

THE SOUL AND DISCURSIVE REASON  
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROCLUS


A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate School  
of the University of Notre Dame  
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

D. Gregory MacIsaac, B.A., M.A.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Stephen E. Gersh". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Stephen" being more prominent than the last name "Gersh".

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Stephen E. Gersh, Director

Department of Philosophy

Notre Dame, Indiana

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# THE SOUL AND DISCURSIVE REASON IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROCLUS

Abstract

by

D. Gregory MacIsaac

In Proclus *dianoia* is the Soul's thinking activity, through which it makes itself into a divided image of *Nous*. This dissertation examines various aspects of Procline *dianoia*. *Dianoia*'s thoughts are *logoi*, because in the Greek philosophical tradition, *logos* came to mean a division of a prior unity (ch.I). Proclus' theory of *dianoia* rejects induction, and is a conscious development of Plato's theory of *anamnêsis*, because induction is unable to yield a true universal (ch.II). The source of Soul's *logoi* is not a pre-natal vision of reality, but rather its ontological dependence on *Nous*. The Soul's *ousia* is a fullness of *logoi* which are images of the *eidê* in *Nous*. The Soul projects these multiple *oudiôdeis logoi* into even greater multiplicity. In so doing, Soul makes itself into the image of *Nous*, and the paradigm of Body. For this reason all *dianoia* is metaphorical, because it either understands *Nous* through the image which itself is, or understands Body through itself as paradigm (ch.III). *Dianoia*, therefore, has two parts. Dialectic is the Soul's grasp of *Nous* through itself as image, and mathematics is the Soul's grasp of Body through itself as paradigm (ch.IV). The Soul's attention to Body may cause it to cease its dianoetic activity, because it takes on Body's passivity. Philosophical discussion may rescue such a fallen soul, turning it back towards itself, away from the body. In Procline



terms, philosophy restores the Soul's *autokinêsis*, or self-motion (ch.V). The particular *Nous* of which Soul is an image, and which *dianoia* divides, is the *Nous* which serves as a measure for Soul's dividing activity. And because Time is the measure of the Soul's motion, this particular *Nous* is the monad of Time (ch.VI). *Dianoia* has as its aim to leave behind all divided thinking, and to be content with the unity of *Nous*, and the simplicity of the One. This is accomplished through that in the Soul which is higher than *dianoia*, the *nous* of the Soul, and its own one (ch.VII).

For my father

John R. MacIsaac

To be carried back to the shrine some dawn  
when the sea spreads its far sun-crops to the south  
and I make a morning offering again:  
*that I may escape the miasma of spilled blood,  
govern the tongue, fear hybris, fear the god  
until he speaks in my untrammelled mouth.*

-- Seamus Heaney, *Station Island*

Aujourd'hui l'espace est splendide!  
Sans mors, sans éperons, sans bride,  
Partons à cheval sur le vin  
Pour un ciel féérique et divin!

Comme deux anges que torture  
Une implacable calenture.  
Dans le bleu cristal du matin  
Suivons le mirage lointain!

Mollement balancés sur l'aile  
Du tourbillon intelligent,  
Dans un délire parallèle,

Ma soeur, côte à côte nageant.  
Nous fuirons sans repos ni trêves  
Vers le paradis de mes rêves!

-- Baudelaire, *Les Fleurs du Mal*

ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ ἦλθες, ἔκλειον.

-- Marinus, *Vita Procli*

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## PREFACE

In a very real sense, I began this study twelve years ago, when I entered the Bachelor of Arts program at the University of King's College/Dalhousie University, in Halifax. It was at King's that I first read Plato, and first realised that the world could be thought. In the Dalhousie department of Classics I had teachers who taught me how to read an ancient text with care, and who taught me that the beginning of philosophising, for us, comes through reading the history of philosophy well. Most prominent among my teachers of that time is Wayne J. Hankey. Professor Hankey has provided me with invaluable assistance over the years, through advice, conversation, and most importantly, through his friendship. I wish to acknowledge my immense gratitude to him here.

At the University of Notre Dame, in Indiana, I found another mentor, Professor Stephen Gersh. The foundation of my interest in Neoplatonism was laid at Dalhousie, but it was not until I met Professor Gersh that I became certain my study of the history of philosophy should take the form of a study of the philosophy of Proclus. As my professor, and eventually as my director, Professor Gersh has given me both the guidance and the freedom which were essential for me to carry out this project. His philosophical acumen, and his subtle and nuanced reading of texts, continue to inspire me. I wish to thank him sincerely for his direction over the past eight years.

The idea for the particular topic of this study came during the year (1994-95) that I studied with Professor Carlos Steel, of the Institute of Philosophy, Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium. Halfway through my year in Leuven, I realised that all of my

previous philosophical studies pointed me towards one doctrine, the Platonic theory of *anamnêsis*. When I told this to Professor Steel, he immediately exclaimed that I was, in fact, interested in working on "the *probolê*." He was referring to Proclus' theory of the projection forth of the soul's innate *logoi*. After returning to Notre Dame, I discovered that Professor Steel had been entirely correct. It was the *probolê* which excited, and continues to hold, my philosophical interest. I acknowledge here my debt to Professor Steel, as providing the particular beginning point for my work of the past five years.

Finally I wish to express my deep gratitude to Professors Peter Emberley, Roy Laird, Waller Newell, and Rob Stainton. In giving me an academic position two years ago, at the College of the Humanities at Carleton University, in Ottawa, they provided me with a community of scholars, students, and dear friends, who now constitute the greater part of what *eudaimonia* I possess.



