to the paradigm should have come to be for the sake of that which *gets* included or assimilated? Were this the case, then the means would have greater importance than the ends and things that are superior would be a gift bestowed upon inferior things that would enable their procession toward the things that are. But it is not

[204] There is a lacuna here. Given the needs of the argument we might suspect something like: 'since there was no moment at which its circling motions began'.

[205] Plutarch and Atticus are usually the targets when Proclus speaks of those who mistakenly suppose that the *Timaeus* implies a beginning in time for the cosmos. For the infinity of past time, see *in Tim.* I 288.5, where Proclus invokes *Laws* III 676b as a proof text. The indestructibility and thus limitless future of the universe is a consequence of its being ungenerated. Cf. Aristotle, *Cael.* 3.1 – a view that Proclus claims that Plato and Aristotle share (*Aet.* 17, 589.2).

[206] For homonymy of the word 'is' in this respect, see above 45.21.

[207] The idea of the ten gifts of the Demiurge to the cosmos that dominated the structure of Proclus' commentary in Book 2 re-emerges here.

possible to discover any such thing among the things that have been set out by Plato, for it is not the case that time has come to be solely as a gift to the heavens, nor is it the case that the heavens have been established
52 solely as a gift to time. In fact, each is a gift both to itself and to the other and to the pair taken together. In order that the whole creation might attain perfection, the heavens have been brought about with such and such a character, and, on the other hand, time has been brought about with such and such a character. In fact, it turns out that each one makes a very significant contribution to the assimilation of the other to its appropriate paradigm, for time would not have imitated Eternity without the existence of the universe [lit. the heaven]. (For without the heavens, toward what would time have proceeded? Which among the things that are would it have measured, connected or perfected?) On the other hand, without time the heavens would not have imitated – to the extent possible – the all-perfect [character] and the eternality of the Living Being Itself. Each one [namely, time and the heavens] has not come to be merely as a gift to the other, nor even as a gift to itself, but rather for the entirety of creation in order that it be created as maximally complete and as similar as possible to its paradigms. In particular time and the heavens have come to be with the goodness of the Father of wholes as their final cause[208] – a goodness through which creation possesses perfection. Each one having come to be what it is by virtue of the other, each one then contributes very significantly to the permanence, order and good conditions of all encosmic things.

G. Summary of the teaching on time

Such then are the philosophical views of Plato on the subject of that time which is one and entire, and which is such as to measure everything and which proceeds and is set in motion solely by the Demiurge or its appropriate monad. It remains in what follows next to deal with the time that is manifested in virtue of the heavens and is distinguished as something pluralised, as it were, or divided along with the various

[208] Previously Proclus has used χάριν and ἵνα in this discussion. Here, however, we have μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς ἀγαθότητος εἵνεκα τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων. While εἵνεκα can in some contexts mean 'for the sake of' it is the term that stands at the base of Aristotle's notion of a final cause: τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. When *x* does F 'for the sake of *y*' in the sense appropriate to final causes, it does not do this in order to benefit or complete *y*, but in order that it may benefit or realise itself. Walking for the sake of health does not benefit health, but rather the walker. Similarly, time and the heaven come about for the sake of the god's goodness – not in order to benefit the god, but in order that they might be as good and complete as possible.

movements of the stars. [This sort of time] would not exist if there were no rotation of the circles of the Same and the Different around [the kind of] time that is invisible and has but a single circular motion, and if each of these circles did not cut off from this [invisible time] a measure that is appropriate to itself and manifest and preserve [this appropriate portion of invisible time] through all things. And since the wandering stars, among which the Sun and Moon are counted, are said to have come into being when this secondary time proceeded into the visible realm and became quite divisible and familiar to everyone through those things that produce its partial measures, how great must we deem the honour bestowed upon the most primary and single time by the philosopher, or rather by the Demiurge of wholes himself?

II. THE NINTH GIFT OF THE DEMIURGE: THE STARS

A. Explication of *Tim.* 38c3–6

As a result of god's reasoning and discursive thought with respect to the genesis of time and in order that time should be engendered, the Sun, the Moon and the five other stars (which possess the name 'wandering stars') came to be for the sake of distinguishing and preserving the numbers of time. (*Tim.* 38c3–6) **53**

1. Visible and invisible time

Since there are two acts of creation, as we have often remarked – the one being invisible, single, simple, hypercosmic and universal (*holos*), while the other is visible, pluralised, multiple in form and divided within the cosmos – there are two corresponding sets of activities. One activity is primary-effective (*prôtourgos*), changeless and intellectual while the other is secondary-effective (*deuterourgos*) and proceeds together with motion and dances around the intellect.[209] While the one transcends that which it produces, the other is ranked alongside its products. There has also been a two-fold procession of time into existent things, the first of which is hypercosmic while the other is encosmic. While the first one both proceeds and remains simultaneously, the other is carried along in motion. The time that undergoes participation is likewise two-fold. On

[209] The exact sense of this contrast is far from clear but its origins lie at *Laws* 10, 897a. There mental states, such as will or reflection, are described as the primary-productive motions that take over the secondary-productive motions of bodies. This is how soul drives (*agein*) all things in heaven and on Earth. See below 72.10–12 and 179.20.

the one hand, there is that which exists by virtue of simple participation (*kata haplên methexin*). On the other hand, there is that in the cycles of the celestial stars which produces months, days, nights and years. Now since there is such a distinction between these two kinds of time, Plato – having provided the conceptions that pertain to the single and simple essence of time – intends to go on to discuss the variety that the [kind] of time that is participated in a divisible manner has – an [objective] toward which the theory (*theôria*) about the planets makes a contribution (for it is through motions of these things dancing around the Sun that the kind of time that is understood in conjunction with [them] is produced). This introduces the ninth Demiurgic gift to the cosmos. In order that you may be provided with an indication of the inferiority of this sort of time relative to the previous kind as early on as the prologue itself, he says that this time has been established **as a result of god's reasoning and discursive thought** and, furthermore, that it has been furnished for **distinguishing and preserving the numbers of time** in accordance with the motion of the stars. One must take both of these things into consideration – that is, both the defining of the many measures of time that follow upon the one time and also the constant preservation of the measures themselves – when he says that the stars have come to be for the sake of this end. Plato brought in the first sort of time when the Demiurge looks toward Eternity and is active by virtue of a single and simple kind of cognition (*noêsis*). The second kind of time is, as Plato also says, **a result of the reasoning and discursive thought**, which indicates the fact that there has been a division of the cause and that there is a multiplication into plurality derived from the single cognition. After all, the divine intellect (*nous*) is one thing, but divine reason (*logos*) is another. While the first has been unified, the second has been made plural and while the first includes things that are wholes, the latter divides the unity into plurality. Finally, the first one remains in itself, while the latter makes itself manifest. So it turns out that this second [kind of] time – if it is visible to everyone, and if it manifests the hypercosmic [kind of] time, and if it is divisible – well, then, it has probably proceeded from the Demiurgic reasoning, while the former [hypercosmic kind of time] received its procession from intellect. On the one hand, the word **reason** (*logos*) shows the cause [sc. the Demiurge's faculty of reason?], while on the other hand, the words **discursive reasoning** (*dianoia*) show the understanding (*gnôsis*) in the Demiurge. Since the understanding is dual in form, one [aspect] is understanding of time as it truly is (which *is* the number of all the cycles in everything), while the other is understanding of the time that is said to derive from the former (which proceeds *in accordance with* number).

Furthermore, the previous [hypercosmic kind] of time includes all the measures of time in a manner that is uni-form (*henoeidôs*) – a fact in virtue of which the cycles bring completion to both souls and bodies and the one measure of the entire cosmic cycle (*apokatastasis*). (There exists, after all, a cycle for divine begettings which the perfect number encompasses, as Socrates says in the *Republic*.)[210] The latter kind of time, however, is the sort that defines and preserves the measures that are found in psychic or corporeal rotations, for appropriate measures have been allotted to each of them individually. By this means he divides the unitary power of the former [hypercosmic] time, but on the other hand preserves the requisite measure for each thing and by virtue of this creates the cosmic cycle; for there is one measure for the cycle of the Sun, and another one for the cycle of the Moon, and yet another for meteorological phenomena – after all, in these things too there is some circle that represents the celestial circle – and there is yet another for other living things, for there are cycles for them and measures of life, as the daemonic Aristotle also says.[211] These, therefore, are the things one ought to infer from these words concerning the differences between the kinds of time.

55

2. The contributions of the planets toward visible time

It also seems that it was not pointless for Plato to say **in order that time might be engendered**. Instead these words are there in order to show also that invisible time – which is a number that is single, whole (*holos*) and intellectual – was there prior to [the kind of time] that undergoes participation and proceeds according to number. In any event, that which comes to be is established invisibly in its cause prior to its becoming. The **engendering** [of time] therefore signifies the procession into the participants – a procession through which [the time] that is already there in the primary mode of being (*prôtôs*) is also manifested in a secondary way (*deuterôs*) with respect to other things. It also signifies that time proceeds from what is more universal (*holokôteros*) into things that are more particular (*merikôteros*), even going as far as the final things, such as animals or plants, where it becomes generally [or universally] known to us from measures that are particular and yet ordered, for it is the case both that the universal (*to holon*) is hard to know and that what is disorderly

[210] Almost a direct quotation: cp. ἔστι γὰρ θείου γενητοῦ περίοδος, ἣν ἀριθμὸς περιλαμβάνει τέλειος with *Rep*. VIII 546b3–4 ἔστι δὲ θείῳ μὲν γεννητῷ περίοδος ἣν ἀριθμὸς περιλαμβάνει τέλειος. Proclus regularly uses γενητός rather than γεννητός when he is discussing the perfect number from the *Republic*.

[211] Festugière rightly corrects Diehl's reference to *GA* IV 9, 777b16–30.

could not come to be a measure for other things. But since, as we have said, the period of the planets and especially the Sun's circle contribute toward the genesis of the second [kind of] time – and especially toward the apprehension (*katalêpsis*) of the many measures that are in it (measures through which we are especially accustomed to measure the whole itself, such as months and years through which we measure time) – he said that these things (that is, the Sun, the Moon and the five planets) have come to be first from the Demiurge. And while each of the fixed stars surely also has its own cycle around the centre (since each has a spherical orbit) which is carried out in some specific temporal measure, these [meaures] are generally not known to us as they are in the case of the planets where the orbits are carried out along the path of the ecliptic. In the case of these [fixed stars] however, we do not know the period [of time] that it takes for them to go around their own particular centres. In any event, the discussion is about the planets and he says that they have come to be in order that they might cooperatively bring about visible time, manifesting one measure which is able to provide a metric for the others since the Sun's measure is the one that is primary-effecive (*prôtourgos*) and has been allocated a leading status. It is particularly important with respect to the genesis of time (and this is why it is called 'the time of time' according to the Theologians (*Or. Chald.* 185)) in as much as it makes manifest that
56 time which is most primary and the cycle of seasons is brought about in accordance with it.[212] The cycle of the Moon has a secondary status. Because it moves all the things in the realm of Becoming proximately, it brings about all growth and diminution by its own powers. This is why it is said that, just as the Sun changes its form (*morphê*) in accordance with the season or in accordance with what sign it occupies in the Zodiac,[213] so too the Moon changes its form each day:

> so that in a month it makes just that journey which the Sun makes in one year

as the Theologian says (*Orph. fr.* 92).[214] The other planets weave together the variety of Becoming by means of their own varied cycles, for one thing depends upon the completion of the cycle of others and each one's life is

[212] The same phrase from the Oracles is cited above at 36.20–22. Presumably Proclus has in mind the role of the Sun in defining the solstices and the equinoxes when he says that the seasons come about in accordance with it; cf. Bouché-Leclercq (1899), 222.

[213] *in Tim.* I 107.29 suggests that no *literal* change of shape in the Sun is meant, but instead that it has different effects depending on its position. So the comparison trades on the capacity of *morphê* to mean 'form', in the sense of a power, and also 'shape'.

[214] Cf. in *Remp.* II 58.13–15 καὶ ὅ γε Ὀρφεὺς ἐν τῷ μηνὶ τρέπειν αὐ τήν φησιν, ὅπερ ἥλιος ἐν ἐνιαυτῷ, τὸ ἀνάλογον ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν θεώμενος.

attained together with different measures. While these [planets] are also given a motion that is single, continuous, regular and unceasing, their order and the regularity and sameness of their motion escapes notice due to their apparent progression, retrogradation and station.[215] He says that it is due to this that they **possess the name 'wandering stars'**. As a result of these facts, one must assume that it is the *stars*, and not the *spheres* in which the stars exhibit progression or retrogradation that are subject to this [wandering]. They are subject to motion upward or downward to the extent that they are like ordered paradigms that have antecedently comprehended (*prolambanein*) all the various motions in the sub-lunary realm (i.e. being moved up and down, as well as in front of and behind). For as he says in the *Laws* (VII 821b–822c) those who dare to attribute wandering to the gods in the heavens have struck a false note. They do not know their order or the harmonised choreography or the regularity of their motion. The irregularity is only apparent in their case, whether this is due to the winding and counter-winding motions, or due to epicycles or eccentrics or due to some other cause. (In fact, none of these hypotheses satisfies the standard of the probable. Some stand opposed to the simplicity of divine things, while others that have been contrived among the more recent [theorists] posit a motion for the heavens as if it were a machine. Since in the *Republic* (X 616d1–617b3), when he makes the whorls homocentric and nests the seven circles [of the planets] in them, he mentions only these things and not any epicycles, it surely seems that *Plato* attributes the irregular [motion] to the stars themselves – though this [motion] also is something that has been given an order, since it returns to its own starting point at regular times.) It is thus like an intermediary between things that undergo motion that is entirely regular and things that undergo motion that is entirely irregular, for [the planets] have been allotted a motion that is regularly irregular or irregularly regular.

57

In any event, time is manifested and makes its procession into the universe through all of the celestial circles – not only those of the planets, but through those of the fixed stars as well. However, Plato paid particular

[215] διὰ τοὺς φαινομένους προποδισμοὺς καὶ ὑποποδισμοὺς καὶ στηριγμούς. A planet exhibits progression or advances when it moves east relative to the backdrop of the fixed stars; retrogradation when it moves west relative to the fixed stars; and station when it appears to come to rest relative to them. The Ptolemaic system explains these motions as the product of regular motions of the planets upon a system of eccentrics and epicycles (cf. Proclus, *Hyp.* 7.4.1). Proclus follows Iamblichus (*in Tim.* fr. 70) in rejecting these astronomical hypotheses and instead attributes these phenomena to the souls of the planets who steer them through the space of the heaven with a motion that is irregularly regular or regularly irregular. For a general treatment, see Siorvanes (1996), 278–84.

attention to them [sc. the planets] in the genesis of time because, while they differ from the fixed stars by dint of the variety of the cycles, they also differ from what is in the sub-lunary realm by virtue of their being always the same. With respect to these differences, the use of the word '**distinguishing**' shows that there is a plurality of temporal measures, while the word '**preserving**' indicates the fact that they always have the same cycle and return to the starting point, for it is necessary to consider that the plurality of [temporal] measures always remains the same.

3. The procession of time

In any case, these things [sc. the planetary motions] have been set in order after the single measure of the entire universal cycle and this single monad of time is itself a number that is complete (*teleios*) and all-perfect (*pantelês*). As a result of this monad there exists in each revolution – whether it be that of Saturn or Jupiter or the Moon – an appropriate measure that receives in addition a distinctive property that derives from the soul or kinetic divinity in each one. After all, there is one number that pertains to the Sun, while another pertains to a horse and yet another to a plant. The cosmic number, however, is common. Because of this we say that there is the same time everywhere because the cosmos has a single life since it has one nature and a single intellect. If it has a single life, then it also has a single lifetime (*bios*) and if it has this, then it also has one temporal measure. Just as each of the parts in it lives in accordance with the universal (*holos*) nature, so too each one is measured in accordance with the universal time and this universal time is the common measure of all things.

After this monad comes a triad. The highest measure is that of the rotation of the primary [sphere of the heavens]. The middle one is that of the [circle of] the Different in its entirety[216] (for as in the case of a single living thing, so too in the case of all the planets there is a single lifetime, one cycle, and a single temporal interval for a return to the starting point). The third [measure] is that of the circulation of what is carried along in the realm of Becoming, for it is because of this that the change of the elements, and the reciprocal replacement of things that
58 undergo motion, as well as regeneration, have been allotted their entire existence.

[216] Recall that in the generation of the soul the circle of the Different was divided into seven circles, corresponding to the orbits of the individual planets. The measure of the Different *in its entirety* that Proclus alludes to here is the Platonic Great Year – the period of time that it takes for the wandering planets to return to exactly the same positions against the backdrop of the fixed stars.

Following this triad, time proceeds in accordance with some numbers for some things and others for others, measuring what is universal and distinguishing all things by appropriate measures. These are things to be dealt with on another occasion.

a. Two puzzles about the order of procession resolved

Here, however, is an issue that is worth not passing over: while still establishing the things that are wholes and without making any mention whatsoever of particular living things, yet he establishes the planets, while the fixed stars are dealt with subsequently in the generation of particular kinds of living things (*Tim.* 40b4–6).[217] Well, the things that are called 'planets' are Rulers of the Cosmos and they have been assigned a *power* that is universal (*holos*). So just as the [sphere of] the fixed stars has a number of astral living beings, so too each of the planets leads a plurality of things that are appropriate to them – whether these be living things or some other such things.[218] It is through the aforementioned fact that one may also deal with the following puzzle: how is it that the single sphere of the fixed stars includes a plurality of stars, while the many spheres [that carry the planets] each carries with it [only] one star? [In reply to this puzzle] it must be said that the sphere up there [i.e the one of the fixed stars], since it is single, was a monad and that suffices for a comprehension (*periochê*) of the appropriate plurality within since the plurality in question is the primary one. In the case of the latter [i.e. the spheres of the planets] what does the leading is two-fold. There is the sphere and then there is each of the Rulers of Cosmos – a monad that has been rendered coordinate with plurality – for things that are inferior require a plurality of rulers and the multitude in each [of the planetary spheres] is invisible due to their inferiority. Among the things in the sub-lunary realm the ruling orders of the divine genera corresponding to each element are even greater in number, as we will learn

[217] 'the things that are universal' are τὰ ὅλα and Proclus regularly regards wholes or universal things as prior to particular or partial things. Cf. *in Tim.* II 2.22 and notes *ad loc.* The fixed stars, as we have just learnt, are superior to the planets. The former are wholly regular in their motions, while the latter are 'irregularly regular'. Nonetheless, Plato mentions the creation of the planets, Sun and Moon here at 38c5 while the fixed stars are mentioned when the Demiurge stocks the universe with examples of all the particular kinds of living thing at 40b4–6. So, a Platonist might wonder why there seems to be a deviation from the order of superiority, and thus procession, in the order of exposition.

[218] Proclus here deduces *a priori* what is in fact the case: the planets have moons that accompany them. See below III 129.9–14 and 131.1–3. The issue is well discussed in Siorvanes (1996), 268–71.

through the genealogy of the gods that we will be provided with.[219] But let these matters be taken as evident.

And here's another problem of a similar sort among the matters pertaining to the generation of time that is worth stopping for:[220] If time comes *after* soul, then how is it that the latter is said to move in accordance with time? If, on the other hand, time is *prior* to soul, then how can it be said to have come to be, since Plato said that the *soul* is the best among the things that have been generated (*Tim.* 32a2)? Or if soul is coordinate with time then how is it that Eternity is not also coordinate with Intellect rather than prior to it? [To this puzzle one] must respond as follows: time is in fact prior to soul, as Eternity is prior to intellect, and soul is indeed the best among the things that have been generated – that is, among the things that have been generated *per se* and not merely [said to be generated] with respect to their presence to things that are secondary. Rather ['generated' here means] having a generation in accordance with[221] an internal activity and possessing a divisible essence that is divided into a **59** plurality such as Plato has provided us with [in his psychogony]. Time, however, is eternal considered in itself since it is intellect, as has been shown, but it is *subject to participation* through a generated mode,[222] where the whole is not present [to the participants] all at once nor in a manner free from change (as is the case with the intellects that are prior to it) but [rather the whole is present to them] in a manner that involves change. As a result time brings the soul to completion as intellect and it is generated in a participatory manner (*kata methexin*). Flowing freely into the things that participate in it, it has made their generations things subject to being counted. It is doubtless in this sense that the number that generally sallies forth together with these generations has been called

[219] Proclus here anticipates the commentary he will give later on in 40d6–7. The general rule is that we get increasing plurality, corresponding to the increasingly unruly nature of the beings that are governed, as we approach the sub-lunary realm and the centre of the Earth. Thus there are lots of visible fixed stars governed by a single monad, identified with the sphere of the fixed stars. With the planetary spheres, we have lots of inhabitants, but only one visible planet. Both the planet and sphere are leaders: since the inhabitants are inferior, we need more rulers. Once we arrive at the sub-lunary region all hell breaks loose, so to speak. As inferior as things are down here, we will need many more rulers than were needed in the case of the planetary spheres. These will be the sub-lunary or generation-producing gods.

[220] Τοσοῦτον δὲ ἄξιον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς τοῦ χρόνου γενέσεως ἐπιστάσεως. Compare the introduction to the previous paragraph in 58.4–5 ἐκεῖνό γε μὴν οὐκ ἄξιον παραδραμεῖν. Both puzzles are alike in dealing with questions about priority.

[221] Reading ἀλλὰ κατὰ at line 32 for the manuscripts' ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐντὸς ἐνέργειαν as Diehl suggests.

[222] μετέχεται δὲ γενητῶς; cf. *in Tim.* II 100.9.

'generated' (which is why it was said to be *mobile* in as much as it goes numerically (54.16), but it is not a *number* which is the same thing prior to that which has been numbered). It is due to these facts, therefore, that he here calls time an *eternal* image, since it is eternal in virtue of an internal activity where the whole activity possesses a simultaneous presence, while in the *Laws* (x 904a8) he says that the soul is indestructible but *not* eternal. This is because it has not been allotted an internal activity that is changeless.

B. Explication of *Tim.* 38c5–d1

When the god had made bodies for each of them, he placed them into the orbits which the revolution of the Different makes, since there were seven orbits for seven bodies. (38c5–d1)

The fact that he regarded the Sun, Moon and the other five [wandering] stars as intellectual living things endowed with soul is something that he has made clear through adding the [words] **he made bodies for each of them**, as [one would] for things that are intellectual and vital (*zôtikos*), for he did not say that he made *them* bodies, but that he made bodies *for them*.[223]

Ought one then to say that the revolutions are the epicycles or counter-rollers[224] or the universal spheres in which each of the stars is [located]? Or ought one say none of these things but instead take them to be the intellectual souls of the [planets] as the divine Iamblichus[225] does? For just as earlier the whole mass [of the universe] was constructed within the soul, so now too the seven bodies [of the planets] have been established within these seven intellectual souls at the same time that he established intellects and souls over them. Furthermore, since much earlier the revolution of the Different that belongs to the World Soul took command of these seven divine bodies, it is probably to remind

[223] Proclus contrasts Plato's actual text – σώματα δὲ αὐτῶν ἑκάστων ποιήσας ὁ θεὸς – with a possible alternative: σώματα αὐτοὺς ποιήσας. Plato's use of the genitive is supposed to emphasise the fact that these were living beings prior to this stage in the generation of the heavens. This leads on to Iamblichus' related "dematerialisation" of τὰς περιφορὰς αὐτῶν. These too will turn out to be souls – not quasi-corporeal spheres.

[224] Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphys.* 1074a2 and Eudoxus fr. 124.

[225] *in Tim.* III 59.22–60.3 = Iamblichus, *in Tim.* fr. 69 (Dillon). Dillon notes that, of the three alternatives just enumerated for the identity of the revolutions, Adrastus (*ap Theon*, 158–66) defended the first, while the counter-rollers are due to Eudoxus and Callippus. The latter are hardly likely, however, to be engaged in the project of interpreting Plato's *Timaeus*. We know of no specific source for the third identification.

us of what was said earlier that he added [the words] **which the rev-**
60 **olution of the Different** that belongs to the World Soul carries[226] around. Again, let us note that the fact that he refers to this [cycle of the Different] in the singular shows that even though it was said to be divided, it is actually indivisible and its unity is not destroyed when it is cut into the seven circles. In fact, it would perhaps be better to say that the bodies of the Rulers of the Cosmos have been situated in
5 the *powers* of the World Soul rather than in the individual souls or in the spheres,[227] for this [expression] 'which the revolution of the Different traverses' indicates that it [sc. the revolution] itself goes along, but not the fact that it leads them [sc. the individual souls or spheres] around.

In any event, the revolution of the Different which is single and yet divided into seven goes around and travels with these seven lives in its
10 embrace, for he also says that when the fixed stars proceed, they are placed under [the authority] of the wisdom[228] of Intellect – which means the soul of the circle of the Same, for the 'most dominant' is that which is given dominance and the wisdom that belongs to this is the intellectual life which is in it. It is in this manner that here too he has placed the
15 seven bodies into the seven circles of the World Soul.

Again, let it be granted that through these things it is evident how the soul's simplicity is preserved in relation to these corporeal orbits, for the single circle of the Same animates the inerrant sphere along with the fixed stars in it thanks to a single unification, while each of the seven [circles] animates both the spheres and the stars in them thanks
20 to a single power. At this point in the text, therefore, he speaks of the common animation for them all, while a bit later (38e5)[229] he will provide an individual animation when he says 'being bound by ensouled bonds, they came to be living things', for they are no longer animated [merely]

[226] ἂς ἡ θατέρου περίοδος περιάγει τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς. Dillon supposes that, while this is not a verbatim quotation, it reflects a reading of ἦγεν at 38c (which is not of course Proclus' reading, though it might have been that of Iamblichus).

[227] Festugière notes: 'This responds to the initial question (59.22–26), the words ὡς γὰρ (59.26) . . . εἰς τοὺς ἑπτὰ κύκλους κατατομῇ (60.3) expressing what one could say in favor of either the first (body in the spheres) or of the second (body in the souls) of the alternatives proposed above.'

[228] Cf. *Tim.* 40a3–4 τίθησίν τε εἰς τὴν τοῦ κρατίστου φρόνησιν on the basis of which Proclus infers that the fixed stars are placed under the wisdom of the World Soul's intellectual life, since this is the aspect of the World Soul that is superior.

[229] Here, as below at 71.3, Proclus omits the word 'bodies' from his quotation of Plato's text.

as parts, but as [individual] living things in virtue of souls appropriate to them.

C. The planets and their movements

He placed the Moon into the first [orbit] around the Earth, and the Sun into the second above Earth, while the Morning Star [i.e. Venus] and the one that is said to be sacred to Hermes [i.e. Mercury] he placed into the circle that, while travelling with equal speed to the Sun, has also been endowed with a power that is contrary to it,[230] whence the Sun, Mercury and the Venus both overtake and are overtaken by one another in virtue of the same things. (*Tim.* 38d1–6)

1. The order of the planets

a. The Platonic ordering

What sort of order is given to the planets according to the Platonic creation of the spheres is clear not only from these lines, but also from **61** the things that have been written in the *Republic* (x 616e3–617b3), for the Sun has been placed second after the Moon, since the association between these gods is something very significant for visible creation. While one [the Sun] holds the status of father, the other has that of mother and their causes – both intelligible and intellectual – are united together with one another and have been manifested from a single cause. The same goddess [Theia] gives birth to 'both great Helios and shining Selênê' (Hesiod, *Theog.* 371), and perhaps the Oracles too teach us this since they always arrange the Moon after the Sun and the air after the Moon whenever providing the order of these things either from above or from below:

[230] Proclus' quotation of the lemma has the singular masculine participles εἰς τὸν τάχει μὲν ἰσόδρομον ἡλίῳ κύκλον ἰόντα, τὴν δὲ ἐναντίαν εἰληχότα αὐτῷ δύναμιν which most modern editors emend to plurals on the grounds that Mercury and Venus must each have their own circles. Proclus' version of the text is an old one since it goes back at least to Alcinous' *Handbook of Platonism* (§14, 7.7). The correct understanding of this phrase, along with the correct understanding of *Tim.* 36d4–7, is a problem that has given rise to a wide divergence of opinions in both ancient and modern interpreters. Proclus' own understanding is taken up by Cornford (1957), 109. This 'contrary power' is a third factor above and beyond the eastward motion of the Different or the westward motion of the Same. This third source of planetary motion results from the voluntary motions of the planets' individual souls. For a good overview of the modern terrain, see Zeyl (2000), xliv–xlvii. Criticisms of Cornford's views tend to centre on two points. First, the textual basis for this third force seems somewhat dubious. Second, critics point out that his analogy for understanding 36d4–7 – the famous moving staircase – is actually inconsistent with what he says here. See Dicks (1970), 124–7.

The aetherial course and the boundless impulse of the Moon,

they say,

and airy streams . . .

and again:

Aether, Sun, breath of Moon, airy leaders.

And in other [verses]:

Of solar circles and lunar soundings and airy hollows . . .

And next

. . . portion of aether and Sun and canals of Moon and air . . .

Portion of aether, Sun, Moon and all those things which swim with the air . . .

And elsewhere

. . . and expansive air,

the course of the Moon, and the eternal orbit of the Sun (*Or. Chald.* fr. 61, trans. Majercik)

As I just said, perhaps, then, it is even possible to become persuaded from the Oracles that the Sun is immediately prior to the Moon, just as the Moon is immediately prior to the air, and that the whole of the heavens has the status of fire; which is also what Plato thinks since in the words where he deals with the arrangement of the four forms [of living creatures] a bit further on, he talks about the aerial form being placed after the celestial [kind].[231] Except perhaps it does not necessarily follow that the Sun is immediately above the Moon due to the analogy with aether, for neither is the aether immediately above the Sun. Thus conversely this argument does not permit one to place the Sun directly above the Moon with no intermediary since it is not necessary that the aether is above the Sun with nothing in between. It is nonetheless the case that the utterances of the ancients gave this position to the Sun, for both Aristotle and the school of Eudoxus thought of the Sun's position in this manner.[232]

[231] Cf. *Tim* 39e10–40a.2 εἰσὶν δὴ τέτταρες, μία μὲν οὐράνιον θεῶν γένος, ἄλλη δὲ πτηνὸν καὶ ἀεροπόρον, τρίτη δὲ ἔνυδρον εἶδος, πεζὸν δὲ καὶ χερσαῖον τέταρτον.

[232] Cf. *Metaphys.* XII 8, 1073b17 and 32.

b. The astrological ordering of the planets[233]

Now if there are people who employ the hypotheses of the mathematicians to validate the placing of the Sun in the middle of the seven planets, binding and connecting the triads to one another with it, they have known that [this conclusion] is not secure nor do the people who say these things do so on the basis of mathematics.[234] They do refute the claim there would be an eclipse if Venus and Mercury were after the Sun (as the Moon sometimes eclipses the Sun) by showing that even when these planets are in conjunction with the Sun as far as longitude goes, there is a substantial difference of latitude. *This* [they say] is what explains why there is no occultation in their case.[235] This, however, does not itself supply what is needed for necessity: [namely, a positive argument for the conclusion] that the Sun is in the middle position. They do not have any argument that produces conviction through demonstrations, though they are in the habit of stifling the many [objections] through replies such as this one. While Ptolemy does indeed say in the *Syntaxis*[236] that if one follows [the criterion of] 'the reasonable' or 'the probable' then it is fitting to place the Sun in the middle position among the seven [planets] in order that, among the five planets, those that are entirely-and-completely (*pantelôs*) set apart from it might be prior to the Sun, while those that accompany the Sun and go before or flank it might come after.[237] However, in the *Hypotheses* he is not entirely insistent, nor

[233] Proclus' attitude toward the order of the planets in the *Timaeus* is a complex matter. See Introduction, pp. 16–28.

[234] It seems likely that Proclus has in mind here people who regard Ptolemy's treatment of this question as definitive. Ptolemy adopts the Chaldean order even though he is aware that there is no evidence that decisively settles the matter.

[235] And not the fact that the order of the planets is Platonic. The objection is a *modus tollens* argument: If the order were Chaldean so that Mercury and Venus were below the Sun, then we should expect there to be transits across the Sun by these planets, just as there are lunar eclipses. But this is not observed. So the order is not Chaldean. Ptolemy too notes that this consideration is not decisive for the Platonic order for much the same reason (*Syntaxis* IX 1, H207.6–10. In his notes Toomer points to Neugebauer's conclusion that such transits are predictable from Ptolemy's own theory. It was perhaps because he realised this that he provides additional reasons why such a transit would be unnoticeable to us due to the sizes of the planets relative to the Sun; cf. *Pl. Hyp.* (Goldstein) 2 28.10–12.

[236] *Syntaxis* IX 1, H207.16–21 πιθανωτέρα μᾶλλον ἡ τῶν παλαιοτέρων τάξις καταφαίνεται χωρίζουσα φυσικώτερον μέσῳ τῷ ἡλίῳ τοὺς πᾶσαν διάστασιν ἀφισταμένους αὐτοῦ τῶν μὴ οὕτως ἐχόντων, ἀλλὰ περὶ αὐτὸν ἀεὶ φερομένων, ἐφ' ὅσον γε μὴ τοσοῦτον ἀφίστησιν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὸ περιγειότερον.

[237] οἱ συνόντες αὐτῷ καὶ προπομπεύοντες ἢ δορυφοροῦντες αὐτόν. Putting the Sun in the middle position divides those planets that are always to be found near it (Mercury and Venus) from those that can appear at any elongation from the Sun.

does he draw a conclusion in these hypotheses about them [sc. the plan-
25 ets and their order] from the distances.[238] It follows from what has been shown in the *Syntaxis* (v §13) that – taking the unit as the [distance] from the centre of the Earth – the closest distance for the Moon is 33 [Earth radii], while the furthest is 64 [radii] (leaving off the fractions in order that we may have the ratios expressed in whole numbers). Furthermore,

[238] Ptolemy's *Planetary Hypotheses* calculates the distances to Mercury, Venus and Mars on the basis of the *assumption* that the Chaldean ordering is correct. He then attempts to infer the distances of the planets from the Earth. To use the distances calculated to establish an ordering would thus be question-begging – though the fact that the calculations work out even as well as they do he might have taken to be confirmation for the ordering.

Ptolemy uses two assumptions. (1) The ratio of the relative distances of a planet from the centre of the Earth, produced by its model, is equal to the ratio of the true distances of the planet from the Earth. (2) The minimum true distance of, for instance, the Moon at the point in its epicycle at which it is furthest from the Earth is equal to the shortest distance between the Earth and the next highest planet, Mercury. That is to say, the planetary spheres nest. The minimum and maximum *distances* of the Moon and the Sun from the Earth are taken from the calculations in the *Syntaxis* and rounded off, giving the Moon 33 and 64 Earth radii at its closest and furthest from the Earth, while the Sun is 1,160 and 1,260 radii respectively. Now Ptolemy uses the *ratios* of the minimum to the maximum distances for the other planets. Mercury's distances stand in the ratio 34:88, while Venus' nearest and furthest points stand in the ratio of 16:104. Given the nesting assumption, he derives the conclusion that Venus' closest approach to the Earth is 166 Earth radii while its furthest distance is 1,079 radii. However, given the nesting assumption, this furthest distance for Venus should equal the closest one for the Sun. But the distance there, derived from the *Syntaxis*, is 1,160. Thus there appears to be an unsightly gap. We cannot place the sphere of Mars in this gap: there is not enough space. So Ptolemy suggests that if the Moon were slightly further away, this would entail a correspondingly closer position for the Sun's greatest distance, thus closing the gap.

Proclus' summary is probably very close to Ptolemy's text. The Greek text of this part of the *Hypotheses* is no longer extant but when we compare what Proclus writes with Goldstein's translation of the Arabic version of this text, it is very close. Here is Goldstein from §3:

> the least distance of the Moon is 33 earth radii, dropping fractions, and its greatest distance 64 earth radii, dropping fractions. Moreover, the least distance from the Sun is 1,160 earth radii, and its greatest distance is 1,260. The ratio of the least distance of Mercury to its greatest distance is equal to about 34:88, and it is clear from the assumption that the least distance of Mercury is equal to the greatest distance of the Moon that the greatest distance of Mercury is equal to 166 earth radii, if the least distance of Mercury is 64 earth radii. The ratio of the least distance of Venus to its greatest distance is equal to about 16:104. It is clear from the assumption that the greatest distance of Mercury is equal to the least distance of Venus that the greatest distance of Venus is 1,079 earth radii, and the least distance of Venus 166 earth radii. Since the least distance of the Sun is 1,160 there is a discrepancy between the two distances which we cannot account for.

the shortest distance between us and the Sun is 1076 [Earth radii], while the greatest is 1260 [radii]. Now since the *ratio* that is posited between Mercury's nearest distance and its furthest is approximately that of 34 to 88, and since it is clear that the furthest distance of the Moon coincides with the least distance of Mercury, the greatest distance for the latter will be 166 while the closest is about 64. Furthermore, since in the case of Venus the ratio of the closest distance to the furthest distance is approximately that of 16 to 104, and since it is clear that the furthest distance of Mercury coincides with the closest distance of Venus, the greatest distance of Venus will be 1079 [Earth radii] and the closest about 166 [radii]. As a result, since the closest distance of the Sun is 1,160, there will be a remainder of a certain size [between it] and the furthest distance of Venus, which would be unaccounted for according to these assumptions.[239] It is obvious that the sphere of Venus and that of Mercury must be arranged between the sphere of the Moon and that of the Sun, for the greatest distance of the Moon [from the Earth] coincides with the closest distance for Mercury, while the furthest distance for Mercury coincides with the closest distance for Venus, and in the case of the latter the greatest is quite close to the nearest distance for the Sun. But it is necessary that there be no void. 30 **63** 5 10 15

Ptolemy concludes on the basis of such arguments that the Sun is in the middle of the seven planets. But of the specialists [i.e. the astrologers] little account [need be taken] as they argue from plausibility.[240] The Theurgist, however, clearly deems that the matter stands thus when he says the Demiurge integrated the Sun's fire into their *midst* making the six Zones dependent upon the seventh[241] – [an assertion] it would not be licit to remain unpersuaded by. Therefore since Plato [was 20

[239] Proclus' summary now omits the sentences in which Ptolemy considers ways in which this gap might be dealt with – perhaps by increasing the estimate of the distance between Moon and Earth. He also argues that you cannot place Mars in the gap since it isn't big enough. Perhaps it is on the basis of this argument from elimination that Proclus thinks that Ptolemy has confirmed the Chaldean ordering of the planets.

[240] ὁ μὲν οὖν Πτολεμαῖος ἐν τοιούτοις λόγοις συνάγει μέσον εἶναι τὸν ἥλιον τῶν ἑπτὰ πλανήτων. ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν μαθηματικῶν οὐ πολὺς λόγος πιθανολογούντων. Diehl suggests ὡς after λόγος, while Festugière additionally supposes that one ought to change the full stop after πιθανολογούντων to a comma and see ὁ δὲ θεουργὸς οὕτως… as corresponding to it. Thus he translates: 'C'est donc par cette sorte d'arguments que Ptolémée conclut que le soleil est au milieu des sept planètes. Il n'y a sans doute pas à tenir grand compte des Mathématiciens comme s'ils usaient d'arguments probables, mais il n'est pas permis de refuser sa foi au THÉURGE.' This seems pretty plausible, though I prefer to render the clauses as separate sentences in English for the sake of clarity.

[241] εἰπὼν τὸν δημιουργὸν ἓξ ἀνακρεμάσαι ζώνας ἕβδομον ἡλίου μεσεμβολήσαντα πῦρ. This passage seems to be drawn from a prose work by Julian the Theurgist that Proclus

attending to] the considerable association of the Sun and Moon and the fact that they proceed innately from the same cause, he has treated their procession into the cosmos as something that has been conjoined. In fact, he was not even the one who initiated this hypothesis, but it was instead Anaxagoras[242] who first assumed this, as Eudemus relates the story.[243]

2. The equal speeds of the Sun, Mercury and Venus

Again, this very point is among the matters that have been investigated – that is, due to what sort of cause is it the case that the Sun, Venus and Mercury move at the same rate?

a. The mathematicans

64 Those who were brought up on mathematics say that it is surely because the epicycles of these three stars are conjoined and their centres lie along a straight line. Thus just as there is a single complete cycle for something that undergoes a single rectilinear motion, so too the epicycles of these [three planets] also make the same complete cycle. And among the epicycles themselves, the ones at the ends are smaller, while the

quotes at several points with variations. Lewy (1956), 123–5 draws them all together and translates the combination as follows: 'The demiurge bent heaven into a curved shape, and attached to it the great multitude of the fixed stars, forcing fire to fire, so that they may not move through wearisome strain, but by a fixture that is not subject to vagaries. He sent underneath six planets, and in their midst the seventh: the fire of the Sun; and he suspended their disorder on the well-ranged girdles of the spheres.' In addition to this passage, Lewy draws on *in Tim.* III 124.32 and 132.28 in the present volume. See also *in Tim.* I 317.22 and *in Remp.* II 220.11.

[242] DK 59 A75. Plato himself reports that Anaxagoras thought that the Moon's light was dependent upon the Sun (*Crat.* 409a9–b1 = A76; cf. B18). Thus these are conjoined in this sense. Perhaps Eudemus inferred a planetary order on Anaxagoras' behalf on this basis, or perhaps Anaxagoras did indeed have views on this subject. The vague language of conjunction, however, suggests that our sources are retrospectively attributing views on the order of the planets to Anaxagoras on the basis of his belief that the Moon gets its light from the Sun. Heath (1981), 85 at least mentions this evidence from Proclus, though it is unclear how much credence he thinks we should lend to it. Dicks (1985) passes over this testimony in silence.

[243] Eudemus of Rhodes was a student of Aristotle, probably born after 350 BCE. Following the death of Aristotle, he went back to Rhodes and founded a school there. Though it seems his school did not survive his death, Rhodes nonetheless was the home of several philosophers in the Peripatetic tradition. Like Theophrastus, he seems to have been largely content to carry on Aristotle's work with little innovation. From our knowledge of his works, he was mostly interested in natural philosophy. Proclus *in Tim.* III 63.24–30 = Eudemus fr. 147, Wehrli (1944–69). Wehrli takes this to be a report of the content of Eudemus' Ἀστρολογικὴ ἱστορία. Cf. Gottschalk, 'Eudemus of Rhodes' in the *New Pauly* and Bodnár and Fortenbaugh (2002).

one in the middle is bigger. As a consequence, both their regular and the irregular motions are carried along in accordance with the same ratio.[244]

b. Porphyry and Theodore of Asine

When the interpreters of Plato sought the reason, they associated the principle for the equal and unequal speeds of the courses [run by the planets] with the lives they have led, as both Porphyry and Theodore[245] 10

[244]



[245] 64.8–65.7 = Porphyry *in Tim.* fr. 79 in Sodano (1964) and testimonium 17 for Theodore of Asine in Deuse (1973). This passage has nonetheless been adduced as evidence concerning the origins of this triad in Neoplatonic metaphysics. Proclus himself uses this triad of principles extensively in his metaphysics and insists on the order Being–Life–Intellect on the ground that the class of living things is broader than the class of intelligent things which it includes as a subset (*ET* 101). While Plotinus associated the idea of Life with the realm of Being and Intellect – doubtless on the basis of *Sophist* 248e–49a – it is unclear that he ever gives a rigorous order to these notions or makes the intelligible realm constituted by this triad. It belongs to later generations of Platonists to calcify Plotinus' fluid deployment of Life in relation to Being and Intellect into *the* Intelligible Triad: Being–Life–Mind. Who did it? Zeller (1963) III ii, 705, Dodds (1963), 253 and Hadot (1960) have pushed for Porphyry.

say. For according to them the equality or inequality in the speeds is due to whether the intellects [of these planets] are conveyed toward Being *immediately* or by means of a plurality [of *intermediaries*] and it also depends on whether they return to one and the same thing if they
15 go there through different intermediaries, or whether they go toward different things. Since the Sun is Being, it goes to Intellect through Life. On the other hand, Venus is Intellect but goes to Intellect through Life [as an intermediary]. Mercury, by contrast, is Life, but goes toward Intellect through <Life>.[246] And even if the Intellect with respect to

Kroll (1892) had argued that Proclus had assigned to Porphyry a doctrine really held only by Theodore of Asine. In fact, larger issues hang on the matter, for Hadot's case for assigning the Intelligible Triad to Porphyry is linked to his case for assigning the anonymous *Parmenides Commentary* edited in Kroll's article to Porphyry. The issue is examined in detail in Edwards (1990).

The issue at hand at this point in the exegesis of the *Timaeus*, however, is the fact that Mercury and Venus are always near the Sun. However, each sometimes appears as a morning star or an evening star and thus there must be changes in their relative positions. This fact is attributed to there being a 'contrary power' that has been allocated to them. All of the later Platonists – Porphyry, Theodore and Iamblichus – invoke the souls of the planets to explain this fact. Thus each will give an account of the movements of the planets that relate them to things that the souls of those planets do. In the case of Theodore and Porphyry, what they do is to revert back to a source that they have in the Intelligible Triad. Variations in speed are a function of the "flight path" that their reversion takes: whether it goes by an intermediate stop or whether it is a "direct flight". Dillon (1973), 356–8 argues that this concoction is the result of attempting to apply the schema of the noetic world in the *Chaldean Oracles* to the planets. Dillon does not give us detailed correspondences between the Being, Life and Intellect under discussion here and the noetic realm of the *Oracles*, referring us instead to the diagram in Lewy (1956) Excursus VIII. There we find the triad Father, Power and Intellect, reflecting fr. 27 of the *Oracles*. Unless we are justified in swapping Being for Father and Power for Life, we do not have an easy and obvious parallel between Being, Life and Mind in this passage and the contents of the noetic realm in the *Oracles*. Indeed, it is Hecate that is associated with Life in the *Oracles* and the relation of Hecate to the two Intellects that are the highest principles in the *Oracles* is a matter of dispute at the present. Cf. Finamore and Johnston (2010).

Perhaps then we should look not to the *Oracles* themselves, but to Porphyry's interpretation of them. John Lydus' report of Porphyry's understanding of the *Oracles* emphasises three ordered triples: Hyparxis, Power and Intellect (fr. 366F in Smith (1993)). Not an exact fit, but possible perhaps. What we see in the passage under discussion, however, does correspond *exactly* with the scheme of Theodore's intellectual and Demiurgic levels explained in Test 6 (Deuse) where we do find Being, Intellect and Life.

[246] Zeller (1963) III ii, 706 and Deuse (1973) read 'life' in the lacuna here, while Diehl, Sodano and Festugiere read 'being'. Diehl refers to 65.13 as justification for this. There Proclus recruits Iamblichus in his criticism of the ideas of Porphyry and/or Theodore and asks (very sensibly!) ποῦ γὰρ ὁ Πλάτων ἐμέρισε τὴν διὰ ζωῆς καὶ διὰ νοῦ καὶ <δι'> οὐσίας ἐπὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀναφοράν. Presumably Diehl's implicit argument in this cross-reference is this: since a return via Being is mentioned here and we do not have such a

which the return happens in these three cases is the same, in one case it is substantial, in the other intellectual, and in the other vital.[247] It is for this reason that, although these planets undergo motion in a manner that is unequal and manifest procession or regression with respect to one another, they finish up in the same [configuration]. Saturn, Jupiter and Mars, however, might have had differing "divisions"[248] and because of this fact are not equal in speed. But even if they were [made up] from the same [division], nonetheless by virtue of the fact that they do not return to the same thing, or else by not doing so through an equivalent number

return path mentioned for *any* of the planets elsewhere, the return path for Mercury in the lacuna at 64.17 must be δι' οὐσίας. Deuse objects that the objective of the reversion in 65.13 is Being – the objective of the *outer* three planets, not the second triad who aim at Intellect. Thus nothing about the intermediate destination for Mercury's reversion can be inferred from this passage. On the other hand, there is a good reason to give Mercury a return to Intellect via Life, just as the Sun and Venus return to Intellect via Life. In what follows, Theodore or Porphyry will contrast the three planets who more or less stick together with those who don't – Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. These three return to the same target – Being – but do so via *different* intermediaries. Thus the contrast works best if the lower three planets have a return to their target via the *same* intermediary.

[247] Reading αὐτὸς for οὗτος in line 12: εἰ καὶ ὁ νοῦς αὐτὸς, ἐφ' ὃν ἡ καταστροφὴ τοῖς τρισίν, ὅπου μέν ἐστιν οὐσιώδης, ὅπου δὲ νοερός, ὅπου δὲ ζωτικός. Festugière takes the objects toward which the planetary souls or intellects return to be the various levels at which Being exists: 'Même si est Intellect le but vers lequel se fait pour les trois le retour, cet Intellect est ici de l'ordre de l'essence, ailleurs de l'ordre intellectif, ailleurs de l'ordre vital.' Thus because the adjectives in the sequence ὅπου μέν . . . ὅπου δὲ are masculine, we should posit different orders of Intellect toward which the planetary souls return: νοῦς οὐσιώδης, νοῦς νοερός, νοῦς ζωτικός. This matches relatively well with Theodore's Intellectual or Demiurgic levels (cf. *in Tim*. II 274.1) and provides a reason for thinking that this testimonium reflects his views in particular. On the other hand, we have just been told that Sun is Being, while Venus is Intellect and Mercury is Life. In late Greek ὅπου can play the role of a demonstrative adverb in just this sort of iteration. If this is so, then what is at issue is not a (merely formal) distinction between the object of the return, but a different manner in which the return journey is carried out given the differences among the starting points.

[248] It seems likely to me that this is a reference to *Timaeus* 36d2–7. Recall that at that point the Demiurge divides the inner circle of the Different into seven unequal circles corresponding to the double and triple intervals. One could attribute the differing speeds of the outer planets to the fact that they correspond to different divisions in the circle of the Different. But, Theodore or Porphyry goes on to point out, even if the circles of Saturn, Jupiter and Mars were to *not* differ with respect to their corresponding psychic circles, we could nonetheless account for the different speeds of the planets in terms of whether their reversion upon Being is mediated by none, one or two stops along the way. Notice that the most extensive of Proclus' reports on Theodore of Asine is given in this commentary on *Timaeus* 36d2–7. There, as now, the report on Theodore is followed by a blistering criticism by Iamblichus which is directed at Amelius and his school and at Numenius. Unlike the present context, however, there is no association between the views presented as Theodore's and the views of Porphyry.

of intermediaries, there would still not be an equivalence of speed among them. For instance, if Saturn went immediately back to Being because it is itself Being, while Jupiter went to Being via Intellect alone and Mars went back to Being through Intellect *and* Life, then there will be one that is in Being without mediation, another that does so through one intermediary, and another that gets there through two intermediaries. Thus we would not have equal speeds. Among the planets, the first triad are led up toward Being, while the second [three planets] are led up toward Intellect and the Moon is directed toward Life since it includes the totality of Becoming in itself and proceeds as far as the furthest nooks and crannies of the Earth.

65

Both Porphyry and Theodore say these things, working from their own personal suppositions,[249] since they say that all these things – that is, Being, Intellect and Life – are everywhere and they stipulate that each of the gods participates in the three Fathers, though different ones predominate in different cases [giving each one its] specifc property (*idiôma*). They also say that the activity of different things is different and that the return [of things to their sources] happens through different intermediaries.

c. Iamblichus

The divine Iamblichus,[250] however, accepts neither the smuggling in of epicycles – on the grounds that they are a fabrication and introducing them is foreign to the spirit of Plato – nor the idea (*epibolê*) about Life, on the ground that it involves a pointless dreaming-up of such intervals, entrances, exits or combinations which are not in any way connected with Plato. For where does Plato divide ascents to Being into those that take place through Life, those through Intellect and those through Being? And where has he aligned Saturn with Being or the one that comes after him [Jupiter] with Intellect or the third [Mars] with Life?

Having rejected these [views of Porphyry and Theodore] he gives a simpler theory. He says that the Moon has been ranked first in the region around the Earth because it has the status of mother and of nature in relation to Becoming (for everything turns with the Moon, growing when it waxes, diminishing when it wanes). The Sun is above the Moon since it is widely recognised as filling the Moon with its powers and possessing the status of father in relation to Becoming. But Venus and Mercury are

[249] οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις περαίνοντες. This comment suggests to me that Proclus does not think that Theodore and Porphyry are applying the *Oracles* to the interpretation of this passage in the *Timaeus*.

[250] Proclus *in Tim*. III 65.7–66.8 = Iamblichus *in Tim*. fr. 70 (Dillon).

above the Sun since they are solar in character and collaborate with it, working together with the Sun toward the completion of the things that are wholes. This is why they move at the same speed as the Sun and are to be found around it, since they are co-contributors with the Sun in creation.[251] As we noted previously [64.1], they stand in opposition to the Sun not merely due to the motion in the epicycles, as the mathematicians claim, nor because the Sun is responsible for revealing things that have been hidden, while Venus and Mercury are responsible for what is hidden (as the astrologers insist).[252] For these reasons too,[253] but also because of the divine power which Plato himself mentions: the power of the Sun is something wondrous and unsurpassable, and for this reason incommensurable in its own right, while the powers of Venus and Mercury shine symmetry and good mixture [upon that which the Sun also illuminates] due to the fact that they always attend upon him. They make the solar creation harmonised, for both are responsible for association. Mercury is a partner in the creation of things that are diurnal or nocturnal and becoming male or female, while Venus possesses the power of binding things together and harmonising what has been separated.[254]

[251] In Ptolemy's *Tetrabiblios* 1 4 powers of heating, cooling, drying and humidifying are assigned to the planets. The Sun principally heats, but plays some role in drying. The Moon is chiefly responsible for humidifying. Venus heats, albeit more modestly, and also plays a role in humidifying. Mercury both dries, because of its proximity to the Sun and also humidifies, because of its proximity to the lower region occupied by the Moon. Since Iamblichus will go on to discuss astrological associations specifically, I surmise that he has something like the Ptolemy passage in mind when he says that Venus and Mercury collaborate with the Sun to produce things that are universal or general, e.g. the regularity of the seasons with their associated temperatures and rains.

[252] In ancient astrology a planet may belong to the nocturnal sect (τῆς νυκτερινῆς αἱρέσεως) or the diurnal one. While the Moon is the principal member of the former, the Sun is the principal member of the latter. Cf. Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblios*, 1 7 and Vettius Valens, *Antholog*. IX 55.10–12. Venus is ranked with the Moon as belonging to the nocturnal sect. Mercury, however, is common to both sects. If 'hidden' in this passage aligns with 'nocturnal' then we have an explanation of the reference. Otherwise not.

[253] καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μὲν γάρ, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' ἣν εἶπεν αὐτὸς θείαν δύναμιν . . . . Dillon suspects that this concession to some role for epicycles may represent Proclus' own view – a suspicion deepened by Proclus' insertion of a cross-reference to his own earlier statement at 65.28. Iamblichus seems uncompromising in his rejection of epicycles in the first part of the passage. Perhaps this is Proclus. Or perhaps Iamblichus thought that it was clearly a mistake to read epicycles *into Plato's text*, while nonetheless acknowledging that there are such things.

[254] Dillon cites a parallel for the functions of Venus in assisting the Sun in Julian *Or*. 4 33.8–12 ὁ μὲν βασιλεὺς Ἥλιος ἔχει τὴν πρωτουργὸν αἰτίαν, Ἀφροδίτη δὲ αὐτῷ συναίτιος, ἡ θέλγουσα μὲν τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν σὺν εὐφροσύνῃ, καταπέμπουσα δὲ εἰς γῆν ἐξ αἰθέρος αὐγὰς ἡδίστας καὶ ἀκηράτους αὐτοῦ τοῦ χρυσίου στιλπνοτέρας. The notion of Aphrodite as cooperating cause is surely present, but the specific ways in which she helps do not look very similar. Festugière notes that the notions adduced here coincide with the

You might also say that it is because the Sun does *not* make use of retrogradation, progression, nor standing stationary in its movements, while Mercury and Venus *do* exhibit progression, stations, and retrogradation,[255] they have been allotted powers opposite to the Sun on the basis of appearance.[256] And perhaps, as we said earlier [II 267.19–23], these three planets have made a procession that is analogous to the primary three monads [sc. Truth, Beauty and Symmetry] in the 'vestibule of the Good' (*Phlb*. 64c1). After all, as we have learned in the *Republic*, the Sun gives existence to light, which is an image of Truth. Venus [i.e. Aphrodite] is responsible for the Beauty among things that are generated, which is in turn an imitation of the Beauty up there [among the intelligibles]. Mercury, in turn, is responsible for Symmetry in everything since he has the status of *logos* for things in the realm of Becoming,[257] for all symmetry proceeds in virtue of a single proportion (*logos*) and in accordance with number – things that this god is the dispenser of. Since [these three planets] are analogous to the aforementioned monads which are together with one another [in the vestibule of the Good], it is quite likely that they wish to be present with one another and to go around together. This is doubtless the reason why they overtake and are overtaken – due to their creation together with one another and their collaborative efforts in creative works. Now if sometimes they move faster, and sometimes slower, but yet it is not the case that when one goes quickly the others do too, or when one goes more slowly, the remaining ones go more slowly too, and so on, it is likely that the one moving quickly should overtake the other two who are moving more slowly and again be overtaken in turn [when it slows down]. There is in fact a single cycle, but the parts of their cycles, because they differ with respect to speed and slowness, **67** make them, at various parts of the cycle, be overtaken or overtake one another, different ones at different times.

Let us conclude on the basis of these things, as well as from what was said before about the earlier [passage], that according to Plato the

character of these planets in astrology and refers the reader to Bouché-Leclercq (1899), 101–4. See also Beck (2007), 82–3.

255 Proclus uses a variety of technical terms for the forward and retrograde motion of the planets: ὁ μὲν ἥλιος οὔτε ἀφαιρέσεσιν οὔτε προσθέσεσι χρῆται τῶν κινήσεων οὔτε στηριγμοῖς, Ἑρμῆς δὲ καὶ Ἀφροδίτη προποδισμοῖς χρῶνται καὶ στηριγμοῖς καὶ ὑποποδισμοῖς. ἀφαίρεσις is the dominant term in *Hyp*. while ὑποποδισμος tends to be used in the *Timaeus Commentary*.

256 ἐναντίας αὐτοὺς εἰληχέναι πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον δυνάμεις clearly refers back to the lemma τὴν δὲ ἐναντίαν εἰληχότα αὐτῷ δύναμιν. The plural participles in Proclus' text have now given rise to plural powers as well.

257 Presumably because of Hermes' association with persuasive speech and rhetoric, cf. *in Remp*. I 69.5.

[movement of the sphere] of the fixed stars is single and regular, while the seven planetary [motions] are regular in themselves, but irregular in relation to one another – except that three have a speed that is equal with one another, for Plato said that these were equal in speed *before* he introduced the seven circles.[258] That each [motion] is regular in itself is also obvious from the *Republic* (617b5) where Socrates says that a Siren is set over [each of] the eight circles, uttering one sound, one tone. As a consequence, regularity is common to them [sc. the circles]. In addition, the seven stars are such that, while they are moved around their own centres, they are also moved with respect to the depth (*bathos*) of the spheres, especially the three that overtake others and are overtaken [in turn] due to the irregularity of their own individual motions. [This must be so] since if the spheres were in fact moved regularly, they would never submit to this [overtaking] but always remain a similar distance from one another. In any event, he too will say this: 'they have turnings as they are carried through the heavens' (*Tim.* 39d8).

3. Mars, Jupiter and Saturn

Therefore, above this triad – a triad that is harmonised through the fact that Venus unifies and leads into association the Mercurial production (which has been diluted) and the solar creation (which has been intensified) – there is another triad that has Saturn and Mars as the extremes that are opposed to one another. ([They are opposed] since the one is a cause of connecting things, while the other is a cause of division and in addition one is a cause of cooling, while the other is the cause of heat.)[259] Jupiter has been arranged in the middle and brings the Demiurgic creations of the two extremes into a good mixture.

In fact, if you like you could see the intermediate position of the Sun in terms of the other [sc. Platonic] order of the planets too. Think about the Sun as having two groups of five on either side of it. Below it there is the Moon and the tetrachtys of the four elements (provided, that you do <not>[260] think of the aether as possessing some sort of difference

[258] sc. the seven circles in the world soul whose non-spatial "position" corresponds to the orbits of the planets. Cf. 36.d.5–7 τάχει δὲ τρεῖς μὲν ὁμοίως, τοὺς δὲ τέτταρας ἀλλήλοις καὶ τοῖς τρισὶν ἀνομοίως, ἐν λόγῳ δὲ φερομένους.

[259] Cf. Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblios* 1.4, 4.1–5.3. Mars heats because of its proximity to the Sun – a fact that is indicated by its red colour. Saturn's nature is to cool because it is furthest away.

[260] It seems that a negation has fallen out somewhere. The point of this qualification is to insist that there are only four elements. In order to have a tetrachtys below the Moon, you either need to treat what some people regard as the fifth element, the aether, as an alternative for the word 'air' or else assimilate it to the element fire. Our text is: ἵνα καὶ τὸ αἰθέριον νοήσῃς ὡς ἔχον τι διαφέρον πρὸς τὸν κυρίως ἀέρα λεγόμενον ἢ καὶ τὴν

68 from what is strictly called air or else include it with the nature of the fire down here – a fire which doubtless is mutually extended among all the elements by virtue of their positions, moving all of them and motivating them into their creative acts, for all that lacks a portion of fire is dead, and cooling is opposed to life).[261] On the other hand, above [the Sun] are the helmsmen of universal Becoming [i.e. Mercury and Venus], who have in common that which neither the Sun nor the Moon exhibit – that is, progressions, stations and retrogradations. It is through these that the nature of things in the sub-lunary realm is changed in various ways – by additions and subtractions or benefactions and remissions of the proportions of their lives or the entirety of their essences.[262] The Sun, however, is extended everywhere from the middle and perfects the creations of the gods prior to him, while stimulating the powers of those that come after him, re-kindling and changing them in various ways. It is for this reason that the Theologian[263] refers to the Sun as the 'Guardian' of the universe and allows that it has powers that are creative, immaculate, uplifting and perfective, as well as many others that are both purificatory and judgemental – [powers] through which it [sc. the Sun] orders the universe eternally in the course of carrying out its rounds.

D. The influence of the planets

As to the others, if someone were to go through in detail every [place] in which [the god] seated them and the causes through which it happened, the account, though it is incidental, would be a greater task than that for the sake of which it would be spoken. These things, then, might get the treatment they deserve later at our leisure. (*Tim.* 38d6–e3)

τοῦ πυρὸς τοῦ ἐνταῦθα συμπαραλάβῃς φύσιν. The D manuscript omits the καὶ after ἵνα so perhaps there is some room to posit a bit of uncertainty here. Could the right reading be ἵνα μὴ?

[261] Cf. the Stoic argument for pantheism based on the presence of the 'vital heat' in everything at Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* II 23–32. It is a common observation that living things are warm and that corpses lose their heat along with the life. Hence vital heat.

[262] Proclus uses two pairs of words to discuss the phenomena of planetary progression and retrogradation. Progression is sometimes denoted by *propodismos*, which has the narrower sense that is almost always astronomical, and sometimes by *prosthesis* which has the wider sense of 'addition' or 'increase'. Retrogradation is sometimes denoted by the narrower *hypopodismos* and at other times by the wider *aphairesis* which means 'removal' in a more general sense. Proclus plays on this dual use here to suggest that planetary progression or retrogradation bring about corresponding effects, like addition or subtraction, among things in the sub-lunary realm.

[263] The reference seems to be to *Orph.* fr. 96 (Kern), which is quoted more fully at *in Tim.* III 227.31.

By **the others** it is clear that he would refer to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn, while the words **he seated them** manifests their eternal and indestructible creation. If, however, you write 'they seated them' as we found in some [manuscripts],[264] then this will provide you with an indication that the heavens have come about and been ordered by the Demiurge, on the one hand, but *also* by other causes. After all, (*gar*) he said a bit earlier (38c7–9) that the god *and* the cycle of the Different arranged the seven bodies and, in addition to this, that there are the specific souls for these which he denominated 'orbits' (*periphora*). These things are what is meant by '*they* seated them', since all things have been established from **69** all the eternal gods in conjunction with whom the Demiurge makes each group of things, since he makes the cosmos in general (*holos cosmos*) an image (*agalma*; cf. *Tim*. 37c7) and seats the images of the partial [or part-like] (*merikos*) gods in it.[265] It is necessary in these matters to be reminded of those things which we are accustomed to say about the order of everything that is encosmic: that the [sphere] of the fixed stars is a monad, since it functions as the cause of everything that remains the same; that there is a triad below the fixed stars which is made up of Saturn, Jupiter and Mars, wherein the first is the cause of continuity, the second of symmetry and the third of distinctions (*diakrisis*);[266] starting over again, the Moon is a monad, since it is the cause of all generation and destruction; while the things below the Moon – the elements in the realm of Becoming – constitute a triad.[267] Among these are the ones who move at the same rate: the Sun which is revelatory of Truth (as we have already said on many occasions); while Venus is the one that manifests Beauty; Mercury, on the other hand, is the one that reveals the Symmetry of *logoi*. [These three – Truth, Beauty and Symmetry –] are the monads in the vestibule of the Good [in the *Philebus*, 64c1]. And if you like you can [add that] among the seven planets, the Moon is responsible for bringing

[264] The F and Y manuscripts of Plato, as well as Stobaeus, have the plural ἱδρύσαντο rather than the singular ἱδρύσατο that Proclus quotes in the lemma.

[265] The images of the *merikos* gods are of course the stars and planets. Festugière thinks that Proclus here abandons the sense of *agalma* as image that he adopted above at 5.30 in his explication of *Tim*. 30c7 and adopts instead the other sense of 'temple'. I suppose this is possible, though it is hard to know exactly what could constitute decisive evidence in this regard. Doubtless the cultic connotations of *agalma* would never be far from the mind of Proclus or his audience.

[266] The role of Mars, the god of war, in distinguishing or dividing is clear enough. Presumbly Saturn is the cause of continuity (*synochês*) or inclusion because its sphere includes the subsequent ones. That leaves Jupiter with symmetry as a middle term between divisive Mars and inclusive Saturn.

[267] It is unclear what justifies calling the elements a triad, save the need for isomorphism with the previous scheme where we have the sphere of the fixed stars as a monad, followed by the three planets Saturn, Jupiter and Mars.

nature (*physis*) to mortal things, since it is the self-revealing (*autoptos*) image of originative nature (*pêgaios physis*),[268] while the Sun is the creator of all perceptions because it is the cause of sight and of being seen.[269] Mercury is the cause of the *motions* of imagination (for it is the Sun that gives the substance or essence (*ousia*) to the power of imagination, perception and imagination having one and the same substance).[270] Venus is the cause of passionate desires, while Mars is the cause of motions of the spirited part [of the soul] that are natural for each thing. Jupiter is the cause of all vital powers in general, while Saturn is responsible for the powers of understanding (*gnôstikos*), for all the irrational species are divided into these.[271] Therefore the causes of these things are antecedently comprehended (*prolambanein*) among the celestial beings – causes of these things here which the Father no doubt introduced and seated in their celestial circles with different ones in different places according to the order that each one belongs to. But these are the things that are recalled through these [words in Plato's text].

A person might be justifiably puzzled with respect to what has been said and wonder where Plato has constituted the soul that belongs to the sphere of the fixed stars. [Such a person] is concerned that Plato should not make the soul of the sphere of the fixed stars the same as the soul of the cosmos, as Aristotle did later.[272] Through the previously mentioned orbits (*periphora*) we have the souls that are specific to the planets since

[268] Presumably 'nature' is meant here as a growth principle. For the Moon's role in this respect, cf. *Or. Chald.* fr. 101 and *in Remp.* II 133.15–17.

[269] Cf. *Rep.* 508c.

[270] A remark that is perhaps suggested by Aristotle *DA* 3.2, 429a1–2 ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένη. On the Neoplatonists' reading of Aristotle's psychology generally, see Blumenthal (1996). The relation between imagination and perception in Proclus is a complex one. At *in Tim.* III 286.17–29 he distinguishes two kinds of perception. One is associated with the material body, the other with the psychic vehicle. In the latter case, perception is the 'same in nature' with imagination. See Lautner (2002).

[271] The assignment of the parts or powers of the soul here roughly corresponds with that which we find in Macrobius, *Somn. Scip.* I 12.14. Here the souls descending into generation pick up further shells to their psychic vehicles. Macrobius, however, gives Jupiter responsibility for the *praktikon*, while Saturn endows souls with the *logistikon* and *theoretikon*. If we are thinking of higher animals, even the irrational ones are capable of acting for ends. Thus those endowed with the *praktikon* are a division within Proclus' wider category of *zôtikos* power.

[272] Diehl thinks that the relevant "Aristotelian" text is *De Mundo* II 392a9 ff. However Festugière responds that Proclus is himself not sure about the authenticity of this work (cf. III 272.21). Festugière would prefer to see this characterisation of Aristotle's view as grounded in the *Metaphysics*. He asserts that 1073b23–4, in conjunction with the notion that the Prime Mover causes motion as the object of desire (1072b3) 'implique nécessairement que le Premier Ciel a une Ame'. This conclusion has been disputed but what cannot be disputed is that some good Peripatetics *thought* that it was a good

a short while later he says concerning them that 'when they have been bound by bonds that are ensouled, they have come to be living things' (38e5). Perhaps, however, when he places the two-fold circles and the two-fold orbits in the World Soul, he has established a two-fold soul in conjunction with them: the one soul is that which belongs to the sphere of the fixed stars, while the other belongs to the sphere of the planets in general, in as much as they have a single orbit.[273] Contrariwise, when he assumes the seven circles in the circle of the Different, he then has the seven souls who employ the seven spheres as vehicles along with them, for the ensoulment that has just been provided is not of the spheres themselves, but of the stars that have been allotted the rank of governors in the spheres. He neglects to mention the ensoulment of the stars in the case of the sphere of the fixed stars because the ensoulment of the spheres in general is included within the circles in the World Soul. He omitted the finishing touches[274] that provide for the various ensoulments due to the old-fashioned form of teaching (*paradosis*) [that Plato employed],[275] for there is one kind of ensoulment that is universal, but there is another [that comes] after this that is universally partial, and yet another that is partially universal, and finally there is that which is entirely partial.[276]

idea to assign souls to the celestial spheres (Alexander (?) *Quest.* 1.25, 40.8–23). Of course, it is still somewhat artificial to identify the soul of the sphere of the fixed stars – if such a thing there be in Aristotle – with the World Soul. The reference to Aristotle is, I think, not to be pressed too hard. There is a mistake to be avoided and Proclus attaches Aristotle's name to that mistake since one might take Aristotle to hold a view that one might casually express in these terms.

273 That is, we have one soul established when the orbit with the east to west motion corresponding to the circle of the Same is introduced and another soul corresponding to the west to east motion that is shared by all the planets. Cf. *Tim.* 36c5–d1.

274 λεπτουργία: the term has its original sense in woodworking and refers to the fine work that carvers and turners do.

275 This is by no means a criticism. Proclus, following Iamblichus and Numenius, supposes that Plato is a Pythagorean and Pythagorean writing is *archaiotropos*. Cf. Iamblichus, *Vit. Pyth.* §29 157.4: [the sayings of the Pythagoreans] 'contain the truth about everything; by comparison with all other writings, they are terse (*stroggylos*), but they are exceptional in their antique patina, like a surface bloom which cannot be touched', trans. Clark (1989).

276 ἄλλη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ καθόλου ψύχωσις καὶ ἄλλη μετὰ ταύτην ἡ καθόλου μερικὴ καὶ ἄλλη ἡ μερικὴ καθόλου, καὶ τελευταία πασῶν ἡ μερική, καὶ κατὰ πάντα τὰ εἴδη τῆς ψυχώσεως ὅ τε κόσμος ὅλος καὶ αἱ τοῦ κόσμου μερίδες ἐψύχωνται. Festugière thinks that one must amend ἡ καθόλου μερικὴ to μερικῶς. It is certainly true that Proclus often uses these adverbial forms to express modes or ways of being. However, what is at issue here is ensoulment, which is explicitly a process (albeit an eternal one). To apply the adjective μερικὴ to it seems to be tantamount to describing it as happening in a certain way, so the adjectival and the adverbial come to the same thing. Festugière does seem right to suppose that the four moments in this process are as follows: (1) universal ensoulment = the process of animating the cosmos by the World Soul considered as a whole;

The cosmos has been ensouled in accordance with all these forms of ensoulment – both the whole and the parts of the cosmos.

Perhaps it is also the case that, having heard Socrates' discussion on the previous day, in which he [Socrates] went into detail about these acts of ensoulment, he [Timaeus] deemed that a distinct individual elaboration of them would be redundant. In any event, on the earlier occasion Socrates established souls over the eight circular whorls which he called 'Sirens' (*Rep*. x 617b6). Moreover, he appointed one Fate over the sphere of the fixed stars, another one over the sphere of the planets considered in general, and another one over the universe in general, thereby explaining that there are specific souls for all of them and ensouling the sphere of the fixed stars in a double manner – [double] in as much as it is both one circle that has been divided by seven circles and also in as much as it is such as to include the plurality of fixed stars. It is a cosmos and is itself universal and particular simultaneously.[277] These things, then, are what one must say about the puzzle that was raised. The use of the word **incidental** to describe the account of the stars makes this clear too since the business at hand was to provide an account of secondary time: what it is, as well as how, and from whence, it has been brought about.

E. The lives of the planets

Then when each of those things whose cooperation was needed to bring about time had come to have the motion proper to it, having been bound by ensouled bonds,[278] they became living things and learned what was assigned to them. (*Tim*. 38e3–6)

(2) universal partial ensoulment = the process of animating the cosmos by the World Soul considered in as much as it is constituted by the two circles of the Same and the Different; (3) partial universal ensoulment = the animation of the spheres of the wandering stars by the circle of the Different when that is considered as a principle of their general movement contrary to that of the sphere of the fixed stars; (4) entirely partial ensoulment = the process by which each star or sphere is granted its own soul.

[277] καθολικὸν ἅμα καὶ μερικόν echoes the previous opposition between ὅ τε κόσμος ὅλος καὶ αἱ τοῦ κόσμου μερίδες ἐψύχωνται. This illustrates the strong association between whole and universal, on the one hand, and part, partial, and particular or individual on the other. Modern philosophy (rightly) regards the contrast between universal and particular as one thing, that between whole and part as another. Proclus, however, does not see things that way and we will not understand inferences that he makes unless we manage to unlearn what seem to us clear and obvious differences.

[278] Proclus' lemma omits 'bodies': δεσμοῖς τε ἐμψύχοις δεθέντα ζῷα ἐγεννήθη. Every other source has δεσμοῖς τε ἐμψύχοις σώματα δεθέντα ζῷα. The line was also quoted above at *in Tim*. I 314.16, again without 'bodies'. I suspect that this is not conscious meddling with the text on Proclus' part. It may be a lapse of memory for he follows the lemma immediately with Τίς μὲν ἡ ψύχωσις τῶν ἑπτὰ σωμάτων τῶν κοσμοκρατόρων . . . . Certainly, given that he thinks that there are bodies for the souls corresponding to the planets mentioned at 38c7 it is difficult to see what motive he could have to avoid the

What the ensoulment of the seven bodies of the Rulers of the Cosmos is and what order it [belongs to] has been stated through the words quoted earlier. Through these words, however, he provides to those capable of seeing it[279] an account of how each of them is also a living thing, dependent upon a more divine soul, as well as the character of its contribution toward the completion of the universe, for each of them has been allocated the life and motion that is fitting for it. After all, since the Demiurgic law (*thesmos*)[280] grants to each mortal creature what is fitting [for it] and arranges everything together for the blessedness of the universe, what must one then say about the Leaders of the universe themselves [i.e. the planets]?[281] Shall we not say that everything that is proper to them and good for them has been received from the Father and, shining with beauty, they not only cooperate with the Father in the genesis of time, but also guide and direct the entire cosmos? In saying these things about them, how could we go wrong in adding that they not only receive the beautiful and the good from the Demiurgic monad, but they also furnish them to themselves since they are self-moving things that originate from themselves the gift of good things? This is doubtless what Plato indicates when he says **each had come to have the motion proper to it** in as much as [each one] determines for itself the measure of both the life and order which has been allocated within the universe, as well as the motion.[282]

conclusion that these bodies are bound by ensouled bonds. After all, it is not as if the texts suggest that the souls are bound *to the bodies*. Rather, the bodies can be seen to be dependent upon the souls, which is just what Proclus thinks generally about bodies. The soul is a pre-existent bond for the body that it animates. Cf. *in Tim*. II 15.13–14.

279 Festugière quite sensibly asks 'who might be incapable of seeing this?' He speculates that this might be Christians (whether orthodox or gnostics) who deny the divinity of the stars. For instance, Clement's tirade against those who equate the heavenly bodies with gods ends with a pithy summary of the Christians' attitude; *Protrepticus* 6.67.2.10 θεὸν ἐπιζητῶ, οὐ τὰ ἔργα τοῦ θεοῦ. This passage is not included in Saffrey (1975).

280 Harold Tarrant has pointed out to me that Plato himself uses the terminology of *thesmos* very infrequently. Notable exceptions include *Phdr*. 248c2, where the 'law of Adrastus' seems relevant to the present context, and *Tim*. 42d2 where the Demiurge announces the law to souls before sowing them into the heavenly bodies. Proclus may well have these passages in mind. Or it may be that his use of '*thesmos*' in this context just reflects the fact that he is more prone to use this vocabulary than Plato was.

281 τῶν ἡγεμόνων τοῦ παντός here is equivalent to οἱ κοσμοκράτορες.

282 The ἑαυτῷ . . . ἀφορίζον following on ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν ἀρχόμενοι τῆς δόσεως τῶν ἀγαθῶν two lines above probably involves a play on words that I cannot adequately translate. In addition to its common sense of 'define' or 'determine' ἀφορίζειν can also mean 'to grant as a special gift'. The stars' life, order and motions thus resemble the existence of things that are self-constituted. Such things exist both as a result of their prior causes and also as a result of their reversion upon themselves (*ET* 40 and 41).

Furthermore, since each of them (I mean the seven bodies) has a double life – one of which is inseparable [from the intelligibles], intellectual and seated within itself in an authoritative manner, while the other is separated and divided in relation to the body that it sustains and moves – according to the latter [aspect] there is a living thing, while according to the former there is a *god*. When Plato distinguishes between these two things it is because the divine soul that is intellectual and does not depart from the intelligibles is one thing, while the living thing that is dependent upon it is another.[283] The latter has its life as a result of the former and is an image of it. He concluded that, **having been bound by ensouled bonds, they became living things and learned what was assigned to them**, for the divine soul learns the Demiurgic will and cognises the works of the Father. It cooperates with him to produce the things that pertain to the cosmos by cognising him and being filled up with divine powers as a result of him, for it is not possible for intellect or soul to exercise providence over wholes whilst still transcending them except by participating in divinity and through a life filled with god. Further, their *cooperation* in bringing about time shows that a secondary-effective (*deuterourgos*) power has been assigned to them in the production of time because the Father possesses their primary-effective (*prôtourgos*) power since the latter has begotten the *wholeness* of time, while the former [planetary gods] have jointly produced the *parts* from which time is composed.[284] The cycles that belong to these [planetary gods] are the parts of time that belong to the universe since they [sc. the heavenly gods] have themselves come to be as parts of the cosmos.

The living thing that is **bound by ensouled bonds** is the ensouled body that possesses life as a result of the soul to which that body was allocated in the Demiurgic lotteries. For if in our case, the living creature is something different from the man, or the visible Socrates is one thing and the true [self] another, then it is certain to an even greater extent that the Sun or Jupiter is one thing but the [composite] of body and soul is another. In any event, in the *Phaedrus* Socrates directed this rebuke against those who constitute a divine creature out of body and soul itself, saying 'for though we have never seen nor adequately conceived a god, we imagine it as some immortal living thing, having both a body

[283] Cf. *ET* 201.

[284] For the contrast between πρωτουργόν καὶ δευτερουργὸν, see above 53.10. The parts of time are to be understood as days, months and years whose periods are defined by the motions of the individual planetary gods. The wholeness of time, by contrast, is the product of the Demiurge.

and a soul, these things being naturally conjoined throughout all time' (246c7–d2).[285] If it is necessary to say how the matter appears to me, it is that in the primary mode (*prôtôs*) a god is the henad in each thing and the ineffable participation in the source of the universal unitary numbers. But in a secondary way (*deuterôs*) there is the intellect that holds each thing together in a manner that is stable, uni-form and invariant. In a third manner, the soul that is filled up with intellect and articulates that which **73** intellect holds in one single embrace (*perioxê*). The first is genuinely god, though the second is maximally divine. While the third is itself divine, it also illuminates the living being[286] with the specific property (*idiôma*) of divinity. Insofar as this is divine, it has been **bound by ensouled bonds** which one might say are bonds that are life-engendering as well as creative and 'indestructible', as he says subsequently (41a8, 43a2), for all bodies that are divine have been bound by souls, enclosed by them, and seated in them. The word **bound** also indicates the stable and changeless embrace of the bodies within these souls and the inseparable association they have with the souls.

Such are the divine bodies who cooperate with the Demiurge in the production of time, summoning forth the single and invisible power of time and providing it with a procession into the cosmos. They are such as to reveal the many measures of time through which time in its entirety – which imitates the time that consists in counting, since it itself has arisen in being counted and has come to be a whole from many numbers in order that it might be assimilated to the whole that is truly inclusive of all the numbers for complete cycles – is filled out.[287] In any event, [the word] **cooperation** (*synapergazesthai*) indicates the fact that the creation proceeds to the end and that the activity is complete.

[285] In juxtaposing this passage from the *Phaedrus* with the *Timaeus*' discussion of the stars and planets as visible and embodied gods, Proclus points to a genuine tension in the Platonic corpus. See Baltzly (2010) on efforts by subsequent Platonists to resolve this tension.

[286] sc. the heavenly god conceived of as possessing the second of the two kinds of life distinguished at 71.32–72.2.

[287] δι' ὧν ὁ σύμπας χρόνος συμπληροῦται μιμούμενος τὸν ἐν τῷ ἀριθμεῖν χρόνον, αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ ἀριθμεῖσθαι συνεστὼς καὶ ὅλος ἐκ πολλῶν ἀριθμῶν γινόμενος, ἵνα ὁμοιωθῇ τῷ ὅλῳ ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ πάντων περιεκτικῷ τῶν ἀποκαταστατικῶν ἀριθμῶν. μιμούμενος must go with ὁ σύμπας χρόνος rather than τὰ θεῖα σώματα who form the subject of this sprawling sentence back in line 15. In his desire to sum up the contribution that the planets make to the genesis of the secondary, visible time, Proclus seems to have been led back to the question of the relation between the higher and lower time (supra 57.14–58.4).

F. The motions of the planets

They started to turn according to the motion of the Different (which was oblique, since it passed through the motion of the Same and was dominated by it)[288] with one having a larger circle, while another had a smaller circle, those who had the shorter ones went around more swiftly, while those with the largest went around more slowly. (*Tim.* 38e6–39a4)

1. General remarks

You might say that the **oblique** motion of the Different shows the obliquity of the [circle of] the Zodiac (for the motion of the planets is one
74 that takes place with reference to the poles of the Zodiac, to put it in technical terminology – for such a definition is not without some value for those who are discussing the celestial bodies).[289] However, the more enlightened (*epoptikôteros*) alternative is to say that it shows the cause of genesis and the deviation (*parallaxis*)[290] that pre-exists in the things in the heavens, for genesis participates in Difference and variety derives from the revolution of the Different, while Sameness derives from the [circle of] that Same that is always invariant, just as Aristotle says.[291]

[288] There is a famous textual crux here. The reading of the best manuscripts is διὰ τῆς ταὐτοῦ φορᾶς ἰούσης τε καὶ κρατουμένης, but modern editors have found these genitives puzzling. Taylor (1928), 203 asks 'How can the revolution of the Same be said to be "overpowered" in the process when we have been told expressly that the κράτος was given to the undivided circle of the Same?' Similarly Cornford (1957), 112. Proclus is clear in what follows that he takes the sense of the passage to be that the circle of the Different goes along with the motion of the circle of the Same and is dominated by it. 74.27–28 ἡ θατέρου περιφορὰ διὰ τῆς ταὐτοῦ τε εἶσι καὶ κρατεῖται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ and 75.8–9 τῆς δὴ θατέρου φορᾶς ἰούσης διὰ τῆς ταὐτοῦ καὶ κρατουμένης ὑπ' αὐτῆς. On the basis of this, and on the Latin translations of Cicero and Chalcidius, Taylor and Cornford suppose that text originally had these participles in the accusative case, while the genitives resulted from a subsequent, mistaken attraction to φορᾶς. Festugière doubts, however, whether the clear sense of the passage requires the textual emendation. Why can one not treat ἰούσης τε καὶ κρατουμένης as genitive absolute explicating the accusative τὴν θατέρου φοράν? Festugière provides a parallel in Herodotus II 134. Archer-Hind (1888), 126 considered this option, which had been proposed much earlier by Lindau (1828) but simply dismissed it as 'hopeless'. It is not clear to me that it is hopeless at all. If there is a way to construe the grammar so as to retain the best manuscripts' reading, this seems to me preferable.

[289] κατὰ γὰρ τοὺς τοῦ ζῳδιακοῦ 3.74 πόλους ἔστιν ἡ τῶν πλανήτων κίνησις, ἵνα μαθηματικῶς εἴπωμεν. This seems misleading on Proclus' part. The more common terminology is περὶ τοὺς τοῦ ζῳδιακοῦ πόλους, as he well knows since he uses the phrase six times in his *Hypotyposis*. The use of κατὰ here is probably meant to pick up on the first words of the lemma: κατὰ δὴ τὴν θατέρου φορὰν πλαγίαν οὖσαν.

[290] In spite of the fact that the context here concerns the movements of the planets, 'parallaxis' here seems to carry its broader and not specifically astronomical sense, as it does at *Tim.* 22d1.

[291] Cf. *GC* 2.10, 336a31–b4

After all, if only the circle of the Same existed, then there would not be change or genesis, and instead everything would be uni-form and those things that had come about [in the past] would always remain the same. And if only the [circle of the] Different existed, then everything would be unstable and undergoing motion. In order, therefore, that there should be both rest and motion and that the whole should be this way, as they say, 'changeless qua [always] changing' and 'immobile in its motion',[292] the universe has both revolutions. The variety of genesis was made manifest through the revolution of the Different, while the communion (*koinônia*) and changelessness is due to the [revolution of] the Same. In the case of these things, in turn, the [revolution of the Same] is due to the circle of the Same that belongs to the soul, while the [revolution of the Different] is due to [the circle of] the Different [in the soul]. Further, these things themselves are due to intellectual Sameness, on the one hand, and Demiurgic Difference on the other. In the case of these things, in turn, one is due to intelligible Limit, while the other is due to the Unlimited.[293] The word **oblique**, therefore, is to be thought about this way.

You may also see what kind of difference Plato has provided between the psychic motion of the Different and the corporeal one, for he called the one 'straight' (*orthos*), while the other he called 'oblique' (*plagios*).[294] The former is immaculate and invariant while the latter has apparent irregularity, a position of sorts, and stands in a relation to the universe, since it proximately directs the variety of generated things. Since the revolution of the Different is like this, it both **goes through the Same and is dominated by it**, for it is moved by invisible causes and moved also by the sphere of the fixed stars, or rather through receiving kinetic powers through it. [The revolution of the Different] is dominated by it because it is led around by the Same's motion which is single and simple. This is [the exegesis of the words] in the mathematical mode. However, you might say that the nature of the Same and the Similar has dominance in another manner. You could say that it is so that the cosmos might be one and in order that all things might be as everlasting (*aïdia*) as possible and so that the cosmos imitates the Living Being Itself in which all things exist eternally (*diaiôniôs*). For if the Different had dominance over the revolution of the Same, then that which is changeless in all things would be lesser and the cosmos would not be able to receive such

[292] ἀμετάβλητος ἢ μεταβολὴ καὶ ἀκίνητος κίνησις. It is unclear exactly where Proclus draws these phrases. Cf. *in Tim.* I 128.5 and *in Remp.* I 35.26.

[293] Cf. *in Tim.* I 132.13–15 ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ τὸ πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον, ἐν δὲ νοῖς ταυτότης καὶ ἑτερότης, ἐν δὲ ψυχαῖς ὁ ταὐτοῦ καὶ θατέρου κύκλος, ἐν δὲ σώμασιν οὐρανὸς καὶ γένεσις.

[294] Cf. Plato, *Tim.* 37b6–9 and Proclus, *in Tim.* II 309.4–310.11.

a full measure of everlastingness as it is [actually] capable of. But if it possessed less of this [everlastingness] in this way, then the similarity it has in relation to the Living Being Itself would also be lesser. So doubtless the motion of the Different goes through the Same and is dominated by it. <But the sphere of the fixed stars>[295] since it is internal to the circle of the Same, also undergoes rotation within its concavity and goes along with it.

2. The relative speeds of the planets

The seven bodies [i.e. the planets] are moved in accordance with Different's very motion – some slower, some faster; some moving along bigger circles, others through smaller ones. [For example,] since the Moon moves around a smaller circle, it moves faster. However, since Saturn moves around a bigger circle, it moves slower.