## INTRODUCTION

### i. The spiritual hierarchy<sup>1</sup>

Soul is the third principle in Proclus' system.<sup>2</sup> It is distinguished from the second principle, Intellect (*Nous*), by the discursive character of its thinking. Unlike the simple and unchanging grasp of the intelligible which belongs to *Nous*, the Soul's discursive reason (*dianoia*) is measured by Time, because it moves from intelligible object to intelligible object. Time is the "measure of motion," as Aristotle says,<sup>3</sup> and the motion in question here is the psychic activity. *Nous* is distinguished from the first principle of Proclus' system, the One, because the One is beyond both being and thinking. It is "*epekeina tês ousias*," as Plato says of the Idea of the Good in the *Republic*.<sup>4</sup>

According to Proclus, Being<sup>5</sup> is a system of determinations which lies in between two indeterminates. Above all Being is its source, the indeterminate One, that is completely ungraspable by thought. The One is the ineffable Absolute, only nameable through its effects, primary of which is the unity that gives determinate identity to each being, and through which each being receives its good. It is beyond the determinate

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<sup>1</sup> For a good overview of the life, work, and tradition of modern scholarship on Proclus, see H.-D. Saffrey, "Proclus Diadoque de Platon," in *Proclus lecteur et interprète des anciens. Actes du Colloque internationale du C.N.R.S., Paris 2-4 oct. 1985*, ed. J. Pépin et H.-D. Saffrey (Paris: C.N.R.S., 1987) pp.xi-xxvii. See also the introduction to volume I of the Saffrey and Westerink (Belles Lettres) edition of the *Théologie Platonicienne*; and L. Siorvanes, *Proclus. Neo-Platonic philosophy and science* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996) pp.1-47.

<sup>2</sup> I am speaking here in very general terms. In more precise terms, between the One and Soul come the First Limit and First Infinity, the henads, and *Nous*. Further, *Nous* itself is subdivided into three intelligible triads, three intelligible-and-intellectual triads, and an intellectual hebdomad.

<sup>3</sup> *Physics* V.11.

<sup>4</sup> *Republic* 509b.

<sup>5</sup> Being in a general sense, not Being as the first moment of *Nous*.

existence which belongs to beings, because if it were any one of the beings it could not be the source of all beings. If the One were part of the complete system of determinations it could not be the cause of that total system of determinations which is Being. Below all Being is the indetermination of matter. The One is indeterminate through excess of power, the power which gives rise to Being, while matter is indeterminate through deficiency of power. Matter is the point at which the unity which gives determination to Being fails, and all that separates matter from non-existence is the direct power of the One in its most dissipated form.

Between the One and matter the determinations of Being unfold themselves, producing themselves as divided images of the ineffable One beyond Being. *Nous*, Soul, and Body or Nature are divided expressions, articulations, or manifestations of what remains unexpressed, inarticulate, and hidden, according to Proclus. How is it possible to manifest the inarticulable simplicity of the One? Proclus' answer is an articulated totality. All that is possible is actual, in Proclus' system. The articulations of reality begin even before Being, from that which is most unified, but which is not the One itself. This is the first Limit, the first Unlimited, and the henads, or "ones" which are only distinguished from the absolute simplicity of the One in that there are many of them. If the One is the principle of 'determination itself', these are the principles of the actual determinations. *Nous*/Being comes next, divided into Being, Life, and *Nous*, as unitary determinate source, power of expression, and multiplicity of determination. And so it continues. Proclus' universe unfolds itself by the smallest steps possible. There are no empty spaces. And it is this full totality in which no possible articulation is left aside which manifests the ineffable One.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> A. Lernoùl, "La dialectique comme science première chez Proclus," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 71 (1987) pp.509-536; p.522: "L'idée de système implique en effet que toute la chaîne des connaissances procède d'une cause unique en même temps qu'elle se convertit tout entière vers cette cause (principe de l'universalité). Or toutes les connaissances procèdent bien de l'intellect et retournent vers lui, si bien que l'intellect pourrait être appelé «lien des connaissances» (et non pas seulement le «lien des sciences»), puisqu'il embrasse leur complet déploiement. En outre, l'exigence de

His favourite metaphor is the circle. How does the circumference of the circle manifest the partlessness of its centre? It does so by the totality of perspectives upon the centre which are resident in the circumference. Being is the circumference whose totality of determinations are the manifestation of and image of the partlessness of the One.<sup>7</sup> The Universe is in fact a series of concentric 'circles' according to Proclus, distinguished by the least possible ontological difference. Each successive order in the unfolding of determinate Being is a circumference having the previous order as its centre, and the One as the centre of its centre. Being as a whole is a divided image of the One. But also each order is its own divided image of the One, as a divided image of all of the orders which precede it. An image is at once the same as and different from its paradigm. Having its proximate cause as its centre, each spiritual entity remains in its cause as the source and centre of its being, proceeds from this centre by unfolding the novel determinations which makes it the sort of being it is, and returns upon itself through the kinship of its own determinations with those of its centre and cause. This circular activity is generative of

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systematicité implique qu'il n'y ait pas de vide dans le tout des connaissances et que la procession, ainsi que la conversion évidemment, s'effectuent par la similitude (principe de continuité). Dans cette perspective, la dialectique apparaît comme une médiation nécessaire entre les mathématiques et l'intellection. Or, la dialectique est bien à la fois encore science, en tant qu'elle est connaissance par la cause, et déjà intellection, en tant qu'elle a pour objet l'intelligible. Enfin comme la triade manence-procession-conversion ne doit pas être comprise comme simplement logique mais comme étant à la fois logique et ontologique, dans la perspective, on l'a vu, d'un cycle de puissance, le système des connaissances se donne moins comme un tableau figé, comme une classification formelle et extérieure à son objet, que comme le processus dynamique d'un déploiement qui inclut en lui la loi ontologique de sa propre production. Les connaissances, qui constituent ainsi une véritable multiplicité dans l'unité, réalisent donc la figure d'un système où l'identité se constitue dans et par la différence, se révélant ainsi comme «identité dynamique»."

See also A. Charles, "Analogie et pensée sérielle chez Proclus," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 23 (1969) pp.69-88; see p.70. Charles points out that for Proclus there is no question of the existence of an analogical order in the universe. Rather, this order is taken as assumed. The question is of the nature of this order. That all things below the One are ordered analogically is guaranteed by the providence (πρόνοια) which is the effective presence of the Good itself to all things. We receive from above the goods which the gods give, not only because of the influence of those goods, or our receptivity to them, but also the "symmetry between the two terms, as if they were breathing or speaking in concert (*ek tēs amphoin summetrias kai hōsanei sumphōias kai sumphōnias*) [*In Tim.* III.7.16ff]."