Plato set these things out with an eye to the fact that [the planets] return to the same point in their cycles because he said that they go around faster or slower [than one another] – not simply that one goes faster, while another goes around more slowly.[296] For whenever there is the same proportion between one circle and another as there is between one time and another, then when things are moved [around those circles], they are moved at the same speed.[297] For instance, let one circle be double another and let the time [it takes to go around one] be double the time [it takes to go around the other]. Surely what is moved around the larger circle in the time that is twice as long could have been moved around the smaller circle in half that time, and the other one would

[295] Diehl's suggestion to fill the lacuna at 75.9.

[296] διὸ καὶ περιιέναι φησὶ θᾶττον ἢ βραδύτερον, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἁπλῶς ἰέναι μὲν θᾶττον, ἐκπεριιέναι δὲ βραδύτερον Festugière translates: 'C'est pourquoi il dit que les astres "font leur tour" plus vite ou plus lentement, et non pas simplement qu'ils vont plus vite, mais font leur tour complet plus lentement.' On this reading, Proclus is calling attention to Plato's choice of περιήειν at 39e2 as a verb that stresses the circular motion of the planets. Here the μὲν . . . δὲ coordinates the verbs to be contrasted. But then why are the different verbs matched with different comparatives: μὲν θᾶττον . . . δὲ βραδύτερον? Surely ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἁπλῶς ἰέναι μὲν θᾶττον, ἐκπεριιέναι δὲ or ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἁπλῶς ἰέναι μὲν θᾶττον, ἐκπεριιέναι δὲ θᾶττον would make *that* point more clearly. Since the explanation that follows (ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχῃ λόγον) concerns the relative speeds of bodies traversing orbits of different lengths, it is at least as likely that Proclus' point is that each planet completes an orbit in a greater or lesser time: not merely that some go faster and some go around more slowly.

[297] Let C and c be the circumferences of two orbits, while T and t are the times that it takes the bodies in those orbits to return to their starting points. Proclus' claim is thus that if $C{:}c = T{:}t$ then the bodies move at the same speed. Thus, in the example that follows Proclus imagines that $C = 2c$ and $T = 2t$. The planet in orbit C – call it P – moves at the same speed as the planet in orbit c – call it p – since P would traverse the distance c in half the time that it takes P to traverse C.

have moved that same distance in half the time [it took for the other to complete its larger circuit]. Thus they have the same speed, for things that are moved the same distance in the same time have the same speed. However, when the proportion between the circles is greater than that between the times, then the thing that goes through the greater circle is faster.[298] Let us suppose that this is how things are and then let the same proportion that holds between the two circles [one larger and one smaller] come to stand between one time and another specific time.[299] Now this latter time will have to be shorter than the one we started with, since what is the same in relation to what is smaller would have a greater ratio [to it]. Therefore what is going around the larger circle will traverse the smaller one in a time that is this much shorter than the thing moving around the shorter circle that we assumed initially. For it has been shown that when the ratio of one circle to the other is equal to the ratio of the one time to the other, then the thing that moves through the smaller circle and the thing that moves through the larger circle go at the same speed. But the thing moving around the small circle on the initial assumption goes around it in a shorter time than was assumed initially. Thus the one goes through the same distance in a longer time, the other in a shorter time. Therefore the thing that is moved around the smaller circle is moving slower than the thing moved around the bigger circle.

76

Again, if the ratio that one circle has to the other is less than the ratio that the one time has to the other time, then the thing that is going around the larger circle is moving slower than [the thing going around the smaller circle]. Should you make the ratio between the one time and

[298] That is, suppose that $C{:}c > T{:}t$. For instance, let C be $3c$, while T is only $2t$. Then the body that traverses C in T is moving faster than the body that traverses c in t.

[299] ἔστω γὰρ οὕτως καὶ γεγονέτω ὡς ὁ κύκλος πρὸς τὸν κύκλον ὁ χρόνος πρὸς χρόνον τινά. The logic of Proclus' argument is not easy to extract from his very spare presentation of it. It beomes somewhat clearer when one compares the parallel case on the next page. (76.6–10 πάλιν ἐὰν ὁ κύκλος πρὸς τὸν κύκλον ἐλάσσονα ἔχῃ λόγον ἢ ὁ χρόνος πρὸς τὸν χρόνον, βραδύτερόν ἐστι τὸ τὸν μείζω κύκλον διιόν· ἐὰν γὰρ ποιήσῃς ὡς ὁ κύκλος πρὸς τὸν κύκλον, οὕτω τὸν χρόνον πρὸς ἄλλον χρόνον, πρὸς μείζω ποιήσεις.) Take a situation where $C{:}c > T{:}t$. Now for the purpose of reductio let the ratio between the times *become* the same as the ratio between the circles. So suppose $C{:}c$ was 4:1 while previously $T{:}t$ was 2:1. The latter time, t, needs to be a smaller number if T is to stand in the same ratio that the circles stand to one another. So we now have $T{:}t = 2{:}1/_2$. Given what has been shown earlier, the objects traversing these circles in these times should now be moving at the same speed. If this is what it would take, it is clear that they did not have the same speed under the opening assumption. In fact, we can now see that under the opening assumption it would take the planet in the larger orbit exactly half the time that it takes the planet in the smaller orbit to complete the same journey.

the other time the same as the ratio between the circles, then the other time will have to be greater, for the same thing considered in relation to what is larger has a smaller ratio. So it turns out that what moves along the larger circle will traverse the smaller circle in a time that is longer than it takes for the thing that is moving along the smaller circle to traverse it. Therefore [the thing moving along the larger circle] is moving slower.

Since this is the way these things are, Plato does not now inquire about the relative speed or slowness of the planets (for this would require an extensive investigation). He adds this however: that the completion of the cycle for some is different than for others, some happening slower, others quicker. The slowness or quickness is brought about either as a result of irregularity of their motions or (what is truer) as a result of the fact that while the stars are carried around with the same speed, one circle has a greater ratio to another or one time to another.

In general this much was what it was proper to know about the motion of the planets considered in itself, that it is not only turned along with <the>[300] [motion] of the spheres (for its own motion is something different from that of the spheres' bodies), nor that it merely remains in one place (for in that case, how will it still be among the things whose nature it is to be carred in a circle?), but that they are carried around their own centres since, according to the teaching of Plato, they imitate the universe. They have no need whatsoever of the jury-rigged[301] hypotheses provided by the astronomers, as has been said earlier (56.28). After all, if Plato wills that the *fixed stars* are moved [on their own axes] (40a7–b2) due to the fact that they imitate the universe, it must be even more the case that those that have been allotted the status of *Rulers of the Cosmos*[302] and leaders [sc. the planets] should imitate the entire cosmos.[303] Surely

[300] Reading <τῆς> τῶν σφαιρικῶν σωμάτων in accordance with Diehl's Addenda on p. 504.

[301] παρὰ τοῖς ἀστρονόμοις ἐπισκευαστῶν ὑποθέσεων. The word ἐπισκευαστής usually has the sense of 'second-hand' or 'derivative' in Proclus. Most commonly he speaks of 'second-hand immortality', cf. *in Tim.* I 260.15; II 100.25; *Plat. Theol.* I 116.10. Here, however, it seems to me that a slightly more pejorative tone is intended.

[302] τοὺς κοσμοκρατορικὴν καὶ ἡγεμονικὴν ἀξίαν λαχόντας. I can think of no way to convey the sense of κοσμοκρατορικός with an adjective. The adjective itself is rare. The TLG has it occurring twice in this section of Proclus' *Timaeus Commentary* but otherwise only in Eusebius (*de laudibus Constantini* 6.18) and in an adverbial form in Theodorus Studites.

[303] This Platonic view is criticised by Aristotle at *Cael.* 2.8, 290a7–b12. Aristotle asserts that there are just two ways in which a planet or star could have its own movement independent of the circle in which it is carried: either by rotating on its axis in one place (κύλισις) or by rolling (δίνησις). The latter alternative seems to mean completing more than one rotation (of the sort not confined to one place?) per orbit around the Earth, since

then while the planets themselves will be moved around their own centres, the spheres in which they have been mounted like helmsmen will carry them around either quickly or slowly. Except that he provides to them a motion that is more varied [than that of the fixed stars] because [the planets] are intermediate between things that undergo rectilinear motion and those that move by themselves solely in a circle. He moves each [planet] around its centre, while each one also goes high or comes close to Earth within its own sphere and also turns around the north or the south – facts which make them inferior to the fixed stars, though in another sense they have been allocated a kind of independence.[304] 77

By virtue of the movement of the Same the ones that go around most quickly and in fact do the overtaking seemed to be overtaken by those that go around more slowly.[305] For the movement of the Same – which

Aristotle uses the fact that the Moon always shows the same side toward us to rule out the case that the heavenly bodies roll. The former alternative is supposedly ruled out by the simple observation that the stars and planets don't stay in one place. However, it seem obvious that Aristotle's alternatives for individual circular motion for the heavenly bodies are not exhaustive. Let us say that a body 'spins' if it completes multiple rotations whilst completing its orbit around the centre. I think it likely that Plato's point is that the stars and planets spin while orbiting the centre. Nothing Aristotle says seems to tell against this possibility. In his commentary on *de Caelo* Simplicius uses this fact to argue that people who suppose Aristotle and Plato to be in conflict on this point are mistaken: 'It is clear that Aristotle eliminates rotation: however, he does not eliminate it as not existing at all among the <stars>, but as not existing by itself with the spheres being fixed, and also as not being the cause of the apparent change in position <of the stars>' (*in Cael*. 455.11–13, trans. Mueller (2004)).

[304] οὗς καὶ ἐλασσοῦσθαι τῶν ἀπλανῶν ἄλλως ἐξουσίαν ἀπόλυτον λαχόντας. This final remark seems to be a concession to the problem raised in Aristotle's *De Caelo* about the relative complexity of the motions of the heavenly bodies as one moves closer to the centre of the cosmos. The fixed stars have a simple circular motion. The motions of the planets above the Sun are complex, but then the pattern reverts to simple circular motion with the Sun and Moon. Aristotle finds this puzzling and posits a way of 'equalising' things. On the whole, Proclus tends to avoid the value judgements associated with complexity that motivate Aristotle's puzzle, preferring to see differences in planetary motions as resulting from the planets' different causal role in ordering the sub-lunary realm. Even here he thinks that the greater complexity of motion, which makes the planets in some sense inferior to the stars, is balanced by the planets' 'independence' or 'liberation'. Cf. the 'liberated gods' associated with the *Phaedrus* myth at *in Tim*. I 18.8.

[305] The appearance is the product of the two movements in question. These are the east to west movement of the circle of the Same, which is identified with the sphere of the fixed stars, and the west to east movement of the circle of the Different. The rotation of the fixed stars is the fastest of the motions in the heavens since they make a complete rotation in 24 hours. For the planets carried along by the motion of the Different, the smaller the orbit, the faster the motion. The Moon is the fastest, since it completes its journey in the opposite direction from the fixed stars in the lunar month. Saturn will be the slowest. But because the motion of the Different is carried along with the

gives all their circles a spiral turning, due to the two distinct [orientations of the circles] going along in opposing [dimensions] at the same time[306] – made the one that departs most slowly from that which is fastest appear to be closest [in speed to it]. (*Tim.* 39a4–b2)

There are two revolutions, as he has frequently reminded us: one from East to West [sc. the motion of the Same], the other from West to East [sc. the motion of the Different]. The person who has observed these two revolutions knows which one is common among the stars and which one is specific [to the planets], and also which ones are moved more quickly and which more slowly. [Such a person] would concentrate on the specific motion that belongs to each one and know that those that come to be among "the followers"[307] are faster and thus would not posit that Saturn is faster than the Moon, but rather that the Moon moves faster than Saturn. When he sees it further to the East, he supposes it is Saturn that gets overtaken and the Moon that does the overtaking. However, for the person who supposes that there is only one simple motion for all of them that goes from East to West, when he sees Saturn and the Moon now together, and then later with Saturn further to the West, he says that Saturn has been moved faster [toward the West], and

motion of the Same, Saturn will *appear* to be moving fastest in the sense that it seems to be *keeping pace* with the fixed stars, while the Moon seems to be *falling further and further behind*.

306 The grammar of this clause has been the subject of debate: πάντας γὰρ τοὺς κύκλους αὐτῶν στρέφουσα ἕλικα διὰ τὸ διχῇ κατὰ τἀναντία ἅμα προϊέναι τὸ βραδύτατα ἀπιὸν ἀφ᾽ αὑτῆς οὖσης ταχίστης ἐγγύτατα ἀπέφαινε. Both Taylor and Archer-Hind agree that διὰ τὸ διχῇ κατὰ τἀναντία ἅμα προϊέναι goes with στρέφουσα ἕλικα alone and not with the main verb ἀπέφαινε. What, however, is the subject for προϊέναι? A-H insists that if we suppose that it is the circles that are going forward, then we can't give any satisfactory sense to διχῇ. Thus he would prefer an understood subject of 'the motion of the Same and the Different considered jointly'. Taylor, however, supposes that either the circles or the orbits are here an understood subject. I have translated the passage as Proclus clearly understands it. At 78.31–79.4 he claims that the motions east to west and west to east for the two circles are not sufficient to produce a spiral motion for the planets. What is crucial is the fact that the motions take place at an angle to one another. Moreover, he thinks that this spiralling is not simply a matter of the planets changing their latitude with respect to the ecliptic (κατὰ πλάτος and thus βορειοτέρους ἢ νοτιωτέρους). This is in fact observed, of course. The spiralling is also κατὰ βάθος, προσγειοτέρους ἢ ἀπογειοτέρους γιγνομένους (79.9–11). So the fact that the path of the ecliptic is at an angle to that of the celestial equator is one contributing factor to the planetary spirals that are observed, but there is also the fact that the planets move closer and further from the Earth. This is, of course, just what Ptolemy thinks too. While Proclus may demur from the idea that the planets are moved on spheres, he does seem to accept that they exhibit perigee and apogee.

307 τὰ ἑπόμενα i.e. in positions following the daily movement of the heavens – eastward positions. Opposed to τὰ προηγούμενα, i.e. those positions that lead the daily movements – the westward ones.

he says that the Moon has been overtaken – a case of the slower one getting passed by the faster one. The cause of his error[308] is the fact that he is considering only the revolution of the Same which is by far the dominant one, but not taking account of the specific motions of the planets. That means that he is unaware that there is a transition that is made, not toward the leading signs [sc. the more westward ones], but **78** toward those that follow [sc. the more eastward ones]. This is doubtless also what the Athenian Stranger (*Laws* VII 822b) reproached the many who are ignorant of astronomy for. He said it is shameful when we have been spectators at the stadium and yet fail to know who is faster and who is slower. The person who supposes the slower runner to be the faster is thought to be absurd. But when we are spectators at the genuine Olympics and fail to know the faster and slower orbit through ignorance of astronomy [this is not commonly held to be ridiculous]. Those that are going around fastest seem to *be overtaken* by those who are going slower – though it will seem to those who are able to look to their specific motions that they in fact *do the overtaking*, for the dominant motion of the Same makes the motion of the ones that are nearer *seem* fastest and it is the one that is closer that undergoes the lesser removal from its spot. Suppose, for example, that the Moon and Saturn appear at the heart of Leo. When the Moon is moved with its own specific motion [from West to East along with the Different] it will be separated from this fixed star, while Saturn is seen around the same place for several nights. The astronomer knows, therefore, that the Moon departs this spot more quickly due to the motion toward the "[signs] which follow" the heart of Leo. The multitude [who are ignorant of astronomy], however, suppose that the Moon and Saturn have been moved by the universe toward the same [direction as the fixed stars] but that they are not making their return to the same point at the same rate. Instead the one has gone toward the West earlier, because it is quicker, while the other gets left behind because it is slower and has not gone as far West at the earlier time. So much then for the conjectures (*hyponoia*) of the multitude.

There is, however, a sense in which this is true (I mean, of course, that Saturn is faster). If it is in fact the case, as we said before [75.25] that the ratio of the circle of Saturn to the Moon's circle is greater than the ratio of the time that it takes for the one to return to its starting point compared to the other, then the one that is closer to the sphere of the fixed stars will be the faster one according to the argument given previously.

[308] Proclus has a little play on words here that cannot be captured in English: τὸ δ' αἴτιον τῆς πλάνης ἐστὶ . . . τὰς δὲ ἰδίας κινήσεις μὴ συλλογίζεσθαι τῶν πλανήτων.

3. The spiral motion of the planets

But what about the words **which gives all their circles a spiral turning, due to the distinct** [somethings] **going along in opposing** [somethings] **that occur at the same time**?[309] And how are we to allow for an opposition to circular motion? Nor is this the explanation of the spiral [motion of the planets] – that each of the planets is subject to two **79** motions.[310] Rather it is due to the fact that they are moved along the ecliptic [at an *oblique angle*] to the celestial equator. (If one were to posit that the Sun is moved along the celestial equator with a motion opposite to that of the universe, this would not be a spiral despite the counter-revolution that occurs.) Neither should one be willing simply to admit that the opposition is a matter of there being another motion [opposed to] the motion in a circle, for it turns out that there are a number of good arguments against that belief.

Perhaps, then, **the distinct** [somethings] **going in opposing** [somethings] is something of the following sort: not only is there the fact that things are moved simultaneously toward the East and the West, but also in terms of latitude, as well as in terms of proximity to the Earth,[311] coming to have a perigee or apogee, and being further to the north or the south, for these two movements in conjunction with the motion of the universe make the spiral. The spiral is also appropriate to the planets since they are intermediate between the fixed stars and the things in the sub-lunary realm. Since the former are moved only in a circle, while the things [below the Moon] undergo rectilinear motion, it follows for things that are intermediate between them to be moved naturally in an irregular manner and also in a regular manner with respect to their longitude (*mêkos*), latitude (*platos*) and proximity to the Earth (*bathos*). This happens in order that [the planets] may be paradigms of the various motions of the things that come after themselves as well as imitating the uni-formity (*to monoeidês*) of the things prior to themselves through their rotation. These things, then, are clear to all.

There is nothing surprising in the fact that there is an *opposition*[312] in the heavens that pre-exists that of the opposites in the revolution of

[309] στρέφειν ἕλικα διὰ τὸ διχῇ κατὰ τἀναντία ἅμα προϊέναι. In the lemma quoted above, I translate this phrase as Proclus understands it. Here I have left open the gaps that he'll work toward filling.

[310] That is, they move with the motion of the Different from west to east, but at the same time are carried along by the dominant motion of the Same from east to west.

[311] οὐ μόνον τὸ ἅμα κινεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀνατολὰς καὶ δύσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ πλάτος καὶ κατὰ βάθος. The following – προσγειοτέρους ἢ ἀπογειοτέρους γιγνομένους – makes clear what κατὰ βάθος means in this context.

[312] This paragraph on oppositions among the higher principles is probably prompted by the presence of κατὰ τἀναντία in the immediately preceding *lexis*.

the [circles of the] Different since we have said that among the genera of Being, there is an opposition between Sameness and Difference, between Motion and Rest, or even among the very first principles [of the genera of Being] between the Limited and the Unlimited,[313] for these things too are opposites. Even if they always possess the power to make things in conjunction with each other, there is nonetheless conflict and disagreement between them at the extremes. Therefore it is no surprise that there is some kind of opposition among the movements in the heavens. After all, [Plato] does not take the opposites now [under discussion to be] things engaged in combat with one another or destructive to each other (these are [characteristic of] things that are enmattered and divisible). Rather, it is simply a matter of things that are productive of oppositions or things having the greatest [spatial] separation from one another (for this too is a mode of opposition in nature).[314] Moreover, the fact that in the case of the celestial motions the appearance is one thing while the truth is another indicates that Not-Being antecedently exists up there and is interwoven with Being.[315]

The spiral shape is not an empty coincidence but rather fills in the intermediate status between bodies that have rectilinear motion and those that are carried around in a circle. The circle, as has been said [79.14], is only for the fixed stars, while the straight line is for Becoming. The spiral, then, is for the planets, since they have a mixture of both rotation and straightness. Their motions with respect to latitude and proximity to the Earth are proximate causes and paradigms of the motions of things down here – that is of motions upward, downward and along the diagonal. Perhaps the Theurgist too,[316] when he celebrated time as spiral in form and as both young and old, looked [specifically] to the fact that the measures of the various periods of time become particularly apparent to us through the occurrence of the spiral motions of the planets, and not merely to the fact that time counts every motion, whether it be rectilinear or circular – motions which the spiral includes

[313] The genera of Being are the Being, Sameness and Difference that the Demiurge composes the World Soul from in *Timaeus* 35a. Proclus adds to these the other two 'greatest kinds' of the Sophist. All these are derived from two prior principles, the Limited and the Unlimited. Cf. *in Tim.* II 133.9–134.20.

[314] Perhaps a play on words: ἔστι γάρ τις καὶ οὗτος ἐναντιότητος ἐν τῇ φύσει τρόπος. The things that are spatially separated (τὰ πλεῖστον ἀπέχοντα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων) have a distinct *topos* which is the *tropos* of the opposition.

[315] Proclus now adds another kind of opposition to those observed in the heavens. In addition to the spatial separation that comes about as heavenly bodies change their positions relative to one another, there is also the opposition between appearance and reality when it comes to the celestial motions. In accordance with Plato's *Sophist*, Proclus equates appearance with Not-Being and truth with Being.

[316] Cf. above 21.2; 40.23 and 30 as well as note 84.

in a uniform way. In this way, he would be going along with Plato since
20 Plato also thinks that we are made familiar with the temporal periods due to the motions of the planets. Enough about these matters. What comes next Plato conveys in this manner:

4. The primary role of the Sun, Tim. *39b2–c1*

In order that there might be a highly visible measure for the relative
25 **slowness and speed and that the eight movements might be carried on,[317] the God kindled a light in the second of the orbits from the Earth – that which we now have called the Sun – so that so far as it was possible it might illuminate *ouranos*[318] to the utmost reaches and so that all the living things for whom it was fitting might participate in number, learning it from the revolution of the Same and the**
30 **similar.** (*Tim.* 39b2–c1)

a. General interpretation

Plato has provided in these [words] the single and authoritative cause of the genesis of visible time, for as the Demiurge establishes invisible
81 time, so too the Sun establishes the visible [kind of time] that measures the motion of bodies, for it is due to light that the Sun brings every

[317] ἵνα δ' εἴη μέτρον ἐναργές τι πρὸς ἄλληλα βραδυτῆτι καὶ τάχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀκτὼ φορὰς πορεύοιτο, φῶς ὁ θεὸς ἀνῆψεν. Here some modern editors see a problem with what they take to be the imputation that the eight movements need the light of the Sun in order to see *their* way. Taylor would keep the text on the grounds that Plato is having a bit of fun with his solemn Pythagorean spokesman. But since Cornford and Archer-Hind take Timaeus to be reporting Plato's views, they are not so comfortable with this idea. Cornford thinks it would be absurd if the fixed stars needed the light of the Sun to show them the way to go. Thus he adopts A-H's suggested emendation of καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀκτὼ φορὰς πορεύοιτο το καθ' ἃ περὶ etc. on the grounds that 'it is man, not the planets and stars, who is to benefit by this "conspicuous measure"'. Cornford (1957), 115. Proclus, however, takes the relevance of φῶς ὁ θεὸς ἀνῆψεν to τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀκτὼ φορὰς πορεύοιτο differently (83.21–84.21). It is not that the Sun allows the planets to see their way, it is rather that the solar year constitutes the appropriate measure for a Platonic Great Year. It is there 'in order that the eight movements might be carried on' in the sense that the solar year allows these eight movements to have a privileged common measure. He categorically rejects the suggestion that the light is kindled in the Sun merely for the benefit of human beings. This would require that what is authoritative should exist for the sake of that which is subordinate, or that what is eternal should exist for the sake of that which is perishable (81.23–27).

[318] This is left untranslated because in what follows at 84.5–85.22 Proclus will debate whether it should be taken to mean the world on which we live that is illuminated only part of the time, or the entire heavens.

temporal interval into the realm of things that are apparent. The Sun defines every period and reveals the measures for the completion of cycles (*apokatastasis*). Therefore it is a **highly visible measure** insofar as it is especially responsible for exhibiting the procession of time 'in accordance with number' (37d6) into the universe. This is quite plausible, for it has a period that is more precise than the five planets (since it is free of progression and retrogradation) and more precise than the Moon by virtue of the fact that its procession to the north or the south always concludes at the same point.[319] But if it has a more accurate period, then it is plausibly a measure of measures and gives its own testimony to make known the periodic measures of the other [heavenly bodies] and the ratios which their respective speeds have to one another. The Sun in particular imitates the 'constant abiding'[320] of eternity due to the fact that it always patrols the same territory. It is in this respect that it differs from the [other] planets.

There is another respect in which it is an even more visible measure than the measure of the [sphere] of the fixed stars (since this too possesses some appropriate measure, appropriate [temporal] extension or single, unchangeable number of its distinctive motion). Nonetheless, it is the solar light that makes this measure [of the sphere of the fixed stars] and the entire unfolding of visible (*emphanês*) time highly visible (*enargês*) and familiar. It is for this reason that he thus says: **in order that there might be a highly visible measure**. For even if there is some measure set over all the others, it is not highly visible, but it is rather the Sun that shows forth both the other intelligibles and time.

One should not say that the solar light has come to be for the sake of *our* ability to make measurements, for in what case is it possible that wholes have been established for the sake of the parts, or things that direct for the sake of those who are subject to their authority, or things that are everlasting for the sake of those that are destructible? Instead, one ought to say the following: that [solar] light shows forth time as a whole, since it possesses a revelatory power, and it summons its [sc. time's] hypercosmic monad and its single measure toward the measurement of the periods of corporeal things, and this makes time perceptible in a sense.

Therefore what causes all the things that undergo motion to possess a highly visible measure is the Sun's light. While this is the overall benefit (*to holon agathon*), subsequent to the [parts of the universe that are

[319] The tropics of Cancer and Capricorn.

[320] τὸ ἀεὶ μένον τοῦ αἰῶνος; cf. *Tim.* 37d6 μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνὶ.

themselves] wholes (*ta hola*),[321] it also benefits the parts in a secondary
82 manner, for it provides a genesis [or source] of number and of measures to those for whom it is fitting to participate in these things. While irrational beings lack any share in these things, it falls to the race of daemons (who follow along with the periods of the gods) and men to have participation in them. The Sun's provision of goods takes place through its
5 light – beginning on high, it goes down from the universal things right to the [level of] parts. And should you wish to address invisible things by starting from those that are apparent, it [sc. the Sun] endows the entire cosmos with brilliance and makes that which is corporeal divine when
10 it has been filled throughout with life. It directs the souls through its immaculate light and imparts to them a power that is immaculate and uplifting (*anagôgos*). By means of its own rays it steers the cosmos and fills the souls with 'fiery seeds',[322] for the order of the Sun comes from on high, deriving from hypercosmic [causes]. It is for this reason that Plato
15 did not establish this light from anything down here below but instead said that the Demiurge himself **kindled** it, causing this sphere[323] to subsist as a result of his own essence and projecting from the solar source a life that is separate and "intellectualised" [or subject to intellection][324] – which is precisely what the Theologians say about the 'hypercosmic fir-
20 maments' too. Due to this fact, he also seems to me to provide a double genesis of the Sun. There is one that is given simultaneously with the seven Rulers of the Cosmos, where he fashioned their bodies and inserted them in their orbits. But then there is a different genesis that provides the kindling of the light by virtue of which he gives to it a share in hypercosmic power. After all, that he should generate its mass in its own right is one thing, but the fact that [he should make it] endowed with its
25 additional authoritative character specific to it is something else. It is on account of this [latter authority] that it is called the King of everything visible and is established as analogous to the single source of goods, for just as the latter illuminates both the intellect and the intelligible (since it

[321] The 'universal parts' of the cosmos are things such as the elements in general and heavenly spheres. Festugière has simply 'l'ensemble', but in view of the repeated contrast between 'wholes' and 'parts' in what follows, I think it may be better to take the plural seriously. On the notion of 'universal parts' generally, see Baltzly (2008).

[322] The phrase is pulled from a longer verse of the *Oracles* (fr. 130) quoted below at III 266.19 and 21–3. The Sun's rays play an important role in the ritual of theurgical elevation. Cf. Lewy (1956), 184–211.

[323] Proclus here shifts from discussing the Sun itself to its sphere for the purpose of drawing a connection with the *Oracles*' terminology of 'firmaments'. Compare 82.19–20 ὃ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ὑπερκοσμίων στερεωμάτων οἱ θεολόγοι φασί with *Or. Chald.* 57 Ἑπτὰ γὰρ ἐξώγκωσε πατὴρ στερεώματα κόσμων (=Simplicius, *in Phys.* 616.35).

[324] νενοωμένην, cf. III 290.29.

is superior to the intelligible), so too the Sun (since it is superior to what is visible) illuminates both that which is visible and sight (*Rep*. VI 508e). If it is beyond what is visible, then it would have a hypercosmic nature, for the cosmos that is both visible and tangible also possesses body (*Tim*. 31b). Therefore we may consider the Sun in a double manner: as one of the seven [planets] and as a leader [who possesses authority] over the wholes; and as encosmic and hypercosmic[325] in as much[326] as it causes the divine light to shine forth like the Good [is responsible for] the truth that makes divine the intelligible-and-intellectual order (*diakosmos*). As Phanes, according to Orpheus,[327] sends out the intelligible light that fills all the intellectual gods with cognition (*noêsis*) and as Zeus kindles the intellectual and creative light for everything that is hypercosmic, in like manner, the Sun endows the visible universe with brilliance through this immaculate light and that which does the illuminating always belongs to a superior order to that which gets illuminated. After all, it is not the case that the Good is intelligible, nor is Phanes intellectual, nor Zeus hypercosmic. So of course on this line of reasoning, while the Sun is hypercosmic, it emits the *sources* of light. Indeed, the most mystical of the Oracles have imparted that its wholeness is among the things that are hypercosmic, for up there we have 'the Solar cosmos' and the 'universal (*holos*) light'[328] – something which the Chaldean traditions also say and about which I am persuaded. Enough about these topics.

30 **83** 5 10 15

[325] Cf. *in Parm*. 1044.4–12 where Proclus similarly invokes the *Oracles* (fr. 148) in support of the view that the Sun that is visible to us is a lower projection of a hidden, supercelestial cause of all light.

[326] The double manner in which we are to consider the Sun seems to break down at this point. So far we have had two balanced pairs – one lower, one higher: καὶ ὡς ἕνα τῶν ἑπτὰ καὶ ὡς ἡγεμόνα τῶν ὅλων καὶ ὡς ἐγκόσμιον καὶ ὡς ὑπερκόσμιον. Following ὑπερκόσμιον we get an explanation: καθὸ καὶ προσλάμπει τὸ θεῖον φῶς. Without conjunction or punctuation we then have ὡς τἀγαθὸν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὴν ἐκθεοῦσαν τούς τε νοητοὺς καὶ τοὺς νοεροὺς διακόσμους which I take to explicate the previous explication by drawing a parallel with the action of the form of the Good in the Republic. This in turn is followed by ὡς ὁ Φάνης . . . , ὡς ὁ Ζεὺς . . . . However, Proclus has abandoned his earlier two-fold balancing to pursue a sequence of parallels that vindicate the Sun's claim to hypercosmic status. It is not uncommon for Proclus to forget himself mid-sentence when he is in the ecstasy of such theologically oriented material.

[327] *Orph*. fr. 86.

[328] *Or. Chald*. fr. 61. On the double Sun in the *Oracles*, Lewy (1956), 151. The Sun's 'wholeness' is the highest manifestation of it as an individual cause in the orders of being. The wholeness of the Sun is thus not itself something that is itself a source of light, just as Good is not itself intelligible. Rather than emitting light, it emits the sources of light, just as the good makes things intelligible without being itself intelligible.

b. Lexis for Tim. *39b2–c1*

It is necessary to return to the individual words and phrases and to speak about them as follows. The words **in order that there might be a measure** do not signify the measure that is the product of reflection,[329] but rather refer to the very fact that the corporeal motions are measured and limited since the visible [kind of] time is engendered.

The words **the eight movements might be carried on** have been provided in relation to the measure [just discussed] and make it clear that this measure runs through and assigns the measures that pertain to the paths taken by the eight motions, for we say what the shared cycle of the eight is in terms of how many *years* it takes for them to come back to the same position. But we know that there has been a solar year because of the *light*, since it is due to this that we know which [sign] of the Zodiac the Sun is occupying, which one it is leaving and into which one it is carried. On account of these things we know the time in which the Sun goes through, or goes around, its own distinctive circle, as well as knowing all the periods of the eight circles in terms of the years it takes to complete them; for we are able, by virtue of the transition that the light makes, to measure the solar period and the common [completion of the cycle] of the other [heavenly bodies], as measured by the measure
84 that belonged to the completion of the solar cycle.[330]

The words **kindled a light** reveals the atemporal hypostasis of light and the fact that it proceeds from things invisible as a result of the Demiurgic essence.[331]

The words **so that so far as possible it might illuminate *ouranos*[332] to the utmost reaches** might have the following sort of explanation. It was necessary that the whole cosmos should be filled up with the solar

[329] οὐ τὸ ἐπινοηματικὸν σημαίνει μέτρον. ἐπινοηματικός is a rare form and D has the more common ἐπινοητικὸν, which also appears in Proclus' only other use at *in Crat*. §53.62. It is not wholly clear what mistake Proclus wishes us to avoid with respect to the words in the lemma. I suspect that it is that we should not take this measure to be something mind-dependent or the product of any soul's reflective awareness of time's passage. Cf. the contrast between *epinoia* and genuine realities at *in Parm*. 715.12–24.

[330] The sense is relatively clear, though the text is problematic. I follow Festugière in reading τούτῳ μετρουμένην ὃ ἦν ταύτης μέτρῳ where the manuscripts have μετροῦμεν.

[331] I suspect Proclus intends his audience to hear an allusion to Orphic poems (fr. 109, Kern). Compare 84.1–2 ἐξ ἀφανοῦς προϊοῦσαν with ὁ Φάνης ἐπιλάμπων τὸ νοητὸν φῶς πάντας ὁρατοὺς ποιεῖ καὶ δείκνυσιν ἐξ ἀφανῶν φανερούς at I 430.16 and φανερὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀφανῶν ὁ Ζεὺς ἀποτελεῖ at III 192.23. See also Hermeias, *in Phdr*. 148.24 and 154.27.

[332] I follow Festugière in not translating *ouranos* here. In what follows, Proclus will interpret the term in two different ways broadly as 'world' (*kosmos*, 84.5–16; 85.19–22) and narrowly as the heavens that are moved in a circle (84.16–17; 85.16–19).

light insofar as this was possible. But the mass of the Earth is by nature dark. Therefore it was necessary for the Sun to be closer to the Earth in order that its darkness might be relieved, for that which is nearer illuminates more and when that which does the illuminating is bigger than that which gets illuminated, it is able to light things up to a greater extent. This is also clear due to the words **so far as possible** (*malista*) [which indicate] that the Sun illuminates the whole world (*kosmos*) to the extent possible (*kata to dynaton*), because it is not able to light up the entire Earth simultaneously but does so in parts as it moves in a circle. The Sun does, however, shine everywhere at once in the shortest period of time when it is at the equinox, for since it is the case that when it rises or sets [at the equinox] it lights up more than half, then in this single rotation it illuminates the whole Earth.[333] On the other hand, if one were to interpret the *ouranos* as that which is moved in a circle [sc. the heavens], then here too it is not the case that the whole is illuminated all at once, for there are shadows up there too due to the occultation (*epiprosthêsis*) in the case of the stars and the Moon. None of the things in the cosmos are free of shadows, nor of matter. Only those things that are above the cosmos are free from shadows or matter, except for the Sun. Wherefore the latter is genuinely free from shadows and it lacks receptivity for genesis while everything else admits of the addition of different illuminations at different times.

For what reason, someone might ask, did he not kindle the light in the *first* of the orbits from Earth? We shall reply that the gleaming of the Sun is intrinsically asymmetric with Becoming. The Moon, however, since it is an intermediate and the light's first recipient makes it more symmetrical with Becoming, for the Moon is sort of a smaller sun, as Aristotle said.[334] In addition, since the Moon is that which is proximately located above the realm of Becoming, it was necessary that it should not be the thing that is most radiant or most luminous, for it would not be lawful

333 ἐν ἐλαχίστῳ δὲ χρόνῳ πᾶσαν ἅμα φωτίζει κατὰ τὸν ἰσημερινὸν ὧν· ἀνατέλλων τε γὰρ καὶ δύνων πλέον ἢ τὸ ἥμισυ φωτίσας ὅλην ἐν μιᾷ ταύτῃ περιφορᾷ καταλάμπει τὴν γῆν. It is not easy to see the point of this argument. In the first place, ἅμα must be taken in a sense that is not strictly temporal. It is simply not the case that there exists a time t such that at t it is daytime all over the planet. Rather it must mean something like 'the Sun gets around to illuminating every part of the world in turn as rapidly as it is possible to get the job done'. Presumably the point about the equinox is that when the Sun is at this position, there will be equal illumination at both poles at once. By contrast, once past the vernal equinox, there will be no sunrise at 90° South until the following September equinox.

334 *GA* IV 10, 777b24–26 ἔστι δὲ ἡ σελήνη ἀρχὴ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον κοινωνίαν καὶ τὴν μετάληψιν τὴν τοῦ φωτός· γίγνεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἄλλος ἥλιος ἐλάττων·

to bring something like that alongside what is dark. Rather, [you would need] something that has this character in a secondary way – something
85 that, while it always has its own light, also changes its participation in the superior light that is manifested, and moreover does this in an orderly way (for what is orderly is superior to that which is disorderly). [This needs to be the case] so that by virtue of this change there should exist a paradigm for the highly variable nature which matter conveys to gen-
5 erated things. Again, this is parallel to the case where the interposition of the Earth results in an absence of light.[335] These matters, therefore, admit of lengthier treatment.

That the stars and the entire heaven (*ouranos*) receive the light from the Sun is easily shown, for that which is common in many things subsists
10 as the result of a single cause and in one sense the cause is such as to transcend those things, but in another sense belongs on the same level with them. The latter is that which participates in the former form in the primary manner, and this thing *is* to the fullest extent that in which it participates in the primary manner.[336] If, then, light is in the Sun to the fullest extent, then this would be the primary light and the light in other things also results from it.[337] So the matter stands thus.

15 What the words **so that so far as possible it might illuminate *ouranos* to the utmost reaches** show has been said above. If you were to take the word *ouranos* to mean that which is carried around in a circle,[338] then you would have to say that [the qualification 'so far as possible'] is on account of the Moon <which> does not always shine fully but [only shines] fully from the conjunction [sc. the new Moon] until the

[335] Proclus is fond of the idea that the Moon, through exhibiting phases, constitutes an 'isthmus' between Being and Becoming (cf. *in Tim.* II 87.33 and 104.19). The parallel with lunar eclipse is not easy to grasp. Could it be that, just as the interposition of the Earth changes the capacity of the Moon to receive the Sun's light, so too the Moon somehow changes the capacity of things in the realm of Becoming to receive the solar illumination? Edmonds (2001), 20 suggests that the Chaldean rituals for ascent might have included timing matters so as to avoid the Moon's influence on the theurgist. Since it is by the solar rays that the theurgist ascends, he would not want his capacity to receive them in the strongest form diminished by the intermediary of the Moon. When Julian hints at the nature of this ritual of ascent, he does speak of the 'seven-rayed' god (*Orat.* V 172d). Since the super-celestial Sun endows not only the seven planets but the fixed stars with its light, then one might suppose that one source of this light is unwelcome. Perhaps the Moon.

[336] This describes the distinction between the unparticipated, paradigmatic cause (which transcends the many) and the participated cause (which is coordinate with the many).

[337] Cf. *in Parm.* 1043.30–1044.31 The Sun is the source of light for all things in the cosmos. It is therefore also the primary participant in the hypercosmic source of light, the One.

[338] sc. the heavens, as above at 84.17.

full Moon.[339] If, however, [you were to take the word *ouranos* to mean] the whole cosmos, then the qualification 'so far as possible' is there on account of the Earth since, as we said, [84.14] the entire [Earth] is illuminated (strictly speaking) only on the single day when the Sun is at the equinox and its risings and settings bring its presence along the diameter [i.e. the celestial equator].

Of course in the consideration of day and night, it remains for us to look at what this number is which is produced as a result of the motion of the Same and the similar. Now surely this number is neither intellectual (*noeros*) nor discursive (*dianoêtikos*), but rather one that is related to opinion (*doxastikos*)[340] – furnishing a token (*endeigma*) of the numbers that pre-exist in the forms – for there is a plurality of ways in which the many kinds of numbers are differentiated, and just as we know the number of invisible time by means of discursive number, so too by means of what is related to opinion we apprehend the number of visible time. **86**

5. *Night and day*

Therefore, night and day – the period of a rotation (*kuklêsis*) that is single and maximally wise – have both come to be thus and for these reasons. Next the month comes about when the Moon goes around its own circle to overtake the Sun, while a year happens whenever the Sun has gone around its circle. Men have not observed the periods of the others, except for a few among the multitude, nor do they have names for them nor do they synchronise them with one another when they consider things by means of number. As a consequence, as a general rule they do not know that the 'wanderings' of these [heavenly bodies] – extraordinary in number and amazingly diversified – *are* time. (*Tim.* 39c1–d2)

a. General interpretation

Night and day had their procession due to the genesis of light, and the smallest measure of time has been divided by means of these intervals, for he says that day and night are the **period of a rotation that is single and maximally wise**. He does not mean that the rotation of the sphere of the fixed stars is the single and maximally wise rotation or that the period that belongs to this [rotation] is day and night, as it seems to most people. Rather, the *rotation* (*kuklêsis*) that is single and maximally wise is the cognition (*noêsis*) that belongs to the circle of the Same, and

339 <ἦν> οὐ πᾶσαν ἀεὶ φωτίζει, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ἀπὸ συνόδου μέχρι πανσελήνου πᾶσαν. This is very puzzling. Proclus must somehow think that there is a full illumination from the Moon only in the waxing phases from the new Moon to the full Moon.

340 This number will be one that is *doxastikos* because of the manner in which it is apprehended – by *perception*; cf. *Tim.* 28a2–3.

the *period* that belongs to this is the revolution (*periphora*) of the sphere of the fixed stars which the former [cognition] leads round. After all, a rotation is an activity, and so is a period, but while the first is more of the nature of an origin, the latter is an effect of the former – one that imitates the rotation. This, therefore, is a-night-and-a-day,[341] and it is from this that months and years are measured, for we measure the larger things by means of the smaller intervals in just the same way that we measure the whole time cycle of the entire cosmos[342] by years.

It is also necessary to attend to the distinctive property of these [temporal intervals] – how they serve as intermediaries between the monadic forms and those [forms] that have been established in the many concrete individuals (*atoma*). The former are in one thing, but are always numerically the same, while the latter are in things that are numerically distinct but by being plural. On the one hand, a year or a month is in one thing that is always numerical, but one happens numerically after another one
87 due to the circular exchange among the various concrete particulars, for one month succeeds another and one year another, but each is always single.[343] But these matters do not require an extensive discussion.

Here, however, is something that a person might find puzzling in what is said [in this lemma] – how he can say that night and day have

[341] τὸ νυχθήμερον is a substantive generated from the adjective meaning 'for the space of a day and a night'. I will use the fused expression rather than translating this as 'twenty four-hours' *duration*' or 'the *space of* a day and a night' since many of the puzzles that Proclus addresses in what follows turn on drawing just this distinction between events and the time that they occupy or determine.

[342] τὸν ὅλον χρόνον τὸν ἀποκαταστατικὸν τοῦ κόσμου παντός. This foreshadows the 'complete year' to be discussed in the next lemma: *Tim*. 39.d.4–7 ὅταν ἁπασῶν τῶν ὀκτὼ περιόδων τὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα συμπερανθέντα τάχη σχῇ κεφαλὴν τῷ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίως ἰόντος ἀναμετρηθέντα κύκλῳ.

[343] For monadic forms, see *in Tim*. 443.10–22. These are forms that are only instantiated by a single object (e.g. the Sun) *ever*. By contrast forms such as Horse or Man are instantiated by a plurality of numerically distinct things all at the same time. At any given time, there are many horses. The year, by contrast, is instantiated by many distinct particulars – now it is 2011, later it is 2012 – but there is only one at any given time. So the month or the year are intermediates in this sense. Monadic forms = single instance, ever. Month or year = plural instances, but only one at any given time. The 'one in the many' = plural instances at every time.

Festugière seems to me to assimilate the monadic form to the monad – that is the transcendent form – and the other kind of form to form-shares or tropes. He writes: 'L'universel en soi se reproduit indéfiniment selon les individus, mais il reste toujours numériquement unique: autrement dit l'universel est seulement unité. L'universel dans les individus se réalise chaque fois dans une unité différente qui, comme individu, est unique, mais ces unités font une pluralité: autrement dit les individus sont seulement multiplicité.' I think this cannot be quite right since it fails to do justice to the fact that a monadic form is a specific kind of form for Proclus (and Syrianus). It is not merely the universal considered in as much as it is numerically one across all instances.

become the *period* of a single and maximally wise *rotation*, for this is the very charge that Aristotle brought against Plato: that the revolution is [identical to] time.[344] [An interpretation which is hardly fair][345] when Plato has added time to a universe *already in motion* as something else apart from the motion! If the motion that belongs to the universe [in general] is something apart from the time [in general] that belongs to it, then the motion that belongs to each of the [individual] things [in the universe] that is moved circularly is something apart from each one's periodic time. In any case, this is one thing one might find puzzling in the words that are being expounded.

In addition, how is it that if the period of the sphere of the fixed stars is the period that is quickest that the [planets] that are nearest to it are slower in making a complete cycle (*apokatastasis*) than those that are further away?[346] Well, perhaps one might need to say in relation to the first [puzzle] that the word 'period' can mean two things. Sometimes it means the motion itself, while at other times it means the measure or the duration of the motion. It is just like the case where 'a bushel' or 'a half-pint' is said in two different ways and each such term [which can mean the measure or the thing measured]. So too one ought now say that the period of the sphere of the fixed stars is not the *motion*, but rather the *temporal extension* of the motion. Perhaps in addition it might be said that when Plato says that time is nothing other than the 'wanderings' [of the planets], he means that time is nothing other than the *periods* that

344 Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* IV 10, 218a33–b3 οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου κίνησιν εἶναί φασιν [sc. time], οἱ δὲ τὴν σφαῖραν αὐτήν. καίτοι τῆς περιφορᾶς καὶ τὸ μέρος χρόνος τίς ἐστι, περιφορὰ δέ γε οὔ· μέρος γὰρ περιφορᾶς τὸ ληφθέν, ἀλλ' οὐ περιφορά. Simplicius (*in Phys.* 700.18–20) tells us that Eudemus, Theophrastus and Alexander all took the sentence at *Physics* 218a33 to refer to Plato and the Pythagoreans respectively. Simplicius' defence of the latter is that this is a misunderstanding: οἱ παρακούσαντες ἴσως τοῦ Ἀρχύτου λέγοντος καθόλου τὸν χρόνον διάστημα τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως. Proclus similarly thinks that Aristotle's criticism of Plato involves misinterpretation.

345 Perhaps a bit of interpolation on my part to bring out the full sense of Proclus' aggrieved καίτοι γε. His point is surely that *Timaeus* 37c has the cosmos, and not merely the World Soul, in motion already, prior to the beginning of the discussion of time. Proclus thinks that the universe's motion is the sixth gift of the Demiurge, whilst time is the eighth and the heavenly bodies the ninth. See the Introduction to volume III in this series for the ten gifts of the Demiurge and the way in which they structure Proclus' commentary.

346 Cf. above 77.14–78.29. Saturn is closer to the sphere of the fixed stars than Mercury, but Mercury returns to its starting point in a much shorter period of time. From the time of Eudoxus, the calculation of the zodiacal period for Mercury was fixed at one year as opposed to 30 years for Saturn. The puzzle that Proclus raises here asks how this can be since Saturn is located closest to the sphere of the fixed stars and carried along with its motion (as are all the heavenly bodies corresponding to the seven circles cut from the Different). After all, the fixed stars are rushing around at an enormous speed!

belong to these wanderings, for these periods are enumerated, but time was the numerable [aspect] of motion according to these people too.[347] It is as if these people had said 'these oxen are such and such a number', for this is similar to the case where it is said that 'these periods are time' in as much as these periods are of such and such a number.

With respect to the second puzzle, it must be said that Plato took the sphere of the fixed stars' *apparent* return to the starting point (*apokatastasis*) [to be the period] that makes up a-night-and-a-day. The *true* return to the starting point is, of course, something quite different. The constellation that rises now does not rise at the same hour on the next night, nor does it have the same position relative to other [things in the heavens] – all of which are things that surely contribute toward there being a return to the starting point for the sphere of the fixed stars. It is not the case that all the constellations [in the sphere] and the
88 fixed stars come back together in the same state in accordance with this period [sc. that of a night and a day]. Indeed, if we were to apprehend accurately the return to the starting point, it would be necessary <to grasp this>[348] as something which takes place in a very long time. It is obvious that since all of the things are present in the sphere of the fixed stars and moved by it, the [spatial] relations they stand in to one another and to the sphere are entirely different at different times, and in addition to these [complexities] it is clear that they also have different motions toward the centres[349] at various times and that the return of everything to the same points is going to take a very long time.

Furthermore, someone might raise the following puzzle too: how is it that he calls the measure for the return of the motion of the Same to its starting point 'a-night-and-a-day'. The former measure [sc. the *apokatastasis* of the Same] is present everywhere from on high as a result of the single and intelligible cause of the universe and the primary paradigm. The space of a night and day, on the other hand, is present among things in the sub-lunary realm. It must be said in reply that what is productive of a-night-and-a-day is *both* the temporal duration (which is indeed in the revolution of the fixed stars in a primary manner (*prôtôs*)) *as well as*

[347] Proclus claims that, once we understand that 'period' is ambiguous, Plato need not be taken to be saying anything different from his Aristotelian critic. Proclus' characterisation, τὸ δὲ ἀριθμητὸν ἦν τῆς κινήσεως χρόνος, is a fair way of describing Aristotle's view. Cf. *Phys.* IV 11, 219b2–8 οὐκ ἄρα κίνησις ὁ χρόνος ἀλλ' ἢ ἀριθμὸν ἔχει ἡ κίνησις . . . ἀριθμὸς ἄρα τις ὁ χρόνος. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀριθμός ἐστι διχῶς (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ τὸ ἀριθμητὸν ἀριθμὸν λέγομεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν), ὁ δὴ χρόνος ἐστὶν τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ οὐχ ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν.

[348] Diehl marks a lacuna at line 2 in which he suggests λαμβάνειν ταύτην.

[349] It seems likely that the 'centres' here are the four points used by astrologers in the calculation of a nativity. See the note on *in Tim.* II 260.15 in volume III of this series.

the solar light. Therefore the measure taken in its entirety is defined in terms of its last stage which is familiar to us, for this night-and-a-day [that is familiar to us through perception] is one thing, while that which exists in invisible time is another. The former is an image of the latter or the terminating stage of its procession,[350] for there are a multiplicity of levels for night and day – intelligible, intellectual, hypercosmic, celestial and sub-lunary – as the Orphic Theologians teach as well.[351] Some of these are *prior* to the creation, some are *included* within creation, while others *proceed* from it. Some are invisible, while others are visible, since it is also the case that the month or the year which is invisible and such as to measure, make continuous and render perfect both the intellectual and corporeal periods are something different from the month or year that is visible – the one which is a limitation and measure of the Sun's revolutions (*peripolêsis*). It works the same way with the other gods, for the visible number for Saturn is one thing but the invisible one is another, and similarly for the numbers that belong to Mars, Jupiter and Mercury. The Month Itself or the Year – the individual period that is, since it is

[350] ἀποπεράτωσις ἐσχάτη is a Neoplatonic technical term for the final stage in the descent from higher paradigmatic cause. The measure which is the space of a night and a day exists in a different mode in the invisible time associated with the psychic rotation of the circle of the Same. Compare *ET* prop. 148.11–16: ἡ δὲ ἀποπεράτωσις, ἐπιστρέφουσα πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὰς προελθούσας ἐπανάγουσα δυνάμεις, ὁμοιότητα καὶ σύννευσιν τῇ ὅλῃ τάξει παρέχεται. καὶ οὕτως ὁ σύμπας διάκοσμος εἷς ἐστι διὰ τῆς ἑνοποιοῦ τῶν πρώτων δυνάμεως <καὶ> διὰ τῆς ἐν τῇ μεσότητι συνοχῆς καὶ διὰ τῆς τοῦ τέλους εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν προόδων ἐπιστροφῆς. The use of ὁ σύμπας διάκοσμος in this passage from *ET* parallels τὸ σύμπαν μέτρον above at line 16. What is at issue is all of the levels of being (that is, adverbial modes of being) at which the night-and-a-day exist. Accordingly Festugière's translation of the phrase as 'la mesure dans toute son étendue conceptuelle' is perhaps a little too much to do with us and how we think of things rather than how things are, regardless of how we think of them.

[351] *Orph*. fr. 99 (Kern) includes this passage as well as Hermeias, *in Phdr*. 154.17–23. Hermeias, however, distinguishes *three* phases of Night with the following correlations: the first is prophecy which corresponds to *epistêmê*, while the second is shame which corresponds to the virtue of self-control, and the third is birth which corresponds with the virtue of justice. Kern also includes an extensive quotation from Damascius in which the general point is that πάντα γὰρ ἦν ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἰδίως. Damascius illustrates this with αἱ τρεῖς αὗται μονάδες αἱ ἴυγγές εἰσι καὶ αἱ νύκτες αἱ τρεῖς. Presumably on the basis of the 'wrynecks' Kroll included this in his collection on the Chaldean *Oracles*, though Des Places does not. In Lewy's reconstruction of Proclus' version of the Orphic and Chaldean systems (p. 483), the three Nights of the Orphics correspond with the three wrynecks of the Chaldean system. In any event, the idea of *three* levels of Night seems to be a recurrent one here, so there is something of a mismatch with Proclus' example in which Day and Night are manifested at five levels: intelligible, intellectual, hypercosmic, celestial and sub-lunary. Perhaps the correlations with the sacred sources – whether Orphic or Chaldean – admit of a certain elasticity depending upon the context.

always one and the same – is a specific god who determines the measure of a motion in a manner that is motionless. After all, from whence does it come about that these periods are always *the same* unless it is from some
89 cause that is *unmoved*? And from whence does the *difference* between their complete cycles (*apokatastasis*) come about other than from *differences* among the unmoved causes? And from whence do we get the *incessant* character [of their rotations] that repeats again and again to infinity unless it is from the *infinite powers* in these [causes]? Now surely having
5 placed this entire temporal series under one [time], you must follow it up to the time that is most primary (*ho prôtistos chronos*) – the time that defines the period of the divine being that has come to be [sc. the visible cosmos][352] – this time being the same as true number as we said earlier [19.14]. Going from these things that are invisible, conceive the remainder that are visible; things that proceed as that which *is enumerated* as
10 a result of being born from the power of the former to *number* them. The latter are, of course, all matters that astronomy deals with well. It determines, albeit in a manner that corresponds to opinion,[353] the number for the periods that it takes for each [planet] to return to its starting point and what sort of ratio the conjunctions for the periods that are made have to one another. For instance, that the period of Saturn is two and a half times that of the planet that comes after it [i.e. Jupiter], and
15 similarly with the others, for even if their complete cycles (*apokatastasis*) are different, they nonetheless have a ratio to one another. There is, of course, a parallel with the sacred tradition[354] which worships the former invisible [numbers] that are the causes of these [visible ones] by naming Night and Day as gods, as well as by delivering those things that commend one to the month and the year, the invocations and self-
20 manifestations.[355] These things are considered not as things to be totted

[352] τὴν τοῦ θείου γενητοῦ περίοδον. Cf. *Tim.* 34a8–b1 Οὗτος δὴ πᾶς ὄντος ἀεὶ λογισμὸς θεοῦ περὶ τὸν ποτὲ ἐσόμενον θεὸν λογισθεὶς and *in Tim.* I 125.24.

[353] See below 91.16 on the *doxastikos* manner in which astronomers deal with the Platonic Great Year, for that is what is at issue with the *apokatastasis* of the entire visible cosmos.

[354] Festugière notes that Lewy (1956), 445 lists ἡ ἱερὰ φήμη as among the ways that the Neoplatonists refer to the Chaldean *Oracles* and invites us to compare αἳ Χαλδαίων φῆμαι above at 83.15. Against this, however, is the salience of Day and Night to the sacred tradition at issue. These figure more prominently in the Orphic theology, though given the correspondences that Proclus supposes obtain between them, this is another situation in which there is a certain elasticity in correlations between Plato and the theologians.

[355] ἐκδιδοῦσα καὶ μηνὸς καὶ ἐνιαυτοῦ συστατικὰ καὶ κλήσεις καὶ αὐτοφανείας. σύστασις is the term used to describe the 'conjunction' achieved with a god by means of theurgy. Lewy (1956), 228–30 utilises this passage from Proclus in his discussion of conjunction. We find here not the plural of the noun σύστασις but rather the plural of the associated adjective, συστατικὸς. These are perhaps the names that will serve to commend one to

up on one's fingers,[356] but rather as among the things that have divine subsistence – things which the sacred laws of those who serve as priests command us to worship and honour by means of statues and sacrifices. The oracles of Apollo[357] also confirm this, as the stories say, and when these things were honoured, the benefits that result from the periods belonged to human beings, both the benefits of the seasons and those of other [periods] similarly. However, when these things were neglected a condition contrary to nature was the result for everything around the Earth.[358] Not only that, but Plato himself in the *Laws* (x 899b2) positively shouts out that all these things are gods: seasons, months and years – just like the stars and the Sun. We are introducing no sort of innovation when we say that it is worthwhile to conceive of the invisible powers that are prior to these visible things [as gods]. So much for these matters. Let us now turn in our account to the individual words and phrases. **90**

b. Lexis for Tim. *39c1–d2*

He enumerated the word **night** before the word **day** so as to convey an image (*indalma*) of the invisible and intellectual measures, for the common tradition positions night ahead of day. In any event,[359] we are accustomed to say a-night-and-a-day because among their intelligible

the god with whom one seeks σύστασις. What has been passed on are things that are συστατικὸς in as much as they are such as to bring about σύστασις. Compare Proclus' interpretation of the Myth of Er where he treats the 'signs' attached to just souls or to unjust souls in *Republic* 614c4–8 (τοὺς μὲν δικαίους κελεύειν πορεύεσθαι τὴν εἰς δεξιάν τε καὶ ἄνω διὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, σημεῖα περιάψαντας τῶν δεδικασμένων ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν) as 'letters of recommendation' to the gods above or below. Cf. *in Remp.* II 152.22–26 ἔοικεν οὖν οἷον συστατικὰ εἶναι τὰ δικαστικὰ ταῦτα σημεῖα τῶν δεδικασμένων ψυχῶν τὰ μὲν πρὸς τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, ἵνα συσταθεῖσαι παρὰ τῶν δικαστῶν τοῦ τέλους τύχωσι παρὰ τῶν ὑποδεχομένων αὐτάς.

356 Cf. above 41.5 and *in Remp.* I 16.3–8 Τὸν τέλειον ἀριθμὸν οὐ μόνον χρὴ νοεῖν ἐπὶ δακτ[ύλων τι]θέντας (οὗτος γ[άρ ἐστιν] ἀριθμητὸν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀριθμὸς καὶ τελειούμενος καὶ οὐδέποτε τέλειος, ἀεὶ γιγνόμενος), ἀλλὰ τὴν αἰτίαν τούτου νοερὰν μὲν οὖσαν, περιέχουσαν δὲ τὸν πεπερασμένον ὅρον τῆς τοῦ κόσμου πάσης περιόδου.

357 Compare Themestius, *Oration* 30. In this essay, Themistius (a) invokes Apollo alongside the gods who preside over agriculture; (b) invokes Orphic rites and ceremonies as having a bearing on agriculture; and (c) honours the Seasons.

358 Festugière takes this to be a possible allusion to evils that have resulted from the abandonment of pagan cults with the growing ascendancy of Christianity.

359 Reading γοῦν for the mss' οὖν with Festugière. Our linguistic usage can hardly be thought to follow from the word order of Plato's text. Rather, our habitual patterns encode an ancient Orphic teaching on the priority of Night over Day – a word order that, in any event, Plato's text agrees with. For the preservation of such 'ancient wisdom' in ordinary speech patterns and myths, see Boys-Stones (2001).

causes the Nights are given subsistence prior to Day. For simultaneously in the third Night itself ***.[360]

With the phrase **thus and for these reasons**, the word **thus** shows the *efficient* causes of night and day – that is, the light [of the Sun] taken together with the [motion of the sphere] of the fixed stars – while the words **for these reasons** show the *final* cause. It happens in order that a-night-and-a-day might be an obvious measure for all of the revolutions [in the heavens].

He called the revolution of the Same **a rotation that is single and maximally wise** in as much as it is uni-form (*monoeidês*) and intellectual, being most closely related to Intellect by virtue of its Rest and Sameness. [He also referred to it this way] in as much as it possesses, on the one hand, its *uni*-formity as a result of having a *single* first principle,[361] but, on the other hand, the fact that it is endowed with wisdom is a result of Intellect.[362] Its rotation, by contrast, results from its specifically psychic character.[363]

Time is posited to be **the 'wanderings' of the stars** – not because he is making the *motions* themselves time, but [he said this] because he supposes that the temporal intervals are *measures* of the motions, for the secondary kind of time[364] he posits is also the number of the visible life of each [heavenly body].

He refers to both the time specific to each of the motions, as well as the time that is common across all of them, as **extraordinary in number** for the latter has comprehended together (*syllambanein*) the diversity of the former's rotations as well as the various configurations (*schêmatismos*) [that the stars stand in].

He calls [the movements of the stars and planets] **amazingly diversified** due to their "dance" (*choreia*) and their conjunctions, their harmonised motion and the order of their return to their starting points. Such, then, are the "wanderings" of the heavens – wanderings which are generally[365] not wanderings at all since they are always complete[366] and
91 hasten toward a single goal.

[360] There is a lacuna in the text at 90.6. What originally stood there probably had some resemblance to the passage from Damascius quoted in note 351.

[361] *μονοειδὲς . . . μιᾶς ἀρχῆς*.

[362] τὸ δ' "ἔμφρον" ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ. I think Proclus intends to link the μίαν δὲ καὶ φρονιμωτάτην κύκλησιν in this lemma with the previous passage at *Tim.* 36e4–5 θείαν ἀρχὴν ἤρξατο ἀπαύστου καὶ ἔμφρονος βίου πρὸς τὸν σύμπαντα χρόνον.

[363] Soul is, of course, a principle of motion.

[364] Supra 54.10, 55.13, and 70.31.

[365] I follow Festugière in taking τὸ ὅλον as adverbial and in bracketing the following τοῦτο. Thus τοιαῦται γὰρ αἱ πλάναι τῶν οὐρανίων, ἀπλανεῖς πλάναι τὸ ὅλον [τοῦτο] ὑπάρχουσαι καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν τέλει οὖσαι καὶ πρὸς ἓν σπεύδουσαι τέλος.

[366] A reference to Aristotle's *Meteorologica* I 2, 339a25 that Proclus has made previously (I 282.21, 290.28, 290.24 and II 302.9).

6. *The Platonic Great Year*

Nonetheless it is possible to conceive that the complete number of time brings to fulfillment the complete year whenever the relative speeds of all of the eight periods, having accomplished their courses together, finish it off[367] as measured by the circle of the Same which is [going][368] in a uniform manner. (*Tim.* 39 d2–7)[369]

Following the Demiurgic generation of the spheres [of the heavens] and the procession of the seven bodies, and following their ensoulment and the order instituted among them by the Father, and after their various motions and the temporal measures of each of their periods and the differences among the completions of their cycles, the account has proceeded to the monad of time's plurality and the single number in terms of which every motion is measured – a measure by which all the other measures have been encompassed and in terms of which the entire life of the cosmos has been defined, as well as the diverse articulation of bodies and the universal lifespan (*holos bios*) that takes place across the all-perfect period. Now this number is one that must not be thought about in a manner that corresponds to opinion[370] – just successively adding ten thousands upon ten thousands – for there are people who are accustomed to speak this way. They take an accurate figure for the completion of the Moon's cycle and likewise for the Sun and multiply both; then they multiply these by the complete cycle for Mercury on top of this, and then that for Venus on top of these, and then Mars to all that, and then similarly for Jupiter and the remaining cycle for Saturn. On top of all that, they take the complete cycle for the sphere of the fixed stars and make the single and common complete cycle of the planets. Anyway, they could talk about it in this manner, if in fact the

[367] σχῇ κεφαλὴν is a bit of a mystery. It is clear enough what it must mean, but the precise derivation of the phrase is unknown. Cf. Taylor (1928), 219–20. Proclus' remarks on the phrase are brief (92.27). His interpretation, I think, sheds little light on Plato, but perhaps reveals Proclus' own systematicity.

[368] Proclus' quotation of the lemma omits the ἰόντος that is present in all the other texts: τῷ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίως ἰόντος ἀναμετρηθέντα κύκλῳ – an omission so insignficant that the OCT does not record it.

[369] The issue at hand is the infamous Platonic Great Year. We can see roughly what Plato has in mind: a period of time that corresponds to the completion of a cycle in which all the heavenly bodies return to some specific configuration. What configuration that might be is unspecified and Proclus will entertain several options. We can see that this period is to be determined by the absolute clock of the rotation of the sphere of the Same, which marks out a 24-hour period. The Platonic Great Year has proved a rich source of speculation down through the ages. Callataÿ (1996) surveys this history as well as providing an answer to the puzzle himself.

[370] The *doxastikôs* approach to this question that follows will be followed by an *epistêmonikôs* consideration of it at 92.7–93.5.

times for the completion of the cycles were prime to one another.[371] If, however, they aren't prime to one another, then they will need to take their common measure [sc. common divisor] and see how many times this number goes into each of the periods it takes for the completion of
92 a cycle. Then, taking the number of times this [divisor] goes into the smallest one, they multiply the larger number by it. Conversely, taking the number of times this [divisor] goes into the larger number, they will need to multiply the smaller number by that. By means of both of these operations of multiplication they will arrive at the same period which is common to both of the complete cycles – a period which is thus time
5 measured by both of them.[372] These are the sorts of things that people like that say.

However, it is necessary not to look simply at the univeral encosmic time in this manner alone, but rather to look at it in a scientific fashion (*epistêmonikôs*) by means of intellect and discursive reasoning. [One should] look to the one number or power with its single articulation or single perfection-conferring procession that extends to every aspect of
10 the life of the cosmos. This life proceeds toward its goal, bends back upon its origin, and converges upon itself. Due to this [activity of procession, reversion and remaining] it makes the motion [of the universe] which it measures circular.[373] Just as the monad determines the infin-
15 ity of number and anticipates the indefiniteness of the dyad, so too time measures the entirety of motion and reverts its end toward its beginning. It is for this reason that it [sc. time] has also been called a **number** that is **perfect** (or **complete**, *teleios*), for a month or a year is a number but not a *complete* one since these are *parts* of other things. However, the time that belongs to the period of the universe *is* complete because it is not a part of anything [i.e of any greater duration]. Rather, it is universal or

[371] Cf. the definition of 'prime to one another' in Euclid VII, def. 12; Theon 23.6–6 and Nicomachus I 11.1. *x* and *y* are prime to one another when 1 is their only common factor. When this is so, *xy* is the lowest common multiple of the two numbers.

[372] Callataÿ (1996) provides the following nice example. Suppose two bodies A and B whose complete cycles take 12 years and 30 years respectively. They will certainly complete their periods together in 360 years. Is there any shorter time that will result in their return to their starting point simultaneously? Yes, since these are not prime to one another. The greatest common divisor of both 12 and 30 is 6. The number by which 6 must be multiplied to get 12 is 2. Multiply the larger of the pair, 30, by 2. This yields 60. Similarly, 6 into 30 yields 5. Multiply the lesser number, 12, by 5 and the result is 60. Thus 60 is the lowest common multiple of both numbers and the shortest period of time for both to be aligned again against the backdrop of the fixed stars. Within this 60 years, A will have completed 5 revolutions, while B will have completed only 2.

[373] The three moments of procession, reversion and remaining have an analogue in the circular shape. Cf. *in Tim.* II 248.15–18.

total (*holos*) in order that it may imitate Eternity. The latter is indeed wholeness in the primary manner, but the one which conveys its entire wholeness simultaneously to things that are. But time does so in conjunction with duration, for temporal wholeness is the articulation of the wholeness which remains in a concentrated form in Eternity.[374] Therefore universal encosmic time measures the single life of the universe in accordance with which all the things that possess a speed **accomplish their courses together**, whether these speeds belong to the circles in the heavens or to those in the sub-lunary realm – for there are periods and completed cycles among these things [down here] too – since these things [that have a speed] have a head (*kephalê*) in the motion of the Same.[375] It happens this way because they are led back to this starting point (*archê*), since it [sc. the motion of the circle of the Same] is doubtless the simplest one of all. After all, the complete cycles are considered in relation to the signs [of the Zodiac] that it possesses. For instance, when everything has made a complete circuit back around to the sign for the equinox. Or to the sign for the summer solstice. Or – even if the joint completion of the cycle were not conceived in terms of coming back to the same [sign], but rather in relation to the same [sign] rising or being in the meridian – every [planet] nonetheless has some sort of **93** configuration in relation to this same thing, for even now, the present order of everything is, in a general way, a kind of completion of a cycle – not to the same sign, but instead in relation to the same apparent 'global astral situation'.[376] At some point this may have taken place around the same thing and in accordance with one individual sign so that if it were to occur once again, the entirety of time will come to its end.[377] It seems that one specific completion of a cycle is recorded because they [sc. the

374 ἀνέλιξις γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ὁλότης ἡ χρονικὴ τῆς ἐν ἐκείνῳ συνεσπειραμένως μενούσης ὁλότητος. συνεσπειραμένον seems to be something of a Platonic term of art that conveys the higher degree of unity of a thing corresponding to its mode of being in higher causes. Cf. Thrasyllus ap Porphyry, *Commentary on Ptolemy's Harmonics* 12.21–8 (Düring) = Tarrant (1993), T23.

375 ἔχοντα κεφαλὴν τὴν ταὐτοῦ φοράν; cf. Plato, *Tim.* 39d5–6 σχῇ κεφαλήν. This is not merely the idea that lower manifestations of a thing (like fire) have a highest form (*akrotês*) in the heavens; cf. *in Tim.* II 43.22–45.5. Instead, I think Proclus relies on the idea that the highest kind of time which measures the motions of the subordinate cycles exists in the temporal wholeness (92.22–3) vested in the sphere of the fixed stars and its motion in particular. This is an *akrotês* of encosmic time, but one that is also a *whole*, which is to say a head. For the equation of *kephalês* with *holos*, see *in Tim.* I 358.1–4.

376 πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς συσχηματίσεως ὁρωμένης; a term used in astrology, cf. *in Remp.* II 318.26

377 Callataÿ (1996), 113 notes that at this point Proclus' attention shifts toward astrology and toward Egyptian astrology in particular. The Year of the Dog is the Sothic cycle. This is a period of 1,461 natural years that brings the heliacal rising of Sothis or

astrologers] also say that Cancer is the horoscope of the cosmos[378] and they call this year 'the Dog Year', because among the fixed stars, the brilliant Dog Star rises together with Cancer. Therefore, if these stars come together again in the same sign of Cancer, this will be the single period itself of the universe. But if, after a complete cycle has come about in Cancer, another cycle takes place with respect to the equinox, this will not be the period itself (for it has not gone from the same condition to the same condition). However, [it will be such a period] if it goes from the equinox to the equinox, or from the summer solstice to the summer solstice, and this number will be equal to that one and this time to that one, since the period for each of them [to take place] is a single thing determined quantitatively through the arrangement (*taxis*) of the things that are moved. These are the things that concern the unit (*hen*) of time that measures all the corporeal motions, in the same manner in which time[379] measures the psychic motions, and as Eternity measures the intellectual lives. It is also clear from what has been said both what this is and from whence it has been established, as well as what sort of completion it supplies for the universe. Except that it must be added to what has been said that this perfect number [in the *Timaeus*] must be thought to differ from the one mentioned in the *Republic* [VIII 546b3] which 'encompasses the period' for divine begettings.[380] The former is

Sirius into alignment with the first day of Thoth, i.e. the first day of the Egyptian civil calendar. The Egyptian civil calendar uses 365 days per year with no provision for intercalary days.

[378] The horoscope of the universe or the *thema mundi* is discussed in Firmicus *Mathesis* 3.1 and Macrobius *in Somnium* 1.21.23–7, though there is a reference to such an idea as early as Thrasyllus. See Bouché-Leclercq (1899), 182–92 for discussion.

[379] Reading χρόνος with A for κόσμος at line 19. The analogy is unit of time (i.e. Great Year) : corporeal motions :: time itself : psychic motions :: Eternity : intellectual lives.

[380] The reference is to the notoriously obscure 'Perfect Number' of the *Republic* which determines, *inter alia*, the right times for the Guardians of the Kallipolis to have marriages. Proclus' collection of essays on the *Republic* includes an 80-page discussion of the 'speech of the Muses'. This passage which discusses the relation between these numbers is the key that Callataÿ (1996), 12–15 argues unlocks the identity of the Great Year, for this passage shows that the *Timaean* Perfect Year is a factor of the *Republic*'s Perfect Number. At this point, Proclus suggests that the *apokatastasis* of the *visible* heavenly bodies is only one *part* – a season as it were – in the life-cycle of the cosmos. The *Republic*'s Perfect Number is the measure of that life-cyle. The value that modern scholarship assigns to the Perfect Number is 25,920,000. Cf. Adam (1902), vol. 2, 265–312 and Diès (1936). Callataÿ assumes that the Perfect Year is one factor and searches for a second factor, which he finds in the 1,000-year intervals of reincarnation in *Phaedrus* 249a–b and *Republic* 614e–615a and 621d. If this is right, and if the Perfect Number is a square, then the length of the Platonic Great Year is 25,920. Yet if Callataÿ finds the necessary clue to unlock this puzzle in Proclus, it is not the case that Proclus himself has seen this.

more partial [than the one in *Republic*] and is such as to bring about the completion only of the cycles of the eight [heavenly bodies]. The other one, however, is such as to include the individual movements among the fixed [stars] as well as the motions that take place in all of the things in motion in the heavens *simpliciter* – whether they be visible or invisible, whether they belong to the race of gods or to those that come after the gods. It also includes the longer or shorter periods of fertility and infertility in the sub-lunary realm. Consequently [this number] also has **94** authority over (*kyrios*) the period of the human race.

7. *Conclusion of the discussion of time*

In this way, then, and for the sake of these things such among the stars as have turnings as they undertake their journeys through the heavens have been engendered; in order that this [cosmos] might be as similar as possible to the perfect and intelligible Living Being with respect to the imitation of its eternal nature. Up to the genesis of time, the other [features of the cosmos] had already been fashioned so as to resemble that which they represent. (*Tim.* 39d7–e4)

It is obvious through what was said beforehand that the cosmos has become more perfect due to the genesis of time (since it has imitated All-perfect Living Being with respect to its eternity) and also that the genesis was established due to the motion of the seven Rulers of the Cosmos [sc. the planets] (for the variety with respect to genesis that was exhibited results from this). Nonetheless, there remains this [point] among the topics concerning time according to Plato that it is worthwhile to grasp: that it has proceeded in a way analogous to the soul since it is simultaneously eternal and generated, just as the soul is both among the things that always are (*ta aei onta*) and the best of the things that have come to be.[381] In the same way, time too is both eternal and generated – [the latter] to the extent that it has been mixed together with souls and bodies and to the extent that it proceeds and runs through all of the secondary beings, since it is also a number that progresses and a circle, but it [time] is also a monad *per se* and a centre. For the Demiurge has introduced this sort of intermediate [stage] between things that are motionless and those that are in motion by virtue of similarity to himself (after all, the Demiurge too is an intermediary between the gods that remain and those that proceed) as well as by virtue of the fact that it is a representation in relation to the paradigm. This is because this too

[381] See Proclus' interpretation of *Tim.* 37a1–2 ([soul is] τῶν νοητῶν ἀεί τε ὄντων ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀρίστη γενομένη τῶν γεννηθέντων) at II 293.2, ff. Proclus construes this sentence in such a way that the soul is both an intelligible that always exists and also something generated. Time will now be given a parallel treatment.

[sc. the Paradigm or Living Being Itself] is surely an intermediate [stage] between intelligible and intellectual beings, as well between Eternity and number, and between the eternal gods and the everlasting ones. While it participates in eternity, it does so in the primary mode and is a monad of [the subsequent] intelligible Living Beings. It is doubtless through these things that the cosmos has been made to represent its paradigm perfectly, since it has come to be everlasting throughout all time. For just as the former [paradigm] has received the whole gift of eternity (for **95** everything that has a share in something in the primary manner shares in the whole of its gift), so too the cosmos doubtless lives through the entirety of time and lives in accordance with the whole of the perfect number. This is surely the reason why it is everlasting, for anything that is able to endure the entire unfolding of time is indestructible, but time in its entirety (*holos chronos*) is the perfect number for the return of everything to its starting point (*apokatastasis tou pantou*), as has been frequently noted.

Furthermore, one may also infer this fact from what was previously said: that it is necessary to suppose that Plato took time to be something importantly different from what the Stoics or many of the Peripatetics took it to be. The former regard it as subsisting merely in accordance with thought, something feeble and close to Not-Being (for time was one among the incorporeal things according to them – things which were of course disdained by them as lacking causal efficacy (*adranês*) and as not beings (*ouk onta*) which subsist merely in thought).[382] The Peripatetics, on the other hand, say that time is an accident (*symbebêkos*) of motion. But what sort of motion [is time an accident of]? [Only] of continuous motions?[383] But time is everywhere, while the motion is in the things that are being moved. Or rather is it [an accident] of all [kinds of motion]? Well then the times will be many. Or is [time] some sort of monad for them? But how is this the numerable aspect (*to arithmêton*) of motion? After all, since it consists in a relation, time will belong among the class of relatives, and when there is no numbering going on, there will be no time.[384] Since Plato regarded all these [consequences] as unworthy of

[382] = *SVF* 2.521 and Long and Sedley (1987) 51F. See also *SVF* 2.331 = Sextus, *M.* 10.215. The Stoics rank time among the incorporeals. As such, time does not cause things. Proclus, of course, finds this view very implausible since he thinks that time is among the most influential causes within the visible cosmos.

[383] πότερον τῆς συνεχοῦς; The question ἀλλὰ πάσης; supplies the alternative yielding, in effect πότερον τῆς συνεχοῦς ἢ πάσης; But since the class of continuous motions is a subset of all motions, we do not have mutually exclusive alternatives. Hence one must, as Festugière rightly insists, understand 'only'.

[384] καὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦντος οὐκ ὄντος οὐδὲ ὁ χρόνος ἔσται. I think this must be the point of the argument. See above at 9.26–8 where Proclus infers that Aristotle's defintion of time

holding a place in the theory of time, he established time from on high, [beginning] from the intelligible and intellectual gods, as a hypercosmic intellect that contains the entire psychic life, measures the psychic and corporeal periods, and brings to completion their motion since [these motions] proceed in [temporal] extension. Then from this monad [in the intelligible and intellectual gods] he established the various times in accordance with the triad[385] and the heptad [seven].[386] He introduces all these in connection with the one time that measures the single life of the universe, and affords to time such great value and the kind of power which results in making the cosmos more similar to the paradigm due to time. It is for the sake of the genesis of this [time] that the Sun and the other Rulers of the Cosmos have been engendered in as much as [these heavenly bodies] summon invisible time to make itself manifest, dividing and distinguishing it whilst unfolding it always in the same manner.

Since he says that the wandering stars that **travel through the heavens** have **turnings**, let us stop to consider whether he thinks that the motion that belongs to them is complex and involves motion around their own centres as well as motion with respect to longitude, latitude or distance [from the Earth] when they undergo their turning through the heavens – that is, whether this is something that happens due to their own spheres, things which are parts of the heavens that essentially compose the entire heaven.[387] After all, he did not say that they are carried '*in* the heavens', as if they were [merely] occupying the same place, but instead he said they are carried '*through* the heavens', as if – in addition to always being carried about their own centres – they are moved through the arches and generally moved in respect of place in order that there might be some sort of mixed motion. Surely there is a parallel with the intermediates between the motions of the fixed stars which always occupy the same place and those of the things in the sub-lunary realm which do not get moved around some middle point. Thus it is already obvious that according to him all the spheres are homocentric and that all have the same centre, but the apparent irregularity of the motions with respect to these seven [planets] comes about due to their reversal (*tropê*) which alters the motion in various ways – adding to them, or substracting from them, or exhibiting progression or retrogradation, or coming in closer

96

makes time's existence depend upon a soul that enumerates the countable aspects of change.

[385] See above 57.28–34. The triad in question is the motion of the Same, the Different, and that which conveys its rotation into the realm of genesis.

[386] i.e. the seven planets or Rulers of the Cosmos.

[387] συμπληροῦσαι τὸν ὅλον οὐρανόν. The verb here does not mean merely 'to fill up' but that the parts that make up this whole are essential to it; cf. *in Tim.* II 62.16–25. On wholes and symplêrôtic parts generally, see Baltzly (2008).

proximity to the Earth. [All this takes place] without the artificial contrivance of epicycles,[388] for Plato has nowhere mentioned any such thing and nature demands in every case that there be an intermediate [stage]. The intermediate [stage] between what is entirely regular and orderly, on the one hand, and what is irregular and disorderly, on the other, is that which is irregular but also orderly. The form of motion had by the planets is surely an example, since it compensates for the irregularity of speed or slowness and the turning [of the planets] this way or the opposite way by the fact that this happens in accordance with a specific order that is always the same. If some people have made use of some sort of epicycles or eccentrics, positing regular motions in order that they might discover the numbers of the motions arising from their combination – some of which are the epicycles or the eccentrics undergoing motion, some of which are the stars on top of these – well, this is a noble thought and one that is fitting to rational souls, but as far as the nature of wholes (which only Plato apprehended) is concerned, it misses the mark badly.

III. THE TENTH GIFT OF THE DEMIURGE: THE COSMOS IS FILLED WITH ALL THE KINDS OF LIVING BEING

A. Introduction, *Tim.* 39e4–6

But with respect to the fact that[389] it did not yet contain all the living beings that have been generated within it, so far it was still dissimilar. Wherefore, of course, he completed what still remained, impressing upon it the nature of the paradigm. (*Tim.* 39e4–6)

It is clear that since he is always assimilating the cosmos to the Living Being Itself, Plato simultaneously has made mention of this three times: making this universe one of a kind (*monogenes*, 31b3), finishing it off with eternity (37d3–9), and rendering it all-perfect (*pantelês*, 37d4). And plausibly so, for the Living Being Itself is characterised by these three things – by being one of a kind, eternal, and all-perfect. Since it has been ranked in the third order among the intelligibles,[390] it has the property of being one of a kind as a result of the first [order] (in accordance with

[388] Another example where Proclus sides with Iamblichus in rejecting the hypotheses of the astronomers. See above 65.7.

[389] Manuscripts Q and D of Proclus agree with the A and F manuscripts of Plato in reading τὸ δὲ rather than τῷ δὲ. Diehl prints the latter, while Festugière adopts the former. I follow Festugière and treat τὸ δὲ in the manner of Taylor (1928), 221, as an adverbial accusative.

[390] Cf. *in Tim.* 1 419.16–19. *Plat. Theol.* III 52.20–55.7 makes clear that this positioning of the Living Being Itself within the intelligible order is due to Syrianus.

which there is the One-Being), while it has the property of being eternal as a result of the second (in accordance with which there is Eternity), but it has the property of being all-perfect as a result of itself. It is necessary and not a digression to see what this property of being all-perfect consists in.[391]

Now since wholeness is triple, as we have frequently noted, and originates from on high among the intelligibles themselves, and since this cosmos is an image of the finest of the intelligibles, it was also necessary that it be established in accordance with each one of the kinds of wholeness – first, in accordance with that which is before the parts; second, in accordance with that which is composed of the parts; and for the same reason with respect to the remaining one.[392] Now the Demiurge himself has already ordered [the cosmos] in terms of the first form of wholeness, for the first thing that it has become is 'a living being endowed with soul and intellect' (*Tim.* 30b8), since when that which was moved in a discordant and disorderly fashion was arranged and received order, then soul, intellect and divine unification supervened.[393] As the dialogue goes on, he then gave the second kind of wholeness – that from the parts – to it when the double revolutions [of the circles in the World Soul] were set up, and the elements [in the world's body] were bound together by proportion, as well as when the circles of the soul were arranged in terms of the monad, the triad, the tetrad and the heptad, for the universe is composed out of all of these things as parts.[394] In fact, these things are essential constituents[395] of the universe as the universe. Again, in the

[391] δεῖ μὴ παρέργως ἰδεῖν. If we take παρέργως to directly modify the infinitive, then it would be right to translate as Festugière does 'il faut le considérer de façon non superficielle'. But the nearly two pages of commentary on this lemma actually have very little to say about the lemma directly. So I think the point is not that one must avoid investigating τὸ παντελής in a superficial manner. Rather, the point is that this investigation, despite appearances to the contrary, is not incidental or secondary to the business at hand. Cf. I 1.16 where we will look at the reasons for the differences between the content of Timaeus of Locris' work and Plato's μὴ παρέργως. This doesn't mean we are going to treat this superficially, but rather that this task isn't a digression from the business of understanding Plato.

[392] For the three kinds of wholeness, see *ET* propositions 67–69; *Plat. Theol.* III 88.16 and 94.24.

[393] ψυχῆς δὲ ἐπιγενομένης καὶ νοῦ καὶ θείας ἑνώσεως. This is a case of wholeness prior to the parts because these features supervene upon the arrangement – they are not constituted by it. They are prior. Compare *in Parm.* 826.37–827.1 where certain qualities which supervene upon bodies (τὰ ἐπιγιγνόμενα τοῖς σώμασι) come about by virtue of rational-forming principles since the mixture of these bodies is not sufficient for them.

[394] Cf. II 270.3–271.15. These are examples of a wholeness ἐκ τῶν μερῶν because the unifing bond of proportion is *in* the things that are so bound by the proportion; cf. II 18.25.

[395] τοῦ παντὸς ὡς παντός ἐστι συμπληρωτικά. See above note 387.

words at hand he gives the third form of wholeness to it, for it is necessary for each part of it to become a whole or for each part to have all things in a manner that is appropriate to itself,[396] so while the heaven
98 [has all things] in a celestial manner, the air [has them] in an aerial manner, and the Earth terrestrially. This is the whole in the part, and it is through [exhibiting] this [kind of wholeness] that what includes all the living beings [sc. the cosmos] is assimilated to a greater degree to the paradigm [sc. the Living Being Itself]. After all, this [paradigm] is the monad and number, and it is necessary for the cosmos too to
5 have all the living beings in it in order that it might thoroughly come to bear the closest resemblance to the paradigm's totality – not merely assuming the constituent wholes that belong to the cosmos, or that it is a whole that has been established from wholes (*Tim*. 33a7), but assuming as well the particular living things through which all the parts of the uni-
10 verse have been essentially constituted, including within itself all the orders [of living things], both the divine and daemonic as well as the mortal, for the assimilation of the universe to the Living Being Itself would become more perfect in this way. This is the tenth gift of the Demiurge [II 5.29] to the cosmos and the greatest one of all. This is not to say that the Demiurge led the cosmos from a [condition of] dissimi-
15 larity to [one of] similarity in relation to the intelligible [Living Being]. (If this were the case, then what is imperfect would come prior to what is perfect in terms of the Demiurgic production.) Rather it is the order [of presentation in the dialogue] that provides a sequence among forms and gives what is precedent in a causal-preparatory way authority over the granting of secondary and tertiary goods. [It works this way] in order that
20 the cosmos might be imprinted to the greatest extent possible with all the deployments of the intelligible forms.[397] Therefore, since the paradigm

[396] δεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἑκάστην αὐτοῦ μοῖραν ὅλην γενέσθαι καὶ πάντα σχεῖν ἑαυτῇ οἰκείως. The καὶ I think is epexegetical. For all things to be in each in accordance with the subject's nature is just what it is for each part of the cosmos to become a whole. Each of the elements, for instance, exists in the heavens, but in a different manner or mode from the way in which it exists here. See above II 44.7–25 as well as *ET* 103 and the comments of Dodds *ad loc* about the origins and pervasiveness of the principle πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, οἰκείως δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ.