J. Trouillard, *La mystagogie de Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1982) p.249: "Comme dans la génération néopythagoricienne des nombres, il n'y a pas de distinction entre le possible et le réel. La procession est manifestation ou *expression*, sous des modes de plus en plus complexes et extensifs, d'une puissance ou mieux d'une exigence intensive. Celle-ci émet une organisation qui se dispose en cercles concentriques. Ceux-ci figurent les niveaux et les rayons symbolisent les séries. Tous sont des fulgurations de l'unité, représentée par le centre."

the concentric circles of reality, as the activity by which *Nous* separates itself from the One and gives rise to Soul, and by which Soul in articulating itself gives rise to Nature or Body.

The activity by which Soul articulates itself as a determinate sort of being is discursive reason. The activity of Soul as a whole is a thinking activity through which Soul brings into being the determinations which constitute the psychic level. Insofar as we are part of Soul as a whole, we too bring the psychic level into existence. Insofar as we are "partial souls" (*merikai psuchai*), the souls which animate human bodies, our discursive reason has a twofold task. First, it allows the partial soul to articulate to itself the discursive determinations into which the Soul itself is articulated. Because the Soul is an image of *Nous*, these determinations which are the Soul's own thoughts are a divided image of *Nous*. So in thinking itself the partial soul is thinking a divided image of the primary determinations into which Being falls. As Soul is an image not only of *Nous*, but also of the principles of *Nous*, the partial soul in thinking itself is also thinking a divided image of the total hierarchy of reality. It is its status as divided image which makes systematic speculative philosophy possible, according to Proclus. The second task of our discursive reason is to awaken in the partial soul the *erôs* which leads it away from its own divided determinations back to the unity of the *Nous* which is its proximate paradigm, and to the simplicity of the One which is its ultimate source. Discursive reason is able to do this because it itself is a dividing of a unified source which is already given to it as its centre. So it acts as a reminder, or as a signpost pointing before itself, so that the soul may retreat to its innermost recesses. In Proclus the aim of philosophy is to cease philosophising, by attaining a thinking superior to philosophy, and finally a unity superior to thinking.

Discursive reason must always remember that it is only an image of the realities which it seeks to articulate. It is a sign which points beyond itself, according to Proclus. For this reason, other sorts of signs which point to the same reality are accorded a place

alongside philosophy. Myths, oracular dreams, and sacred rituals mediate the ineffable to our imagination and our senses, just as philosophical systems mediate the ineffable to our discursive reason. If our centre is concentric with that of *Nous*, then the power of the One itself, the henads, and *Nous* is present to us. In religious language Proclus would say that the gods are present to us, and when they speak to us we give them shape and voice, even though they are in themselves formless.<sup>8</sup> The dialogues of Plato and the myths of Homer both have their place in articulating the unity of *Nous* and the ineffability of the One to us.

The Soul is the middle point of the universe in Proclus' system. It is the point at which Limit and Unlimited are in balance, and the point at which the expansion of power from the One begins to turn into the dissipation of matter.<sup>9</sup> On the one hand the Soul is a spiritual being and is capable of self-reversive activity of thinking, but its activity of thinking is divided and complex. As an image of *Nous* it can never adequate the unity of the intelligible Forms, but it makes up for this deficiency through a never ending activity of unfolding the concentrated content of *Nous* onto the psychic level.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> J. Trouillard, *La mystagogie de Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1982) p.249: "La philosophie n'est pas une oeuvre de pure raison spéculative. Dans un univers don't les extrêmes (l'un pur et le divers pur) sont ineffables et où la pensée est une activité médiane, celle-ci est alimentée et orientée par le *mythe*. Quand ce dernier n'est pas seulement pédagogique, mais inspiré ou initiatique [*In Remp.* I.80.11-12; I.81.14-15; I.178.10-179.03], il déploie le paysage d'une opération déifiante et il invite à la parfaire par la théurgie. Il apporte la communication et l'illumination don't la raison devra être la conscience distincte." See also ch.II of the same work, "Le merveilleux dans la vie et la pensée de Proclus."

<sup>9</sup> Proclus' universe is concentric in another manner. The higher principle is more strongly a principle than any of its effects, hence its power extends further than does the power of any of its effects. So the power of the One extends all the way to matter, and the indeterminate through excess is thus the direct cause of the indeterminate through deficiency. *Nous* is a triad of Being, Life, and *Nous*, in which the power of Being extends to inanimate bodies, and is that which gives them determination, the power of Life extends to plants, and the power of *Nous* gives to animals with sense some grasp of being. The Soul confers self-motion on itself and on the bodies which it animates, and this self-motion is primarily discursive reason. See figure 1, Appendix.

<sup>10</sup> J. Trouillard, *La mystagogie de Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1982) p.250-251: "Le point où l'intensité de la puissance et l'extension du nombre obtiennent leur équilibre, c'est le niveau de l'âme. Chez elle la complexité atteint son développement le plus distinct sans briser son intériorité. C'est pourquoi elle est la médiation universelle, *le milieu et le centre de tous les êtres* [*In Alc.* 320.19]... Dès lors c'est dans l'âme que, de droit et pas seulement de fait, nous déchiffrons la constitution de l'univers, puisque l'âme ne laisse rien hors d'elle-même, et surtout pas ce qui la transcende [*In Tim.* III.102.12-14]. Elle est l'espace unique et inépuisable dans lequel se meut le philosophe, le lieu des «raisons sacrées et des symboles divins» [*Oracles chaldaïques*, Des Places, p.211, 22, fr. V du commentaire de Proclus] qu'éveille l'initié."

This study will examine the unfolding activity which Proclus thinks discursive reason is.