[397] 'Deployments' is Festugière's translation of τοὺς ἐξελιγμοὺς τῶν νοητῶν εἰδῶν. The term has both an astronomical and a military sense. In the former, it appears synonmyous with ἀποκατάστασις, while in its military sense it means 'counter-march'. The term is used three times in the surviving works of Proclus (*in Tim*. III 191.11 and 14). In the latter instances, as here, there is some notion that we are dealing with the final stages of the unfolding of general forms to particular instances: ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ταῦτα εἴδη γενόμενα καὶ τελεσιουργηθέντα πολυειδῶς ἀνελίττεται κατὰ παντοίους ἐξελιγμοὺς . . . τὸν ἐξελιγμὸν τῶν εἰδῶν. Our military sources distinguish various kinds of counter-march. You execute a counter-march when you need to turn your

was monadic and such as to include all of the *intelligible* living beings, it is also necessary for the cosmos to be not merely one of a kind (31b3), and a whole composed of wholes (33a7), but also such as to include all of the *sensible* kinds of living beings.

B. The Living Being Itself, *Tim.* 39e7–9

Therefore, in as much as intellect saw that 'that which Living Being is' (*ho esti zôon*) had forms present to it, being such in number and kind, he thought it necessary for this [universe] too to have such things. (*Tim.* 39e7–9)[398]

1. General interpretation

So here then begins the account of the 'zoo-ogony' that supplies all the parts of the universe with the appropriate genesis of living things and **99**
regulates all the kinds by their appropriate numbers, producing all the numbers [of the species of living being] by virtue of the maximal similarity with the paradigm. By virtue of this creation, the third [kind of wholeness (97.17–19)] comes to the cosmos, since the parts are [here] interwoven with the whole, the numbers to their monads, thus making each part of the universe an order (*cosmos*), a whole in the parts, and everything.[399] This too has been allotted to the cosmos in accordance with its assimilation to the Living Being Itself because the latter, of course, is also a monad that is wholly-complete (*holotelês*) and a number; an all-perfect (*panteleios*) intelligible intellect and a plenum (*plêrôma*) of intelligible causes – causes which it generated and which remain throughout eternity within it. After all, there is one plurality that remains in the causes, while there is another that proceeds and gets

military formation to face an enemy behind you. The simple command 'about turn!' would leave the leader of the file in the formation at the rear of the men he is supposed to be leading. In one version of the counter-march – the Laconian – the man in back turns around and stands his ground while the file leader leads the men past him to take up a new position in advance of where the last man is standing. In the Macedonian counter-march, the file leader turns in place while the file reforms in a position behind him. This, of course, gives one's enemy the appearance that you are falling back in retreat. In a Persian counter-march, the files divide into two and exchange places so that the formation remains in the same place. At least the first two kinds of counter-march provide some vague symbolic expression of the circulation in the procession–reversion–remaining triad.

398 Proclus' quotation of the lemma differs slightly from the text of Plato. The OCT has ἥπερ οὖν νοῦς ἐνούσας ἰδέας τῷ ὃ ἔστιν ζῷον, οἵαί τε ἔνεισι καὶ ὅσαι, καθορᾷ, τοιαύτας καὶ τοσαύτας διενοήθη δεῖν καὶ τόδε σχεῖν. Proclus omits ἔνεισι and τοιαύτας.

399 This third sort of wholeness καὶ ἑκάστην μοῖραν τοῦ παντὸς κόσμον ποιοῦσα καὶ ὅλον τὸ ἐν μέρει καὶ πᾶν. To be made πᾶν here means to be made to have all (in the appopriate manner) as above at 97.32: πάντα σχεῖν ἑαυτῇ οἰκείως.

divided,[400] since the Demiurge himself established some genera of gods within himself, while others he brings forth from himself into secondary things and tertiary orders. This being's father likewise produces different causes of creation – the paradigmatic ones that remain in him on the one hand, and the causes that are themselves positioned before the wholes on the other.[401] Grandfather Ouranos retains some [gods] in himself, while to others he provides a separation.[402] The Theologians also show these things by their use of mystical names – for instance when they say 'concealing' or 'ingestion' or when they say [one god] finds 'nurture in the thigh' [of another].[403] *A fortiori*, prior to these [gods] the intelligible intellect – the Father of wholes – engenders and reveals some of the causes in there [i.e. in himself], while others he brings forth from himself and places them in authority over the orders of gods who subsequently come after him. While the former are uni-form, universal and all-perfect since he retains them within his own comprehension (*periochê*),[404] the others are made plural and divided due to Difference since he brings them forth into different orders. Now since the paternal order in general establishes [its effects] in this manner, it is also quite plausible that this cosmos too – since it is an imitation of intelligible orders and dependent upon them – possesses one kind of totality (*pantotês*)[405] that is prior to the particular living beings as well as another kind of totality that is essentially constituted from this. It is receptive of the second kind along with the first in order that it might be as similar as possible

[400] Festugière suggests repunctuating so as to replace the full stop after μεριζόμενον in line 12 with a comma. The following illustration about the effects and causes that remain and those that go forth provides an argument by analogy for the parallel behaviour of the pluralities, some of which go forth and some of which remain in their causes.

[401] This presumably is Kronos who is the summit of the intellectual order of gods, while Zeus or the Demiurge is below him. Cf. *Plat. Theol.* v 15.15–24.

[402] Presumably Proclus has in mind Hesiod's *Theogony* 147–60 where Ouranos hides Kottos, Briareos and Gyes away whilst the other offspring of Heaven and Earth enjoy a separate existence.

[403] Proclus has already provided his allegorical reading of episodes in the Orphic poems where one god ingests another at II 93.16–19 above. For the theme of divine ingestion generally in the Orphica, see note 296 in volume III of this series. It is of course Dionysius who is hidden and nourished in the thigh of Zeus; cf. Euripides *Bacch.* 286 and the Orphic *Hymns* (Quandt) 48.3, 52.3.

[404] The sense of 'comprehension' here is not the mental one of an act of understanding, but rather the metaphysical notion of inclusion in which Eternity is a 'single comprehension of the intelligible henads'. Cf. 12.17 above.

[405] Totality is a notion closely linked to, but nonetheless conceptually distinct from, wholeness. At *in Tim.* II 61.26, Proclus claims that the universe is assimilated to intellectual wholeness and to intellgible totality by being 'as whole as possible' and 'complete and made of complete parts' (*Tim.* 32c8–9).

to its Demiurgic cause and to its paradigmatic cause. So much for this [subject] then. 100

2. *Lexis: what does the phrase ὅ ἐστι ζῷον mean?*

a. Proclus' explanation

The words **that which Living Being is** have been explained and earlier we gave our view, at least, of what it is.[406] Let it now be said in addition that, with respect to the intelligible realm, there is first the *summit* which is unified and hidden, then the *power* that belongs to it which simultaneously proceeds and remains, and then the *self-manifestation* through its activity which shows the plurality – the intelligible plurality, that is – in it. Of these [three] the first is intelligible Being, while the second is intelligible Life, and the third is intelligible Intellect. However, it is not possible that Being Itself is the most primary Living Being Itself, for up there [at the level of Being Itself] there is no plurality nor a tetrad of forms.[407] Rather, this was referred to by Plato as the One-Being[408] as a result of its singularity and its inexpressible unification (*aphrastos henôsis*). While the Living Being Itself is said to participate in a total manner in Eternity, the One-Being does not participate in anything, unless one were to say that it participates in the One – which is itself [an argumentative move] that deserves to be stopped in its tracks, for perhaps while that which is above it is superior even to this sort of reference, nonetheless it *is* in the primary mode what it *is not* such as to be through participation.[409] Therefore the Living Being Itself is not able to be identical with Being Itself on account of the reasons just given. Nor can it be identical to the intelligible Life, for that which is a living being (*zôion*) is secondary to life (*zôê*) and is said to be a *living* being in virtue of the participation in life. In general, if the Living Being Itself were second,

[406] Proclus refers to the discussion of the nature of the Paradigm at I 321.24–325.12. Diehl's textual reference to I 306.1 refers instead to the discussion of who the Demiurge is.

[407] The four genera – celestial, aerial, aquatic and terrestrial – must be somehow intrinsically inherent in Living Being, while Being Itself is not intrinsically differentiated into all the ways in which things are or exist.

[408] That is, the subject of the second hypothesis of the *Parmenides* at 142b, ff.

[409] This parallels Proclus' argument at I 433.26–30. In spite of the fact that the Intelligible Living Being is the last term among the intelligible order, it can still be 'the most beautiful of the intelligible things' (*Tim.* 30d2). This does not require us to deny that the other intelligibles are beautiful nor to say that they are less beautiful than the Intelligible Living Being. They are simply beautiful in a different mode of being – not through *participation* in Beauty, but rather by themselves being the cause through which other things are beautiful: οὐ γὰρ μετέχουσι τοῦ κάλλους, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐταῖς ἐστιν ἡ καλλοποιὸς αἰτία καὶ τὸ πρώτιστον κάλλος καὶ ἡ καλλονή (I 433.29–31).

then Eternity would be [identical to] Being.[410] But this is impossible, for the One-Being is one thing, but Eternity is another. The former is the monad of Being, while the latter is the dyad after Being since it has an 'always' in combination with it.[411] The first one is what causes every thing *to be*, while the second is what causes things to be *permanently*. So
25 if Living Being Itself is neither identical with the One-Being nor that which comes after it (for this is Eternity, the intelligible power and the infinite life and the wholeness itself in terms of which each of the things that are divine is simultaneously also the whole) it remains of necessity that the Living Being is third. For it is also necessary for the Living Being Itself to be in some sense an intellect – if in fact its image [i.e. the cosmos] is inevitably [apprehended] together with sense perception and
30 if perception is [in turn] an image of intellect.[412] As a result, that which is intellect in the primary mode (*prôtôs*) has in it that which is Living Being in the primary mode. Consequently, if it is secondary to Life, of necessity he has established it in accordance with an intelligible intellect, for since it is an *intelligible* living being – as he said, 'the most beautiful of
101 the objects of thought' (*Tim.* 30d2) – it would also have this status (*taxis*) of being one of a kind (*monogenes*), for everything that comes after this form [sc. the one that is one-of-a-kind] is produced together with other things and falls short of the intelligible totality (*pantotês*).

b. The agreement of Plato and Orpheus[413]

The Living Being Itself, therefore, is an intelligible intellect (*noêtos nous*) which, since it includes within itself the intellectual orders (*diakosmêsis*)

[410] At 10.8–11.19 Proclus argues that Eternity is prior to the Living Being Itself. So if it were second after Being, then given the superiority of Eternity to the Living Being, Eternity and Being would have to coincide.

[411] The argument relies on seeing Eternity (*aiôn*) as being *aei on* (always being).

[412] εἴπερ καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν αὐτοῦ πάντως μετ' αἰσθήσεως, νοῦ δὲ εἰκὼν ἡ αἴσθησις. It is obviously necessary to understand this in the context of *Timaeus* 28a1–2, 28c1 or 52a7 where it is clear that the sensible realm is *grasped* μετ' αἰσθήσεως. On the sense in which perception is an image of *noêsis* in Proclus, see Lautner (2006) and Baltzly (2009).

[413] The previous section rehearses some of the reasoning from Book 1 of Proclus' commentary with respect to the identity of the Living Being itself. But it does not clarify its rank in relation to the Demiurge as 1 323.20 does. There Proclus concludes that the Paradigm is both prior to the Demiurge in the intelligible mode of being (*noêtôs*) but in him in the intellectual mode of being (*noêros*). This conclusion is immediately followed by a harmonisation of Plato with Orpheus (1 323.22–325.11). There is yet another discussion of the identity of the *Autozôon* with Phanes at 1 427.6–430.18. Here too, following the review of what the Living Being itself is, Proclus turns to Orpheus and again struggles with the Paradigm's relation to the Demiurge as revealed by the Theologian.

of gods, is such as to bring them together, make them one, and bring about their perfection.[414] On the one hand, since it is the limit, it is the most beautiful of the things that are intelligible (*noêtos*), but on the other hand, it also reveals to intellectual (*noêros*) beings the intelligibles' unified and unknowable (*agnôstos*) causes, and while it motivates itself in relation to forms (*idea*) and various powers, it also produces all the secondary orders of gods.[415] This is doubtless why Orpheus referred to this god as 'Phanes' in as much as [the Living Being Itself] reveals (*ek-phainein*) the intelligible henads and he [Orpheus] entrusted to him [Phanes] the role of making the forms (*morphê*) for living things, since the primary cause of intelligible living things is revealed in him. He also entrusted him with pluri-form forms[416] in as much as he includes the intelligible forms in a primary manner. In the saying '*klêida noou*', he calls him the key of the intellect because of the fact that he limits the entire intelligible substance and sustains intellectual life.[417]

[414] ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ αὐτοζῷον νοῦς νοητός, περιέχων τὰς νοερὰς διακοσμήσεις τῶν θεῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ συναγωγὸς αὐτῶν καὶ ἑνοποιὸς καὶ τελεσιουργός. The masculine adjectives require that it is the νοῦς that is being described here, not the orders of gods included within it. This passage then looks slightly different from Proclus' earlier account of the Living Being in which it includes orders of gods that have similar functions. Cf. *in Tim.* I 428.22–24 ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰς τῶν δευτέρων τάξεων αἰτίας προείληφε, ποιητικῶν, συνοχικῶν, ἀρχικῶν, τελεσιουργῶν, ἀτρέπτων.

[415] This claim seems intended to pave the way for the alignment of the αὐτοζῷον with the Orphic Phanes in the next sentence. In that further elucidation, Phanes ἐκφαίνοντα τὰς νοητὰς ἑνάδας and it is probably in anticipation of the introduction of henads that in the present sentence we have the Living Being Itself τὴν δὲ ἡνωμένην αὐτῶν καὶ ἄγνωστον αἰτίαν ἐκφαίνων τοῖς νοεροῖς. The present sentence also has the αὐτοζῷον motivating itself and producing as well as revealing: ἐγείρων μὲν ἑαυτὸν πρὸς ἰδέας καὶ δυνάμεις παντοίας, παράγων δὲ πάσας τὰς δευτέρας τάξεις τῶν θεῶν. There seems to be a parallel double activity on the part of Phanes in the next sentence: καὶ ζῴων αὐτῷ μορφὰς ἀνέθηκεν ὡς ἐν αὐτῷ τῆς πρώτης αἰτίας τῶν νοητῶν ζῴων ἐκφανείσης καὶ ἰδέας πολυειδεῖς ὡς τῶν νοητῶν ἰδεῶν πρώτως περιληπτικῷ. (I take both ζῴων αὐτῷ μορφὰς and ἰδέας πολυειδεῖς to be governed by ἀνέθηκεν while the parallel ὡς clauses provide the reasons why Phanes has these two functions assigned to him. The reason for the dative περιληπτικῷ remains a mystery to me.) I suppose that there is a sense in which the first pair of functions is internal (motiving itself or revealing what is in itself) while the second is directed to what lies below the αὐτοζῷον – Phanes. This is clear enough in the case of παράγων τὰς δευτέρας τάξεις but less so in the case of ἰδέας πολυειδεῖς.

This is in fact the second time that Proclus argues for the identity of the Orphic Phanes and the Living Being itself. See *in Tim.* I 427.6–430.18. It is not easy to make every aspect of the two discussions align perfectly. Perhaps we should expect some flexibility at those points where Proclus seeks to conjoin one theology to another.

[416] ἰδέας πολυειδεῖς – perhaps an allusion to the *Tim.* 39e7, ᾗπερ οὖν νοῦς ἐνούσας ἰδέας τῷ ὃ ἔστιν ζῷον.

[417] Kern includes *in Tim.* III 101.9–102.5 in fr. 82 of *Orphicorum Fragmenta* along with *in Tim.* II 85.23–31 since both include the verse 'Cherishing by his breast swift, eyeless Love'. The phrase 'key of the intellect' is nowhere else attested for the Orphic

Now it is upon a god of this degree that the Demiurge of the universe is dependent. While he is himself an intellect, as we said earlier,[418] he is nonetheless an intellectual intellect (*noeros nous*) in as much as he is especially responsible for intellect. It is also for this reason that he is said to look to the Living Being Itself, for *looking* is the distinctive characteristic of *intellectual* gods since of course the Theologian has referred to the *intelligible* intellect as *eyeless*. In any case, he says the following about it [sc. the Living Being Itself]:

Cherishing by his breast swift, eyeless Love (*Orph.* fr. 82, Kern)

For even its product is intelligible.[419] Now since the Demiurge is intellect, he does not belong among the things that are participated in order that he might be the maker of wholes and able to look to the Living Being Itself. But since he is unparticipated, he is a genuinely intellectual intellect, and while it is due to the simplicity of his cognition (*noêsis*) that he is united together with the intelligible, it is due to the fact that it is varied that he sets about the production of secondary [effects]. The dialogue[420]

poems. However, Proclus calls Hecate, who also features prominently in the *Chaldean Oracles*, 'the key *holder* of the cosmos': *in Remp.* II 121.8–10 = *Orph.* fr. 316 καὶ τὴν μεγίστην θεὸν Ἑκάτην τὰ πέρατα τῶν ἐγκοσμίων συγκλείουσαν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κληδοῦχον ἀποκαλουμένην. Johnston (1990) 39–48 examines this role for Hecate and concludes that it is part of her general characterisation as a liminal goddess who presides over boundaries between realms. In the case of Hecate, this will presumably be the visible cosmos. It is tempting to suppose that Proclus regards Phanes as playing a similar role when he περατοῖ πᾶσαν τὴν νοητὴν οὐσίαν καὶ συνέχει τὴν νοερὰν ζωήν.

[418] On the position of the Demiurge in the intellectual order of gods, see *in Tim.* I 310.3–312.26.

[419] ἔστι γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἐνέργημα νοητόν. Festugière translates: 'Car l'Amour est l'effet intelligible de l'action de l'Intellect intelligible', noting that one can only translate ἐνέργημα with a paraphrase. But it seems possible to me that we might take the simpler reading. The contrast at issue is that between the Demiurge, which is an intellectual intellect, and the Living Being Itself which is intelligible. Proclus equates the latter with the Orphic Egg (*in Tim.* I 451.10). Eros/Phanes is thus the product of this (fr. 71a, 79, 81). (See Brisson (1987b), 73 for the identity of Eros with Phanes.) Eros/Phanes, in turn, is ranked to correspond with the intelligible gods.

[420] The previous discussion of the agreement of Plato and Orpheus on the paradigm (*in Tim.* I 323.22–325.11) already identifies *noêsis* with sight, presumably on the basis of *Timaeus* 29a2–3: εἰ μὲν δὴ καλός ἐστιν ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ὅ τε δημιουργὸς ἀγαθός, δῆλον ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἀίδιον ἔβλεπεν. This identification is reintroduced and expanded on the basis of the present lemma. The vision or ὅρασις that is *noêsis* must be implicit in the verb καθορᾷ in the lemma under discussion (τῷ ὅ ἐστι ζῷον ὅσαι τε καὶ οἷαι καθορᾷ, τοσαύτας διενοήθη δεῖν καὶ τόδε σχεῖν). The notion of *dianoia* is discovered in διενοήθη. Moreover, since this involves thinking about what the sensible must contain in order to be a maximally complete image of its intelligible paradigm, the Demiurge is concerned with creation. Hence the distinction between *noêsis* directed at higher causes and *dianoia* concerned with the production of Demiurgic works is implicit in the lemma.

refers to the former [simple] cognition that belongs to the Demiurge as 30
'vision' in as much as it is something that has not been made plural or
in as much as it is illuminated by the intelligible light. The secondary
activity [of cognition], however, is referred to as 'discursive thought'
(*dianoêsis*) in as much as it goes beyond (*dia*) simple cognition (*noêsis*) and
advances toward the production of Demiurgic works. Now while Plato **102**
says that [the Demiurge] looks to the Living Being Itself, Orpheus says
that [the Demiurge] 'leapt upon' and 'ingested' [the intelligible] – that
is, after Night showed [him how to], for since Night is simultaneously
intelligible and intellectual, the intellectual intellect is connected to the 5
intelligible. You must not, however, say that because of this the Demi-
urge looks to that which is external to himself (for it is not lawful to do
this), but that since he has reverted upon himself and toward the source
of forms that is within him, he is conjoined to the monad of various
formal orders.[421]

For the intellect does not subsist without the intelligible and the intelligible does 10
not subsist separate from intellect (*Or. Chald.* 20)

according to the Oracles. Now since in the case of our own souls we say
that the soul knows all things when it looks toward itself and that the
things that are prior to it are not external to it, how is it not the case
to an even greater extent that when the Demiurgic intellect intelligises 15
itself it sees the intelligible cosmos? After all, the Living Being Itself is
in it too, albeit not in a manner that is monadic.[422] Rather, it is present
in accordance with a specific divine number and it is due to this fact
that he is said to ingest this intelligible god as we said [99.20] since
he is himself intellectual according to the Theologians insofar as he
is unified [with the intelligible] by this [act of ingestion] <and at the
same time> an intelligible universe and the formal divisions as well as 20
the intelligible number.[423] This is something which Plato also indicates

[421] πρὸς τὴν μονάδα συνάπτεσθαι τῶν παντοίων εἰδητικῶν διακόσμων. This terminology is used frequently in the *Parmenides Commentary* but not elsewhere in the *Timaeus Commentary*. It seems to refer to the distinctions among the ranks of forms, such as that between intelligible and intelligible-and-intellectual forms. See in particular, *in Parm.* 951.28 and 969.32.

[422] This presumably corresponds to the earlier claim in Book 1 that the Living Being is present in the Demiurge in an intellectual mode; 1 323.20.

[423] There is a lacuna at line 20 for which Festugière accepts καὶ ἅμα. Thus διὸ καὶ κατ-απίνειν λέγεται τὸν νοητόν, ὡς εἴπομεν, ἐκεῖνον θεὸν αὐτὸς νοερὸς ὢν παρὰ τοῖς θεολόγοις ὡς ἑνούμενος τούτῳ, <καὶ ἅμα> τὸ νοητὸν πᾶν καὶ αἱ εἰδητικαὶ διαιρέσεις καὶ ὁ νοητὸς ἀριθμός. This seems plausible. However, I fail to see how his translation gives any sense to ὡς ἑνούμενος τούτῳ. He writes: 'c'est pourquoi aussi le Démiurge est dit chez les THÉOLOGIENS "avaler" ce dieu intelligible, comme nous l'avons dit (102.2), étant lui-même un dieu intellectif <et en même temps> tout l'Intelligible et les divisions

when he referred to the Demiurge's forms (*idea*) with the terms **such in number and kind**. By means of the latter he makes clear the distinctive property of the causes, while by means of the former he shows their numeric division.

c. Two corollaries

If this is how things stand in this case, then one should not suppose that there exists an infinity of forms among the intelligibles, as some people in fact say (for that which is determinate is more appropriate to things that are first principles than what is indefinite, as Plato too indicates). It is always the case with respect to the things that come first that they are reduced in their quantity, but intensified in their power compared with the subsequent things that proceed from them.[424] Moreover one should not say that those who distinguish the Living Being Itself from the Demiurge make the intelligibles external to the intellect,[425] for we do not
103 make that which is seen inferior to what does the seeing, in order that it may be external but nonetheless prior to it. The more divine intelligibles are thought by the ones that are less replete[426] in as much as they are in them. As Socrates says, when the soul goes into itself it discovers all the things that are, 'god and wisdom' (*Alc.* 1 133c5).[427] While the Living Being Itself is indeed prior to the Demiurge it is not external to him since up above everything is present in a manner that is universal and intelligible, whilst in the Demiurge everything is present in a manner that is intellectual and separate, for the distinct causes of the Sun and the Moon have been pre-existent in the latter, and not merely the single

formelles et la somme intelligible.' For ἑνούμενος with the dative for being unified with, cf. Iamblichus, *Myst.* v 20.25.

[424] For this line of argument on the infinity of forms, compare *in Parm.* 751.37–752.23. For the general principle that the higher causes are fewer in number but greater in power, see *ET* 62.

[425] This is a standing issue in Platonism. Porphyry describes how he was converted to the view of Plotinus and Amelius that the intelligibles are not outside the intellect in *V. Plot.* §18; cf. Plotinus *Enn.* v 5. The import of the relation between the Demiurge and the Paradigm in the *Timaeus* figures prominently in these disussions. Proclus' solution, following his teacher Syrianus (*in Tim.* 1 322.18–323.22), is that the Paradigm is both *prior to* and also *in* the Demiurge, albeit in different modes. So while there is a sense in which the intelligibles are outside the intellect – in the sense that existence *noêtôs* is prior to existence *noêrôs* – this does not mean that the intellect cognises mere representations of that which is external to it.

[426] ὑπὸ τῶν κοιλοτέρων; cf. 1 354.12.

[427] This lemma falls outside the extant portion of Proclus' commentary on the *Alcibiades*. On this passage in the subsequent Neoplatonic commentary tradition, see Tarrant (2007).

idea of celestial gods that is constitutive of the being (*hypostatikos*) of the celestial genus [of living things]. It is from this fact that the Oracles say that the Demiurgic forms are

> Carried along like a swarm of bees, breaking themselves on the bodies of the cosmos (*Or. Chald.* 37)[428]

for the divine intellect unfolded the universal division – the Demiurgic plurality that belongs to the things in the intelligible [realm] – into everything.[429] These things then are to be taken as corollaries.[430]

d. The views of Amelius, Numenius and Iamblichus on this passage

Having explained these things it is worthwhile to recount the opinions of the more ancient interpreters who have attempted to do something novel concerning the words in this lemma.

It is from these words in particular that Amelius[431] established his triad of Demiurgic intellects. He calls the first 'that which is' (*onta*) from the phrase that 'which Living Being is', while the second he calls 'that which has' (*exonta*) from the fact that it 'has' [forms present to it] (for it is not the case that the second intellect *is* [the forms] but they are instead introduced in it), while the third intellect is 'that which sees' from the

[428] Here Proclus pulls a couple of phrases from the *Oracles* that he has quoted at length in the *Parmenides Commentary* (800.20–801.5). The order of verses is not preserved. So here we have: ὅθεν καὶ τὰ λόγια τὰς δημιουργικὰς <ἰδέας> σμήνεσσιν ἐοικυίας φέρεσθαι λέγει ῥηγνυμένας κόσμου περὶ σώμασι, while in the Parmenides we have:

> Ῥηγνύμεναι κόσμου περὶ σώμασιν, αἳ περὶ κόλπους
> Σμερδαλέους σμήνεσσιν ἐοικυῖαι φορέονται,

Proclus seems to like the image of forms going forth like swarms of bees since he discusses this verse in particular in his brief exegesis of the Oracle at *in Parm.* 801.35.

[429] τὴν γὰρ ὁλικὴν αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ διάκρισιν ἀνείλιξεν εἰς πᾶν τὸ δημιουργικὸν πλῆθος ὁ θεῖος νοῦς. My translation treats the accusative τὸ δημιουργικὸν πλῆθος as an alternative formulation for τὴν ὁλικὴν διάκρισιν. Equally, it could be governed by εἰς which might yield 'the divine intellect unfolded the universal division that belongs to the things in the intelligible realm wholly or entirely into the Demiurgic plurality'. But it is hard to see this as a gloss on the passage from the *Oracles* since the creative or Demiurgic forms are going right down to the bodies of the world. Can such bodies be the Demiurgic plurality? Festugière has: 'En effet l'Intellect divine a fait se dérouler dans toute la multiplicité des créations la discrimination des formes totalitairement contenue dans l'Intelligible.'

[430] The two corollaries are that the forms are finite in number and that while the Paradigm is prior to the Demiurge, this does not mean that the intelligibles are outside the intellect in any epistemically problematic way. For a similar, loose sense of 'corollary' see II 89.20 and III 38.12.

[431] On Amelius' views on the three Demiurgic intellects, see *in Tim.* I 306.1–14 and Brisson (1987a), 832–3.

fact that it 'saw' [that it had these forms]. Now Plato did indeed say that the forms are in that which Living Being is, but he did *not* say that Living Being Itself is one thing, while that in which the forms of living things are is another. Consequently, 'that which is' is not *something different from* 'that which has', even if there is, on the one hand, the 'that which Living Being is' and, on the other, that in which the forms are present.[432]

Numenius[433] on the other hand situates the first god to accord with 'that which Living Being is' and says that he cognises calling in the help of the second, while he arranges the second to accord with intellect and this [god] in its turn creates calling in the help of the third. The third [god he arranges to] accord with that which makes use of discursive thinking. While it is quite clear that these things possess intrinsic differences [between them] at this point they have not been divided in this manner by Plato so as to yield the result that the intellect that cognises (*noein*) is one thing, while the intellect that reasons discursively is another (*dianoein*), for Plato has not drawn a distinction between the *activities* and the things that *perform* in the activities. After all, the activities result from the agents even more so in the case of divine substances where they coincide with the essences.[434] With respect to the present purpose, when [the Demiurge] 'thinks' [that it is necessary for the universe to have the four genera of living being] or 'sees' (39e9) [the four kinds in the paradigm] these are to be interpreted as products[435] of the Demiurgic intellect. It is far more necessary to draw a distinction between these [products of Demiurgic intellectual activity] and the intellect since they coincide with the intellect's mode of being (*hypostasis*).

The divine Iamblichus[436] has also sufficiently refuted these men, adding that Plato has not made such distinctions among the gods as these people say in either the *Sophist*, the *Philebus* or the *Parmenides*.

[432] Proclus' point here seems to be that the distinction between the intelligible Living Being and the four genera of forms that essentially constitute it is not tantamount to a distinction between different or non-identical intellects.

[433] 103.28–32 = fr. 22 (Des Places).

[434] Proclus' criticism of Numenius is thus closely related to his criticism of Amelius. This makes sense, given that he supposes Numenius to be closely allied to Amelius in his views on the three Demiurges. In effect, each has hypostatised distinctions among Demiurgic activities into distinctions among Demiurges. In the case at hand, we can see that such a move from distinct activities to distinct actors is misguided. We can distinguish the man who builds from the activity of building because the builder is an embodied soul, the house a distinct object, and so on. In the realm of the intelligibles where *energeia* and *ousia* coincide, such a distinction is less sharp.

[435] ὡς ἐνεργήματα; cf. 101.24 above.

[436] Proclus, *in Tim.* III 104.8–16 = Iamblichus, *in Tim.* fr. 71 (Dillon). In fact, Dillon thinks it likely that the preceding paragraphs that summarise and criticise the views of Amelius and Numenius probably come more or less directly from Iamblichus too.

Instead, he has given there separate accounts of each order and divided the hypotheses from one another, [making] that which concerns the One separate from that which concerns the whole, and outlining similarly in succession each following order according to its appropriate definitions.

For our own part, since our task is not to refute the views of those who have said something different, let us remind ourselves that these are the questions we have set previously: 'What is the paradigm that is one and intelligible?' 'What is the universal Demiurge?' 'What is the unification between both of them?' Let us then consider the manner in which the dialogue subsequently provides the plurality of paradigms and multiple acts of creation.

C. The forms within the Living Being, *Tim.* 39e10–40a2

These are, of course, four: one is the genus of the celestial gods, another that which is winged and traverses the air, the third is the aquatic kind (*eidos*), while the fourth is footed and goes by dry land. (*Tim.* 39e10–40a2)

1. The discourse mirrors its subject matter

Just as in the case of the Demiurgic cognition (*noêsis*) itself, where the monad comes before the intellectual plurality or in the case of the Paradigm, where the unified form pre-exists number, so too the account that explains divine matters is a representation of the nature of the things about which it informs us. At first it embraces (*perilambanein*) the universal object of knowledge all at once and in a manner that involves a divinely inspired conception (*enthousiastikê epibolê*). Next it unrolls[437] that which was rolled up and articulates the single act of cognition (*noêsis*) through words. It divides that which is unified in accordance with the very nature of things (*ta pragmata*), at one point expounding their unification and at another point drawing a distinction, since it is in no way natural to embrace [both these tasks] simultaneously, nor is it even possible. Now, Plato's dialogue doubtless has also been subjected to this [imitation of the subject matter in the narrative form] since it has first revealed in a divinely inspired manner the universal number of intelligible forms and then distributed the processions found in it, for up there [in the realm of forms] the plurality that is manifest is an intelligible one

105

437 ἀναπτύσσει τὸ συνεσπειραμένον. Proclus' choice of verb emhasises the parallel between the metaphysical procession into plurality from more unified causes and the presentation of Platonic *physiologia* in words. The first sense in LSJ is 'to unfold the rolls on which books are written', cf. Herodotus 1.125.

where the very first of the monads of the forms occur. That this is in fact Plato's customary approach we have noted earlier and on the basis of many examples – for instance, from all examples previously given like 'it has come to be' and 'he was good' and '[just] one [universe]'.[438]

2. Why are there four forms?

Moving from [the character of] the account to the things [that the account is about] let us first consider what the tetrad of forms itself is and from whence this number [four] is derived. Next let us ask what these four forms are and *how* they are 'in' the Living Being Itself – whether the latter's [property of being] all-perfect (*to panteles*) is essentially constituted through [these four] or whether they are present in some other manner. If we go through these topics step by step we will discover the divinely inspired conception (*entheon epibolê*) of Plato.

It is once again necessary to revert to the demonstrations that have been discussed earlier, in which we said that, with respect to the intelligible essences of the gods that are most primary, unified and simplest, when they proceed from on high from the henad of henads in a specific manner that is surely ineffable and incomprehensible to all, there is one [phase of the procession][439] that is the very first, hidden and paternal, but

[438] Cf. the methodological remarks on 28b7 at I 282.27–283.19 where Proclus likens the procedure that Timaeus follows to the creative activities of the Demiurge. When he says '[the universe] has come to be' – the emphatic Γέγονεν of 28b7 – this embraces (*perilambanein*) the object of knowledge all at once in a divinely inspired manner: πρῶτον μιᾷ φωνῇ τὸ δόγμα περιλαβὼν καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα πρὸ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀνακηρύξας ἀντικρυς κατὰ τοὺς ἐνθουσιῶντας (283.5–7). Similar remarks apply to 'he [sc. the Demiurge] was good' at 29e1. Cf. I 360.13–15 ἐπήγαγε τὸ ἀγαθὸς ἦν, νοῦν διὰ τῆς ἀναφωνήσεως ταύτης μιμούμενος καὶ τὴν ἀθρόαν τοῦ παντὸς περίληψιν. ἐν γὰρ τῷδε τῷ κώλῳ περιέχεται πᾶν τὸ ζητούμενον. Finally, there is *Timaeus* 31a3–4 where Timaeus again announces the conclusion that the Demiurge created only one universe in a pithy manner prior to the proof. Proclus once again views this as an imitation of the Demiurgic intellect. In this case it also suggests that in putting the question 'how many universes?' to himself, Timaeus imitates the Demiurge in reverting upon himself. When he gives the one-word solution to this question, this is an imitation of intellect: διὰ δὲ τῆς συντόμου λύσεως κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν – ἡ γὰρ ἐν ἑνὶ τὸ πᾶν περιλαμβάνουσα φωνὴ τῆς νοερᾶς ἐστιν ἐπιβολῆς εἰκών (I 438.25–8). On the general theme of the relation between subject matter and manner of discourse in Proclus' *Timaeus* commentary, see Martijn (2008), 219–96.

[439] The subjects in this three-step process are never specified: τὸ μέν ἐστι πρώτιστον καὶ κρύφιον καὶ πατρικόν, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καὶ μία δύναμις τῶν ὅλων καὶ ἀπερίληπτον μέτρον, τὸ δὲ τρίτον εἰς ἐνέργειαν προελθὸν καὶ παντοίας δυνάμεις καὶ ἅμα πατρικόν τε καὶ ποιητικὸν ὑφεστηκός. It seems best to me to treat them as phases or moments in a continuous process of emanation. We could, of course, treat them as separate objects or levels of being, but note the use of adverbs in what follows. This suggests we should think of these stages or phases in terms of activities or modes.

then another that is second [which is a] single power and an uncircumscribed measure of wholes. Third is that which proceeds into activity and various powers, having been established simultaneously as paternal and creative.[440] The first [phase] is a *monad* because it is undoubtedly the hidden cause of the entire intelligible realm and the source of divine numbers. The second, by contrast, is a *dyad* for it remains and also proceeds since among the intelligible genera it has been amalgamated from Eternity (*to aei*) taken together with Being.[441] The object of our current investigation, however, is the *tetrad* that has received the entire hidden cause of the monad, while nonetheless exhibiting in itself the former's inseparable power. As many things as were in the monad in a manner that **106**
is primary, unified and inseparable, the tetrad manifested in a manner that is separated and already numerically extended – a manner that corresponds to creation in secondary things. Next there is the third [phase] which has an order that is fitting to it, but also participates in a general way in the causes that are prior to it – not only the tetrad, but even prior to this it participates to an even greater degree in the monad and the dyad. In as much as it is a monad, it has been allocated to the superior paternal [order], while in as much as it is a dyad it has been allocated to the order that is productive and procreative. Therefore, it has been called Living Being Itself, as a result of which it is, on the one hand, a monad of the nature of every living thing, whether intellectual, vital (*zôtikos*) or corporeal. On the other hand, it is also a dyad as a result of the fact that it includes both male and female simultaneously, for these [sexes] are present in every order of living thing in an appropriate manner – being present in one manner in gods, but in another in daemons, and in yet another among mortal beings – and it is necessary that the primary henads of these [sexes] pre-exist within the single comprehension (*periochê*) of Living thing.[442] From this dyad [of male and female] come the four forms of living thing so that as a result it has also been established as a tetrad. It is in conformity with these forms that the four-part creation has proceeded, and the first efficient cause of wholes is a tetrad. Therefore since Plato will impart the four-fold power of the paradigm, he says that the maximally unified forms for the encosmic

[440] ἅμα πατρικόν τε καὶ ποιητικὸν ὑφεστηκός. Proclus treats this as a Pythagorean epithet for the tetrad at 316.26. Of course, it also recalls Plato's 'Father and Maker' at *Tim.* 28c3.

[441] See above 99.23.

[442] ἐν τῇ μιᾷ τοῦ ζῴου περιοχῇ. As usual, there is no particularly apt translation of this Proclean terminology. At III 14.2–4 it seems to be used synonymously with ἕνωσις. Generally speaking, whatever exists in the unfolding of higher causes at lower levels must pre-exist in those higher causes. A περιοχη seems to be the locus of that pre-existing cause – in this case, the cause of the difference between male and female.

[kinds of living things] are themselves four and included by the single Living Being Itself. The single form, Living Being Itself, exists up there, and so too does the dyad, male and female. But if you like, Plato has also distinguished genera and kinds. After all, he called the intellectual ones [sc. the genus of celestial gods] and those that traverse the air 'genera' (*genos*), while he called the remaining two sorts (*idea*) [sc. those of aquatic and terrestrial living things] 'kinds' (*eidos*) because they are inferior to the former.[443] The tetrad is also as far as the intelligible forms go, for Plato has defined the limit of the intelligibles with reference to this [point]. Beyond this, they proceed over various orders of beings (*diakosmos*) and in accordance with one number or another, for there is an appropriate number for each individual order (*taxis*). The smaller number is such as to include forms that are more universal, while the number that has been multiplied is such as to include forms that are more particular, since it is the case that the things that are more divine, being endowed with
107 superior power, are more condensed with respect to quantity, while the forms of secondary things have been multiplied to a greater extent than the things that are prior to them – the things that are intellectual being greater in number than those that are intelligible, and the things that are hypercosmic being greater in number than the things that are intellectual, while the things that are encosmic are, in turn, greater in number than those that are hypercosmic.[444] In any event, these [forms of secondary things] are those that have arrived at the final level of division, just as the intelligible [forms] have accepted the highest degree of unification, for in every procession as the plurality increases, the power [of receiving the cause in fullness] diminishes.[445] Therefore, if Timaeus had made the account one about some intellectual order, then he would have said that it possessed some other [larger] number [than the tetrad that pertains to the intelligible order] – for instance, it might be hebdomatic or a decad.[446] But since [the account is] concerned with the intelligible cause of forms that includes all such intelligible living beings as there are, he says that the primary forms are four in number, for the tetrad exists up there, proceeding from the monad of the intelligible [realm] and filling

[443] Proclus reads significance into Plato's choice of terms in the lemma: μία μὲν οὐρανίων θεῶν γένος, ἄλλη δὲ πτηνὸν καὶ ἀεροπόρον, τρίτη δὲ ἔνυδρον εἶδος, πεζὸν δὲ καὶ χερσαῖον τέταρτον. Translating 'genus' and 'species' would convey a sense of subordination, but clearly a misleading one. Even if there is some sense in which fish and land animals are inferior to gods and birds, it is not true that fish are a *species* of bird. Hence I have opted for 'genera' and 'kinds'.

[444] Cf. ET 62 and 103.28 supra. [445] Cf. ET 36.

[446] The intellectual order is, in fact, hebdomatic. Saffrey and Westerink (1968–97), vol. 5, i–xxxvii take this line from the *Timaeus Commentary* as the starting point for their inquiry into why this should be so.

up the Demiurgic decad.[447] After all, 'the divine number proceeds', as the Pythagoreans say in the hymn to number:

From the undefiled depths of the monad, until it should arrive, at the sacred tetrad, which has given birth to the mother of all, the all-receiver, the venerable one, placing a limit around all things, the undeviating one, the unwearying one; they call her pure Decad.[448]

While the 'undefiled monad' and 'the depths of the monad' mean the uni-form and hidden cause of the One-Being, 'the sacred tetrad' is a manifestation of the intelligible plurality – a manifestation which the Dyad exhibits since it is an intermediary between the monad and the tetrad. The 'decad' means the cosmos itself which receives all of the divine numbers when images were provided to it from above, for it is possible to interpret what has been said in this manner when we look to the creation of the cosmos.[449] This is what is to be said about the tetrad itself.

3. What are these forms?[450]

After these [considerations], let us say what the four forms are and of what sort are the things whose being they constitute. Different people have

[447] In Pythagorean lore, the tetrad contains the decad since $1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10$; cf. Joost-Gaugier (2006), 105–6. At I 316.15–19 Proclus correlates Plato's *Timaeus* 28c3 with Pythagorean orders of gods by treating the Father as the Monad, the Father-and-Maker as the tetrad, and the Maker-and-Father as the decad.

[448] Proclus cites these verses frequently: *in Tim.* I 316.21; II 53.3 and 233.23. See also *in Remp.* II 169.25 where they are attributed to Orpheus rather than Pythagoras. Cf. Kern, *Orph. Fr.* 315.

[449] Proclus' interpretation of the Hymn to Number thus aligns certain phrases in this Orphic/Pythagorean teaching with the three stages of procession that he himself has outlined in 105.32–106.19.

[450] The issue in what follows is the order of the kinds of living things in an imagined descent from higher causes. The order of the words in Timaeus' exposition might seem to suggest that we have gods, birds, aquatic and then terrestrial beings. This will seem strange to anyone who supposes that humans are 'higher' than fish and that Plato's zoo-ogony should exhibit this fact. The three views summarised here deal with this issue in different ways. Interpretation (A) treats the four kinds as implicitly just two: gods and mortals. While it is true that the celestial genus is here said to be divine and thus immortal, this does not mean that we should simply equate the present tetradic division with the division into mortals and gods. When Proclus describes the advocates of (A) as τῆς λέξεως καταδραττόμενοι μάλιστα τῆς τοῦ Πλάτωνος, he does not mean that they stick closely to the words in the lemma. Rather he must mean that they have fastened on some particular words to the exclusion of others. Proclus will raise a difficulty for this interpretation below at 108.28. Interpretation (B) effectively

given different views [on the subject]. Some people, who have latched on
30 to some particular words of Plato's text, say that (A) the procession takes
place into the gods and the mortal genera, while others who look toward
the facts say that (B) the procession is into gods and the genera that are
superior to us on the grounds that these things have been made to pre-
exist prior to mortal beings and it is necessary that the Demiurge should
108 not make mortal beings from divine ones without any intermediary. Still
other people conjoin both [of these views] with what has been written in
the *Epinomis* (984b) and interpret the passage as saying that (C) the gods
have been established in the heavens, while daemons are in the air, with
5 those in the water being demi-gods, and on Earth there are the humans
and other mortal living beings.

Such are the differences of opinion among the interpreters, and while we admire those who love the spectacle of the facts, we will nonetheless seek to follow our teacher [Syrianus].[451] We say that (D) **the celestial**
10 **genus of gods**[452] is one that includes all of the celestial genera, whether they be genera of gods or angels or daemons.[453] [The kind that] **traverses the air** includes all such beings as have been positioned in the air, whether these be gods that have been assigned to the air or daemons that follow them or mortal animals that lead their lives in the air. The **aquatic kind** includes every genus that has been assigned to the water and those

re-writes Plato's text: no matter what Plato might seem to be saying here, the plain fact is that the procession must first be into superior beings. Festugière suspects – not unreasonably – that Iamblichus may be the person associated with the second view. Certainly Iamblichus distinguishes the souls of gods and superior beings from those of lower souls in his account of the structure of hypotheses in the *Parmenides*; cf. *in Parm*. fr. 2 (Dillon). The order of the presentation of the genera of living things in the lemma is in some sense geographical: the heavens are above the air and the air above the water and the earth. The third interpretation combines an appropriate order of precedence – gods, daemons, demi-gods, humans and other animals – with this geographic order by assigning different ranks of living things to different regions. Syrianus' reading (D) resembles (C) in stressing the order of regions, but without assuming that this corresponds to an order of precedence among the beings. The celestial and aerial regions may be inhabited by a wide range of different ranks of being: gods, angels, daemons, and even birds.

[451] III 108.5–28 = Syrianus, *in Tim*. fr. 19 (Klitenic Wear).

[452] Proclus subtly re-orders the words in the lemma. Rather than the lemma's οὐρανίων θεῶν γένος here he writes τὸ μὲν οὐράνιον τῶν θεῶν γένος. It seems odd to say that daemons belong to a genus of celestial gods, but not so odd to say that they belong to a celestial genus that includes gods (as well as other beings).

[453] πάντων . . . τῶν οὐρανίων γενῶν εἴτε θείων εἴτε ἀγγελικῶν εἴτε δαιμον<ί>ων. Literally, 'whether divine, angelic or daemonic'. The adjective '*theos*' can have a similar ambiguity to the English 'divine', but in this case it functions as an alternative to angelic or daemonic – not a genus of which they are species. Lacking an English adjective that is as tightly bound to the word 'god' as '*theios*' is to '*theos*', I have opted to translate the adjectives as genitive nouns governed by an implicit 'genera'.

that thrive in water, while **the footed kind that go by dry land** includes the living things that have been apportioned to the earth, having arisen and grown in it. After all, the Demiurge is the cause of absolutely all of the encosmic forms and is the common father of all. While the divine and daemonic genera are born from and through him alone, the mortal kinds were handed over to the young gods (42d6), since they were able to engender them in a manner that was proximate.[454] In addition, it is not the case that the Paradigm is the cause of some living beings, but not of others. Rather, it possesses the maximally universal causes of all of them, for if, contrary to fact, the Paradigm were the cause of divine and daemonic kinds, but in no way the cause of the mortal kinds, then supposing the mortal kinds did not come to be, the heavens [sc. the universe] would no longer be entirely-complete, because it would not have all the kinds of living being.[455] However, the [universe] is similar to the Paradigm and entirely-complete, since it imitates the four forms that belong to the Living Being Itself.

If someone were to say,[456] contrary to this, that these genera include both gods and mortals, how will we make this consistent with Plato since after the creation of the celestial living beings he says: 'to talk about the other daemons and to know their genesis is something more than what pertains to us' (*Tim.* 40d6–7)? Or the fact that he has mentioned the gods

454 This claim foreshadows resolution of an interpretative puzzle at 109.8. The Demiurge and the Paradigm are among the causes of all of the kinds of living being, regardless of whether they are gods, daemons, humans or other animals. But this is not yet to say that either is the *proximate* cause. Thus the four forms in the Paradigm will play a role in bringing about all the kinds of living being, but other things do too.

455 οὐκέτι τῶν θνητῶν μὴ γενομένων οὐρανὸς <π>α<ν>τελής, ὡς τὰ πάντα γένη τῶν ζῴων οὐκ ἔχων· ἔστι γὰρ ὅμοιος τῷ παραδείγματι καὶ παντελής. The counterfactual that we are evaluating supposes that the Paradigm is the cause of the immortal beings but not the mortal ones. Diehl's emendation seems to imagine that such a supposition means that the latter then don't come about at all. οὐκέτι goes with οὐρανὸς <π>α<ν>τελής and τῶν θνητῶν μὴ γενομένων speaks to a missing phase in the [eternal!] creation after which the heaven is no longer complete. But surely we could better honour the spirit of the counterfactual by bracketing μὴ. Let it be that immortal beings are caused by the Paradigm. These, in turn, cause mortal beings – though the forms of such mortal beings in the Paradigm play no role in this creation. This is what the counterfactual supposes. Since mortal creatures have no *eternal* intelligible cause, there would have been a time in the eternal past history of the universe when their generation failed. When these mortal creatures no longer came to be (οὐκέτι τῶν θνητῶν [μὴ] γενομένων), then the world is ἀτελής. But this is impossible if it is, in fact, similar to the Paradigm and thus παντελής.

456 The following is directed specifically against the (A) reading. Daimones are neither gods nor mortals, so the advocates of (A) can provide no explanation of how they have been introduced prior to 40d6.

109 that proceed into the sub-lunary cosmos?[457] Now, on the one hand, here after the aerial [kind of living beings], he arranges the aquatic [sort], and after this, the [kind] with feet. On the other hand, in the generation of mortal living beings, he no longer preserves this order [of presentation] but instead engenders all [the other kinds] by means of souls of the human sort (*Tim*. 42b–c). After the soul's sojourn as a citizen of the heavens,[458] he leads it into the race of beings with feet in order that the human species might be produced, and after this, when they sin, [these human souls] into the winged [kind] or again into some species with feet or some kind of wild animal, and next into something aquatic. As a result it seems that these three genera [in the Living Being Itself] are not the sole cause of these mortal things, but [they are causes] that are prior to these other [subsequent causes][459] in which the same order of the three forms is preserved through the deterioration of secondary beings when they have gone forth from the things that are prior to them. It is necessary, therefore, that all [the kinds of living being] are produced through these forms – both the divine and the mortal genera – and that the intelligible forms be such as to constitute the being (*hypostatikos*) of all the genera since [these intelligible forms] are more universal.

It is also necessary to consider the words under discussion in a manner appropriate to each order. For instance, the words **the genus of gods**

457 Presumably this refers to gods such as Ocean and Gê discussed at 40e5 and following. This counts against the (C) reading which assigns different ranks of beings to different regions. If Ocean is in the water and Gê on the land, then according to this reading, Ocean should be only a demi-god and Gê not a god at all.

458 μετὰ τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ πολιτείαν αὐτῆς. Festugière translates 'après la vie céleste de l'âme' with the comment that: 'La référence à *Rép*. IX 592 B 2 (Diehl, après Schneider) me paraît sans portée, et πολιτεία a ici son sens tardif, qui n'est pas exclusivement propre aux chrétiens.' It also seems to me possible that Proclus has in mind the passage at *Tim*. 41e where the Demiurge has set each human soul in a star and announces to them the laws of fate. They then pass into their first incarnation in the sub-lunary realm. This is surely a πολιτεία of sorts too and one that seems more proximate to the concerns of this passage.

459 This seems to be Proclus' explanation of how we are to regard the seemingly incompatible zoo-ogonies in the *Timaeus* as telling a consistent story. It is true that the four forms in the Paradigm play a role in bringing about human beings, as well as lions and tigers and bears. But it is also true that lions and tigers and bears are the result of the mistakes of humans since humans are reincarnated in these forms in accordance with the laws of fate. The stories fit together because it is no part of the first story that the four forms are the *sole* cause of all the various kinds of living beings. Accordingly, I think that Festugière's translation of ὥστ' ἔοικεν οὐ μόνον εἶναι τὰ τρία γένη τούτων αἴτια τῶν θνητῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τούτων ἄλλων as 'Il semble, dès lors, que les trois genres soient causes non pas seulement de ces races mortelles, mais, avant celles-ci, d'autres races' is probably mistaken. It is difficult for me to see how such an observation is apposite to what has gone before.

has one sense when it covers the beings that are specifically called gods, while it has another sense when it covers the genus of beings superior to us which have been arranged in the heavens. After all, we say that there celestial angels, daemons and heroes and all these things are denominated 20
'gods' because the specific property of being divine predominates over their individual distinctive property.[460] Generally speaking, the daemons up there are god-daemons, and similarly for the angels and heroes [up there].[461] Once again, [the words] **winged** and **traverses the air** are used in one sense in the case of aerial gods, but in another manner in the case of daemons and in yet another manner in the case of mortal beings [who live in the air]. In the case of the gods, the intellectual [character] 25
is called 'winged', while the providential character, by contrast, is said to 'traverse the air', since it is extended entirely throughout the aerial sphere and keeps it all together.[462] In the case of the daemons, however, the [word] 'winged' is a symbol of swift activities, while 'traversing the air' reveals that they are present everywhere without any obstacle and the fact that they go through everything. Among mortal beings [that 30
are in the air] 'winged' reveals the motion that takes place through a single organ which occurs when making use of the wings alone, while **110**
'traversing the air' reveals the varied motion that takes place due to the body, for nothing prevents partial souls who live in the air from moving around in it. Furthermore, in the case of things that are divine, the word **aquatic** indicates the inseparable superintendence over water, which is the reason why the Oracles call these gods 'those who walk on water'.[463] 5
In the case of the kinds that come after the gods, [the term 'aquatic' indicates] their being such as to sustain a liquid nature. Moreover, in

[460] τὸ θεῖον ἰδίωμα κρατεῖ τῆς ἰδίας αὐτῶν ἰδιότητος. The point must be, not merely that we sometimes in some contexts *call* a certain class of heroes or angels gods, but rather that there they *are* a kind of god. Cf. *in Alc.* 71.4–7.

[461] καί εἰσιν ἐκεῖ δαίμονες τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο θεοὶ δαίμονες καὶ ἄγγελοι καὶ ἥρωες ὁμοίως. I agree with Festugière in taking τὸ ὅλον adverbially. It is also tempting to bracket τοῦτο here as we did earlier at 90.25.

[462] The connection between traversing the air and providence is that providence governs everything and so is, in some sense, present everywhere, just as the air is present throughout the spheres in which it is found. Presumably Proclus thinks that the connection between the idea of having wings and intellect is obvious. Every reader of the *Phaedrus* will know that a soul ceases to be intellectual or *noeros* when it loses its wings in the descent to the body.

[463] ὑδροβατῆρας *Or. Chald.* 92; cf. Seafaring Apollo (Ἀπόλλωνος Ἐπιβατηρίου) in Pausanius 2.32.2. Festugière comments that these must be daemons rather than gods on the basis of Eunapius *V. Soph.* where Iamblichus evokes daemons from the baths of Gadara and the report that Porphyry banished a daemon from a bath, cf. Bidez (1964, rpr. of 1913), 15. But even if there were a widespread belief that daemons were particularly prone to take up habitation in baths, nothing in that would preclude Syrianus or Proclus supposing that the Oracles assigned some gods to the water.

one case the term **footed** is indicative of that which sustains the final outpost [in the order of procession] and runs through it, since what is *terra firma* controls it [the final outpost] in a stable manner and perfects it by means of powers and various lives, while in the other case it is indicative of that which makes different regions of the Earth prosperous at different times through the appropriate motions that belong to it.[464] So much for the words [in the lemma].

4. Assorted observations

You should infer from these things that the Living Being Itself – the intelligible one, that is – is entirely different from that which is in the Demiurge, for while the former does *not* possess distinct forms for mortal living beings (since if this were so, then the Demiurge would also have created the mortal ones, since he wants the things in the cosmos to represent everything that is in the Living Being in order that he might make the cosmos entirely-complete), the Demiurge *does* contain forms for mortal living beings as well – forms that are distinct from those that produce the immortal living beings. In any event, he knows the [forms of] mortal things and it is clear that he knows them in a manner that involves species (*eidêtikôs*)[465] and deemed it proper for the young gods to create them by looking to *him* (*Tim*. 40e8) rather than to the Living Being Itself because he possesses the forms of mortal beings separate from those of immortal beings. Therefore up there [in the intelligible Living Being Itself] that which is aerial or aquatic or footed is each one a single form of all living things that are aerial in any manner whatsoever or aquatic or footed [as the case may be]. In the Demiurge, however, they have been divided so that while some are speciated comprehensions[466] of immortal beings that live in the air, others are speciated comprehensions of mortal living things [that are aerial] and similarly for those that are aquatic or terrestrial. Therefore it is not the case that the plurality in the Living Being that is speciated and the one that is creative are the same, as one can deduce from these methods of reasoning (*ephodos*).

[464] Since the discussion has been proceeding in the order (a) gods; (b) daemons; (c) others, the clause in this sentence presumably provides a division between gods in the terrestrial region and daemons. In the former case (οὗ μὲν τὸ συνέχον τὴν τελευταίαν ἕδραν καὶ χωροῦν δι᾽ αὐτῆς), the final outpost is Earth and the god in question is Gê. οὗ δὲ τὸ ἄλλοτε ἄλλας μερίδας κατευ θῦνον τῆς γῆς ἐπιδείκνυσι διὰ τῆς οἰκείας αὐτοῦ κινήσεως would then describe some providential activity on the part of daemons.

[465] Cf. *Plat. Theol*. IV 88.18–22 where the *eidêtikôs* manner of being of entities in the intellectual (*noeros*) realm (within which the Demiurge is ranked) is contrasted with the *hypousiôs* manner of being in which these same entities are found in the intelligible (*noêtos*) realm (within which the Paradigm is ranked).

[466] εἰδητικαὶ περιοχαί; cf. note 442 above.

Take a look at how the division of these genera has been made so as to yield a monad and a triad (contrasting the highest gradation of the celestial genus with the other genera) and a pair of dyads (since he called the celestial and the winged each a genus), while he called the aquatic and footed ones each a kind (*eidos*), insofar as the latter have an inferior status in relation to the former, just as the species (*eidos*) is inferior to the genus.[467] 111

Furthermore, it is necessary to consider the following: that the region of fire has been left out in the [words of this lemma].[468] This is because the divine genus includes the highest gradation[469] of fire as regards their own composition (*Tim*. 40a2–3). For fire alone among the sub-lunary bodies never is, but has instead been given subsistence solely in virtue of change, since it always requires the nourishment of air or liquid[470] (though they come after its genesis). In addition, fire alone lacks its own proper place, for though 'upwards' acts like a proper place for fire,[471] it is neither the case that it *is* up there (for it would be seen since it is naturally visible) nor does it *arrive* there, since it would be quenched by the intervening air which is dissimilar to it. If, then, it is necessary for there to be the wholeness of fire, since it has a form, it is also necessary for it to be

[467] Cf. note on 106.24–26 above.

[468] That is, while Plato identifies the other kinds of living being in terms of elements – the aerial, the aquatic and those that walk on the earth – he has called the race of gods 'celestial', not fiery.

[469] τὴν ἀκρότητα τοῦ πυρὸς is treated as synonymous with ὁλότητα πυρὸς (111.13) or τὸ ὅλον πῦρ (112.2). Festugière treats the latter two as ways of referring to 'la masse totale de cet élément, par opposition à une partie donnée' and distinguishes it from the highest gradation or lowest gradation. I agree with the latter. However, the highest gradation is in some sense the most generic, universal and thus causally prior manifestation of the element. It seems to be both a thing and something of which other, lower gradations of fire are species. Given our modern conception of universals, there should be no degrees of being a universal. An entity is either such as to be had by many or it is not. But in Neoplatonic metaphysics universality varies in proportion to degrees of unity and thus causal order. In my view, τὸ ἀκρότατον or ὁλότητα πυρὸς or τὸ ὅλον πῦρ inhabit what we would think of as an uninhabitable ontological borderland between things that exhibit structure and the structures they exhibit.

[470] Festugière invites us to compare Aristotle's *Meteorologica* 4.1, 379a14–15 where Aristotle claims that all the elements apart from fire undergo decay, while they serve as matter for it. In ἀεὶ τροφῆς δεόμενον τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος I have translated with the broader sense of 'liquid' (e.g. lamp oil) rather than 'water', which would sound paradoxical indeed.

[471] That is to say, fire has a natural direction upwards, but it is not the case that it has a natural place like earth or water where, when it arrives at this place, it rests and *is* there. On the idea that fire has no natural place at which it is at rest and ceases from motion, see Baltzly (2002).

somewhere instead of subsisting solely in the process of becoming,[472] [then, given that] sub-lunary fire is not this sort of thing, fire would exist only in the heavens, remaining[473] the kind of thing that it is and always occupying, for its motion upward is not something that fire has in its natural condition, but only solely when it is in an unnatural condition. Thus the sacred discourse of the Chaldeans also connects things that are aerial with the 'lunar soundings',[474] the celestial character being assigned to fire in accordance with the division of the elements into the cosmos, for the fire in the realm of Becoming is a certain sort of effluxion (*aporroia*) of celestial fire and is found in the 'hollows' of the other elements.[475] However, there is no sphere of fire *per se*. Rather, the highest [gradations] of air imitate the purity of fire that exists on high. And we are claiming that these [highest gradations of air] are sub-lunary fire and that the place of fire is [just] below the heavens, for this is the one most similar to the celestial level (*bathos*) in the same way that the [lower] limit of air is most similar to the water since it is dense and like mist.[476] Aristotle too thought this way, it seems, since he thought it worthwhile to refer to the fire down here in this fashion, but to call the fire that is immediately
112 below the heavens and which he of course says is carried around with the rotation of the heavens 'pyro-form'.[477] But if this is so, then it is entirely necessary to ask him, 'Where is that which exists truly as fire or the whole

[472] εἰ οὖν δεῖ καὶ ὁλότητα εἶναι πυρὸς καὶ εἶναί που αὐτό, εἶδος ἔχον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαι μόνον ὑφεστώς.... What is ὁλότητα πυρὸς? After looking at a variety of passages, Festugière concludes that the wholeness of an element refers to the total mass of the element, as opposed to a given part of it which might be either its highest gradation or its lowest one. It thus seems to function like a mass term. I think that 'wholeness' can sometimes work this way, but I think it can't mean that in this context. In this context, the ὁλότητα πυρὸς is the place where all the fire would naturally go. However, there is no such place – no fire sphere. The highest gradation of fire is the heavens and the various lower gradations of fire, or other elements resembling fire, are found everywhere.

[473] Following Festugière's suggestion and reading the μένον of the vulgate rather than the μόνον found in Q and D before οἷόν ἐστι. Cf. *ET* prop. 27.7–8: μένει δὲ οἷόν ἐστι πᾶν τὸ παράγον· καὶ μένοντος, τὸ μετ' αὐτὸ πρόεισι.

[474] *Or. Chald*. fr. 61. Cf. 61.11–22 above.

[475] ἐν τοῖς κοιλώμασι. I suspect this alludes to another of Proclus' favourite passages from the *Oracles* in which a storm 'expends the flower of fire' and hurls itself into the 'hollow of worlds'. Cf. *in Tim*. I 451.21 and *Theol. Plat*. III 99.15: ἔνθεν συρόμενος πρηστὴρ ἀμυδροῖ πυρὸς ἄνθος| κόσμων ἐνθρῴσκων κοιλώμασι.

[476] Cf. *Tim*. 66e3 where Plato claims that the transition between air and water comes via mist.

[477] This is not, as Diehl suggests, a reference to the *De Mundo*. Rather, Proclus is here discussing the 'fire belt' that Aristotle invokes to explain the Sun's heat at *Meteo*. 1.3, 340b22–24 and in *Cael*. II 7. Aristotle does not use the specific term πυροειδής in relation to the fire belt though he does say at 341b19 ὑπέκκαυμα τοῦτο ὃ νῦν εἴπομεν πῦρ. It does occur, however, in *GC* 2.3, 330b24.

[or universal] fire?' It is not down here (for this is not whole), nor is it up there (for [by Aristotle's lights] this is [merely] pyro-form since it is not that which exists truly as fire). He will be compelled to place that which is really fire (*to ontôs pyr*) in the heavens since it is pure light. You ought not be surprised if it should turn out that the most tenuous and purest fire is also in the highest [regions?] of the air in the same manner in which the densest and most turbid [kind of fire] is in the hollows of the earth – not because it [sc. the purest fire there] makes a whole that is different from the whole of air, but because its extreme tenuousness allows it to penetrate into the pores [of the air] which are very narrow. Hence it is not seen [in the air] for two reasons: due to the fact that it is not condensed and also due to the fact that it offers no resistance to our sight since it is constituted by such small parts, just as in the case of the light that belongs to our acts of seeing.[478] In any event, that which is really fire is in the heavens, but with respect to sub-lunary fire, its purest [sort] is in the air that is closest to the things that are celestial – which, as the dialogue goes on, he will call 'aether' (58d1) – while its densest [manifestation] is enclosed within the hollows of the earth.

Now, since the account that concerns the four genera in common has been given, let us see how he has organised each of them in what follows.

D. Composition of the celestial genus, *Tim*. 40a2–4

Therefore the substance (*idea*)[479] of the divine [genus of living things] he fashioned for the most part from fire, in order that it might be brightest and most beautiful to see. (*Tim*. 40a2–4)

The fixed stars are the first among the particular living things – [a subset of living things] which the Demiurge doubtless established first, fashioning the substance (*idea*) of this kind for the most part from fire itself, for it is necessary for us first to go through [the facts] about its substance

[478] Recall that our eyes emit light according to Plato (*Tim*. 45b). Yet we do not see the light cone shooting out of other people's eyes when they are seeing. (Think how odd *this* would be. We would not only see people looking, we would see them seeing!) This must be due to the eye's innate light sharing the same character with *to ontôs pyr*.

[479] In what follows, Proclus treats Plato's use of *idea* in this lemma as equivalent to *ousia*. Moreover, since what is at issue is what the celestial genus is composed from (*ek*), I have chosen to translate *ousia* and idea as 'substance'. This keeps something of a connection with the Aristotelian notion of *ousia* as essence, since Proclus accords the issue of substance a primary place in the inquiry. But the modern notion of substance keeps the sense of composition in mind as well. On the fluidity of *ousia* in Proclus' discussion of the composition of the World Soul from Being (*ousia*), Sameness and Difference, as well as *ousia*'s contrast with *dynamis* and *energeia*, see p. xii in volume IV of this series.

(*ousia*), then about its shape (40a4), and in the third place about its position (40a4–7), and fourthly about its motion (40a7–b4). The account concerning its substance brings the many disagreements of the interpreters rolling in, one after another. How does it have the greater part of its substance composed from fire? Does it happen, as some say, because
113 although it is combined from all of the elements, nonetheless it has obtained the greatest share from fire? Or is it that the entire celestial genus [of living things] is composed from all, but the majority of it is fiery? (After all, it is possible to say either of these things if, for instance, one were to say that everything is composed of all the genera of Being, though the intelligibles are composed for the most part from Sameness.[480]) But surely one shouldn't understand [Plato's phrase] 'the greatest part of fire' as the person who looks to the facts interprets them? – as the fire that has the most form, instead of as the fifth body, on the grounds that [the fire that has the most form] will be receptive of many *logoi*, these *logoi* being things with which each of the divine bodies is full.[481] Or does this composition come about in none of these ways, since there are some who say that the divine living beings have been established from fire, but [a kind of fire] whose substance has extension

[480] Proclus' picture is, in fact, more complicated than this; cf. *in Tim*. II 134.21–26.

[481] ἀλλ' ἆρα μὴ οὕτως, ὥσπερ ὁ τῶν πραγμάτων θεατὴς ὄντως ἐξηγήσατο τὴν πλείστην ἰδέαν τοῦ πυρός, ἀντὶ τοῦ πέμπτου σώματος τὸ πῦρ ἀκουστέον πλείστην ἰδέαν ἔχον, ὡς πολλοὺς λόγους ὑποδεξάμενον, ὧν ἐστι πλῆρες ἕκαστον τῶν θείων σωμάτων; I agree with Festugière when he says in his notes that this passage is 'très difficile' though I disagree with him about how to construe it. He says: 'le "contemplateur des réalités" est Aristote qui, par πῦρ, a en fait (ὄντως) entendu le cinquième élément (donc il a considéré les πραγμάτα et non les mots qui les expriment) et fait coïncider ce cinquième élément avec la cinquième figure de Tim. 55c5.' Accordingly he translates: 'Ou bien, comme le contemplateur des réalités l'a en fait interprété, ne faut-il pas entendre par "forme la plus considérable du feu", en lieu et place du cinquième corps, le feu qui comporte la plus grande quantité de forme, etc.' However, I fail to see how anything here suggests the fifth body of the dodecahedron. I think rather that Proclus' point is that if one were to read Plato's words in light of the facts of the case, *even then* one would not include the fifth element. So grammatically, I take ὄντως with θεατὴς and see the accusatives τὴν πλείστην ἰδέαν and τὸ πῦρ as both governed by ἀκουστέον. So compare *in Tim*. I 162.4–6 καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν τόπον οὐ τὴν γῆν οὐδὲ τὸν ἀέρα τοῦτον ἀκουστέον, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τούτων τὸ διάστημα τὸ ἀκίνητον. This has the structure: 'one ought to interpret x (acc.) not as y (acc.) but as z (acc.)'. Here, of course, the correct way to interpret is marked off by ἀλλὰ but in our case I think ἀντὶ τοῦ πέμπτου σώματος would make such a preposition difficult. Proclus frequently characterises Iamblichus as the interpreter who looks to the facts or the pragmata (*in Tim*. frs. 9, 24, 45, 74). This rather obscure remark, then, may be a somewhat veiled rejection of one of the divine Iamblichus' wilder flights of interpretative fancy. The fifth element – properly understood – is simply the highest gradation of fire and this is precisely what the Demiurge composes the stars from.

and has been rendered a plurality (for while what is intelligible is uniform, what is corporeal is [merely] 'for the most part' (*pleiston*) insofar as it is divisible, insofar as it is extended, [and] insofar as it has mass (*ongkos*))?

Or is it rather this that is truest of all? That if we should look to all of these conceptions we shall conceive a single truth that results from all of them, for we shall place all the elements in the heavens, but in an immaterial manner (in as much as this is possible where they are in material things) and [we will put them there] only in accordance with the very highest forms of them. If the form of fire or air or water or earth is present among the intelligibles, then it is necessary for the heavens to participate in this tetrad first. As the creation proceeds, it establishes the lowest nature of the elements – a nature that is genuinely material – and it will give the stars the greater part of their substance from fire, for even if all [of the elements] are in them [sc. the stars], nonetheless fire predominates. This is because, among the elements of genesis, fire has the status of form in relation to the other elements. Therefore it is necessary that among the [celestial] gods there is a preponderance of what is fiery in order that the form should predominate over the substrate, while there is only a little bit of the other [elements] since this bit has the status of substrate. Thus up there [in the heavens] there is a certain substance that is earthy since it is solid and has a tangible mass, which is why it offers resistance to our eyes.[482] What is fiery is also up there since it is such as to illuminate and provide form for the mass (*ongkos*) and the extension (*diastasis*). The intermediates between these [elements] are also up there [sc. air and water] in as much as they serve to connect the ones at the extremes [sc. fire and earth] and make them one, while the fiery [element] predominates over all of them because up there [in the heavens] the form controls the substrate. It sustains and monitors what is the same everywhere and is itself filled with life and the power of self-motion. As a result, it [sc. the fiery element] will be filled with divine and creative *logoi*, but it has also proceeded into plurality and extension, everywhere determining the extension and including the mass that belongs to body.[483]

[482] Unlike the light which flows out of people's eyes when they see (112.12), some of the things in the heaven are visible to us. Given that seeing (on the Platonic view) requires that the object seen offers resistance to the light that comes out of the eyes – a light that gets stiff enough for us to see with it only when there is daylight to reinforce it of course – there must be something up there in the heavenly bodies that offers such resistance. This will be the highest gradation of earth.

[483] ὥστε καὶ λόγων ἔσται πλῆρες θείων καὶ δημιουργικῶν καὶ εἰς πλῆθος προελήλυθε καὶ διάστασιν. I take it that the change from future to perfect tense is supposed to provide a contrast even in the absence of any particle to mark it.

We shall not fear those clever types among the dialecticians who – looking only to a certain small portion of nature – see fit to ridicule Plato [for saying that] the stars are carried around in a circle since they say that fire goes up.[484] These [observations] have no place in the case of the celestial fire. Just as the motion of the intelligible fire is not the same as that of fire that is corporeal in form (for after all, there *is* intellectual fire, which is the *logos* of fire that exists in the intellect), so too the motion of celestial and sub-celestial fire is not the same either. The motions that co-exist with things depend upon the order of the substances [that are involved]. If the fire from which the stars are composed is indeed divine, then it is not like this totally enmattered and densest fire [down here]. And if the former is the **brightest and most beautiful**, then it is different from that which is dark and mingles with matter's ugliness, for the final [gradation] of matter *is* darkness and ugliness, while this [celestial fire] *is* brightest and most beautiful – [observations] which are indeed sure indications (*tekmêrion*) of the truth! For the blinding transparency of its light[485] is an image of the divine goodness itself and its outstanding beauty is a fitting token (*endeigma*) of intelligible symmetry. Therefore the divine fire is one thing, but that which is not divine is something different.

Thus it seems to be the case that what is really fire (*to ontôs pyr*) is up there in the highest place, and through this the stars are fiery since they have been allocated to the place that belongs to fire. The highest gradation of earth is up there too, though conversely earth in general is down here.[486] [The earth down here] participates in the lowest gradation of fire, in as much as this was possible for something that was

[484] See *in Tim.* II 11.25–32. The objection is from Aristotle, *Cael.* I 2, 269b33–5.

[485] ὑπέρλαμπρον διαύγασμα τοῦ φωτὸς. διαύγασμα is hapax legomena in Proclus. The entry for διαυγασμός in LSJ seems to derive entirely from Anaximander's sole use DK A23. Suppose we take seriously the root verb here, which is about transparency or seeing through. ὑπέρλαμπρος, however, connotes excess of light or sound. Hence the paradoxical phrase 'blindingly transparent'. Does this make sense? Perhaps. Recall that the celestial fire is not visible until it is condensed, for example in a planet like the Sun, since it is so tenuous as to offer no resistance to our vision (112.11–13). Its predominance in the heavens serves to make it invisible to us most of the time. A less adventuresome translation would be 'brilliant radiance'.

[486] γῆ δὲ ἀνάπαλιν ἐνταῦθα μὲν εἶναι ἡ ὅλη. ἡ ὅλη γῆ here is not equivalent in meaning to τὸ ὅλον πῦρ above at 112.12. That term was used synonymously with the 'highest form' or 'fire in its most general or universal sense'. Here ἡ ὅλη γῆ is simply the bulk of the quantity of earth (in whatever gradation). ἀνάπαλιν indicates that the case of fire and the case of earth are not parallel. In both cases, the highest forms are in the heavens. That goes without saying. But since the heavens are made mostly of fire, it is also true that the bulk or largest quantity of fire is up there too. By contrast, the quantity of the highest gradation of earth present in the heavens is small compared with the large quantity of low-grade earth down here.

earth – fire of the earthiest and densest sort – just as when the fire up there had a share of earth it was [a share of] the highest gradation of earth. These facts are entirely obedient to that rule which Ptolemy and Plotinus[487] have revealed: when any body is in its proper place, it either rests or is carried around in a circle. Going upward or going downward belong to things that are not in their proper place when they try to get to what is proper for them. So it is also the case with each of the other [elements] that when it is in its proper place, it must either be at rest or going in a circle, and should it be fiery and going up, it is in every case in a foreign place. 30 **115**

One must not mistrust the Theologians when they put the empyrian substance in the heavens,[488] for there are many forms of fire. Furthermore, to say simply that the celestial body is the fifth [element] is not yet to make anything clear about it except to say that it is different from the elements down here. Plato, however, has revealed its entire nature, leaving aside in the words at hand the [question of the nature of the] highest gradations of the [other] elements [apart from fire].[489] Thus one must refute the syllogism of those who think to refute Plato's account 5 10

[487] Plotinus' response to Aristotle's objection appears at II 2.1, 23–4. The reference to Ptolemy is less clear, but I suspect that Proclus has in mind something in the now-lost work, *On the Elements*. Compare Simplicius' report of its content at *in Cael.* 20.11–25.

[488] The Chaldean Oracles divide the universe into three regions: the Empyrian, the Aetherial and the Hylic (Lewy (1956), 137–57). See the discussion at *in Tim.* II 57.10–30 where Proclus seeks to reconcile their divisions with Plato's view that none of the four elements are found outside the universe.

[489] ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μὲν λέγειν ἁπλῶς, ὅτι πέμπτον ἐστὶ σῶμα τὸ οὐράνιον, οὐδέν ἐστι περὶ αὐτοῦ διασαφεῖν πλὴν ὅτι τῶνδε τῶν στοιχείων ἕτερον, ὁ δέ γε Πλάτων καὶ τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ πᾶσαν ἀνέπτυξεν, ἀπολείπων καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις τὰς τῶν στοιχείων ἀκρότητας. The role of ἐν ἐκείνοις in this sentence is rather mysterious. Diehl refers us to 117.2 where we have ὡς εἴρηται ἐν ἐκείνοις functioning clearly as a reference to *Tim.* 38c. It is on this basis, presumably, that Festugière translates the latter part of the sentence as: 'dans ce traité même, il admet la notion d'un degré supérieur des éléments'. This, he speculates, might be a reference to *Tim.* 45b4 where Plato distinguishes between the fire that burns and that which does not. But this is not an account of the highest gradations of the elements, but of one element alone – fire. It seems to me no less likely that ἐν ἐκείνοις refers to the words in the lemma under discussion. For here we have – on Proclus' reading at least – an account of the highest gradation of fire from which the celestial gods are composed. Plato, after all, has told us that it is brightest and fairest to see. He has not, however, given us an account of the highest gradations of earth or air or water. So I take ἀπολείπων in LSJ's II 3 sense, while Festugière has preferred I 4. My reading does a better job of connecting the concluding participle phrase with the overall point of the sentence. In effect, what Proclus is saying is that: unlike people who just go on about a fifth element, Plato has told us how the primary ingredient of the celestial composite – the highest gradation of fire – differs from the elements down here (though he has not given us a similarly detailed account of the highest gradations of the elements that are also present up there).

of the stars as [having its <substance> composed][490] **for the most part** from fire by refusing to accept their minor premise[491] – that fire goes up – for one should not characterise the nature of fire on the basis of that which is in an unnatural condition and going to its natural one, but rather on the basis of that which is in its natural condition. Such fire is that which either rests or goes in a circle.

E. Shape of the celestial creatures, *Tim.* 40a4–5

Assimilating [the celestial living beings] to the universe, he made them well-rounded (*Tim.* 40a4–5)

Each of the parts[492] possesses a two-fold similarity: the first to the appropriate wholeness, the second to the paradigm of its whole series. Things that are universal have only a single similarity, i.e that toward the paradigm upon which they are dependent. However, things that are parts [or particular] have a two-fold resemblance – in relation to the whole and in relation to the form of the wholeness.[493] Thus the partial [or particular] soul is assimilated both to the universal [or whole] soul and to the intellect, while the universal [or whole] soul has a single similarity in relation to the intellect that is one and universal [or whole]. Universal nature [or whole nature], in turn, has a single similarity to the soul, while a particular [or partial] nature is assimilated both to its own wholeness [or universal] and also to the soul. Therefore, according to this line of reasoning, it is surely the case that each of the stars is also

[490] ὡς τὴν πλείστην <ἰδέαν> ἐκ πυρὸς ἐχόντων. Diehl inserts the term from Plato's lemma where D and ς have οὐσίαν. It is not clear that either is strictly necessary given the context.

[491] τῇ ἑτέρᾳ προτάσει; Festugière reconstructs the syllogism in question as follows: (1) No element whose natural motion is rectilinear is the celestial element; (2) The natural motion of fire is rectilinear (i.e. upward); so fire is not the celestial element.

[492] The following passage is one is which *meros* or part is opposed to *holos* (which can be 'whole' or 'general') in ways that defy easy translation into English. Contemporary philosophy has one contrast between 'part' and 'whole' and a different, unrelated contrast between 'particular' and 'universal'. The instantiation relation that obtains between universals and particulars is different from the parthood relation. Our understanding of a universal is one that has its origins in Aristotle, but in Aristotle there is a linguistic connection with the first distinction. Particulars are *kath hekasta* while the universal is *katholou* from *kata* + *holon*. Perhaps in part because of this linguistic connection, Proclus seems to intuit some intimate connection between the two distinctions, though the exact nature of this connection is not easy to fathom. For an initial attempt, see Baltzly (2008). In what follows, I will give what I think is the most plausible translation of the terms, followed by an alternative in brackets that will perhaps aid non-Greek readers in seeing other semantic possibilities.

[493] πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν τῆς ὁλότητος. It looks as if the form or kind here is equated with the paradigm or unparticipated monad at the head of a series.

made to represent both the entire cosmos [of which it is a part] and its appropriate paradigm.[494] The similarity is different in each case, for in the latter case [the star is assimilated] in terms of its whole substance,[495] while in the former case it is assimilated in terms of its shape and its motion. After all, [each star] was created to be well-rounded, just as the cosmos too is spherical in form, for the universe is a sphere in the primary manner, so far as this is possible among the sensibles.[496] Through this fact itself it also imitates the Demiurge and the intelligible Paradigm, for it is by each of them converging upon itself that it establishes the visible living being.[497] But convergence up there was tied together with the well-rounded circle down here, because what has come to be has been imprinted throughout with the distinctive property of the Paradigm as far as was possible. Enough on these matters.

If we wish to investigate the cause through which a part has come to bear a resemblance to the universe, we will not be at a loss for arguments, for this result is not possible in every case. After all, it would not be for the best for the eye to have come to have the same shape as the whole [of which it is a part], nor is this argument true in the case of the heart or the head. When it is the wholeness that is *prior to the parts* that is at issue, then it *is* possible for the parts to be made to resemble the whole and for

494 These two examples show why it is not possible to get a consistent reading of the semantic duality of *holos* as 'whole' or 'universal'. The conclusion that Proclus wants is that each planet is similar both to the cosmos (of which it is a part) and also to its hypercosmic paradigm. But that relation won't work for the case of individual or partial souls. Individual souls are not *parts of* the World Soul or universal soul (cf. Plotinus IV 3.5) except perhaps as a theorem is part of a science (IV 3.2, 49–58). The relation between individual souls and the universal soul is more akin to the particular–universal relation than it is to the part–whole relation. The assimilation to the particular–universal relation is not complete, of course, since individual souls are deficient in relation to that from which they derive their being; cf. Steel (1978). In general, Proclus' argument positively requires a confused notion of *meros* and *holos*.

495 The paradigm to which the celestial living beings are assimilated is presumably the form in the Living Being Itself. Previously *ousia* and *idea* have been used interchangeably in the discussion of Timaeus' claim that the Demiurge ἀπειργάζετο this genus τὴν πλείστην ἰδέαν ἐκ πυρὸς (112.23–6). Fire is the element that has the status of form in relation to the others. So by making the celestial living being for the most part from fire, the Demiurge makes them similar to their paradigm κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὅλην.

496 πρώτως γὰρ σφαῖρα τὸ πᾶν ὡς ἐν αἰσθητοῖς. The universe is a sphere in the primary mode of being – that is, in the mode of being that is most proximate to and thus most similar to the cause of being spherical.

497 εἰς ἑαυτὸ συννεῦον. Because *noêsis* is an activity that resembles the sphere (*Laws* 898a–b), Proclus talks about the Paradigm and the Demiurge converging upon themselves to describe their self-cognition. Cf. *in Tim.* II 92.3 for the Paradigm and I 71.1 for the Demiurge.

the good to belong to them through this resemblance. However, where the wholeness is made out of the parts, in this case it is no longer a good thing for the part to be assimilated to the whole. Now the universe is such a thing, since it is a whole that is prior to its parts and is essentially constituted by the partial kinds of living beings in accordance with the third form of wholeness, just as we said earlier (97.12). [This is just what we should expect] since the Living Being Itself [upon which the universe is modelled] is also a whole and entirely-complete (*pantelês*) in as much as it is a monad and includes all the intelligible living beings through the aforementioned tetrad.

F. The position of the celestial creatures, *Tim*. 40a4–7

He put them into the wisdom of that which is dominant to keep company with it, distributing all [the celestial living beings] around the heavens in a circle [so that], when it had been decorated throughout, there is a true cosmos in it. (*Tim*. 40a4–7)[498]

The position of the stars is discussed herein and it is said that they have been placed throughout the circle of the Same's revolution and that he 'enwreathed the [broad] heaven', as the poem says (*Od*. V 303), arranging one order over others and presenting a wondrous variety (*Tim*. 39d2). But if you wish to speak more grandly on this subject, he placed the stars into the divine soul of the sphere of the fixed stars, manifestly animating them and providing them with an appropriate life and intellect. In like manner
117 he also put the planets into the orbits (*periphora*) which the revolution

[498] Proclus' quotation of the lemma differs from the text of the OCT by the inclusion of the preposition ἐν prior to αὐτῷ: κόσμον ἀληθινὸν αὐτῷ πεποικιλμένον εἶναι καθ' ὅλον. This variation is not recorded in the critical apparatus, perhaps because of the comment of Stallbaum: 'Ita ubi haec acceperis, pro αὐτῷ non erit cur ἐν αὐτῷ requiras, quamquam Proclus p. 275 ita scriptum exhibet.' Hence we have in Cornford 'to be in very truth an adornment (cosmos) *for it*, embroidered over the whole'. But the inclusion of ἐν does not allow αὐτῷ to function in this way. I have translated this passage in the manner in which I imagine Proclus understands it. Grammatically, of course, it is not quite right, since we would need ὡς or ὥστε with the infinitive to convey the idea that when the decorating has taken place this *results in* there being a true cosmos in the heaven. That this is, however, Proclus' understanding of the lemma emerges later when he discusses the divinity of the Earth (141.25–28). The relevant connection seems to be between the fact that *all* the celestial living beings are in the heavens and the fact that *all* the elements exist in a manner where they are distinct from one another in the Earth. The fact that the Earth πάντα στοιχεῖα διακεκριμένως ἔχειν renders it (ἀποτελῶν) not merely a cosmos, but a κόσμον ὅλον that is ἀνὰ λόγον τῷ οὐρανῷ πεποικιλμένον. Recall, of course, that in the present passage we have a πεποικιλμένον καθ' ὅλον that yields a 'true cosmos'. Just prior to 141.25–28 Proclus has invoked the *Phaedo*'s phrase 'true Earth' (110a1).

(*periodos*) of the Different makes, as was said at that point in the text (*Tim*. 38c7–8). After all, since they are living things that are *divine*, it is necessary for them to have a soul that is intellectual and for it to possess a divine intellect. That they are not solely animated by the World Soul, but that each one possesses a soul that has been individually instituted [for it] we may learn by having reflected upon the fact that, among the living things down here all those that are animated by their own individual souls, which illuminate them with life, in addition to [being animated] by the World Soul (human beings, for example) are superior to all those that are animated by the World Soul alone (for instance, the things that are the last stages of creation).[499] While the former are preserved from two [sources of life], the latter are barely kept alive as a result of the World Soul. But if this is true and if the bodies of the celestial beings are superior to our own bodies, then *a fortiori* each star is animated by its own individual soul in addition to [being animated by] the Cosmic Soul, and if each one is indeed like the whole heaven within which it is [positioned], then it too is carried around in a circle. But if this is the case, then every one of them is moved in a circle around its own centre. And if this is so, and if it is also the case that every eternal motion has its own individual cause, then there will be as many kinetic causes as there are things that are individually moved, as Aristotle says,[500] and it is necessary that in the stars there have been established individual souls that move them, and if they [the souls] move them [the stars] in an orderly manner, then [it is also necessary that] they [sc. the souls] be rational (*noeros*). But if that which it is not lawful to say in the case of divine bodies (sc. that they move irregularly)[501] were to obtain, then [the souls that move them will be] irrational (*alogos*) – a [conclusion] that ranks among the genuinely absurd – it is necessary that each of the stars has its own individual divine soul in command.[502] Due to the fact that there are souls in them, they are connected to the World Soul, while it is due to the intellect that they are unified with the universal Intellect.

499 For the ensoulment of plants, embryos and the Earth in general in the commentary tradition, see Sorabji (2005a), vol. 1, 253–60.

500 Diehl provides only a general reference to *Phys*. 8.4. However, the question of whether Aristotle supposes that each star has its own soul is a complicated one. The various comments we find on the life and motion of the stars do not add up to any single clear picture; cf. Scott (1994), 24–38.

501 εἰ δ', ὃ μὴ θέμις εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ θείων σωμάτων; cf. *Tim*. 29a2–4 εἰ μὲν δὴ καλός ἐστιν ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ὅ τε δημιουργὸς ἀγαθός, δῆλον ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἀίδιον ἔβλεπεν· εἰ δὲ ὃ μηδ' εἰπεῖ τινι θέμις, πρὸς γεγονός.

502 τῶν ἄστρων ἰδίαν ἔχειν ἐπιβεβηκυῖαν θείαν ψυχήν; cf. above 59.29–31 where it is the World Soul's circle of the Different that takes command: ἡ θατέρου περίοδος τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς τοῖς ἑπτὰ τούτοις θείοις σώμασιν ἐπιβέβηκε.

After all, given that there is a share of reason and intellect present to
25 mortal beings, what is it necessary to think about the bodies of the gods
themselves? Therefore it is through their own individual souls that [each
star] is inserted into the soul of the motion of the Same[503] – a [motion?]
which has plausibly been called **dominant** in as much as it predominates
over all of the revolutions [of the Different] and articulates all these
[revolutions] in an intellectual manner. In the same manner in which the
30 genus of the stars is led around by the universal motion, so too the souls of
the stars are doubtless encompassed by the single soul that belongs to the
rotation of the Same and the intellects [of the stars are encompassed by]
the intellect.[504] In addition, it is also necessary that there be, subsequent
118 to the transcendent monad, a monad that is coordinate with the plurality.
Thus since the transcendent monad is the very first[505] of the four forms,
the plurality of stars that proceeds from this is encompassed by the sphere
of the fixed stars which is a coordinate monad. In a similar manner, the
5 universal sphere too has the status of a monad in relation to the individual
celestial spheres, while the Rulers of the Cosmos are [each] leaders of
the plurality for that individual sphere, for in the case of each sphere
there exists a number [of living beings] proportional with those spheres'

[503] ἐντέθειται οὖν διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ψυχῆς εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τῆς ταὐτοῦ φορᾶς. τὴν ψυχὴν τῆς ταὐτοῦ φορᾶς seems odd, but it is repeated again below at 118.16–17 with συνάπτει rather than ἐντέθειται: συνάπτει δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὅλην ψυχὴν τῆς ταὐτοῦ φορᾶς. One is prepared to accept that the World Soul *has* its own motion of the Same, since the World Soul is constituted by the circle of the Same and its motion. But what in the world can the soul *of that motion* be? In the latter case, it is tempting to suppose that διὰ has fallen out prior to τῆς ταὐτοῦ φορᾶς: each star is connected to the World Soul through the motion of the Same. But this happy solution for the 118.16–17 passage is precluded by the parallel here where the stars are not inserted into the World Soul through having the motion of the Same, but by having their own individual souls: διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ψυχῆς in this line is subsequent to διὰ μὲν τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐσῶν ψυχῶν συνάπτεσθαι πρὸς τὴν ὅλην ψυχήν above at 21–23. So there's no option to blame the copyist for whatever incoherence there might be here. Perhaps the explanation lies in Proclus' quotation of the lemma. There he writes (correctly) that the Demiurge τίθησί τε εἰς τὴν τοῦ κρατίστου φρόνησιν. Since τοῦ κρατίστου is masculine, this must mean ὁ ταὐτοῦ κύκλος. But in the immediately subsequent line he switches to the feminine participle in glossing the lemma: ἣν "κρατίστην" εἰκότως ἐκάλεσεν ὡς κρατοῦσαν πασῶν τῶν περιφορῶν. Now φορὰ is feminine, but so too is ψυχή. Is it possible that Proclus has mentally slipped from a lemma that discusses the dominant *circle* of the same, to a version that discusses the dominant *motion* of the same, to supposing that it discusses another feminine noun, and arrived at last at the soul of the motion of the Same? This confusion would have to survive the flip back to the masculine τοῦ κρατίστου φρόνησιν at 118.21, but there he is describing Iamblichus' views on the passage and perhaps mixing his previous confusion with Iamblichus' correct quotation of the lemma.

[504] Probably the intellect of the World Soul is meant rather than the *nous noeros*.

[505] τῆς πρωτίστης τῶν τεττάρων ἰδεῶν = the celestial genus of gods in *Tim.* 39e10.

appropriate revolutions, [a population] that co-exists with the chorus of the fixed stars.[506]

Now, if in the case of the fixed stars the single monad is their wholeness [sc. the sphere], but if in the case of the planets the wholeness is one thing [the sphere], while there is also a planetary leader for each, there is nothing amazing in that, for as the motion of the rotations of the [circle of the] Different is more varied, so too the things that do the leading are more numerous, for the plurality has proceeded to a greater extent. In the case of the things in the sub-lunary realm, the leaders are yet more numerous, for the monads in the heavens engender numbers that are proportional to them.

In any event,[507] it is just as we said: on the one hand, the animation of the stars inserts the stars in their own specific souls, while on the other it connects them to the World Soul of the motion of the Same.[508] It also

[506] ἔστι γὰρ καθ' ἑκάστην ἀριθμὸς ἀνὰ λόγον τῷ τῶν ἄστρων χορῷ συνυφεστὼς ταῖς οἰκείαις περιφοραῖς. Above at 58.11 we learnt that each sphere has a number of astral creatures in it and that each planet is a leader of such a plurality. See also *in Tim.* III 129.9–14, 131.1–3. The present passage seeks to tell us something about the population of these invisible satellites of the planets, but the singular and plural datives make it difficult to ascertain exactly what is meant. The masculine participle συνυφεστὼς takes a dative and presumably ἀνὰ λόγον governs the other dative, but which is which? Festugière translates: 'Car il y a pour chaque sphère, en proportion du chœur des astres qui y sont inclus, un nombre fixe de cosmocrateurs correspondant aux révolutions propres à ces astres.' This, I think, cannot be right. First, since the context suggests that we are now discussing planetary spheres – not the sphere of the fixed stars – there is no choir of stars included in each one. Or at least there is no visible choir. There is just one planet. Moreover the other passages that deal with the satellite beings in the planetary sphere suggest that there is just one Ruler: the visible planet. So it cannot be the number of Rulers that corresponds to the revolutions proper to the star in question. My guess is that τῷ τῶν ἄστρων χορῷ goes with συνυφεστὼς since the number – of living beings and thus the living beings themselves – is co-existent with the inhabitants of the sphere of the fixed stars. It would be absurd if the population of the sphere of Saturn or Venus changed. That means that ἀνὰ λόγον goes with ταῖς οἰκείαις περιφοραῖς. What sense can be made of this? I suspect that Proclus supposes that the invisible population of a planetary sphere is proportional to the number of revolutions that planetary sphere makes in a Platonic Great Year. Given the relative periods of, say, Mercury and Saturn, this would mean that the sphere of Mercury is more densely populated with invisible satellite creatures than that of Saturn. This, of course, gets things wrong as we understand the notion of satellites. However, it does give what Proclus would regard as the right distribution. As we come closer to the sub-lunary realm of Becoming, plurality increases.

[507] Proclus, *in Tim.* III 118.16–21 = Iamblichus, *in Tim.* fr. 71 (Dillon).

[508] See note 503 above. Dillon connects the distinction drawn here between the Cosmic Soul and the τὴν ὅλην ψυχὴν τῆς ταὐτοῦ φορᾶς with Proclus' earlier disagreement with Iamblichus about whether the *Timaeus* includes a hypercosmic soul (Iamblichus, fr. 54 = *in Tim.* II 240.4, ff.). I confess that I find Dillon's comments in this regard too brief to be illuminating. Is the idea that the distinction is one that Iamblichus

leads them up to the Cosmic Soul, and it seats them in the intelligible Paradigm itself – a fact which the divine Iamblichus sees with remarkable clarity when he places **the wisdom of that which is dominant** in the Paradigm.

The sphere of the fixed stars is a **true cosmos** because it is more properly speaking a cosmos [or ordered arrangement] than the one in the sub-lunary region which is always in need of orders from elsewhere and is continually changing.

In addition, the cosmos has thus been **decorated** in as much as it has been made to bear the impression of intellectual variety, like uni-form blossoms that it has received throughout itself that imitate the beauty of the celestial paradigm.

The words to **distribute** or to **distribute in a circle** are appropriate to it too, for the one signifies the intellectual permanence (*dianomê*), while the other indicates the Demiurgic order, for it is on this account that the Theologians[509] appointed Good Governance (*Eunomia*) to rule over the fixed stars, since she distinguishes the plurality in it [sc. the sphere] and always maintains watch over the appropriate order. On this account, then, they also celebrate Hephaestus as the maker of the heavens, conjoining him with Beauty (*Aglaïa*) in as much as he beautifies (*aglaïzein*) all the heavens through the decoration of the stars. Among the Seasons (*Hôrai*) in turn, they set Justice (*Dikê*) to govern over the planets as the one who is responsible for bringing irregularity into rational regularity,[510] while it is Thaleia among the Graces who makes the planets' lives evergreen (*aeithalês*). They appointed Peace to rule over the sub-lunary region in as much as she pacifies the war of the elements, but Good Cheer (*Euphrosynê*) endows each of the things down here with good nature when they are engaged in their natural activities.

G. The motions of the celestial genus, *Tim*. 40a8–b4

He assigned two motions to each, one in the same and around the same (since each always thinks the same thing for itself concerning the same things), the other going forward (since each is dominated by the revolution of the Same and the Similar). But with respect to the five motions [each one] is motionless and at rest in order that each of them might be the best possible. (*Tim*. 40a8–b4)

endorses, so that the latter soul is equivalent to the hypercosmic soul discussed in fr. 54 – a soul whose presence in the *Timaeus* Dillon supposes Proclus to reject? But this seems unlikely since it is Proclus who introduced the phrase earlier at 117.26.

[509] *Orph*. fr. 181 (Kern); cf. *in Tim*. 1 333.2–6.

[510] The planets' motion is, of course, regularly irregular or irregularly regular (57.5–7) according to Proclus. Justice is here given credit for this fact.

1. General interpretation – the two motions

The account that deals with the motion [of the stars] comes after that which deals with the animation. This is because each of the stars has been ensouled and by virtue of this fact allotted an appropriate motion, for the soul is an origin (*archê*) of motion.[511] Furthermore, [the account of the stars' motion] has been woven together with the theory that concerns the shape [that each one possesses], for since the circular shape is the one that is appropriate and this has been received from the Demiurgic causes, it is necessary for each one to have an activity that is appropriate to its shape and [this activity is] circular motion. After all, every natural body is moved *per se* and not incidentally [when it moves naturally], if nature is in fact a origin of motion or [more broadly] change which is in a natural body in the primary manner, *per se* and not incidentally.[512] But the starry body is changeless (*akinêton*) with respect to all the other changes[513] in as much as it is everlasting (*aidios*) and exists at all times. It is only able to admit of motion with respect to place, and circularity belongs to this motion insofar as each star undergoes motion in its own place.

Furthermore, there is also that which I mentioned earlier (117.10): how will it be possible for a star to be composed of the same substance as the entire heaven unless it is of course carried around in a circle in accordance with some individual motion? And how will it imitate the universe in any manner other than by being carried about its own centre? Therefore it is necessary that the stars are moved with respect to two motions – one is a *per se* motion around its own centre, while the other is a motion that takes place in conjunction with its own wholeness.[514]

[511] Diehl refers us to Aristotle, *DA* II 1, 412b16, but Proclus would presumably think that this is just a question of Aristotle being in agreement with Plato, for Proclus locates the source of the idea that soul is an origin and source of motion with *Phaedrus* 245e and *Laws* 10. 892a; cf. *in Crat*. §102.

[512] With Diehl, cf. Aristotle, *Phys*. 2.1, 192b21–33. Proclus regards this too as part of the common core of Platonism, broadly construed so as to include Aristotle. Note the 'we say' at *in Parm*. 792.19–20.

[513] Here context invites us again to depart from 'motion' as the traditional translation for '*kinêsis*'. You could preserve the usual translation with the proviso that motion with respect to quality is alteration; motion with respect to quantity is increase or decrease; while motion with respect to place is locomotion or what we normally call in English just 'motion'; cf. Aristotle, *Phys*. V 2, 226a24–b1. But it seems simpler to just adjust for the context. Proclus' point is that since the stars are eternal, they don't undergo any kind of change other than change in place or locomotion.

[514] Recall that the sphere of the fixed stars is the 'wholeness' of the stars (118.9), so this second motion is the stars' motion from east to west as they are carried along with the sphere's motion.

What then are these two motions? Different people say different things [on the subject]. Some say that both [motions] are corporeal, while others say that one of them is psychic, while the other is corporeal. But it is better to make the psychic motion, as well as the corporeal motion two-fold, for the soul that belongs to these divine living beings has an appropriate way of life (*zôê*) and through these appropriate activities it is conjoined to the intelligibles. Furthermore, it is led around together with the World Soul because, in the case of divine beings, it is surely [true] that the parts (as it were) and their activities are active in conjunction with those of the wholes [of which they are parts]. Thus the soul [of each star] is moved doubly, and so too is its body. [The body] revolves around its own centre, imitating the distinctive activity of its own soul. Its own intellect is also carried along with the forward motion of the sphere of the fixed stars, imitating the joint activity of its soul with the soul's own wholeness, as well as the settlement (*endrysis*) in the whole that belongs to the intellect that is in it. Therefore in the case of both the star's soul and its body a double kind of motion must be accepted, for the soul in particular has the same wisdom concerning the same matters, always cognises in the same manner,[515] and is moved forward following the wholeness to which it belongs. Because it has a share of powers that are more divine, it goes back up to the very highest of the intelligibles – something which one might say has the status that belongs to those who lead and which is 'in front of' the soul in as much as it is cognised and seen by the soul. (Thus Socrates in the *Republic* distinguishes, in the case of the signs that are attached to souls, between those that are hung in front and those in back since these signify whether the soul is to be dispatched toward intellect or toward nature.)[516] The body [of the star], however, is moved toward those who are in the lead in conjunction with the revolution of the whole, though it also has its distinctive motion which is impelled from itself and bears an image (*indalma*) of the
121 activities of discursive thought and of eternal and intellectual motions. Through [the words] **in the same** he shows that it has the same motion in relation to the whole, while through [the words] **it always thinks about the same things**, he shows that it has always been ordained for the same

[515] Cf. *Laws* 10, 898a8–9.

[516] In the myth of Er (614c6–d1) the judges send souls by the upward path with signs bearing the verdict passed on them on their fronts (πορεύεσθαι τὴν εἰς δεξιάν τε καὶ ἄνω διὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, σημεῖα περιάψαντας τῶν δεδικασμένων ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν), while those who are unjust take the downward path, wearing signs of what happened to them on their backs (τοὺς δὲ ἀδίκους τὴν εἰς ἀριστεράν τε καὶ κάτω, ἔχοντας καὶ τούτους ἐν τῷ ὄπισθεν σημεῖα πάντων ὧν ἔπραξαν). Cf. Proclus, *in Remp.* II 152.17–26.

purpose, participates in the same soul, and is reverted upon the same intellect.[517]

2. Lexis

It is necessary[518] at this point that the distinctions that follow his doctrines be made concerning individual words and phrases in this manner. He has given to each of the stars two motions: **the one in the same and around the same**. This we must say means the [corporeal] motion of the star around its appropriate centre. Then, punctuating with a comma, one must add that each **always thinks the same thing for itself concerning the same things**. (For having given to each star a corporeal motion around its own centre, he then gave it a *psychic* motion too – one that always thinks the same things for itself.) [We must say that this] psychical motion is discursive thought since it is always about the things that are.[519] The [words] **same** [thought] and **about the same things** make this clear, for the star's soul does not entertain different thoughts at different times about the same matters – that's what happens to us when we take leave of the objects of thought or do not entertain the same thoughts about the same things. In the case of the remaining [phrase] – **the one that goes forward** – this means the corporeal motion through which [each star] is moved as a whole from [one] place [to another]. Then, punctuating with a comma, one most add **being dominated by the motion of the Same and the Similar**. The motion of the Same and the Similar means the movement of the circle of the Same which belongs to the World Soul – a soul by which the soul of each of the stars is governed. And when it imitates [that soul], it is moved toward what is before it – which is, of course, genuine Being (*to ontôs on*) – since it has been yoked together with the intellectual activities of that soul and assimilates itself to the divine orbits of the World Soul. It is clear that the movement forward belongs only to things that are wholly moved from place to place, so that while the stars would be moved forward, the sphere of the fixed stars would not, but instead has only motion in a circle. The planets are moved in the same manner as the stars, but not the planetary spheres.

[517] Diehl inserts καὶ after a comma, but it seems better to insert δηλοῖ or similar, since Proclus has now shifted to a discussion of individual words and phrases.

[518] As Festugière notes, this paragraph contains a mixture of finite verb forms as well as participles with accusative and infinitive. Presumably everything is meant to be governed by the initial Δει that opens the paragraph.

[519] Reading δεδωκὼς (δέδωκε codd.) γὰρ τὴν σωματικὴν τὴν περὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον κέντρον ἑκάστῳ δέδωκε (δεδωκὼς codd.) καὶ τὴν ψυχικὴν [ἀεὶ ταὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ διανοουμένῳ), ταύτην λέγοντας τὴν ψυχικὴν] διανοητικὴν οὖσαν τῶν ὄντων ἀεί [δῆλον secl. Diehl] with Festugière.

3. Related topics

a. Correlations between motions and order

Here once again we can see the rank of the objects as a result of the num-
122 ber of motions. The motion that belongs to the universe is uni-form, while that of the fixed stars is dual-in-form, and the motion of the things in the sub-lunary realm is, in turn, multi-form and indefinite.[520] Furthermore, though each of the planets is moved with a uni-form motion,
5 nonetheless the combination of the many orbits – both the orbit that belongs specifically to each planet, as well as those that are consequent upon the orbit of the fixed stars – produces a motion that involves variety. After all, it was necessary for the cause of variety and the origin (*archê*) of opposition to be antecedently comprehended in the heavens, for how else will the heavens be able to contain the Becoming? How will the heavens be able to guide the change that occurs among the sub-
10 lunary elements unless it includes within itself the origin of opposition? But since the heavens are as immaterial as possible for sensible things, the opposites are not in conflict in it, nor is there faction among them. Instead they co-exist (*synÿparchein*) with one another and the same thing is moved with respect to the two revolutions. And it is not that the one
15 motion is *per se*, while the other is incidental, if it is necessary to say what I believe to be the case: rather each of the two is *per se*. After all, what could count as incidental up there since these things are entirely immaterial and have all been established from the universal creation?[521] Thus the shape and the motion up there are [both] essential (*ousiôdês*).[522] In any event, since it is immaterial – I mean [lacking] this matter [down
20 here; the kind] that is unstable and has acquired only a bastard beauty, being itself deformity – the heavens have comprehended these opposite two motions together at the same time. For since, when the opposites exist apart from this [sort of] matter that doesn't retain anything[523] they

[520] μονοειδὴς μὲν γάρ ἐστι κίνησις ἡ τοῦ παντός. 'The universe' in this context must refer to the sphere of the fixed stars that has only motion in a circle. Note the previous distinction at 121.28–9: ὥστε τὰ μὲν ἄστρα κινοῖτ' ἂν εἰς τὸ πρόσω, ἡ δὲ ἀπλανὴς οὐκέτ', ἀλλὰ κύκλῳ μόνον.

[521] ἐκ τῆς ὅλης δημιουργίας; cf. *in Tim.* II 3.1.

[522] The point seems to be that the planetary spheres' motion in the opposite direction is not simply one that is somehow communicated to these spheres from the sphere of the fixed stars. Rather this motion belongs to those planetary spheres *per se* and results from their essence. The opposition between these motions – an opposition that involves no conflict – is the pre-existent cause of genuinely clashing forces in the sub-lunary world.

[523] ἔξω γὰρ ὄντα τῆς ὕλης ταύτης τῆς οὐδὲν στεγούσης, cf. II 10.5 τὴν παχυτάτην ὕλην καὶ μὴ στέγουσαν τὰ εἴδη διορίζων.

are things that go together and are unified with one another. However, when they are in matter, they are in conflict since they are unable to receive the presence of both forms due to the weakness of matter. Let these things, then, be said on the subject of the motions [of the stars].

b. The forward motion of the fixed stars

What are the five motions which he takes away from the fixed stars? Obviously up and down, in reverse, and to the right or to the left, for since he had already taken the six motions from the sphere of the fixed stars earlier (34a4–5), he gave the motion forward to the stars in order that [each star] be moved with the motion of the whole. To the planets, however, he gave not only the forward motion, but also backward [or retrograde] motion[524] for it is solely in terms of the latter that they are said to 'wander'. There is no need to be amazed if the motion which he earlier called 'to the right' (36c7) he now calls **motion forward**, for it is 'to the right' in as much [as one is thinking about it] in relation to the whole revolution, but it is 'forward' in as much as [one thinks of it] in relation to the stars. On the one hand, it appears to have the single motion 'that is particularly relevant to intellect and wisdom' (34a2) and none of the other six motions insofar as it is one cosmos. But on the other hand, insofar as has been divided into fixed stars and planets, it also appears to have motion 'to the right' and 'to the left' (36c6–7) due to the double revolutions. Insofar as it contains particular living things [sc. different celestial gods] it also appears to have motions that are invariant (*aplanês*) and wandering (*planômenos*) or motion forward and motion backward – the former in the case of the [astral living things] that are fixed, the latter in the case of the [planetary living things] that wander. It also seems, as far as it is possible to divine from these things, that it moves each of the fixed stars in a similar manner to the sphere of the fixed stars around its own centre, but in as much as each goes toward the *west* it is rotated. For if it happens in this manner, then when each one is also moved by the whole, then it will be moved toward what is *in front* of itself, for the 'that toward which' there is a natural motion in each case determines what is

123

[524] τὴν εἰς τὰ ἑπόμενα; lit. toward those who follow. Festugière helpfully refers us to Bouché-Leclercq (1899), 117, note 1 who writes: 'Dans le langage courant, avancer (προποδίζειν – τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς προστιθέναι) pour les planètes, signifie aller à l'encontre du mouvement diurne, suivant l'ordre des signes du Zodiaque (εἰς τὰ ἑπόμενα); reculer (ἀναποδίζειν – ὑποποδίζειν – ἀφαιρεῖν), c'est aller dans le sens du mouvement diurne (εἰς τὰ ἡγούμενα ou προηγούμενα).'

'the front' for each one.[525] Therefore, the 'that toward which' for the rotation of each [star] is this – toward the west – in order that it may be assimilated[526] in this respect to its own wholeness just as in the case of the planets the east is the front toward which each one is naturally carried.

In any event, the motion forward belongs to the fixed stars, but not to [any individual] planetary sphere, for in their case there is something external, and while some of them lead, others follow.[527] The universal sphere, by contrast, rises above all rectilinear motion and is conveyed with circular [motion] alone. One might also say that the planets are made to have their own individual motion toward the east when at the same time they are carried around in a circle and also moved as a whole through the depths of their spheres. One might also say that the east is in front of them, but they undergo a contrary revolution at the hands of the sphere of the fixed stars which carries them toward what is behind them in a manner opposed to their individual motion.

Therefore among the six motions, it is only forward motion that has been given to the stars. You could [use an argument to] prove that this motion is the most honourable one among those that are left.[528]
124 It is just as Aristotle says: the motion that belongs to what is best is the best motion. It is for this reason that locomotion is superior to the

[525] Diehl refers us to *Cael.* 2.2, 284b21, but it appears that here Aristotle defines the front in terms of the direction of *perception*, not natural motion; cf. *PA* 656b23. It appears to me that the more relevant passage is *Cael.* 2.5, 287b22–288a12. Simplicius' commentary on this passage (*in Cael.* 418.17–422.1) reveals that Alexander had much to say about the question of whether there is a natural forwards and backwards in the universe. The worry is one about circularity: if the natural forward motion is simply that from where the stars rise toward where they set, then in which ever way they go – westward or eastward – the motion is natural.

[526] Reading ὁμοιωθῶσι in line 18 with Schneider for ὁμοίως ἐν. The 'wholeness' for each star is the sphere in which they reside (118.9), so when they move to the west on their own individual axes, they are assimilated or made like their 'wholeness' which also goes from east to west.

[527] ἡ δ' οὖν εἰς τὸ πρόσω κίνησις τῶν ἀπλανῶν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς πλανωμένης. The latter seems to be a collective singular for the planetary spheres; cf. 70.6–7 above for the contrast τὴν μὲν τῆς ἀπλανοῦς, τὴν δὲ τῆς πλανωμένης ὅλης. Festugière has made an uncharacteristic slip: 'c'est aux fixes qu'appartient le mouvement en avant, non à la sphère des fixes'. Proclus' sentence goes on to offer what I take to be two grounds for denying forward motion to the spheres for the planets. First, there is something external to them, namely the sphere of the fixed stars, which must somehow complicate the determination of what counts as forward. Second, some among the planetary spheres lead (e.g. the Sun) while others follow (e.g. those of Venus and Mercury who stay in proximity to the Sun).

[528] That is, among the kinds of changes allowed for heavenly bodies. They do not, of course, have any kind of qualitative change – only change of place.

other motions,[529] and among the local motions the first one is circular [motion],[530] while motion toward the front [ranks] second.[531] After all, this [motion toward the front] belongs to the fixed stars: **with respect to the five motions each of them is motionless and at rest**. Plato said both [motionless and at rest] in order that you might not conceive of 'motionless' as paralysis or idleness or privation, but might instead take it [sc. motionlessness] to belong to the heavens due to superiority.[532] The [words] that follow show this too, for he says: **in order that each of them might be the best possible**. Now, if the motionlessness with respect to the five motions aims at the beauty and goodness of the order of the heavens, then it is not lifelessness or privation. It is instead a power that restricts variation (*poikilia*); for the circle of the fixed stars encompasses all motion, however it might be accomplished, while the forward motion added to the stars clearly shows that this motion serves as an origin (*archê*) for all rectilinear motion. The variation [that is evident] among [the motions of] the planets, however, directs all the indefiniteness (*aoristia*) in the realm of Becoming, since it moves it [sc. Becoming] proximately by means of articulating its own various motions.

c. Against the precession of the equinoxes

Therefore *Plato* has provided the fixed stars with this sort of motion. On the other hand, however many there might be among those who put their faith in observations who give the stars a retrograde motion around the poles of the ecliptic of a degree every hundred years, like Ptolemy and prior to him Hipparchus[533] – well, let these people know that, prior to them the Egyptians made use of observations too, and prior by far even to them, the Chaldeans (and prior to their observations, they were

[529] The reference is far from clear. Aristotle certainly argues that motion in place is *primary* in *Physics* 8.7, 260a27, ff. However, at no point does he argue that it is primary *because* it is the motion that belongs to the heavens. In the context, that would be close to begging the question.

[530] Circular motion is the only kind of motion that admits of the possibility of being single, continuous and everlasting; *Phys*. 8.8.

[531] Cf. *Cael* 2.5 288a2–5 Εἰ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἀεὶ ποιεῖ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων τὸ βέλτιστον, ἔστι δὲ καθάπερ τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς εὐθείας φορῶν ἡ πρὸς τὸν ἄνω τόπον τιμιωτέρα (θειότερος γὰρ τόπος ὁ ἄνω τοῦ κάτω), τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν.

[532] In the case of the heavens, the ἀκινησία with respect to the other kinds of motion or change is not a lack of something, but rather a positive attribute that belongs to this subject because of its inherent superiority to sub-lunary things that undergo the other forms of motion. Similarly, the negative predications of the One are not an indication that it lacks anything either, but rather that it is the causal source of the properties that are negated in its case; cf. *in Parm*. 1072.19–1077.18.

[533] Cf. *Almagest* 7.2 for Ptolemy's report concerning Hipparchus (2nd century BCE).

instructed by gods), and *they* believed similarly to Plato on the subject of the motion of the fixed stars, for on the question of the stars, the *Oracles* speak not merely once, but many times of the fixed stars having [only?] a forward march (*proporeuma*).

The course of the Moon and the forward march of the stars. (*Or. Chald.* 64)

And again

The forward march of the stars was not engendered for your sake. (*Or. Chald.* 107, v.6)

[Julian] the Theurgist provides the stars with a forward motion (*to prosthen kinêsis*) too in the *Guidebooks* when he says concerning the Third
125 Father, 'he affixed a great crowd of unwandering stars, forcibly conjoining fire to fire by means of a joint that has no capacity for being borne along an errant path'.[534] This testifies quite clearly that the fixed stars are invariably moved in the same [manner],[535] so that through both [these sources] one may have confidence in Plato's opinion.

In addition to these facts, the phenomena are sufficient to persuade anyone with eyes. It is obvious that if the fixed stars were moved around the pole of the ecliptic toward the following signs [i.e. eastwards], then Ursa Major – which since the time of Homer[536] has been said to be 'always visible' – must go below the horizon in no small part in these latitudes since it would on this assumption have now undergone a movement of more than fifteen degrees.[537] And if it does not turn around the pole for the celestial equator, then Canopus would no longer be visible to the people in the third *klima* (sc. southern lattitudes) when it makes its brief orbit above the horizon, nor to those in Rhodes where it grazes the horizon according to Posidonius.[538] But Ursa Major *is* always visible

[534] λέγων περὶ τοῦ τρίτου πατρός· ἔπηξε δὲ καὶ πολὺν ὅμιλον ἀστέρων ἀπλανῶν, τὸ πῦρ πρὸς τὸ πῦρ ἀναγκάσας πήξει πλάνην οὐκ ἐχούσῃ φέρεσθαι. See above note on 63.21–3 above and 132.28–133.1 below.

[535] σαφῶς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ μαρτυρεῖ κινεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀπλανεῖς. Presumably 'in the same' this means that they turn on their own axis and are carried along with the sphere's daily diurnal rotation, but they don't undergo the minuscule 'slipping back' that one might posit to explain the phenomenon of the precession of equinoxes.

[536] Cf. *Il.* 18.488 on the basis of which the scholiasts and Ps-Plutarch credit Homer with the recognition that the Bear is always visible.

[537] For discussion, see Siorvanes (1996), 287–8.

[538] 124.18–125.17 = *Posidonius* fr. 205 (Kidd). See the commentary there for the history of the idea, sometimes assigned to Posidonius, that we can distinguish seven regions of latitude by reference to half-hour differences in the length of the longest day. The third *klima* would include the band bounded by Alexandria to the south (14 hours) and Rhodes to the north (14.5 hours).

and Canopus *does* maintain the same position. Therefore the babbling on their part about the eastward motion of the fixed stars is just not true.

If they take themselves to say things consistent with the phenomena when they seek to recruit the calculations of the motions of the planets or the tables of nativities as [evidence for] the fixed stars undergoing an eastward motion – well, this is what must be said to them: those who find it unacceptable that the fixed stars undergo this motion are in utter agreement with the phenomena, and when they publish tables of planetary motions or apply themselves to matters concerning the casting of nativities, they have never had any need to bring this [supposed motion of the fixed stars] into the exposition of tables or the discovery of nativities.[539] I would say that the Chaldeans were examples of such people who were in possession of observations of whole cosmic periods and whose predictions of happenings (*pathêma*) both public and private were irrefutable. Why then are we to take as evidence the records of a few observations and juvenile sightings which are not so accurate, when the former [sc. the Chaldeans] testify to the beliefs of the **126** ancients on the subject of the motions of the fixed stars? For do they not know this – that it is possible to infer a true [conclusion] from false premises and that it is not necessary that when the thing concluded is in agreement with the phenomena, this is sufficient proof to be led to the truth of the premises?

H. Fixed stars and planets, *Tim.* 40b4–8

Which is doubtless the cause from which as many of the stars as are fixed have come about; being divine living things, they remain always rotating in the same on account of these things. Those that make a turn and go 'wandering' in this sense have come about in accordance with those [considerations] mentioned in what went before. (*Tim.* 40b4–8)

1. Lexis

The **cause** of the production of the stars includes all the things that are most properly [regarded as] first principles – the paradigmatic, the Demiurgic and the final cause – for it was from all of these that the stars were engendered as things of this sort and moved in this fashion.

The [word] **fixed** is one that reveals that they are uni-form and always proceed with the same motion, while the [phrase] **divine living things**

539 Ptolemy (*Tetrabiblos* 1 22) recommends the use of notional signs to correct for the gradual shift in the positions of the constellations. It appears from Proclus' remark that not all astrologers followed the practice of correcting for precession. Cf. Barton (1994), 92 and Bouché-Leclercq (1899), 129.

indicates the presence in them of both divine intellect and divine soul and, prior to these, of a single henad in virtue of which each one is a god. Because each one is a *living* thing, it has a *soul* that moves it. On the other hand, because each is a *divine* living thing, it is dependent upon a *divine intellect*. After all, it is not [simply] intellect which makes a thing divine, since there is also angelic intellect and daemonic intellect. Rather, this divine intellect differs in general from that which is not divine by being dependent upon divinity which makes the intellect itself divine.

The [words] **they remain always rotating in the same** represent the celestial everlastingness in accordance with which [the stars] always occupy the same region of the heavens, being moved around their own centres. It also represents their ceaseless activity and the incessant life that belongs to them.

2. General interpretation

Now, those who make the stars things that lack soul, or those who suppose that the souls of the celestial [bodies] change just like ours do, or those who imagine there to be a temporal genesis of them – [all these people] fail to obtain an understanding of Plato, for if some living thing is divine, then it *is* the case that it has a divine soul and a divine intellect, but it is *not* the case that [something is a divine living thing] merely
127 as a result of being animated by World Soul, for the Earth is also a divine living being, if it is in fact the eldest of the gods, and in it there are some living creatures that possess their only actuality (*entelecheia*) as a result of the soul of the universe,[540] yet these things are not divine living beings. Furthermore, if something remains in a condition of *always* being moved, it will not come to possess a soul as a result of time, nor will it give this up at some point, for the word 'always' makes clear in both cases that it is unable to undergo change with respect to time.

These [words] are concerned with the fixed stars. Concerning the planets, however, Plato again reminds us that while they do have varied motions, the motions are nonetheless in a [regimented] order (*en taxis*) and take place in accordance with measures and limits, for their simplicity includes plurality, the order [among them] preserves variety, and the measure [in accordance with which they take place] determines

[540] ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἐντελεχείας ἔχοντα μόνας. Diehl suggests ὅλης γῆς but Festugière is surely right that it is ψυχῆς that is intended. The term *entelecheia* in this passage should be understood in relation to Aristotle, *DA* 2.1, 412a20 where the soul is the 'first *entelecheia* of a body potentially having life'. This enlivening factor is not separate from the body (*in Tim.* III 300.2) and here Proclus implies that it derives from the World Soul that constitutes that body as part of its own, cosmic, body. But, of course, we would all agree that such lower life forms are not divine, in spite of the fact that they are animated by the World Soul.

the "wandering" [that they seem to exhibit]. What, therefore, does the present reminder mean and what [hidden] indication is presented to us? Or is it (as some say) this: that this [reminder] shows that the planets, even if they are in a sense superior to the fixed stars to the extent that they have been allotted a status as leaders and Rulers of the Cosmos and are, as the Theologians say, 'zone-free' (for in each of the Rulers of the Cosmos there exists an order of gods that is zone-free)[541] – in spite of this, the [planets] are simultaneously made less than the [fixed stars] with respect to the variety of movements, the wanderings, and the varied motion [that the planets, but not the fixed stars, exhibit]. We shall say that of course it is not absurd for the one thing to be both superior and subordinate to the same things [when considered] in relation to one concept or another. Rather, we shall inquire if this is [precisely] what is indicated by the fact that Plato talked about the planets *prior* to the fixed stars – imparting their order, motion and their powers as well as their periods and complete cycles – and then invoked the account concerning them once again *after* discussing the fixed stars. It is because the account of the former is secondary to that of the latter [when considered] with respect to the variety of their motions.[542]

To be divine living things is accordingly common to all of the fixed stars and the planets, for this is clearly said about both of them. It is a distinguishing feature for the former to undergo their specific motion invariably in the same place (for this is what was said about the fixed stars (40b2–7)). On the other hand, when the planets make their journeys through the heavens, they have 'turnings', for this is what has been said about the planets (39d8), just as he now refers to them as **those that make a turn**. It is therefore clear that Plato means that the planets themselves [perform] these turnings that they make on their journeys – coming to be closer or further from the Earth or changing in latitude – on their own. It is not the case that they are carried by other things, whether one says these 'other things' are counter-rotating [spheres] or epicycles.[543] Possessing a single yet varied motion thanks, as it were, to their own single nature, the planets exhibit progression or retrogradation in a helical manner and alter the configuration of their own orbit in all

128

[541] Cf. Lewy (1956), 137.

[542] So, according to Proclus, the order of Plato's discussion honours both the Chaldeans' insight that the planets have a superior status to the fixed stars in as much as they are zone-free Rulers of the Cosmos, but also the insight that superiority tracks simplicity, so that by this conception the stars are superior to the planets. Plato first discusses the planets (*Tim.* 38c–39e), then in the present passage mentions the fixed stars prior to the planets.

[543] I follow Festugière in reading καὶ οὐχ ὑπ' ἄλλων φερόμενα, καθάπερ φασὶ (rather than φησὶ) τῶν ἀνελιττουσῶν [τινες] ἢ τῶν ἐπικύκλων.

sorts of ways. As a result, the motion that belongs to each one is triple. First there is the one that happens when they are turned as they undergo motion with respect to latitude (*platos*) and depth (*bathos*) in conjunction with each planet being moved around it own centre. Then there is that which takes place when each one is led around its individual circle to the left [i.e. west to east]. Then there is the one [from east to west] which takes place due the fact that the motion of the Same dominates the entire motion of the Different.[544] So much then for these special beings which are things seen in the philosophy of Plato.

3. Assorted considerations

a. Composition of heavenly bodies and spheres

If, however, you were to demand to know what the composition is for the very planets and stars themselves or the universal spheres, and whether it is the same for the stars as for the spheres or whether they are different, we would reply through the Platonic first principles themselves when we say that the entire heaven is made from all of the elements, but that in one place fire in conjunction with earth is dominant, but that in another fire conjoined with what has the form of air is dominant, and in yet another place it is fire conjoined with the highest gradation of water, just as there is air with fire itself. With respect to each of these, there is variation in great abundance. It is surely for this reason that some things [in the heavens] are particularly visible (all those that have fire together with what is solid), while others are most invisible (all those that have fire together with what is translucent or diaphanous). It is by virtue of these latter things that it is possible to see the objects that are higher up (just as [it is possible to see objects] by virtue of the air), while the former things stand in the way of our sight. Now, if we have stated these matters correctly, it is quite plausible that the spheres [in the heavens] have a substance that is finer and more diaphanous, while the stars are more solid. However, fire predominates everywhere and the entire heaven is characterised in accordance with the power of this [element]. The fire up there is not caustic since the [region just] below the Moon, where we
129 have the very first [gradation] of the elements found down here (which Aristotle was in the habit of calling pyro-form), [contains nothing caustic either].[545] Neither is [the fire in the heavens] something destructive or

[544] As Festugière notes, there are in fact four motions here once we include the rotation of each planet on its axis; cf. *in Remp.* II 232.24–233.6.

[545] This, of course, is the fire sphere or *hypekkauma* just below the level of the Moon; cf. *Cael.* 2.7, 289a18–35 and *Meteo.* I 3.340b6–14. It is composed of a sort of fire that is not, in itself, such as to burn or give off heat. The Sun's motion in proximity to this fire

opposed to earth. Rather [the celestial gradation of fire] shines with life-engendering heat, the power to illuminate, as well as purity and translucency, for that which is violent is one thing, while that which is pure is quite another, as Socrates has shown in the *Philebus* (52c1–10). Therefore the fire up there is light and there is no need to cause trouble for the account concerning it by having recourse to this dense and dark fire [of ours]. In this way, then, the account concerning the planets will be provided in a manner appropriate to the things that have been said [by Plato}.

b. The possibility of planetary satellites

If there should be some other divine celestial creatures that follow along with the revolutions of the planets – [a class of beings] of whom the seven [planets] are the leaders – then Plato also included all of them in these [words in the lemma]. After all, these beings too **make a turn** and possess the sort of '**wandering**' that he spoke about in the case of planets just a bit earlier, since they revolve together with their own rulers[546] and complete their cycles in conjunction with them in the same manner in which the fixed stars are dominated by the rotation of the whole [sphere in which they are situated].

c. The planets and time

In any case, with respect to the latter he says earlier that these planets have come to be for the sake of the generation of time, so that time might be produced along with them. Through both their irregularity and the fact that they are always in motion, they bring forth into the cosmos different temporal measures – measures which the single time is such as to include, since it possesses the one periodic number that is inclusive of all the various numbers that belong to the periods [of the planets]. It is surely not the case that when Plato says that the fixed stars are moved around upon their own centres [i.e. on their axes], together with their forward motion, that he would *deny* that they contribute toward making time, since they too have a periodic number for their specific cycle in virtue of which time as a whole is measured. Rather, he talks about the planets in a manner that is fitting to the study of nature, mentioning

belt ignites it and it is this that explains the heat associated with this heavenly body; cf. Sorabji (2005b), vol. 2, 371–4. Proclus' point seems to be that if there is a form of fire that is (only just) within the sub-lunary realm yet is not caustic, then there is no obstacle to positing a fire in the heavens that does not burn things.

546 sc. the planets whose satellites they are.

them in particular since in their case there would be perception to testify to the motions of the planets by which [the temporal measures that they introduce] differ. However, there is nothing for us to grasp from perception concerning the different numbers that belong to the motions of the fixed stars or the periods which are produced when they go along their paths. Thus this fact (I mean, of course, the fact that the planets have come to be for the sake of time) has hopefully been especially noted by us through these words, just as Plato himself has noted it.

d. Celestial fire again

We have already (111.4, 114.7) spoken against all those who refuse to assent to the view that the heaven is made of fire on the grounds that fire is naturally carried upwards, but it is necessary to remind them again and again that they speak absurdly since they are fond of disputation.[547] These people look to this fire down here [as evidence for this putatively natural movement upward] which is fire in an unnatural condition, though what is natural to fire, even if one were to take that [fire] which is [just] below the Moon [as an example], is not to be moved upwards, but rather to remain in its own place. The fact that it is moved upward leads it into a natural condition, but the upward motion is not itself natural.[548] After all, *being healed* is not natural for a body, but rather *being in a state of health* [is what is natural]. Being healed is natural only to that which has been ill. Consequently being carried upward is natural [only] to that fire which is not completely fire, but what is natural for fire in a condition of activity (*kat' energeian*) is for it to remain in its natural [state] above – a [state] in which it rests. If it were to be moved, it would only have a single circular motion. If it is true, as Aristotle says, that the highest gradation of this [element] in our region is carried around in a circle in conjunction with the aether,[549] then it is demonstrated to a still far greater degree that [fire is naturally] carried around in a circle. After

547 Cf. 114.7 above.

548 Proclus thus denies Aristotle's premise that if a simple body is naturally at rest in place P, then the movement to place P must be itself a natural movement (*Cael.* 3.2, 299b30). The analogy that follows shows what is wrong with Aristotle's reasoning. Generally speaking, it does not follow that if it is natural for a body to be in a certain state (e.g. healthy) that the movement from some other state or position is itself natural. Being healed – analogous to the process of movement to a natural place – is not natural for an animal *qua* animal. It is natural, to the extent that it is natural at all, only for an animal *qua* diseased.

549 The following would be a devastating argument against Aristotle if indeed the layer of flammable substance found just below the Moon *rotated* along with the aether above it. But this seems unlikely since it is friction that results from the motion of the Sun's passing above it that ignites it and thus generates the heat that seems to derive from

all, if this is *always* carried around in a circle, then to the extent that this is possible, it is moved *naturally*, for what is unnatural cannot go on forever[550] since everything of this sort takes place by force. Now if it is the case that even below the Moon there is fire of this sort [that naturally moves in a circle], why are they disputing about the celestial [gradations] of fire having a motion upwards when their own arguments are going in opposite directions [lit. up and down]? These matters, as I said, have also been discussed to some extent in what has gone before.

e. Planetary satellites resolve Aristotle's question

Since Aristotle inquired into the cause through which the sphere of the fixed stars has comprehended many stars, though there is only one such sphere, while the planetary spheres which are multiple each have but one [body in them], it is possible to understand the things that he resolved on this question from his [written works]. However, we have already foreshadowed something on this subject (58.11, 118.9) and now, writing what comports with what was said before, we shall say that **131** each of the planetary spheres is a whole cosmos which includes many kinds of gods that are invisible to us, but in all these cases the visible star has a leadership role (*hêgemonia*). The fixed stars are different from those in the planetary spheres in this respect: while the former have a single monad – the wholeness [sc. the sphere] that belongs to them – in the latter case, where there are invisible [satellites] that revolve on their own spheres in conjunction with each of the planets, there are two [monads]: the wholeness and also a transcendent superiority that has been allocated to those that are included [within that wholeness or sphere]. After all, since they are secondary to the fixed stars, they needed twice as much care (*epistasia*) – one a kind of care that deals more with wholes (*holikôteros*), another kind that is more to do with parts (*merikôteros*).

One could also construct an argument from the extremes [for the conclusion] that there is a plurality in each of them [sc. the planetary spheres] that is coordinate with that sphere; for if the sphere of the fixed stars has a plurality that is coordinate with it and if the Earth [has a plurality] of terrestrial living beings, as the former sphere [of the fixed stars has a plurality] of celestial [living beings], then it is entirely necessary for each wholeness [i.e. each sphere] to have some sort of partial living beings that are coordinate with it, through which it is said to be a wholeness. Though the intermediate [cases] escape our

the Sun itself. If the *hypekkauma* were in motion with the aether, how would the Sun's passage generate the requisite friction?

[550] Cf. Aristotle, *Cael.* 2.3, 286a16–20.

sense perception, the [existence of the living beings] at the extremes is obvious – at one extreme [sc. the fixed stars] it is clear due to the outstanding brightness [of the celestial living beings], while at the other extreme [the existence of living things coordinate with the sphere in question] is clear due to the fact that [the terrestrial living beings] belong to the same kind as us. In addition, if particular souls have been sown round about them – some around the Sun, others around the Moon, others around each of the remaining [spheres] – and even prior to this there are daemons that fill up the herds of which they are the leaders, then it is clear that it has been well said that each of the spheres is a cosmos. And the Theologians teach us these things too when they say about each cosmos that, prior to the daemons, there are gods in them, with different gods [for each one] depending upon the leadership role for each different cosmos *** for instance, concerning our sovereign mistress, the Moon, they say that there are some specific goddesses in her – a Hecate and an Artemis. And concerning the King, Helios [the Sun], and the gods up there, the Theologians celebrate the higher Dionysius as:

Associate of Helios, gazing upon the holy, celestial pole (Or. Chald. *226)

They [also] praise the higher Zeus, the higher Osiris, and the solar Pan [and] the other gods which fill the books of the Theologians and the Theurgists. From all this it is clear how it can be true to say that each of the planets is a 'captain' of the many gods that fill up the specific orbit that belongs to him or her. Therefore we resolve these issues in this way.

This, however, is one thing that it is necessary to infer from what has been said: that according to Plato the fixed stars are not only higher than the planets in position, but are higher in value. In the case of the former, he says (40a3) that [the Demiurge] put them 'into the wisdom of the circle of the Same', while in the latter case [that they are in] 'the orbits which the revolution of the Different goes through' (38c7) because the first cohabits solely with the intellectual life of the Same, while the latter also lives together with the revolution of the Different. In every case they cohabit with the former, because they too are carried round by the sphere of the fixed stars, just as the fixed stars are, but along with their being carried round by the revolution of the Different as well. If, therefore, the first participate directly in the former [intellectual life] that is more divine, while the latter participate in it through the intermediary of an inferior [kind of intellectual life], then it is surely necessary that the one has a higher value, while the other has a lower one. Thus it seems that if there is something that must be inferred from these facts it is that the souls of the fixed stars live a life that is more in accord with the Same – though they would possess both [psychic] circles (since our souls have the

Same and the Different, as Plato in fact says, the stars' souls have them too) – and because of this these souls cohabit more with the World Soul by virtue of being similar. By contrast, the souls of the planets live more in accord with the Different and it is for this reason that their bodies are moved with a variety of motions and they are inserted into the orbits of the Different. These facts would also provide a reason for those who only look to the motions of the heavenly bodies – which is, of course, the distinctive characteristic of physical theory. And the Theurgist teaches us to consider both the stars and planets in this manner too when he is speaking about the creation of the fixed stars on the one hand and says 'he affixed a great crowd of unwandering stars – not by a tension laborious [or] onerous – but by means of a joint that has no need to wander'[551] (making clear through the word 'affixed', one presumes, the invariant motion they have in the same place), while when he is speaking about the planets, by contrast, he says that when he had established these six, 'he integrated the Sun's fire in the middle as a seventh suspending their disorder upon the well ordered zones'. On the one hand, he *says* that the irregular motion that the planets possess is disorder, but on the other [he implies] that the dominant good order of the zones in which they have been arranged converts their [merely] relative disorder into order (for they are not moved in an irregular manner due to weakness, as is the case with things that lack soul, but rather due to the will of the things that are in command of them). He also said that it is through their own order that the various acts of cognition (*noêsis*) which he called 'zones' convert the apparent disorder of the bodies into the suitable order that conducts them around [the heavens] when each of the planets has been conserved through its own powers.

133

I. The Earth, *Tim.* 40b8–c3

He contrived the Earth to be, on the one hand, our nurse but, on the other hand, since it is concentrated (ἰλλομένην)[552] around the pole that has been extended through everything, it is guardian and creator of both

[551] ἔπηξε δὲ καὶ πολὺν ὅμιλον ἀστέρων ἀπλανῶν μὴ τάσει ἐπιπόνῳ πονηρᾷ, πήξει δὲ πλάνην οὐκ ἐχούσῃ χρωμένων. Compare 124.34–125.2 ἔπηξε δὲ καὶ πολὺν ὅμιλον ἀστέρων ἀπλανῶν, τὸ πῦρ πρὸς τὸ πῦρ ἀναγκάσας πήξει πλάνην οὐκ ἐχούσῃ φέρεσθαι. Diehl and Lewy agree in regarding ἐπιπόνῳ as a gloss and μὴ τάσει πονηρᾷ as a remark intended to show that the stars do not move by any onerous exertion on their part (cf. Aristotle *Cael.* 2.1, 284a17). On this passage from Julian the Theurgist and Proclus' various quotations of it, see the note on 63.21 above.

[552] This particular term is the basis for what Taylor (1928), 226 calls 'the most famous controversy ever raised about the interpretation of the *Timaeus*': does the Earth rotate on its own axis? Some manuscripts have *eillomenên* ('packed around'), while others (including Proclus) have *illomenên*. One might most naturally render this 'winds around'.

night and day – the first and most senior of all such gods as have come to be within the heavens. (*Tim*. 40b8–c3)

1. Order of exposition

The physical account (*physiologia*) of Earth is woven in right next to the account of the motion of the stars. It is not the case that the dialogue introduces the Earth for the first time through the words at hand, for it was already established at the point at which he established the cosmos from the universal elements – both the ones at the extremes and the intermediate ones.[553] However, [it is discussed at this point] in as much as the account concerned with Earth contributes to the accounts of the passage of the planets and the fixed stars and to that which is concerned with time and the temporal periods, since Earth has come to be a guardian of night and day. The entirety of the heavens dances around it and revolves around it in a circle and it is the centre of the universe insofar as the centre is regarded as belonging to the class of physical bodies. After all, the indivisible centre is one thing (*allo*), since it is within that which is most truly a sphere and which encompasses the full
134 extent of the physical and sensible cosmos. This has the status of a middle and extends in all directions from the middle – a centre which, when it is arranged in proportion to the poles, is the power of the sphere. The physical centre, however, is something else (*allo*) – something that nature has placed in the middle, around which all the stars are moved in a circle, and toward which they send down their activities; something which we, of course, say is the Earth. Consequently, since he has discussed the circular motion of the things that are celestial, the account concerned with the Earth has been quite plausibly connected to what was said before.

Furthermore, considered in another manner, the Earth's nature occupies the role of mother in relation to the celestial order, for all such

I have translated it as Proclus understands it. He is quite sure that Plato does not have a moving Earth. You can almost see the semantic association he is relying on in his interpretation of the term if you stress the notion of 'centre' in the English word 'concentrated'. For a brief overview of the issues, see Zeyl (2000), xliv–l.

553 Presumably Proclus has in mind the fact that the element of earth is introduced at 31b where the Demiurge makes the body of the cosmos. Recall that, since it is visible and tangible, it must be composed of fire and earth. In order for these opposed elements to comprise the cosmos' body, they must be conjoined in a geometrical proportion by two intermediate elements: air and water.

In what follows I will capitalise 'earth' where it seems clear that it is the planet that is at issue and leave it lower case where it seems likely that it is the element. When it seems clear that the goddess is meant, I'll write 'Gaia'. But this is something that has to be picked up from context. The uncial script in which Proclus' texts would have been copied had no clear syntactic marker for these distinctions.

things as the heaven creates in a paternal fashion, these the Earth creates in a maternal manner. Even all the meteorological phenomena[554] through which the circle of generation is completed derive their subsistence from the heavens, like a father who governs from above all the enmattered substance that is carried about [in the region of the air]. On the other hand, the [meteorological phenomena also] derive from the Earth as from a mother, for it furnishes the *matter* from the exhalations that have jointly flowed into her and from herself, just as the heavens provide the *form* (*eidos*) or the shape (*morphê*). Therefore it is for these reasons that Plato has quite plausibly arranged the account that deals with the Earth along with that which deals with the heavens, since he is looking to the very nature of the things in question and considering their coherence and association as well as the innate connection [that exists] in their first principles.

Moreover, he has made the power of proportion manifest through the order in which [he has gone about his] task since he undertakes the account of the planets first, and then in the middle, while giving that which deals with the Earth prior to the account of the other sub-lunary daemons. [This illustrates the power of proportion] for in this manner the extreme terms also become the first and the middle, while on the other hand the middle terms are substituted into the position of the extreme terms themselves. But 'by nature this [bonding] is best accomplished by proportion' (31c3–4).[555]

In every manner of looking at things, therefore, the physical account of the Earth is therefore innately connected to the theory that is concerned with the heavens. So much, then, concerning the order [of the dialogue].

2. *What is the Earth?*

What, then, is the Earth? From whence does it proceed? How is it said to be **our nurse**? And how is it said to be the **most senior** and **very first among the gods**? Should we prove capable of understanding these

554 τὰ μετέωρα πάντα refers to the subject matter of Aristotle's *Meteorologica*. These include comets, meteors and the Milky Way (which are, I think, what Proclus principally has in mind here) as well as other affections that occur in air and water, such as clouds and winds. It is clear that this is what Proclus has in mind since he goes on to discuss the exhalations or ἀναθυμιάσεως that figure in to Aristotle's explanation of comets, the Milky Way and other such things as he supposes to take place just below the level of the Moon. Cf. *Meteo*. 341b6, ff.

555 Proclus seems to suppose that the order of presentation somehow mimics the geometric proportion that is discussed at *Timaeus* 31c–32a. So, for instance, 2, 4, 8 is a geometrical progression since 2:4 :: 4:8. The middle terms can become the extremes since 4:2 :: 8:4.

things, then we will have a theory about it that is surely sufficient for the
135 purposes at hand.

The Earth therefore proceeds in the primary manner from the *intelligible Earth*, which includes in a unitary manner the intelligible order (*diakosmos*) of the gods and which is established eternally in the Father, and from the *intellectual Earth* that has been made coordinate with the heavens and which receives all the productions of the heavens. It is analogous to these [intelligible and intellectual Earths] since it remains forever in the centre of the heavens. And since it is everywhere surrounded by the heavens, it is full of generative power and creative perfection. Therefore that which is truly Earth is not this *corporeal thing* with its dense mass (*pachus ongkos*) (for then it would not be the most senior of the gods due to its mass, nor would it be first among the things that have been arranged within the heavens). Nor is what is truly Earth the *soul* of this body here (for then it would not have been arranged around the pole that runs through the universe, since soul is not the sort of thing [that gets arranged around such a pole], but rather the body of the Earth is). If it is necessary to say that which is truest about it, it is that the Earth is a living thing that is composed from divine soul and living body, because the whole [i.e. the universe] too is a living thing, as Plato says (32d1). After all, there exists in it an intellect that is immaterial and separate that also maintains this mass in the same place; and there is a divine soul that dances around this intellect; and there is an aethereal body that is proximately dependent upon the soul; and finally there is this visible mass that is everywhere inspired and filled with life from the soul's vehicle. [This filling with life, in turn] results in the Earth engendering and nourishing various living things, some of whom are planted in it, while others are moved about it. Seeing this fact, even *Aristotle* had qualms about not giving the Earth a physical life.[556] After all, from whence does it come about that when plants remain rooted in the Earth, they live, but when they have been up-rooted from it, they die, if it is not from the fact that even the Earth's mass is filled with life? But it is in general necessary to assume that wholes have been animated prior to parts, for it would be ridiculous if man were to participate of rational soul and intellect but one were to give no soul to the earth or the air which might employ it as a vehicle and steer the elements or preserve them within their appropriate boundaries. After all, wholes are
136 more authoritative than parts and the things that last forever are more authoritative than those that are destructible. But nothing which lacks

[556] What text of Aristotle might Proclus have in mind? Perhaps, in spite of his doubts about its authorship (III 272.21), he has in mind *De Mundo* 391b.13–4 ἡ φερέσβιος γῆ, παντοδαπῶν ζῴων ἑστία τε οὖσα καὶ μήτηρ.

soul is more honourable [than that which has it] as Theophrastus[557] too said. Therefore it is necessary to give soul and intellect to the Earth. The former makes it procreative (*gonimos*), while the latter maintains it in the middle of the universe.

This Earth, therefore, is a plenum[558] of both intellectual and psychic substances, as well as immaterial powers since it is a divine living being; for if we say that the partial soul taken in conjunction with its specific vehicle participates in plurality by means of its enmattered body (as has been shown elsewhere), what must one think about a soul that is thus divine? That *a fortiori* there are visible bodies that hang down from the Earth through the intermediary of other vehicles – [vehicles] through which these [visible bodies] are able to receive illuminations.

3. The sense in which the Earth is 'our nurse'

In any event, since the Earth is this sort of thing, it is said to be **our nurse**. [This is so] because, in the first place, it possesses a power that is in a way equivalent to the heavens, since in the same manner in which the heavens were such as to include divine living things, so too the Earth itself likewise seems to include 'earthy' [i.e. terrestrial] living beings. Second, [it is said to be our nurse] because it breathes our lives into us from the life that is appropriate [to it], for the Earth does not merely make the corn spring up or nourish our *bodies* through these things, but also fills our *souls* with illuminations of its own. Since it is a divine living

557 Proclus discusses the same quotation, which he draws from 'what Theophrastus has written in *On the Heavens*' above at II 122.10–16.

558 αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ γῆ, ζῷον οὖσα θεῖον καὶ πλήρωμα νοερῶν τε καὶ ψυχικῶν οὐσιῶν ἀύλων τε δυνάμεων (εἰ γὰρ τὴν μερικὴν ψυχὴν μετὰ τοῦ ἰδίου ὀχήματος ἐνύλῳ σώματι πλεονάζειν φαμέν, ὡς ἐν ἄλλοις δέδεικται, τί χρὴ οἴεσθαι περὶ θείας οὕτω ψυχῆς; Festugière takes the sense of πλεονάζειν to be that individual human souls go beyond or 'exceed' the soul of the Earth in having an enmattered body. Thus he translates: 'Car, si nous disons que l'âme humaine, bien que surabondant sur les âmes divines par un corps matériel, est accompagnée du véhicule qui lui est propre, comme il a été montré ailleurs, que ne doit-on pas penser d'une Ame aussi divine?' The dative here provides that by which the human soul goes beyond the Earth in its descent into plurality. However, πλεονάζειν also has a well-established sense in Proclus in which it means 'participates in plurality'. This sense seems to me more apposite to the conclusion at hand. The conclusion that the parenthetical remark is meant to support is that the Earth itself is a πλήρωμα. Proclus thinks that *every* soul is a πλήρωμα of life and intellect (*Plat. Theol.* III 26.26). By means of the latter, souls are connected to what is prior, while by means of the latter they animate the bodies subsequent to them. The point of the parenthetical remark is that if each partial soul is such a πλήρωμα by dint of animating the individual enmattered body that it presides over, it is clear that the Earth will surely be such a πλήρωμα by the fact that it illuminates the multiple visible bodies that are dependent upon it – and in fact it does so, not directly, but through other, presumably more subtle, intermediate vehicles.

thing and we have been begotten as particular, generated living things, it nourishes and maintains the mass (*ongkos*) that belongs to us through its own body, while it perfects our souls from the soul appropriate to it. It also rouses up the intellect that is in us in accordance with the intellect that belongs to itself, and since it acts in this manner it surely has become, with the whole of itself, the nurse for our whole composition. It is as a result of this fact, it seems to me, that he referred to the Earth as our nurse, indicating its activity of providing intellectual nourishment. After all, if it is *our* nourishment that is at issue and *we* are really souls and intellects, then the Earth would be such as to perfect us in these respects in particular when it moves our intellect.

4. The interpretation of ἰλλομένην

Since [the Earth] is a divine living being and such as to include many particular living things, it is said to be **concentrated about the pole that has been extended through everything**, doubtless because it has been confined and bound close together around the axis of the universe. The axis is the pole and it is now said to be a pole (*polos*) because the universe turns (*polei*) around it.[559] But the axis is the pole taken in conjunction with extension, because the pole is something that has no parts, as if one were to say that the line is an individual point that flows. It is said to be stretched through everything (*dia pantos*) in as much as it runs right through the centre of the Earth (*dia tou kentrou*), for it is not said that it is stretched through everything in the sense that it is 'stretched through the universe' (*dia tou pantos*) since it is not possible to say it thus without stammering.

It is clear that **concentrated** (*illomenên*) means that the Earth is bound fast (*sphiggomenên*) or confined (*synechomenên*), for it is not the case, as Aristotle supposed (*Cael.* II 13, 293b30), that it undergoes motion. Plato specifically preserves the Earth as something unmoved and the cause through which it has been made to stand motionless is added in the *Phaedo*. He says, then, that 'when a thing which has equal tendencies is placed in the middle of something that is [everywhere] similar [to itself], it will have no inclination whatsoever toward one [place] rather than another' (*Phdo.* 109a4–5). In addition to this, the meaning is one that is attested from Greek usage since it is clear that 'concentrated' means 'brought together' (*synagoumenên*), and not 'undergoing motion', since they call an *illas* a bond. In what follows, Timaeus himself has said that the hairs rooted over the head are concentrated (*illesthai*) and sown into

[559] See below 139.7 where Proclus gives an explanation of this that he draws from Iamblichus.

the skin.[560] From these facts it is clear how he meant [the verb] 'to be concentrated' in the lemma to apply to the Earth. In addition, if it is the case that [the line at *Phaedrus* 247a2 that says] 'Hestia alone remains in the house of the gods' refers to the Earth, then Plato would fall far short of having the Earth move. Even if we should not take Hestia there as the Earth, it must nonetheless be assumed she is the hearth-guarding power in it, for just as we say that, within the universe, the [celestial] poles are maintained by Hestia, so too we say that earth plays an analogous role among the elements, so that as the hypercosmic Hestia stands to the great leader of the twelve gods [sc. Zeus], so too, among the things within the cosmos, the Earth stands in this relation to the heavens. In addition, should we look toward the Pythagorean Timaeus[561] we would have yet another reason not to take the Earth to be undergoing motion, for he says on this point that the Earth has been situated in the middle. How then could it be reasonable for us to interpret 'concentrated' (*illomenên*) as 'wound around' (*heiloumenên*) and to make the Earth be turned around, as if we are saying things congenial to Plato [when we take it this way]?[562] Let Heraclides of Pontus[563] – who was no disciple of Plato – hold this view that the Earth moves in a circle. Plato, however, makes it stand motionless; or else he would not have made the Complete Year to be composed only from the *eight* periods, but would instead have added in that of the Earth as a *ninth*, reckoning the completion of its cycle in with the others and making a single cycle which is complete relative to the circle of the Same from all of them.[564] Let us therefore interpret the pole

20 25 **138** 5 10 15

[560] ἐρεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Τίμαιος ἐν τοῖς ἑπομένοις ἴλλεσθαι τὰς τρίχας ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν ῥιζουμένας καὶ συσπειρωμένας εἴσω τοῦ δέρματος. In fact, Proclus does not quote the line exactly. The OCT gives ἐντὸς ὑπὸ τὸ δέρμα εἱλλόμενον κατερριζοῦτο (*Tim.* 76b7–c1). No manuscript records the form ἰλλομένον.

[561] This is the first reference in Book 3 to the work of 'the Pythagorean Timaeus'. The work *On the Nature of the Universe and the Soul* attributed to Timaeus of Locrus is in fact among the pseudepigrapha of the Hellenistic period; cf. Thesleff (1965). Proclus, however, seems to regard it as a genuine work that Plato took over and expanded upon (*in Tim.* 1 7.19–21). The passage to which Proclus refers here is 97d.

[562] LSJ regards these as different forms of the same verb. Proclus obviously does not.

[563] Heraclides of Ponticus (*c.* 390–sometime post-322) was, in fact, personally associated with the Old Academy, having contested the leadership of the school with Xenocrates and lost out. When Proclus says that he was οὐ Πλάτωνος ὢν ἀκουστής this cannot mean that he was someone who had not heard Plato, for he is listed among those who attended the mysterious lecture on the Good (Simplicius, *in Phys.* 453.28–9). It seems more likely that he means that Heraclides was no disciple of Plato or is not to be counted among the Platonists. For Heraclides' view that the Earth makes a daily rotation, see Heath (1981), 254–83.

[564] Proclus' point is that the Platonic Great Year (*Tim.* 39d) is defined in relation to the time it takes for the sphere of the fixed stars and the seven planets (Moon, Mercury, Venus, Sun, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn) to all come around to the same point again. If

or the axis and the claim that the Earth is confined in the middle around this [axis] in this manner.

It is necessary, however, to pass from the word at hand to the case of nature and to consider that the poles are stabilising and sustaining powers that belong to the universe since, on the one hand, they rouse up the universal mass (*holos ongkos*) toward the love of the intelligibles, but, on the other hand, also sustain that which has parts in a manner that is partless, that which <has been pluralised>[565] in a manner that is unified, and that which is divisible in a manner that is indivisible. It is for this reason that in the *Republic* (616c7–8), he made 'the staff and the hook' [of the spindle of Necessity] 'from adamant' since their adamantine quality indicates the fact that they are invariant (*to aklines*), as was said.[566] It is also necessary to consider the axis as a single instance of divinity that is such as to bring together the centres [i.e. the four cardinal points][567] of the universe, such as sustain the whole cosmos, and such as to set in motion the revolutions of the things that are divine, since it is that around which the dance of wholes takes place (i.e. that around which the circulations occur), since it props up (*anechein*) the whole universe, which is why it has also been referred to as Atlas,[568] in as much as it possesses an activity that is like what is motionless and unwearied. In addition, the fact that he uses
139 the word **stretched** indicates that this single power that stands guard over the circulation of wholes is Titanic.[569] But even if, as the divine Iamblichus[570] says, we choose to understand the words 'the pole that has

the Earth turned on its own axis, there would be another, ninth, cycle to bring it to completion.

565 Reading τὸ <πεπληθυσέμενον καὶ τὸ> with Diehl at line 21. If we do not do this, then we have three adverbial modes in which the poles sustain things but only two things that are thus sustained. An alternative would be to treat καὶ ἡνωμένως as epexigetical for one of the other adverbs, but it is not clear that being unified is the same as being either partless or indivisible. Indeed, these two seem closer in meaning to one another than either does to ἡνωμένως. Thus it seems better to provide a third object for συνεχούσας.

566 Cf. *in Remp.* II 208.26–207.29 on the composition of the spindle in the myth of Er.

567 Cf. II 260.15 and note *ad loc.*

568 Cf. *in Remp.* I 173.5 and Pausanius V 11.5 and VI 19.8 where the same verb is used to describe Atlas' activity with respect to the celestial pole.

569 This claim is based on the similarity between τεταμένον and Τιτήνιον – a similarity for which I can devise no English equivalence. See below 144.9 where the connection is drawn again.

570 Proclus, *in Tim.* III 139.2–7 = Iamblichus, *in Tim.* fr. 73 (Dillon). Dillon notes that the previous sentence which connects having been extended (*tetamenon*) with the Titans may well relate Iamblichus' view too. Cf. Proclus, *in Crat.* §106.20–5: 'in these lines perhaps Plato transmits to us two basic interpretations of the name of the Titans, which Iamblichus and Amelius have recorded: for the one says that the Titans have been named after the idea of "extending" (*diateinein*) their powers to all things' (trans. Duvick, 2005).

been extended through everything' as the heaven, we will not – even on this interpretation – deviate from the thought of Plato; for as he himself says in the *Cratylus* [405c8], the experts in astronomy call the heaven 'the pole' from the fact that it goes around (*peri-polein*) harmoniously. In accordance with this conception one might say that when the pole is stretched through everything this is the heaven which has been made convex through the whole of itself since it lacks any angles (for it would thus present the appearance of a circle that has been stretched).[571] The Earth is concentrated (*illesthai*) around this [pole], converging upon the centre, not spatially, but rather through a desire for similarity with it [sc. the heavens] in order that, by being confined to the centre in the same manner as the heavens are moved around the centre, it may come to be similar to what is essentially spherical since it has been con*centr*ated[572] as much as possible. As the universe has been extended around it, in the same manner the Earth is bound fast (*sphiggomenê*) in relation to[573] the heavens. Plato has provided the cause through which the Earth is confined or sustained (*synechetai*) in the middle [of the universe] in terms of either of the following two conceptions. It is either because the axis is the sustaining (*synektikos*) power of the Earth or else it is because it is confined (*synechetai*) on all sides by the revolution [of the heavens] and brought together in the centre of the universe.

5. The Earth is guardian and creator of both day and night

Now, since the Earth is this kind of thing, what are the benefits that it therefore bestows upon the universe? This is made clear through Timaeus' subsequent words when he calls it **guardian and creator of both night and day**. It is clear, in the first place, that it is such as to create night, for it produces the cone,[574] since its shadow is the cone and its size and shape give the shadow such a size and such a shape. But how is it the creator of day? Or is it that day in this sense is produced when it is taken in conjunction with night, for it is in relation to night that the

[571] It seems that Proclus imagines a process in which a spherical shape is derived by pulling the centre of a circle from above and below and thus extending the surface in three dimensions.

[572] κατὰ δύναμιν σφαιρωθεῖσα. LSJ gives the passive the sense of 'concentrated', citing Damascius' Pr. 400 (Ruelle).

[573] Reading πρὸς with s for περὶ in the other manuscripts. For a similar use of the former preposition with this verb, see Damascius *in Phdo*. 72.5 where the Good σφίγγει τὴν γῆν πρὸς ἑαυτήν.

[574] i.e. the conically shaped shadow of the Earth that is identified with night. Cf. Aristotle, *Meteo*. 1.8, 345b6–8 τῆς γῆς ὁ κῶνος ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου συμβάλλοι τὰς ἀκτῖνας . . . ἡ καλουμένη νύξ. By the second century, this idea is a standard part of astronomical handbooks. See the references provided by Festugière in his note on Proclus, *in Remp*. II 189.10.

risings and settings are observed? The fact that Plato has used the term 30 'day' as equivalent to what is brought about in opposition to night has been made clear by the fact that his word order puts 'day' after 'night', just as he did earlier in the line where he said 'night and day, therefore, **140** have both come to be thus' (39bc1). The Earth, therefore, is the creator for both when it jointly produces these things that are so conjoined in collaboration with the Sun – though the Sun is to a greater extent the cause of day, while Earth is the cause of night.

Since the Earth is their creator, it is also the **guardian** for them [sc. night and day]: preserving their boundaries and the balance they have in 5 relation to one another, as well as guarding their growth and diminution – [something it does], of course, in accordance with a certain proportion, which is doubtless why some people also call it *Isis* in so far as it equal-*Ises*[575] the inequality [between the hours of daylight and darkness] and brings the waxing and waning of both into proportion. Others, however, who looked to the Earth's procreative [power] address 10 it as Demeter, just as Plotinus too has done when he calls the Earth's intellect 'Hestia' but its soul 'Demeter'.[576] For our part, though, we say that the most primary causes of these goddesses are themselves Intellectual, Leading and Liberated. [We say] they have sent down illuminations and powers from themselves to the Earth and that there 15 exists a terrestrial Demeter, a terrestrial Hestia, and a terrestrial Isis, just as there is a terrestrial Zeus or a terrestrial Hermes. These [terrestrial goddesses] have been stationed around the single divinity of the Earth in the same manner in which the plurality of celestial gods have proceeded around the single divinity of the heavens, for processions toward the Earth and the terminating stages [of such processions] 20 (*apoperatôsis*) have come about for all the gods in the heavens, and all such things as exist in the heavens in a celestial manner, exist in the Earth in a terrestrial manner. The Intellectual Earth receives in turn all the paternal powers of the heavens and has everything in a manner that is procreative (*gennêtikôs*). In the same manner, therefore, we also 25 speak of a terrestrial Dionysius or a terrestrial Apollo who issues forth

575 I can think of no means apart from this sort of post-modernist cliché (that has been so often parodied) to convey the association that Proclus finds in διὸ δὴ καὶ Ἶσιν αὐτὴν προσηγόρευσάν τινες, ὡς ἐπανισοῦσαν τὴν ἀνισότητα. Ideally I need a second Isis-quasi-cognate in 'inequality' to capture the double-barrelled force of Proclus' justification (such as it is) for connecting the Earth with Isis. Festugière suggests that the 'some' who call the Earth Isis may include Porphyry; cf. *Peri Agalmatôn* 10.24–25 (Bidez) Τῆς δὲ οὐρανίας γῆς καὶ τῆς χθονίας τὴν δύναμιν Ἶσιν προσεῖπον διὰ τὴν ἰσότητα, ἀφ᾽ ἧς τὸ δίκαιον·

576 *Enn.* IV 4.27, 15–17 εἶτα τὴν ἄλλην ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν, ἣν δὴ Ἑστίαν καὶ Δήμητραν ἐπονομάζουσιν ἄνθρωποι θείᾳ φήμῃ καὶ φύσει ἀπομαντευομένῃ τὰ τοιαῦτα χρώμενοι.

prophetic waters in many parts of the Earth and foretells the future at the openings in the ground.[577] The purificatory powers, the powers associated with Paeon, and the critical powers[578] [that proceed into the Earth from the heavens] produce in it different places that are purificatory or judgemental[579] or medicinal. But to go through all the terrestrial powers is impossible, for while the divine [powers] are innumerable, the orders of those angels and daemons that follow from them are yet more numerous. [These orders] have been allocated circularly throughout the entire Earth and dance around its single divinity and [its] one intellect and single divinity. **141**

6. The Earth is most senior among the gods

It remains to consider how the Earth is said to be the **most senior among the gods** and the **very first of those that are within the heavens**, for to those who are accustomed to look to the Earth's enmattered [character] – its density and darkness – this will seem to have been a remark made in a straightforward way (*haplôs*). For our part, however, though we will admit that there is something like what they are talking about in the mass (*ongkos*) of the Earth,[580] nonetheless we will also demand that they

577 Cf. Iamblichus, *Myst.* III 11.16 where Iamblichus gives as examples the priest of Clarius in Colophon who uses prophetic water and οἱ δὲ στομίοις παρακαθήμενοι, ὡς αἱ ἐν Δελφοῖς θεσπίζουσαι.

578 ἄλλους δὲ τόπους αὐτῆς καθαρτικοὺς ἢ κριτικοὺς ἢ ἰατικοὺς ἀποτελοῦσιν αἱ εἰς αὐτὴν καθήκουσαι παιώνιοι καὶ κριτικαὶ δυνάμεις. Diehl gives no comma after καθήκουσαι and thus takes παιώνιοι to modify it, i.e. the purificatory-medicinal powers. (Proclus consistently uses masculine endings even when this adjective modifies a feminine noun, though it has feminine endings that are attested in other writers and listed in LSJ; cf. *in Tim.* II 63.9–10 τῆς Παιωνίου σειρᾶς; III 262.26–27 τῆς παιωνίου δυνάμεως; *in Remp.* II 153.26 ὅσαι ταῖς παιωνίοις δυνάμεσι but contrast Olympiodorus, *in Grg.* 47.2.19–20 ἔστιν οὖν πρώτη δύναμις νοερά, εἶτα ἡ ζωοποιὸς καὶ ἡ παιωνία.) Diehl's choice, however, gives us *two* powers which generate *three* kinds of places endowed with different qualities. Festugière translates: 'En outre les Puissances guérisseuses et séparatives qui descendent en elle rendent certains lieux de la Terre doués de vertus purificatrices, séparatives et médicales.' He supposes that the medical powers with which a place is endowed are somehow a matter of the impure being separated from the pure. I think that since we have three kinds of places it is better to supply a comma after καθήκουσαι and understand some δυνάμεις that are καθήκουσαι, some that are παιώνιοι, and some that are κριτικαὶ. Given Proclus' great affection for triadic schemes, this seems much more probable to me.

579 [Iamblichus] *Theol. Arith.* 69.24 glosses κριτικός as δοκιμαστικός. I suspect that Proclus has in mind places that are sanctified for testing or rendering judgements upon a person. An example might be the τόπον τινὰ δαιμόνιον in *Rep.* 614c1 where Er reports that the souls of the dead were judged.

580 The Earth, like every other divinity in Proclus' metaphysics, manifests itself differently in the different hypostases. The fact that the Earth is thus plural leads him quite naturally to the concluding part of the *Phaedo* where Socrates distinguishes between

look at the other good things that belong to the Earth – goods through which the remaining elements gain some advantage. [I mean] stability, procreation, concord in relation to the heavens, and its position in the centre of the universe. The centre has the greatest power in the universe, since it is such as to sustain the entire revolution. It is for this reason that the Pythagoreans too called the centre the 'Watch-tower of Zeus', insofar as the Demiurgic Watch has been stationed in it.[581] We will also remind our opponents of the Platonic hypotheses about the Earth and its functions (*ergon*) as Socrates relates them in the *Phaedo* (110a1–111c3). This Earth which is home to us is thus a hollow that is dark and [its contents] have been corroded by sea water.[582] The 'true Earth' (*Phdo.* 110a1), however, is something different, possessing the living-quarters of the gods, sacred groves,[583] and a beauty that is fitting and appropriate for the heavens. It is thus unnecessary to be amazed if the Earth should now be said to be the 'most senior' of the gods and the 'very first among those that have come to be within the heavens' since it possesses a grandeur so elevated and beauty of such a sort. It has come to resemble those 'balls that are constructed from twelve [pieces of leather]' (110b7) in the same manner in which heaven has received from the Demiurge its decoration by the dodecahedron, as he himself says in what follows (*Tim.* 55c4–6).[584] Let us also reflect upon the fact that it is only the Earth that

what we call the Earth and the 'true Earth'. The former is a hollow in the true Earth whose features provide very little indication of the glories of the latter.

[581] Cf. *in Tim.* II 106.21 and Aristotle fr. 204.

[582] κοῖλόν ἐστι καὶ σκοτεινὸν καὶ ὑπὸ ἅλμης κατεδηδεσμένον. Contrast the jewels that are found in the true Earth above us in *Phdo.* 110e2–4: ἐκεῖνοι οἱ λίθοι εἰσὶ καθαροὶ καὶ οὐ κατεδηδεσμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἅλμης. For the mythological effects of corrosion by the sea, consider also Glaucos at *Rep.* 611d.

[583] θεῶν ὑποδοχὰς ἔχουσα καὶ ἄλση. Cf. *Phdo* 111b6–7 καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἄλση τε καὶ ἱερὰ αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς θεοὺς εἶναι.

[584] It is difficult to know what to make of Proclus' ὥσπερ ὁ οὐρανὸς τῷ δωδεκαέδρῳ παρὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ διεζωγράφηται. The reference to the *Timaeus* is to 55c4–6 which reads: ἔτι δὲ οὔσης συστάσεως μιᾶς πέμπτης, ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς αὐτῇ κατεχρήσατο ἐκεῖνο διαζωγραφῶν. This line, however, is one that both modern and ancient interpreters have found puzzling.

One line of interpretation supposes some affinity between the shape of the dodecahedron and the universe. Just what sort of affinity is hard to say, however. In the *Phaedo*, it is the *Earth* that is supposed to have the shape of a ball stitched together from twelve pieces of leather, while in the *Timaeus* it seems clear that the universe has a spherical shape. Thus it seems unlikely that the universe *really is*, like the Earth, a sort of soccer ball unless the moral to be drawn from the compromise with necessity is that the universe's shape only approximates to that of the sphere. Timaeus Locrus (98d) seems to suggest *some* sort of connection between the shape of the dodecahedron and the universe when he says that the dodecahedron is the image of the universe since it is closest to being a sphere (τὸ δὲ δωδεκάεδρον εἰκόνα τῶ παντὸς ἐστάσατο, ἔγγιστα

has been allowed to have all of the elements in a manner separate [from one another] – a fact that renders it a whole cosmos since it has been decorated in a manner analogous to the heavens, for there is a river of fire in it, as well as one of air, one of water, and [a river] of different [sort of] earth which would have the same relation to it that [Earth] itself has in relation to the universe, as Socrates says in the *Phaedo*.[585] But if this is so, then earth has a great superiority with respect to the other 30

σφαίρᾳ ἐόν). But this falls short of saying that the universe *is* a soccer ball – only that there is some sort of connection between the two.

Such a symbolic relationship between the *shapes*, however, would leave Plato's use of διαζωγραφῶν as a bit of a mystery – at least if LSJ is right to define it as 'to paint in diverse colours'. It is true that in the *Phaedo* the soccer ball Earth has its faces painted different colours (110b). But it is difficult to imagine that Plato intends us to understand that the heavens have a similarly multi-chromatic paint job. Thus it seems more plausible to take it in the sense of 'decorated' with the number twelve: twelve faces on the dodecahedron and twelve signs of the Zodiac. This line of thought is taken up in Plutarch's *Platonic Questions* (1003c–d).

Never a man to minimise the meaning inherent in Plato's every word, Proclus seems to endorse *both* understandings, though the symbolism of shape is more fully attested. The text at *in Remp*. II 45.6–9 where he alludes to *Timaeus* 55c4 is somewhat fraught. However, it appears to say that the number twelve 'describes the figure of the heaven in its entirety' σχηματογραφεῖ πάντα τὸν [οὐρανόν, μᾶλ]λον δὲ διαζωγραφεῖ, καθάπερ φησὶν ὁ Τίμαιος on the grounds that τὴν μὲν τοῦ δωδεκα[έδρου περί]μετρον συμπληροῖ τοῖς δυόδε[κα πενταγώνοις]. This is *immediately* followed by the observation that there are twelve signs in the Zodiac.

Yet we should hesitate to ascribe to him the view that the heaven *really is* a dodecahedron, inflated or otherwise, since it appears that μᾶλ]λον δὲ διαζωγραφεῖ is supposed to qualify the sense of σχηματογραφεῖ. This, of course, is frustrating if we don't understand what διαζωγραφεῖ is supposed to mean in the first place. Proclus is clear, however, that we are not meant to understand *Timaeus* 55c literally as the Demiurge painting or decorating the universe with the dodecahedron (*in Parm*. 842.5). That there is a symbolic relationship between the shape of the heavens and the dodecahedron is confirmed by the report of 'the commentator's view' (i.e. that of Proclus) in the second set of notes on Damascius' lectures on the *Phaedo* (Damasc. II §132). There the note-taker records: Ὅτι τὸ δωδεκάεδρον οἰκεῖον σχῆμα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, φησὶν ὁ ἐξηγητής, ὡς τῆς γῆς ὁ κύβος. The fact that this figure is οἰκεῖον to the heaven does not mean that the heaven really has that shape, as Damascius' lecture went on to point out: Καίτοι ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων καὶ ὁ οὐρανός, ὥστε σφαῖρα· εἰ δὲ πῦρ μόνον, πυραμὶς ἂν εἴη. Since this remark is followed by a different interpretation provided by 'our professor' it seems likely that it reflects Proclus' own qualification to the first statement. There is a merely symbolic association of 'appropriateness' between the shape of the heavens and the dodecahedron.

[585] As Festugière correctly points out, the exact passage in the *Phaedo* that Proclus means to point to is mysterious. Diehl gives 112e. There we find a discussion of 'four streams', one of which (Pyriphlegethon) indeed is fiery, since it gives rise to lava flows, but is also described as 'muddy'. So the four rivers in the *Phaedo* don't seem to be readily assigned to the four elements. Nonetheless – and this is the point that escaped his notice – the rivers were so assigned to the terrestrial elements according to the Orphic tradition (Damascius, *in Phdo* I §541 and II §145). The Commentator (i.e. Proclus) is

elements insofar as it imitates the heavens and has everything in itself in a terrestrial manner. Let us add to this also that the Demiurge introduced
142 these two elements first (earth and fire) and that the other [elements] are introduced for the sake of these, in order that they might have the role of bonds in relation to them (31b8). [Let us also add] that though the four [elements] are in the heavens and in the sub-lunary region, they are
5 up there [in the heavens] in a fiery manner (for what is up there, as we said, has its substance composed for the most part from fire [*Tim*. 41a1]), while down here [all the elements are present] in a terrestrial way (for the layer of the air has embraced the earth and the mass (*ongkos*) of the water has been poured over it and [each] has an earthy character because by their own nature they are dark). Therefore in the heavens there is a predominance of fire, while below the Moon there is a predominance
10 of earth. But since Becoming has been connected with the heavens in a manner that is naturally interrelated (*symphyôs*), the [final] limit of the heavens is earth, (in as much as earth is in the heavens), while the starting point of the realm of Becoming is fire (in as much as fire is in Becoming). After all, it is customary to call the Moon 'earth' since it plays the same sort of role in relation to the Sun that the Earth plays in relation to fire.

15 Another limitless Earth he resolved to make
Which immortals laud as Selene, but mortal men the Moon.

as Orpheus says.[586] The highest point of Becoming is fire, as Aristotle [indicates] when he names the aether 'fire'.[587] Elsewhere, however, he
20 does not think it proper to call it 'fire' but instead calls it 'pyro-form', as has been frequently noted [129.1]. The [final] limit of the heavens, therefore is not entirely such as to have no share in change as it comes closer to Becoming. On the other hand, the starting point of Becoming is moved in a circle in imitation of the heavens.

Further to this, let us adopt the principle (*logos*) that it is necessary to judge the value of things, not by the position that they occupy, but
25 rather by their powers and by their substance – which is just what has been

credited with identifying Okeanus with water, while it is implied that the other correlations are part of the Orphic tradition. Damascius' criticism of the Orphic/Proclean identifications and his alternative reading of the *Phaedo* passage are provided in II §145.

[586] *Orph*. fr. 91 (Kern) quoted at greater length at II 48.15 and mentioned at II 282.11. See below III 172.21.

[587] Diehl supposes that Proclus has in mind *Meteo*. 2.9, 369b14 and *Cael*. 3.3, 302b4. In each case, however, Aristotle is reporting the usage of Anaxagoras who called the aether 'fire'.

shown in other cases. By what property is it necessary to judge superiority? Well, what else except those properties which exhibit the divine orders (*taxis*)? After all, genuine superiority rests with the gods. It remains, therefore, to determine superiority from the orders of gods: the monadic, the stable, the all-perfect, the procreative, the sustaining, the perfective, that which is stretched through everything, that which makes things alive, that which places things in order, the assimilative, and the inclusive. These are the properties that are specific to all of the divine orders (*diakosmêsis*). With respect to them, however, the earth gets a greater share than all the other elements. As a result it would quite plausibly be said to be **both the most senior and the very first among the gods**.

143

Furthermore, one must consider the nature of things in a two-fold way. First, in terms of the procession that the inferior things that have been ranked second always make from the things that are prior to them. Second, in terms of the reversion through which the last terms [in the procession] are connected through similarity with the first terms and [thus] complete one cycle of universal production. Since the cosmos is indeed spherical, and this sort of shape is a distinctive characteristic for things that relate to reversion, one must connect the Earth that is in it [sc. the cosmos] to the heavens through one circle and a single similarity, for this is the way in which the centre has the strongest similarity with the poles. After all, the heaven everywhere surrounds the things that are wholes,[588] moving itself around the poles. But it has been allotted to the Earth alone to be at rest in the centre, for it was fitting for the realm of Becoming that what is unmoved be more senior than that which undergoes motion. Now surely you would say that, with respect to all these concepts, the Earth is the most senior of all the gods within the heavens since it is coordinate with the heavens. It is, after all, inside the heavens insofar as it is surrounded on all sides by it, for just as [the Demiurge] 'framed all that is corporeal inside of the soul' (*Tim.* 36d8–e1), so too he has created the Earth inside of the heaven, since it is bound fast (*sphiggein*) and confined by it (*synechein*)[589] and the things that are wholes [sc. the elements] were created along with it. With respect to [Earth being] **the very first** [among the gods within the heavens], you

[588] τὰ ὅλα here are, I believe, the 'whole or universal parts' that are introduced in the second Demiurgic foundation of the cosmos (*in Tim.* II 2.12–14). These will include the psychic circles, the spheres of the heavens, as well as the elements considered in their entirety or as wholes.