## ii. The hierarchy of Soul

We should examine the articulations into which the order of Soul falls, in order to lay the ground for our discussion of discursive reason (*dianoia*). Proclus' system is considerably more complex in structure than is Plotinus'. Proclus still speaks of three main spiritual principles (One, *Nous*, Soul), but the structure of these principles has been elaborated to a much greater degree than in Plotinus. As in Plotinus, *Nous* and Soul give rise both to subordinate and coordinate entities.<sup>11</sup> So *Nous* gives rise both to Soul (subordinate) and to other intellects, or *noes*<sup>12</sup> (coordinate). Proclus extends coordinate causation to the One, which Plotinus refused to do. So in Proclus we find the coordinate series of *henads*, which are 'ones' participated in by all other things.

For purposes of clarity, I will discuss here only the order of Soul. However, the general principles which govern this order also apply to the order of *Nous*, and to a lesser extent to the One and the henads. The Soul order begins from what Proclus calls the monad of Soul. From this monad arises both a coordinate series of souls, and a subordinate series. In the subordinate series we find not souls, but Body. Had we begun from any particular henad, we might find a subordinate series composed of the henad itself, a *nous*, a soul, and a body. The monad of Soul participates *Nous*, but it is itself not

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<sup>11</sup> These are often called by modern scholars vertical and horizontal planes of causation. S. Gersh has argued persuasively that these two planes of causation must be viewed as two ways of viewing the relation between hypostases. Briefly, insofar as the hypostasis of *Nous* causes the hypostasis of Soul, *Nous* gives rise to a subordinate entity (vertical plane of causation); insofar as Soul has as part of its constitution its own *nous*, *Nous* gives rise to a coordinate entity (horizontal plane of causation). See S. Gersh, *From Iamblichus to Eriugena* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978) pp.141-151. So the production of subordinate and coordinate entities are two aspects of the same causal process. One nuance which must be added is that the first members of the coordinate order are not participated by the lower order. Such unparticipated terms, however, are produced by the same self-related activity which brings both the participated terms and their participants into existence.

<sup>12</sup> *Noes* is the plural nominative of *nous* used by Proclus (see *In Parm.* 703.15). *Noi* is also attested in late writers (see L.S.J. entry for *nous*), however, I will use the plural *noes* in this study.

participated by any body. Bodies participate in the souls which stand in the coordinate series of soul arising from the monad. Proclus' uses the technical terms unparticipated (*amethektos*) and participated (*methektos*) to refer to this distinction. There are texts which seem to suggest that Proclus thought that the first members of the coordinate series of souls were also unparticipated. He refers to the distinction between unparticipated and participated souls as the difference between hypercosmic and encosmic souls, i.e. a soul which does not animate a body stands above the cosmos, while those that do animate bodies are in the cosmos. There is at least one hypercosmic soul, the monad of Soul. And from one passage in his commentary on the *Timaeus* it seems that Proclus is at least willing to entertain the idea that there are a plurality of hypercosmic souls.<sup>13</sup> In this passage he gives an account of the difference between hypercosmic and encosmic souls. The difference between *Nous* and Soul in general is that while *Nous* is able to grasp its intelligible object all at once, in a simple self-related act of thinking, Soul is not able to do this. Soul's activity is measured by Time, as it moves from a consideration of one intelligible object to the next. Encosmic souls must think their intelligible objects one by one, Proclus tells us, while hypercosmic souls are able to think more than one thing at a time, although they are unable to think all things at once, and because of this fall short of the simplicity of *Nous*.

Proclus' main classification of Souls is found in his *Elements of Theology* (prop.184), where he tells us that every soul is either divine, or subject to change from an enjoyment of *nous* to lack of *nous*, or intermediate between these two. The intermediate class is inferior to divine souls, but enjoys *nous* perpetually. In earlier propositions Proclus has specified what "divine" (*theios*) means. Divine souls are able to participate *Nous* in two ways. As is the case with all souls, even those which are not divine, they are able to participate *Nous* through the mediation of the unparticipated monad of Soul.

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<sup>13</sup> See *In Tim.*251.30-255.03.

Because the monad of Soul participates in *Nous*, and all souls arise from the monad of Soul and have the same structure as it, all souls participate in *Nous* in virtue of this monad. Unlike Souls which are not divine, however, divine souls also participate *Nous* through their similarity to the noetic order. Although each of the members of the Soul order is equally a soul, Proclus thinks that the kinship and similarity of the members of the order to the higher order diminishes as the series progresses.<sup>14</sup> Because of their greater similarity to the order of *Nous*, divine souls are able to participate directly in a *nous* which stands in the coordinate series of *noes*. So in Proclus' three-fold classification, both divine souls and the intermediate sorts of souls participate in *Nous* without interruption, the first sort of soul through the monad of Soul and through its own participation in a particular *nous*, the second sort of soul only through the monad of Soul. Professor Dodds, in his note to proposition 184, lists the various sorts of soul in these two classes. Taking our cue from him we may say that divine souls include (1) the unparticipated hypercosmic monad of Soul; (2) any other hypercosmic souls;<sup>15</sup> (3) the Soul of the World, which is the first encosmic soul and animates Body as a whole; (4) the souls of the seven planets and the fixed stars (these and all subsequent souls are encosmic); (5) and the 'gods below the moon'. "the descendants of *Gé* and *Ouranos* enumerated by Plato, *Tim.* 40 E."<sup>16</sup> The souls which enjoy perpetual *nous*, but are not divine are the *aggeloi*, *daimones*, and *hêrôes* (angels, demons, and heroes).

In the third class, souls which "are subject to change from *nous* to lack of *nous*" (*metaballousa apo nou eis anoian*), we find human souls.<sup>17</sup> We participate in *Nous* only through the monad of Soul, and we do not always do so, because we are susceptible to the

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<sup>14</sup> How this actually works is not important for this discussion, but it has to do with the predominance of Being, Same, or Other in the various levels of Soul.

<sup>15</sup> Dodds does not include this possibility.

<sup>16</sup> *El. Th.* p. 295 Dodds.

<sup>17</sup> Proclus' technical term for human souls is the "partial soul" (*merikê psuchê*).



attraction of body and are able to turn towards it, away from *Nous*. A diagram might be helpful at this point. See figure 2. Appendix.

In our discussion of the Soul in Proclus we will be moving back and forth between two levels. First, when we discuss the general structure of Soul we should be understood to be speaking about the structure which is shared by all Soul, from the monad to the partial soul. All members of the coordinate series have the same internal structure, so it is possible to make statements about Soul in an unqualified manner. For example, all Soul is a triad of essence, power, and activity. When we are speaking about Soul as a whole, we will generally capitalise Soul. We will also capitalise references to the monad of Soul. Second, often we will be speaking about things which are only the case for the partial soul, mostly having to do with its descent into becoming and forgetfulness of its own origin. In these cases we will not capitalise soul.

Already we have come across the discursive character of *dianoia*. Proclus' system is at the same time a hierarchy of transcendent principles, and an ordering of immanent principles. Because of the divisions inherent in dianoetic expression, we must speak of the various sort of Soul as separate from each other, and as below *Nous* and the One, and it is difficult to say at the same time that the various sorts of soul are parts of one and the same reality, and that *Nous* and the One are also completely present to them. The words in which we speak of the order of the Whole emphasise the separation of entities, and in order to speak of the co-presence we have to make use of a circumlocution. In other words, when we say that two things are present to each other we posit them as separate and then negate that separation. We must keep in mind this tendency of *dianoia* to separate things all through this study.

## CHAPTER I

### LOGOS AND ANALOGIA

*Dianoia* is the type of cognition which is most proper to the Soul, according to Proclus. The soul possesses other ways to grasp reality, such as sensation and *nous*, but it is the discursive activity of *dianoia* which emerges at the level of Soul and which best manifests Soul's intermediate station between the partlessness of *Nous* and the division of Body.<sup>18</sup> This study is an examination of *dianoia* in Proclus, which he describes as a projection of the *logoi*, or 'reason principles', which constitute the Soul's essence (*ousia*). Proclus' phrase is *probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn*.

We should notice first that Proclus uses the term *logos* in this phrase, rather than *eidos*. Proclus has a tendency to use the word *logos* when speaking of the Soul, and *eidos* when speaking of *Nous*, although this is not always the case. The term *logos* seems to be more appropriate to Soul than *eidos*, because *logos* has the connotation of an unfolding or unrolling of an idea, a connotation which fits well with Proclus' account of the Soul's *dianoia* as a dividing activity which unrolls or unfolds its source.<sup>19</sup> Proclus often uses the word *anelittein*, which means to unroll or unfold, in conjunction with *dianoia* and *logos*. Notice that this term is a metaphor. The intelligible source of *dianoia* is neither folded nor circular, so strictly speaking, it cannot be unfolded or unrolled. But Proclus uses this metaphor to give a sense of what *dianoia* does in knowing. *Dianoia* is an activity which gives rise to, projects, a multiplicity of *logoi*. These *logoi* are somehow expressive of a

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<sup>18</sup> In *Eucl.* 4.11-14.

<sup>19</sup> For a history of *logos* as the interior discourse of the soul, see C. Panaccio, *Le discours intérieur de Platon à Guillaume d'Ockham* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1999).

prior intelligible source, and are expressive of this source through their own multiplicity. So they unroll or unfold this source. Proclus makes use of metaphor liberally. He describes the *logoi* which emerge through projection as expressive of a content which is "hidden" or which exists "secretly" (*kruphiōs*). Words like *kruphiōs* and *anelittein* are not themselves the realities which they signify, rather they direct the soul towards a comprehension of what they signify, and in fact do this quite well. Proclus' use of explicit metaphors is appropriate, because he thinks that *dianoia* in general is metaphorical, or expressive, or symbolic. *Dianoia* is the multiple expression of the unified content of *Nous*. It creates its own level of intelligibility, but in doing so it points back to the hidden intelligible which is its source, much as a linguistic metaphor points beyond itself in an effort to draw the mind to a comprehension of its source.<sup>20</sup>

The source which the Soul's *logoi* unfold is its own *ousia*, but it is also the prior unity of *Nous*. Proclus has a number of ways of speaking of Soul's participation in *Nous*. One way is to say that Soul remains in *Nous*, as the first moment of the ubiquitous spiritual motion of remaining, procession, and return (*monē, proodos, epistrophē*). Participation in *Nous* is this remaining moment, or departure point. Another way is to speak of Soul's *ousia* as its participation in *Nous*. So Proclus calls the *ousia* of Soul a

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<sup>20</sup> I offer only as a suggestion the connection between the word *anelittein* and the ancient form of the book, the scroll. The scroll had been replaced by the codex as the predominant form of the pagan book by the fourth century A.D., but Proclus, living in the 5<sup>th</sup> century, would undoubtedly still have been familiar with it. He may perhaps have been thinking of unrolling a scroll so as to see what lay hidden inside of it when he chose to use the word *anelittein* as a metaphor for the activity of *dianoia*. Interesting as well is that Proclus connects the *logos* of *dianoia* with the god Hermes. *Hermeneuein* means "to interpret," and is derived from the name Hermes, patron of the sciences and inventor of writing. *In Alc.* 195.1-5: "The *logos* in us is nourished by these, and through them it rises to *Nous*, as Socrates teaches us in this text. And all these are the teaching of Hermes (*Hermaika paideumata*) (τούτοις δὴ οὖν τρέφεται ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν λόγος καὶ διὰ τούτων ἀνεισὶν εἰς νοῦν, ὡς καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐν ἐκείνοις ἐδίδασκε, καὶ ἔστι πάντα ταῦτα [τὰ] Ἑρμαϊκὰ παιδεύματα." Proclus lists *gymnasia*, *mousikē*, *ta mathēmata*, and *dialektikē*. Dialectic, because "the god [i.e. Hermes] is the discoverer (*heuretēs*, also inventor) of all *logos* (*logou gar esti pantos ho theos heuretēs*). [*In Alc.* 195.10]" See also notes 3-7, p.399 of A. Segonds' trans. and commentary; as well, see *In Alc.* 187.19 and note 2, p.394, Segonds. Hermes is identical to the God Thoth discussed in J. Derrida, "Plato's Pharmacy," in *La dissémination* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1972). Derrida's thesis is that the *différance*, or inherent ambiguity in writing acts as an inexhaustible source for hermeneutic interpretation. Proclus' hermeneutics is of course quite different, because underlying the novel hermeneutic projections of *dianoia* is a metaphysical source in *Nous* quite unlike the Derridian linguistic source.