[589] Recall that these are verbs that Proclus uses to gloss the meaning of the much disputed term '*illomenên*' which occurs in the first part of the lemma that is currently under discussion. See above 136.32.

have[590] your indication of its superiority in terms of its essence, while the fact that it is the **most senior** [is evident] from the prerogatives which the Earth has been granted. For how could you deny that what has within it the Watch-tower of Zeus (141.11) and the procession of Kronos obtains the greatest share of the spoils in the cosmos and is that which is greatly honoured? For it is not merely Tartarus (in the sense of the final stage of the Earth) that has been possessed by Kronos and the power of Kronos, but also if there is anything that one ought to suppose to be below this, [it too has been possessed by Kronos]. After all, Homer says that this [sc. Tartarus] is *contained* through the 'sub-Tartarian gods' (*Il.* 14.279) – not that the gods are ranked *beyond* Tartarus, as the words indicate, but that Tartarus itself has been *surrounded* on all sides by them.[591]

144 Furthermore, one must consider the analogy that holds between the Earth and the intellectual Earth, for in the same manner in which the one established and included the perfective, guardian and Titanic *orders* of the gods – things about which the Orphic Theologians are full [of information] – so too the Earth has a variety of *powers*. Thus Earth is a **nurse** in as much as [it has a power] that imitates the perfective order of gods – a power on account of which it is traditional for Athenians to sing hymns to the Earth as 'Nourisher of Youth'[592] – and as the 'one who sends up gifts'[593] since Earth sends up plants and nourishes animals. Earth is a **guard** in as much as [it has a power that imitates] the guardian [order of gods]. It is **extended** (*tetamenê*) around the pole that [runs through] everything in as much as [it imitates] the Titanic [order of gods].[594] Moreover, since the intellectual Earth gave birth to [the

[590] Reading ἔχεις for the mss' ἔχει in ἔχει δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρώτιστον τὴν τῆς κατ' οὐσίαν ὑπεροχῆς ἔνδειξιν. Festugière acutely notes that the next sentence (πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἴποις . . .) continues a line of argument directed to Proclus' audience.

[591] Proclus glosses the ἔνερθε in Homer's οἳ ἔνερθε θεοὶ Κρόνον as συνέχεται διὰ τῶν ὑποταρταρίων θεῶν and πανταχόθεν ὑπ' αὐτῶν περιείληπται καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Τάρταρος. The gods below Tartarus are the Titans. Proclus' now-lost commentary on the *Phaedo* provided an allegorical reading of Tartarus, as he tells us at *in Remp.* II 183.16–25. Some traces of this reading can be discerned through the two versions of Damascius' lectures on the *Phaedo*. Proclus is sometimes identified as 'the Commentator', but since Proclus himself says in his *Republic Commentary* that his reading related the words of Plato's texts to the beliefs of the theologians, we may reasonably regard the material in Damascius' lectures that draw on Orphic texts, Homer and Hesiod as stemming from Proclus' exegesis.

[592] Cf. Pausanius Grammaticus, K.40.1–2 (Erbse) κουροτρόφος γῆ· ταύτῃ δὲ θῦσαί φασι πρῶτον Ἐριχθόνιον ἐν ἀκροπόλει καὶ βωμὸν ἱδρύσασθαι χάριν ἀποδιδόντα τῇ γῇ τῶν τροφείων.

[593] "ἀνησιδώραν", ὡς καὶ ἀνιεῖσαν τὰ φυτα. Cf. 136.16.

[594] See note above on 138.30. Note that here Proclus has shifted the gender of the participle in Plato's text (ἰλλομένην δὲ περὶ τὸν διὰ παντὸς πόλον τεταμένον) to the feminine so that it now describes the Earth (or perhaps a power of the Earth) rather than the

Hesperides], Aegle and Erytheia Hesperethousa,[595] prior to the others, so too Earth is the creator of day and night. The analogy between the former and the latter is clear. Enough on these matters.

If, however, you wanted to interpret the claim that the Earth is the **very first** and **most senior of the gods** in another manner, as [indicating the fact that] the Earth is made to exist as a result of the very first and most senior among the causes, this account too would have plausibility due to the fact that the [causes that are] very first send forth their own activities to a greater extent.[596] The things that come last also often preserve the proportion that obtains among the first [causes], since these final things have their existence (*hyparxis*) only as a result of these [first causes].[597] As a result, Plato's statement is true at every level, whether you should care to look to the Earth's mass or to the powers that are in it.

7. *What it means to say the Demiurge 'contrived' the Earth*

Is it necessary to think that the word **contrived** provides evidence of the extent of the intellectual power that is present in the creation? After all, the Sun is incapable of creating night and day on its own and so too is the Earth (for the absence of light is one thing, but night is another). To discover how these things [sc. night and day] might be brought about through both [the Sun and the Earth] together is truly a task for Demiurgic contrivance, for it was the position of the Earth in the middle, and the dance of the Sun around it, and the rotation of the sphere of the fixed

masculine celestial pole. This move is necessitated by the fact that the previous terms (Nurse, Guardian) in his correlations between terrestrial powers and divine orders have been epithets applied to the Earth in the lemma under discussion.

595 Reading Αἴγλην τε καὶ τὴν ἑσπερέθουσαν Ἐρύθειαν with Festugière. The names of the Hesperides admit of many spellings, but none such as we find here. The Hesperides are nymphs who are daughters either of Night or of Atlas in different accounts. Either could suit Proclus' purposes, since Night has good Orphic credentials and Atlas has already been associated with the celestial pole. Aegle means 'bright' and so Proclus takes her to be the intellectual analogue of the day that the Earth guards. The name Hesperides is related to evening, so presumably any of them other than Aegle will do as an intellectual correlate of night.

596 Cf. *ET* prop. 56: higher causes produce the things that are secondary to them, as well as the things that the secondary things themselves produce. Thus at *in Tim.* III 222.7–25 Proclus explains how the mortal living things are caused by the encosmic gods, as well as by the Demiurge who, in turn, causes them. The mortal living creatures are also caused by the Paradigm or the Living Being Itself, though all these causes operate in different ways.

597 Higher causes not only have an influence that runs down through their products, their influence keeps going – so to speak – even after the causal influence of their products has left off. Hence it is that matter is solely a product of the Good, while enformed things are the product of both the Good and the Paradigm. Cf. *in Tim.* I 387.20–388.6 and *ET* 57.

30 stars around the Earth that produced night and day. Furthermore, the position of the Earth in the centre makes the alternation of night and day proportional, which would not be the case had someone removed it from the middle and positioned it elsewhere. These are things that it is possible to infer from the word **contrived**, though there are, of course, further things that could be added.

J. The dances of the stars, *Tim.* 40c3–d4

145 **Now,[598] to describe the dances (*choreia*) of these very beings and their conjunctions (*parabolê*) with one another, or [about][599] the cycling back (*anakuklêsis*) of their circles upon themselves and their approaches**

598 There are a number of textual issues here, so it may be best to have the text of Proclus' lemma as well as that of Plato as it is printed in the OCT right at the beginning.

Proclus: χορείας δὲ τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ παραβολὰς ἀλλήλων καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν κύκλων πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς ἀνακυκλήσεις καὶ προσχωρήσεις, ἔν τε ταῖς συνάψεσιν ὁποῖοι τῶν θεῶν κατ' ἀλλήλους γινόμενοι καὶ ὅσοι κατ' ἀντικρύ, μεθ' οὕστινάς τε ἐπίπροσθεν ἀλλήλοις ἡμῖν τε κατὰ χρόνους οὕστινας ἕκαστοι κατακαλύπτονται καὶ πάλιν ἀναφαινόμενοι φόβους καὶ σημεῖα τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα γενησομένων τοῖς δυναμένοις λογίζεσθαι πέμπουσι, τὸ λέγειν ἄνευ διόψεως τούτων αὖ τῶν μιμημάτων, μάταιος ἂν εἴη πόνος.

Plato: *Tim.* 40c3–d3 χορείας δὲ τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ παραβολὰς ἀλλήλων, καὶ [περὶ] τὰς τῶν κύκλων πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς ἐπανακυκλήσεις καὶ προχωρήσεις, ἔν τε ταῖς συνάψεσιν ὁποῖοι τῶν θεῶν κατ' ἀλλήλους γιγνόμενοι καὶ ὅσοι καταντικρύ, μεθ' οὕστινάς τε ἐπίπροσθεν ἀλλήλοις ἡμῖν τε κατὰ χρόνους οὕστινας ἕκαστοι κατακαλύπτονται καὶ πάλιν ἀναφαινόμενοι φόβους καὶ σημεῖα τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα γενησομένων τοῖς οὐ δυναμένοις λογίζεσθαι πέμπουσιν, τὸ λέγειν ἄνευ δι' ὄψεως τούτων αὖ τῶν μιμημάτων μάταιος ἂν εἴη πόνος.

599 It is customary now to bracket περὶ in line c4. Taylor (1928) regards it as presenting 'grave gammatical difficulties'. Deleting it lets the accusatives that follow be governed by τὸ λέγειν just as χορείας and παραβολὰς are. Proclus' quotation of the lemma and his treatment of it (146.9–15) retains the περὶ, so it is interesting to ask how he understands it. Taylor thinks that he writes it, but largely ignores it, explaining it as if it were <τὰ> περὶ – a case of periphrasis like that which occurs in *Tim.* 39b3: τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀκτὼ φοράς Festugière seems to think that Taylor drew this conclusion from the way in which Proclus introduces the discussion of the lexis: τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰς τῶν κύκλων πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς ἀνακυκλήσεις καὶ τὰς προσχωρήσεις τοὺς προποδισμοὺς δηλοῖ καὶ τοὺς ὑποποδισμούς. Festugière rightly notes that τὰ here means 'the words περὶ τὰς τῶν κύκλων etc.'. It is unclear to me that this was the basis of Taylor's claim that Proclus *treats* the περὶ as mere periphrasis parallel to τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀκτὼ φοράς at *Tim.* 39b3–4. Festugière's own solution is that Proclus gives τὸ λέγειν a double construction. On the one hand we have infinitive verb + accusative of direct object (λέγειν χορείας and παραβολὰς, and then in addition infinitive verb + περὶ + accusative (λέγειν περὶ τὰς ἀνακυκλήσεις καὶ τὰς προσχωρήσεις). This is, I suppose, possible, but it would be somewhat unusual for περὶ to take an accusative with λέγειν where the meaning is 'to talk about some subject matter'. In such contexts, περὶ typically takes a genitive and there is no other example of λέγειν + περὶ + accusative that I can locate in the Proclean corpus. So it appears that Proclus either more or less ignores the περὶ and treats τὰς ἀνακυκλήσεις καὶ τὰς προσχωρήσεις as accusatives governed by λέγειν (Taylor) or he attends to the

(*proschôrêsis*);[600] to say which gods come [into line] with one another at their alignments (*synapsis*) and how many of them are in opposition (*kat' antikru*), and in what order and at which times they screen one another relative to us, and at what times they are severally hidden and, appearing again, bring with them fears and signs of the things to come to those who are[601] able to reason – to describe [all these things] without the use of imitations of these [celestial] phenomena[602] themselves, would be labour spent in vain. (*Tim.* 40c3–d3)

presence of the περὶ but ignores its usual grammar (Festugière). It is not clear that there is much to recommend one of these alternatives over the other.

600 προσχωρήσεις with Proclus or προχωρήσεις with the editor of the OCT? (And it *is* the editor's decision, for all the good manuscripts have προσχωρήσεις.) The difference is that προσχώρησις connotes 'an approach', typically by one thing toward another (in the dative), while προχώρησις connotes a 'going forth' like the advance of the tide or 'forward progress'. Taylor (1928) argues that, whatever text Proclus had before him, his explanation is suitable only for προχώρησις since he explains whatever term he is looking at in opposition to ἐπανακυκλήσεις, equating their opposition to that of προποδισμός to ὑποποδισμός. But the former is the direct or forward motion of the planets, so only the notion of 'advance' will fit – not that of 'approach'. So Taylor thinks it likely that the manuscripts of Proclus' text should be corrected to προχώρησις. But Festugière, by looking closely at exactly what Proclus says, tries to show how the sense of 'approach' can be made to fit with Proclus' identification with προποδισμός. At 146.12–13 Proclus writes: προποδίζοντες μὲν γὰρ προσχωροῦσι ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ἀποκαταστάσεσιν, which Festugière takes to mean 'par leur motions en avant *ils s'approchent* de leurs points de retour au même lieu'. But it is unclear to me what justifies Festugière's inclusion of the words 'en avant' unless we are *already* justified in merging the meaning of προσχώρησις with that of προχώρησις. I think that, in some sense, Taylor's point stands: it *is* hard to see how Proclus could have equated the meaning of προσχώρησις with that of προποδισμός. The alternative προχώρησις has a meaning that is more appropriate to such an equation. But, on the other hand, Taylor has failed to notice that Proclus' text has ἀνακυκλήσεις rather than the ἐπανακυκλήσεις that we find in the OCT, so the equation with ὑποποδισμός is not as clear as it might otherwise be for him. He can use the term to describe a backward turning, as he does when the reversal in the myth of the *Statesman* (269e3 τὴν ἀνακύκλησιν) is before his mind (*in Tim.* II 96.3), but more frequently it simply means 'rotation'. Thus if there is any correction of Proclus' text that is warranted, it could just as easily be from ἀνακυκλήσεις to ἐπανακυκλήσεις. In general, it seems to me that nothing very clear about the original words of Plato's follows from Proclus' text.

601 The OCT prints οὐ ('not') here on the evidence of Cicero and A. It was not read by Chalcidius and so disappeared sometime between the first century BC and the fourth century CE. Archer-Hind (1888) notes *ad loc* that 'the οὐ would very readily be omitted by a copyist living at a time when astrology had become prevalent, and recourse was had to the professional astrologer for the interpretation of signs of the heavens'. Certainly Proclus believes that there are signs in the heavens to be read by those who can calculate their meanings. Thus we should expect exactly what we get in his version of the lemma.

602 There are two questions here about dividing words. First, ἄνευ δι' ὄψεως as in the text of the OCT or ἄνευ διόψεως? Second, should we have τούτων αὖ τῶν μιμημάτων or αὐτῶν? In ἄνευ διόψεως we have the genitive form of a noun that literally means 'a view

1. The scope of this discussion

The business at hand for Plato right now is not to smuggle in a theory based on astronomy, nor to refute the arguments which some people make so badly concerning [astronomical] hypotheses as to lose track of the astrological observations – nor would those who follow along with Plato [deal with] this [subject matter] intrinsically,[603] for surely the philosopher has declined the invitation to do so at the present moment ('for at the moment there is a lot of work that has yet to be done', *Il.* 19.150) and it is not necessary to spend time over these things. After all, astronomy is one thing, but study of nature is another, since Aristotle too distinguished between them in the second [book of his] lectures on the *Physics* (2.2, 193b26). Furthermore, it is necessary to have a lot of leisure in the first place in order to look at these things in images [i.e. in models] and to go on to give an account of them thusly, for as Plato says **it would be labour spent in vain** to speak about these things **without visible imitations**. One must set about the task of giving a theory of the constituent parts of the universe (*ta hola*)[604] [only] when one has thus examined them in the presence of the abacus, the armillary sphere, a model, and the astrolabe. And then there is the necessity of observations which the instruments [just discussed] provide to those who spend time over these matters. It is for these reasons, then, that the philosopher has declined the invitation to give an account of these matters.

through' but is accorded the metaphorical meaning 'consideration' in LSJ on the basis of this very passage in Plato (if indeed this word is in Plato). So taking this as a noun and dividing to read αὖ τῶν we get: 'without further consideration of models of these things'. On the other hand, δι' ὄψεως gives us a preposition with the noun for sight which most translators take as modifying μιμημάτων : 'without visible models of these very things' (<τῶν> δι' ὄψεως, Cornford) or 'without the use of visible models' (no emendation noted, Zeyl). Now the manuscripts of Proclus have δι' ὄψεως throughout and his quotation of the lemma has αὐτῶν rather than αὖ τῶν. Yet Diehl has corrected this to ἄνευ διόψεως and αὖ τῶν. Festugière agrees with Taylor that the latter change on Diehl's part is clearly unwarranted. The question of διόψεως or δι' ὄψεως is less easy. Festugière argues that the latter reading is required at 145.23 and 149.21 since in each case we have just the addition of the article that Cornford proposes. However, 150.21 is another story. Here there is no article after ἄνευ and thus it seems that it must mean 'without consideration'. But it is not unprecedented for Proclus to treat the wording of a line in Plato in different ways, without announcing this fact, when it suits his purposes. See above at 144.8. Here again it seems to me that no very reliable inferences may be drawn about the best reading of Plato's text from what Proclus has to say.

603 μηδὲ κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τῷ Πλάτωνι συνεπόμενοι. The exact sense is unclear, but recall 65.7–12 where Iamblichus dismisses such speculation as 'foreign to the spirit of Plato'.

604 The heavens are among the 'universal parts' of the cosmos; cf. II 2.22–3.2. These 'whole parts' fill up or essentially constitute (*symplêroun*) the cosmos.

The very things which he *does* now say, however, one must understand in two different ways: both mathematically and philosophically, for [what is said] pertains to the corporeal motions and to the psychic motions of the stars.

2. Mathematical interpretation

If prior [to the philosophical interpretation that begins at 149.23] you wish to proceed in the mathematical [mode of interpretation], let us interpret their **dances** as their well-ordered and harmonised revolutions. And since he added words **of these very beings** [after dances], it means the dance of the stars for whose sake the account that deals with the Earth has been inserted. He did not say that the Earth, which is concentrated (*illomenên*), dances, but rather that the *stars* dance *around* the Earth, for they 'dance' when they undergo a single and concordant motion around the same thing. **146**

Let us interpret **conjunctions** (*parabolê*) as their being arranged at the same longitude when they differ with respect to latitude or distance from the Earth (*bathos*) – I mean when they rise together or set together.

The [words] **cycling back** (*anakuklêsis*) **of their circles upon themselves** and **their approaches** (*proschôrêsis*) make clear their forward (*propodismos*) and retrograde (*hypopodismos*) motion, for they exhibit progression when by their own motions they approach their complete cycles (*apokatastasis*), but they exhibit retrogradation when they cycle back toward themselves. Here he means the **circles** to be the spheres in accordance with which the stars undergo motion, but he does not mean the epicycles, for he made no mention of the latter anywhere. In the same vein, he has not said that there are eccentrics for the circles. It would be ridiculous either to make some little circles in the case of each sphere which undergo a motion that is opposite to its motion – whether these little circles are parts of the sphere or have some other sort of composition – or to have a situation where the eccentric spheres *enclose* the centre, but nonetheless don't get moved *around* it. This [latter alternative] destroys the common axiom for natural things: that all simple motion is either around the centre of the universe or away from the centre or toward the centre. The former [alternative] either divides the sphere into arches that are carried [around] in opposite ways and does away with the continuity (*synecheia*) of each sphere or else it introduces circles among the celestial [spheres] that have a different nature and strings together motions from things that are dissimilar and which lack a natural community (*asympathês*) with one another due to their dissimilar composition.

If this is how matters stand, then it is necessary to attend [carefully to the following possiblity][605] – for since these are matters that demand great attention, our views must be stated once again – might it not be that Plato attributes motion to the very stars themselves first and foremost (*diaphorôs*), having no need of these contrivances [of epicycles or eccentrics], since these are unworthy of the divine essence? It is [in fact] necessary for the very variety in their motions to be dependent upon the *souls* [that animate the stars] so that the bodies that undergo motion do so swiftly or slowly in accordance with the *will* of these souls. But this [variation] does not occur through any weakness [on the part of these souls], as many who make excuses for this difference or irregularity suppose. And this [difference or irregularity] comes about in regular temporal periods when the stars themselves undergo motion around their own centres and also variously undertake journeys through their own spheres. [This happens] in order that they might have a motion that is mixed, since they are intermediaries between the fixed stars [that have only regular, circular motion] and the things [in the sub-lunary realm] that undergo motion in a straight line.[606] They are carried to the heights and the depths; and they exhibit progression and retrogradation; and they do all these things in an orderly manner in time, for he said earlier that the heavenly bodies 'have turnings as they undergo their journeys *through* the heavens' (39d8). (After all, if they undertake a journey through the heavens, then it is clear that they are moved in various ways through the depths of the spheres, for things that undertake a journey *through* something do not remain in the same [place] but make a transition from one part of that through which they travel into another part of it. If these things [that are undertaking a journey] also have *turnings*, then the various sorts of transitions that belong to them are turned around in the spheres [through which the journeys take place] with respect to both breadth and depth.) The spheres, of course, undergo only a motion to the east, although this motion does not take place around the same fixed poles, for in the *Republic* he made the single origin for them the axis, [calling it] the spindle, and the poles of the eight spheres [he called] the hooks, and he said that for these [spheres] there is a single and simple motion around the hooks, just as there is for the sphere of the fixed stars.[607] But, going on from this, he says there too that the Fates preside

147

[605] I have taken significant liberties in breaking the following into distinct sentences. As is often the case when Proclus gets particularly passionate about a topic, the syntax becomes somewhat jumbled. In what follows, we have not so much as a semicolon for nearly 15 lines.

[606] Cf. *in Remp*. II 233.6–21 where this intermediate status is more fully elaborated.

[607] Cf. *in Remp*. II 94.12–13 where the same identification is made. The terms 'hooks', 'spindle' and 'whorls' are drawn from Plato's analogy with a spindle or device used for

over the circles and move [each] different [sphere] in a different manner. Here [in the *Timaeus*], however, he has made one [sc. the sphere of the fixed stars] go around at a right angle, while the other [sc. that which corresponds to the Different] goes along the diagonal.[608] This is parallel to the case of the circles of the soul in which he placed the causes of the universal spheres themselves (this is why he moved them 'ecliptically'[609] along the diagonal), as well as [the causes of] the wandering stars (which is why he said of these [psychic circles] that some undergo motion in a manner similar or dissimilar to others (*Tim.* 36d6), just as the planets do (*Tim.* 38d4–5)).[610] Therefore the difference between [the motion of] the 30

spinning wool. The hooks that hold the wool that is to be spun would extend out at an angle from the top of the spindle. The spindle corresponds to the celestial pole that defines the rotation of the sphere of the fixed stars around the diameter of the universe. Since the path of the ecliptic sits at an angle to this, the hooks must correspond to the (plural?) poles around which the planets run their course through the ecliptic.

608 ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὴν μὲν κατὰ πλευρὰν περιήγαγε, τὴν δὲ κατὰ διάμετρον. Cf. *Tim.* 36c5–7 τὴν μὲν δὴ ταὐτοῦ κατὰ πλευρὰν ἐπὶ δεξιὰ περιήγαγεν, τὴν δὲ θατέρου κατὰ διάμετρον ἐπ' ἀριστερά.

609 αὐτοὺς ἐκίνησε λοξῶς. The adjective's basic meaning is 'oblique' or 'at an angle' but the phrase ὁ λοξὸς κύκλος comes to mean the path of the ecliptic; cf. Aristotle, *Metaphys.* 12.5, 1071a16.

610 ὡς τοὺς κύκλους τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐν οἷς καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ὅλων σφαιρῶν τὰς αἰτίας ἔθετο, διὸ κατὰ διάμετρον αὐτοὺς ἐκίνησε λοξῶς, καὶ τῶν πλανωμένων ἄστρων, διὸ καὶ τούτους εἶπεν ὁμοίως τινὰς καὶ ἄλλους ἀνομοίως κινεῖσθαι, καθάπερ ἐκεῖνα. Proclus does not make it particularly easy to see his point. We must understand καὶ τῶν πλανωμένων ἄστρων with ἐν οἷς καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ὅλων σφαιρῶν τὰς αἰτίας ἔθετο, so that what we are discussing is the causes of the motions of universal spheres, on the one hand, and of the planets themselves on the other. This would make sense given that Proclus has opened this extended rant against the evils of epicycles and ecliptics with the claim that the planets move through their spheres due to their own will. Thomas Taylor takes it this way: 'in which he established the causes of the whole spheres and the planets'. However, he does not go on to coordinate the two clauses that follow each instance of διὸ, so his translation gives no indication that we have a cause of the motion of the planetary sphere, on the one hand, and of the planet on the other. This is understandable since Proclus has not used particles to coordinate them. Instead the reader must draw the connection from the position of the words in the sentence. Festugière preserves Proclus' sentence structure: 'comme il avait fait pour les cercles de l'Ame, là où il a exposé les causes et des sphères entières elles-mêmes – c'est pourquoi il a fait se mouvoir les cercles de l'Ame (se. les cercles de l'Autre) obliquement selon la diagonale – et des astres errants, c'est pourquoi il a dit, de ces cercles de l'Ame, que les uns se meuvent de façon semblable, d'autres de façon dissemblable, comme les astres errants.' Of course, this leaves the reader groping around for a way to understand the continuation at 'et des astres errants'. I have tried to make the argument somewhat clearer. The movements that planets have through the spheres (which of course carry them along as the planets themselves move autonomously) and the autonomous planetary movements each have their causal origin in distinct facts about the construction of the World Soul.

148 planetary spheres and that of the fixed stars is in virtue of these [factors] and also in virtue of whether it is [motion] toward the right or toward the left.

In any case, the creation of the spheres is, according to Plato, of this sort: the seven spheres have the same pole, and they possess a difference in relation to the single [sphere of the fixed stars], as we said. While the fixed stars are moved solely around their own centres, the planets, by contrast, go around their own centres but also undertake their journeys through the depths of the spheres in which each one exists, variously undergoing turns toward the top or the bottom, forward or backward. These planets are moved around their poles and each one around its individual ecliptic circle. The spheres in which the planets are [situated], however, are all moved in a similar manner to the sphere of the fixed stars; that is, with a motion around the same pole – [a pole] which is single for all of them. While the sphere of the fixed stars undergoes a single motion that is intrinsic to it, the sphere [of each individual] planet has a motion that is two-fold: there is its own motion which takes place along the ecliptic and then there is the motion where it is led around together with the sphere of the fixed stars. The stars that are fixed also have a motion that is around their own centre as well as the fact that they are carried forward with the sphere of the fixed stars. The planets, however, get carried around together with the sphere of the fixed stars; and each of the planets is also <carried around along with>[611] its own sphere with a motion toward the East; and [each planet also has motion that is] intrinsic to it [with which it moves] with respect to breadth [latitude] and depth [i.e. distance from the Earth], as well as moving around its own individual centre. After all, it is necessary for each of them to be moved in this way: since each [planet] is spherical, it imitates its own wholeness [i.e. the planetary sphere that is its home] in just the same manner that the fixed stars have been rendered coordinate <with their own wholeness>.[612] And in addition, when each of the planets undertake their various journeys through the heavens, each retains its 'turning', as he said (*Tim.* 39d8).

Now, although these [criticisms of reading current astronomical theories into Plato's text] are true, as we have presumably indicated [here] and previously (96.27–32), nonetheless the hypotheses about epicycles and

[611] Reading συμπεριφέσθαι in the lacuna at line 17 with Kroll.

[612] Reading τῃ ἑαυτῶν ὁλότητι in the lacuna at line 21 with Festugière to parallel μιμούμενον τὴν οἰκείαν ὁλότητα in the previous line. Plato says explicitly that each of the fixed stars rotates on its axis (40a9); cf. 128.8 above. Proclus connects this with the fact that all the celestial gods have been made well rounded in imitation of the whole universe (40a4).

eccentrics are not pointless. Instead they analyse the complex motions [of the planets] into simple ones so that through them we might more easily get a hold of the points at which these complex motions make a complete cycle (*apokatastasis*) since the grasp [of these facts] doesn't come about easily from the motions themselves but is built up only from simplifications.[613] Therefore it is a useful mechanism to discover what simple [motions are sufficient to] make the complex [resultant motions] and to track down the measures of the complex ones through the former. It is as if someone who was unable to measure the spiral around a cylinder were then to take a line that is moved around it at a right angle [to the axis of the cylinder] and a point on a [vertical] straight line that measures motions of these things [sc. the distance between the lines and the number of turns] to discover what the quantity is for the motion around the helix and the amount of time it takes.[614] In any case, the people who use counter-rolling [spheres] or epicycles and eccentrics look to this [sort of case] and discover the complex motion through the simple motions that make it up. But these matters are worthy of much greater attention and it is because of this fact that I tender them to the lovers of spectacle[615] for investigation and I awaken in them more accurate intellections concerning these things.

One must consider the **alignments** (*synapsis*) to be their conjunctions (*synodos*) and the configurations (*schêmatismos*) which they make in relation to one another, whether [they make these configurations] in a manner that is triangular, rectangular, hexagonal, along a diagonal; for when he assumes only conjunction and **opposition** (*kat antikru*) among them as extreme terms, he [thereby implicitly] includes all the remaining shapes [as falling between these extremes].

The **screenings** are [the situations][616] whereby one heavenly body comes in front of another from our point of view, for when one thing

[613] Reading ἐκ τῶν ἁπλῶν with Schneider for the manuscripts' ἁπλανῶν.

[614] The description is very compressed, but I suspect that Proclus means to break the length of the helix down into three simple components: the circumference of the cylinder, the vertical distance between turns, and the number of turns. The calculation of the time that it would take to traverse the length of the helix requires the assumption of a constant rate of speed. Given what Proclus thinks really happens with the planets, this assumption is not in fact met. Perhaps he thinks that the hypothesis of epicycles moving at a constant speed compensates for this, trading a constant planetary speed for a purely fictional extra distance travelled on the epicycle, so as to yield a correct calculation of the time it takes for a planet to come back around to the same point.

[615] Cf. 108.7 above.

[616] τὰς δὲ "ἐπιπροσθήσεις", καθ ἃς ἡμῖν τε καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἐπιπροσθοῦσιν refers to the words μεθ' οὕστινάς τε ἐπίπροσθεν ἀλλήλοις ἡμῖν in the lemma and explains the somewhat pedantic treatment of 'behind' in the following sentence.

has been arranged behind something else relative to us, the latter comes to be in front of that which is behind it. When [the heavenly bodies] intercept one another they screen [the one that is behind] relative to us.

One must think that the words **at what times they are hidden and appear again** refer to the disappearances [of the planets] brought about by the Sun and their risings[617] – both of which those who are expert in these matters say are productive and significant of great events.

In any event, **to describe** all these things in separation from **them** – and by 'them' he means visible imitations which are of course [astronomical] instruments – **would be labour spent in vain**.

3. Philosophical interpretation

Now after the mathematical [interpretation], let us consider each of the things that have been said in a philosophical manner.[618] Surely then the **dances** of the souls are the Bacchic ones that they make around the intelligible, and the intellectual periods and complete cycles (*apokatastasis*), for they [sc. souls] also dance when they are following the more divine among their leaders, as Socrates says in the *Phaedrus*.[619]

The **conjunctions** are the understandings (*gnosis*) that they have of one another, for up there everything is brightness and they see one another, and one soul is not ignorant of what belongs to another. Furthermore, they make their own forms conform, like traces or impressions, to the intelligibles that are their own paradigms.

150 The **cycling back of the circles** and the **approaches** are reversions that take place from them toward intellect and again from intellect toward them, for both make the eternal time and they know intellect from themselves and know themselves from intellect.

[617] Compare τὰς κρύψεις τὰς ὑπὸ τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὰς φάσεις, ἃς ἀμφοτέρας μεγάλων τινῶν εἶναι ποιητικὰς καὶ σημαντικὰς λέγουσιν οἱ ταῦτα δεινοί with 151.33–152.2 ποτὲ μὲν καλύπτεται ὑπὸ τὰς αὐγὰς τῶν ἡγεμόνων θεῶν, ποτὲ δὲ ἀναφαινόμενα φόβους καὶ σημεῖα ποιεῖται τῶν μελλόντων. Exactly *what* is being hidden or appearing in the latter passage is a matter of interpretation. Siorvanes (1996) thinks that it may be the otherwise invisible satellites of the planets.

[618] Proclus now gives a second reading of most of the words in the lemma, interpreting them – not with reference to the motions of the visible gods in the heavens – but in relation to the divine souls that animate these bodies. Cf. 145.30 above.

[619] Cf. 252d1: οὕτω καθ' ἕκαστον θεόν, οὗ ἕκαστος ἦν χορευτής. Plato's metaphor, in which the soul that imitates and follows after the god is like a member of a chorus, gets solidified into a literal meaning for χορευτής so that a follower of a philospher is a χορευτής; cf. *Plat. Theol.* 1 6.24. The connection between the dance of the stars here in the *Timaeus* and the chorus line of souls in the *Phaedrus* seems to be the only textual grounding for Proclus' campaign to re-read the lemma at the level of souls.

The **alignments** and the 'diametrical oppositions'[620] are the reciprocal unions they have in relation to the intelligible, since when they are reciprocally connected with respect to the intelligible, then their processions also take place. When their own 'one' connects with the 'one' that belongs to intellect, there is a conjunction (*synodos*) between both, for in these conjunctions it is necessary for the centres of the things that are moving together to come to be in a straight line. But when they proceed from there into exercising providence over secondary things, they withdraw into [a position that stands] **in opposition** to this [prior] unification. But since they are always invariant, simultaneously proceeding and remaining, they are also simultaneously kept together and diametrically [opposed].

The **screenings** of one [heavenly body] by another relative to us are the intermediates that are between the divine souls and our own, for it is not the case that all things are united with all things in a manner that lacks mediation. Instead some are united to others, whether superior or inferior, through intermediates.

The words **at what times they are hidden and appear** [refer to] both the starting points of the periods and the points at which the cycle is completed (*apokatastasis*), for it is in relation to these in particular that the things in the cosmos 'turn' and transform, bringing total ruin and great changes, as Plato says in the *Statesman*.[621]

In any case, **to describe all these things without consideration**[622] **of imitations of these things** which are observed about the heavens **would be labour spent in vain**. After all, it is necessary to return to the recollection of invisible things from the things that are visible, for just as we have brought ourselves at first to the understanding of celestial things from the instruments and shadows down here, so too we must

[620] As becomes clear at line 10, Proclus thinks that διάμετροι στάσεις is synonymous with the κατ' ἀντικρὺ in the lemma.

[621] κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας μάλιστα τρέπουσι τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ μεταβάλλουσιν, ἀθρόας ἐπάγουσαι φθορὰς καὶ μεγάλας μεταβολάς, ὥς φησιν αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ Πολιτικῷ. Proclus has in mind the passage from this dialogue upon which the Neoplatonists lavished the most attention: the story of the cosmic reversal at 270a. In the present context, he connects appearances and disappearences of the planets with the 'turnings' that the planets are said to make (*Tim.* 39d8, cited above at 147.13 in this connection). This notion of turning is then connected to the language of reversal of the *Statesman* 270b10–c2: Ταύτην τὴν μεταβολὴν ἡγεῖσθαι δεῖ τῶν περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν γιγνομένων τροπῶν πασῶν εἶναι μεγίστην καὶ τελεωτάτην τροπήν. When the reversal occurs, this results in the greatest transformations 270c4–5 Μεγίστας τοίνυν καὶ μεταβολὰς χρὴ νομίζειν γί γνεσθαι τότε τοῖς ἐντὸς ἡμῖν οἰκοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. In addition to the alliteration of μεγάλας μεταβολάς which echoes Plato's text, Proclus is also very fond of ἀθρόα φθορά; cf. *in Tim.* I 106.14, 29; 107.21; 114.27; 116.2.

[622] See note 602 above.

likewise bring ourselves to the recollection of revolutions of things that are invisible from the former [celestial things]. The heaven, after all, is intermediate between things that are generated and those that are intelligible.

Now, since he said that the configurations and motions of celestial things **bring fear** and afford **signs of the things** that are coming **to those who are able to reason** one must also see that it is not enough to think merely that they signify those things, but that, they are signifiers of things that have come to be, being things that are significant (*sêmantikos*) of specific things. It is for this reason that he deliberately noted the signifying activities that are in them.[623] Theophrastus said that in his time the theory of the Chaldeans around these matters was most remarkable. Among other things, they predicted the lifestyles and deaths in the lives of individuals. And [they did] not merely [predict] common occurrences – for example, storms or fine weather – but he refers to them [the specific prediction that] if Mercury appears in the winter, this signifies that cold is coming, while if in summer, heat. In any event, in his book *On Signs*, Theophrastus said that they predict everything – both individual and common occurrences – from celestial things.

K. Conclusion of the discourse on the visible gods, *Tim*. 40d4–5

Let these things be sufficient for us on this matter, and let what has been said be the end concerning the nature of the visible and generated gods. (*Tim*. 40d4–5)

One task for science is this: to apply a fitting measure to discourses and to give them as much [space] as what is conveyed is able to contribute toward the theory at hand. This is surely what Plato does in these words. He puts an end to the discourses about the living things that are celestial and astral – discourses for the sake of which he provided the account of the Earth, for it doubtless contributes toward the making of time in conjunction with the celestial revolutions. Here the things that have been discussed can be concluded, for the things that **concern the visible and generated gods** have an end according to him – beings which we, of course, call 'astral gods' or, in general, 'celestial gods'. He says they are **visible** because they are doubtless encosmic and have something that belongs among the things that are sensible [sc. the visible star] dependent upon their intellectual essence. On the other hand, he also says that they are **generated** since they have *soul* –which he refers to as the very first

[623] Reading Schneider's ἐν αὐτοῖς for ἑαυτοῖς in line 33 with Festugière.

among the things that are generated (*Tim.* 37a2) – for they are not entirely visible just insofar as they are, but there is something in them that is generated, but invisible nonetheless. Moreover, that the account of the Earth is for the sake of the account that is about the stars he has shown by the fact that, right after he added the account of the Earth, the account of the dance [of the stars] was undertaken. [That is,] 'the dances (*choreia*) of these very beings and their conjunctions (*parabolê*) with one another' and the words that follow through which he has obviously shown (I think) that the task for him is to speak about the celestial gods and the genera of beings that attend upon them – things which, when they are concealed by the brightness of the gods' leaders at one moment and then reappear at another, surely 'bring fear' and are made to be signs of the future, for he will make what is said fit these too to the limited extent that is proper to them. **152**

IV. THE TRADITIONAL GODS

A. Sub-lunary gods and daemons, *Tim.* 40d6–7

To speak about the other daemons and to know their genesis is a task greater than ourselves. (*Tim.* 40d6–7)

1. How these beings are known

Since he intends to pursue an account concerned with the sub-lunary gods, he says that this is remarkable and a **task greater than ourselves**, perhaps in as much as these matters go beyond tradition that belongs to us, should we propose both to discover their genesis and to show it to others. After all, what he said earlier about the Demiurge – that it is 'quite a task both to find him and to declare him to all' (28c3–5) – surely applies now to [speaking] about the sub-lunary gods: that to know their genesis and to speak [about them] is a task greater than ourselves.

What, then, does the manner of this indication that is used by him mean? After all, since he has given accounts that are numerous and remarkable about the entire heaven and about the intelligible Paradigm, how can he say that the account that deals with the generation-producing (*genesiourgos*) gods[624] is a task too great for him? Or perhaps it is possible [for him] to say these things because these [generation-producing gods] were thought by many among the physiologists to be soul-less

[624] *in Crat.* §158.2 informs us that the generation-producing order of gods is headed by Poseidon. *in Remp.* II 174.16–22 grants to them functions analogous to those which human parents perform for their children. See also II 344.24 for the fluid terminology that is about to be discussed: ὑπὸ σελήνην δαιμόνων ἢ θεῶν γενεσιουργῶν.

things that are just randomly carried along, without exercising providential care, i.e. the elements. While agreeing that the things in the heavens participate in intellect and the gods due to the order among them, they abandoned the realm of Becoming as something subject to great change, indefinite and without providential care – things of the kind that Aristotle too subsequently believed them to be, since he established unmoved causes only for the celestial revolutions (whether there were eight or more) but abandoned these elements [down here] to be soul-less.[625] Lest we should be afflicted with the same [errors] as these people, Plato right at the beginning celebrated and announced the generation of the *sub-lunary* gods as divine and intellectual, there being no need whatsoever of any such [corresponding] indication in the case of the celestial gods.[626] And perhaps one might say this too: that souls more easily forget those things that are nearer to them, while they remember more readily the first principles [or rulers (*archôn*)] that are superior to them, for [the latter] have a greater effect upon them because of their superior power and they seem to be present to these souls through activity – which is doubtless also what comes about in the case of our sight, for there are many things situated right on Earth that we do not see, yet we nonetheless seem to see the sphere of the fixed stars or the stars themselves because they shine their light upon our sight. Thus the *eye of the soul* is more inclined toward forgetfulness or blindness in the case of the things that are nearer than it is in the case of the principles [or rulers] that are higher up and more divine. In the same way, every cult or sect agrees that there is the principle that is the very first, and all people call upon a god who aids, but not everyone is convinced that there are gods who come after this first principle or that providence exercised by them within the universe, for the One is revealed to them more clearly than the plurality.[627] Other sects believe that there are gods, and they

[625] The attribution to Aristotle of a view about the extent of providence makes more sense if we think of Aristotle being mediated to Proclus and the other Neoplatonists through the filter of Alexander of Aphrodisias. Alexander was concerned with this issue which is taken up briefly in the *Quaestiones* and at greater length in a work entitled 'On Providence' which is preserved in an Arabic version by Abû Bishr Mattâ. For translations of key passages and discussion, see Sorabji (2005b), vol 2, 80–2. In Alexander's hands, the Aristotelian position is more subtle than Proclus allows. Though there is no providential agent present in the sub-lunary realm, as there is in the celestial region, nonetheless an indirect providential care for species (though not individuals) results from the motions of the heavens.

[626] The unspoken assumption is that in Plato's day, all right-thinking people would have acknowledged the celestial gods as divinities and would not have needed to be reminded of this fact.

[627] This is plausibly interpreted as an oblique criticism of the Christian sect; cf. Saffrey (1975), 558–9.

place the daemonic genus after gods, but are unaware of the order of heroes.[628] This is, generally speaking, the greatest task for science: to put the finishing touches on the procession of beings and the [roles of] intermediate [stages in that procession]. Now, if we have stated things correctly, then, when discussing the celestial gods, Plato quite reasonably gives no indication of the difficulty of the account that concerns them, but when he intends to speak about the sub-lunary gods, he says it to be a task greater than himself, for the account that is concerned with these matters is more difficult. This is because it is not possible to draw conclusions about them from what is manifest but it is instead necessary [to reason] solely on the basis of inspired and intellectual conceptions. Let these things serve as the answer to this puzzle.

2. Why are the sub-lunary gods called daemons?

Once more, someone might raise a puzzle about the reason why he has referred to them [sc. the sub-lunary gods] as daemons. Some people placed the gods in the heavens but have been motivated by these words to place daemons in charge of the sub-lunary realm. However, the fact that Plato thought these [daemons] to be gods is easy to infer from what comes next, for he says 'Let us thus accept the genesis concerning these *gods* given by those [who claim to be their offspring] and let us say [etc.]' (40e3–4). In general, it appears that he is not speaking specifically about the things that are specifically denoted by the word 'daemons', since there would not be a physical first principle for them that derives from sense perception which must be the point from which physical accounts originate. In addition,[629] the word 'daemon' is only mentioned twice [in the dialogue]: once where he says that our rational soul is a daemon of the living being (90a), and [a second time] where he calls the generation-producing gods daemons as he does in these [words in the lemma].

Now, someone might well ask, 'So why in the world has no mention been made of the beings that are *essentially* daemons?' – for one must solve this problem first. Or was this not something that was implied by Socrates in what he said to the same audience the previous day about those who are in charge of the lifestyles of the souls and those who punish their sins in Hades?[630] Therefore he declines to mention these

[628] For the role of heroes or heroic souls as intermediaries between daemons and human souls, see *in Crat.* §§ 117 and 128.

[629] Festugière is right to retain the τε following ὅλως in line 29. Accordingly I have translated δὶς δὲ μέμνηται with 'in addition' to show the coordination, while nonetheless breaking Proclus' single sentence into two in order to make it read more easily.

[630] Cf. the beings who are in charge of punishments (*Rep.* 10 614e4 ἄνδρες . . . ἄγριοι, διάπυροι ἰδεῖν) are daemons according to Proclus (*in Remp.* II 181.8). The other daemons in the myth of Er are those who correspond to the lives that souls choose rather

things since they are already evident, but from what he has said here, he has led [his audience] to a deeper understanding (*hyponoia*) of those daemons too that were celebrated by him [on the previous day]. In the same manner he also passed over the individual animations of the eight spheres themselves, as well as the animation of the circle of the fixed stars – [treating it] all as one with [the animation] of the stars that are included within it and [treating the animation of the circle] of [each] planet as one with [the animation] of the planets [that are in them], on the grounds that had been given previously by Socrates.[631]

But this [reply to the previous question] provides a plausible justification. Coming back to the previous inquiry, let us discuss these generation-producing gods with which the passage is concerned and explain the reason why he has referred to them by means of the word 'daemon'.

Theodore, who deals otherwise with these matters,[632] says that he [sc. Plato] calls them 'daemons' insofar as they stand in a relation (*hôs en schesi*), but calls them 'gods' insofar as they are unrelated (*hôs aschetos*). [He does this] insofar as he ranks them among the parts of the entire cosmos below the Moon, where they animate various things in different manners.[633]

than have allotted to them (*Rep.* 10, 617e1: οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἱρήσεσθε). Proclus argues that neither Lachesis nor her prophet belong to the class of daemons but rather belong to the class of angels since they announce to the souls what rules of Fate involve; cf. *in Remp.* II 255.16–20.

631 The thought seems to be that it would be pointless now for Timaeus to mention that these spheres – as well as the divinities that reside within them – are living beings. After all, in Proclus' mind all this would have been implicit in what Socrates said about the whorls in the myth of Er on the previous day.

632 III 154.19–24 = Theodore of Asine T27 (Deuse). ὁ μὲν οὖν Θεόδωρος ἄλλον τρόπον ταῦτα μεταχειριζόμενος.... Festugière translates 'Theodore, qui entreprend de traiter ce problème d'une manière bien à lui...' on the basis of Proclus' earlier remark (*in Tim.* II 215.29) that Theodore interprets Plato in his own peculiar manner. This is certainly possible. But it could also convey that Theodore deals with the question of the contextual relativity of the term 'daemon' or 'god' in his work *On Names*.

633 In his notes Festugière relates this passage to Theodore T30 (III 187.16–24). There the 'relational souls' of the three major divisions of the universe are related to the gods Phorkys, Kronos and Rhea. The starless sphere beyond the sphere of the fixed stars is related to Phorkys, while Kronos corresponds to the stars, and Rhea to the material realm. Presumably Festugière has in mind that Rhea will be identified with (a) a relational soul; (b) a daemon in as much as she is related to the sub-lunary realm and (c) a god in as much as she is considered absent this relation. But this leaves it a bit mysterious what one should say about Phorkys and Kronos since this information about relational daemons and unrelated gods concerns (only?) those below the level of the Moon.

Our teacher [Syrianus],[634] however, first of all deemed it worthwhile to interpret them as daemons in relation to the celestial gods, for they are dependent upon them and exercise providence in conjunction with them over their appropriate regions. And this arrangement is itself Platonic, for in the *Symposium* (202e, 203b) he refers to the daemon Eros as the attendant of Aphrodite and as one who has proceeded from Resource who is truly a god. Yet in the *Phaedrus* he surely posits Eros as himself a god in as much [as we consider Eros] in relation to the elevated life that comes from him.

Next, according to an alternative conception, he says that there are daemons among the celestial beings as well as gods among the things in the sub-lunary realm. But all [the members of] the genus up there are called 'gods' (which is why he called the form (*idea*) of the celestial gods a genus (*genos*), even though daemons too have been brought in through this term).[635] Down here, however, the entire class (*to pan plêthos*) are called daemons, since up there the property that is distinctive of divinity predominates, while down here it is the property that is distinctive of daemons – a fact which, when looked upon in isolation, led some people to separate the divine and the daemonic in terms of the celestial and the realm of Becoming. But it is requisite to station both [kinds] in both [places], and although the divine [kind] abounds up there and the daemonic down here, nonetheless the divine [sort] does exist down here. After all, if the whole cosmos is a blessed god, then none of the constituent parts is itself devoid of god or of providential care. But if all things participate in god and providence, then each has been allotted a divine nature. But if this is so, then appropriate orders of gods preside over them; for if the heavens participate in a single soul and one intellection through intermediate souls and intellects, then what must one think about these elements? How is it not the case that to an even greater extent these [elements] should have a share in the single divinity of the cosmos precisely through some intermediate order of gods?

In addition, there would be the following absurdity [if one were to claim that there are no gods in the sub-lunary region]: on the one hand, we have the art of theurgy (*telestikê*) or that of oracles or that of animating statues of the gods – [all arts] which have been established on Earth

155

[634] 154.15–156.3 = Syrianus *in Tim.* fr. 20 (Klitenic Wear).

[635] It seems to me unlikely that Plato's use of the terms *genos*, *idea* and *eidos* is sufficiently subject to terminological discipline for the evidence to support Syrianus' claim. The claim that there are daemons among the celestial beings is supposed to be justified by what Plato writes about the four kinds of living being at *Tim* 39e10–40a1: εἰσὶν δὴ τέτταρες [sc. ἰδέαι], μία μὲν οὐράνιον θεῶν γένος, ἄλλη δὲ πτηνὸν καὶ ἀεροπόρον, τρίτη δὲ ἔνυδρον εἶδος. Because Plato speaks of a celestial *genos* in contrast to the aquatic *eidos*, we should understand that daemons as well as gods have been introduced.

[wherein] things that have been composed from matter that is partial and destructible attain through certain symbols a receptivity for participation in god or being moved by god or foretelling the future. On the other hand, [according to the view being criticised] the creator of things that are universal would not put divine souls or intellects or gods in charge of the universal, indestructible elements that constitute the cosmos. Is this because he did not want to? And how could he not want to, since he wants to make 'all things like unto himself' (*Tim.* 29e3)? Is he otherwise unable? Well, what is preventing him? After all, we see from the works of theurgy that this [sc. putting divine souls in charge of material bodies] is possible. But if he wants to and is able to, then it is obvious that he established gods to oversee the realm of Becoming, with portions assigned by lot. But since the daemonic genus is everywhere one that is attendant upon the gods, there are also generation-producing daemons. Some of them are in charge of the universal elements, while others are guardians of regions (*klima*).[636] Yet others are in charge of peoples, others of cities, others of individual genera, while others are overseers for individual things, for the guardianship of the daemons descends to the final level of division. Let this be our investigation into one problem about what Plato intends to say.

3. Where does the daemonic order fall?

Second after the topic concerning the manner of existence (*hyparxis*) enjoyed by daemons, there is another problem about their order (*taxis*). For let them count as gods and let them be called 'daemons' on account of the reason we have just given. Where then are we to rank them? Will it be, as mentioned beforehand (154.24) below the Moon or prior to the [celestial] gods? This latter view [that daemons are *prior* to the celestial gods] might seem to be the case for two reasons. One reason is that Plato indicates that he is going *up* to a higher order when he says that to speak about them [sc. the daemons] is a task that is beyond us, given that there has already been a [previous] discussion of the celestial gods. Another reason is that he says that he is going to set forth the account *following* (*Tim.* 40e2) those who hand down the genealogies of the gods. But it was, prior to the cosmos and the creator, that those people have handed down these generations of these gods – I mean those that have proceeded from Heaven (Ouranos) and Earth (Gaia).

We [reply] that he introduced them [sc. daemons] *after* the celestial gods and it is because of this that they are the result of Heaven and Earth,

[636] This term has a very broad sense and can connote (a) terrestrial regions in a general sense; (b) the seven latitudes that make up the habitable part of the Earth (cf. 125.13 above); and (c) the astrological zones that correspond to the terrestrial *klima*.

about whom he spoke previously (for it is also for this reason that he said Earth is the most senior of the gods within the heaven (*Tim.* 40c3), since he intends to introduce the other gods that are within the heaven from both the former and from Heaven). In any case, we will show this – that the address from the Demiurge to both these and all the other [gods] is made on the assumption that they have been produced within the All by him (41a7–8). We will attribute the explanation for why he says that he follows the genealogies of the gods, and also the explanation for why he announced in advance that he would decline to speak about them, to the fact that there is no clear sign of the hypostasis of these beings which can be derived from the appearances as there is in the parallel case of the heavens, where the order of their periods is a conspicuous sign of the governance of the gods. It is beyond the study of nature (*physioloia*) to undertake discussion about matters where the physical facts (*physika pragmata*) give us no basis for belief. It is for this reason that he said, as a physiologist, that it was beyond him to give an account concerning these matters. If he says that he is following divinely inspired people and gives a similar genealogy of gods when he is speaking about the gods *below* the heaven as when they are talking about the gods *above* the heaven, there's nothing remarkable in that. Plato, after all, knew that all the orders of **157** gods – from whichever level they might originate – advance as far as the last stages, giving rise to series from themselves which are everywhere analogous to themselves. As a result, even if those among these orders of gods who are celebrated by the Theologians would indeed be *above* the cosmos, still they are also *in* this universe here. As this heaven is akin to that one and the Earth here to Earth up there, so too the orders that owe their existence to the one are akin to those that proceed from the other.

From these facts one must surely conclude that, according to Plato – just like according to the other Theologians – the things that proceed first produce the things that come next in conjunction with their own causes.[637] After all, since these [sub-lunary] gods proceed from the Demiurge and also from the first things that have proceeded from him, they are said to be engendered by Earth (Gaia) and Heaven (Ouranos). In any event, the Demiurge speaks to all of them when he obliges them to create mortal creatures, imitating the power that he himself exercised in their genesis. Therefore all of them have proceeded from one [cause], even if the secondary things *also* come from those that come [immediately] before them. It follows from this, of course, that not everything

[637] The mechanics of procession mean that in the series A, B, C, A produces B and B produces C in conjunction with A. A causes C in a superior more general way, while B fills in some of the details.

that is produced by the young gods is mortal, if in fact some among these [products of the young gods] proceed from others [above them] – rather, only the contrary is true: all mortal beings have been produced by the young gods. This, in turn, has the consequence that the young gods also produce some things in accordance with their own motionless [kind of] existence (*hyparxis*), while producing other things in accordance with [the kind of existence] that undergoes motion, for they would not be included among the causes of immortal things if they produced all [their products] exclusively in accordance with [the kind of existence] that undergoes motion – that is, if it is in fact true that everything that is derived from a movable cause is essentially such as to change.

4. Are there irrational daemons?

On the basis of these conceptions, let us resolve the following question: if there are indeed irrational daemons, as the Theurgists say, from whence have they been established? If they are, on the one hand, derived from the young gods, one must inquire how are these daemons *immortal* (for these [younger] gods are the fathers of mortal creatures)? If, on the other hand, they are the result of the Demiurge, then how can they be *irrational* (for the Demiurge is in every case the father [of his products] *in conjunction with intellect*)? The solution of this question, then, is as follows: the [irrational daemons] have been established from the young gods and are not mortal through this fact, since some of the younger [gods] actually generate others. Perhaps it is due to this fact that the beings that are [thus] engendered have been called 'daemons' so that we might apprehend that the things that truly count as daemons were established from the same things. But furthermore, they also proceeded from the one Demiurge for he is the cause of all immortal beings, as Timaeus himself says (41c2–5). If the one Demiurge gives everything a share in intellect, then there is some final trace (*ichnos*) of the defining intellectual characteristic in irrational daemons to the extent that they they have a ready capacity for imagination (*euphantastos*) (for this is the final echo of intellect, and the capacity for imagination is called the passive intellect for this reason even by others and this usage is not wrong).[638] Consequently the "semi-mortals" are [one class] among those beings that are specifically called daemons.

Plato has previously implanted in us the starting points for a solution in relation to our inquiry into the final genus among the class of daemons. If there is some [member] of the daemonic genus that uses reason, it is then obvious how we shall trace it back to the one Demiurge: either

[638] Cf. *in Euc.* 51.20–52.20; *in Remp.* II 52.6–8 and 77.16–18. On passive intellect as *phantasia* in the commentary tradition, see Sorabji (2005a) vol. I, 121–3.

as something produced from him [directly], or as something produced through the intermediary of gods that have been produced by him – by the celestial gods if it is a celestial daemon or by the sub-lunary gods if it is a sub-lunary daemon (since some of the sub-lunary gods are the fathers of others as Plato taught, following [in this teaching] the genealogies of the gods). Consequently it would be nothing remarkable if these [sub-lunary] gods, since they were parents of [other] *gods*, also engendered *daemons* that were on the same level with themselves – not only irrational ones, but rational ones too – just as the celestial [gods are the parents] of celestial daemons. Thus, the issue concerning daemons gets decided on the basis of these things in a manner that follows the guidance provided by the Platonic doctrines,[639] for from what Plato has said on the subject of the generation-producing gods, it becomes clear what he would say if he were asked about the genesis of daemons in the true sense. But since he knew in general terms the *relational* genus (*kata schesin*) of daemons,[640] he would surely have been even more knowledgeable about the beings that are daemons by virtue of their very being (*kath' hyparxin*) [and] who fill the universe down here. How could he not agree that there is a relational genus of daemons when he himself says that our soul is **159** allotted the status of a daemon (*Tim*. 90a4) in relation to the mortal living creature by those who made mortal things? It is therefore necessary that, prior to the daemonic life that is relational, there is [a daemonic life] that is essential (*ousiôdês*) and [it is also necessary] for things that have given the relational [life] to the one to give the essence to the other. But since Plato established the rulers of the universe, he supposed them to have their own everlasting attendants who come after them and take their existence (*hypostasis*) from them.

One must heed those who spoke [about them] earlier, since they are offspring of the gods, as they say, and doubtless clearly know their own parents. Therefore it is impossible to mistrust the children of gods, even though they speak without demonstrations that are either plausible or necessary. (*Tim*. 40d7–e2)

[639] ἑπομένως ταῖς Πλατωνικαῖς ὑφηγήσεσιν. Not, as Festugière would have it, 'avec les enseignements de Platon'. I suspect Taylor's 'conformably to Platonic doctrines' imagines that the feminine plural dative goes with an implicit *doxai*. Not even Proclus can pretend that the *full* details of the daemonology that he is elaborating can be drawn from Plato's *Timaeus*. He says, honestly, that this resolution conforms with the general direction set by the Platonic tradition and he argues that what Plato does say in the *Timaeus* shows that he would give the same answers if he were asked.

[640] Cf. *in Tim*. I 77.5 = Porphyry *in Tim*. 1.10 (Sodano) = Numenius fr. 37 (Des Places). According to this account of daemons, there are three kinds: those that are genuinely divine; human souls that are daemons *kata schesin*; and soul polluters. Festugière also refers the reader to *in Tim*. III 219.5–18 = Iamblichus *in Tim*. fr. 80 (Dillon).

Even amid matters that seem difficult to understand or puzzling, the person who simply *knows* takes the easy path to divine understanding (*gnôsis*) – retracing [a path that runs via] the divinely inspired cognition (*entheos noêsis*) through which things become clear and familiar (*gnôrimos*), for all things are in the gods. The one who has antecedently comprehended all things is able to fill others with his own understanding. This is precisely what Timaeus has done here when he refers us to the authority of the Theologians and the generation of the gods celebrated by them.

Who, then, are these people and what is the understanding (*gnôsis*) that belongs to them? Well, in the first place, they are **offspring of the gods** and **clearly know their own parents**. They are **offspring** and **children** of the gods in as much as they conserve the form of the god who presides over them through their current way of life, for Apollonian souls are called 'offspring and children of Apollo' when they choose a life that is prophetic or dedicated to mystic rites (*telestikos bios*).[641] These souls are called 'children' of Apollo to the extent that they belong to this god in particular and are adapted to that series down here. By contrast, they are called 'offspring' of Apollo because their present lifestyle displays them as such. All souls are therefore children of god, but not all of them have *recognised* the gods whose children they are. Those who recognise [their leading gods] and choose a similar life are called 'children of gods'. This is why Plato added the words **as they say**, for these souls [sc. those of the people to whose authority Timaeus proposes to defer] reveal the order from which they come – as in the case of the Sibyl who delivered oracles from the moment of her birth[642] or Heracles who appeared at his birth together with Demiurgic symbols.[643] When souls of this sort

[641] It is important to keep in mind the *Phaedrus* myth wherein different souls follow different gods in their tour of the forms. Having a particular god as one's leading god makes your soul apt for certain functions once it has descended into a body (cf. 252c4–253c1). Thus those souls that were followers of Apollo – and thus form part of his series or chain – are naturally apt for prophecy or mystic arts. Note that 248d7–e1 refers to a mantic or telestic life-style. By contrast, those belonging to the series of Helios should choose a life dedicated to the priesthood or healing (cf. *in Tim.* III 279.14–19). In what follows, Proclus distinguishes between belonging to a series (being a *child* of Apollo) and living a life that is fitting to persons who belong to that series (i.e. being an *offspring*). The theologians who are able to relate to us the facts about the genesis of their gods will be *both* children and offspring of the relevant gods.

[642] Cf. *in Tim.* III 282.4 and Hermias, *in Phdr.* 94.26.

[643] It is not clear what Proclus is referring to here. Festugière suspects some Orphic connection in which Heracles – identified with Cronos or Time – is born with the body of a snake and three heads: that of a bull, a lion and a god. Cf. Kern, *Orph.* frs. 54, 57 and 58. What is clear is that Proclus supposes that Heracles belongs to the order of Zeus (*in Tim.* I 179.29) who is, in turn, identified with the Demiurge.

revert upon their parents, they are filled by them with divinely inspired cognition (*entheos noêsis*). Their understanding (*gnôsis*) is a matter of divine possession since they are connected to the god through the divine light and [this sort of understanding] transcends all other [kinds of] understanding – both that achieved through [reasoning through] what is likely (*di' eikotôn*), as well as that which is demonstrative (*apodeiktikos*). The former deals with nature and the universals that are in the particulars, while the latter deals with incorporeal essence (*ousia*) and things that are objects of knowledge. But divinely inspired understanding alone is connected to the gods themselves.

But since they claim to report matters of intimate concern to them (*oikeia*) we should follow custom (*nomos*) and heed them (*pisteuein*). So let it be [the case], then, that the genesis concerning these gods accords with their [account] and also let us say [what this account is].[644] (*Tim.* 40e2–4)

Considering the words of Plato strictly (*akribôs*), one might conclude many things from them. For instance, that divinely inspired understanding (*entheos gnôsis*) gets completed through intimacy (*oikeiotêtos*) with the gods (for the Sun is seen through light that is solar-in-form (*hêlioeidês*), and the divine is revealed through divine illumination). [Or, for instance,] that the divine law (*nomos*) defines the divine orders – a law which the divinely possessed cognitive acts (*entheastikos noêsis*) of the ancients reveal and in accordance with which souls which are in a state of activity (though not themselves divinely possessed) give heed to those souls that are divinely possessed. Heeding this law himself in the prologue (27c1), he said to invoke the gods and goddesses, so that when all kingdoms – both the ones in the heaven and those in the sub-lunary region – have been ordered in terms of the most primary and intellectual first principles, and all things everywhere stand in an analogous relation, [then] the order of the things might serve as a guide [for the order] of our thoughts. In any case, the words **let it be** come before **let us say** – an order that leads from the things to the words. Such, then, are **161** the conclusions that one might draw from the words at hand. But it is also a Pythagorean [practice] to follow the Orphic genealogies [of the

[644] οὕτως οὖν κατ' ἐκείνους ἡμῖν ἡ γένεσις περὶ τούτων τῶν θεῶν ἐχέτω τε καὶ λεγέσθω. This is not the most natural translation of this sentence from Plato, but Proclus goes on (160.31–161.1) to invest the word order ἐχέτω . . . λεγέσθω with significance, treating the former as something that corresponds to facts or things (*pragmata*), while the latter corresponds with words (*logoi*). I have tried to give a translation that conveys the way in which Proclus wants his audience to hear the lemma.

5 gods], for when the science of the gods proceeded, it [descended] from the Orphic tradition, through Pythagoras, to the Greeks, as Pythagoras himself says in the Sacred Discourse.[645]

[645] See *in Tim*. III 168.9–16 which is also included by Kern among the testimonia concerning those taught by Orpheus (§255).

References

ADAM, J. (1902). *The Republic of Plato*. Cambridge University Press.

ARCHER-HIND, R. D. (1888). *The Timaeus of Plato, edited with Introduction and Notes*. London: Macmillan.

BALTZLY, D. (2002). 'What Goes Up: Proclus against Aristotle on the Fifth Element'. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 80: 261–87.

(2008). 'Merological Modes of Being in Proclus'. *Ancient Philosophy* 26(2): 395–412.

(2009). 'Gaia Gets to Know Herself: Proclus on the World's Self-Perception'. *Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* 54(3): 261–85.

(2010). 'Is Plato's Timaeus Panentheistic?' *Sophia* 49(2): 193–215.

BARTON, T. (1994). *Ancient Astrology*. London: Routledge.

BECK, R. (2007). *A Brief History of Ancient Astrology*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

BIDEZ, J. (1964, repr. of 1913). *Vie de Porphyre: le philosophe néoplatonicien*. Hildesheim: Olms.

BLUMENTHAL, H. J. (1996). *Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity: Interpretations of the De anima*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

BODNÁR, I. and FORTENBAUGH, W., eds. (2002). *Eudemus of Rhodes*. Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

BOUCHÉ-LECLERCQ, A. (1899). *L'astrologie grecque*. Paris: Leroux.

BOYS-STONES, G. R. (2001). *Post-Hellenistic Philosophy*. Oxford University Press.

BRISSON, L. (1987a). 'Amélius, sa vie, son œuvre, sa doctrine, son style'. *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt* 36(2): 793–860.

(1987b). 'Proclus et l'Orphisme', in *Proclus: lecteur et interprète des anciens*, ed. J. PÉPIN and H. D. SAFFREY. Paris: CNRS, 43–104.

(2003). 'Plato's *Timaeus* and the *Chaldean Oracles*', in *Plato's Timaeus as Cultural Icon*, ed. G. REYDAMS-SCHILS. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 111–51.

CALLATAŸ, G. D. (1996). *Annus Platonicus: A Study of World Cycles in Greek, Latin and Arabic Sources*. Louvain: Institut Orientaliste, Université Catholique de Louvain.

CLARK, G. (1989). *Iamblichus: On the Pythagorean Life*. Liverpool University Press.

CORNFORD, F. M. (1957). *Plato's Cosmology*. New York: Liberal Arts Press.

DES PLACES, É., ed. (1973). *Numenius: Fragments*. Collection des universités de France. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

DEUSE, W., ed. (1973). *Theodorus von Asine: Sammlung der Testimonien und Kommentar*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag.

DICKS, D. R. (1970). *Early Greek Astronomy to Aristotle*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

DIÈS, A. (1936). *Le Nombre de Platon: essai d'exégèse et d'histoire*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale.

DILLON, J., ed. (1973). *Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta*. Philosophia Antiqua. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

EDMONDS, R. (2001). 'Did the Mithraists Inhale?' *Ancient World* 32(1): 10–24.

EDWARDS, M. J. (1990). 'Porphyry and the Intelligible Triad'. *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 110: 14–25.

ERBSE, H. (1950). *Untersuchungen zu den attizistischen Lexika*. Berlin: Akademie–Verlag.

FESTUGIÈRE, A. J., trans. (1966–8). Proclus, *Commentaire sur le Timée*. Paris: CNRS.

FINAMORE, J. and JOHNSTON, S. I. (2010). 'The Chaldean Oracles', in *The Cambridge History of Late Antique Philosophy*, ed. L. GERSON. Cambridge University Press, vol. I, 161–73.

HADOT, P. (1960). 'Être, vie, pensée chez Plotin et avant Plotin', in *Les Sources de Plotin: Entretiens Hardt V*. Geneva: Foundation Hardt, 108–57.

HANFMANN, G. M. A. (1951). *The Season Sarcophagus in Dumbarton Oaks*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

HEATH, S. T. (1981). *Aristarchus of Samos: The Ancient Copernicus*. New York: Dover.

JOHNSON, S. E. (1984). 'The Present State of Sabazios Research'. *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 17(3): 1583–1613.

JOHNSTON, S. I. (1990). *Hekate Soteira: A Study of Hekate's Role in the Chaldean Oracles and Related Literature*. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

JOLY, E. T. (2003). 'Time is Not a Product of the Soul: Proclus versus Plotinus'. *Laval théologique et philosophique* 59(2): 225–34.

JOOST-GAUGIER, C. (2006). *Measuring Heaven: Pythagoras and His Influence on Art in Antiquity and the Middle Ages*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

KLITENIC WEAR, S. (2008). 'Syrianus the Platonist on Eternity and Time'. *Classical Quarterly* 58(2): 648–60.

KROLL, W. (1892). 'Ein neuplatonischer Parmenidescommentar in einem Turiner Palimpset'. *Rheinisches museum für philologie* 47: 599–627.

LAMBERTON, R. (2001). 'The Schools of Platonic Philosophy of the Roman Empire', in *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity*, ed. Y. L. TOO. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 433–58.

LAUTNER, P. (2002). 'The Distinction Between Phantasia and Doxa in Proclus' *In Timaeum*'. *Classical Quarterly* 52: 257–69.

(2006). 'Some Clarifications of Proclus' Fourfold Division of Sense-perception in the *Timaeus* Commentary', in *Proklos: Methode, Seelenlehre, Metaphysik*, ed. M. PERKAMS and R. M. PICCIONE. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 117–36.

LEWY, H. (1956). *Chaldean Oracles and Theurgy: Mysticism, Magic and Platonism in the Later Roman Empire*. Cairo: L'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale.

LINDAU, A. F. (1828). *Platonis Timaeus*. Leipzig: Guil. Vogelii.
LONG, A. A. and SEDLEY, D. N. (1987). *The Hellenistic Philosophers*. Cambridge University Press.
MACMULLEN, R. (1981). *Paganism in the Roman Empire*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
MAJERCIK, R. (1989). *The Chaldean Oracles: Text, Translation and Commentary*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
MARTIJN, M. (2008). *Proclus on Nature: Philosophy of Nature and its Methods in Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
MARTIN, T. H. (1841). *Études sur le Timée de Platon*. Paris: Ladrange.
MUELLER, I. (2004). *Simplicius On Aristotle On the Heavens 2.1–9*. London: Duckworth.
O'MEARA, D. (1974). 'Review of *Theodoros von Asine. Sammlung der Testimonien und Kommentar* von W. Deuse'. *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 94: 204–5.
QUANDT, W. (1962). *Orphei hymni*, 3rd edn. Berlin: Weidmann.
RUELLE, C. E. (1889–99). *Damascii Sucessoris: Dubitationes et Solutiones*, 2 vols. Paris: Klincksieck.
RUNIA, D. and SHARE, M., trans. (2008). Proclus, *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, vol.* II *Book 2 – Proclus on the Causes of the Cosmos*. Cambridge University Press.
SAFFREY, H. D. (1975). 'Allusions antichretiennes chez Proclus: le diadoque Platonicien'. *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Philogiques* 59: 553–62.
SAFFREY, H. D. and WESTERINK, L. G. (1968–97). *Proclus: Théologie platonicienne*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
SCHNEIDER, K. E. C. (1847). *Procli commentarius in Platonis Timaeum: graece*. Breslau: Eduardus Trewendt.
SCOTT, A. (1994). *Origen and the Life of the Stars: A History of an Idea*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
SIORVANES, L. (1996). *Proclus: Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
SMITH, A., ed. (1993). *Porphyrii Philosophi Fragmenta*. Stuttgart and Leipzig: Teubner.
(1996). 'Eternity and Time', in *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus*, ed. L. GERSON. Cambridge University Press, 196–216.
SODANO, A. R. (1964). *Porphyrii: in Platonis Timaeum Commentariorum Fragmenta*. Naples: Istituto della Stampa.
SORABJI, R. (2005a). *The Philosophy of the Commentators:* Vol. 1, *Psychology*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
(2005b). *The Philosophy of the Commentators:* Vol. 2, *Physics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
STEEL, C. (1978). *The Changing Self: A Study of the Soul in Later Neoplatonism – Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus*. Brussels: Koninklijke Academie Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van Belgie.
TARDIEU, M. and LEWY, H. (1978). *Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy: Mysticism, Magic and Platonism in the Later Roman Empire*. Paris: Études Augustiniennes.
TARRANT, H. (1993). *Thrasyllan Platonism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

(2004). 'Must Commentators Know their Sources? Proclus' *in Timaeum* and Numenius', in *Philosophy, Science & Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries*, ed. P. ADAMSON, H. BALTUSSEN and M. STONE. London: Institute of Classical Studies, vol. 1, 175–90.

(2007). 'Olympiodorus and Proclus on the Climax of the Alcibiades'. *International Journal of the Platonic Tradition* 1(1): 3–29.

TAYLOR, A. E. (1928). *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

THESLEFF, H. (1965). *The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period*. Åbo, Finland: Åbo Akademi.

TOOMER, G. J. (1984). *Ptolemy's Almagest*. London: Duckworth.

VAN DEN BERG, R. M. (2009). 'As we are always speaking of them and using their names on every occasion. Plotinus Enn. III.7 [45]: Language, Experience and the Philosophy of Time in Neoplatonism', in *Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism*, ed. R. T. F. CHIARADONNA and F. TRABATTONI. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 101–120.

WEHRLI, F., ed. (1944–69). *Die Schule des Aristoteles: Eudemos von Rhodos*. Basel: Schwabe.

ZELLER, E. (1963). *Die Philosophie der Griechen*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

ZEYL, D. (2000). *Plato: Timaeus*. Indianapolis: Hackett.

English–Greek glossary

English	Transliteration	Greek
abacus	*abakion*	ἀβάκιον
able	*dynatos*	δυνατός
absence	*sterêsis*	στέρησις
accidental property	*symbebêkos*	συμβεβηκός
account	*logos*	λόγος
accurate	*akribês*	ἀκριβής
accurate	*kyrios*	κύριος
action	*poiêsis*	ποίησις
activities, in terms of (their)	*kat' energeian*	κατ' ἐνέργειαν
activity	*energeia*	ἐνέργεια
actuality	*entelecheia*	ἐντελέχεια
adamant	*adamantos*	ἀδάμαντος
add	*prostithenai*	προστιθέναι
admit of	*epidechesthai*	ἐπιδέχεσθαι
advance, progression (astron.)	*propodizein*	προποδίζειν
advantage, to gain	*pleonektein*	πλεονεκτεῖν
Aegle (Hesperides)	*Aïglê*	Αἴγλη
aerial	*aerios*	ἀέριος
aether	*aithêr*	αἰθήρ
aetherial	*aitherios*	αἰθέριος
affection	*pathos*	πάθος
aggregate	*athroizein*	ἀθροίζειν
air	*aêr*	ἀήρ
akin	*homogonos*	ὁμόγονος
akin	*syngenês*	συγγενής
all at once	*athroos*	ἀθρόος
all-perfect	*pantelês*	παντελής
alteration	*exallagê*	ἐξαλλαγή
always	*aei*	ἀεί
Amelius	*Amelios*	Ἀμέλιος
analysis	*analysis*	ἀνάλυσις
Anaxagoras	*Anaxagoras*	Ἀναξαγόρας
ancient	*palaios*	παλαιός
angel	*angelos*	ἄγγελος
angelic	*angelikos*	ἀγγελικός

angles, lack of	*agônios*	ἀγώνιος
animal	*zôion*	ζῷον
animate, v.	*psychoun*	ψυχοῦν
antecedently comprehend	*prolambanein*	προλαμβάνειν
Aphrodite (goddess)	*Aphroditê*	Ἀφροδίτη
apogee	*apogeios*	ἀπόγειος
Apollo	*Apollôn*	Ἀπόλλων
apparent	*phainomenos*	φαινόμενος
apprehension	*katalêpsis*	κατάληψις
appropriate	*oikeios*	οἰκεῖος
aquatic	*enydrios*	ἐνύδριος
archangelic	*archangelikos*	ἀρχαγγελικός
Aristotle	*Aristotelês*	Ἀριστοτέλης
arithmetic	*arithmêtikos*	ἀριθμητικός
armillary sphere	*krikôtê sphaira*	κρικωτὴ σφαῖρα
arrange	*diakosmein*	διακοσμεῖν
arrangement	*diakosmos*	διάκοσμος
arrangement (orderly)	*diakosmêsis*	διακόσμησις
arrive at the truth	*alêtheuein*	ἀληθεύειν
Artemis	*Artemis*	Ἄρτεμις
articulation	*anelixis*	ἀνέλιξις
assimilate	*homoioun*	ὁμοιοῦν
assimilation	*aphomoiôsis*	ἀφομοίωσις
assimilation	*homoiôsis*	ὁμοίωσις
association	*koinônia*	κοινωνία
astrolabe	*astrolabos*	ἀστρολάβος
astrological	*astrologikos*	ἀστρολογικός
astronomer	*astronomos*	ἀστρονόμος
astronomy	*astronomia*	ἀστρονομία
at a loss, be	*aporein*	ἀπορεῖν
atemporal	*achronos*	ἄχρονος
Atlas	*Atlas*	Ατλας
Atticus	*Attikos*	Ἀττικός
author	*poiêtês*	ποιητής
authoritative	*hegemonikos*	ἡγεμονικός
authoritative	*kyrios*	κύριος
authority	*epikrateia*	ἐπικράτεια
awaken	*egeirein*	ἐγείρειν
axis	*axôn*	ἄξων
Bacchic	*bakcheia*	βακχεία
beautiful	*kallos*	κάλλος
beautify	*aglaïzein*	ἀγλαΐζειν
Beauty (goddess)	*Aglaïa*	Ἀγλαΐα
become	*gignesthai*	γίγνεσθαι
Becoming	*genesis*	γένεσις

before	*proteron*	πρότερον
beginning	*archê*	ἀρχή
being	*on, to*	ὄν, τὸ
beneficent	*agathourgos*	ἀγαθουργός
best	*ariston*	ἄριστον
bind together	*synereidein*	συνερείδειν
blessed	*eudaimôn*	εὐδαίμων
blessedness	*makariotês*	μακαριότης
body	*sôma*	σῶμα
bond	*desmos*	δεσμός
book	*biblion*	βιβλίον
book	*biblos*	βίβλος
breadth	*platos*	πλάτος
breathe into	*empnein*	ἐμπνεῖν
brightness	*augê*	αὐγή
bring forth	*proagein*	προάγειν
bring forth together	*symparagein*	συμπαράγειν
bring/lead forth	*paragein*	παράγειν
by nature, be	*phyein*	φύειν
calculate	*logizesthai*	λογίζεσθαι
Cancer	*Karkinos*	Καρκίνος
Canopus	*Kanôbos*	Κάνωβος
captain	*agelarchês*	ἀγελάρχης
causal efficacy, lacking in	*adranês*	ἀδρανής
cause, n.	*aitia*	αἰτία
caused, that which is	*aitiaton*	αἰτιατόν
celebrate	*hymnein*	ὑμνεῖν
celestial	*ouranios*	οὐράνιος
centre	*kentron*	κέντρον
Chaldeans	*Chaldaioi*	Χαλδαῖοι
change	*kinêsis*	κίνησις
change	*metabolê*	μεταβολή
changeless	*akinêtos*	ἀκίνητος
changeless	*ametabatos*	ἀμετάβατος
channel	*ochetos*	ὀχετός
character	*charaktêr*	χαρακτήρ
character, ethical	*êthos*	ἦθος
charioteer	*heniochos*	ἡνίοχος
circle	*kyklos*	κύκλος
circular	*kyklikos*	κυκλικός
circulation	*anakyklêsis*	ἀνακύκλησις
city-state	*politeia*	πολιτεία
co-establish	*synyphistanai*	συνυφιστάναι
co-exist	*synyparchein*	συνυπάρχειν
cognise	*noein*	νοεῖν

cognition, act of	*noêsis*	νόησις
collection	*athroisma*	ἄθροισμα
combination	*diaplokê*	διαπλοκή
come into being	*gignesthai*	γίγνεσθαι
come to be	*gennan*	γεννᾶν (pass.)
come to be in	*enginesthai*	ἐγγίνεσθαι
come/go forth	*proerchesthai*	προέρχεσθαι
coming to be	*genesis*	γένεσις
commensurability	*symmetria*	συμμετρία
common	*koinos*	κοινός
communion	*koinônia*	κοινωνία
complete, adj.	*teleios*	τέλειος
complete, such as to make	*telesiourgos*	τελεσιουργός
complete, to make	*teleioun*	τελειοῦν
complete, v.	*apotelein*	ἀποτελεῖν
completely and perfectly	*teleôs*	τελέως
completeness	*teleiotês*	τελειότης
completion of cycle	*apokatastasis*	ἀποκατάστασις
complex	*poikilos*	ποικίλος
compose	*symplêroun*	συμπληροῦν
composite	*synthetos*	σύνθετος
composition	*symplêrôsis*	συμπλήρωσις
composition	*systasis*	σύστασις
comprehension	*periochê*	περιοχή
concentrate	*illesthai*	ἴλλεσθαι
conception	*ennoia*	ἔννοια
conception	*epibolê*	ἐπιβολή
conception	*noêma*	νόημα
concord	*symphônia*	συμφωνία
concrete particular	*atomos*	ἄτομος
cone	*kônon*	κῶνον
configuration	*schêma*	σχῆμα
conjoin	*synaptein*	συνάπτειν
conjunction (astonomy)	*parabolê*	παραβολή
connect	*synaptein*	συνάπτειν
connective	*synektikos*	συνεκτικός
Connector (Chald. Or.)	*synocheus*	συνοχεύς
conserve	*sôizein*	σώ˛ζειν
continuation	*diamonê*	διαμονή
continuous	*synechês*	συνεχής
conviction	*pistis*	πίστις
coordinate	*systoichos*	σύστοιχος
corporeal	*sômatikos*	σωματικός
corporeal in form	*sômatoeidês*	σωματοειδής
corruption	*phthora*	φθορά
cosmic	*kosmikos*	κοσμικός

cosmos	*kosmos*	κόσμος
count (v)	*arithmein*	ἀριθμεῖν
countable	*arithmêtos*	ἀριθμητός
craftsman	*technitês*	τεχνίτης
Cratylus	*Kratylos*	Κρατύλος
create	*dêmiourgein*	δημιουργεῖν
creation	*poiêsis*	ποίησις
creation (object created)	*dêmiourgêma*	δημιούργημα
creative	*dêmiourgikos*	δημιουργικός
creative process	*dêmiourgia*	δημιουργία
creator	*dêmiourgos*	δημιουργός
custom	*nomos*	νόμος
cycle	*periodos*	περίοδος
cylinder	*kylindros*	κύλινδρος
daemon	*daimôn*	δαίμων
dance (v.)	*choreuein*	χορεύειν
dark	*skoteinos*	σκοτεινός
day	*hêmera*	ἡμέρα
death	*thanatos*	θάνατος
define	*aphorizein*	ἀφορίζειν
defining (characteristic)	*idios*	ἴδιος
defining characteristic	*idiotês*	ἰδιότης
definite article (gramm.)	*arthron*	ἄρθρον
definition	*aphorismos*	ἀφορισμός
definition	*logos*	λόγος
degree (astronomy)	*moira*	μοῖρα
Demeter	*Dêmêtêr*	Δημήτηρ
demi-god	*hêmitheos*	ἡμίθεος
Demiurge	*dêmiourgos*	δημιουργός
Demiurgic	*dêmiourgikos*	δημιουργικός
demonstrate	*apodeiknuein*	ἀποδεικνύειν
demonstration	*apodeixis*	ἀπόδειξις
dense	*pachys*	παχύς
depend	*exaptein*	ἐξάπτειν
depend upon	*exêrtêsthai*	ἐξηρτῆσθαι
depth	*bathos*	βάθος
desire	*orexis*	ὄρεξις
destructible	*phthartos*	φθαρτός
deterioration	*hyphesis*	ὕφεσις
dialectician	*dialektikos*	διαλεκτικός
dialogue	*logos*	λόγος
Difference	*heterotês*	ἑτερότης (opp. ταυτότης)
different	*heteros*	ἕτερος
different	*thateros*	θάτερος
dimension	*paratasis*	παράτασις