fullness of *logoi* (*plêrôma tôn logôn*), meaning by *logoi* the secondary existence in Soul of the *eidê* which exist primarily in *Nous*. These are complementary ways of speaking of the same thing. In Proclus' system, the Soul is a divided image of *Nous*. It is a divided image in its first moment, as either a remaining which points beyond itself towards procession, or as *ousia* which is the foundation of the Soul's self development. In both of these ways of speaking the beginning point is a divided image, and from this beginning point the Soul's thinking activity draws itself forth into an even more divided image. Soul is an image of *Nous* not only in its remaining, but in its procession and return; not only in its *ousia*, but in its *dunamis* and *energeia*. The reality which is Soul is a drawing forth, a projection (*probolê*), of itself as a participant of *Nous*, and this projection is what constitutes the whole Soul as a divided image of *Nous*.

*Logos* has a great number of senses. I will argue briefly that Proclus' use of this word as his normal term for psychic thinking is appropriate. Building on previous philosophical uses of the word, he gives a terminological unity to a number of different aspects of his account of Soul. It is through the projection of the *logoi* in its *ousia* that the hypostasis of Soul both constitutes itself and gives rise to Body as a divided image of itself. The projection of the partial soul (*merikê psuchê*) is also for it its act of self-constitution, and the activity by which it rules and directs the body which it is allotted. Insofar as the partial soul is the same reality as the hypostasis, it projects the same *logoi* by which Body is ordered. So not only does the partial soul grasp itself as an image of *Nous* through its *dianoia*, it also grasps itself as the paradigm of Body. This aspect of *logos*, as the medium of *dianoia*, is unified in Proclus with *logos* as philosophical argument, the best example of which is found in the Platonic dialogues. *Dianoia* is the interior activity of the Soul in thinking, but it can give rise to and itself be occasioned by dialectical conversation with others. The dialogues of Plato furnish us with examples of philosophy as dialectical conversation, and exhibit the double motion of *dianoia* as both the way down from and the way back up to the intelligible itself. In the *Timaeus* and

*Parmenides* the structure of Nature and of the Divine Orders is unfolded in what Proclus considers to be the perfection of Physics and of Theology. Here the unfolding of the intelligibles into multiplicity is articulated in dianoetic language. In dialogues such as the *Alcibiades I* philosophy rescues the partial soul which is fascinated by the passions arising from Body, leading such a soul back to a remembrance of its own worth and nature. Here the refutation of Alcibiades removes the obstacles to his soul's self-projection, and he is able to begin the ascent back to *Nous*. In both cases the medium is the projection of the partial soul's *logoi*. *Logos* also has a mathematical sense. Mathematical cognition has an important place in *dianoia*, because the sort of unrolling of premises which we find in a geometrical proof is considered by Proclus to be a very good example of the *probolê tôn oudiôdôn logôn*. As well, a *logos* is a mathematical ratio, and forms part of a mathematical proportion (*analogia*). The concept of *analogia* is extremely important for Proclus' general account of *dianoia*. The universe as a whole is a hierarchy of paradigm and image, beginning from the henads, whose series run through all of reality. These series are bound together by *analogia*, just as certain number series are bound by *analogia* as mathematical proportion. A series of numbers bound by mathematical proportion begins from unity and proceeds into novel multiplicity, but all through this procession the proportion between members of the series remains the same. According to Proclus, this is an image of the procession of all things from the henads. Despite the fact that there are novel determinations of Being at every level, the character conferred on a series by its henad remains the same throughout. Because of *analogia* the Soul is an image of *Nous* and paradigm of Body. The idea of *logos* as unfolding is at the heart of Proclus' conception of *analogia*, because the unfolding of a *logos* produces novel multiplicity, but does so as an explication or expression of a prior unity. In other words, *analogia* holds between levels because the unfolding *logos* manifests the higher level on the lower. That mathematical *analogia* is an image of *analogia* in general is taught chiefly in Proclus' commentary on Plato's *Timaeus*.

So *logos* in Proclus serves to unify the following: (i) the self-constitution of Soul; (ii) the production and ordering of Body by Soul; (iii) *dianoia* as an unfolding activity by which Soul knows itself as an image of *Nous* and paradigm of Body; (iv) philosophical conversation as both explicating reality, and leading the partial soul up to unification with the higher realities; (v) mathematical ratio (*logos*) and proportion (*analogia*); (vi) and the *analogia* which holds between all levels of Proclus' universe.

The following passage from Theon of Smyrna, a 2nd cent. A.D. mathematician and Platonist, exhibits the diversity of senses which the word *logos* has:

The word '*logos*' is used in many ways by the Peripatetics; [there are] the *logos* which is said to be expressed in sound [*meta phônês prophorikos*] by the moderns [*hupo tôn neôterôn*];<sup>21</sup> and the *logos* which resides in the mind [*endiathetos*];<sup>22</sup> and the *logos* which lies in discursive reason [*en dianoiai keimenos*] without voice or sound; and the *logos* of analogy or proportion [*ho tês analogias*] according to which it is said that one thing has a relation [*logon*] to another thing. [There is also the *logos* as] the account of the elements of speech [*hê tôn tou logou stoicheiôn apodosis*]; and the *logos* of things which honor and are honored, by which we say that a certain thing is of account or of no account. The calculation of bankers is also called '*logos*', as is the discourse of Demosthenes and Lysias in their written works; the definition of things which explains their essence [*ho horos ho to ti ên einai kai tèn ousian sêmainôn*]<sup>23</sup> is the defining [*horistikos*] *logos*; there are the syllogism and induction [*epagôgê*]; the tales of Lybius, and myths, tales and proverbs are given the name *logos*. There are also the *logos* of Form [*ho tou eidous*], and the spermatikos *logos*,<sup>24</sup> and many others. But, according to Plato, the word '*logos*' is used in four different ways: for discursive reason without voice [*dianoia aneu phthoggou*]; for the word with sound proceeding from discursive reason [*to meta phônês rheuma apo dianoias*]; for the account of the elements of the universe [*hê tôn tou holou stoicheiôn apodosis*];<sup>25</sup> and the *logos* of analogy or proportion [*ho tês analogias*].<sup>26</sup>

<sup>21</sup> The Stoics.