Dionysius	*Dionysos*	Διόνυσος
discordent	*plêmmelês*	πλημμελής
discourse	*logos*	λόγος
discursive	*dianoêtikos*	διανοητικός
discursive	*metabatikos*	μεταβατικός
discursive thought	*dianoia*	διάνοια
disorder	*ataxia*	ἀταξία
disorderly	*ataktos*	ἄτακτος
disposition	*hexis*	ἕξις
dissimilar	*anomoios*	ἀνόμοιος
dissimilarity	*anomoiotês*	ἀνομοιότης
dissolution	*lysis*	λύσις
dissolve	*lyein*	λύειν
distance	*apostêma*	ἀπόστημα
distinguish	*diakrinein*	διακρίνειν
divide	*merizein*	μερίζειν
divine in form	*theoeidês*	θεοειδής
divine, to make	*ektheoun*	ἐκθεοῦν
divinely inspired	*entheos*	ἔνθεος
divinity	*theotês*	θεότης
divisibility	*merismos*	μερισμός
divisible	*merizomenos*	μεριζόμενος
divisible	*meristos*	μεριστός
division	*diairesis*	διαίρεσις
dodocahedron	*dôdekaedron*	δωδεκάεδρον
dog	*kyôn*	κύων
dual in form	*dyoeidês*	δυοειδής
dyad	*dyas*	δυάς
earth	*gê*	γῆ
East	*anatolikos*	ἀνατολικός
eccentric	*ekkentros*	ἔκκεντρος
ecliptic	*loxos*	λοξός
ecliptic (circle/path of the)	*zôidiakos*	ζῳδιακός
effect	*aitiaton*	αἰτιατόν
effect	*apotelesma*	ἀποτέλεσμα
Eirênê (Peace)	*Eirênê*	Εἰρήνη
element	*stoicheion*	στοιχεῖον
empyrian	*empyrios*	ἐμπύριος
encompass, such as to	*perilêptikos*	περιληπτικός
encosmic	*enkosmios*	ἐγκόσμιος
engender	*gennan*	γεννᾶν
enlightened	*epoptikos*	ἐποπτικός
enmattered	*enylos*	ἔνυλος
ensoul	*psychoun*	ψυχοῦν
ensouled	*empsychos*	ἔμψυχος

ensoulment	*psychôsis*	ψύχωσις
epicycle	*epikyklos*	ἐπίκυκλος
Epinomis	*Epinomis*	Ἐπινομίς
equality	*isotês*	ἰσότης
equator	*isêmerinos*	ἰσημερινός
equinox	*isêmeria*	ἰσημερία
essentially constitute	*symplêroun*	συμπληροῦν
eternal	*aidios*	ἀίδιος
eternity	*aidiotês*	ἀιδιότης
eternity	*aiôn*	αἰών
Eudemus	*Eudêmos*	Εὔδημος
Eudoxos	*Eudoxos*	Εὔδοξος
Eunomia (Good Governance)	*Eunomia*	Εὐνομία
Euphrosynê (Good Cheer)	*Euphrosynê*	Εὐφροσύνη
even (number)	*artios*	ἄρτιος
everlasting	*aidios*	ἀίδιος
everlastingness	*aidiotês*	ἀιδιότης
evident	*phaneros*	φανερός
excellence	*aretê*	ἀρετή
exegesis, to provide an	*exêgeisthai*	ἐξηγεῖσθαι
exhalation	*anathymiasis*	ἀναθυμίασις
exhalation	*aporroia*	ἀπόρροια
existence	*hyparxis*	ὕπαρξις
explanation	*aitia*	αἰτία
extend	*diateinein*	διατείνειν
extended	*diastatos*	διαστατός
extension	*diastasis*	διάστασις
extension	*diastêma*	διάστημα
extensionless	*adiastatos*	ἀδιάστατος
exterior discourse	*prophorikos (logos)*	προφορικός (λόγος)
extreme term	*akrotês*	ἀκρότης
fact	*pragma*	πρᾶγμα
false	*pseudês*	ψευδής
familiar	*gnôrimos*	γνώριμος
fastest	*tachistos*	τάχιστος
fate	*heimarmenê*	εἱμαρμένη
fate	*moira*	μοῖρα
father	*patêr*	πατήρ
father-begotten	*patrogenês*	πατρογενής
female	*thêlys*	θῆλυς
female Titan	*Titanis*	Τιτανίς
fiery	*empyrios*	ἐμπύριος
fill in/out/up	*symplêroun*	συμπληροῦν
final	*eschatos*	ἔσχατος
final cause	*telikê aitia*	τελική αἰτία

fine	*kalos*	καλός
finishing touches, to put on	*leptourgein*	λεπτουργεῖν
fire	*pur*	πῦρ
first	*prôtos*	πρῶτος
first principle	*archê*	ἀρχή
fit	*epharmozein*	ἐφαρμόζειν
fixed (stars)	*aplanês*	ἀπλανής
font	*pêgê*	πηγή
Fontal	*pêgaios*	πηγαῖος
footed, having feet	*pezos*	πεζός
forgetting	*lêthê*	λήθη
form	*eidos*	εἶδος
form	*idea*	ἰδέα
form	*morphê*	μορφή
formless	*aneideos*	ἀνείδεος
foundation	*hypostasis*	ὑπόστασις
fraction	*morion*	μόριον
friendship	*philia*	φιλία
Gaia or Earth	*gê*	γῆ
genealogy	*genealogia*	γενεαλογία
genealogy of the gods	*theogonia*	θεογονία
generate	*gennan*	γεννᾶν
generated	*genêtos*	γενητός
generation	*apogennêsis*	ἀπογέννησις
generation	*genesis*	γένεσις
generation-producing	*genesiourgos*	γενεσιουργός
genesis	*genesis*	γένεσις
genuine substance	*he ontôs ousia*	ἡ ὄντως οὐσία
genuinely	*ontôs*	ὄντως
genus	*genos*	γένος
gift	*dôron*	δῶρον
gift	*dosis*	δόσις
goal	*telos*	τέλος
god	*theos*	θεός
goddess	*thea*	θεά
godless	*atheos*	ἄθεος
good	*agathos*	ἀγαθός
good in form	*agathoeidês*	ἀγαθοειδής
goodness	*agathotês*	ἀγαθότης
Graces	*Charites*	Χάριτες
growth principle	*phytikon*	φυτικόν
guardian	*phroura*	φρουρά
Hades	*Haidês*	Ἅιδης
happiness	*eudaimonia*	εὐδαιμονία

harmonised	*enarmonios*	ἐναρμόνιος
harmony	*harmonia*	ἁρμονία
health	*hygeia*	ὑγεία
hear	*akouein*	ἀκούειν
heart	*kardia*	καρδία
Hearth	*Hestia*	Ἑστία
heaven	*ouranos*	οὐρανός
hebdomadic	*hebdomadikos*	ἑβδομαδικός
Hebe	*Hêbê*	Ἥβη
Hecate	*Hecate*	Ἑκάτη
helical	*helikoeidês*	ἑλικοειδής
helix	*helix*	ἕλιξ
helmsman	*kubernêtês*	κυβερνήτης
henad	*henas*	ἑνάς
Hephaestus	*Hephaistos*	Ἥφαιστος
Hera	*Hera*	Ἥρα
Heracles	*Heraklês*	Ἡρακλῆς
Heraclides (of Pontus)	*Hêrakeidês*	Ἡρακλείδης
herd	*agelê*	ἀγέλη
Hermes	*Hermês*	Ἑρμῆς
hero	*hêrôs*	ἥρως
hexad	*hexas*	ἑξάς
hidden	*kryphios*	κρύφιος
highest form	*akrotês*	ἀκρότης
highest gradation	*akrotês*	ἀκρότης
Hipparchus (astronomer)	*Hipparchos*	Ἵππαρχος
holy	*hagnos*	ἁγνός
Homer	*Homêros*	Ὅμηρος
homocentric	*homokentros*	ὁμόκεντρος
hook of spindle (myth of Er)	*agkistron*	ἄγκιστρον
horoscope	*hôroskopos*	ὡροσκόπος
human	*anthrôpikos*	ἀνθρωπικός
human	*anthrôpinos*	ἀνθρώπινος
hypercosmic	*hyperkosmios*	ὑπερκόσμιος
hypostasis	*hypostasis*	ὑπόστασις
hypothesis	*hypothesis*	ὑπόθεσις
hypothetical	*hypothetikos*	ὑποθετικός
Iamblichus	*Iamblichos*	Ἰάμβλιχος
idea	*idea*	ἰδέα
ignorance	*agnoia*	ἄγνοια
illuminate	*ellampein*	ἐλλάμπειν
illuminate	*epilampein*	ἐπιλάμπειν
illumination	*eklampsis*	ἔκλαμψις
illumination	*ellampsis*	ἔλλαμψις
image	*agalma*	ἄγαλμα

image	*eidôlon*	εἴδωλον
image	*eikôn*	εἰκών
image	*indalma*	ἴνδαλμα
imagination	*phantasia*	φαντασία
imitate	*apomimeisthai*	ἀπομιμεῖσθαι
imitate	*mimeisthai*	μιμεῖσθαι
imitation	*mimêma*	μίμημα
imitation	*mimêsis*	μίμησις
immaculate	*achrantos*	ἄχραντος
immaterial	*aulos*	ἄυλος
immobile	*akinêtos*	ἀκίνητος
immortal	*athanatos*	ἀθάνατος
imperfect	*atelês*	ἀτελής
impossible	*adynatos*	ἀδύνατος
impression	*typos*	τύπος
inaccessible	*abatos*	ἄβατος
inactive	*anenergêtos*	ἀνενέργητος
inanimate	*apsychos*	ἄψυχος
incidental property	*symbebêkos*	συμβεβηκός
include, such as to	*periektikos*	περιεκτικός
incommensurable	*asymmetros*	ἀσύμμετρος
incomplete	*atelês*	ἀτελής
incorporeal	*asômatos*	ἀσώματος
incorporeal	*aulos*	ἄυλος
indefinite	*aoristos*	ἀόριστος
indestructible	*alytos*	ἄλυτος
indestructible	*an ôlethros*	ἀνώλεθρος
indestructible	*aphthartos*	ἄφθαρτος
indicate	*endeikynai*	ἐνδεικύναι
indication, sure	*tekmêrion*	τεκμήριον
individual	*idios*	ἴδιος
individual	*merikos*	μερικός
indivisible	*amerês*	ἀμερής
indivisible	*ameristos*	ἀμέριστος
ineffable	*aporrêtos*	ἀπόρρητος
ineffable	*arrêtos*	ἄρρητος
inequality	*anisotês*	ἀνισότης
inexpressible	*aphrastos*	ἄφραστος
inferior	*katadeesteros*	καταδεέστερος
inferiority	*hyphesis*	ὕφεσις
infinite	*apeiros*	ἄπειρος
infinite in power	*apeirodynamos*	ἀπειροδύναμος
infinity	*apeiria*	ἀπειρία
inhere	*enyparchein*	ἐνυπάρχειν
innate	*homophyês*	ὁμοφυής
innate	*symphyês*	συμφυής

innumerable	*aperiêgêtos*	ἀπεριήγητος
inscribe	*engraphein*	ἐγγράφειν
inseparable	*achôristos*	ἀχώριστος
inseparable	*adiazeuktos*	ἀδιάζευκτος
inseparable	*anekphoitêtos*	ἀνεκφοίτητος
instrument	*organon*	ὄργανον
instrumental	*organikos*	ὀργανικός
intellect	*nous*	νοῦς
intellect, endowed with	*ennous*	ἔννους
intellection	*noêsis*	νόησις
intellectual	*noeros*	νοερός
intelligible	*noêtos*	νοητός
intermediary	*mesos*	μέσος
intermediary	*mesotês*	μεσότης
intermediate	*mesos*	μέσος
intermediate	*mesotês*	μεσότης
interpenetrate	*phoitan*	φοιτᾶν
interpret	*akouein*	ἀκούειν
interpret	*akroasthai*	ἀκροᾶσθαι
interpret	*exêgeisthai*	ἐξηγεῖσθαι
interpreter	*exêgêtês*	ἐξηγητής
interval	*diastêma*	διάστημα
invariant	*aklinês*	ἀκλινής
invariant	*aplanês*	ἀπλανής
invisible	*aoratos*	ἀόρατος
invisible	*aphanês*	ἀφανής
invocation	*agôgê*	ἀγωγή
irrational	*alogos*	ἄλογος
irrefutable	*anelengktos*	ἀνέλεγκτος
irregular	*anômalos*	ἀνώμαλος
Isis	*Isis*	Ἶσις
Julian (the Theurgist)	*Hioulianos*	Ἰουλιανός
Jupiter (planet)	*Dis*	Δίς
Justice (goddess)	*Dikê*	Δίκη
kind	*genos*	γένος
kindle	*anaptein*	ἀνάπτειν
king	*basileus*	βασιλεύς
know	*gignôskein*	γιγνώσκειν
known, capable of being	*gnôrimos*	γνώριμος
Kronos	*Kronos*	Κρόνος
latitude	*platos*	πλάτος
latitude	*topos*	τόπος
law	*nomos*	νόμος

law, sacred	*thesmos*	θεσμός
lawful	*themis*	θέμις
Laws (Plato's)	*Nomoi*	Νόμοι
leader	*hegemôn*	ἡγεμών
leading gods	*hêgemones (theoi)*	ἡγεμόνες (θεοί)
leisure	*scholê*	σχολή
Leo (constellation)	*leôn*	λέων
level	*taxis*	τάξις
liberated	*apolytos*	ἀπόλυτος
life	*zôê*	ζωή
life giving/engendering	*zôiogonos*	ζῳογόνος
life, way of	*bios*	βίος
lifespan	*bios*	βίος
light	*phaos*	φάος
light	*phôs*	φῶς
limit (opp. ἄπειρον)	*peras*	πέρας
limitation	*peratôsis*	περάτωσις
living being	*zôion*	ζῷον
Living Being Itself	*autozôion*	αὐτοζῷον
longitude	*mêkos*	μῆκος
love	*erôs*	ἔρως
lover of spectacles	*philotheamôn*	φιλοθεάμων
lunar	*mênaios*	μηναῖος
lunar	*selêniakos*	σεληνιακός
male	*arrên*	ἄρρην
masculine, be	*arrenousthai*	ἀρρενοῦσθαι
mass	*ongkos*	ὄγκος
master	*despotês*	δεσπότης
material	*hylaios*	ὑλαῖος
material things	*ta enyla*	τὰ ἔνυλα
mathematical	*mathêmatikos*	μαθηματικός
mathematics	*mathêmata*	μαθήματα
matter	*hylê*	ὕλη
measure	*metron*	μέτρον
measure, lacking	*ametros*	ἄμετρος
measure, to	*metrein*	μετρεῖν
middle	*mesos*	μέσος
mixture	*mixis*	μῖξις
monad	*monas*	μονάς
month	*mên*	μῆν
Moon	*selênê*	σελήνη
Moon (full)	*panselênos*	πανσέληνος
Moon (Oracles and Orphics)	*mên*	μῆν
mortal	*thnêtos*	θνητός
mother	*mêtêr*	μήτηρ

motion	*kinêsis*	κίνησις
motion	*phora*	φορά
motionless	*akinêtos*	ἀκίνητος
movable	*kinêton, to*	κινητόν, τὸ
moved by another	*heterokinêtos*	ἑτεροκίνητος
moved by itself	*autokinêtos*	αὐτοκίνητος
multi-formed	*polyeidês*	πολυειδής
multiplication	*pollaplasiasmos*	πολλαπλασιασμός
multiply	*pollaplasiazein*	πολλαπλασιάζειν
multitude	*plêthos*	πλῆθος
Muse	*Mousa*	Μοῦσα
mystic rites, he who practises	*telestikos*	τελεστικός
mystical	*mystikos*	μυστικός
name	*onoma*	ὄνομα
name-giver	*onomatothetês*	ὀνοματοθέτης
nativities (astrology)	*genethlialogia*	γενεθλιαλογία
natural	*physikos*	φυσικός
nature	*physis*	φύσις
nature, study of	*physiologia*	φυσιολογία
necessity	*anankê*	ἀνάγκη
next to	*prosechês*	προσεχής
Night	*Nyx*	Νύξ
night-and-a-day	*nychthêmeron*	νυχθήμερον
North	*boreios*	βόρειος
nourishment	*trophê*	τροφή
number	*arithmos*	ἀριθμός
number (v)	*arithmein*	ἀριθμεῖν
Number Itself	*autoarithmos*	αὐτοαριθμός
number six	*hexas*	ἑξάς
Numenius	*Noumênios*	Νουμήνιος
numerable	*arithmêtos*	ἀριθμητός
nurse	*trophos*	τροφός
obvious	*enargês*	ἐναργής
obvious	*phaneros*	φανερός
occultation	*epiprosthêsis*	ἐπιπρόσθησις
odd (number)	*perissos*	περισσός
odd (number)	*perittos*	περιττός, opp. ἄρτιος
One, the	*hen, to*	ἕν, τὸ
one-of-a-kind	*monogenês*	μονογενής
opinion	*doxa*	δόξα
opposite	*antithesis*	ἀντίθεσις
opposition	*enantiôsis*	ἐναντίωσις
Oracle	*logion*	λόγιον

oracle	*chrêsmôidia*	χρησμῳδία
orbit	*periphora*	περιφορά
order	*taxis*	τάξις
organ	*organon*	ὄργανον
organise	*diakosmein*	διακοσμεῖν
origin	*archê*	ἀρχή
original	*prôtos*	πρῶτος
originary	*archêgikos*	ἀρχηγικός
Orpheus	*Orpheus*	Ὀρφεύς
Orphic	*Orphikos*	Ὀρφικός
Osiris	*Osiris*	Ὄσιρις
Pan	*Pan*	Πᾶν
paradigm	*paradeigma*	παράδειγμα
part	*meros*	μέρος
part	*moira*	μοῖρα
part	*morion*	μόριον
partial or particular	*merikos*	μερικός
participant	*methektos*	μεθεκτός
participant	*metochos*	μέτοχος
participate	*metechein*	μετέχειν
participated	*methektos*	μεθεκτός
participated (in)	*metechomenos*	μετεχόμενος
participation	*methexis*	μέθεξις
participation	*metousia*	μετουσία
partless	*amerês*	ἀμερής
paternal	*patrikos*	πατρικός
perceptible	*aisthêtos*	αἰσθητός
perception	*aisthanesthai, to*	αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὸ
perceptual	*aisthêtikos*	αἰσθητικός
perfect, adj.	*teleios*	τέλειος
perfect, such as to	*telesiourgos*	τελεσιουργός
perfect, to	*teleioun*	τελειοῦν
perfection	*teleiotês*	τελειότης
Peripatetic	*Peripatêtikos*	Περιπατητικός
permeate	*phoitan*	φοιτᾶν
perpetual	*aidios*	ἀίδιος
Phaedo (title of Platonic dialogue)	*Phaidôn*	Φαίδων
Phaedrus (title of Platonic dialogue)	*Phaidros*	Φαῖδρος
Phanes	*Phanês*	Φάνης
Philebus (title of Platonic dialogue)	*Philêbos*	Φίληβος
philosopher	*philosophos*	φιλόσοφος
physical	*physikos*	φυσικός

physics	*ta physika*	τὰ φυσικά
place	*topos*	τόπος
planet	*planêtês*	πλανήτης
planet Jupiter	*Zeus*	Ζεύς
planet Mars	*Arês*	Ἄρης
plant	*phyton*	φυτόν
Plato	*Platôn*	Πλάτων
Platonist	*Platônikos*	Πλατωνικός
pleasure	*hêdonê*	ἡδονή
plenum	*plêrôma*	πλήρωμα
Plotinus	*Plôtinos*	Πλωτῖνος
plural, make	*plêthyein*	πληθύειν
plurality	*plêthos*	πλῆθος
pneuma	*pneuma*	πνεῦμα
point	*sêmeion*	σημεῖον
pole	*polos*	πόλος
Porphyry	*Porphyrios*	Πορφύριος
portion	*morion*	μόριον
Poseidonius	*Poseidônios*	Ποσειδώνιος
possible	*dynatos*	δυνατός
potentially	*dynamei*	δυνάμει
power	*dynamis*	δύναμις
predicate (v)	*katêgorein*	κατηγορεῖν
predominance	*epikrateia*	ἐπικράτεια
pre-exist	*proeinai*	προεῖναι
pre-exist	*proüparchein*	προϋπάρχειν
pre-exist	*proüphistanai*	προϋφιστάναι
pre-existence	*proüpostasis*	προϋπόστασις
prefigure	*prolambanein*	προλαμβάνειν
preliminary causal manner, in a	*kat' aitian*	κατ' αἰτίαν
preservation	*sôtêria*	σωτηρία
preserve	*phrourein*	φρουρεῖν
primary-effective	*prôtourgos*	πρωτουργός
principle	*archê*	ἀρχή
prior	*proteron*	πρότερον
privation	*sterêsis*	στέρησις
probable	*pithanos*	πιθανός
proceed	*proerchesthai*	προέρχεσθαι
procession	*parodos*	πάροδος
product	*gennêma*	γέννημα
product of activity	*energêma*	ἐνέργημα
production	*apogennêsis*	ἀπογέννησις
proof	*tekmêrion*	τεκμήριον
property	*poiotês*	ποιότης
property (distinctive)	*idiotês*	ἰδιότης
property (unique or specific)	*idiôma*	ἴδίωμα

prophetic	*mantikos*	μαντικός
proportion	*analogia*	ἀναλογία
providence	*pronoia*	πρόνοια
providential	*pronoêtikos*	προνοητικός
providential care, lacking	*a-pronoêtos*	ἀπρονόητος
proximate	*prosechês*	προσεχής
psychic	*psychikos*	ψυχικός
Ptolemy	*Ptolemaios*	Πτολεμαῖος
pure	*hagnos*	ἁγνός
pure	*katharos*	καθαρός
purpose	*proairesis*	προαίρεσις
puzzle	*aporia*	ἀπορία
puzzled, be	*aporein*	ἀπορεῖν
Pythagorean	*Pythagoreios*	Πυθαγόρειος
rank	*systoichia*	συστοιχία
rank	*taxis*	τάξις
ratio	*logos*	λόγος
rational	*logikos*	λογικός
rational-forming principle	*logos*	λόγος
reason (v)	*logizesthai*	λογίζεσθαι
reasonable	*eulogos*	εὔλογος
reasoning, faculty of	*logizomenon*	λογιζόμενον
receive	*hypodechesthai*	ὑποδέχεσθαι
receptacle	*hypodochê*	ὑποδοχή
receptive	*epitêdeios*	ἐπιτήδειος
recollection	*anamnêsis*	ἀνάμνησις
rectilinear motion, to undergo	*euthyporeisthai*	εὐθυπορεῖσθαι
region	*klima*	κλῖμα
regular	*homalos*	ὁμαλός
regularity	*homolotês*	ὁμαλότης
re-kindle	*anazôpyrein*	ἀναζωπυρεῖν
relation	*schesis*	σχέσις
remain (in a place or state)	*menein*	μένειν
represent	*apeikazein*	ἀπεικάζειν
Republic (title of Platonic dialogue)	*Politeia*	Πολιτεία
resolve (a question)	*lyein*	λύειν
Resource (cf. *Symposium*)	*Poros*	Πόρος
Rest (opp. Motion)	*stasis*	στάσις (opp. κίνησις)
retrogradation	*aphairesis*	ἀφαίρεσις
retrogradation	*hypopodismos*	ὑποποδισμός (opp. προποδισμός)
return to same point (v)	*apokathistasthai*	ἀποκαθίστασθαι
return to same/original point/position (n)	*apokatastasis*	ἀποκατάστασις

revelation	*ekphansis*	ἔκφανσις
reversion	*epistrophê*	ἐπιστροφή
revert	*epistrephein*	ἐπιστρέφειν
rising (of planet)	*phasis*	φάσις
rites, sacred	*teletes*	τελετές
rotation	*kyklêsis*	κύκλησις
rotation	*periagôgê*	περιαγωγή
rotation	*periphora*	περιφορά
Ruler of the Cosmos (planet)	*kosmokrator*	κοσμοκράτορ
Sabazios	*Sabazios*	Σαβάζιος
sacred	*hieros*	ἱερός
sacrifice	*thysia*	θυσία
Same (opp. Difference, the Different)	*tauto(n)*	ταυτό(ν), ταὐτό(ν), τὸ
Sameness	*tautotês*	ταυτότης
Saturn	*phainôn*	φαίνων
Saturn (planet)	*Kronos*	Κρόνος
science	*epistêmê*	ἐπιστήμη
scientific	*epistêmonikos*	ἐπιστημονικός
season	*hôra*	ὥρα
second	*deuteros*	δεύτερος
secondary	*deuteros*	δεύτερος
secondary by-product	*hysterogenês*	ὑστερογενής
secondary way or manner, in a	*deuterôs*	δευτέρως
sect	*hairesis*	αἵρεσις
seer	*mantis*	μάντις
self-manifestation	*autophaneia*	αὐτοφάνεια
self-motive	*autokinêtos*	αὐτοκίνητος
self-revealing	*autoptos*	αὔτοπτος
senior	*presbyteros*	πρεσβύτερος
sense faculty (opp. intellectual)	*aisthêtikos*	αἰσθητικός
sense perception	*aisthêsis*	αἴσθησις
sensible	*aisthêtos*	αἰσθητός
sensible particulars	*ta gignomena*	γιγνόμενα, τὰ
separable	*chôristos*	χωριστός
sequence	*proêgêsis*	προήγησις
series	*seira*	σειρά
shape	*morphê*	μορφή
shape	*schêma*	σχῆμα
share, to have a	*metalambanein*	μεταλαμβάνειν
share, to have a	*metalanchanein*	μεταλαγχάνειν
shine	*epilampein*	ἐπιλάμπειν
sight	*opsis*	ὄψις
similar, make	*homoioun*	ὁμοιοῦν
similarity	*homoiôsis*	ὁμοίωσις

simplicity	*haplotês*	ἁπλότης
sin (v)	*hamartanein*	ἁμαρτάνειν
singularity	*monôsis*	μόνωσις
Sirens	*Seirênes*	Σειρῆνες
Socrates	*Sôkratês*	Σωκράτης
solar	*hêliakos*	ἡλιακός
solid (number, proportion, thing)	*stereos*	στερεός
solstice (time)	*tropikon*	τροπικόν
solution	*lysis*	λύσις
Sophist (title of Platonic dialogue)	*Sophistês*	Σοφιστής
Sosicrates	*Sôsikratês*	Σωσικράτης
soul	*psychê*	ψυχή
soul of the universe	*he holê psychê*	ἡ ὅλη ψυχή
soul of the universe	*he tou pantos psychê*	ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχή
soulless	*apsychos*	ἄψυχος
source	*pêgê*	πηγή
south	*notios*	νότιος
special	*exairetos*	ἐξαίρετος
species	*eidos*	εἶδος
speech	*logos*	λόγος
sphere	*sphaira*	σφαίρα
spherical	*sphairikos*	σφαιρικός
spherical in form	*sphairoeidês*	σφαιροειδής
spindle (myth of Er)	*atraktos*	ἄτρακτος
spirited part of soul	*thymoeidês*	θυμοειδής
stable	*monimos*	μόνιμος
star	*astêr*	ἀστήρ
star	*astron*	ἄστρον
Statesman (title of Platonic dialogue)	*Politikos*	Πολιτικός
station (astron.)	*stêrigmos*	στηριγμός
statue	*agalma*	ἄγαλμα
statue-making	*agalmatopoios*	ἀγαλματοποιός
stimulate	*egeirein*	ἐγείρειν
Stoics	*Stoas, hoi apo tês*	Στοᾶς, οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς
Strato of Lampsacus	*Stratôn*	Στράτων
strength	*sthenos*	σθένος
sub-celestial	*hypouranios*	ὑπουράνιος
subject	*hypokeimenon*	ὑποκείμενον
sub-lunary	*hyposelênos*	ὑποσέληνος
subsistence	*hyparxis*	ὕπαρξις
substrate	*hypokeimenon*	ὑποκείμενον
subtraction	*aphairesis*	ἀφαίρεσις
summer (solstice)	*therinos*	θερινός

summon	*prokalein*	προκαλεῖν
Sun	*hêlios*	ἥλιος
superiority	*hyperochê*	ὑπεροχή
supervene	*epigignesthai*	ἐπιγίγνεσθαι
sustaining	*synektikos*	συνεκτικός
Sybil	*Sibylla*	Σίβυλλα
symbol	*symbolon*	σύμβολον
symmetry	*symmetria*	συμμετρία
sympathetic	*sympathês*	συμπαθής
Symposium	*Symposion*	Συμπόσιον
Tartarus	*Tartara*	Τάρταρα
teach	*didaskein*	διδάσκειν
teacher	*kathêgemôn*	καθηγεμών
temporal	*chronikos*	χρονικός
temporal	*egchronos*	ἔγχρονος
terminating stage (of procession)	*apoperatôsis*	ἀποπεράτωσις
terrestrial	*chthonios*	χθόνιος
tetrachtys	*tetraktys*	τετρακτύς
tetrad	*tetras*	τετράς
tetradic	*tetradikos*	τετραδικός
Thaleia	*Thaleia*	Θάλεια
Theaetetus	*Theaitêtos*	Θεαίτητος
Theodore (of Asine)	*Theodôros*	Θεόδωρος
theologian	*theologos*	θεολόγος
Theophrastus	*Theophrastos*	Θεόφραστος
theoretical	*theôrêtikos*	θεωρητικός
theory	*theôria*	θεωρία
theosopher	*theosophos*	θεόσοφος
theurgist	*telestês*	τελεστής
theurgist	*theourgos*	θεουργός
theurgy	*telestikê*	τελεστική
thing	*pragma*	πρᾶγμα
think	*noein*	νοεῖν
through participation	*kata methexin*	κατὰ μέθεξιν
throughout eternity	*diaiôniôs*	διαιωνίως
Timaeus	*Timaios*	Τίμαιος
time	*chronos*	χρόνος
Titan	*Titan*	Τιτάν
token	*endeigma*	ἔνδειγμα
totality	*pantotês*	παντότης
trace	*ichnos*	ἴχνος
tradition	*akoê*	ἀκοή
tradition	*paradosis*	παράδοσις
tradition	*phêmê*	φήμη

transcend	*exêirêsthai*	ἐξῃρῆσθαι
transcendent	*exêirêmenos*	ἐξῃρημένος
transition	*metabasis*	μετάβασις
triad	*trias*	τριάς
true	*alêthês*	ἀληθής
truth	*alêtheia*	ἀλήθεια
unchangeable	*anexallaktos*	ἀνεξάλλακτος
unchanging	*akinêtos*	ἀκίνητος
unclear	*amydros*	ἀμυδρός
understanding	*gnôsis*	γνῶσις
understanding, act of	*gnôsis*	γνῶσις
undifferentiated	*adiaphoros*	ἀδιάφορος
undivided	*ameristos*	ἀμέριστος
unequal	*anisos*	ἄνισος
unfolding	*anelixis*	ἀνέλιξις
ungenerated	*agenêtos*	ἀγένητος
unification	*henôsis*	ἕνωσις
unified	*heniaios*	ἑνιαῖος
uni-form	*henoeidês*	ἑνοειδής
uni-form	*monoeidês*	μονοειδής
unify	*henoun*	ἑνοῦν
union	*henôsis*	ἕνωσις
unitary	*heniaios*	ἑνιαῖος
universal	*holikos*	ὁλικός
universal	*holos*	ὅλος
universal	*katholou*	καθόλου
universal soul	*he holê psychê*	ἡ ὅλη ψυχή
universals	*ta hola*	τὰ ὅλα
universals	*ta katholou*	τὰ καθόλου
universe	*pan*, *to*	πᾶν, τὸ
unknowable	*agnôstos*	ἄγνωστος
unlimited	*apeiros*	ἄπειρος
unmediated	*amesôs*	ἀμέσως
unparticipated	*amethektos*	ἀμέθεκτος
unrelated	*aschetos*	ἄσχετος
up there (in the realm of intelligibles)	*ekei*	ἐκεῖ
uplifting	*anagôgos*	ἀναγωγός
Ursa major	*Arktos*	Ἄρκτος
varied	*poikilos*	ποικίλος
vehicle	*ochêma*	ὄχημα
Venus (planet)	*Aphroditê*	Ἀφροδίτη
verb	*rhêma*	ῥῆμα
vestibule (cf. *Philebus* 64c)	*prothyron*	πρόθυρον

virtue	*aretê*	ἀρετή
visible	*horatos*	ὁρατός
visible, highly	*enargês*	ἐναργής
vital	*zôtikos*	ζωτικός
void	*kenon*	κενόν
wandering [planetary bodies]	*planômenos*	πλανώμενος
water	*hydôr*	ὕδωρ
well-ordered	*eutaktôs*	εὐτάκτως
West	*dysis*	δύσις
whole	*holos*	ὅλος
whole, in a manner that is	*holikôs*	ὁλικῶς
wholeness	*holotês*	ὁλότης
wholly-complete	*holotelês*	ὁλοτελής
whorl (cf. myth of Er)	*sphondylos*	σφόνδυλος
will	*boulêsis*	βούλησις
winged	*ptênon*	πτηνόν
wings, shedding of (cf. *Phaedrus*)	*pterorryêsis*	πτεροῤῥύησις
wisdom	*phronêsis*	φρόνησις
word	*lexis*	λέξις
word	*logos*	λόγος
word	*onoma*	ὄνομα
word	*rhêma*	ῥῆμα
World Soul	*he holê psychê*	ἡ ὅλη ψυχή
worship	*thrêskeia*	θρησκεία
year	*eniautos*	ἐνιαυτός
young	*neos*	νέος
Zeus	*Dis*	Δίς
Zeus	*Zeus*	Ζεύς
Zodiac	*zôidiakos*	ζῳδιακός
Zodiac, sign of	*zôidion*	ζῴδιον
Zodiac, sign of	*sêmeion*	σημεῖον
zone-free (*Or. Chald.*)	*azônikos*	ἀζωνικός
zoo-ogony	*zôiogonia*	ζῳογονία

Greek word index

A

ἀβάκιον, abacus 145.24
ἄβατος, inaccessible 14.14
ἀγαθοειδής, boniform 6.27
ἀγαθός, good 14.24; 16.14; 16.15; 71.15; 105.13
  τὸ ἀγαθόν, a good 3.25; 4.6; 6.3; 6.29; 7.6; 7.8; 7.12; 7.14; 7.18; 7.24; 17.14; 20.21; 22.7; 25.10; 49.13; 71.22; 81.33; 82.6; 82.26; 98.18; 141.7; benefit 89.24; goodness 124.11; the Good 12.10; 12.22; 14.18; 14.28; 29.2; 66.15; 69.14; 83.2; 83.10; the good 10.26; 14.25; 71.20; 116.13
ἀγαθότης, goodness 44.25; 52.12; 114.22
ἀγαθουργία, beneficence 2.24
ἀγαθουργός, beneficent 6.28
ἄγαλμα, image 1.5; 3.3; 4.18; 4.19; 4.23; 4.31; 5.1; 5.16; 5.25; 5.29; 5.30; 5.32; 6.7; 6.23; 6.24; 41.31; 41.32; 69.3; 69.3; 69.16; statue 6.14; 89.21; 155.19
ἀγαλματοποιός, statue-making 6.10
ἀγγελικός, angelic 108.10; ἀ. γένη, angels 126.21
ἄγγελος, angel 109.18; 109.22; 140.31; that which informs 104.31
ἀγελάρχης, 'captain' 132.3
ἀγέλη, herd 131.21
ἀγένητος, ungenerated 16.30; 38.5; 38.7; 38.7; 47.16; incapable of generation 50.1; 51.10
ἄγκιστρον, hook (of spindle) 138.22; 147.24
Ἀγλαΐα, Beauty (Aglaïa) 119.3
ἀγλαΐζειν, beautify 119.3
ἁγνός, pure 107.17; holy 131.30
ἀγνοεῖν, fail to know 78.6; be ignorant of 149.30; be unaware of 153.13
ἄγνοια, ignorance 41.19; 44.5
ἄγνωστος, unknowable 101.7
ἀγωγή, invocation 20.23
ἀγώνιος, lacking angles 139.9
ἀδαμάντινος, adamantine 138.24
ἀδάμαντος, adamant 138.23
ἄδεκτος, unable to receive 42.12; lacking receptivity 84.22
ἀδιάζευκτος, inseparable 73.10
ἀδιαστάτως, in a manner that is indivisible 138.21
ἀδιάφθορος, indestructible 43.27
ἀδιάφορος, undifferentiated 30.12; 38.11; 40.9
ἀδρανής, lacking causal efficacy 95.13
ἀδυνατεῖν, be unable 155.26
ἀδύνατος, impossible 5.14; 18.21; 18.31; 32.10; 32.13; 37.28; 37.31; 100.20; 140.29; 159.10
ἀεί, always 3.9; 7.17; 7.19; 7.23; 8.19; 9.4; 9.6; 9.9; 9.9; 9.10; 9.10; 9.12; 9.14; 9.15; 9.15; 9.20; 9.20; 9.29; 9.30; 9.32; 11.27; 15.10; 15.12; 15.13; 15.22; 15.23; 15.24; 15.25; 15.29; 15.30; 15.31; 16.15; 16.16; 17.4; 18.9; 18.30; 21.27; 22.14; 23.3; 23.16; 27.27; 28.17; 34.9; 35.9; 40.13; 40.24; 42.21; 42.30; 44.21; 44.28; 47.6; 47.6; 47.6; 49.8; 57.11; 57.13; 57.14; 66.3; 67.17; 74.7; 74.10; 79.27; 81.9; 81.13; 81.14; 83.9; 84.32; 85.18; 86.29; 86.31; 87.2; 88.31; 88.32; 90.26; 94.17; 95.34; 96.10; 96.12; 96.25; 97.5; 100.21; 100.22; 102.27; 111.8; 111.17; 118.24; 119.1; 119.12; 120.22; 121.2; 121.3; 121.9; 121.12; 121.13; 126.8; 126.15; 126.24; 126.25; 127.4; 127.5; 130.20; 143.5; 150.11; constant 54.1; invariably 14.12; 26.9
  ὁ ἀεὶ χρόνος, all time 72.27; eternal time 150.2
  τὸ ἀεί, Eternity 105.32
ἀειθαλῆς, evergreen 119.7

ἀεικινησία, motion of an eternal character 9.12; (the property of being) always in motion 129.19
ἀείπολος, having an eternal orbit 61.25
ἀειφανής, always visible 125.8; 125.14
ἀέριος, aerial 4.29; 61.30; 109.1; 109.23; 110.23; 110.24; 110.26; 111.21; airy 61.14; 61.19
ἀερίως, in an aerial manner 98.1
ἀεροπορεῖν, move around in the air 110.2
ἀεροπόρος, traversing the air 104.24; 106.25; 108.10; 109.23; 109.26; 109.29; 110.1
ἀερώδης, having the form of air 128.20
ἀζωΐα, lifelessness 124.12
ἀζωνικός, zone-free 127.15; 127.16
ἄζωνος, independent of the zones 43.13
ἀήρ, air 4.28; 34.28; 34.30; 61.10; 61.16; 61.22; 61.24; 61.27; 68.1; 98.1; 108.4; 108.11; 108.12; 108.13; 109.26; 110.2; 111.9; 111.13; 111.25; 111.29; 112.7; 112.9; 112.15; 113.19; 128.22; 128.27; 135.30; 141.28; 142.6
ἀθάνατος, immortal 36.32; 72.26; 110.18; 110.23; 110.26; 142.16; 157.23; 157.29; 158.4
ἄθεος, devoid of god 155.11
ἀθετεῖν, refuse to assent to 130.4
ἀθρόος, all at once 2.15; condensed 112.11; simultaneous 7.1; total 150.19
ἀθροίζειν, aggregate 12.19
ἄθροισμα, collection 11.34
ἀθρόως, all at once 1.10; 6.3; 21.9; 22.5; 50.28; 104.31
Αἴγλη, Aegle 144.10
ἀίδιος, eternal 1.8; 1.40; 3.6; 3.7; 4.18; 5.4; 5.7; 5.16; 5.18; 6.24; 7.29; 7.32; 8.2; 9.3; 9.29; 9.29; 18.14; 18.28; 41.12; 41.21; 41.25; 41.29; 41.32; 43.10; 52.8; 68.25; 69.1; 81.27; 117.15; being forever 135.6; everlasting 5.23; 50.23; 75.2; 94.29; 94.31; 95.3; 119.28; 159.6; going on forever 130.21; lasting forever 136.1
ἐξ ἀιδίου, from the point of view of what always is 2.23
ἀιδιότης, eternity 7.30; 8.2; 8.3; 8.6; 12.8; 24.2; 24.12; 38.31; continuation forever 22.12; eternality 41.22; everlastingness 18.15; 75.6; 126.25
ἀιδίως, eternally 23.24; 41.1; 68.17
Ἅιδης, Hades 154.8
αἰεί, forever 14.10
αἰθέριος, aetherial 43.14; 43.16; 61.12; 67.30; 135.19
αἰθήρ, aether 61.16; 61.21; 61.32; 62.1; 62.3; 112.15; 130.17; 142.18
αἴθρη, aether 61.21
αἰνίσσεσθαι, speak somewhat cryptically 19.17
αἵρεσις, sect 153.7
αἱρεῖν, choose 159.25; 159.31; determine 89.11; grasp 22.15
αἴσθησις, perception 69.17; 69.19; 129.29; 129.30; sense perception 4.12; 100.29; 100.30; 131.16; 153.31
τὰ ἐν αἰσθήσει φερόμενα, sensible things 45.2
αἰσθητός, perceptible 13.13; 81.31; sensible 17.1; 33.25; 33.27; 33.27; 33.32; 34.4; 35.23; 36.9; 48.7; 51.20; 98.23; 116.1; 122.11; 133.27; 151.24
τὸ αἰσθητόν, visible universe 7.30
αἶσχος, ugliness 114.19; deformity 122.19
αἰσχρός, shameful 78.3
αἰσχρότης, ugliness 114.18
αἰσχύνεσθαι, have qualms 135.24
αἰτία, cause 4.16; 7.6; 12.18; 13.32; 13.33; 17.13; 17.16; 20.8; 21.31; 24.15; 30.22; 31.25; 31.32; 31.33; 36.1; 36.6; 39.4; 41.2; 50.11; 54.6; 54.14; 55.7; 56.28; 61.6; 63.26; 63.31; 64.8; 68.19; 68.28; 69.6; 69.9; 74.4; 74.28; 80.11; 80.31; 85.9; 88.11; 88.33; 89.2; 90.5; 90.7; 99.10; 99.23; 100.1; 101.7; 101.12; 102.23; 105.30; 105.34; 106.19; 107.9; 107.19; 108.23; 116.7; 119.22; 122.7; 126.6; 126.11; 130.26; 134.17; 137.9; 139.17; 140.2; 140.12; 144.15; 147.29; 152.26; 157.25; explanation 84.4; 156.22; reason 3.24; 50.21; 100.18; 112.11; 153.23; 156.6; that which is responsible for 66.18; 69.15
κατ' αἰτίαν, causal-preparatory 50.14; 98.17
αἰτιάασθαι, blame 48.1; make the cause of 13.33

αἴτιος, being a cause 12.4; 15.1; 20.15; 22.20; 25.10; 26.6; 26.9; 36.19; 67.24; 69.8; 69.18; 89.17; 100.23; 106.6; 108.17; 108.22; 108.24; 109.9; 157.23; 158.4; being an explanation 62.14; 78.32; responsible 3.25; 9.10; 9.12; 65.30; 66.5; 66.19; 101.19
τὸ αἴτιον, cause 15.9; 15.26; 15.32; 17.4; 22.26; 23.30; 24.15; 26.22; 28.30; 32.6; 39.4; 41.22; 43.7; 51.7; 61.5; 68.28; 69.24; 69.27; 74.28; 77.28; 89.2; 99.11; 99.16; 99.17; 102.23; 103.8; 106.6; 117.15; 144.15; 157.10
α. κινητικόν, kinetic cause 117.17
α. ποιητικόν, efficient cause 7.9; 28.31
κατ' αἰτίων προήγησις, causal sequence 31.25
αἰών, eternity 5.12; 8.15; 8.16; 8.22; 9.2; 9.16; 9.19; 9.31; 10.3; 10.5; 10.8; 10.13; 10.18; 10.19; 10.19; 10.21; 11.2; 11.7; 11.9; 11.13; 11.17; 11.18; 11.20; 11.23; 11.25; 11.27; 11.30; 11.30; 11.33; 12.3; 12.6; 12.8; 12.11; 12.12; 12.14; 12.31; 13.2; 13.3; 13.6; 13.6; 13.9; 13.12; 13.15; 13.18; 13.30; 14.17; 14.17; 14.27; 14.29; 14.30; 15.7; 15.9; 15.11; 15.13; 15.19; 15.19; 15.22; 15.29; 15.31; 16.1; 16.4; 16.9; 16.10; 16.12; 16.24; 17.1; 17.2; 17.3; 17.5; 17.11; 17.14; 17.17; 17.18; 17.23; 17.27; 18.3; 18.4; 18.7; 18.20; 18.30; 20.7; 20.26; 22.10; 24.8; 24.11; 24.15; 24.24; 24.26; 25.1; 25.3; 25.6; 25.16; 25.31; 25.32; 27.4; 27.13; 27.15; 27.18; 27.19; 27.21; 27.22; 27.24; 28.11; 28.14; 28.26; 28.32; 29.16; 29.28; 29.29; 29.30; 31.9; 31.10; 31.16; 32.33; 33.2; 33.8; 33.10; 33.12; 33.29; 34.8; 34.9; 34.12; 34.21; 34.21; 37.27; 40.24; 42.13; 44.5; 45.3; 46.5; 46.30; 48.17; 48.18; 49.24; 50.27; 51.23; 52.6; 54.3; 58.28; 58.30; 81.13; 92.20; 93.20; 94.28; 94.29; 94.33; 97.12; 100.12; 100.20; 100.25
αἰώνιος, eternal 3.9; 8.12; 8.16; 9.13; 9.15; 10.12; 10.18; 10.19; 10.21; 11.8; 11.8; 11.14; 11.24; 11.27; 12.14; 13.1; 13.2; 13.3; 15.3; 15.7; 15.30; 16.11; 16.27; 16.30; 16.32; 17.12; 20.10; 20.26; 25.7; 25.14; 25.17; 25.27; 25.30; 25.32; 26.1; 26.1; 26.1; 26.3; 26.4; 26.30; 27.4; 27.26; 28.18; 31.15; 37.28; 40.3; 40.22; 42.29; 42.31; 44.18; 45.22; 48.5; 49.9; 51.19; 59.2; 59.10; 59.11; 59.13; 94.12; 94.17; 94.19; 94.29; 97.7; 97.9; 97.11
αἰωνίως, eternally 20.27
ἀκάματος, unwearying 107.17
ἀκαρής, a minute 7.33
ἀκατάληκτος, ceaseless 89.2; 126.27
ἀκήρατος, undefiled 107.14; 107.18
ἀκινησία, motionlessness 124.6; 124.11
ἀκίνητος, changeless 53.10; 74.13; immobile 26.11; 26.13; 26.13; 26.23; 26.25; 42.18; immovable 26.8; motionless 9.11; 9.13; 36.8; 94.24; 119.15; 124.5; 137.10; 138.11; 157.22; unmoveable 25.25; unmoved 9.7; 41.2; 41.6; 41.22; 88.33; 89.1; 119.27; 137.9; 143.14; 152.26; without motion 31.11
ἀκινήτως, changelessly 44.28; in a manner free from change 59.3; in a manner that is motionless 88.31; in a manner involving no change 32.15
ἀκλινής, invariant 74.24; 138.23
ἀκλινῶς, in a manner that is invariant 72.31
ἀκμαῖος, in its prime 47.6
ἀκοή, tradition 152.9
ἀκόλουθος, that which follows as a consequence 157.21
ἀκολουθεῖν, follow 62.18; 108.3
ἀκούειν, hear 25.1; 70.20; interpret 84.17; 107.24; 138.7; 144.14; 146.2; 154.25; take (words) in a certain sense 38.18; take to mean 85.17; understand 139.4
ἀκουστέος, to be interpreted as 113.8
ἀκουστής, disciple 138.10
ἀκρίβεια, accuracy 125.31
ἀκριβής, accurate 35.24; 48.30; 81.10; 88.2; 91.19; 149.7; precise 12.30; 47.24; 81.6
ἀκριβῶς, precisely 47.14; strictly 160.18; strictly speaking 85.21
ἄκρα, highest degree 3.12
ἄκρον, extreme term 26.10; 42.25; 134.25; 134.26; 149.12; extreme 67.23; 114.1; 131.12; 131.16; highest gradation 111.25; 130.16
ἄκρος, at the end 64.5; at the extreme 133.20; at the summit 100.4; exalted

27.9; foremost 6.9; highest 57.28; 112.7; 107.4; 114.25; 114.27
ἀκρότης, highest degree 10.25; highest gradation 12.17; 15.21; 110.31; 111.6; 114.30; 128.21; highest point 142.17; highest 120.24; very highest form 113.18; 115.10
ἀκτίς, ray 82.11
ἀλήθεια, truth 21.12; 66.17; 69.11; 83.2; 113.16; 114.20; 126.5
ἀληθής, true 6.7; 15.2; 36.20; 41.27; 42.20; 43.1; 44.21; 76.19; 78.24; 78.24; 87.28; 113.14; 116.12; 117.10; 117.10; 125.15; 126.2; 126.2; 130.18; 130.18; 132.2; 132.2; 133.26; 135.14; 144.20; 148.23; 157.20; 157.20; 157.24; 157.24
τὸ ἀληθές, the truth 80.2
κατὰ τὸ ἀληθές, actually 40.14
ἀληθινός, true 72.20; 116.24; 118.22; 141.17; truly 19.17; 19.23; 33.10; 35.33; 89.6; veritable 6.23; ἀ. ἔννοια, true conception 42.3
ἀληθῶς, in the true sense 158.26; really 32.15; 36.12; 54.16; 73.18; 112.2; 112.4; 135.8; 154.30; 158.2; truly 19.15; 26.28
ἄληπτος, incomprehensible 105.24
ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, undergo alteration 18.25; 30.15
ἀλλότριος, different 76.24; foreign 115.4; from elsewhere 118.23
ἀλλοτρίως, foreign to the spirit of 65.9
ἄλογος, irrational 4.12; 69.24; 82.2; 117.20; 117.20; 157.27; 157.30; 158.21
ἄλσος, sacred grove 141.18
ἀλυσία, indestructibility 50.19
ἄλυτος, indestructible 50.9; 50.10; 50.10; 50.20; 50.22; 73.6
ἁμάρτημα, mistake 48.11
ἁμαρτάνειν, sin 109.6; 154.9
ἀμέθεκτος, unparticipated 101.26
ἀμείβειν, change 56.5
Ἀμέλιος, Amelius 33.33; 34.1; 103.18
ἀμενηνός, feeble 95.11
ἀμερής, having no parts 137.1; indivisible 19.7; 23.21; 30.28; 133.26; partless 23.19
ἀμέριστος, indivisible 12.8; 17.12; 21.30; 25.20; 31.15; 33.16; 34.21; 39.21
ἀμερίστως, in a manner that is indivisible 22.7; in a manner that is partless 138.20; indivisibly 23.18
ἀμέσως, in a manner that lacks mediation 150.15; in an unmediated way 17.3; with no intermediary 62.2; with nothing in between 62.3; without any intermediary 107.32; without mediation 64.27
ἀμετάβατος, changeless 12.7; 26.8; 59.14
ἀμεταβλησία, inability to undergo change 127.6
ἀμετάβλητος, changeless 11.14; 16.30; 16.32; 73.9; 74.12; 75.5
τὸ ἀμετάβλητον, changelessness 74.15
ἀμεταστάτως, changelessly 21.10; 22.15
ἀμέτρητος, unmeasured 33.3
ἀμετρία, lack of measure 30.2
ἀμήχανος, extraordinary 86.10; 90.19
ἀμιγῶς, in an unmixed relation 30.18
ἀμοιβή, change 87.1
ἄμοιρος, have no share in 142.21; lack a portion of 68.4; lack a share in 82.2
ἀμοιρεῖν, be denied something 2.17
ἀμυδρός, indistinct 3.28; 10.1
ἀμφισβήτησις, dispute 8.21
ἀμφισβητεῖν, maintain 130.22
ἀναγκάζειν, compel 12.11; 112.4; force 125.1
ἀναγκαῖος, necessary 3.15; 29.9; 61.31; 136.2; 159.11
ἀνάγκη, (it) must 41.22; (it is) necessary 3.19; 10.30; 32.20; 37.18; 37.21; 42.5; 100.28; 109.11; 117.17; 117.20; 119.22; 120.3; 131.14; 132.15; 159.2; necessity 62.15; of necessity 100.27
ἐξ ἀνάγκης, of necessity 18.33; 100.32
ἀναγωγή, return 65.7
ἀναγωγός, uplifting 68.16; 82.11
ἀναζητεῖν, investigate 116.8
ἀναζωπυρεῖν, re-kindle 68.13
ἀναθυμίασις, exhalation 134.15
ἀναιρεῖν, destroy 16.33; 146.21
ἀναίρεσις, destruction 35.26
ἀνακαλεῖν, recycle 2.8; recall 40.27; invoke 127.25
ἀνακάμπειν, bend back 92.11
ἀνακλητικός, such as to call back 1.13; 2.6
ἀνακρεμαννύναι, make dependent 63.23; suspend 133.1

ἀνακύκλησις, circulation 57.32; 138.27; 139.1; cycling back 145.2; 146.10; 149.32; rotation 90.21; 144.29
ἀνακυκλεῖν, carry around 9.4; 41.1; come full circle 30.30; come round 21.1; cycle back 146.13; rotate 36.7; 75.10
ἀναλογία, analogy 62.1; 144.1; 144.12; proportion 97.26; 134.21; 134.27; 140.5; 140.7; 144.18
ἀναλύειν, analyse 148.26
ἀναμετρεῖν, measure 91.5
ἀναμέτρησις, ability to make measurements 81.25
ἀναμιμνήσκειν, remind 104.17; bring to recollection 150.26
ἀνάμνησις, recollection 42.5; 150.24
ἀνανεάζειν, make new 40.26
ἀνανεώνειν, reinvigorate 47.4
Ἀναξαγόρας, Anaxagoras 63.28
ἀναπιμπλάναι, infect 47.19
ἀναπληροῦν, supply 98.28
ἀναπλοῦν, explain 70.27
ἀνάπτειν, kindle 80.25; 82.15; 83.6; 84.1; 84.25
ἀνάπτυξις, derivation 29.13
ἀναπτύσσειν, reveal 115.9; unroll 105.2
ἀνατέλλειν, rise 84.14; 85.21; 87.29; 92.33
ἀνατιθέναι, attribute 57.2; entrust 101.11
ἀνατολή, East 35.2; 35.14; 35.15; 77.15; 77.16; 77.24; 79.9; 123.25; 147.20; 148.18; rising 139.28
ἀνατολικός, eastern 77.22
τὸ ἀνατολικόν, the east 123.19; 123.27
ἀναφορά, ascent 65.13
ἀνεγείρειν, rouse up 136.22; 138.19; stimulate 68.12; urge 149.7
ἀνέδραστος, unstable 122.19
ἀνείδεος, lacking form 33.16
ἀνέκλειπτος, ceaseless 126.27
ἀνεκφοίτητος, not departing 72.1; inseparable 105.34
ἀνεκφοιτήτως, in a manner that is inseparable 106.2
ἀνέλεγκτος, irrefutable 125.29
ἀνέλιξις, articulation 91.15; 92.22; 124.18; unfolding 3.8; 29.19; 31.21; 33.4; 81.19; 95.4
ἀνελίσσειν, unfold 103.14; unroll 105.2
ἀνελίττειν, articulate 73.1; 92.8; counter-roll 59.23; 149.2; counter-rotate 128.5; reveal 30.27; 31.7; spell out 29.6; 29.31; unfold 14.15; 26.24; wind 56.26
ἀνεμπόδιστος, unimpeded 7.1
ἀνέμφατος, without a hint of 12.23; without a trace of 1.18
ἀνενέργητος, inactive 32.12
ἀνεξάλλακτος, unchangeable 12.18; 15.5
ἀνεξαλλάκτως, unchangeably 15.10
ἀνεπίτατος, not capable of different degrees 30.12
ἄνεσις, remission 68.9
ἀνευρίσκειν, discover 149.4
ἀναρτᾶσθαι, be dependent 99.30; 101.17; 115.22; 126.20; 126.23
ἀνησιδώρα, one who sends up gifts 144.7
ἄνθος, blossoms 118.26; flower 14.6; 14.11
ἀνθρώπειος, human 94.2
ἀνθρώπινος, human 109.4
ἀνθρωπίνως, in a manner that is human 12.28
ἄνθρωπος, human 108.5; human being 43.5; 48.21; 82.3; 89.25; 117.8; human species 109.6; man 19.30; 72.19; 86.6; 135.29; person 8.29; 42.2; 42.7; 48.1; 153.8
ἀνίδρυτος, unstable 74.11
ἀνισοταχής, unequal in speed 64.11
ἀνισοταχῶς, in a manner that is unequal (in speed) 64.19
ἀνισότης, inequality 64.10; 140.7
ἀνιχνεύειν, pursue 14.16
ἀνιέναι, go up 156.9
ἀνόμματος, eyeless 101.21; 101.23
ἀνομοιότης, dissimilarity 17.19; 17.31; 98.14; 146.28
ἀνόμοιος, dissimilar 23.15; 111.13; 146.27
ἀνομοίως, in a dissimilar manner 147.31
ἔχειν ἀνομοίως, be dissimilar 97.2; be in opposition 11.29
ἀντανίσωσις, balance 140.4
ἀνταποδιδόναι, compensate for 96.24
ἀντιλέγειν, refute 104.9
ἀντιλαμβάνειν, apprehend 96.32
ἀντερείδειν, offer resistance 112.12; 113.30
ἀντιδιαιρεῖν, divide 70.28; draw a distinction 104.2; 104.7
ἀνθιστάναι, oppose 17.21; contrast 110.32
ἀντίθεσις, opposite 11.22; 11.31; opposition 1.17; 17.31
ἀντίθετος, opposed 11.27

ἀντικεῖσθαι, be opposed to 3.16; 11.23; 16.30; 23.13; be an opposite 25.23
ἀντικειμένως, in a manner opposed 123.29
ἀντικρύ, in κατ' αντικρύ, in opposition 145.5; 149.11; 150.10
ἀντιλέγειν, oppose 141.13
ἀντιληπτέος, must be grasped 25.10
ἀντιμετάστασις, reciprocal replacement 57.34
ἀντίξοος, standing opposed 11.10
ἀντιπεριάγειν, revolve and carry in a contrary direction 123.28; bring about in opposition 139.30
ἀντιπεριφορά, counter-motion 56.26; counter-revolution 79.4
ἀντίρροπος, equivalent 136.13
ἀντέχειν, last 23.5
ἀντιφθέγγειν, shout back 42.15
ἀντίφραξις, interposition 85.6
ἀνυπέρβλητος, unsurpassable 66.1
ἄνω, above 48.6; 51.16; 130.15; at the top 148.7; high up 128.26; 153.6; on high 111.26; up 56.20; 122.26; 130.23; upward(s) 56.19; 80.12; 111.11; 111.17; 130.4; 130.8; 130.10; 130.13; 130.23
ἄνωθεν, above 68.5; down 161.3; from above 61.10; 107.23; 134.13; 135.30; from on high 82.4; 82.13; 88.10; 95.21; 97.15; 105.23
ἀνώλεθρος, indestructible 59.13; 95.4
ἀνωμαλία, irregularity 30.7; 56.25; 57.2; 67.14; 74.25; 76.18; 96.16; 96.24; 119.5; 129.19; 133.1; 147.6; lack of regularity 30.16
ἀνώμαλος, irregular 30.14; 57.5; 64.7; 67.5; 96.22; 96.23
ἀνωμάλως, irregularly 57.5; 57.5; in an irregular manner 79.16; 133.4
ἀνωφερής, going up 114.9; 114.33; 115.3; 115.14
ἀξία, rank 70.11; status 39.23; 39.31; 55.29; 76.32; 127.15; value 16.20; 31.6; 132.7; 132.16; 142.24
ἄξιος, deserving 68.22; 100.14; worth(y) 58.4; 58.24; 149.5; worthwhile 41.29; 94.15; 95.29; 103.16
ἀξιοῦν, deem proper 110.20; say 35.17; 89.30; think worthwhile 111.31; 141.6; 154.24; validate 62.7
ἀξίωμα, axiom 146.22; honour 52.31
ἄξων, axis 136.31; 136.32; 137.1; 138.16; 138.24; 139.19; 147.22
ἄοκνος, ceaseless 14.10
ἀορασία, blindness 153.5
ἀόρατος, invisible 151.27; *comp.* most invisible 128.24
ἀοριστία, indefiniteness 92.14; 124.17
ἀόριστος, indefinite 102.26; 122.3; 152.23
ἀπαγγελία, diction 16.14
ἀπαγγέλλειν, report 160.13
ἀπαιτεῖν, demand 29.8; 96.21; ask 112.2
ἀπαντᾶν, reply 128.17
ἀπαράλλακτος, unchangeable 81.18
ἄπαυστος, unceasing 56.12
ἀπαύστως, in a manner that is unceasing 24.5
ἀπεικάζειν, represent 94.9; 94.32; 115.28
ἀπεικασία, representation 94.27
ἀπεικονίζειν, imitate 25.18; represent 54.31; 104.30
ἀπολαμβάνειν, receive 71.15
ἀπειράκις, countless times 29.8; infinitely 30.32
ἀπειρία, infinity 30.3; 40.25; 92.13; 102.24; unlimited 74.20; 79.25
ἀπειρία, ignorance 78.7
ἀπείριτος, unlimited 142.15
ἀπειροδυναμία, infinite power 21.1
ἀπειροδύναμος, infinite in power 40.24
ἄπειρος, indefinite 29.4; infinite 9.11; 10.30; 28.15; 33.2; 51.11; 89.3; 89.3; 100.26
ἐπ' ἄπειρον, to infinity 36.7
ἐξ ἀπείρου, from an infinity 51.12
ἄπειρος, ignorant 78.3
ἀπέραντος, limitless 20.30; 40.22
ἀπεργασία, production 72.11
ἀπεριήγητος, innumerable 140.30
ἀπερίληπτος, uncircumscribed 105.26
ἀπήχημα, echo 158.8
ἀπιστεῖν, be unpersuaded by 63.24; mistrust 159.11
ἀπιστητέος, must be mistrusted 115.4
ἀπλανής, fixed 35.32; 36.30; 39.26; 39.28; 55.20; 57.8; 57.10; 58.6; 58.9; 60.10; 60.18; 67.4; 69.6; 69.29; 69.31; 70.6; 70.12; 70.25; 70.27; 70.29; 74.29; 76.30; 77.7; 78.15; 78.28; 79.13; 80.8; 81.15; 81.16; 86.16; 86.20; 87.13; 87.19; 87.27; 87.31; 87.32; 88.14; 90.8; 91.24; 93.9; 93.27; 96.12;

ἁπλανής, fixed (*cont.*) 112.23; 116.31; 118.4; 118.9; 118.22; 118.31; 120.17; 121.29; 122.2; 122.6; 122.26; 122.28; 123.7; 123.11; 123.13; 123.13; 123.21; 123.28; 124.4; 124.13; 124.19; 124.26; 124.27; 125.1; 125.3; 125.16; 125.19; 125.22; 126.1; 126.6; 126.14; 127.7; 127.13; 127.22; 127.24; 127.27; 127.31; 129.16; 129.23; 129.32; 130.26; 131.4; 131.9; 131.12; 132.6; 132.12; 132.13; 132.18; 132.28; 132.29; 133.21; 144.28; 147.9; 147.21; 147.24; 148.1; 148.4; 148.10; 148.12; 148.14; 148.14; 148.16; 148.21; 153.3; 154.13; invariant 123.9; not wandering 90.25
ἄπλετος, boundless 61.12
ἁπλήθυντος, not pluralised or able to be pluralised 11.11; 22.11; 101.30
ἁπλότης, simplicity 14.20; 50.11; 56.29; 60.15; 127.9
ἁπλοῦς, simple 7.1; 10.15; 46.14; 46.19; 46.21; 46.33; 49.12; 53.7; 53.17; 53.20; 54.4; 65.16; 74.31; 77.24; 92.29; 101.28; 101.32; 105.22; 146.22; 147.25; 148.25; 148.29; 149.4; simplified 148.28
ἀποβλέπειν, consider 77.29; look to 8.30; 9.21; 78.10; 80.14; 107.31; 113.15; 130.7; 134.19; 138.4; 141.4; 144.21; look upon 155.6
ἀπόγειος, having an apogee 79.10; close to the earth 128.2
ἀπογεννᾶν, bring about 68.28; derive 5.3; engender 21.21; 95.31; 118.15; generate 1.11; 99.10; give birth to 144.11; have 82.24; produce 7.10; 24.20; 99.3; 99.15; 109.12
ἀπογέννησις, generation 12.26; 91.7; 101.33; production 31.25; 98.16; 101.29; 126.12; 143.8
ἀποδιδόναι, give 60.31; 95.29; 104.13; 123.30; 135.30; 145.22; provide 49.11; 77.2; 83.22; 124.19; 124.32; 129.9
ἀποδεικνύειν, demonstrate 37.31; 130.18
ἀποδεικτικός, demonstrative 160.9
ἀπόδειξις, demonstration 62.16; 105.21; 159.12
ἀποδέχεσθαι, accept 65.8
ἀποδοκιμάζειν, reject 65.16
ἀπόδοσις, definition 74.2
ἀποτιθέναι, place 70.5
ἀποκαθιστάναι, be returned 28.29; bring back to a start 20.29; complete a circuit 92.30; complete a revolution 29.7; 29.10; return (come back) to a start(ing point) 19.31; 28.16; 28.20; 29.20; 29.20; 57.3; 78.20
ἀποκαλεῖν, call 106.9; 139.22; 154.2; denominate 109.20; refer to as 5.25; 90.19; 151.25
ἀποκατάστασις, complete cycle 64.3; 64.4; 89.1; 89.15; 92.4; 92.29; 93.11; 127.24; 138.15; 146.13; 148.27; 149.25; completed cycle 92.27; 150.17; completion of cycle 56.10; 76.16; 81.4; 91.11; 91.19; 91.25; 93.2; 93.6; cosmic cycle 54.21; 54.28; cycle 129.26; make a complete cycle 87.14; return to same point 75.15; 88.7; return to starting point 22.6; 40.16; 43.26; 57.13; 78.27; 87.27; 87.31; 88.2; 88.8; 89.11; 90.24; 95.6
  ἀ κυκλική, regular circular motion 18.16
ἀποκαταστατικός, completing a cycle 73.19; 91.26; 91.29; 93.27; cycle 86.26; regular 18.12; such as to bring back/return to starting point 30.17; 33.11; 57.31
ἀποκαταστατικῶς, in a complete cycle 22.18
ἀποκληροῦν, assign 51.19; 52.33
ἀποκρεμᾶν, hang down 136.10
ἀποκύησις, birth 160.3
ἀπολαμπρύνειν, endow with brilliance 82.7; 83.8
ἀπολαύειν, achieve 18.12
ἀπολλύναι, pass away 23.3; 49.9; be destroyed 60.3
Ἀπόλλων, Apollo 89.23; 140.24; 159.26
Ἀπολλωνιακός, Apollonian 159.25
ἀπολογία, excuse 48.15
ἀπόλυτος, liberated 140.13
  ἀ. ἐξουσία, independence 77.7
ἀπομαντεύεσθαι, to divine 123.12
ἀπομιμεῖσθαι, imitate 8.23; 52.9
ἀπονέμειν, allocate 49.15; allot 23.26; 42.11; 54.25; assign 19.13; 23.10; 111.21
ἀπονεμητέος, to be assigned 42.29

ἀποπεράτωσις, terminating stage 88.18; 140.20
ἀποπίπτειν, fail 126.30
ἀποπλανείν, deviate 139.5
ἀποπληροῦν, fill 136.18
ἀπορεῖν, be at a loss 116.9; be puzzled 69.28; 87.3; 87.12; 88.8; 153.22
ἀπορία, puzzle 58.12; 70.31; 153.22
ἄπορος, intractable 35.4; puzzling 35.6; 159.14
ἀπόρροια, effluxion 111.23
ἀπόστασις, distance 24.29
ἀπόστημα, distance 62.22; 62.27; 62.29; 63.1; 63.3; 63.4; 63.6; 63.8; 63.10; 63.11
ἀποτέλεσμα, effect 86.22
ἀποτελεύτησις, completion 36.11
ἀποτέμνειν, separate 40.12
ἀποτυποῦν, impress 97.4; 118.25; imprint 98.19; 116.5
ἀποφαίνειν, appear 77.13; call 59.6; declare 1.22; 49.6; portray as 6.10; say 42.1; show 24.23
ἀπρονόητος, deprived/devoid of providential care 2.20; 152.24; without (exercising) providential care 152.21; 155.11
ἁπτός, tangible 82.31; 113.30
ἀργία, idleness 124.7
ἀργός, idle 2.21
Ἀρεϊκός, belonging to Mars 88.29; 91.22
Ἄρης, Mars 64.21; 64.26; 67.23; 68.24; 69.7; 69.21
ἄρθρον, definite article 14.25
ἀριθμητός, countable 9.30; 20.12; numerable 32.6; 87.23; 95.18; subject to being counted 32.22; 59.6; that which gets counted 9.25; 9.26; 19.27; 32.22; 32.24
  τὸ ἀριθμητόν, number 3.29
ἀριθμός, number 1.19; 2.10; 8.16; 9.1; 9.23; 9.28; 17.28; 18.1; 19.10; 19.15; 19.15; 19.18; 19.23; 19.29; 20.28; 26.16; 26.17; 26.18; 26.19; 26.19; 26.21; 27.2; 29.17; 30.28; 32.27; 38.10; 39.9; 40.1; 40.6; 40.14; 40.18; 53.4; 53.30; 54.16; 57.17; 57.20; 58.2; 59.7; 59.8; 59.8; 73.17; 80.28; 81.17; 82.1; 85.23; 85.25; 85.27; 85.28; 85.29; 85.29; 85.30; 86.8; 86.31; 87.25; 87.26; 88.28; 89.6; 89.11; 90.18; 91.12; 91.16; 91.28; 92.8; 92.13; 92.17; 93.16; 94.21; 94.28; 96.28; 98.4; 99.1; 99.2; 99.5; 99.9; 104.29; 105.8; 105.16; 106.30; 106.30; 107.7; 107.23; 118.7; 118.15; 121.31; 129.31
  κατ' ἀριθμόν, according to / in accordance with number 15.1; 17.19; 19.6; 19.9; 19.12; 19.24; 23.18; 27.25; 45.3; 46.26; 54.18; 55.5; 66.21; 81.5; in number 40.10; numeric 102.23; numerical sequence 17.22; numerically 58.9; 86.29; 86.30; 86.32; 106.3
  ἀ. ἀποκαταστατικός, for complete cycle 73.19
  ἀ. ἀφανής / ἐμφανής, invisible / visible 88.28–29
  ἀ. διανοητικός, discursive 85.28
  ἀ. ἑνιαῖος, unitary 72.30
  ἀ. θεῖος, divine 102.17; 105.30; 107.13
  ἀ. κοσμικός, cosmic 57.21
  ἀ. νοερός, intellectual 19.16; 55.4
  ἀ. νοητός, intelligible 19.25; 102.21
  ἀ. περιοδικός, periodic 129.21–22; 129.25
  ἀ. τέλειος, perfect / complete 54.22; 91.2; 92.16–18; 93.23; 95.3; 95.5
ἀριθμεῖν, count 19.28; 59.9; 73.16; 73.17; 80.18; enumerate or number, number 19.26; 26.16; 89.9; 95.19; *pass. part.* ἀριθμούμενος, numerable 26.22; being counted 41.24
  τὸ ἀριθμούμενον, that which is / gets numbered 17.29; 19.19; 19.27; 26.15; 26.24; 27.14
  τὸ ἀριθμοῦν, the number with which we count 9.24; that which does the counting 9.25; 9.28; 9.29; 32.23; 32.24; that which numbers 41.23
ἀριστερός, left 122.27; 123.8; 128.11; 147.33
ἄριστος, best 10.26; 10.27; 11.3; 58.27; 58.30; 94.18; 116.11; 119.16; 124.1; 124.1; 124.10
Ἀριστοτέλης, Aristotle 9.23; 23.20; 37.31; 49.17; 54.33; 62.5; 69.31; 74.8; 84.29; 87.6; 111.30; 117.17; 124.1; 129.1; 130.18; 130.25; 135.24; 137.7; 142.18; 145.19; 152.24
ἀρκεῖν, get by 22.20; be enough / sufficient 34.8; 58.15

Ἄρκτος, Ursa Major 125.7; 125.14
ἁρμόζειν, apply 42.17; 42.32
ἁρμονία, harmony 21.22
ἁρμονικός, harmonic 21.17
ἄρρην, male 106.11; 106.24
ἀρρενοῦσθαι, become male 66.7
ἄρρητος, ineffable 72.29; 105.24
Ἄρτεμις, Artemis 131.27
ἄρτιος, even (number) 50.17; 50.17; 50.18
ἀρχαγγελικός, Archangelic 43.15
ἀρχαῖος, ancient 125.32
ἀρχαιότροπος, old-fashioned 70.15
ἀρχή, beginning 2.12; 16.17; 33.5; 92.16; origin 47.4; 92.11; 119.19; 119.25; 122.8; 122.10; 147.22; 124.15; principle 14.8; 14.13; 18.29; 20.10; 21.26; 64.10; 79.25; 90.13; 102.26; 126.11; 128.18; 134.20; 142.22; 153.30; 160.27; principle [or ruler] 152.32; 153.6; 153.7; ruler 129.15; start 45.18; starting point 30.32; 92.28; 142.11; 150.17; 158.13
  εἰς ἀρχήν, at first 150.25
  ἐξ ἀρχῆς, from the start 75.29; on the initial assumption 75.31; 76.3; 76.3
ἀρχηγέτις, fundamental 44.13
ἀρχηγικός, fundamental 10.9; 10.15; of the nature of an origin 86.21; originary 46.33; primordial 39.4
ἀρχηγός, initial leader 31.3
ἀρχικός, Commanding 43.16
ἄρχειν, be in charge 155.33; begin 82.5; depart (from a point) 28.8; 28.9; initiate 24.23; 63.28; originate 15.6; 71.22; 97.15; 157.1; rule 21.20; start 39.6
ἄρχων, ruler 159.4
ἀσαφής, hard to see 22.4
ἀσθένεια, weakness 16.22; 122.24; 133.4; 147.5
ἀσθενής, weak 23.25
ἄσκιος, free from / of shadows 84.21; 84.22
ἀστεμφής, unchanging 11.13; motionless 42.18
ἀστήρ, star 58.12; 64.2; 67.11; 76.30; 77.17; 90.16; 96.30; 123.5; 124.34; 146.6; 146.15; 146.30; 147.7; 153.3
  α. ἀπλανής, fixed 76.20; 78.15; 93.9; 124.27; unwandering 132.29
  ὁ ἀστήρ τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ, Mercury 151.5
ἀστέριος, of the stars 124.29; 124.31
ἄστοχος, missing the mark 96.32
ἄστρον, star 39.7; 39.30; 40.7; 52.22; 52.29; 53.3; 53.17; 53.31; 54.2; 56.17; 56.17; 57.2; 58.13; 59.18; 59.24; 60.19; 70.11; 70.13; 70.32; 76.22; 84.19; 85.7; 89.29; 94.5; 113.23; 114.9; 114.16; 114.25; 115.12; 115.28; 116.26; 116.31; 117.18; 117.21; 117.29; 118.3; 118.16; 119.4; 119.18; 120.4; 121.7; 121.9; 121.23; 121.28; 122.29; 123.30; 124.15; 126.12; 126.14; 126.28; 128.16; 128.17; 128.29; 130.26; 131.3; 133.17; 134.4; 145.32; 146.3; 147.12; 151.28; 154.14
  ἄ. ἀπλανές, fixed star 60.10; 60.18; 87.32; 118.8–09; 126.7; 127.14; 132.27; 148.4; 148.14
  ἄ. πλανώμενον, wandering star 70.1; 118.8–10; 147.30
ἀστρολάβος, astrolabe 145.26
ἀστρολογικός, astrological 145.15
  ὁ ἀστρολογικός, astrologer 65.30
ἀστρονομία, astronomy 78.2; 78.7; 89.10; 139.7; 145.13; 145.18
ἀστρονομικὸς, ὁ, astronomer 78.17
ἀστρονόμος, astronomer 76.28
ἀστρῷος, astral 58.9; 151.18; 151.22; of a star 120.20; starry 119.26
ἀσύμμετρος, incommensurable 66.2; asymmetric 84.25
ἀσυμπαθής, lacking natural community 146.27
ἀσύντακτος, irregular 1.19; not coordinate 11.9
ἄσχετος, unrelated 154.21
ἄσχιστος, indivisible 60.2
ἀσώματος, incorporeal 23.21; 95.12; 160.11
ἄτακτος, disorderly 18.7; 37.24; 37.24; 37.32; 38.10; 55.13; 56.21; 85.2; 96.22
  τὸ ἄτακτον, disorder 132.33
ἀτάκτως, disorderly 6.19; 97.22
ἀταξία, disorder 133.2; 133.4; 133.8
ἀτελής, imperfect 98.15; incomplete 22.22; 22.24; 22.24; 47.4; not perfect 2.18; 3.14; 3.21; 18.15
ἀτεχνῶς, quite simply 36.21; crudely 42.15
ἀτιμαστέος, not without some value 74.2
Ἄτλας, Atlas 138.28

ἄτομον, concrete individual 86.28; concrete particular 86.32
ἄτοπος, absurd 22.25; 26.17; 78.5; 127.19; 155.18
ἀτόπως, absurdly 130.6
ἄτρακτος, spindle 147.23
ἄτρεπτος, motionless 138.29
ἄτροπος, undeviating 107.17
ἄτρυτος, unwearied 138.29
Ἀττικός, Atticus 37.12
αὐγή, brightness 152.1
ἄυλος, free of matter 84.21; immaterial 122.11; 122.16; 122.18; 135.17; 136.6
ἀύλως, in an immaterial manner 113.17
αὐξάνειν, grow 18.25; 56.3; increase 107.6; wax 65.19
αὔξησις, increase 34.30; growth 140.5; waxing 140.8
αὐτοαριθμός, Number Itself 32.26
αὐτοβραδυτής, Slowness Itself 19.18
αὐτοζῷον, Living Being Itself 10.13; 10.16; 10.18; 11.21; 13.7; 13.9; 13.21; 100.28; 110.28; Living Being Itself 5.9; 5.10; 5.11; 5.11; 5.13; 5.19; 5.24; 8.18; 10.9; 10.22; 11.4; 11.12; 13.6; 13.12; 13.17; 13.18; 13.19; 13.23; 13.24; 13.30; 26.1; 28.12; 28.13; 33.30; 50.26; 52.9; 75.2; 75.7; 97.5; 97.8; 98.11; 99.7; 100.9; 100.12; 100.17; 100.20; 100.28; 101.3; 101.20; 101.26; 102.1; 102.16; 102.30; 103.6; 103.25; 105.17; 106.9; 106.22; 106.23; 108.28; 110.13; 110.21; 116.19
αὐτοκίνητος, self-moving 71.21; 114.3
αὐτοκινήτως, self-motive 30.20
αὔτοπτος, self-revealing 69.16
αὐτοτάχος, Speed Itself 19.18
αὐτοφάνεια, appearance in person 20.24; self-manifestation 89.19
ἀφαίρεσις, retrogradation 66.9; subtraction 68.9
ἀφαιρεῖν, subtract 96.18; take (away) from 122.26; 122.28
ἀφανής, invisible 35.31; 36.6; 36.20; 40.2; 40.18; 41.6; 52.23; 53.7; 55.4; 58.20; 73.13; 74.28; 80.33; 82.7; 84.2; 85.29; 88.17; 88.23; 88.24; 88.28; 89.7; 89.16; 89.31; 90.2; 95.32; 131.1; 131.6; 150.24; 150.27
ἀφανῶς, invisibly 55.6; 93.29
ἄφθαρτος, incapable of destruction 50.1; indestructible 51.9; 68.25; 155.23
ἀφθονία, selflessness 7.10
ἄφθονος, without envy 6.29
ἀφομοιοῦν, assimilate 1.11; 20.6; 33.28; 51.24; 51.25; 51.27; be similar 2.26; 33.15; bring into conformity 51.7
ἀφομοίωσις, assimilation 27.6; 52.5; resemblance 116.14
ἀφομοιωτικός, assimilative 1.14; 2.2; 21.25; 142.31
ἀφορίζειν, define 4.4; 43.31; 88.16; 89.5; 91.14; 106.28; delineate 30.21; determine 39.1; 41.23; 43.18; 44.1; 71.25; distinguish 58.3; limit 83.20
ἀφορισμός, definition 104.16
ἀφοριστικός, delimiting 20.3
ἀφορία, infertility 94.1
ἀφορμή, means 48.29
ἄφραστος, inexpressible 100.11
Ἀφροδισιακός, of Venus 91.22
Ἀφροδίτης, Aphrodite 154.29; Venus 62.11; 63.5; 63.9; 63.10; 63.12; 63.15; 63.17; 63.32; 64.16; 65.22; 66.2; 66.7; 66.11; 66.17; 67.20; 69.12; 69.20
ἀφωρισμένως, definitively 23.8; in a determinate fashion 31.23
ἀχάλαστος, never slackening 30.12
ἄχραντος, immaculate 68.16; 74.24; 82.10; 82.10; 83.8
ἄχρονος, atemporal 37.30; 84.2
ἀχρόνως, in a manner that is atemporal 22.7
ἀχώριστος, inseparable 71.27; 110.3
ἀψίς, arch 96.9; 146.24
ἄψυχος, inanimate 22.29; 23.3; 32.29; lacking soul 126.28; 133.5; soulless 152.20; 152.26

B

βάθος, depth 67.13; 123.26; 128.11; 147.11; 147.15; 147.20; 148.6; 148.18; layer 142.6; level 111.28; proximity to (distance from) the earth 79.10; 79.17; 80.10; 96.4; 146.9
βαθύς, deep 34.26; 49.15
βακχεία, Bacchic 149.25
βασιλεία, kingdom 160.27
βασιλεύς, King 82.25; 131.28
βίαιος, forced 130.21

βιβλίον, book 16.3
βίβλος, book 132.1; 151.9
βίος, life 24.23; 92.10; 159.25; lifespan 91.15; lifestyle 151.3; 154.8; 159.28; lifetime 57.24; 57.31
βόρειος, North 77.6; 79.11; 81.8
βούλησις, will 6.27; 40.8; 42.14; 72.5; 133.5; 147.3

Γ

γελοῖος, absurd 5.12; 27.13; 31.5; ridiculous 51.12; 135.28; 146.17
γενεαλογία, genealogy 161.3
γενεθλιαλογία, casting of nativities 125.24
γένεσις, Becoming 16.6; 16.7; 39.32; 44.26; 45.1; 45.5; 45.17; 46.3; 46.6; 46.22; 46.24; 46.27; 46.33; 47.3; 47.17; 47.18; 47.19; 47.29; 48.13; 48.14; 48.16; 48.20; 49.11; 51.2; 51.17; 55.26; 56.10; 64.31; 65.18; 65.22; 68.5; 80.8; 84.26; 84.28; 122.8; 124.17; 142.10; 142.12; 142.17; 142.21; 142.22; birth 160.4; bringing about 45.9; coming to be 9.17; 31.22; 38.21; creation 2.4; generation 15.27; 18.18; 20.20; 37.13; 38.9; 47.1; 50.12; 50.14; 58.7; 58.24; 58.33; 59.6; 69.9; 109.2; 129.18; 134.11; 152.29; 156.13; 158.26; 159.20; genesis 3.14; 7.32; 16.8; 20.16; 34.16; 37.9; 53.2; 55.14; 55.30; 57.9; 71.17; 74.4; 74.6; 74.9; 74.14; 80.32; 82.1; 82.20; 84.22; 86.12; 94.8; 94.11; 94.12; 94.13; 95.31; 99.1; 108.32; 111.10; 113.25; 126.30; 152.6; 152.10; 152.14; 153.27; 157.15; 160.15; nativity 125.18; 125.27; realm of Becoming 29.24; 45.20; 47.27; 56.2; 57.32; 66.20; 69.10; 84.30; 111.22; 142.11; 143.14; 152.23; 155.7; 155.29
γενεσιουργός, generation-producing 22.20; 152.18; 154.2; 154.18; 155.31; 158.25
γένος, genus 11.19; 11.33; 12.5; 12.13; 12.16; 58.22; 79.23; 99.13; 103.10; 104.24; 105.31; 106.24; 106.25; 107.28; 107.31; 108.9; 108.9; 108.14; 108.18; 108.29; 109.9; 109.13; 109.14; 109.16; 109.17; 110.30; 110.32; 110.32; 111.1; 111.4; 111.5; 112.17; 113.2; 113.4; 117.29; 151.33; 153.12; 155.1; 155.2; 155.31; 156.1; 158.12; 158.13; 158.27; 158.30; kind 85.28; 99.1; 108.24; 108.26; 109.7; 110.6; 116.18; 131.2; race 82.3; 93.29; 94.2; 109.5
γενητός, generated 8.13; 16.27; 16.5; 16.29; 25.20; 48.6; 51.1; 58.31; 59.4; 59.6; 66.18; 74.25; 85.5; 94.17; 94.19; 151.11; 151.21; 150.28; 151.24; 151.25; 151.27; that which has come to be 16.31; 43.27; 46.13; 89.6; divine begettings (*Rep*. 546b) 54.21; 93.25
γενητῶς, through a generated mode 59.2
γενικώτερος, more generic 15.25
γεννᾶν, beget 72.13; create 2.25; engender 22.1; 22.16; 53.2; 55.2; 83.21; 94.4; 99.23; 108.21; 109.4; 126.13; 135.22; 157.13; 158.20; generate 1.5; 2.5; 22.23; 58.26; 58.30; 136.19; 157.33; 158.1; give birth 7.28; 89.9; 108.19; give rise to 157.2; *pass*. become 71.3; 72.3; come to be 49.21; 49.29; 60.22; 70.4; result from 21.8
γέννημα, product 4.17; 22.21; 22.28; 24.9; 24.31
γέννησις, engendering 55.7
γεννῆται, parents 158.21
γεννητικός, generative 1.13; 2.4; 135.7; genetic 4.15; procreative 141.8; productive 22.24
γεννητικῶς, in a manner that is procreative 140.23
γεωμέτρης, geometer 13.8
γήινος, earthy 113.29; 114.29; 142.7; earthy [i.e. terrestrial] 136.14
γηίνως, in a terrestrial way 142.5
γῆ, Earth 2.11; 4.28; 46.18; 60.24; 60.25; 62.26; 65.1; 65.17; 80.25; 84.7; 84.7; 84.12; 84.16; 84.24; 85.6; 85.20; 89.26; 98.1; 108.5; 108.15; 108.16; 110.11; 112.8; 112.17; 113.19; 114.26; 114.27; 114.28; 114.30; 114.30; 127.1; 128.20; 129.3; 131.13; 133.11; 133.16; 133.22; 134.5; 134.7; 134.8; 134.10; 134.14; 134.18; 134.23; 134.28; 134.30; 135.1; 135.1; 135.9; 135.14; 135.25; 135.27; 135.30;

136.3; 136.5; 137.4; 137.9; 137.20; 137.22; 137.22; 137.23; 138.1; 138.3; 138.5; 138.6; 138.11; 138.13; 138.17; 139.11; 139.18; 139.18; 139.20; 140.1; 140.2; 140.14; 140.17; 140.20; 140.22; 140.25; 140.32; 141.1; 141.5; 141.7; 141.14; 141.18; 141.20; 141.25; 141.28; 142.1; 142.7; 142.9; 142.11; 142.12; 142.14; 143.2; 143.10; 143.13; 143.16; 143.20; 143.24; 143.27; 144.1; 144.2; 144.21; 144.24; 144.27; 144.29; 144.30; 146.4; 146.5; 146.5; 151.18; 151.27; 153.2; 155.19; 156.14; 156.16; 156.16; 157.6; 157.7; 157.13

γιγαντικός, of the Giants 42.13

γιγνώσκειν, know 2.31; 6.21; 12.28; 41.17; 83.27; 83.31; 85.29; 102.13; 108.32; 150.3; 152.5; 152.14

γνώμη, understanding 126.31

γνωρίζειν, make familiar 80.20; make known 81.11

γνώριμος, familiar 55.12; 81.20; 88.15; 159.16; recognised 52.27

γνώρισμα, sign 156.25

γνῶσις, understanding 2.30; 21.23; 54.15; 149.28; 159.15; 159.17; 159.21; 160.7; 160.8; 160.12; 160.18

γνωστικός, of understanding 69.23

γνωστός, known 55.23

τὸ γνωστόν, that which is known 22.15; object of knowledge 105.1

γόνιμος, fertile 7.11; procreative 106.8; 136.3; 140.9; 142.29

Δ

δαίμων, daimon 82.2; 106.13; 108.4; 108.12; 108.31; 109.18; 109.21; 109.22; 109.24; 109.27; 131.21; 131.24; 134.24; 140.31; 152.5; 153.23; 153.24; 153.29; 153.32; 154.1; 154.2; 154.4; 154.11; 154.19; 154.20; 154.24; 154.28; 154.33; 155.3; 155.4; 155.30; 155.31; 156.2; 156.5; 157.27; 158.1; 158.2; 158.11; 158.20; 158.22; 158.23; 158.26; 158.27; 158.29; 158.30; 159.1

δαιμόνιος, daemonic 54.33; 98.10; 108.19; 108.24; 126.21; 153.12; 155.6; 155.9; 158.13; 159.2; of daemones 108.10; 155.5

δάκτυλος, finger 26.19; 26.20; 89.20

ἐπὶ δακτύλων, superficially 41.5

δανείζω, borrow 2.6

δεικνύναι, demonstrate 5.22; 13.16; 13.20; exhibit 16.6; manifest 24.15; 106.2; reveal 81.3; show 10.17; 23.20; 32.9; 36.25; 38.11; 50.1; 59.2; 62.12; 62.25; 75.32; 100.6; 102.3; 129.5; 136.8; 142.25; 156.19

δεῖν, bind 60.22; 70.3; 71.3; 72.3; 72.16; 73.5; 73.9; 97.26

δεινός, clever type 114.7; expert 139.6; 149.20; profound 44.5; with a terrible power 44.9

δεκάδα, decad 107.12; 107.17; 107.21

δεκαδικός, (of a) decad 107.8

δέκατος, tenth 36.24; 98.12

δεξιά, right 122.27; 123.2; 123.3; 123.8; 147.33

δεσμός, bond 60.21; 70.3; 71.3; 72.3; 72.16; 73.4; 73.5; 137.16; 142.2

δέσποινα, sovereign mistress 131.26

δεσπότις, master (of slave) 21.19

δευτερουργός, secondary-effective 53.11; 72.10

δευτέρως, in a secondary manner / sense / way 3.7; 7.4; 45.29; 55.8; 72.30; 81.34; 84.32

Δημήτηρ, Demeter 140.9; 140.11; 140.15

δημιούργημα, product 1.12; 3.4; product of creation 24.1; 34.11; that which is created 6.23; 35.23

δημιουργία, act of creation 23.7; 53.6; 104.21; creation 6.15; 28.17; 29.7; 36.13; 36.18; 37.18; 37.23; 38.3; 39.20; 42.15; 52.1; 52.11; 67.22; 68.26; 88.21; 99.3; 99.15; 106.18; 107.24; 108.30; 113.21; 117.9; 122.16; 132.28; 144.23

δημιουργικός, creative 6.22; 20.14; 23.23; 23.27; 28.7; 35.30; 66.26; 68.15; 73.6; 83.6; 110.29; 114.5; 135.8; Demiurgic 21.31; 22.13; 38.29; 53.26; 54.13; 67.26; 71.12; 71.20; 72.4; 72.18; 74.19; 84.2; 91.7; 98.16; 99.33; 99.16; 101.33; 102.15; 103.15; 103.11; 103.19; 104.6; 104.27; 107.12; 118.30; 119.22; 126.12; 141.12; 144.26; 160.4

δημιουργός, creator 2.2; 69.17; 133.12; 139.22; 139.27; 139.32; 140.2; 144.12; 155.23; 156.13; Demiurge 2.1; 2.12; 3.5; 3.11; 3.27; 4.13; 5.20; 6.9; 18.13; 19.3; 21.14; 28.8; 28.31; 29.27; 31.8; 37.17; 39.25; 40.8; 42.11; 50.12; 52.18; 52.32; 54.3; 54.15; 55.19; 68.28; 69.2; 73.12; 80.33; 82.15; 94.23; 97.20; 98.12; 98.14; 99.12; 101.17; 101.24; 101.26; 102.6; 102.30; 103.5; 103.7; 104.19; 107.32; 108.17; 110.13; 110.15; 110.25; 112.24; 116.2; 141.23; 142.1; 152.11; 156.19; 157.12; 157.30; 158.3; 158.6; 158.14; the god 63.22
δημιουργεῖν, create 1.10; 103.31; 110.21; 115.31; 143.20; 143.22; 157.14; make 159.1
Δίς, Zeus 131.31; 140.16; planet Jupiter 67.25; 68.24
διάθεσις, condition 89.27
διαίρεσις, division 5.8; 67.24; 102.20; 110.31; 111.22; distinction 121.5
διαιώνιος, eternal 49.22; 51.17; 94.7; 99.10; 120.33
διαιωνίως, eternally 75.3; 135.3
διακαθαίρειν, purify 42.4
διακεῖσθαι, be disposed 7.15; 7.23
διακοσμεῖν, arrange 8.15; 68.29; 68.30; create the cosmos 16.19; order 68.17; 160.27; put in order 39.32
διακόσμησις, arrangement 13.11; order 35.32; 44.18; 101.4; 143.1; 157.1; ordering 16.19
διάκοσμος, order 24.14; 30.20; 83.4; 102.9; 106.29; 135.2
διακρατεῖν, comprehend 1.21; control 110.9; 114.2
διακριβολογεῖσθαι, be particularly scrupulous about what one says 47.26
διακρίνειν, distinguish 12.8; 33.6; 49.7; 71.31; 118.32; 145.19
διάκρισις, distinction 69.8; 104.10; 105.5; division 102.23; 103.14; separation 99.19
διαλαγχάνειν, be allocated 140.31; be assigned 108.14
διαλεκτικός, dialectician 114.7
διαλαμβάνειν, deal with 52.22
διαλύειν, resolve 132.5
διαλυτέος, must be solved 154.4
διαμένειν, be maintained 21.28; continue 16.5; 16.7; remain 74.10; 126.8; 126.24; 127.4; stand 7.33
διάμετρος, diagonal 147.28; 147.29; diameter 85.22; diametrical 150.4; 150.12
διαμονή, continuation 12.18; 15.9; 15.10; 16.1; 16.2; 17.29; 22.9; 22.12; 23.27; permanence 52.15; 100.24
διανόησις, discursive thought 101.32
διανοητικός, discursive 85.26; 85.28; 120.33; 121.13
διάνοια, discursive reasoning 54.15; 92.7; discursive thought 53.1; 53.29; 54.5; thought 14.14; 42.6; 139.5
διανομή, permanence 118.29
διαπεφορημένως, in a differentiated manner 35.22
διαπλέκειν, weave together 56.10
διαπλοκή, combination 65.11
διάρθρωσις, resolution 8.26
διαρκεῖν, endure 95.4
διάστασις, disagreement 1.17; 79.26; extension 46.15; 48.18; 81.17; 113.32; 114.5; 137.1; interval 23.10; 65.10
διαστατός, extended 113.14; divisible 138.21; having extension 31.5; 113.12
τὸ διαστατόν, extension 114.6
διάστημα, duration 88.13; extension 35.1; 48.28; 87.20; interval 35.5; 35.7; 35.13; 81.2; 86.14; 86.24; 90.17; distance 76.4
διασῴζειν, preserve 33.19; conserve 133.9
διάταξις, orders 118.23; arrangement 154.27
διατάττειν, arrange 21.16; 97.28; set out 51.30; 75.16
διατείνειν, extend 68.11; 92.9; 109.26; 134.1; *pass.* insist 62.23; 65.31; stretch 142.30
διατρίβειν, spend time 145.18; 145.28; deal with (a topic) 160.10
διαύγασμα, transparency 114.21
διαύγεια, translucency 129.4
διαυγής, translucent 128.25
διαφανής, diaphanous 128.25; 128.29
διαφέρειν, be differentiated 41.3; differ 15.22; 19.19; 24.14; 57.10; 62.13; 66.31; 67.30; 81.15; 89.1; 89.15; 93.26; 126.22; 131.3; 146.8; intensify 102.28

διαφορά, difference 55.2; 74.21; 91.11; 103.33; 108.6; 147.5; 147.32; 148.3; distinction 53.19
διάφορος, different 1.15; 44.3; 89.1; 115.29; 129.19; 129.29; 129.31; differing 64.22; various 95.26; 133.6
διαφορότης, differentiation 85.28
διαφόρως, first and foremost 147.1
διδάσκειν, instruct 124.25; provide an account 70.33; teach 12.29; 38.3; 43.24; 61.8; 88.21; 131.23; 132.26; 158.18
διεγείρειν, arouse 24.1; motivate 68.3; prompt 18.10; stimulate 35.30
διαζωγραφεῖν, decorate 141.24
διελέγχειν, blame 47.29; refute 62.12; 104.17
διέρχεσθαι, traverse 75.32; 76.12; go through 112.26
διέξοδος, trajectory 31.22
διήγησις, treatment 68.23
διήκειν, run through 137.3
διηνεκῶς, continually 18.30
διῃρημένως, separately 30.29; 50.30; 103.7; 106.2
Δίιος, of Jupiter 57.18; 88.29; 91.23
δικαίως, justifiably 33.10
Δίκη, Justice 119.5
Διόνυσος, Dionysius 131.28; 140.24
διορίζειν, define 160.22; differentiate 40.11; distinguish 44.3; 102.30
διορισμός, defining 39.9; 53.32; definition 40.15; distinguishing 40.6; 53.4; 53.29; 57.12
διοριστικός, such as to define 54.24
δίοψις, that which is visible 145.23; 149.21; consideration 150.21; use 145.9
διορίζειν, make distinct 103.8; 110.15; 110.18; separate 104.12
δόγμα, belief 126.1; 161.2; view 121.6
δόξα, apprehension 4.12; belief 79.6; opinion 103.17; 125.4; teaching 76.28; view 104.17; 138.10
δοξαστικός, related to opinion 85.26; 85.30
δοξαστικῶς, in a manner that corresponds to opinion 89.10; 91.17
δοξαστός, being an object of opinion or belief 4.13; 49.3
δόσις, gift 7.25; 26.3; 26.12; 27.29; 71.22; 94.33; 95.1
δοτήρ, dispenser 66.22
δρόμος, course 61.12; 61.25; 64.10
δυάς, dyad 15.11; 15.17; 15.18; 15.29; 46.6; 92.14; 100.22; 105.31; 106.7; 106.8; 106.12; 106.15; 106.23; 107.20; 111.1
δύναμις, capacity 6.19; 19.3; character 42.10; power 1.9; 1.14; 1.19; 1.23; 7.9; 7.20; 20.13; 21.1; 21.4; 21.22; 29.11; 29.19; 31.26; 42.15; 50.27; 56.3; 58.8; 60.4; 60.19; 60.28; 65.21; 66.1; 66.8; 66.13; 68.13; 68.15; 75.2; 79.27; 92.8; 95.29; 98.20; 100.5; 101.8; 102.28; 105.26; 105.28; 107.6; 110.9; 114.4; 116.6; 120.24; 127.23; 128.31; 133.10; 134.2; 134.21; 136.13; 137.24; 139.1; 140.14; 141.10; 142.25; 143.28; 144.4; 144.21; 152.34; 157.15
δυνάμει, potentially 32.24
εἰς δύναμιν, to the extent possible 1.9; 21.29; 25.10
κατὰ δύναμιν, potentially 32.25; as far as possible 49.24; 82.23; to the extent possible 52.9; to the greatest extent possible 84.5; as much as possible 139.14
δ. ἀγαθουργός, benificent 6.28
δ. ἀμερής, indivisible 30.28
δ. ἀναγωγός, leading 68.18; uplifting 82.11
δ. ἀνακλητική, such as to call creations back to their cause 1.13
δ. ἀνεκφοίτητος, inseparable 106.1
δ. ἄπειρος, infinite 89.3
δ. ἄυλος, immaterial 136.6
δ. ἀφανής, invisible 73.13; 89.31
δ. ἀφομοιωτική, assimilative 1.14; 2.2
δ. ἄχραντος, immaculate 68.18; 82.10
δ. γεννητική, generative 1.13; 2.4; 135.7
δ. γνωστική, of understanding 69.23
δ. δευτερουργός, secondary-functional 72.10
δ. δημιουργική, creative 6.22; 23.23; 68.17
δ. ἑδραστική', stabilising 138.18
δ. ἐκφαντορική, revelatory 81.29
δ. ἑνιαία, unitary 54.27
δ. ζωτική, vital 69.22
δ. θεία, divine 65.32; 72.7; 140.30
δ. καθαρτική 68.18
δ. κινητική, kinetic 74.30
δ. κρατητική, controlling 124.12
δ. κριτική, critical 68.19; 140.28

δύναμις, capacity (*cont.*)
δ. νοερά, intellectual 24.9; 144.23
δ. νοητή, intelligible 100.25
δ. παιώνιος, associated with Paeon 140.28
δ. πατρική, paternal 140.23
δ. πρωτουργός, primary-functional 72.12
δ. συνεκτική', sustaining 138.18; 139.18
δ. τετραδική, four-fold 106.20
δ. τελεσιουργός, perfective 1.14; 68.18
δ. ὑπερκόσμιος, hypercosmic 82.23
δ. ὑπερφέρουσα, superior 106.33
δ. φωτιστική, illuminating 129.3
δ. χθονία, terrestrial 140.29
δυνατός, able 100.17; 119.29; 136.11; possible 8.14; 13.20; 16.28; 20.24; 37.24; 61.27; 72.8; 81.26; 84.11; 91.1; 100.9; 107.23; 113.3; 114.28; 116.10; 116.13; 123.12; 128.26; 130.28; 144.33; 152.19; 155.27
δυοειδής, dual in form 54.15; 122.2
δύσγνωστος, hard to know 55.12; difficult to understand 159.13
δύσις, West 77.15; 77.15; 77.25; 78.21; 79.9; 123.18; setting [of heavenly bodies] 139.29
δωδεκάεδρον, dodecahedron 141.23
δωδεκάσκυτος, of twelve strips of leather 141.22
δῶρον, gift 3.11; 53.26; 98.12

E

ἑβδομαδικός, hebdomatic 107.8
ἐγγίγνεσθαι, be immanent 3.17; come to be in 33.23
ἔγγονος, offspring 159.8; 159.21; 159.23; 159.26; 159.28
ἐγείρειν, motivate 101.7
ἐγερτικός, such as to stimulate 30.16
ἔγκλημα, charge 42.8; 87.6
ἐγκόσμιος, encosmic 4.19; 4.22; 4.24; 6.6; 6.7; 17.10; 17.25; 18.3; 19.13; 23.13; 28.10; 40.21; 52.15; 53.15; 69.5; 83.1; 92.7; 92.24; 106.21; 107.3; 108.17; 151.23; within the cosmos 2.31; 21.27; 24.24; 25.9; 27.6; 39.16; 42.32; 138.3
ἐγκύκλιος, circulating 20.12; circular 40.19
ἔγχρονος, in time 25.7; 49.10; temporal 13.5; 13.21; 32.3; 48.17
ἑδράζειν, establish 15.7
ἕδρα, outpost 110.8
ἑδραστικός, stabilising 138.19
εἰδητικός, formal 102.8; 102.20
ε. περιοχή speciated comprehension 110.26; 110.28
εἰδητικῶς, in a manner that involves species 110.19
εἰδοποιία, qualification by form 4.10
εἰδοποιός, providing form 113.31
εἶδος, form 3.28; 5.15; 5.17; 5.22; 16.14; 19.9; 19.13; 22.31; 29.17; 30.29; 34.11; 34.18; 34.25; 37.1; 37.6; 37.8; 37.16; 38.5; 38.14; 38.17; 38.27; 43.4; 45.4; 46.13; 46.14; 46.26; 46.31; 70.15; 70.19; 85.11; 85.27; 86.27; 96.24; 97.20; 97.30; 98.17; 98.19; 101.2; 102.25; 104.29; 106.26; 106.27; 107.1; 108.18; 111.2; 111.4; 111.14; 113.19; 113.25; 113.27; 114.2; 115.6; 116.18; 122.24; 134.16; 149.30; 159.23; kind 104.25; 106.25; species 69.24
κατ' εἶδος, formally 41.2
εἴδωλον, image 10.4; 19.27; 27.15; 44.14; 72.2; 88.17
εἰκάζειν, represent 110.17
εἰκός, probable 56.28; plausible 154.16; 159.11; likely 160.9
εἰκότως, justifiably 69.29; likely 66.29; plausibly 26.5; 41.1; 81.6; 81.10; 97.8; 99.28; 117.27; probably 54.12; 59.31; quite likely 66.23; quite plausibly 9.25; 128.28; 134.7; 134.17; 143.2; quite reasonably 153.15; quite rightly 6.15
εἰκών, image 3.13; 8.14; 8.17; 11.31; 13.4; 17.2; 17.17; 17.22; 17.25; 17.26; 18.2; 18.20; 18.30; 20.26; 25.31; 25.32; 27.13; 27.15; 27.19; 28.13; 29.27; 31.9; 32.33; 33.9; 33.10; 33.12; 33.13; 33.14; 33.18; 33.21; 33.29; 33.33; 34.2; 34.4; 34.9; 44.9; 44.12; 45.24; 47.1; 49.9; 51.26; 59.10; 66.17; 97.16; 100.29; 100.30; 107.23; 114.22; 145.21

εἱμαρμένη, Fate 18.6
εἶναι, τὸ, Being 10.2; 15.30; 48.28; existence 16.29; 19.5; 39.3; 39.10; 'to be' 15.25
  εἶναι κατ' αὐτό, per se existent 23.19
  ἡ ἐν τῷ εἶναι διαμονή, continuation in being 16.1
  ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι διαμονή, to be permanently 100.24
  τὸ εἶναι τῆς ζωῆς, life span 20.4
Εἰρήνη, Peace 119.8
Ἑκάτη, Hecate 131.26
ἐκεῖ, there 37.14; 37.15; 104.13; (137.23); 147.25; 155.4; up there [among the intelligibles / in the heavens] 5.10; 13.25; 45.26; 47.8; 58.14; 80.4; 83.14; 84.18; 100.9; 105.9; 106.22; 107.10; 109.21; 110.23; 111.11; 113.29; 114.2; 114.24; 114.26; 114.29; 116.4; 122.15; 122.17; 128.32; 129.6; 131.28; 131.28; 131.31; 142.4; 149.29; 155.1; 155.8; 157.7
ἐκθεοῦν, make divine 83.3
ἔκκεντρος, eccentric 56.27; 96.27; 96.30; 146.16; 146.20; 148.25; 149.3
ἔκλαμψις, illumination 5.2
ἔκφανσις, appearance 149.17; 150.16; manifestation 107.20; revelation 2.15; 65.29
ἐκφαντικός, revelatory 6.12; 69.11; 73.15
ἐκφαντορικός, revelatory 38.23; 81.28
ἐλαττοῦσθαι, diminish 65.20; 107.5
ἐλάττωσις, diminution 140.5
ἐλεγκτέος, must be refuted 115.11
ἐλέγχειν, charge 42.9; 42.9; refute 115.11
ἑλικοειδής, spiral in form 21.2; 40.23; 80.13; spiral in shape 40.30
ἑλικοειδῶς, in a helical manner 128.7
ἕλιξ, helix 21.4; 40.29; 149.1; spiral 77.11; 78.29; 78.32; 79.3; 79.12; 79.13; 80.5; 80.9; 80.15; 80.18; 148.31
ἐλλάμπειν, illuminate 117.7
ἔλλαμψις, illumination 4.25; 17.13; 136.11; 136.18; 140.14; 160.21
ἐμπνεῖν, inspire 135.20; breathe into 136.15
ἐμπύριος, empyrian 43.17; 115.5; fiery 82.12
ἐμφαίνειν, exhibit 15.11; manifest 68.26; reveal 17.32; 84.3; say 154.7; serve as 124.15
ἐμφανής, apparent 80.16; 81.2; 82.6; manifest 35.31; 54.11; 55.27; 153.20; phenomenal 26.25; visible 36.2; 36.18; 40.17; 40.25; 52.27; 53.8; 61.3; 80.33; 81.19; 83.21; 85.30; 88.23; 88.26; 88.29; 89.8; 89.31; 90.18; 116.4; 136.10
ἐμφανῶς, invisibly 93.29; obviously 151.31
ἔμφασις, hint 12.25; 44.20; reflection 33.28; trace 42.28
ἐμφέρειν, bear in 112.9
ἔμφρων, filled with wisdom 24.22; 28.24; endowed with wisdom 90.14
ἐμφρόνως, wisely 24.6; 45.12
ἔμψυχος, endowed with soul 4.21; 97.21; 28.13; 49.27; 59.19; ensouled 6.20; 10.20; 60.22; 70.3; 71.3; 72.3; 72.16; 72.17; 73.5
ἕν, one, single, passim.
  τὸ ἕν, the One 11.11; 14.25; 14.27; 15.17; 18.1; 19.10; 29.1; 29.2; 100.13; 104.14; 153.11
  τὸ ἓν ὄν, the One-Being 15.14; 15.18; 15.21; 15.28; 15.31; 97.11; 100.11; 100.21; 100.24; 107.19
ἐνάντιος, contrary 60.27; opposed 67.23; 68.4; 79.4; 79.32; 129.2; opposite 66.12; 79.3; 79.21; 79.25; 79.30; 96.26; 122.11; 122.20; 122.22; 146.18
ἐναντιότης, opposition 80.1
ἐναντιοῦν, stand in opposition 65.26
ἐναντίως, in opposite ways 146.24
ἐναντίωσις, opposition 78.31; 79.20; 79.23; 79.29; 122.7; 122.10
ἐναργής, clear 10.1; 41.31; 153.10; 156.24; 158.25; obvious 90.9; highly visible 80.23; 81.4; 81.16; 81.20; 81.21; 81.22; 81.32
ἐναρμόνιος, harmonised 56.24; 66.4; 67.19; 90.23; 146.2
ἐναρμονίως, harmoniously 139.7
ἑνάς, henad 12.15; 12.15; 14.2; 15.27; 22.10; 24.18; 72.28; 101.11; 105.23; 105.23; 106.15; 126.18
ἐνδεῖν, bind 73.7
ἔνδειγμα, token 85.26; 114.23

ἐνδεικνύναι, indicate 6.30; 25.30; 38.22; 39.14; 54.7; 71.23; 73.9; 73.21; 80.3; 102.21; 102.27; 110.4; 126.16; 127.21; 136.26; 138.24; 138.30; 143.32; 148.23; 153.16; 156.8
ἐνέργεια, activity 9.13; 12.7; 14.1; 15.6; 18.11; 19.6; 22.4; 22.5; 25.29; 26.2; 27.2; 27.30; 29.19; 31.33; 46.7; 65.6; 86.21; 100.6; 101.32; 104.3; 104.4; 105.27; 109.28; 119.22; 120.10; 120.13; 120.15; 120.33; 130.14; 134.5; 136.26; 138.29; 144.17; 150.33; 153.1
ἐνεργεί, actually 32.25
κατ' ἐνέργειαν, actually 32.25
ἡ ἔνδον ἐνέργεια, internal 19.7; 25.14; 27.27; 59.11; 59.14
ἡ ἐντὸς ἐνέργεια, internal 58.32
ἡ ἔξω ἐνέργεια, external 19.8
ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἐνέργεια, natural activity 119.10
ἐ. ἀκατάληκτος, ceaseless 126.27
ἐ. ἀκίνητος, changeless 53.10
ἐ. δευτερουργός, secondary-productive 53.11
ἐ. μεταβατική, discursive 24.5
ἐ. νοερά, intellectual 24.21; 30.19; 53.11; 121.25
ἐ. προνοητική, providential 2.22
ἐ. πρωτουργός, primary-productive 31.26; 53.10
ἐ. τελεία, perfecting 73.21
ἐ. ψυχική, psychic 24.31
ἐνέργημα, product 101.24; 104.6
ἐνεργητικός, actuating 31.26
ἐνθεάζειν, be divinely inspired 156.30
ἐνθεαστικός, divinely-possessed 160.22
ἔνθεος, divinely inspired 105.20; 159.15; 160.6; 160.12; 160.18; filled with god 6.20; 72.9; inspired 153.20
ἐνθέως, in a divinely inspired manner 105.8
ἐνθουσιάζειν, be divinely possessed 160.24; 160.24
ἐνθουσιαστικός, divinely inspired 105.1; divinely possessed 160.7
ἐνιαῖος, unitary 54.27; 72.30; unified 104.29
ἐνιαίως, in a manner that is unitary 15.20; 135.2; in a unified manner 50.28; 106.1
ἐνιαυτός, year 34.14; 34.24; 35.17; 36.5; 36.13; 36.16; 37.2; 39.24; 39.28; 41.16; 53.18; 55.17; 56.7; 83.25; 83.26; 83.31; 86.4; 86.24; 86.25; 87.1; 87.2; 88.24; 88.30; 89.19; 89.29; 92.17; Year 41.1; 86.30
ἐ. κυνικός, Dog Year 93.8
ἐ. τέλειος, Complete Year 91.2
ἐ. τέλεος, Complete Year 138.12
ἑνίζειν, unify 1.17; unite 15.18; make one 17.29
ἑνικῶς, in the singular 11.16; 60.1
ἑνικός, unified 106.20
ἐννοεῖν, conceive 14.27; observe 86.6; reflect upon 141.25
ἔννοια, concept 12.6; 15.22; 20.2; conception 8.28; 23.29; 32.16
ἡ ἀληθινὴ ἔ., the true conception 42.4
ἡ κοινὴ ἔ., the common conception 9.15
ἡ πρωτὴ ἔ., the initial conception 9.20
ἔννους, endowed with intellect 4.21; 6.20; 10.20; 28.13; 49.28; 97.21
ἑνοειδής, uni-form 99.25; 107.19; 113.12; 118.26
ἑνοειδῶς, in a manner that is uni-form 72.30; in a manner that is uniform 54.19; in a unified manner 21.4; in a uniform way 80.18
ἑνοποιὸς, unifying 14.4; making one 101.5; 114.1
ἑνοποιεῖν, unify 67.20
ἑνοεῖν, unify 1.21; 1.24; 11.10; 12.24; 14.29; 54.8; 100.4; 101.6; 102.19; 105.3; 105.22; 117.23; 122.22; unite 24.24; 150.15
ἐντελέχεια, actuality 127.3
ἐντυχία, conjunction 41.3
ἐνύδριος, aquatic 4.29; 109.2; 110.25
ἔνυδρος, aquatic 104.25; 108.13; 109.8; 110.3; 110.23; 110.27; 111.2
ἔνυλος, enmattered 39.3; 79.31; 114.16; 134.13; 136.7; 141.3
ἐνυπάρχειν, inhere 30.21
ἕνωσις, unification 11.13; 12.1; 12.3; 13.28; 14.3; 15.1; 42.23; 60.17; 97.24; 104.20; 105.4; 107.5; 150.10; unifiction 100.11; union 150.5; unity 7.3; 11.17; 54.9
ἑνωτικός, such as to unite 50.27
ἑξαγωνικῶς, in a manner that is hexagonal 149.10

ἐξαίρετος, special 10.8; 17.14; 49.13; 128.13
ἐξαλλαγή, alteration 144.31; variation 128.23
ε'ξαπλοῦν, extending 26.29
ἐξάπτειν, depend 147.3; 151.24
ἔξαψις, kindling 82.22
ἐξελιγμός, deployment 98.19
ἐξελίττειν, unfold 21.29
ἐξεργασία, exegesis 12.30
ἐξήγησις, interpretation 8.9
ἐξηγητής, explainer 64.8; 104.30; interpreter 14.19; 49.1; 112.28
ἐξηγεῖσθαι, interpret 108.6; 113.6; 138.15
ἐξῃρημένως, in a transcendent manner 12.20; 15.20
ἐξῃρῆσθαι, transcend 5.1; 14.2; 14.23; 23.14; 24.11; 24.18; 30.14; 42.19; 42.28; 43.3; 48.18; 51.17; 53.12; 72.9; 85.10; 117.32; 118.2; 131.8; 160.8
ἐξηρτῆσθαι, depend upon 10.1; 19.2; 27.7; 44.8; 45.11; 71.7; 72.1; 135.19; 154.26
ἕξις, state 22.31
ἐξομοιοῦν, assimilate 2.13; 97.5
ἐξυμνεῖν, celebrate 41.17
ἐπακολουθεῖν, result 89.26
ἐπαναβαίνειν, be highest 36.20
ἐπανισοῦν, equal-Ise 140.7
ἐπάρχειν, be in charge 155.32
ἐπεισάγειν, introduce 146.25
ἐπεισκυκλεῖν, bring rolling in 112.28
ἐπιπλήσσειν, rebuke 72.23; reproach 78.2
ἐπέχειν, have 61.4; 113.25; 142.2; occupy 83.27; 134.9
ἐπήβολος, competent 29.14
ἐπιβαίνειν, in command 59.31; 117.21; 133.6
ἐπιβολή, concept 127.20; conception 14.17; 22.14; 105.1; 105.20; 113.15; 139.8; 139.17; 143.16; 153.21; 154.32; 157.26; consideration 4.8; idea 65.10
ἐπιγίγνεσθαι, supervene 43.9; 97.23
ἐπίδοσις, benefaction 68.9
ἐπιείκεια, even-handedness 42.6
ἐπιθυμητικός, passionate 69.21
ἐπίκηρος, mortal 43.8
ἐπικράτεια, authority 2.19; 17.5; 18.9; 98.17; predominance 44.15; 46.2; 142.8
ἐπικρατεῖν, be dominant 75.3; 78.11; 128.19; predominate 65.5; 113.24; 113.27; 114.1; 128.30
ἐπίκτητος, foreign 18.14
ἐπίκυκλος, epicycle 56.27; 57.1; 59.23; 64.1; 64.4; 64.5; 65.7; 65.27; 96.19; 96.27; 96.29; 128.5; 146.15; 148.24; 149.3
ἐπιλάμπειν, illuminate 14.12; shine 14.4; 66.3
ἐπινοηματικὸς, produced by reflection 83.19
ἐπίνοια, conception 21.6; device 18.13; 18.17; thought 95.10; 95.13; 96.31
Ἐπινομίς, Epinomis 108.2
ἐπιπλέκειν, conjoin 35.12
ἐπιπλέον, full 48.33
ἐπιπλοκή, connection 17.16; combination 35.9
ἐπιπροσθεῖν, be in front of 149.14; 149.16; stand in the way 128.27; undergo occultation 62.10; 62.14
ἐπιπρόσθησις, occultation 84.18; taking a position in front 149.13; 150.12
ἐπισκευαστής, jury-rigged 76.29
ἐπίσκεψις, examination 76.16; investigation 8.27; 34.26; 149.6
ἐπιστασία, care 131.9; governance 156.26; superintendence 110.4
ἐπίστασις, attention 146.29; 149.5; consideration 9.2; 85.24; stopping 58.24; 100.14
ἐπιστήμη, science 10.7; 151.13; 153.14; 161.5
ἐπιστημονικός, scientific 43.1; 48.30
ἐπιστημονικῶς, in a scientific fashion 92.8
ἐπιστητός, object of knowledge 160.11
ἐπιστρέφειν, bring about reversion, revert 1.11; 2.14; 4.14; 30.30; 33.25; 92.15; 160.5
ἐπιστροφή, reversion 143.6; 143.9; 150.2
ἐπισύνθεσις, composition 96.29
ἐπισυντιθέναι, add 91.18
ἐπιτάραξις, confusion 48.31
ἐπιτείνειν, intensify 67.22
ἐπιτήδειος, disposed 7.23; receptive 155.20
ἐπιτηδειότης, aptitude 7.4; 7.13
ἐπιτηδείως, aptly 7.15; 7.19
ἐπιχθόνιος, mortal man 142.16
ἐπιψηφίζειν, confirm 89.22

ἐπονομάζειν, call 50.13; 90.11; 92.16; 109.25; 123.3; refer to as 102.22
ἐποπτικός, enlightened 74.4
ἐποχετεύειν, channel 5.2
ἐποχεῖσθαι, employ as a vehicle 70.9; 135.30
ἑπτὰς, the number seven 50.16; 50.16; heptad 95.27; 97.27
ἑπτάτομος, divided into seven 60.9
ἔργον, function 141.14; task 68.21; 134.21; 144.27; 151.13; 153.14; 153.18; work 38.29; 66.26; 72.5; 101.33; 145.17; 155.28
Ἐρίθυια, Erytheia 144.11
Ἑρμαϊκός, Mercurial, of Mercury 67.21; 88.29; 91.21
ἑρμηνεύειν, expound 105.5; interpret 8.24; mean 40.7; understand 2.23
Ἑρμῆς, Hermes 60.26; 140.16; Mercury 60.30; 62.11; 63.1; 63.3; 63.8; 63.14; 63.16; 63.17; 63.32; 64.16; 65.23; 66.5; 66.10; 66.19; 66.22; 69.13; 69.18; 151.5
ἔρως, Eros 154.28; Love 101.23; love 138.20
ἐρωτικῶς, in a manner that is filled with love 14.13
ἐσπερέθουσα, Hesperis 144.10
Ἑστία, Hearth 137.25; Hestia 137.20; 137.23; 138.2; 140.11; 140.15
ἑστιοῦχος, guarding over the earth 137.23
ἔσχατος, final 43.22; 55.10; 107.3; 114.19; 143.27; 156.2; 158.7; 158.11; furthest 65.1; last 43.31; 88.15; 117.9; 143.6; 157.2; lowest 113.21; 114.28; terminating 88.18
ἕτερος, different, other, passim
τὸ ἕτερον, Difference, (opp. τὸ ταυτόν) 11.24
ἑτερότης, difference 24.30; Difference 74.6; 74.19; 79.24; 99.27
εὐδαιμονία, happiness 8.8
εὐδαίμων, blessed 3.32; 4.2; 155.10
Εὔδημος, Eudemus 63.30
Εὔδοξος, Eudoxus 62.5
εὐθέως, immediately 5.6; 12.22
εὐθυπορία, rectilinear motion 124.16
εὐθύπορος, going in a straight line 18.16
εὐθυπορεῖσθαι, undergo rectilinear motion 77.3; 79.15; 80.6
εὐκρασία, good mixture 66.3; 67.26
εὔκυκλος, well-rounded 115.18; 115.32
εὐλαβεῖσθαι, to be concerned 69.30
εὔληπτος, easy to grasp 148.26; 148.28
εὔλογος, reasonable 29.9; 29.9; 29.12; 62.18; 138.7
εὐμήχανος, useful mechanism 148.29
εὐμοιρία, good conditions 52.16
Εὐνομία, Good Governance (Eunomia) 118.31
εὐπορία, easy (path) 159.14
εὕρεσις, discovery 125.27
εὔτακτος, well-ordered 6.20; 30.13; 133.1; 146.2
εὐταξία, good order 133.3
εὐφάνταστος, easily imagined 158.7
εὐφραίνεσθαι, be delighted 7.13; rejoice 1.6; 3.4; 6.16; 6.30; 6.32; 7.4; 7.22
Εὐφροσύνη, Good Cheer (Euphrosunê) 119.9
ἐφαρμόζειν, adapt 27.29; apply 151.14; conform 149.31; fit 152.3
ἔφοδος, approach or method of reasoning 38.12; 110.29
ἔφορος, overseer 155.29; 156.1
ἐχυρός, secure 62.9
ἑωσφόρος, Morning Star, Venus 60.25; 60.30

Z

ζάθεος, sacred 107.15; 107.20
Ζανὸς πύργος, Watch-tower of Zeus 141.11; 143.26
Ζεύς, Jupiter 64.21; 64.26; 69.7; 69.23; 72.21; Zeus 47.9; 83.6; 83.11
ζῳδιακός, Zodiac 39.29; 73.28; 73.28; ecliptic 124.20; 125.6
ζῴδιον, sign of the Zodiac 56.4
ζωή, Life 42.22; 45.10; 64.15; 64.16; 64.17; 64.27; 64.30; 65.4; 65.10; 65.13; 65.15; 100.31; life 2.28; 3.1; 4.9; 6.5; 6.5; 17.9; 22.32; 23.30; 23.32; 30.11; 34.20; 43.19; 54.33; 56.11; 57.23; 57.24; 60.8; 64.9; 68.5; 68.10; 71.10; 71.25; 72.2; 72.9; 72.17; 82.9; 82.17; 91.14; 92.24; 95.28; 100.19; 101.16; 110.10; 114.3; 116.32; 117.8; 119.7; 135.21; 135.27; 136.15; 136.16; 154.32; 159.31; life span 19.29; 20.4; way of life 120.10; 159.24
ζ. ἀκατάληκτος, incessant 126.28

ζ. ἀμετάβλητος, unchanging 11.13
ζ. ἄπειρος, infinite 10.29; 100.26
ζ. ἀστεμφής, motionless 11.13
ζ. ἀφανής, invisible 35.31
ζ. ἀχώριστος, inseparable 71.27
ζ. γενεσιουργός, generation-producing 22.20
ζ. δαιμονία, daimonic 159.3
ζ. διττή, double 71.27
ζ. ἐμφανής, manifest 35.31; visible 90.18
ζ. εὐδαίμων, blessed 4.3
ζ. θεία, divine 36.27
ζ. νοερά, intellectual 60.13; 93.20; 132.11
ζ. νοητή, intelligible Life 100.7; 100.18
ζ. χωριστή, separated 71.27
ζ. φυσική, physical 135.24
ζ. ψυχική, psychic 95.23
ζῆν, live 1.40; 6.1; 6.14; 18.5; 19.30; 23.1; 24.6; 43.25; 43.26; 57.26; 95.2; 95.3; 110.2; 127.2; 132.20; 135.15; 135.26
τὸ ζῆν, life 4.4; Life 10.2
ζωναῖος, connected with the zones 43.13
ζώνη, zone 27.10; 63.23; 133.1; 133.3; 133.6
ζῳογονία, zoo-ogony 98.27
ζῳογόνος, life-engendering 73.5; 129.3
ζῷον, living thing, animal *passim*
ζ. αἰσθητόν, perceptible living being 13.13; 98.23
ζ. ἀστρῷον, astral living thing 151.17
ζ. γήινον, earthy [i.e. terrestrial] living being 136.15
ζ. ἐμφανές, visible living being 116.4
ζ. ἔμψυχον ἔννουν, living being endowed with soul and intellect 97.21
ζ. θεῖον, divine living being 113.11; 117.3; 120.10; 126.7; 126.16; 126.20; 126.31; 127.1; 127.3; 127.28; 136.5; 136.14; 136.29
ζ. θεῖον οὐράνιον, divine celestial creature 129.10
ζ. θνητόν, mortal animal or living thing 108.5; 108.13; 110.26; 159.2
ζ. μερικόν, particular living thing 58.5; 58.7; 98.8; 99.30; 112.23; 123.9; 136.19; 136.29
ζ. νοητόν, intelligible living being 8.19; 10.10; 11.5; 11.8; 11.12; 11.18; 12.15; 13.15; 13.16; 13.23; 94.30; 98.21; 100.33; 101.12; 107.10; 116.21
ζ. νοούμενον, living thing that is the object of intellection 11.3
ζ. παντελοῦς, All-perfect living Being 5.15; 5.18; 12.31; 94.11
ζ. τελεῖον καὶ νοητόν, perfect and intelligible Living Being 94.7
ζ. χθόνιον, terrestrial living being 131.13
ζωοποιός, that which makes things alive 142.30
ζωτικός, having power to bring to life 6.13; vital 59.21; 64.19; 69.22; 106.10

H

Ἥβη, Hebe 47.11
ἡγεμονία, leadership role 131.3; 131.25
ἡγεμονικός, authoritative 80.31; 82.25; commanding 39.23; leading 55.29; 140.13
ἡ. ἀξία, rank of governor 70.11; status of leader 76.32; 127.14
ἡγεμονικῶς, in an authoritative manner 71.29
ἡγεμονεῖν, direct 81.26; lead 118.13
ἡγεμών, leader 71.14; 83.1; 118.6; 118.11; 118.14; 129.11; 131.21; 138.2; 149.26; 152.1
Ἥλιος, Helios 61.7; 131.30; Sun 61.21; 61.25
ἦθος, character 42.7
ἥκειν, derive 82.14; 160.2
ἠλακάτη, hook [of the spindle of Necessity] 138.23
ἡλιακός, of the Sun 35.8; 54.29; 55.18; 88.27; 91.20; solar 61.18; 65.23; 66.4; 67.22; 81.20; 81.24; 82.17; 83.15; 83.26; 83.32; 84.6; 88.15
ἡ. Πάν, solar Pan 31.31
ἡλιοειδής, solar-in-form 160.20
ἥλιος, Sun 19.30; 34.27; 35.2; 35.5; 35.13; 36.14; 36.16; 36.19; 36.20; 39.22; 39.28; 52.29; 53.2; 53.24; 55.19; 55.29; 56.4; 56.7; 57.20; 59.18; 60.24; 60.27; 60.29; 61.2; 61.9; 61.16; 61.27; 61.32; 62.1; 62.2; 62.3; 62.4; 62.8; 62.11; 62.12; 62.15; 62.19; 62.29; 63.11; 63.14; 63.18; 63.20; 63.23; 63.26; 63.31; 64.15; 65.20; 65.22; 65.25; 65.32; 66.3; 66.9; 66.12; 66.16; 67.27; 68.6; 69.11; 69.16; 69.20; 72.21; 79.2; 80.26; 81.1; 81.16; 81.22;

ἥλιος, Sun (*cont.*) 81.33; 82.5; 82.13; 82.20; 82.28; 82.32; 83.7; 83.12; 83.27; 84.7; 84.21; 84.26; 84.29; 85.8; 85.13; 86.4; 86.5; 89.30; 95.31; 103.8; 131.19; 131.28; 132.33; 140.1; 140.2; 142.13; 144.23; 144.28; 149.18; 160.20
ἡμέρα, Day 32.18; 32.21; 40.32; 89.18; 90.5; day 2.11; 34.14; 34.23; 34.27; 34.29; 34.29; 34.30; 35.3; 35.6; 35.8; 35.9; 35.12; 35.14; 35.15; 35.20; 35.29; 36.1; 36.4; 36.9; 36.15; 37.2; 38.4; 39.26; 39.28; 53.18; 56.6; 85.21; 85.24; 86.1; 86.12; 86.15; 86.17; 87.4; 88.9; 88.19; 90.1; 90.3; 90.8; 133.13; 133.23; 139.23; 139.26; 139.27; 139.29; 139.32; 140.2; 144.12; 144.24; 144.29
ἡμερινός, diurnal 37.7; 66.6
ἡμίθεος, demi-god 108.4
ἡμίθνητος, semi-mortal 158.10
ἡνίοχος, charioteer 25.2
ἡνωμένως, in a unified manner 41.23; 138.21
Ἡρακλείδης, Heraclides (of Pontus) 138.9
Ἡρακλῆς, Heracles 160.3
ἡρεμία, rest 23.12
ἥρως, hero 109.19; 109.22
ἡρωικός, of heroes 153.13
Ἥφαιστος, Hephaestus 119.1

Θ

θάλαττα, seas 4.28
Θάλεια, Thaleia 119.6
θάνατος, death 151.4
θάτερος, other 2.19; the other one 75.23; τὸ θάτερον, the Different 11.23; 24.33; 25.6; 36.11; 50.15; 52.23; 57.30; 59.16; 59.29; 59.32; 60.6; 60.9; 68.30; 70.8; 73.22; 73.27; 74.6; 74.10; 74.15; 74.17; 74.22; 74.27; 75.4; 75.8; 75.11; 79.22; 117.1; 118.12; 128.13; 132.9; 132.11; 132.13; 132.19; 132.22; 132.24
θεά, a goddess 32.17; 32.18; 131.27; 160.26
θέαινα, goddess 140.12
Θεαίτητος, Theaetetus 32.9
θεῖος, divine 4.5; 7.21; 9.22; 15.6; 16.18; 17.13; 24.22; 24.32; 28.23; 31.1; 33.1; 34.3; 36.12; 36.23; 36.26; 36.27; 36.27; 37.3; 38.29; 38.32; 39.4; 43.7; 45.9; 48.7; 49.3; 49.12; 51.22; 54.7; 54.7; 58.22; 59.26; 59.30; 65.7; 65.32; 71.7; 71.32; 72.5; 72.7; 72.24; 73.2; 73.3; 73.4; 73.7; 73.11; 82.8; 83.2; 89.5; 89.18; 89.20; 97.24; 98.10; 102.17; 103.1; 103.15; 104.4; 104.9; 104.10; 104.30; 105.30; 106.32; 107.12; 107.22; 108.1; 108.18; 108.24; 109.12; 109.20; 111.5; 112.20; 113.9; 113.11; 114.4; 114.15; 114.22; 114.23; 114.24; 116.31; 117.2; 117.3; 117.19; 117.21; 118.20; 120.10; 120.12; 120.23; 121.26; 126.7; 126.16; 126.17; 126.19; 126.20; 126.20; 126.22; 126.22; 126.23; 126.31; 126.32; 126.32; 127.1; 127.3; 127.28; 129.10; 132.15; 135.15; 135.18; 136.5; 136.9; 136.14; 136.19; 136.29; 139.2; 140.30; 142.27; 143.1; 147.2; 150.14; 152.29; 153.6; 155.6; 155.8; 155.9; 155.12; 155.24; 159.14; 160.7; 160.20; 160.21; 160.21; 160.22; of divinity 155.4; of (the) gods 6.11; 6.11; 93.29; 108.10; 117.25; 131.2; 142.28; 155.17
θείου γενητοῦ, [period for] divine begettings, cf. *Rep.* 546b 54.21; 93.25
τὸ θεῖον, the divine 18.6; 21.14; divine thing 56.29; 100.27; 110.3; 138.26
τὸ θειότερον, the more divine 149.26
ὡς θεῖον, as divine 41.6
θείως, in a manner that is divine 12.27
θέμις, lawful 7.4; 48.12; 84.31; 102.6; 117.19; legitimate 47.18; licit 43.11; 63.24
θεογονία, genealogy of the gods 58.23; 156.11; 156.22; 156.31; 158.19
Θεόδωρος, Theodore [of Asine] 25.2; 64.11; 65.2; 154.20
θεολογία, theologians 88.21; 144.4
θεολογικός, theologically inclined 14.19; theological 49.4
θεολόγος, Theologian 131.23; 132.1; 157.4; 157.10; 159.19; specifically the Oracles 55.31; 115.5; 127.15; specifically Orphic 56.8; 68.15; 82.19; 99.19; 101.21; 102.19; 118.30; 144.4
θεός, god 5.2; 5.17; 6.25; 7.17; 7.25; 10.6; 12.27; 13.24; 16.10; 17.23; 18.19; 20.11; 20.23; 21.19; 21.21; 22.14;

27.9; 27.15; 28.7; 32.17; 32.19; 32.20; 36.22; 36.25; 36.32; 36.32; 40.5; 40.31; 41.1; 41.9; 41.13; 41.20; 42.30; 43.12; 45.18; 53.1; 53.29; 59.15; 61.3; 65.4; 66.21; 68.12; 68.30; 69.3; 71.31; 72.26; 72.28; 73.2; 80.25; 82.3; 88.28; 88.31; 89.28; 93.29; 94.25; 99.13; 99.25; 101.4; 101.9; 101.10; 101.17; 103.4; 105.22; 106.13; 107.28; 107.30; 108.3; 108.9; 108.11; 108.29; 108.33; 109.16; 109.17; 109.19; 109.21; 109.25; 110.6; 113.26; 124.25; 126.18; 127.2; 127.17; 131.24; 131.28; 132.3; 133.14; 134.32; 135.3; 135.10; 137.21; 138.2; 140.19; 140.20; 141.1; 141.18; 141.20; 142.28; 143.3; 143.31; 144.2; 144.15; 145.4; 152.22; 153.8; 153.9; 153.11; 153.12; 153.24; 153.26; 153.28; 154.21; 154.30; 154.31; 155.1; 155.12; 155.13; 155.19; 155.21; 155.25; 155.29; 155.31; 156.5; 156.7; 156.26; 157.1; 157.5; 157.11; 158.21; 159.9; 159.10; 159.16; 159.20; 159.22; 159.23; 159.27; 159.29; 159.30; 159.31; 160.8; 160.12; 160.15; 160.19; 160.26; 161.5

ἡ θεός, goddess 61.6

ἡ πηγαία θεός, the Frontal Goddess 43.19

θ. ἀέριος, aerial 4.28; 109.23

θ. ἀίδιος, everlasting 5.23; 94.29; eternal 1.5; 4.18; 5.4; 5.18; 6.24; 41.32; 69.1

θ. αἰώνιος, eternal 20.26; 94.29

θ. ἀφανὴς, invisible 40.2

θ. γενεσιουργός, generation-producing 152.19; 154.2; 154.18; 158.25

θ. γενητός, created 151.11; 151.21

θ. ἐγκόσμιος, encosmic 4.20; 4.22; 4.24; 6.6; 6.7; 40.21

θ. ἐν οὐρανῷ, celestial 56.23

θ. ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ, within the heavens 143.17; 156.17

θ. ἐνύδριος, aquatic 4.28

θ. εὐδαίμων, blessed 3.32; 155.10

θ. ἡγεμών, leading 152.1

θ. κατ᾽ οὐρανὸν, heavenly 40.16

θ. κυκλοέλικτος, unrolled in a spiral 20.26

θ. νέος, young (cf. *Tim.* 42d6) 108.20; 110.20; 157.18; 157.29; 157.21; 157.32

θ. νεώτερος, younger 20.26

θ. νοερός, intellectual 83.6; 95.22; 101.20

θ. νοητός, intelligible 3.3; 4.23; 4.25; 4.31; 4.32; 5.4; 5.8; 5.16; 5.31; 6.8; 13.23; 41.31; 43.6; 95.22; 102.18

θ. ὁρατός, visible 151.11; 151.21

θ. οὐράνιος, celestial 103.9; 104.23; 151.33; 153.16; 154.25; 155.2; 158.16; 158.22; in the heavens 140.19

θ. πρεσβύτερος, older 20.26

θ. ὑδροβατήρ, one who walks on water 110.5

θ. ὑπερουράνιος, above the heaven 156.31

θ. ὑπουράνιος, sublunary 158.17

θ. ὑπὸ σελήνην, sublunary 152.7; 152.13; 152.29

θ. ὑποταρτάριος, sub-Tartarian 143.30

θ. χθόνιος, earthly 4.28

θεόσοφος, Theosopher 41.16

θεότης, divinity 4.23; 4.30; 5.32; 6.1; 57.20; 72.9; 73.4; 126.22

ἡ μία θεότης, single divinity 138.25; 140.16; 140.18; 140.33; 155.18

θ. πατρική, Paternal Divinity 14.11

θεουργός, Theurgist 20.22; 26.4; 27.9; 40.21; 43.11; 63.22; 80.13; 124.32; 132.2; 132.26; 157.28

Θεόφραστος, Theophrastus 136.2; 151.2

θεραπεύειν, worship 89.17

θερινός, summer (solstice) 92.31; 93.15; 93.15

θερμότης, heat 67.25; 129.3

θεσμός, sacred law 89.22

θ. δημιουργικός, demiurgic law 71.12

θ. τελεστικός, sacred rite 41.4

θεωρητικός, theoretical 24.25

θεωρία, theory 53.24; 65.16; 95.21; 119.20; 132.26; 134.29; 134.33; 145.13; 145.27; 151.3; 151.16

θηλύνειν, make female 66.7

θνητός, mortal 36.32; 69.15; 71.11; 98.10; 106.14; 107.28; 107.32; 108.1; 108.5; 108.13; 108.20; 108.25; 108.25; 108.29; 109.3; 109.9; 109.13; 109.24; 109.30; 110.14; 110.15; 110.19; 110.22; 110.26; 117.24; 157.14; 157.18; 157.20; 157.29; 157.33; 159.1; 159.1

θολερός, turbid 112.8

θρησκεία, worship 41.14; cult 153.7

θρησκεύειν, worship 89.21

θυμοειδής, spirited 69.21
θυσία, sacrifice 89.21

I

Ἰάμβλιχος, Iamblichus 31.2; 33.2; 34.6; 45.9; 49.3; 51.22; 59.26; 65.7; 104.9; 118.20; 139.3
ἰατικός, medicinal 140.27
ἰδέα, form 5.10; 5.17; 5.24; 12.15; 12.23; 21.29; 33.20; 38.20; 61.29; 61.30; 98.24; 100.10; 101.8; 101.13; 102.8; 103.24; 103.26; 103.28; 105.11; 105.16; 105.17; 106.16; 106.17; 106.21; 106.23; 106.31; 107.9; 107.26; 108.27; 109.10; 109.12; 110.15; 110.18; 110.22; 110.24; 113.7; 113.8; 115.23; 118.2; 155.2; idea 102.22; 103.9; 33.1; sort 106.26; substance 112.20; 112.25; 112.29; 113.23; 115.12; 142.4
  ἰ. δημιουργική, Demiurgic form 103.11
  ἰ. νοητή, intelligible form 12.16; 101.13; 105.8; 109.13
  ἰ. πρώτη, primary form 107.10
ἰδίᾳ, in particular 6.4; specifically 153.29
ἴδιος, distinctive 2.30; 81.18; 83.29; 120.15; 120.31; distinctive (characteristic) 9.14; 101.20; 132.26; 143.9; distinguishing (feature) 16.6; 127.29; individual 39.24; 60.6; 60.21; 67.15; 70.2; 93.28; 109.20; 117.5; 117.7; 117.12; 117.15; 117.18; 117.21; 120.2; 123.25; 123.29; 128.11; 129.26; 151.8; 154.12; private 125.29; specific 23.19; 37.6; 68.31; 70.1; 70.26; 77.17; 77.19; 77.30; 78.10; 78.14; 90.20; 127.30; 132.4; 136.7
  τὸ ἴδιον, distinctive feature 16.4; 31.24; 45.30; 48.5
ἰδιότης, defining characteristic 25.11; 158.7; distinctive property 21.8; 29.11; 57.19; 86.27; 102.22; 109.21; 116.6; 142.26; 155.5; specific character 82.25; 90.15
ἰδίωμα, unique property 32.15; 30.19; 33.20; specific property 65.5; 73.4; 109.20; 143.1
ἰδίως, individually 117.16; specifically 23.2; 109.16; 153.29; 158.10
ἱδρύειν, establish 3.18; 6.9; 55.6; 69.1; 155.19; make to stand 137.10; position 144.32; seat 68.19; 68.25; 68.26; 69.4; 69.26; 71.28; situate 27.4; 138.6
ἱερός, sacred 41.14; 60.26; 89.17; 89.22; 111.19; 161.6
  ἱερά, rites 32.17; 41.10
ἱλλάς, bond 137.15
ἵλλεσθαι, concentrate 133.11; 136.30; 137.6; 137.14; 137.17; 137.19; 138.7; 138.7; 139.11; 146.5
ἴνδαλμα, image 90.2; 120.32
Ἰουλιανός, Julian 27.10
Ἵππαρχος, Hipparchus 124.22
ἰσημερία, equinox 85.21
ἰσημερινός, celestial equator 79.2; 79.3; 125.10; equinox 84.14; 92.31; 93.12; 93.14; 93.14
Ἶσις, Isis 140.6; 140.15
ἰσόδρομος, equal or the same in speed 60.26; 63.31; 65.25; 67.6; 67.7; 69.11
ἰσόρροπος, having equal tendencies 137.11
ἴσος, equal, equivalent 30.13; 13.27; 64.24; 93.15
ἰσοταχής, equal in speed 64.23; 64.25; 64.28
  τὸ ἰσοταχές, equality in speed 64.12
ἱστορεῖν, relate 63.29; recount 103.17; record 125.31
ἱστορία, story 89.23
ἴχνος, trace 149.31; 158.6

K

καθαρός, pure 30.11; 112.5; 112.7; 112.14; 129.5
καθαρεύειν, be free [of some imperfection] 81.7; 84.19
καθαρότης, purity 111.25; 129.4
καθαρτικός, purificatory 68.16; 140.27
καθηγεμών, teacher 15.16; 38.13; 108.8; 154.24
καθολικός, universal 70.30
καθόλου, universal 70.16; 70.18
κάλλιστος, most beautiful 10.10; 10.23; 10.24; 10.25; 10.29; 11.2; 11.6; 100.33; 101.6; 112.21; 114.17; 114.20; finest 97.16
καλλονή, beauty 44.25

κάλλος, Beauty 66.18; 66.19; 69.12; beauty 114.22; 118.28; 122.19; 124.10; 141.18; 141.21
καλός, good 79.6; noble 96.31
  τὸ καλόν, beauty 71.16; the beautiful 71.19
καναχισμός, sounding 61.18; 111.20
κανών, table 125.24; 125.26
Κάνωβος, Canopus 125.11; 125.15
Καρκίνος, Cancer 93.7; 93.8; 93.10; 93.11
καταδεέστερος, below 143.29; inferior 2.17; 24.2; 102.31; 132.15; 132.16; 143.5
κατακοσμεῖν, organise 5.4; regulate 99.1
κατάληψις, apprehension 55.15
καταπίνειν, ingest 102.2; 102.17
κατάποσις, ingestion 99.20
καταστρέφειν, return 64.14; 64.24
καταστροφή, return 64.18
κατεσθίειν, corrode 141.17
καυστικός, caustic 128.31
κεκρατημένως, authoritatively 8.23
κενός, void 63.19; empty 80.5
κέντρον, axis, centre 27.1; 55.22; 55.26; 62.26; 64.2; 67.12; 76.27; 76.34; 77.4; 88.6; 94.23; 96.3; 96.10; 96.15; 117.14; 120.3; 120.5; 120.14; 121.8; 121.11; 123.14; 126.26; 128.10; 129.23; 133.25; 133.26; 135.6; 137.4; 138.25; 139.13; 139.14; 139.20; 141.9; 141.10; 141.12; 143.11; 143.14; 144.30; 146.20; 147.8; 148.5; 148.6; 148.15; 148.19; 150.8
κεφαλή, finish 91.4; head 92.27; 116.11; 137.17
κινεῖν, move (something) 2.5; 20.24; 23.31; 26.7; 27.32; 56.2; 68.3; 71.30; 77.4; 117.18; 117.19; 123.13; 124.17; 124.20; 126.19; 136.28; 137.22; 138.10; 146.30; 147.26; 147.30
  κινοῦν αἴτιον, kinetic cause 117.15
κίνησις, change 18.24; 20.4; 32.14; 37.9; 119.27; Motion (*megista genê*) 11.23; 11.25; 11.26; 79.24
κινητικός, kinetic 74.30; 57.20; 117.16; such as to set in motion 138.26
κινητός, mobile or moveable 8.14; 18.19; 25.28; 26.3; 26.5; 26.11; 26.24; 26.25; 26.26; 26.27; 26.29; 27.28; 29.27; 29.29; 31.10; 31.11; 31.16; 31.27; 31.33; 32.3; 33.8; 34.8; 59.8; subject to change 18.32
  τὸ κινητόν, motion 29.32
κινητῶς, in a manner that involves motion 8.22; in a manner that involves change 59.4
κλεῖς, key 101.14
κλῆρος, lottery 72.18; region 154.26
κληροῦν, assign (by lot) 108.12; 155.30
κλήσις, invocation 32.18; 41.4; 89.19
κλῖμα, klima 125.13; region 155.32
κοίλος, hollow 112.16; 141.16
κοιλότερος, less replete 103.2
κοιλότης, concavity 75.10
κοίλωμα, hollow 111.24
κοινός, common 9.15; 32.16; 42.9; 57.21; 57.27; 60.20; 67.11; 68.6; 69.22; 77.17; 83.25; 83.33; 85.9; 90.3; 90.20; 91.24; 91.27; 92.3; 108.18; 112.18; 125.29; 127.27; 146.21; 151.4; 151.8
κοινωνία, association 13.28; 43.8; 61.2; 63.25; 66.5; 67.20; 73.11; 134.19; communion 74.15
κοινωνός, partner 66.5
κόλπος, hollow 61.19; bosom 112.8
κορυφή, hidden cause 105.29
κοσμεῖν, arrange 46.28; order 17.4; 17.6; 28.8; 97.20; 97.22
κοσμητικός, placing things in order 142.31
κοσμικός, cosmic 17.26; 57.21; 117.12; 118.18; 125.28
κοσμοκράτορ, Ruler of the Cosmos 2.10; 40.2; 58.8; 58.18; 60.5; 71.5; 82.21; 94.12; 95.32; 118.6; 127.16
κοσμοκρατορικός, of the Rulers of the Cosmos 76.32; 127.14
κόσμος, cosmos, passim; world 84.11
κουροτρόφος, Nourisher of Youth 144.6
κρατητικός, controlling 124.12
κράτιστος, dominant 60.12; 116.22; 117.27; 118.21; superior 25.11
κράτος, authority 36.15; dominance 60.12; 74.32; 77.29
Κράτυλος, Cratylus 139.5
κρικωτός σφαίρα, armillary sphere 145.25
κριτικός, separative 68.17; judgemental 140.27; 140.28

Κρόνιος, of / for Saturn 57.18; 78.26; 88.28; 89.13; 91.23; of Kronos 143.28
Κρόνος, Kronos 143.26; 143.28; Saturn 64.21; 64.25; 65.14; 67.22; 68.25; 69.7; 69.23; 75.14; 77.21; 77.25; 78.14; 78.16; 78.19; 78.25
κρύφιος, hidden 100.4; 105.25; 105.33; 107.19
κρύψις, concealing 99.20; hiding 65.30; 149.18
κυβερνᾶν, direct 71.18; 74.24; steer 82.11; govern 134.12
κυβερνήτης, helmsman 68.5; 76.34
κύκλησις, rotation 79.20; 86.2; 86.15; 86.16; 86.18; 86.20; 86.22; 87.5; 90.10; 90.14; 117.31; 123.17
  κ. κατὰ τὸν χρόνον, temporal cycle 28.29
κυκλίζειν, go in a circle 115.3; 115.17
κυκλικός, circular 18.16; 29.30; 33.4; 78.31; 80.18; 92.12; 119.21; 119. 23; 119.29; 123.24
κυκλίσκος, little circle 146.17
κυκλοέλικτος, unrolled in a spiral 20.25
κύκλος, circle 20.9; 21.3; 27.2; 28.19; 29.25; 29.25; 54.31; 55.18; 56.33; 60.3; 60.14; 60.27; 61.18; 67.7; 67.10; 69.27; 70.5; 70.14; 70.28; 70.28; 73.24; 75.13; 75.14; 75.19; 75.19; 75.21; 75.21; 75.22; 75.25; 75.26; 75.27; 75.28; 75.28; 75.30; 75.32; 76.1; 76.1; 76.3; 76.6; 76.6; 76.7; 76.8; 76.9; 76.9; 76.11; 76.12; 76.20; 76.21; 77.3; 77.10; 78.26; 78.26; 79.5; 79.14; 80.7; 83.29; 83.30; 84.13; 84.17; 86.4; 86.5; 92.26; 94.22; 97.26; 116.5; 116.23; 117.14; 118.28; 121.29; 123.26; 124.13; 128.12; 130.16; 130.17; 130.19; 132.18; 133.24; 134.4; 134.11; 138.10; 139.10; 142.22; 143.7; 143.11; 145.2; 146.10; 146.14; 146.17; 146.25; 147.26; 147.28; 148.9; 149.32; 154.13
  κύκλῳ, circular 40.28; 124.3; circularly 87.10; in a cyclical way 27.13
  ἐπὶ λοξοῦ κύκλου, [motion] along the ecliptic 79.1
  κατὰ κύκλον, circular 86.32; circularly 40.26; 140.32
  κ. οὐράνιος, celestial 54.31; 57.7
  κ. ταὐτοῦ, circle of the Same 25.1; 25.7; 60.11; 60.17; 74.17; 86.19; 91.5; 116.27; 121.22; 132.8; 138.15
  κ. τοῦ θατέρου, circle of the Different 24.33; 25.6; 70.8; 74.17
κυκλοφορεῖν, carry around in a circle 80.7; 114.33
κυκλοφορητικός, carried (around) in a circle 76.25; 85.17; 114.10; 117.13; 120.1; 130.18
κυκλοφορία, circular motion 134.6
κύλινδρος, cylinder 148.31
κυνικός ἐνιαυτός, Dog Year 93.8
κύων, Dog (star) 93.9
κύριος, accurate 35.28; authoritative 94.2; 135.32
κυρτοῦν, make convex 139.9
κωλύειν, preclude 25.32; prevent 11.1; 110.2
κῶνον, cone 139.24; 139.25

Λ

λέξις, individual words and phrases 83.18; 89.32; 121.5; specific terms 4.8; words 103.18; particular words 107.29
λέων, Leo 78.13
λεπτομερής, tenuous 112.6; 112.10
λεπτός, fine 128.28
λεπτουργεῖν, put the finishing touches 70.22; 153.15
λεπτουργία, finishing touches 70.15
λήθη, forgetfulness 153.5; forgetting 43.7; oblivion 20.16
λήξις, portion 155.29
λογίζεσθαι, calculate 20.22; reason 145.9; 150.31
λογικός, rational 96.31; 135.29; 154.1; 158.21
  ἡ λογική, logic 49.2
λόγιον, Oracle 102.12; 110.4
  τὰ λόγια, the Oracles 103.10; 124.26
  τῶν λογίων, the Oracles 14.3; 61.8; 61.26
λόγος, account 34.26; 49.5; 68.20; 70.22; 70.32; 89.32; 91.17; 134.22; 98.27; 104.13; 104.30; 105.7; 105.14; 112.18; 114.12; 107.7; 112.28; 115.12; 119.6; 119.17; 127.25; 127.26; 129.7; 129.8;

133.16; 133.21; 133.22; 134.7; 134.18; 134.23; 144.16; 145.22; 145.29; 146.4; 151.18; 151.28; 151.29; 152.8; 152.16; 152.19; 153.17; 153.19; 153.32; 156.12; 156.29; argument 62.2; 63.19; 78.29; 79.6; 116.9; 116.12; 145.13; dialogue 5.26; 42.7; 42.10; 97.24; 101.30; 104.22; 133.18; discourse 111.19; 151.14; 151.18; 161.6; discussion 45.23; 87.3; justification 154.16; logos 66.19; 69.13; 113.9; 114.4; meaning 137.14; Oracles 83.13; passage 45.19; 154.18; principle 142.23; proportion 66.21; 68.9; 75.18; 75.26; ratio 62.28; 62.30; 63.6; 64.7; 75.30; 76.7; 76.11; 76.21; 78.26; 81.12; 89.12; 89.16; reason 54.8; 54.14; 117.24; 132.24; 158.13; reasoning 53.1; 53.28; 54.5; 54.12; 83.11; rule 114.31; sentence 16.24; speech 19.21; 41.27; 42.20; 43.1; 156.21; statement 43.2; 144.20; text 53.22; usage of words 42.7; words 2.27; 61.30; 71.6; 138.17; 161.1

ἀνὰ λόγον, analogous 19.10; 66.15; 66.22; 82.26; 94.16; 135.5; 138.1; 141.27; 157.3; 160.29; proportional; 118.7; 118.15; 134.2; 144.30

ἐνὶ λόγω, in brief 47.17

ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, in language 3.14

ἔχειν λόγον πρὸς, have/play a role/status in relation to 24.13; 39.20; 65.18; 65.22; 113.25; 118.6; 134.9; 141.29; 142.3; 142.13; stand to [in a ratio] 13.6; 13.9

οὐ πολὺς λόγος, the argument holds no great weight 63.21

λ. ἁρμονικός, harmonic ratio 21.17

λοξός, ecliptic 36.31; 55.24; 148.9; Zodiac 83.27

ἐπὶ λοξοῦ, [motion] along the ecliptic 79.1

λοξῶς, along the ecliptic 147.30; 148.13

λόξωσις, obliquity 73.28

λύειν, dissolve 49.21; 49.30; 50.7; 50.8; 50.8; 50.9; resolve (a question) 9.27; 157.26

λύσις, dissolution 49.21; 49.30; 50.13; 50.14; solution 157.31; 158.12

M

μαθηματικός, mathematical 149.23

ὁ μ., mathematician 62.6; 65.29; specialist 63.21

μαθηματικῶς, in the mathematical mode 74.32; 146.1; in technical terminology 74.1; mathematically 145.30

μαθήματα, mathematics 62.10; 63.32

μακαριότης, blessedness 71.13

μαντικός, prophetic 140.25; 159.25

μάντις, seer 23.9

μέθεξις, participation 10.26; 31.28; 31.31; 32.3; 34.2; 34.6; 72.9

ἐν μεθέξει, participated 32.10

κατὰ ἁπλῆν μέθεξιν, by virtue of simple participation 53.17

κατὰ μέθεξιν, by participation 51.21; 59.5; 100.16

μείωσις, lessening 34.30; waning 140.8

μέλλειν, be future, intend, *passim*.

τὸ μέλλον, future 37.14; 37.22; 37.26; 140.26; 152.2; 155.22

μερίζειν, divide 53.9; 54.6; 65.12; 71.29; 95.33; 99.12; 99.26

μερικός, individual, partial 5.28; 26.17; 39.17; 40.5; 52.28; 69.3; 70.17; 70.18; 93.26; 110.2; 115.24; 116.17; 131.10; 131.14; 136.7; 136.19; 136.29; 155.20; particular 55.10; 55.11; 58.5; 58.7; 70.30; 98.8; 99.30; 106.32; 112.23; 115.26; 123.9; 131.18

μερίς, part 8.7; 70.20; 96.6; 98.9; region 36.32; 110.10

μερισμός, division 48.18; 107.4; 156.2

μεριστός, divisible 17.15; 25.20; 30.6; 31.12; 31.14; 31.30; 31.32; 52.28; 58.33; 79.31; 113.13; 138.21

μεριστῶς, in a divisible manner 21.30; 30.27; 32.1; 35.22; 38.18; 50.29; 53.23

μέρος, part 4.27; 28.6; 57.25; 66.31; 66.32; 72.16; 81.25; 81.34; 82.5; 84.13; 97.18; 97.19; 97.25; 97.28; 98.2; 99.4; 99.6; 115.19; 115.22; 116.8; 116.12; 116.13; 116.15; 116.15; 116.17; 120.12; 135.28; 135.32; 146.19; 147.16; 147.17; 154.23; portion 61.21

ἐν μέρους εἴδει, partial forms 5.15; 5.17

μέρος τοῦ χρόνου, part of time 18.18; 34.17; 37.1; 37.4; 72.14; 72.15

πλῆθος μερῶν, plurality 58.33

μέσος, intermediate 33.27; 34.6; 133.20; 150.15; 155.14; 155.17; middle 7.12; 41.11; 134.4; 136.4; 137.12; 138.6; 138.17; 139.18
ἐν μέσῳ, in the middle 67.25; 144.27
διὰ μέσων, through an intermediary 64.14; 65.6; 136.10; 158.15
μεσότης, intermediary 64.24; 64.28; 150.13; intermediate [character] 25.22; intermediate [stage] 94.23; 153.14; intermediate position 67.27; intermediate status 80.6
μετάβασις, transition 25.16; 31.20; 77.31; 83.31
μεταβατικός, discursive 24.4
μεταβατικῶς, discursively 22.17; 27.30; 21.9; 30.20
μεταβολή, change 7.31; 16.29; 23.12; 38.21; 42.19; 49.14; 57.33; 74.9; 74.13; 85.1; 85.3; 111.8; 119.25; 122.9; 142.21; 147.18; 150.20; 157.25
μετάδοσις, sharing 6.28
μετάθεσις, transposition 48.31
μεταλαγχάνειν, have a share 11.14; 40.15; 47.18; 48.16; 51.4; 95.1; 113.1; 120.23; 155.17
μεταλαμβάνειν, have a share 7.14; 45.31
μετέχειν, participate 2.28; 3.21; 10.12; 10.13; 10.15; 11.8; 13.5; 13.10; 13.12; 13.22; 13.22; 13.25; 13.25; 13.26; 15.30; 17.2; 17.2; 17.4; 18.8; 19.15; 19.26; 22.2; 22.24; 22.28; 22.29; 22.30; 22.32; 23.2; 23.15; 23.16; 23.32; 24.4; 25.29; 26.6; 26.14; 26.15; 26.29; 27.3; 27.12; 27.23; 27.23; 27.25; 27.28; 28.21; 28.22; 29.10; 29.10; 29.22; 30.8; 32.4; 32.28; 32.28; 32.29; 32.30; 32.32; 33.18; 33.21; 33.23; 33.24; 33.25; 33.32; 34.22; 35.23; 39.33; 45.24; 45.33; 46.23; 49.28; 53.16; 53.22; 55.5; 55.7; 59.2; 59.5; 65.4; 74.5; 80.28; 82.2; 85.11; 85.12; 94.29; 94.30; 95.1; 100.12; 100.13; 101.25; 106.5; 113.20; 114.28; 121.3; 132.14; 135.29; 152.22; 155.12; 155.14; 155.21
μετέωρα, meteorological phenomena 54.30; 134.11
μετουσία, participation 7.8; 72.29; 82.4; 85.1; 100.19
μετοχή, participation 13.26; 13.28; 48.27
μετρεῖν, measure 17.28; 19.4; 19.8; 20.1; 20.5; 20.7; 20.11; 21.10; 22.3; 23.14; 24.16; 24.18; 30.1; 30.2; 30.18; 30.26; 31.4; 31.5; 31.29; 32.14; 36.15; 38.32; 41.18; 42.19; 43.13; 43.21; 43.23; 46.21; 46.23; 46.28; 52.7; 55.16; 55.17; 57.27; 58.3; 81.1; 83.20; 83.33; 84.1; 86.23; 86.24; 91.13; 92.4; 92.12; 92.15; 92.24; 93.19; 93.20; 95.23; 95.28; 129.26; 148.31; 148.33
κατὰ τίνας (ἀριθμοὺς) μετρεῖ, how many times it goes into 91.28; 92.1
μετρητικός, such as to measure 19.3; 21.3; 21.25; 33.11; 43.30; 46.15; 52.17; 88.24; such as to provide a metric 30.10; 30.18; 41.12; 55.28
μέτρον, measure 17.9; 17.23; 17.26; 17.26; 17.27; 17.31; 19.13; 19.32; 20.1; 20.11; 22.9; 22.13; 23.27; 24.2; 24.10; 25.9; 30.3; 30.24; 30.31; 33.4; 34.12; 35.29; 36.12; 36.17; 36.18; 38.31; 39.17; 39.22; 39.25; 39.29; 40.5; 40.11; 40.27; 42.17; 46.27; 42.29; 47.1; 52.25; 52.28; 53.32; 54.1; 54.19; 54.21; 54.24; 54.26; 54.28; 54.29; 54.33; 55.12; 55.13; 55.15; 55.21; 55.23; 55.28; 56.11; 57.12; 57.14; 57.16; 57.18; 57.25; 57.27; 57.29; 58.3; 71.24; 73.15; 75.6; 80.16; 80.23; 81.3; 81.4; 81.10; 81.10; 81.12; 81.15; 81.16; 81.17; 81.19; 81.21; 81.22; 81.30; 81.32; 82.1; 83.19; 83.19; 83.22; 83.23; 83.23; 83.33; 86.13; 87.17; 88.8; 88.10; 88.16; 88.26; 88.32; 90.2; 90.9; 90.17; 91.10; 91.14; 91.27; 105.26; 127.9; 127.10; 129.20; 148.30; 151.13
μῆκος, longitude 62.13; 79.17; 96.4; 146.7
μηναῖος, lunar 61.18; 111.20; of the Moon 61.25; 124.29
μήν, Month (as Form or god) 32.17; 32.20; 36.26; 40.32; 41.10; 41.10; month 34.14; 35.17; 36.5; 37.2; 39.26; 53.18; 55.16; 56.7; 86.24; 87.1; 89.18; 89.29; Moon 61.12; 61.22; [Oracles] 142.16
μητήρ, mother 61.1; 65.18; 107.15; 134.9; 134.14
μητρικῶς, in a maternal manner 134.10
μηχανᾶσθαι, contrive 34.16; 38.28; 133.13; 144.22

μηχάνημα, device or contrivance 18.17; contrivance 147.1
μηχανή, contrivance 38.29; 144.27; 144.33; machine 56.30
μίμημα, imitation 27.19; 66.18; 99.29; 145.10; 145.23; 149.21; 150.21
μίμησις, imitation 20.9; 28.27; 46.30; 46.31; 76.31; 94.7
μιμεῖσθαι, imitate 2.3; 21.28; 28.25; 29.16; 43.32; 45.3; 52.5; 73.16; 75.2; 76.27; 76.33; 79.19; 81.13; 86.22; 92.20; 94.11; 108.28; 111.26; 116.2; 118.27; 120.2; 120.15; 120.17; 121.23; 141.32; 142.22; 144.5; 148.20; 157.15
μοῖρα, degree [aston.] 124.21; 125.9; Fate 70.25; 147.26; part 97.31; 98.28; 99.5; share of spoils 143.25
μοναδίζειν, monadify 1.24
μοναδικός, monadic 14.25; 86.27; 98.21; 142.29
μοναδικῶς, in a manner that is monadic 102.16
μονάς, monad 1.21; 1.22; 5.10; 15.14; 15.28; 19.2; 25.28; 26.30; 29.6; 30.29; 30.31; 31.7; 46.4; 52.18; 57.16; 57.28; 58.14; 58.18; 66.14; 66.22; 69.6; 69.9; 69.14; 71.21; 81.29; 91.12; 92.13; 94.22; 94.30; 95.17; 95.26; 97.27; 98.4; 99.5; 99.8; 100.21; 102.8; 104.28; 105.11; 105.29; 105.34; 106.1; 106.7; 106.7; 106.9; 107.11; 107.14; 107.18; 107.18; 107.21; 110.31; 116.20; 117.32; 118.1; 118.1; 118.4; 118.5; 118.9; 118.15; 131.5
ὅλος μ. whole number 62.28
μονή, rest 28.26; 43.33; 143.14; Rest [*megista genê*] 18.1
μόνιμος, stable 9.21; 10.9; 73.9; 142.29
τὸ μόνιμον, stability 15.3; 141.8
μονίμως, in a stable manner 72.30; 110.9
μονογενής, one of a kind 10.18; 13.17; 13.21; 97.6; 97.9; 97.10; 98.22; 101.1
μονοειδής, uni-form 36.6; 74.9; 90.11; 122.1; 122.4; 126.15
τὸ μονοειδές, uni-formity 79.19; 90.13
μόνωσις, singularity 100.10
μόριον, fraction 62.28; part 11.21; 22.19; 23.28; 25.5; 29.22; 34.22; 34.24; 34.25; 34.31; 35.10; 35.11; 35.16; 35.19; 35.21; 35.32; 36.30; 38.26; 45.16; 48.8; 51.2; 60.23; 92.18; 92.19; 155.11; portion 2.7; 50.8; 50.32; 114.8
μορφή, form 44.9; 56.5; 101.11; shape 134.16
μυριάς, a ten thousand 91.18; 91.18
μυστικός, mystical 12.29; 83.13; 99.19

N

νεανιεύεσθαι, be a young hot-head 24.32
νεαροπρεπής, juvenile 125.32
νέος, young, *passim*
ν. δημιουργοί, junior creators (cf. *Tim.* 42d6) 2.2
ν. θεῖοι, young gods (cf. *Tim.* 41d6) 110.20; 157.29; 157.32
νοερός, intellectual 19.9; 19.11; 19.16; 22.19; 24.9; 24.21; 25.27; 27.24; 28.8; 30.19; 34.10; 36.9; 45.11; 46.26; 53.11; 55.4; 59.15; 59.21; 59.25; 59.28; 60.13; 61.5; 64.19; 71.28; 71.32; 74.18; 83.3; 83.5; 83.6; 83.11; 85.25; 88.19; 88.25; 90.2; 90.11; 93.20; 94.28; 95.22; 101.4; 101.7; 101.16; 101.18; 101.20; 101.27; 102.4; 102.4; 102.19; 104.28; 106.10; 106.25; 107.2; 107.2; 107.6; 109.25; 114.12; 117.3; 117.19; 118.25; 118.29; 120.33; 121.25; 132.10; 135.3; 136.5; 136.25; 140.12; 140.22; 144.1; 144.23; 149.26; 151.24; 152.29; 153.21; 158.7; 160.27
νοερῶς, in an intellectual manner 103.7; 117.28
νόημα, conception 53.20
νόησις, act of cognition 4.14; 6.5; 7.1; 12.8; 21.30; 29.28; 42.23; 54.4; 54.6; 83.5; 86.19; 101.28; 101.30; 101.32; 104.27; 105.3; 133.6; 159.15; 160.6; 160.23; 160.30
νοεῖν, cognise 4.15; 4.17; 14.6; 20.27; 22.15; 22.17; 28.1; 72.5; 72.7; 103.30; 104.1; 120.22; 120.26; conceive 2.22; 8.23; 72.25; 89.8; 89.31; 92.32; regard 1.4; 4.8; think 12.6; 22.29; 36.10; 67.28; 67.30; 74.21; 103.2; νοούμενος, subject of thought 11.3; intellectualised 82.18
τὸ νοεῖν, thought 14.12
τὸ νοούμενον, object of thought 10.23; 10.28; 11.6; 100.33; 121.16

νοητός, intelligible 2.31; 3.3; 3.6; 3.7; 4.11; 4.23; 4.25; 4.31; 4.32; 5.5; 5.7; 5.8; 5.16; 5.19; 5.31; 6.7; 7.2; 7.31; 8.1; 8.3; 8.19; 9.31; 10.5; 10.6; 10.10; 10.28; 11.5; 11.8; 11.12; 11.18; 11.26; 12.15; 12.15; 12.16; 12.19; 12.23; 13.15; 13.16; 13.22; 13.23; 13.27; 13.32; 14.2; 15.2; 15.19; 16.20; 16.21; 17.7; 17.26; 17.27; 19.12; 19.25; 22.10; 24.11; 24.17; 24.24; 25.19; 33.4; 34.2; 41.30; 41.31; 42.17; 42.25; 42.27; 42.30; 43.6; 45.22; 45.26; 45.29; 46.5; 46.25; 47.6; 47.14; 48.1; 50.26; 51.6; 51.19; 61.5; 72.1; 74.20; 81.23; 82.27; 82.28; 83.3; 83.5; 83.10; 88.11; 88.19; 90.4; 94.6; 94.27; 94.30; 95.21; 97.10; 97.15; 97.16; 98.15; 98.19; 98.21; 99.9; 99.9; 99.22; 99.29; 100.3; 100.7; 100.7; 100.8; 100.8; 100.18; 100.25; 100.32; 100.32; 101.3; 101.4; 101.6; 101.11; 101.12; 101.13; 101.15; 101.21; 101.24; 101.28; 101.31; 102.4; 102.5; 102.10; 102.10; 102.15; 102.18; 102.20; 102.20; 102.25; 102.31; 103.2; 103.14; 104.19; 105.8; 105.10; 105.23; 105.29; 105.31; 106.27; 106.28; 107.2; 107.4; 107.9; 107.9; 107.11; 107.20; 109.13; 110.13; 113.5; 113.13; 113.18; 114.11; 114.23; 116.3; 116.21; 118.19; 120.11; 120.25; 135.1; 135.2; 138.20; 149.25; 149.31; 150.5; 150.6; 150.28; 152.17

νοητῶς, in a manner that is intelligible 17.24; intelligibly 103.7

νόμος, custom 160.14; law 160.21; 160.25

οἱ νόμοι, Plato's *Laws* 28.22; 36.24; 41.8; 56.22; 59.12; 89.28

νοῦς, Intellect (as hypostasis) 12.6; 12.7; 12.10; 14.6; 14.7; 14.8; 22.14; 24.9; 27.18; 27.19; 27.21; 27.22; 27.24; 28.5; 28.8; 31.12; 31.13; 33.14; 33.16; 43.32; 46.31; 60.11; 64.15; 64.16; 64.16; 64.17; 64.17; 64.26; 64.26; 64.30; 65.3; 65.13; 65.15; 90.12; 100.8; 117.23; intellect 5.31; 6.5; 6.26; 10.20; 12.5; 12.11; 14.11; 14.12; 18.5; 24.27; 25.12; 27.3; 28.2; 28.16; 28.18; 28.22; 28.23; 28.26; 36.27; 53.12; 54.7; 54.13; 57.24; 58.28; 58.29; 58.30; 59.2; 59.3; 59.4; 59.29; 64.13; 72.8; 72.30; 73.1; 73.1; 82.28; 90.14; 92.7; 95.23; 97.23; 98.24; 99.9; 99.22; 100.28; 100.29; 100.30; 100.32; 101.3; 101.14; 101.15; 101.17; 101.19; 101.19; 101.21; 101.24; 101.27; 102.4; 102.10; 102.11; 102.15; 102.15; 102.31; 103.15; 103.19; 103.30; 104.2; 104.6; 114.12; 115.25; 115.25; 116.32; 117.3; 117.23; 117.24; 117.31; 117.31; 120.16; 120.18; 120.29; 121.4; 123.6; 126.17; 126.20; 126.20; 126.21; 126.22; 126.23; 126.32; 135.17; 135.18; 135.29; 136.3; 136.22; 136.23; 136.27; 136.28; 140.10; 140.33; 150.1; 150.1; 150.3; 150.4; 150.7; 152.22; 155.14; 155.15; 155.24; 157.31; 158.5; 158.8; 158.8

νότιος, south 77.6; 79.11; 81.8

Νουμήνιος, Numenius 34.1; 103.28

νύξ, Night (as god) 32.18; 32.21; 40.32; 89.18; 90.5; 90.6; 90.7; 102.3; night 2.11; 34.14; 34.23; 35.10; 35.12; 35.15; 35.15; 35.29; 36.1; 36.5; 36.9; 36.16; 37.2; 38.4; 39.26; 39.27; 53.18; 78.16; 85.25; 86.1; 86.12; 86.16; 86.17; 87.4; 88.9; 88.18; 90.1; 90.3; 133.13; 133.23; 139.23; 139.23; 139.27; 139.30; 139.31; 139.31; 140.2; 144.11; 144.24; 144.25; 144.29

νυχθήμερον, a-night-and-a-day 86.22; 87.28; 88.12; 88.13; 88.17; 90.3; 90.9; night and day 144.31

O

ὄγκος, mass 3.2; 4.13; 59.26; 82.24; 84.7; 113.14; 113.30; 113.31; 114.6; 135.9; 135.10; 135.18; 135.20; 135.26; 136.21; 141.5; 142.6; 144.21

ὁ. ὅλος, universal mass 138.20

οἰκεῖος, appropriate 18.28; 22.7; 23.26; 40.27; 49.6; 49.10; 49.15; 52.4; 52.18; 54.26; 57.18; 58.3; 58.10; 58.15; 60.23; 81.17; 81.17; 84.32; 98.28; 99.1; 102.26; 104.15; 106.30; 110.11; 115.20; 115.29; 116.32; 118.8; 118.28; 118.32; 119.19; 119.21; 119.22; 120.10; 120.10; 121.8; 135.31; 136.16; 136.21; 152.3; 154.26; 155.13; [a thing's] own (or vel sim) 1.20; 7.10; III 55.25; 65.2; 77.5; 96.5; 111.10; 111.11; 111.17; 114.32;

115.1; 115.1; 115.2; 118.17; 121.11; 122.5; 147.8; 148.19; 148.20; 160.13
οἰκειότης, intimacy 160.19
οἰκειοῦν, adapt 16.13; 159.27; be appropriate 16.24; 39.30; 46.3; pertain 36.30; be akin 46.5
οἰκείως, in an appropriate manner 97.32; 106.13; 109.15; 129.9
ὁλικός, universal 13.26; 15.24; 53.8; 55.9; 58.8; 103.14; 106.31; 108.23; 109.13; dealing with wholes 131.10
ὁλικῶς, in a manner that is universal 103.6
ὅλος, universal, whole, general, *passim*.
δημιουργὸς τῶν ὅλων, Demiurge of Wholes 3.26; 52.32
ἐν ὅλαις μονάσιν, in whole numbers 62.28
ἡ ὅλη γένεσις, universal Becoming 68.5
ἡ ὅλη φύσις, universal nature 57.26; 115.26
ἡ ὅλη ψυχή, World Soul 21.8; 24.22; 59.30; 60.1; 60.4; 60.14; 70.4; 70.14; 117.4; 117.7; 117.8; 117.10; 117.23; 118.18; 120.11; 121.22; 127.2; 132.21
ὅλον αὐτόν, the whole itself 55.16
ὁ ὅλος νοῦς, universal intellect 24.27; 117.23
ὁ ὅλος χρόνος, universal time 39.25; 41.19; 57.26
πατὴρ τῶν ὅλων, Father of Wholes 2.24; 6.16; 29.5; 34.10; 52.13; 99.22
τὰ καθ' ὅλου, universals 160.10
τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ὅλον, a natural whole 30.17
ὁλοτελής, wholy-complete 38.15; 38.20; 99.8
ὁλότης, wholeness 5.21; 72.13; 83.13; 92.20; 92.21; 92.22; 92.23; 97.14; 97.17; 97.20; 97.25; 97.31; 99.4; 100.26; 111.13; 112.9; 115.20; 115.23; 115.27; 116.12; 116.15; 116.18; 118.9; 118.10; 120.5; 120.18; 120.23; 123.19; 131.5; 131.7; 131.14; 131.15; 148.20
Ὀλύμπια, Olympics 78.6
ὁμαλός, regular 30.14; 40.13; 56.12; 57.6; 64.6; 67.4; 67.5; 67.8; 67.11; 96.22; 96.27
ὁμαλότης, regularity 56.14; 56.25; 119.6
Ὅμηρος, Homer 125.8; 143.31
ὁμοιότης, similarity 3.13; 44.7; 44.10; 75.7; 99.2; 139.12; 143.7; 143.11
ὁμοιοῦν, assimilate 5.26; 73.18; 98.2; 115.24; 115.30; be like 7.31; make like 8.1; make similar 5.13; 5.24; resemble 116.13; 116.16
ὁμοίωσις, assimilation 20.7; 98.11; 99.7; similarity 3.5; 17.20; 94.25; 98.14; 115.19; 115.29
ὁμόκεντρος, homocentric 56.32; 96.14
ὁμόπολος, having the same pole 148.2
ὁμοταχής, having / going at the same speed 75.20; 75.24; 75.25; 76.2
ὁμοταχῶς, with the same speed 76.20
ὁμοφυής, innate 63.25; 134.20; 134.28
ὁμόφυλος, cognate 46.32
ὁμφή, oracle 36.22
ὄν, being (*participle*) 3.25; 3.30; 5.5; 5.9; 5.19; 7.29; 9.13; 9.27; 9.29; 9.30; 10.10; 10.18; 11.3; 12.1; 16.15; 19.23; 22.21; 23.15; 23.16; 23.17; 23.18; 23.21; 23.22; 25.11; 26.7; 26.9; 26.11; 26.13; 26.25; 27.13; 27.16; 27.17; 27.17; 28.13; 29.32; 32.11; 32.21; 33.3; 33.4; 34.15; 35.7; 41.20; 48.11; 49.25; 52.7; 52.8; 55.23; 58.16; 59.17; 59.21; 65.23; 65.25; 66.22; 67.23; 70.29; 71.22; 73.11; 73.15; 75.12; 77.26; 82.27; 84.8; 84.30; 86.9; 87.8; 91.5; 93.26; 95.19; 95.20; 95.23; 97.16; 100.32; 103.2; 111.9; 111.12; 111.13; 111.29; 112.4; 112.5; 114.3; 114.32; 115.3; 117.3; 117.20; 120.1; 122.16; 126.7; 128.14; 130.6; 130.19; 131.9; 131.17; 135.27; 146.19; 146.26; 147.9; 148.11; 148.20; 148.23; 150.32; 154.9; 154.30; 158.21; 159.23; existing 11.27; 41.20; 44.24; 52.6; 119.28; 122.21
ἡ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι διαμονή, continued existence 23.27
Περὶ Τοῦ Ὄντος, *On Being* (book title) 16.3
τὰ ὄντα, things that are, 12,4; 44.4; 46.8; 46.12; 48.22; 48.24; 92.21
τὰ ὄντως ὄντα, genuine Being 42.32; 46.4; 47.28; things that genuinely are 47.20
τὸ ὄν, Being 11.20; 11.33; 15.8; 15.14; 16.3; 16.4; 44.14; 44.15; 44.20; 45.10; 45.27; 46.1; 48.13; 48.14; 48.16; 48.27; 51.4; 51.16; 79.23; 80.4; 100.8; 100.22; 105.32; 113.5