<sup>22</sup> This is the Stoic distinction between the ἐνδιάθετος λόγος and the προφορικός λόγος as the thought in the mind and the thought expressed by voice. See below.

<sup>23</sup> τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is an Aristotelian expression for definition.

<sup>24</sup> A Stoic term. See below.

<sup>25</sup> Notice the exact parallelism of this expression with the ἡ τῶν τοῦ λόγου στοιχείων ἀπόδοσις above. There may not be any corruption in the text, but it is possible that there has been a substitution of λόγος for ὅλος in the first passage, or of ὅλος for λόγος in the second.

<sup>26</sup> Theon of Smyrna 72.24-73.14: λόγος δὲ κατὰ μὲν τοὺς περιπατητικούς λέγεται πολλαχῶς, ὅ τε μετὰ φωνῆς προφορικός ὑπὸ τῶν νεωτέρων λεγόμενος καὶ ὁ ἐνδιάθετος καὶ ὁ ἐν διανοίᾳ κείμενος ἀνευ φθόγγου καὶ φωνῆς καὶ ὁ τῆς ἀναλογίας, καθ' ὃν λέγεται ἔχειν λόγον τὸδε πρὸς τὸδε, καὶ ἡ τῶν τοῦ λόγου στοιχείων ἀπόδοσις καὶ ὁ τῶν τιμῶντων καὶ τιμωμένων, καθ' ὃν φάμεν λόγον τινὸς ἔχειν ἢ

*Logos* has a number of specific philosophical uses, stemming from the Stoic, Aristotelian and Platonic schools. Apart from a mention of the *logos* with voice which proceeds from discursive reason, the sense of *logos* as 'unfolding' is not explicitly articulated in this passage, although it is a reasonable development of a number of these senses. In particular, the final four senses, which Smyrnaeus tells us are Platonic, are unified in Proclus' use of *logos* as unfolding the Soul's unfolding of *Nous*.

### I.i. General denotations of the word *logos*

In order to establish that Proclus' meaning of *logos* as unfolding is an appropriate use of the word, we should examine very briefly the entries for *legō* and *logos* in the L.S.J. lexicon, and then examine some of the uses of *logos* in Proclus' philosophical predecessors.

*Logos* is a noun derived from the verb *legō*, which itself most primitively means 'to lay' and in the passive form 'to lie'. From this sense comes the sense 'to lay in order' or 'arrange', and hence 'to gather' or 'pick up'. From the sense 'to lay among' comes the sense 'to count', as to lay among something is to be counted among it. From to count comes to 'recount' or 'relate' something, and hence to 'speak' or 'say'. From this sense comes 'to wish to say' or 'to mean'. Finally, *legō* can also mean 'to recite what is written'.

The entry for *logos* is considerably more complex than that for *legō*. It contains the following ten sub-headings, each of which is further subdivided:

- I. Computation, reckoning
- II. Relation, correspondance, proportion
- III. Explanation
- IV. Inward debate of the soul
- V. Continuous statement, narrative (whether fact or fiction), oration, etc.
- VI. Verbal expression or utterance, rarely a single word, usually of a phrase

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μη ἔχειν, καὶ ὁ τραπεζιτικὸς λόγος καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ Δημοσθενικὸς ἢ Λυσιακὸς καὶ ὁ ὅρος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν σημαίνων, ὁριστικὸς ὢν, καὶ ὁ συλλογισμὸς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐπαγωγή καὶ ὁ Λιβυκὸς καὶ ὁ μῦθος καὶ ὁ αἶνος λόγος λέγεται καὶ ἡ παροιμία, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὁ τοῦ εἶδους καὶ ὁ σπερματικὸς καὶ ἄλλοι πλείονες, κατὰ δὲ Πλάτωνα τετραχῶς λέγεται λόγος, ἢ τε διάνοια ἄνευ φθόγγου καὶ τὸ μετὰ φωνῆς ρεῦμα ἀπὸ διανοίας καὶ ἡ τῶν τοῦ ὅλου στοιχείων ἀπόδοσις καὶ ὁ τῆς ἀναλογίας.

- VII. A particular utterance, saying
- VIII. Thing spoken of, subject matter
- IX. Expression, utterance, speech regarded formally
- X. Word or Wisdom of God, personified as his agent in creation and world-government.

For our purposes, the most significant sub-headings are II, III, IV and VI. *Logos* III is the most significant for Proclus' account of *dianoia*, so we will examine this range of senses last.

The sense of *logos*<sup>27</sup> (II) as 'relation', 'correspondance' or 'proportion' can mean (II.1) a relation generally, as cars are related to the road in the same manner that trains are to rails, and (II.2) it can also mean a mathematical ratio. As I have noted above, the use of *logos* as mathematical ratio is quite important in Proclus' account of *dianoia*.

The sense of *logos* as 'inward debate of the soul' (IV) can mean (IV.1) 'thinking' or 'reasoning' in general, as the process of thought. It also signifies (IV.2.a) Reason as a faculty of the soul, either identified with or distinguished from other faculties such as intellect (*nous*), discursive reasoning (*dianoia*), opinion (*doxa*), imagination (*phantasia*) or sense-perception (*aisthēsis*). In Proclus *logos* is most properly identified with *dianoia*, but in certain texts it is also identified with *nous* or opinion. Imagination and sense-perception are usually distinguished from *logos*. In section (IV.2.b) of the entry we find a brief citation of *logos* as 'creative reason' in *Enn.* III.2.14, 15 and 18. Plotinus uses the term *logos* in this passage as equivalent to the providential plan according to which the chances and changes of life in the Material World develop.