ὄν, being (*participle*) (*cont.*)
τὸ ἓν ὄν, the One-Being 15.14; 15.18; 15.21; 15.28; 15.31; 19.10; 97.11; 100.11; 100.20; 100.21; 100.24; 107.19
τὸ ζῷον ἀίδιον ὄν, eternal living being 1.8; 5.7
τὸ μὴ ὄν, Not-Being 11.22; 44.15; 44.16; 45.32; 46.3; 48.12; 48.13; 48.14; 48.16; 48.26; 49.5; 80.4; non-existence 43.28; 43.29; that which is not 47.23; 47.24; 49.3
τὸ μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς ὄν, that which is not in any way at all 46.11
τὸ μηδέπω ὄν, that which is yet to be 46.8
τὸ μηκέτι ὄν, that which is no more 46.8
τὸ μήπω ὄν, thing that is 'not yet' 38.24
τὸ νοητὸν ὄν, intelligible Being 100.7
τὸ νοητῶς ὄν, being that exists intelligibly 17.24
τὸ ὂν αὐτό, Being Itself 100.17
τὸ ὄντως ὄν, genuine Being 33.52; 44.21; 45.26; 48.19; 51.21; 121.24
τὸ οὐσιῶδες ὄν, substantial being 16.25
τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ὄν, thing that exists in itself 3.17
ὄνομα, name 6.11; 6.13; 27.11; 99.20; 89.17; word 29.12; 35.25; 42.4; 110.12; 144.33; 153.32
ὀνοματοθέτης, Name-giver 29.14
ὀπαδός, attendant 36.32; 154.29; 155.31; 159.6
ὅρασις, vision 101.30
ὁρατός, visible 10.16; 82.25; 82.28; 82.29; 82.30; 82.31; 83.8; 111.12; 128.23; 151.11; 151.21; 151.22; 151.26
ὀργανικός, instrumental 39.19
τὸ ὀργανικόν, instrument 149.22
ὄργανον, instrument 39.8; 39.13; 39.30; 39.32; 40.1; 40.4; 145.28; 150.25; organ 109.31
ὄρεξις, desire 69.21; 139.11
ὀρθός, correct 28.23; 47.20; straight (line) 74.23
ὁρμή, impulse 61.12
ὅρος, boundary or limit 22.13; 107.16; 127.9; 135.31; 140.4; definition 152.4
Ὀρφεύς, Orpheus 83.4; 101.9; 102.2; 142.17
Ὀρφικός, Orphic 88.20; 144.3; 161.3; 161.3
Ὄσιρις, Osiris 131.31
οὐράνιος, celestial 4.27; 8.30; 17.9; 21.10; 29.23; 53.17; 54.31; 57.6; 61.29; 69.25; 69.27; 74.3; 80.3; 88.20; 103.9; 103.10; 104.23; 108.8; 108.9; 108.30; 109.19; 110.32; 111.1; 111.21; 111.23; 111.28; 112.15; 113.2; 114.10; 114.13; 115.7; 118.5; 118.27; 126.29; 129.10; 130.22; 131.13; 134.6; 134.9; 146.26; 150.26; 150.29; 151.8; 151.17; 151.19; 151.22; 151.32; 152.25; 152.30; 153.16; 154.25; 154.33; 155.2; 156.10; 156.15; 58.16; 158.16; 158.22; 158.22
οἱ οὐράνιοι, the heavens 56.30; 74.5; 90.25; 92.26; 124.8; 124.10; 156.25
τὰ οὐράνια, celestial beings 117.10; things in the heavens 152.22
οὐρανίως, in a celestial manner 97.32; 140.21
οὐρανός, the heavens or heaven 3.26; 8.15; 13.11; 20.20; 34.15; 34.19; 34.19; 35.10; 35.16; 36.4; 37.13; 37.8; 37.9; 39.1; 39.6; 42.16; 46.30; 49.20; 49.27; 50.13; 50.2; 50.22; 50.24; 50.25; 50.6; 50.9; 51.23; 51.24; 51.31; 51.31; 51.8; 52.2; 52.6; 52.8; 56.23; 61.28; 67.18; 68.29; 70.26; 79.21; 79.28; 85.7; 93.28; 94.5; 96.1; 96.5; 96.6; 96.6; 96.7; 96.8; 98.1; 108.25; 108.3; 109.18; 109.5; 111.16; 111.27; 111.32; 112.1; 112.14; 112.5; 113.16; 113.20; 115.5; 116.23; 116.28; 117.13; 118.15; 119.2; 119.3; 120.1; 122.20; 122.7; 122.8; 126.24; 126.25; 127.31; 128.18; 128.30; 130.4; 133.14; 133.24; 134.10; 134.12; 134.16; 134.17; 134.29; 135.11; 135.4; 135.5; 135.6; 136.13; 137.24; 138.28; 138.3; 139.15; 139.4; 139.6; 139.9; 140.18; 140.19; 140.21; 140.23; 141.19; 141.2; 141.21; 141.23; 141.27; 141.32; 141.8; 142.10; 142.11; 142.11; 142.20; 142.23; 142.3; 142.8; 143.10; 143.12; 143.16; 143.17; 143.18; 143.20; 147.13; 147.14; 148.21; 150.22; 150.27; 152.17; 153.24; 155.14; 156.17; 156.19; 156.32; 157.6; 160.28; ouranos (sense indeterminate) 80.27; 84.4; 84.16; 85.16; 85.16; Heaven (Ouranos) 99.18; 156.14; 156.15; 156.18; 157.13

ὁ προπάτωρ Οὐρανός, Grandfather Ouranos 99.18
οὖσα, the present tense participle of the verb 'to be' 16.22; 16.26
οὐσία, Being (*megista genê*) 11.20; 16.9; 17.9; 31.15; 33.11; 33.21; 34.21; 41.25; 41.29; 43.10; 44.21; 47.17; 47.18; 47.18; 49.13; 64.13; 64.15; 64.25; 64.26; 64.27; 64.29; 65.3; 65.13; 65.13; 65.14; essence 4.6; 4.17; 5.1; 7.18; 11.18; 18.24; 21.22; 21.24; 24.4; 24.17; 24.18; 25.21; 26.2; 27.27; 40.3; 40.23; 44.13; 48.5; 53.20; 58.33; 68.10; 69.19; 82.16; 84.2; 104.5; 105.23; 143.23; 147.2; 151.24; 159.4; 160.11; substance 19.4; 23.22; 23.27; 24.7; 25.11; 101.16; 104.4; 112.26; 112.28; 113.12; 113.29; 114.14; 115.5; 115.30; 120.1; 128.29; 134.13; 136.6; 142.25
κατ' οὐσίαν, substantial 18.22; essentially 27.1; 28.18; 139.14; 154.4; 157.26
ο. ὑποκείμενή, substrate 113.28
οὐσιώδης, essential 122.17; 159.3; substantial 16.23; 16.26; 19.28; 27.20; 64.18
ὀχετός, canal 4.25; 61.22
ὄχημα, vehicle 135.21; 136.7; 136.10
ὄψις, sight, act of seeing 82.29; 112.12; 112.13; 128.27; 153.1; 153.4

Π

πάθημα, affection 19.6; happening 125.30
παθητικὸς νοῦς, passive intellect 158.9
πάθος, affection 30.11
παιδαγωγεῖν, guide 28.24
παῖς, child 13.8
π. θεῶν, child of gods 159.10; 159.23; 159.29; 159.31
π. τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος, child of Apollo 159.26
παιώνιοι δυνάμεις, powers associated with Paeon 140.28
παλαιός, ancient 62.4; 103.17; 160.23
παλιγγενεσία, regeneration 57.34
πάμφθορος, capable of being entirely destroyed 43.23
Πᾶν, Pan 131.31
πανδοχεύς, all-receiver 107.16
πανσέληνος, full Moon 85.19
παντέλειος, all-perfect 99.9
παντελής, all-perfect 12.25; 34.11; 57.17; 91.16; 97.7; 97.9; 99.25; 142.29; entirely-complete 108.26; 108.27; 110.17; 116.20
ὁ παντελὴς νοῦς, All-perfect Intellect 33.14
τὸ παντελὲς, the property of being all-perfect 52.8; 97.12; 97.13; 105.18
τὸ παντελὲς ζῷον, All-perfect Living Being 5.15; 5.18; 12.31; 94.11
τὸ παντελὲς πέρας, All-perfect Limit 17.6
παντελῶς, in an entirely-complete manner 8.13; 16.28; 16.29; 16.32; 17.1; 32.10; entirely-and-completely 37.29; 62.20
παντότης, totality 98.6; 99.31; 101.2
παραβολή, conjunction 89.12; 90.23; 145.1; 146.7; 149.28; 151.30
παράγει, bring forth 17.23; 17.32; 21.26; 43.20; bring in 54.2; 155.3; introduce 5.28; 12.23; 67.7; 69.25; 94.23; 95.28; 133.18; 142.1; 156.15; 156.18; produce 39.14; 101.2; 101.8; 110.19; 156.21; 157.18; 157.20; 157.22; 157.24; 158.15; 158.15
παράδειγμα, Paradigm 7.29; 50.23; 50.24; 104.28; 108.21; 108.27; 116.6; 118.21; paradigm 1.7; 1.12; 3.13; 6.17; 6.31; 7.28; 20.5; 21.28; 27.6; 28.28; 28.32; 44.12; 45.25; 49.9; 49.22; 49.24; 51.26; 52.4; 52.12; 56.20; 79.18; 80.11; 85.4; 94.26; 94.32; 95.30; 97.4; 98.3; 98.6; 98.20; 99.3; 104.18; 104.21; 106.20; 115.20; 115.21; 115.29; 149.32; model 145.25
π. νοητός, intelligible 5.20; 116.2; 118.19; 152.17
π. οὐρανιον, celestial 118.27
π. πρώτον, primary 88.11
παραδειγματικός, paradigmatic 20.8; 21.26; 99.15; 100.1; 126.12
παράδοσις, form of teaching 70.15; tradition 12.29; 161.4
παρακμάζειν, be past one's prime 47.3
παρακολούθημα, that which is attendant upon 24.31
παρακολουθεῖν, attend 82.3
παράλλαξις, deviation 74.4
παρανομία, illicit use [of words] 44.6; mistake 48.3

παράτασις, dimension 9.1; 17.30; 51.18; duration 87.17; 92.22; 95.25; sequence 16.17
παρατατικός, past tense 16.22
παρατρέχειν, be past 44.18
παρέγκλισις, derivation 46.1
πάρεδρος, Associate [of Helios] 131.30
παρέρχεσθαι, decline 156.23
παρελθόν, past 37.22; 37.25; 48.9
τὸ παρελθόν, what has happened 37.14
τὸ παρεληλυθός, that which has already happened 16.13
πάρεργος, incidental 68.20; 70.31
παρέργως, as a digression 97.13
πάρεσις, paralysis 124.6
παρεῖναι, be present 11.17; 16.33; 17.5; 17.10; 23.4; 30.15; 35.19; 35.33; 152.34
Παρμενίδης, *Parmenides* (book title) 12.28; 14.21; 19.11; 49.5; 104.12
πάροδος, procession 81.9; 86.12; 54.14; 63.25
πᾶν, τὸ, the universe 1.8; 2.29; 4.10; 4.20; 5.13; 5.14; 5.21; 5.24; 5.25; 5.27; 5.28; 5.29; 6.21; 9.4; 13.13; 23.2; 28.8; 32.7; 36.27; 36.33; 50.22; 57.7; 68.14; 68.17; 71.8; 71.13; 71.14; 71.14; 72.15; 74.14; 76.27; 76.31; 78.20; 79.3; 79.12; 81.5; 87.8; 87.9; 87.10; 88.11; 92.18; 92.25; 93.11; 93.22; 95.28; 97.7; 97.29; 97.29; 98.9; 98.11; 98.28; 99.6; 101.17; 115.18; 116.1; 116.7; 116.16; 120.3; 122.1; 127.15; 133.25; 136.4; 136.31; 136.33; 137.4; 138.19; 138.25; 139.20; 139.21; 141.9; 141.10; 141.29; 146.23; 153.10; 156.21; 157.5; 158.29; 159.5
ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός, the World Soul 24.5
πατήρ, Father 1.5; 3.30; 6.3; 6.16; 7.7; 14.5; 29.31; 39.16; 65.5; 69.25; 71.15; 71.17; 72.5; 72.12; 91.9; 135.3; father 35.26; 61.4; 65.22; 99.15; 108.18; 134.12; 157.30; 157.31; 158.18
π. ὁ τρίτος, the Third Father 124.34
π. τῶν ὅλων, Father of wholes 2.24; 29.5; 34.10; 52.13; 99.22
πατρικός, Paternal 14.6; 14.11; paternal 99.28; 105.25; 105.28; 106.7; 140.22
πατρικῶς, in a paternal fashion 134.10
πάτριος, traditional 144.6
πατρογενής, father-begotten 14.3
παχύς, dense 111.29; 112.8; 112.16; 114.17; 114.29; 129.7; 135.9
τὸ παχύ, density 141.4
πεζός, footed, with feet 104.25; 108.15; 109.2; 109.5; 109.7; 110.7; 110.23; 110.25; 111.2
πεμπάς, group of five 67.28
πεπληθυσμένως, in a manner that is pluralised 17.7
πέρας, Limit (principle, opp. Unlimited) 17.7; 30.4; 74.19; 79.25; limit 38.25; 79.26; 101.6; 106.28; 111.29; 142.10; 142.21; ending point 30.32
περατεῖν, conclude 81.9; limit 30.3; 101.15
περάτωσις, limitation 88.26
περιαγωγή, rotation 28.33; 29.1
περιάπτειν, attach 120.28
περιγεῖος, close to the Earth 128.3
περιγράφειν, circumscribe 29.5; outline 104.16
περιεκτικός, inclusive, such as to encompass 33.11; 40.28; 51.25; 73.19; 98.23; 98.3; 106.11; 106.31; 129.22; 136.14; 142.31
περικόσμιος, that which goes around the cosmos 36.17
περιλάμπειν, light up 84.9; 84.12
περιληπτικός, such as to include 29.32; 30.6; 32.21; 80.19; 94.1; 98.21; 101.14; 108.9; 129.20; 131.2; 136.29
περιοδικός, periodic 81.11; 87.11; 89.11; 129.21; 129.22; 129.25
περιοδικῶς, in a periodic manner 4.4; 28.19; 28.24
περίοδος, cycle 18.12; 19.32; 20.30; 29.21; 38.15; 38.26; 40.4; 53.17; 54.17; 54.20; 54.22; 54.29; 54.32; 56.1; 56.9; 57.11; 57.13; 57.15; 57.31; 66.31; 66.31; 67.1; 68.31; 72.15; 93.26; orbit 55.22; 55.25; 60.16; 78.7; 80.26; 84.24; 121.26; 122.5; 125.12; period 21.11; 28.32; 32.27; 40.16; 41.18; 41.20; 43.14; 43.18; 43.22; 43.23; 43.26; 43.28; 43.30; 43.31; 44.1; 51.1; 55.17; 55.26; 80.17; 80.21; 81.3; 81.7; 81.10; 81.30; 82.3; 83.30; 83.32; 86.3; 86.6; 86.15; 86.17; 86.19; 86.21; 87.5; 87.13; 87.16; 87.19; 87.22; 87.25; 88.1; 88.26; 88.30; 88.33; 89.6; 89.12; 89.14; 89.24; 91.3; 91.11; 91.16;

92.19; 92.27; 93.10; 93.13; 93.16; 93.25; 94.1; 94.2; 95.24; 127.23; 125.28; 129.32; 133.22; 138.12; 149.25; 150.17; 156.26
ἡ θατέρου περίοδος, revolution of the Different 59.16; 59.29; 59.32; 60.7; 60.9; 117.2; 132.9; 132.13
ἡ ταὐτοῦ περίοδος, revolution of the Same 77.29
περιουσία, surplus 7.11
περιοχή, comprehension 12.17; 14.2; 17.14; 22.10; 24.11; 38.31; 42.12; 58.16; 99.26; 106.15; 110.27; embrace 73.2; 73.10
Περιπάτου, Peripatos (school of the Peripatetics) 95.10
περιπόλησις, orbit 128.8; revolution 88.27; 150.27
περιτροπή, rotary motion 51.6
περιττός, odd in number 50.15; superfluous 70.22
οἱ περιττότεροι, the more gifted 9.2
περιφέρεια, rotation 80.9
περιφερής, moved in a circle 21.5
περιφέρεσθαι, be carried around 76.27; 148.16
περιφορά, orbit 50.15; 50.18; 59.16; 68.32; 70.2; 70.5; 82.22; 70.7; 132.4; 132.24; revolution 29.24; 36.12; 51.3; 57.17; 59.22; 74.6; 74.13; 74.15; 74.27; 75.4; 77.14; 77.16; 79.22; 80.29; 86.20; 87.7; 88.14; 97.25; 116.27; 117.1; 117.28; 118.8; 119.14; 120.31; 122.13; 123.4; 123.9; 129.11; 132.9; 132.11; 138.27; 139.19; 141.11; 146.2; 151.19; 152.25; rotation 21.11; 35.13; 41.12; 52.23; 57.29; 84.16; 90.10; 90.11; 112.1; 118.12; 129.16
πηγαῖος, Fontal 43.17; 43.19; 43.21; originative 69.16
πηγή, source 14.8; 72.29; 82.17; 82.27; 83.1; 102.7; 105.30
πηγνύναι, affix 124.34; 132.30; 132.29; conjoin 125.1
πήξις, affixing 132.32
πιθανολογεῖν, reason on probability 63.21
πιθανός, probable 62.18; plausible 144.16
πιστεύειν, put faith in 124.22; be convinced 153.10
πίστις, belief 156.28
πιστός, that in which one may have confidence 125.4
πλάγιος, oblique 73.22; 73.27; 74.20; 74.23
ἐπὶ τὰ πλάγια, along the diagonal 80.12
πλάνη, error 77.28; wandering 56.23; 86.10; 87.21; 90.15; 90.25; 90.25; 125.1; 126.8; 127.11; 127.18; 129.13; 132.30
πλανητά, wandering stars 52.29; 53.3; 56.16; 96.1
πλανήτης, planet 53.23; 55.20; 55.24; 56.9; 58.6; 58.8; 62.7; 63.20; 69.15; 74.1; 76.15; 77.30; 79.1; 80.15; 80.20; 81.6; 122.30; 123.24; 125.23; 129.8; 134.22
πλανᾶσθαι, wander 123.1
πλανώμενος, of the planets 70.7; 70.25; 154.14; planetary 67.4; 118.11; 123.21; 131.4; 148.13; wandering 123.9; 123.11
τὰ πλανώμενα, the planets 55.18; 57.30; 60.32; 62.19; 64.29; 70.1; 79.13; 80.9; 81.14; 91.25; 96.24; 117.1; 118.10; 119.4; 121.30; 121.30; 122.3; 123.8; 123.19; 124.16; 125.17; 127.7; 127.13; 127.22; 127.28; 127.32; 128.15; 129.10; 129.17; 129.28; 129.30; 130.1; 130.27; 131.1; 131.6; 132.3; 132.6; 132.22; 132.27; 132.32; 133.9; 133.21; 147.30; 147.33; 148.5; 148.16; 148.17; 154.15
πλάτος, breadth 147.19; 148.18; latitude 62.13; 79.9; 79.17; 80.10; 96.4; 128.10; 146.8; realm 100.4; 105.30; 128.3
πλατύς, expansive 61.24
Πλάτων, Plato 3.28; 8.21; 9.22; 10.3; 10.7; 21.13; 24.21; 26.4; 28.31; 29.15; 34.3; 36.22; 40.21; 41.8; 43.24; 49.16; 49.17; 51.14; 51.30; 52.19; 53.19; 56.31; 57.9; 60.31; 61.29; 63.24; 64.8; 65.9; 65.12; 65.12; 67.3; 69.30; 71.23; 71.32; 75.15; 76.15; 76.27; 76.31; 80.19; 80.22; 80.32; 82.14; 87.7; 87.27; 89.27; 94.15; 95.8; 95.21; 96.32; 100.11; 102.1; 102.21; 102.27; 103.24; 104.1; 104.3; 104.11; 105.7; 105.20; 106.19; 107.30; 108.29; 114.9; 115.9; 115.11; 124.6; 124.18;

Πλάτων, Plato (*cont.*) 124.25; 125.4; 126.31; 127.21; 128.14; 129.12; 132.6; 135.16; 137.9; 137.22; 138.8; 138.9; 138.11; 139.4; 139.17; 144.20; 145.12; 145.16; 146.30; 148.1; 151.16; 160.17
Πλατωνικός, Plato's 105.11; Platonic 128.18; 141.14; 154.27; Platonist 24.20; 33.31; 158.24
πλεονάζειν, participate in plurality 136.8; abound 155.8
πλεονεκτεῖν, gain advantage 141.7; get a greater share 143.2
πλῆθος, plurality 1.18; 8.18; 11.5; 11.7; 11.9; 11.10; 11.15; 11.34; 12.4; 12.17; 12.23; 12.25; 14.30; 15.18; 15.19; 24.11; 54.6; 54.9; 58.10; 58.12; 58.14; 58.16; 58.16; 58.18; 58.19; 58.33; 70.29; 91.12; 99.11; 100.6; 100.9; 103.15; 104.20; 104.28; 105.9; 107.6; 107.20; 110.28; 114.5; 118.1; 118.3; 118.7; 118.13; 118.32; 127.10; 131.11; 131.13; 140.19; 153.11; 155.4
  πλήθει, in number 86.10; 90.19
πληθύνειν, make plural 54.8; 99.26; multiply 36.7; 106.32; 107.1; pluralise 52.21; 53.8; 138.21; render a plurality 113.12
πλημμελής, discordant 37.11; 37.19; 38.5; transgression 48.13; wrongful 37.27; 45.17
πλημμελεῖν, be mistaken 43.5; strike a false note 56.22
πλημμελῶς, illicitly 48.5; in a discordant manner 6.20; 97.22
πλήρης, filled or full 6.1; 19.3; 113.9; 114.3; 114.4; 132.1; 135.7; 135.27; 144.4
πληροῦν, fill 4.23; 4.30; 6.3; 6.27; 7.11; 23.32; 65.21; 72.7; 73.1; 82.9; 82.12; 83.5; 84.5; 107.11; 135.21; 159.18; 160.6; fulfill 91.3
πλήρωμα, (singular) plenum 8.18; 99.9; 136.5; (plural) constituent part or element 5.27; 5.28; 8.10; 98.7; 155.24
πλησιάζειν, consort 23.31
Πλωτῖνος, Plotinus 114.31; 140.10
πνεῦμα, breath 61.16
ποδηγετεῖν, guide 71.18; 122.9; direct 124.16
ποίησις, creation 18.14; 39.21; 52.13; 61.3; 65.26; 66.6; 66.25; 67.26; 68.3; 68.12; 73.20; 106.4; creative act 66.4; poem 116.28; production 67.21; 135.5
  π. φυσική, nature's productive acts 23.8
ποιητής, author 6.11; Creator 39.16; maker 119.2
ποιητικός, creative or such as to create 39.31; 105.28; 139.23; productive or such as to produce 18.3; 20.3; 79.32; 88.13; 106.8; 149.19
  π. αἴτιον, efficient cause(s) 7.9; 28.31; 90.7; 106.18
ποικίλος, complex 96.2; 148.26; 148.27; 148.30; 148.30; varied, various, involving variety 31.27; 52.21; 56.9; 70.16; 77.2; 91.10; 101.28; 118.12; 122.6; 127.8; 128.6; 132.22; 144.4; 149.4
ποικιλία, variety 53.22; 56.9; 57.10; 74.6; 74.14; 74.25; 94.13; 116.29; 118.25; 122.7; 127.10; 127.17; 127.25; 147.2
ποικίλλειν, decorate 116.24; 118.24; 141.27; diversify 86.11; 90.22; decoration 119.4; variation 124.13; 124.16
ποικίλως, in various ways, variously 68.13; 147.9; 148.7
ποιότης, property 30.10
πολεῖν, turn 136.33
Πολιτεία, *Republic* (book title) 54.23; 56.32; 61.1; 66.16; 67.9; 93.24; 109.5; 120.27; 138.22; 147.22
Πολιτικός, *Statesman* (book title) 150.20
πολλαπλασιάζουν, multiply 92.1
πολλαπλασιασμός, multiplication 92.3
πόλος, celestial pole 131.30; 137.25; pole 133.12; 134.3; 135.13; 136.31; 136.32; 136.33; 137.1; 137.1; 138.16; 138.18; 139.3; 139.6; 139.8; 143.12; 143.13; 144.9; 147.21; 147.23; 148.9; 148.11
  π. τοῦ ζῳδιακοῦ, pole of the zodiac 74.1; 124.21; 125.6
  π. τοῦ ἰσημερινοῦ, celestial pole 125.11
  π. τοῦ λοξου, pole of the ecliptic 36.31
πολυειδής, multiple in form 53.9; multi-form 122.2; pluri-form 101.13
πολυμετάβολος, highly variable 85.4; subject to great change 152.23
Ποντικός, of Pontus 138.9
πόρισμα, corollary 38.12; 103.16

πόρος, pore 112.10
Πόρος, Resource 154.29
Πορφύριος, Porphyry 33.31; 64.10; 65.1
Ποσειδώνιος, Posidonius 125.14
πότνια, queenly 47.11
πρᾶγμα, thing 7.13; 12.9; 17.10; 20.5; 23.10; 23.13; 24.28; 27.8; 38.21; 42.33; 43.24; 44.3; 44.16; 48.26; 49.7; 85.5; 104.30; 105.4; 105.15; 107.27; 113.6; 114.15; 137.11; 142.24; 143.4; 160.29; 160.31
τὰ πράγματα, facts 21.7; 22.1; 107.31; 108.7; 156.28; subject matter, matters under discussion 6.26; 8.27; 24.32; 33.1; 42.3; 44.7; 134.18; objects 121.31
πραγματεία, sort of business one is engaged in 49.1; 49.18
πρέσβειρα, venerable 107.16
πρεσβεία, prerogative 143.24
πρεσβύτερος, older 1.15; 8.25; 20.25; 27.12; 44.28; 45.7; 45.14; 47.5; 47.7; 47.14; with greater seniority 2.20; 18.1; 31.6; 33.19; 143.15
πρεσβύτατος, eldest 127.2; most senior 133.14; 134.31; 135.10; 141.1; 141.20; 143.3; 143.17; 143.23; 144.14; 144.15; 156.17
πρεσβύτης, old 40.23; 80.14
προάγειν, bring forth 99.14; 99.24; 99.27; 129.20
προαίρεσις, purpose 3.24
προάρχειν, pre-exist 106.14
πρόβλημα, problem 49.19; 156.3
προγινώσκειν, predict 151.8
πρόγονος, parent 159.10; 159.22; 160.6
προέρχεσθαι, proceed 5.27; 6.18; 9.2; 18.7; 19.6; 19.23; 22.11; 22.26; 24.14; 29.21; 30.32; 40.8; 43.19; 45.10; 52.6; 53.14; 54.13; 66.15; 91.17; 94.16; 94.26; 105.27; 106.18; 107.11; 109.1; 114.5; 118.13; 140.18; 154.30; 156.14; 157.8; 157.12; 157.16; 157.19; 158.4; 161.5
ἐρεῖ προελθών, says a short while later 70.2; says subsequently 73.6
προεμφαίνειν, present a premonition 15.18
προήγησις, sequence 31.25; 98.17
πρόθεσις, purpose or undertaking 7.26; 49.18
πρόθυρον, vestibule 66.15; 69.13
προϊέναι, go 77.12; 78.30; 79.8; 94.22; 97.24; 109.11; 109.30; 112.16; 147.25; proceed 6.28; 7.5; 7.7; 8.9; 15.1; 17.18; 19.8; 19.12; 19.14; 19.24; 19.24; 19.25; 19.27; 25.15; 27.3; 27.4; 27.7; 29.18; 30.19; 30.26; 32.1; 34.10; 34.22; 39.15; 44.8; 52.19; 52.27; 53.11; 53.15; 54.18; 55.10; 58.2; 60.10; 64.31; 66.21; 73.20; 84.2; 88.22; 89.8; 92.10; 94.20; 95.25; 99.12; 100.5; 101.33; 102.29; 105.23; 105.31; 106.29; 107.12; 113.20; 118.3; 126.15; 134.30; 135.1; 150.9; 150.12; 157.10; 157.11
ἐρεῖ προϊών, says in what follows 141.24
προεῖναι, be prior to 55.3
προκαλεῖν, summon 81.29; 73.12; 95.32
προκαταλαμβάνειν, anticipate 92.14
προκατασπείρειν, implant 158.12
προλαμβάνειν, antecedently comprehend 20.27; 36.1; 56.21; 69.25; 122.7; 159.17; presuppose 3.21; prefigure 16.16
προνοητικός, providential 2.22; 4.16; 109.25
πρόνοια, providence 150.9; 153.9; 155.12
προνοεῖν, exercise providence 72.8; 154.26
πρόοδος, procession 3.8; 4.24; 4.26; 18.1; 21.32; 29.3; 30.9; 30.12; 31.7; 31.17; 35.18; 44.20; 46.27; 50.12; 51.29; 55.8; 57.8; 63.27; 73.14; 81.5; 91.8; 92.9; 105.9; 107.5; 107.28; 140.20; 143.5; 143.27; 150.6; 153.14; progression 46.15
προοίμιον, prologue 53.27; 160.25
προπάτωρ Οὐρανός, Grandfather Ouranos 99.17
προποδίζειν, exhibit progression 7.11; 56.18; 96.18; 128.7; 146.12
προποδισμός, progression 56.15; 66.11; 68.7; 81.7; 146.11
προπόρευμα, forward march (Oracles) 124.27; 124.29; 124.31
πρόρρησις, prediction 125.29
πρόσγειος, at the perigee 77.5; 79.10; 96.19
προσεικάζειν, assimilate 115.18
προσεοικός, fitting and appropriate 30.23; 141.19
προσηγορεύειν, call 111.2; 140.6; refer to as 100.11; 101.10; 101.22; 153.23

προσιέναι 25.21; 48.26
πρόσθεν, εἰς τὸ, going forward 119.13; forward 120.16; 120.22; 121.18; 121.26; 122.29; 122.31; 123.2; 123.4; 123.10; 124.32; 129.24; toward what is in front 121.24
πρόσθεσις, progression 66.9; addition 68.8; 84.23
προσλαμβάνειν, gain 42.22; receive in addition 57.19; take as partner 28.23; *(passive)*, receive 7.30; 10.25; multiply 40.25
προσόμοιος, bearing a resemblance 98.5; 116.8
προσονομάζειν, refer to 154.19
πρόσρησις, way of referring to 49.10; 100.15
προστασία, leadership 2.17
προστατεῖν, be in charge of 153.25
προστάτης, he who presides over 159.24
προστιθέναι, add 8.27; 43.32; 76.17; 96.17; 104.10; 124.15; 137.9; attribute 49.12
προσυποδεικύναι, provide an additional demonstration 11.32
προσφέρειν, transfer 47.20; 47.28; 48.14
πρόσφορος, appropriate 40.11; 52.24; proper 18.10; 19.13; suitable 23.26; 38.26
προσφόρως, in a manner that is suitable 49.18
προσχρήσει, ἐν, calling in the help (of) 103.29; 103.31
προσχώρησις, approach 145.3; 146.11; 150.1
προσχωρεῖν, approach 146.12
πρόσω, in front 56.20; 123.17; 123.19; 123.27
  εἰς τὸ πρόσω, forward 121.28; 123.15; 123.20; 123.30; 124.14; 148.8; 148.15
  ἐπὶ τὸ πρόσω, toward the front 124.3
πρότασις, premise 115.13
προυπάρχειν, pre-exist 32.23; 32.24; 36.8; 41.22; 74.5; 79.21; 85.27; 104.29
προϋπόστασις, antecedent existence 80.4
προϋφιστάναι, exist in a pre-existent manner 23.16; pre-exist 103.8; 107.31
πρώτιστος, first, most primary 7.8; 30.4; 34.3; 36.9; 44.7; 52.31; 55.32; 89.5; 100.8; 105.22; 140.12; 160.26; very first 10.30; 19.10; 33.17; 33.21; 33.22; 43.16; 105.10; 105.25; 118.2; 128.32 134.31; 141.2; 141.20; 143.3; 143.22; 144.14; 144.15; 144.17; 151.25; 153.7
πρῶτος, first 7.11; 10.11; 10.32; 13.10; 13.12; 14.20; 22.28; 24.19; 28.16; 29.17; 33.13; 45.8; 49.28; 55.19; 60.24; 63.29; 64.29; 65.17; 84.24; 84.27; 97.11; 97.20; 97.21; 102.27; 103.20; 103.28; 103.30; 106.18; 112.23; 124.3; 124.22; 134.22; 133.13; 134.25; 135.10; 142.1; 143.7; 144.18; 157.12; primary 9.19; 30.3; 33.26; 33.28; 57.29; 58.16; 66.14; 85.13; 88.11; 101.12; 106.14; 107.10; prime (of numbers) 91.26; 91.27
  τὸ π., the One 33.15
  πρῶτον, at first 104.31; first 10.6; 32.7; 41.12; 41.29; 45.12; 47.27; 105.7; 105.15; 112.24; 112.25; 113.20; 154.4; 154.24; 157.10; for the first time 133.18; in the first place 11.29; 21.13; 34.28; 136.12
  εἰς τὸ πρῶτον, in the first place 145.21
  κατὰ πρώτην, first 97.17
πρωτουργός, primary-effective 30.22; 31.26; 36.1; 53.10; 55.29; 72.12
πρώτως, in a primary manner, mode or way 13.5; 13.6; 15.31; 29.21; 55.8; 72.28; 85.11; 85.12; 88.14; 92.20; 94.30; 94.33; 100.16; 100.30; 100.31; 101.14; 106.1; 115.32; 116.1; 119.25; 135.1; in a primary sense 3.7; 7.29; primarily 6.32
πτεροῤῥύησις, shedding of wings 43.7
πτέρυξ, wing 109.31
πτηνόν, winged 104.24; 109.7; 109.22; 109.25; 109.28; 109.30; 111.1
Πτολεμαῖος, Ptolemy 62.17; 63.19; 114.31; 124.21
Πυθαγόρας, Pythagoras 161.4; 161.5
Πυθαγόρειος, Pythagorean 49.17; 107.13; 138.4; 141.11; 161.2
πῦρ, fire 61.28; 68.4; 111.5; 111.6; 111.7; 111.10; 111.14; 111.16; 111.18; 111.21; 111.23; 111.25; 111.26; 112.4; 112.6; 112.20; 112.24; 112.29; 113.1; 113.7; 113.8; 113.11; 113.19; 113.23; 113.24; 113.25; 114.9; 114.12; 114.26; 114.28; 115.6; 115.12; 115.14; 125.1; 125.1; 128.19; 128.20; 128.21; 128.22; 128.24; 128.25; 128.30;

129.8; 130.3; 130.4; 130.8; 130.13; 130.13; 130.14; 130.22; 130.23; 141.28; 142.1; 142.5; 142.9; 142.12; 142.14; 142.18; 142.18; 142.19
π. ἡλίου, of the Sun 63.24; 132.33
π. θεῖον, divine 114.15; 114.23
π. νοερόν, intellectual 114.12
π. νοητόν, intelligible 114.11
π. οὐράνιον, celestial 111.23; 114.11; (114.13)
π. σωματοειδές, corporeal in form (114.13)
π. ὑποσέληνον, sublunary 111.27
π. ὑπὸ σελήνην, sublunary 111.15; (112.14)
π. ὑπουράνιον, sub-celestial (114.14)
τὸ ἄνω πῦρ, the fire that exists on high 111.26
τὸ ἐκει πῦρ, the fire up there 114.30; 128.32; 129.6
τὸ ἐνταῦθα πῦρ, the fire down here 68.1; 111.31; 112.3; 130.7
τὸ ὄντως πῦρ, that which is really fire 112.5; 112.13; 114.25
πύριος, fiery 113.3; 113.27; 113.31; 114.1; 114.26; 115.3
πυρίως, in a fiery manner 142.4
πυροειδής, pyro-form 112.1; 112.4; 129.2; 142.19

P

ῥαστώνη, good nature 119.10
ῥέειν, derive 54.18; flow 27.8; 59.5
ῥῆμα, word 3.23; 12.32; 34.13; 47.27; 71.9; 103.20; 109.15; 143.32; 154.19; 160.18; verb 16.22; 38.19
ῥῆσις, word 87.12
Ῥόδος, Rhodes 125.13

Σ

Σαβάζιος, Sabazios 41.11; Sabazion 41.11
σαφῶς, clearly 24.21; 35.11; 38.3; 40.7; 50.1; 63.22; 125.2; 127.29; 159.9; 159.22
σειρά, series 37.4; 89.4; 115.21; 157.2; 159.28
Σειρῆνα, Siren 67.10; 70.24
σελήνη, Moon 19.31; 39.25; 52.30; 53.2; 55.20; 56.1; 56.5; 59.18; 60.24; 61.2; 61.9; 61.9; 61.16; 61.27; 61.28; 61.32; 62.2; 62.12; 62.27; 63.3; 63.14; 63.16; 63.26; 64.30; 65.17; 65.20; 65.21; 67.29; 68.8; 69.9; 69.15; 75.13; 77.21; 77.21; 77.25; 77.27; 78.14; 78.14; 78.17; 78.19; 81.8; 84.19; 84.27; 85.18; 86.3; 91.19; 103.8; 131.20; 131.26; 142.12; 142.15; 155.1; Selênê 61.7
ὑπὸ σελήνην, below the Moon 128.32; 130.8; 130.21; 142.9; 154.22; 156.7; sublunary 8.29; 56.19; 57.11; 58.21; 68.6; 79.14; 88.12; 88.20; 92.26; 93.30; 96.13; 108.33; 111.7; 111.15; 112.14; 118.14; 118.23; 119.8; 122.3; 122.9; 134.24; 142.3; 152.13; 152.29; 153.17; 153.25; 152.7; 160.28
σεληνιακός, lunar 36.10; of the Moon 54.30; 57.18; 78.27
σεμνός, dignified 3.19; 10.8; 10.22; holy 38.19; possessing dignity 20.9; superior 42.12; 51.28; worthy 21.7
σημεῖον, point 81.9; 87.29; 87.32; 93.4; 137.2; 148.33; sign (of Zodiac) 92.30; 92.31; 93.10; sign 120.28; 145.8; 150.30; 150.32; 152.2
Περὶ Σημείων, *On Signs* (book title) 151.9
σθένος, strength 29.7; 46.7
Σίβυλλα, Sybil 160.2
σκέμμα, issue 49.6; 158.32; topic 94.15; 105.19; 156.4
σκέψις, enquiry 48.32
σκοπεῖν, consider 41.5; 86.8; 160.18
σκοτεινός, dark 84.6; 84.8; 84.31; 114.18; 129.7; 141.4; 141.16; 142.8
σμικρομερής, constituted of small parts 112.12
Σοφιστής, *Sophist* (book title) 49.4; 104.11
στάσις, position 68.3; 149.12; Rest 11.21; 11.24; 11.26; 11.26; 13.32; 79.24; 90.12; rest 7.3; 38.2
διάμετρος στάσις, opposition 150.4
στέγειν, retain 122.21
στερεός, solid 113.29; 128.24; 128.29
στερέωμα, firmament 82.18
στέρησις, absence 85.5; 144.25; privation 44.20; 124.7; 124.12
στηριγμός, standing stationary 66.10; station 56.15; 66.11; 68.7
Στοᾶς, οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς, Stoics 95.9

στοιχεῖον, element 2.7; 57.33; 58.22; 67.29; 68.2; 69.10; 97.26; 111.22; 111.24; 113.1; 113.17; 113.21; 113.25; 113.26; 115.8; 115.10; 119.8; 122.9; 128.19; 129.1; 133.19; 135.31; 138.1; 141.7; 141.25; 141.26; 141.31; 142.1; 143.2; 152.21; 155.16; 155.23; 155.32; 152.27
στοχάζεσθαι, aim at 124.11
Στράτων, Strato 15.8; 16.2
συγγενής, related to 90.12; akin 157.6
συγγενῶς, in a relation 30.25
συγκατάδυσις, setting together 146.9
συγκεῖσθαι, be compounded 12.4
συγκεραννύναι, combine 112.30
συγκοινωνεῖν, contribute 65.26
συγκυκᾶν, collapse 12.9
συγχέειν, mix up 44.2; 48.8; run together 2.15
σύγχυσις, confusion 44.6
σύζευξις, connection 134.20
συζεῖν, cohabit 132.10; 132.21
συλλαμβάνειν, assist 8.9; coincide 16.17; comprehend together 58.21; 90.21; 122.21
συλλέγειν, accumulate 22.6
συλλογίζεσθαι, deduce 110.29; draw conclusion 40.18; 62.24; 153.20; infer 132.5; take account of 77.30
συλλογισμός, syllogism 115.10
συμβαίνειν, result 1.22; 116.9; turn out 52.3
συμβεβηκός, incidental property 20.17; 21.6; 23.22; 27.17; 27.17; 38.20; 95.14; 122.15
κατὰ συμβεβηκός, incidentally 119.24; 119.26; 122.14
σύμβολον, symbol 109.28; 155.20; 160.4
συμμερίζειν, divide 52.21
συμμετρία, commensurability 7.16; Symmetry (*Phlb*. 64c) 66.19; 69.13; symmetry 66.2; 66.20; 69.8; 114.23
σύμμετρος, commensurate 7.20; symmetrical 84.27
συμμετρεῖν, measure 36.20; synchronise 86.8
συμμέτρως, in a symmetrical [relation] 5.3
συμμιγνύναι, mix together 94.20
συμμιγής, admixed 114.18
σύμμιξις, mixture 80.9; combination 122.4
συμπαθής, in sympathy 23.1
συμπαράγειν, produce 157.10
συμπαραλαμβάνειν, include 68.2; recruit 125.19; bring in 125.26
συμπαρατείνειν, unfold in parallel 3.8; stretch out alongside 32.11
συμπλέκειν, combine 100.23; amalgamate 105.32
συμπεραίνειν, accomplish 91.4; 92.25; attain 56.11; conclude 151.20
συμπεριάγειν, lead around together 120.11; 132.13
συμπεριιέναι, go along with 75.10
συμπεριπολεῖν, go around together 66.24; revolve in conjunction with 131.6; revolve together 129.14
συμπεριφέρεσθαι, carry around with 111.32; 132.12
συμπλέκειν, tie together 116.4
συμπληροῦν, complete 83.31; compose 96.6; constitute 155.10; essentially constitute 98.8; 99.31; 105.18; 116.17; fill 37.3; 80.6; 131.21; 132.3; 158.29; fill out 73.16
συμπληρωτικός, essentially constitutive 97.29
συμπλοκή, interweaving 31.25; 80.4
σύμπνοια, symbiosis 7.16
Συμπόσιον, *Symposium* (book title) 154.28
σύμπτωμα, coincidence 80.5
σύμφυλος, of the same family 51.20
συμφύειν, conjoin 72.27; connect 142.10
συμφωνία, coherence 134.19; concord 7.17; 141.8
σύμφωνος, in agreement 125.20; 126.3; concordant 146.6
συμφωνεῖν, agree 21.13; 125.23; make consistent 108.30
συναγωγός, such as to bring together 101.5; 138.25
συναισθάνεσθαι, have awareness 20.14
συναίσθησις, awareness 8.28
συνανατέλλειν, rise together 93.8
συνανατολή, rising together 146.9
συναναφύρειν, mix together 49.13
συναπαρτίζειν, leave off 62.27
συναπεργασία, collaborative efforts 66.26
συναποκαθιστάναι, come back together in the same state 88.1; complete a cycle in conjunction with 129.15; 138.13

συναποκατάστασις, completion of cycle 83.25; 84.1; joint completion of cycle 92.32
συναποτελεῖν, contribute towards making 151.19; jointly produce 72.14; 140.1
συνάπτειν, connect 15.13; 30.32; 51.6; 102.4; 111.20; 117.22; 118.17; 134.7; 142.9; 143.7; 150.5; 150.7; 160.8; 160.12; conjoin 63.27; 64.1; 102.8; 108.1; 119.2; 120.11; *(passive)* coincide 63.2; 63.8; 63.15
συναρμοστικός, harmonising 66.8
συναρτᾶν, weave together 119.20
σύναψις, alignment 145.3; 149.8; 150.4
συνδετικός, of binding 66.7
συνδημιουργεῖν, collaborate 65.23
συνδιήκειν, mutually extend 68.2
συνδιιστάναι, be subject to being divided along with 32.2
συνδράμειν, come together 93.10
σύνδρομος, coinciding 104.4; 104.8; going together 122.22
συνεῖναι, be present 16.21; 51.11; 66.23; be together with 17.7
συνείρειν, string together 146.26
συνεισφέρειν, introduce 16.26
συνεκδράμειν, sally forth together 59.7
συνεκτείνειν, extend along with 27.29
συνεκτικός, connective, such as to connect 38.23; 50.27; 113.32; sustaining 110.6; 138.19; 138.26; 139.18; 141.10; 142.29
συνελίσσειν, articulate 117.28; roll together 35.30; 36.12; spell out together 20.9; unfold 95.34
συνενοῦν, unite together 61.5; 101.28
συνεξαφανίζειν, destroy along with 18.26
συνεξομοιοῦν, assimilate 121.25
συνεργία, joint activity 120.18
συνεσπειραμένως, in a concentrated form 92.23
συνέχεια, continuity 31.17; 33.5; 146.25
συνεχῶς, continually 118.24
συνήθεια, common usage 47.28
σύνθετος, composite 46.19
συννεύειν, converge 92.11; 116.3; 139.12
σύννευσις, convergence 116.4
συννοεῖν, reflect upon 117.5
συνοδεύειν, be in conjunction with 62.13
σύνοδος, conjunction 149.8; 149.11; 150.7; 150.8; new Moon 85.18
συνοικεῖν, dwell with 2.30
σύνολον, entire thing 33.9
συνιδεῖν, see 7.33; 85.8
συνουσία, class 49.2
συνοχεύς, Connector 18.4
συνοχή, connecting 67.24; continuity 11.13; 69.7; maintenance 11.31; 12.26
συνοχικός, such as to make continuous 88.25
σύνταξις, arrangement 146.8; being coordinate 14.23; 43.4; *Syntaxis* (book title) 62.17; 62.24
συντάττειν, arrange together 46.7; 71.12; 134.18; make (render) coordinate with 42.26; 47.29; 48.24; 48.26; 58.18; 118.1; 118.3; 135.4; 148.21; place in the same class 23.1; rank alongside 46.12; 53.13
  συντεταγμένος, be at / on the same level 13.33; 85.10; be integrated with 24.19
συντέλεια, completion 71.8; 93.22
συντελεῖν, contribute 8.6; 55.18; 53.23; 87.31; 133.23; 151.15; help to bring about 27.6; 39.22; work together with 65.24
συντέμνειν, shorten 28.2
συντρέπειν, turn with 65.19
συνυπάρχειν, co-exist 50.16; 114.15; 122.12
συνυφαίνειν, weave together 99.4; 133.16
συνυφιστάναι, bring forth together with 3.26; co-exist with 118.8; contribute to the establishment of 39.19; contribute 39.24; establish in conjunction with 70.5; establish together with 2.13; 58.5
συρρέειν, (currents that) flow together 134.15
συσπείρειν, concentrate 137.18; roll up 105.2
σύστασις, composition 44.3; 111.6; 128.15; 136.24; 146.19; 146.28
συστατικός, that which commends 89.19; that from which something is composed 114.16
συστέλλειν, reduce 102.28; condense 106.33
σύστοιχος, coordinate, on the same level 7.18; 58.27; 58.28; 131.11; 131.12; 131.15; 143.16; 158.20

συσφίγγειν, bind close together 136.32
συσχημάτισις, global astral situation 93.3
σφαῖρα, ball 141.22; sphere 56.17; 58.12; 58.13; 58.14; 58.17; 60.6; 60.19; 67.13; 67.15; 70.9; 70.10; 70.11; 70.13; 76.24; 76.34; 77.5; 82.16; 91.7; 96.5; 96.14; 111.25; 116.1; 123.27; 128.17; 128.28; 131.7; 131.22; 133.27; 134.2; 146.14; 146.18; 146.19; 146.24; 147.8; 147.15; 147.19; 147.20; 147.23; 148.3; 148.6; 148.10; 148.15; 148.17; 154.12
ἡ κρικωτὴ σφαῖρα, armillary sphere 145.25
ἡ ὅλη σφαῖρα, universal sphere 59.24; 118.5; 123.23; 128.16; 147.29
ἡ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης σφαῖρα, the sphere of Venus 63.15
ἡ τοῦ ἀέρος σφαῖρα, aerial sphere 109.27
ἡ τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ σφαῖρα, the sphere of Mercury 63.14
σ. ἔκκεντρος, eccentric sphere 146.20
σ. οὐράνιος, of the heavens 118.5
σ. πλανώμενη, planetary 121.30; 131.4; 148.1
σ. σεληνιακή, lunar 36.11
σφαιρικός, spherical 55.22; 139.14; 143.8; 148.20; of the spheres 76.24
σφαιροειδής, spherical in form 115.32
σφαιροποιία, creation of the spheres 60.31; 148.2
σφαιροῦν, be spherical 46.31; 139.15
σφίγγειν, bind fast 137.6; 139.15; 143.21
σφοδρός, violent 129.4
σφόνδυλος, whorl (*Rep.* X, 616d) 56.33; 70.24
σχέσις, relation 35.5; 74.26; 88.4; 95.18; 154.21; 159.3
κατὰ σχέσιν, relational 158.27; 158.30
σχετικός, relational 159.2
σχῆμα, configuration 93.1; 150.29; shape 80.5; 112.26; 115.31; 119.20; 119.21; 119.23; 122.17; 139.25; 139.26; 143.9; 149.13
σχηματισμός, configuration 90.22; 149.9
σχίζειν, divide 60.2
σχολή, leisure 68.22; 145.21
σῴζειν, conserve 48.20; 159.23; preserve 2.31; 6.2; 18.29; 60.16; 109.10; 117.9; 144.18
Σωκράτης, Socrates 19.16; 19.22; 54.23; 67.9; 70.20; 72.20; 72.23; 103.4; 120.27; 129.6; 141.15; 141.30; 149.28; 154.5; 154.15
σῶμα, body 3.2; 20.12; 20.18; 21.16; 21.24; 27.31; 28.19; 31.12; 31.31; 31.32; 33.30; 43.8; 54.20; 59.15; 59.20; 59.21; 59.27; 59.30; 60.5; 60.14; 68.30; 71.5; 71.27; 71.29; 72.17; 72.22; 72.24; 72.27; 73.7; 73.9; 73.11; 74.3; 75.11; 76.25; 80.7; 81.1; 82.21; 82.31; 91.8; 91.15; 94.20; 103.13; 110.1; 111.7; 113.8; 113.10; 114.6; 114.32; 115.7; 117.11; 117.20; 117.25; 119.23; 119.26; 120.14; 120.20; 120.30; 130.11; 132.23; 133.8; 133.25; 135.12; 135.13; 135.15; 135.19; 136.7; 136.10; 136.17; 136.20; 147.4
σωματικός, corporeal 19.5; 23.12; 31.21; 54.25; 60.16; 74.22; 81.30; 83.20; 88.25; 93.19; 95.24; 106.10; 113.13; 120.7; 120.8; 120.9; 121.10; 121.18; 143.19; 145.31
σωματοειδής, corporeal 21.18; 30.5; 49.29; 82.8; 135.9; corporeal-formed 4.20; corporeal in form 114.13
σωτηρία, preservation 20.16

T

τάξις, arrangement 93.18; course 5.26; level 88.19; order 2.14; 4.9; 5.3; 10.6; 18.6; 30.32; 31.17; 31.24; 37.3; 38.22; 45.11; 48.9; 52.15; 56.13; 56.24; 58.21; 60.32; 61.10; 69.5; 69.26; 71.6; 71.25; 82.13; 83.9; 90.24; 91.9; 93.2; 96.25; 97.10; 97.23; 98.10; 98.16; 99.14; 99.24; 99.27; 99.28; 99.29; 101.9; 104.13; 106.5; 106.12; 106.30; 107.7; 109.4; 109.10; 109.15; 114.14; 116.29; 118.30; 119.1; 121.31; 124.10; 127.8; 127.10; 127.16; 127.22; 133.3; 133.7; 133.8; 134.9; 134.22; 134.29; 140.31; 142.27; 142.28; 144.2; 144.5; 152.22; 153.13; 155.13; 155.17; 156.5; 156.9; 156.26; 157.1; 157.5; 157.8; 160.2; 160.22; 160.29; 161.1; position 13.30; 62.4; 134.26; 144.27; rank 40.2; status 56.2; 61.4; 61.28; 101.1; 111.3; 113.28; 120.25; 134.1; 159.1

Τάρταρος, Tartarus 143.27; 143.32; 143.33
τάσις, tension 132.29
ταυτότης, Sameness 11.21; 74.7; 74.18; 79.23; 90.12; 113.5; sameness 56.14
τάχιστος, fastest or quickest 77.8; 77.13; 78.7; 78.11; 87.13
ταχύτερος, faster 77.21
ταχύτης, quickness 76.18
τεκμαίρεσθαι, be inferred 132.17
τεκμήριον, sure indication 114.20; proof 22.27; 126.4
τεκταίνεσθαι, construct 59.27; frame 21.19; 143.19
τέλεος, complete 23.3; perfect 3.5; 3.12; 3.15; 7.3
τέλειος, complete 22.23; 27.5; 38.15; 47.5; 47.6; 51.2; 52.11; 73.21; 92.18; 92.19; 138.11; perfect 2.18; 3.22; 6.29; 10.10; 10.24; 10.31; 10.31; 11.2; 11.7; 22.22; 52.2; 52.14; 54.22; 57.16; 91.2; 91.2; 92.17; 93.23; 94.6; 94.10; 95.3; 95.5; 98.10; 98.15
τελειότης, completeness 16.24; 18.3; perfection 8.8; 17.8; 18.8; 18.15; 22.9; 24.12; 38.30; 135.8
τελειοῦν, bring about the completion of 21.24; bring to a conclusion 46.29; bring to completion 30.22; 59.4; complete 22.25; 28.9; 36.13; perfect 1.11; 2.14; 2.26; 20.8; 22.2; 22.3; 38.25; 52.7; 68.12; 136.21
τελείωσις, completion or perfection 4.18; 22.6; 22.21; 24.1
τελειωτικός, such as to make complete or perfect 25.12; 51.25
τελεσιουργία, completion 65.24
τελεσιουργός, bringing about or conferring perfection 1.14; 38.22; 68.16; 88.25; 92.9; 101.5; 110.9; 136.28; 142.30; 144.3; 144.5; bringing to completion 95.24
τελεστής, one who practises theurgic rites 6.9; 6.13
τελεστική, ἡ, the art of theurgy 155.18; 155.28
  βίος τελεστικός, life dedicated to mystic rites 159.25
  θεσμὸς τελεστικός, sacred rite 41.4
τελετές, sacred rites 41.12; 41.13
τελευταῖος, final 7.12; 10.32; 29.24; 42.11; 44.8; 70.18; 110.8; 135.20; 144.18; 158.8; last 34.7
τελέως, completely 18.6; 25.23; 130.13; perfectly 19.22; 94.32; thoroughly 98.5
τελική αἰτία, final cause 90.9; 126.13
τέλος, completion 22.17; final [cause] 28.32; thing finalised 44.22; purpose 121.3; goal 92.10; end 16.16; 18.11; 33.6; 51.27; 73.20; 90.27; 92.15; 93.5; 151.11; 151.17; 151.20
  διὰ τέλους, throughout all 49.25
  ἐν τέλει, complete 90.26
τέμνειν, divide 40.10
τεταγμένως, in an orderly fashion/manner/way 28.21; 85.2; 117.18; 147.12
τείνειν, extend 133.12; 136.30; 139.16; 144.8; run through 135.12; stretch 137.3; 137.5; 138.30; 139.3; 139.8; 139.10
τετραγωνικῶς, in a manner that is rectangular 149.10
τετραδικός, tetradic 1.23; four-fold 106.19
τετρακτύς, tetrachtys 67.29
τετραμερής, four-part 106.17
τετράς, tetrad 1.23; 97.27; 100.10; 105.15; 105.33; 106.2; 106.6; 106.17; 106.19; 106.27; 107.10; 107.15; 107.19; 107.21; 107.25; 113.20; 116.21
τέτταρες, four 5.10; 61.30; 104.23; 105.17; 106.16; 106.21; 107.10; 107.26; 108.27; 112.17; 118.2; 142.3
τεχνίτης, craftsman 23.7
τηρεῖν, sustain 114.3
τήρησις, observation 124.22; 124.23; 124.24; 125.28; 125.31; 145.15; 145.27
τίκτειν, bring forth 43.20; give birth 61.6; 107.15
Τίμαιος, Timaeus 15.11; 19.20; 35.27; 36.3; 49.6; 107.7; 137.16; 138.4; 139.21; 158.5; 159.18
Τιτανικός, Titanic (order of gods) 144.3; 144.9
Τιτήνιος, Titanic 138.30
τμῆμα, division 64.22
τομή, division 11.1
τοπικός, locomotive 124.2; local 124.2
τοπικῶς, locally 18.25; spatially 139.11

τόπος, latitude 125.8; place 46.18; 78.16; 96.8; 96.10; 96.12; 111.10; 111.11; 111.17; 111.27; 114.25; 114.26; 114.32; 115.1; 115.2; 115.4; 119.28; 119.29; 121.19; 121.27; 121.27; 140.26; position 132.7; 142.24; region 65.17; 126.26
τρέπειν, turn 34.12; 77.6; 96.4; 126.8; 128.1; 128.9; 129.13; 147.19; 148.7; 150.18
τρέφειν, nourish 135.22; 136.17; 136.20; 144.8; (passive) thrive 108.15
τριάς, triad 57.28; 58.1; 62.9; 64.29; 67.19; 67.22; 69.7; 69.10; 95.27; 97.27; 103.19; 110.31
τριγωνικῶς, in a triangular manner 149.10
τρίτος, tertiary 98.18; 99.14; third 7.15; 32.21; 39.8; 43.14; 45.7; 45.11; 57.32; 65.15; 90.6; 97.9; 97.30; 99.3; 100.27; 103.23; 103.31; 103.32; 104.24; 105.27; 106.4; 112.26; 116.18; 124.34; 125.12
τροπή, reversal 96.17; turning 67.19; 94.5; 96.1; 96.26; 127.32; 128.3; 147.13; 147.18; 148.22
τροπικόν, solstice 92.31
τροφή, nourishment 99.21; 111.9
τροφός, nurse 133.11; 134.31; 136.12; 136.23; 136.24; 136.26; 144.5
τύπος, impact 39.27; impression 33.18; 47.2; 149.31

Y

ὑγιάζειν, heal 130.11; 130.12
ὑγιαίνειν, be in a state of health 130.12
ὑγιής, sound 42.2
ὑδροβατῆρας, one who walks on water 110.5
ὕδωρ, liquid 111.9; water 108.4; 108.14; 108.15; 110.4; 111.29; 113.19; 128.21; 140.25; 141.28; 142.6
ὑλαῖος, material 113.17; 113.22
ὕλη, matter 15.28; 37.6; 84.20; 85.4; 114.18; 114.19; 122.18; 122.21; 122.23; 134.14; 155.21
ὑμνεῖν, celebrate 20.25; 27.10; 40.30; 40.32; 41.11; 43.12; 80.13; 119.1; 131.29; 154.11; 157.4; 159.20; praise 40.22; sing hymns to 144.6
ὕπαρξις, existence 9.17; 15.5; 44.25; 144.19; 156.4; 157.22; subsistence 89.20
  καθ' ὕπαρξιν, by virtue of their very being 158.28
ὑπάρχειν, be present 16.20; be 25.31; 82.29; 90.26; 112.12; belong 9.6; 89.24; 116.14; 121.27; 124.4; 124.8; come 88.32; exist 74.11; pertain 145.31; subsist 85.9; 102.11
ὑπεναντίος, opposed 17.15
ὑπεραίρειν, go beyond 152.9
ὑπερέχειν, be superior 127.13; 127.19; 127.20; rise above 123.23
ὑπερκόσμιος, hypercosmic 28.10; 28.11; 53.7; 53.14; 54.12; 81.29; 82.13; 82.18; 82.23; 82.30; 83.1; 83.7; 83.11; 83.12; 83.14; 88.19; 95.22; 107.2; 107.3; 138.1
ὑπερουράνιος, above the heaven 156.31
ὑπεροχή, superiority 14.26; 24.16; 106.8; 124.7; 131.8; 141.31; 142.26; 142.27; 143.23; 152.34
ὑπερτέλειος, superperfect 11.1; 11.4
ὑποδέχεσθαι, receive 4.26; 4.32; 5.1; 7.5; 21.30; 30.29; 50.28; 74.30; 94.33; 99.32; 105.33; 107.22; 113.9; 118.27; 135.4; 140.22
ὑποδοχή, receptacle 6.6; 7.15; 7.23; living-quarters 141.18
ὑπόθεσις, assumption 63.13; hypothesis 14.21; 56.28; 62.6; 62.22; 63.28; 76.29; 104.13; 141.14; 145.14; 148.25; premise 126.2; 126.4; supposition 65.2
  ἐπὶ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, what is posited 62.30
  καθ' ὑπόθεσιν, in a hypothetical sense 16.19
ὑποκείμενον, subject 27.16; 27.16; 44.23; substrate or underlying subject 3.22; 18.23; 113.28; 114.2
  ὑποκειμένη οὐσία, substrate 113.27
ὑπόληψις, assumption 25.4
ὑπόμνησις, reminder 127.11
ὑπόνοια, conjecture 78.24; deeper understanding 154.10
ὑποποδίζειν, exhibit retrogradation 56.18; 128.7; 146.13; 147.11
ὑποποδισμός, retrogradation 56.15; 66.11; 68.7; 81.7; 146.12
ὑποσέληνος, sublunary 111.27

ὑπόστασις, existence 35.28; 58.1; 159.6; hypostasis 84.3; 156.24; mode of being 104.8
ὑποστάτης, creator 69.20
ὑποστατικός, constitutive of the being 103.9; 107.27; 109.14
ὑποστίζειν, punctuate with a comma 121.9; 121.19
ὑποταρτάριος, sub-Tartarian 143.30
ὑποτέμνειν, cut off from 52.25
ὑπουράνιος, sub-celestial 114.14; 158.16; 158.17; 158.18
ὑστερογενής, secondary by-product 26.18
ὑφείμενος, inferior 17.5; 51.28; 58.19; 106.26; 111.3
ὕφεσις, deterioration 109.10; inferiority 53.28; 58.20
ὑφήγησις, teachings 9.22; guidance 158.24
ὑφηγητικά, τὰ, *Guidebooks* (book title) 124.33
ὑφιστάναι, come to exist 52.29; 157.25; establish 2.10; 10.6; 21.15; 22.22; 27.14; 29.29; 32.8; 51.25; 51.32; 53.29; 58.6; 69.1; 69.29; 80.33; 81.26; 82.16; 86.28; 93.21; 94.12; 95.22; 95.26; 97.17; 97.25; 98.7; 99.13; 99.28; 100.32; 105.28; 106.16; 108.3; 112.24; 113.21; 116.3; 122.17; 132.32; 133.18; 133.19; 144.2; 155.29; 157.7; 157.28; 157.32; 158.3; 159.5; exist 2.22; 52.22; 144.15; give existence to 66.17; 90.5; 111.8; subsist 95.14; 111.15; 134.12
ὑψοῦσθαι, come to be at the apogee 77.5; 96.18

Φ

Φαῖδρος, *Phaedrus* (book title) 72.23; 149.27; 154.30
Φαίδων, *Phaedo* (book title) 137.10; 141.15; 141.30
φαίνειν, appear or be apparent 35.6; 56.25; 153.30; be visible 125.11; illuminate 80.27; 84.4; 85.16; make manifest 13.29; 74.15; seem 77.9; 78.8; 78.12; 136.14; 141.3
φαινόμενος, apparent 36.1; 36.28; 56.14; 74.25; 87.26; 96.15; 133.7; visible 30.6; 36.19; 36.23; 44.14; 72.20; 131.3; 135.20; 150.23
φαινόμενον, appearance 35.26; 66.13; 80.2; 156.24; phenomenon 125.5; 125.20; 125.23; 126.4
φαίνων, Saturn 19.31
φανός, bright 149.29; 159.16
φανερός, evident 5.5; obvious 41.7; 63.7; 96.13; visible 80.31
Φάνης, Phanes 83.4; 83.10; 101.10
φανταζόμενος, appearing 27.17; be manifested 31.29
φαντασία, imagination 69.18; 69.20; 158.9
φανταστικός, of the imagination 69.19
φάος, light 14.4
φάσις, rising 149.18
φήμη, tradition 89.17; 90.3; 83.16; repute 62.4
φθαρτός, corruptible or destructible 39.3; 81.27; 136.1; 155.21
φθαρτικός, destructive 79.30; 129.2
φθίνειν, decay 2.7
φθορά, corruption or destruction 20.15; 23.4; 69.9; ruin 150.19
φίλερις, fond of disputation 130.6
Φίληβος, *Philebus* (book title) 104.12; 129.5
φιλοθεάμων, lover of spectacle 108.7; 149.6
φιλόσοφος, philosopher 2.27; 8.22; 12.32; 14.16; 21.31; 24.26; 25.26; 31.2; 52.32; 145.16; 145.29
φοιτᾶν, run through 94.21
φορά, motion or movement 30.11; 40.19; 52.22; 54.25; 56.26; 65.28; 71.2; 71.24; 73.22; 73.23; 73.27; 74.22; 75.8; 75.11; 77.8; 78.11; 78.32; 79.12; 80.24; 83.22; 83.24; 85.24; 88.6; 88.9; 92.28; 94.13; 117.26; 117.29; 118.18; 119.23; 120.17; 121.20; 121.21; 122.6; 128.9; 128.12; fertility (opp. ἀφορία) 94.1
φρόνησις, wisdom 60.11; 60.13; 103.4; 116.22; 118.21; 123.6; 132.8
φρόνιμος, wise 86.2; 86.15; 86.16; 86.18; 87.5; 90.10
φρουρά, guardianship 38.31; 156.2; Watch 141.12
φρουρεῖν, preserve 2.16; 27.8; 40.12; 40.14; 40.19; 54.27
φρουρητικός, guardian 2.9; 139.1; 144.3; 144.8; preserving 21.25; standing guard 54.25
φρουρός, Guardian 18.4
Φρύξ, Phrygian 41.10

φυλακή, preserving 39.9; 40.6; 53.4; 53.30; 54.1; 57.13
φύλαξ, Guardian 68.14; guardian 2.10; 2.11; 133.12; 133.23; 139.22; 140.3; 144.8; 155.33
φυλάττειν, preserve 26.8; 52.26; 109.3; 135.32; 137.9; 140.3; maintain 125.15
φύειν, be natural / naturally 7.22; 7.26; 22.30; 42.6; 105.6; 130.4; grow 108.16; 134.26
φυσικός, natural 19.5; 23.8; 119.23; 146.22; physical 48.32; 133.25; 133.27; 134.3; 135.25; 153.30; 153.31; 156.28
ἡ φυσική, physical science 132.25
ἡ Φυσική Ἀκρόασις, *Lectures on the Physics* (book title) 145.20
φυσικός, physicist 15.9; 32.5
φυσιολογεῖν, do natural philosophy 36.29
φυσιολογία, physical account 133.16; 134.28; study of nature 129.27; 145.19; 156.27
φυσιολόγος, physiologist 152.20; 156.29
φύσις, nature 6.4; 8.5; 8.12; 9.21; 11.17; 12.24; 13.29; 14.26; 16.12; 16.31; 16.33; 17.16; 18.14; 23.25; 25.25; 25.33; 26.12; 26.21; 27.32; 28.7; 28.19; 29.23; 30.22; 31.6; 31.22; 33.17; 45.30; 48.15; 50.11; 50.21; 51.1; 51.22; 57.23; 65.18; 68.2; 68.8; 69.15; 75.1; 76.26; 80.1; 89.27; 96.21; 96.32; 97.4; 104.31; 105.4; 106.10; 113.22; 114.8; 115.9; 115.14; 119.25; 123.20; 128.6; 134.3; 134.8; 134.19; 138.18; 142.7; 143.4; 146.26; 151.11; 155.12; 160.10
ἡ ὅλη φύσις, universal nature 57.26; 115.26
κατὰ φύσιν, by nature 30.5; 31.16; in a natural condition 111.18; 115.15; 115.16; 130.10; natural 30.17; 69.22; 119.10; 123.16; 130.9; 130.11; 130.11; 130.13; 130.14; 130.15; naturally 79.16; 120.30; 130.20
παρὰ φύσιν, in an unnatural condition 111.19; 115.15; 130.7; unnatural 130.20
φύσει, by nature 84.6; naturally 111.12
φ. διαιωνία, eternal nature 49.23; 51.17; 94.7
φ. θεία, divine 155.12
φ. νοερά, intellectual 27.24
φ. πηγαία, originative 69.16
φ. πολυμετάβολος, entirely changeable 85.4
φ. ὑγρά, liquid 110.7
φ. ὑπερκόσμιος, hypercosmic 82.30
φυτό, plant 55.11; 57.21; 135.25; 144.7
φωνή, voice 29.15; sound 67.10
φῶς, light 66.17; 80.25; 81.2; 81.28; 81.33; 82.6; 82.15; 82.22; 83.8; 83.13; 83.26; 83.32; 84.1; 84.3; 84.25; 84.27; 84.32; 85.1; 85.6; 85.8; 85.13; 86.12; 90.8; 112.5; 112.13; 114.21; 129.6; 144.25; 153.4
τὸ ὅλον φῶς, universal light 83.15
φ. ἄχραντον, immaculate 82.10
φ. δημιουργικόν 83.6
φ. ἑνοποιόν, unifying 14.4
φ. ἡλιακόν, solar 81.20; 81.24; 84.6; 88.15
φ. ἡλιοειδές, solar-in-form 160.20
φ. θεῖον, divine 83.2; 160.8
φ. νοερόν 83.6
φ. νοητόν, intelligible 83.5; 101.31
φ. πρῶτον, primary 85.13
φωτεινός, luminous 84.30
φωτίζειν, illuminate 34.28; 84.9; 84.10; 84.10; 84.11; 84.15; 84.17; 85.18; 85.21; shine 84.14
φωτιστικός, such as to illuminate 84.23; 113.31; 129.3

X

χαίρειν, rejoice 6.25; 7.21; 7.22; 62.7
Χαλδαῖοι, Chaldaeans 83.15; 111.20; 124.24; 125.27; 151.2
χαρακτήρ, character 6.11; 6.13
Χάριτες, Graces 119.7; 119.9
χειμών, storm 151.5; winter 151.5
χερσαῖος, going by dry land 104.25; what is terra firma 110.8
χθόνιος, terrestrial 4.29; 110.27; 131.13; 140.15; 140.15; 140.16; 140.16; 140.17; 140.24; 140.25; 140.29
χθονίως, terrestrially 98.1; in a terrestrial manner 140.21; 141.32
χορεία, choreography 56.24; circling motion 50.29; 51.5; dance 9.17; 28.15; 90.23; 138.27; 144.28; 145.1;

146.1; 146.3; 149.24; 151.28; 151.30; evolution 38.16
χορευτικός, dedicated to dancing 28.5; related to dancing 29.30
χορεύειν, dance 28.2; 28.4; 28.5; 28.15; 28.17; 28.18; 29.6; 53.12; 53.24; 133.24; 135.18; 140.33; 146.5; 146.6; 149.27
χορηγία, abundance 7.6; provision 6.29; 82.6
χορηγός, that which provides 24.2
χορόνοος, 'choro-noos' 28.1; 'dancing intellect' 28.14
χορός, chorus 118.8
χρῆσις, usage 42.4; 48.29; 137.13
χρησμῳδεῖν, deliver oracles 160.3
χρησμῳδία, oracle 89.22
χρηστήριος, of oracles 155.19
χρονικός, of time 53.32; 73.15; 80.16; 91.12; temporal 3.9; 18.15; 22.19; 23.10; 23.24; 27.15; 30.31; 31.7; 35.2; 36.12; 42.31; 46.7; 46.15; 46.21; 48.28; 51.18; 55.21; 57.12; 57.25; 80.21; 81.2; 87.20; 88.13; 89.4; 90.17; 91.10; 92.23; 129.19; 133.22
χρόνος, time 2.11; 2.19; 3.8; 3.25; 3.27; 4.1; 4.3; 4.4; 4.5; 7.10; 7.28; 7.32; 8.4; 8.5; 8.7; 8.10; 8.17; 8.23; 8.28; 9.1; 9.16; 9.19; 9.23; 9.26; 9.31; 9.33; 10.4; 10.4; 10.4; 10.16; 11.28; 12.7; 13.5; 13.7; 13.9; 13.10; 13.13; 13.21; 16.7; 16.8; 16.16; 16.20; 17.6; 17.17; 17.18; 17.24; 17.28; 18.2; 18.9; 18.13; 18.18; 18.32; 19.2; 19.7; 19.15; 19.19; 19.28; 19.30; 20.1; 20.2; 20.3; 20.4; 20.19; 20.21; 20.21; 21.9; 21.10; 21.15; 21.20; 21.26; 21.32; 22.2; 22.6; 22.10; 22.16; 22.16; 22.18; 22.27; 22.29; 22.32; 23.2; 23.4; 23.5; 23.14; 23.29; 23.32; 24.7; 24.10; 24.13; 24.17; 24.23; 24.25; 24.27; 24.28; 24.30; 25.3; 25.5; 25.8; 25.24; 26.3; 26.14; 26.18; 26.27; 27.1; 27.19; 27.21; 27.22; 27.26; 28.1; 28.3; 28.9; 28.12; 28.14; 28.27; 28.30; 28.31; 29.6; 29.10; 29.16; 29.28; 29.29; 29.32; 30.4; 30.8; 30.9; 30.11; 30.26; 30.31; 31.15; 31.33; 32.3; 32.11; 32.16; 32.20; 32.22; 32.26; 32.28; 32.29; 32.29; 32.32; 33.17; 33.29; 34.17; 34.18; 34.23; 34.25; 35.1; 35.10; 35.11; 35.16; 35.17; 35.21; 35.30; 35.33; 36.4; 36.15; 36.21; 36.21; 36.21; 36.30; 37.1; 37.4; 37.4; 37.7; 37.12; 37.13; 37.16; 37.18; 37.20; 37.21; 37.23; 37.24; 37.25; 37.27; 37.29; 37.32; 38.5; 38.6; 38.9; 38.15; 38.15; 38.17; 38.20; 38.22; 38.24; 38.27; 38.29; 39.6; 39.7; 39.8; 39.9; 39.10; 39.12; 39.15; 39.18; 39.31; 39.31; 39.33; 40.6; 40.7; 40.12; 40.15; 40.19; 40.22; 40.25; 40.29; 40.31; 42.28; 43.4; 43.12; 43.15; 43.30; 44.1; 44.5; 44.19; 44.26; 44.29; 45.2; 45.5; 45.9; 45.17; 46.6; 46.9; 46.10; 46.12; 46.13; 46.14; 46.16; 46.17; 46.22; 46.23; 46.23; 46.24; 46.25; 46.25; 46.28; 46.28; 46.29; 47.4; 47.6; 47.13; 47.15; 47.19; 48.8; 49.11; 49.20; 49.25; 49.27; 50.2; 50.3; 50.3; 50.3; 50.4; 50.4; 50.4; 50.5; 50.6; 50.7; 50.8; 50.8; 50.10; 50.10; 50.20; 50.20; 50.22; 50.25; 50.29; 50.31; 50.32; 50.33; 51.2; 51.3; 51.5; 51.7; 51.9; 51.11; 51.14; 51.22; 51.24; 51.31; 51.32; 52.3; 52.5; 52.8; 52.19; 52.24; 52.31; 53.2; 53.2; 53.4; 53.14; 53.19; 53.20; 53.22; 53.25; 53.28; 53.30; 54.1; 54.2; 54.16; 54.24; 55.1; 55.3; 55.17; 55.30; 55.30; 55.31; 55.32; 57.7; 57.10; 57.16; 57.22; 58.2; 58.24; 58.25; 58.29; 59.1; 59.10; 71.2; 71.16; 72.10; 72.11; 72.13; 72.14; 72.15; 72.27; 73.12; 73.13; 73.15; 73.16; 75.19; 75.19; 75.21; 75.21; 75.24; 75.26; 75.26; 75.28; 75.29; 76.1; 76.1; 76.5; 76.7; 76.8; 76.9; 76.10; 76.12; 76.21; 76.22; 78.27; 78.27; 80.13; 81.5; 81.23; 81.28; 81.31; 83.21; 83.29; 84.13; 86.9; 86.13; 87.7; 87.8; 87.10; 87.21; 87.22; 87.23; 87.25; 88.3; 90.15; 90.16; 90.20; 91.2; 92.4; 92.15; 92.19; 92.22; 93.5; 93.16; 93.16; 93.18; 94.8; 94.11; 94.15; 94.19; 94.31; 95.2; 95.4; 95.5; 95.8; 95.12; 95.16; 95.17; 95.19; 95.20; 95.21; 95.22; 95.26; 95.27; 95.29; 119.28; 125.8; 127.4; 129.18; 129.18; 129.20; 129.25; 129.27; 130.1; 133.22; 145.6; 147.12; 149.2; 149.16; 150.3; 150.17; 151.2; 151.19

χρόνος, time (*cont.*)
κατὰ (τὸν) χρόνον, in accordance with time 58.25; temporal 9.13; 9.14; 28.29; 126.30; with respect to time 127.6
ὁ ὅλος χρόνος, universal time 39.25; 41.19; 57.27
ὁ ὅλος ἐγκόσμιος χρόνος, universal encosmic time 92.7; 92.24
τὸ ἐνεστὼς τοῦ χρόνου, the present tense 48.20
χ. ἀποκαταστατικός, temporal interval for a return to the starting point 57.32; time cycle 86.25; time for the completion of cycles 91.26; 91.29
χ. ἀριθμούμενος, numerable 26.22
χ. ἀρχαγγελικός, Archangelic 43.15
χ. ἀρχικός, Commanding (43.16)
χ. ἄτακτος, disorderly 37.24; 37.25
χ. ἀφανής, invisible 55.4; 80.33; 85.29; 88.17; 95.33
χ. δεύτερος, secondary 52.26; 54.11; 55.14; 70.33; 90.19
χ. ἐμφανής, visible 26.25; 36.2; 55.27; 81.19
χ. περιοδικός, periodic 87.11
χ. πηγαῖος, Fontal 43.21
χ. πρώτιστος, absolutely primary 89.5
χ. τεταγμένος, orderly 37.14; regular 57.4; regular temporal period 147.7
χ. ὑπερκόσμιος, hypercosmic 54.12
χ. φανερός, visible 80.31
χ. ψυχικὸς χρόνος, psychic time 24.33
χώρα, place 114.10; 130.9; region 111.5
χωρίς, apart from 7.32; separate from 30.16; 39.28; 102.11; 104.14; 104.14; 110.22; 149.20
χωριστός, separate(d) 71.28; 135.17

Ψ

ψελλισμός, stammering 137.5
ψευδής, false 126.2
ψηφηφορία, calculation (astronomical) 125.17
ψιλός, bare 21.5; mere(ly) 25.31; 95.10; 95.14
ψιλῶς, in a simple sense 35.9; simply 35.12; 92.6
ψύξις, cooling 67.24; 68.4
ψύχη, soul 2.29; 3.26; 4.2; 4.2; 4.6; 5.31; 6.5; 6.12; 9.28; 10.20; 12.7; 12.10; 21.11; 21.17; 21.19; 21.20; 21.21; 21.23; 21.24; 22.2; 22.13; 22.28; 23.28; 23.28; 23.29; 23.30; 23.32; 24.3; 24.3; 24.7; 24.10; 24.13; 24.19; 24.31; 25.5; 25.12; 25.29; 26.7; 26.10; 27.18; 27.20; 27.21; 27.22; 27.26; 27.30; 28.9; 28.19; 28.21; 28.23; 29.22; 29.23; 30.4; 31.11; 31.21; 31.30; 32.28; 32.30; 32.30; 33.30; 34.20; 54.19; 57.19; 58.25; 58.26; 58.27; 58.27; 58.29; 58.30; 59.4; 59.13; 59.27; 59.28; 60.6; 60.12; 60.16; 60.23; 68.31; 69.29; 70.9; 70.24; 70.27; 72.6; 72.8; 72.18; 72.22; 72.24; 72.26; 72.31; 73.7; 73.10; 73.11; 74.17; 82.9; 82.12; 94.16; 94.17; 94.20; 97.23; 97.26; 102.13; 103.3; 109.4; 115.26; 115.27; 117.17; 117.22; 117.26; 117.26; 117.30; 117.31; 118.17; 119.19; 120.9; 120.13; 120.15; 120.17; 120.20; 120.21; 120.26; 120.28; 120.30; 121.3; 121.23; 126.19; 126.29; 127.5; 131.18; 132.18; 132.21; 135.11; 135.13; 135.18; 135.19; 135.30; 136.1; 136.2; 136.18; 136.21; 136.22; 136.27; 140.11; 140.33; 143.19; 147.3; 147.28; 149.24; 151.25; 152.31; 153.5; 154.8; 155.15; 158.31; 159.27; 159.29; 160.5; 160.23
ἡ ὅλη ψυχή, universal soul 21.8; 24.22; 115.24; Whole Soul 120.12; World Soul 59.30; 60.1; 60.5; 60.14; 70.4; 70.14; 117.7; 117.23; 118.18; 121.22; 131.21
ἡ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχή, World Soul 69.31
ἡ τοῦ ὅλου ψυχή, World Soul 117.4
κατὰ ψύχην, in terms of the soul 21.16; psychic 20.19; with respect to soul 49.29
ψ. Ἀπολλωνιακή, Apollonian 159.25
ψ. ἰδία θεία, individual divine 117.21
ψ. κοσμική, Cosmic 117.12; 118.19
ψ. διττή, two-fold 70.6
ψ. θεία, divine 71.8; 71.32; 116.31; 126.17; 126.31; 135.15; 136.9; 150.14; 155.24
ψ. λογική, rational 96.31; 135.29; 154.1
ψ. μερική, partial 26.17; 110.2; 115.24; 136.7

ψ. μέση, intermediate 155.14
ψ. νοερά, intellectual 59.25; 59.28; 117.3
ψ. οὐράνιος, celestial 17.10
ψυχικός, of the soul 25.21; psychic 4.6; 19.4; 21.32; 23.11; 24.14; 24.31; 24.33; 30.20; 54.25; 74.22; 90.14; 93.20; 95.23; 95.24; 120.7; 120.8; 121.11; 121.13; 136.6; 145.32
ψυχοῦν, animate 60.17; 60.23; 116.31; 117.4; 117.7; 117.11; 119.18; 127.1; 135.28; 154.23; ensoul 3.32; 70.20; 70.27
ψύχωσις, animation 60.20; 118.16; 119.18; 154.12; ensoulment 70.10; 70.13; 70.13; 70.16; 70.16; 70.19; 70.21; 71.5; 91.8

ω

ὠδίς, birthpang 12.25
ὥρα, hour 87.29; Season 32.16; 32.20; 36.26; 41.14; 55.32; 56.4; 89.29; 119.5
ὡριαῖος, of the season 89.25
ὡροσκόπος, horoscope 93.7

General index

The primary vehicle for finding material within the translation is intended to be the word index and glossary; this index is chiefly designed to help readers locate names, passages, and topics discussed in the introductory material and the notes.

Adrastus 17, 121
Albert the Great 4
Alcinous 123
Alcmaeon 83
Alexander of Aphrodisias 50, 139, 258
Amelius 56, 75, 87, 131, 186, 187, 188, 236
Ammonius 25
Anaxagoras 23, 128, 242
apogee 20, 150
Archer-Hind 47, 144, 150, 154, 247
Aristotle
  Categories 53
  De Anima 138, 213, 222
  De Caelo 4, 53, 92, 111, 148, 200, 204, 218, 224, 226, 227, 229, 242
  Generation of Animals 115, 159
  Metaphysics 121, 124, 251
  Meteorologica 168, 199, 200, 224, 231, 237, 242
  Nicomachean Ethics 50
  Parts of Animals 218
  Physics 5, 53, 66, 73, 86, 92, 163, 164, 209, 213, 219, 248
astrology 21, 26, 43, 127, 133, 134, 164, 171, 172, 221, 247
Atticus 6, 92, 101, 111

Bouché-Leclercq 26, 116, 134, 172, 217, 221
Boys-Stones 167
Brisson 65, 87, 184, 187

Callataÿ 169, 170, 171, 172
Callippus 23, 121
Cancer, *see* tropics
Capricorn, *see* tropics
Chalcidius 26, 144, 247
Chaldean astronomy or astrology 16, 21–2, 26, 27, 99, 125, 126, 127, 219, 223, 256
Chaldean Oracles xii, 11, 22, 25, 47, 60, 65, 70, 99, 116, 130, 157, 160, 165, 166, 184, 200, 205, 228
Christians 33, 101, 141, 167, 258
Cicero 136, 144, 247
Clement of Alexandria 33, 141
Connectors (Chaldean divinities) 65
Cornford, F. M. 47, 123, 144, 154, 208, 248

Daemon 2, 31–2, 33, 194, 195, 197, 198, 259, 261
Damascius 74, 103, 165, 168, 237, 241, 244
Day as god 166, 167
Demiurge 1–2, 6–7, 12, 28–9, passim
Demosthenes 96, 98
Diehl x, xi, passim
Different, circle of 15, 16, 29, 30, 49, 76, 109, 118, 123, 131, 140, 144, 149, 152, 175, 209
Dillon, John xii, 60, 87, 102, 121, 122, 130, 133, 188, 211, 236
Dodds, E. R. xii, 11, 129, 178
dodecahedron 202, 207, 240–1

Earth (planet) 3, 16, 18, 21, 24, 31, 43, 104, 120, 126, 150, 160, 198, 208, 229, 233, 236, 237, 238, 239–45, 262
ecliptic 16, 24, 25, 26, 30, 150, 251
Egypt 25, 172, 219, 253, 256
Elias 55
emendations (to text of Diehl) 60, 64, 65, 78, 86, 131, 136, 158, 167, 172, 176, 200, 215, 218, 223, 237, 244, 245, 252

epicycles 3, 15, 17, 18, 117, 133, 251, 253
Equinoxes, precession of 24–8
Er, myth of 16, 17, 22, 167, 214, 236, 239, 259, 260
Euclid 170
Eudemus 23, 128, 163
Eunapius 197

Festugière A. J. x, passim

gods
  celestial 2, 24, 43, 94, 194, 207, 252, 258
  sub-lunary 2, 32, 33
Great Year (Platonic) 13–14, 33, 90, 118, 154, 169, 211, 235
greatest kinds (cf. Plato's *Sophist*) 43, 153

Hecate 100, 130, 184
henads 8, 11, 58, 88, 183
Heracles 266
Heraclides Ponticus 235
Hermeias 158, 165
Hesiod 85, 180
Hesperides 245
Hipparchus 24, 219
Homer 25, 105, 208, 220, 244, 248

Iamblichus xii, 4, 7, 8–9, 17, 43, 44, 47, 56, 60, 69, 75, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 101, 102, 103, 107, 117, 121, 122, 130, 131, 132, 133, 139, 176, 186, 188, 194, 197, 202, 210, 211, 234, 236, 239, 248, 265
Isis 238

Johnston 184
Julian the Apostate 133, 160
Julian the Theurgist 22, 25, 69, 85, 99, 127, 229
Jupiter (planet) 16, 21, 131, 137, 138

Klitenic-Wear, Sarah xii, 31, 60

Lactantius 96
lacuna 62, 78, 101, 106, 111, 130, 146, 164, 168, 185, 252
Lewy, Hans 22, 60, 69, 165, 166, 229
Living Being Itself 1, 6–8, 56, 67

Macrobius 16, 26, 138, 172
Marinus 60
McTaggart 3, 9
megista genê, *see* greatest kinds
Mercury 16, 21, 23, 123, 131, 133, 163, 211
Month as god 13, 69, 85, 96, 99
Moon 16, 90, 126, 128, 133, 138, 149, 160, 161

neologisms 58, 79
Nichomachus of Gerasa 55, 170
Numenius 56, 75, 87, 131, 139, 188, 265

Okeanys 2, 196, 241
Olympiodorus 239
One, the 11, 56, 58, 62, 160, 219
One-Being 8, 54, 61, 62
Origen 27
Orphica xii, 31, 96, 97, 136, 157, 158, 165, 166, 180, 183, 184, 193, 212, 241, 266
Ouranos 2, 180

participated form 8, 29, 45
Pausanius 197, 236
perigee 20
Plato
  Epinomis 16, 31
  Laws 1, 13, 19, 80, 111, 113, 207, 213
  Parmenides 61, 107
  Phaedrus 76, 143, 172, 197, 213, 254, 266
  Republic 17, 115
  Sophist 107, 129, 153
  Statesman 255
  Symposium 71
Plotinus 4, 6–8, 57, 70, 73, 75, 129, 186, 205, 207
Plutarch of Chareonia 6, 75, 101, 111, 241
Porphyry xii, 7, 56, 63, 87, 129, 186, 197, 238, 265
Posidonius 220
procession 14, 20, 50, 170, 179, 189, 194, 263
Proclus
  de Aet. xii, 111
  ET xii, 28, 165, 178, 186, 245
  Hyp. xii, 15, 17–18, 134
  in Alc. xii, 75, 186
  in Crat. xii, 103, 236, 257, 259
  in Parm. xi, 30, 157, 160, 177, 186, 219, 241

Proclus
in Remp. xi, 22, 23, 43, 68, 79, 85, 96, 109, 128, 134, 138, 167, 184, 236, 241, 244, 250, 257, 259
Plat.Theol. xii, 43, 50
Ptolemy 17, 21–7, 28, 125, 126, 133, 205, 221
Pythagoreans 55, 65, 139, 163, 191, 235

retrogradation 19, 83, 117, 134

Sabazian cult 96
Sambursky, Samuel 9
Same, circle of 15, 16, 19, 29, 30, 49, 76, 123, 139, 140, 144, 152, 169, 175, 210
satellites 91, 211, 254
Saturn 16, 21, 131, 135, 137, 138, 149, 163, 211
Seasons (Horai) as gods 13, 85, 167
Simplicius
in Cael. 25, 75, 149, 205, 218
in Cat. 53, 68
in Phys. 4, 9
Siorvanes, Lucas 91, 117, 119
Sorabji, Richard 9
Steel, Carlos 4
Stoics 68, 88, 136, 174
Strato of Lampsacus 61
sub-lunary region 20, 23, 32, 120, 216, 258
Sun 16, 21, 22, 23, 116, 128, 133, 154, 156, 160, 200
Syrianus xii, 60, 61, 79, 87, 89, 176, 186, 194, 261

Tarrant, Harold 64, 76, 106, 141, 171, 186
Taylor, A. E. 47, 144, 150, 169, 176, 229, 246, 247, 248
Taylor, Thomas 251, 265
Themistius 167
Theodore of Asine 75, 129, 260
Theon of Smyrna 170
Theophrastus 96, 128, 163, 233
Thrasyllus 172
Titans 236, 244
tropics (Cancer or Capricorn) 155

unparticipated monad 99, 160, 206
Ursa Major 25

Venus 123, 131, 133
Vettius Valens 133

wholeness, kinds of 28

Zeyl, D. 47, 123, 248
Zodiac 15, 241