Aside from its common meaning as 'talk', *logos* (VI) as 'verbal expression or utterance' can mean (VI.3.a) a 'discussion', 'debate' or 'deliberation'. This sense is not the technical philosophical sense, but rather, discussion or deliberation as general discussion of a topic, or deliberation about how something should be done. *Logos* (VI.3.c) has the

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<sup>27</sup> I do not give all the senses contained in II, III, IV and VI, but only those significant for our investigation of *dianoia* in Proclus. However, I retain the L.S.J. numbering to facilitate consultation of the lexicon entry.



technical philosophical sense of 'dialogue'. This sense refers at first to the practice of dialogue as a manner of carrying on philosophical debate, and is extended to the literary genre of philosophical dialogue. Finally, *logos* (VI.3.d) can refer a section or division of a dialogue or treatise.

*Logos* (III) in the sense of 'explanation' holds the most significant senses for *dianoia* in Proclus. It can mean (III.2.a) generally an argument, and in Proclus this sense of *logos* is somewhat blended with the sense of *logos* (VI.3.c) as philosophical dialogue, because Proclus portrays the philosophical arguments in which Socrates engages his interlocutors as methodical philosophical arguments. Related to this sense is the *logos* (III.2.c) as logical premise, and *logos* (III.2.d) as a principle arrived at as a result of reasoning (*logismos*). *Logos* (III.4) has the connotation of 'thesis' or 'hypothesis' in the sense of a provisional ground, while *logos* (III.6) is a 'formula', or verbal description which is wider than the definition of something, but often used as a definition, expressing rational thinking about that thing. Finally, *logos* (III) has three related meanings which are particularly significant. The first (III.7.a) is the Reason which is the divine order exhibited in the cosmos, found in both Stoic and Neoplatonic philosophy. Related to this in Stoicism is the *spermatikoi logoi* (III.7.b), or 'generative reason principles' immanent in generated things. Finally, in Neoplatonism we find the *logoi* (III.7.c) derived from the Forms in Intellect (*Nous*) through which the the Material World develops according to the divine intelligible order.

The divisions between these senses of *logos* are of course somewhat artificial, and in most philosophers these connotations will be blended in various ways in a single usage of the term. Note that the translation of *logos* as "word" is misleading, because *logos* is rarely used in the sense of a single word. Its sense is more usually an "account," or "discourse," i.e. some sort of activity by which something is expressed.

## I.ii. Philosophical uses of *logos* in the Stoics and Plotinus

*Logos* is a particularly important term for the Stoics. They held that the cosmos was composed out of an eternal Fire, which they identified with *logos*.<sup>28</sup> This Fire proceeds outwards as the origin of and rational ordering of the cosmos, and at periodic intervals returns back to pure Fire in a great conflagration, only for the process to begin again.<sup>29</sup> The Stoics thought that their doctrine was prefigured in Heraclitus' seeming identification of the cosmos with Fire and *Logos*.<sup>30</sup> Stoic as well is the idea which Smyrnaeus mentions of the *spermatikoi logoi*, or seminal reason principles in the cosmos, that are expressions of the designing Fire. In general, the *spermatikoi logoi* are the eternal Fire under the aspect of its operation in the ordering of the development and identity of individual things.<sup>31</sup> Although they were materialists, their use of *logos* as the

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<sup>28</sup> The Stoics speak of a duality of Matter and the *Logos* which orders matter, but because they also conceive of *Logos* as material, it may perhaps be fair to treat the principle of Matter as a logical abstraction, much in the sense of Aristotelian matter. This justifies the assertion that *Logos* is both the ordering principle, and in a sense the substratum of the cosmos, i.e. it is a self-organising principle which is both the principle of order and that which is ordered. Matter is spoken of as a distinct principle, but one which is never without *Logos*, much as Aristotelian matter is never without form. This anticipates the Neoplatonic development of δύναμις as the potentiality of form to unfold itself in a self-development of its unrealised potentialities. See A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) pp.270-272.

<sup>29</sup> Aetius I.7.33 (*SVF* 2.1027 part) [in A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) pp.274-275]: "The Stoics made god out to be intelligent, a designing fire which methodically proceeds towards creation of the world, and encompasses all the seminal principles (*spermatikoi logoi*) according to which everything comes about according to fate, and a breath pervading the whole world, which takes on different names owing to the alterations of the matter through which it passes (Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ νοερὸν θεὸν ἀποφαίνονται, πῦρ τεχνικόν, ὁδῶ βαδίζον ἐπὶ γένεσιν κόσμου, ἐμπεριειληφὸς πάντας τοὺς σπερματικούς λόγους, καθ' οὓς ἕκαστα καθ' εἰμαρμένην γίνεται· καὶ πνεῦμα μὲν διήκον δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου, τὰς δὲ προσηγορίας μεταλαμβάνον κατὰ τὰς τῆς ὕλης, δι' ἧς κεχώρηκε, παραλλάξεις)." See F.H. Sandbach, *The Stoics* (New York: Norton, 1975) pp.71ff., and the qualifications of the Stoic identification of Nature and *logos* in A.A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974, 1986) pp.148-149, 154ff.

<sup>30</sup> See A.A. Long, "Heraclitus and Stoicism," reprinted in A.A. Long, *Stoic Studies* (Cambridge: University Press, 1996) pp.35-57; originally published in *Philosophia* 5-6 (Athens, 1975-76) pp.133-53. See esp. pp.45ff.

<sup>31</sup> Stobaeus I.213, 15-21 (*SVF* 1.120, part) [in A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p.275): "Zeno says that the sun and the moon and each of the other stars are intelligent and prudent and have the fieriness of designing fire. For there are two kinds of fire: one is undesigning and converts fuel into itself; the other is designing, causing growth and preservation, as is the case in plants and animals where it is physique and soul respectively. Such is the fire which constitutes the substance of the stars (Ζήνων τὸν ἥλιόν φησι καὶ τὴν σελήνην καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρῶν ἕκαστον εἶναι νοερὸν καὶ φρόνιμον, πύρινον <δὲ> πυρὸς τεχνικοῦ, δύο γὰρ γένη πυρὸς, τὸ μὲν ἀτεχνον καὶ μεταβάλλον εἰς ἑαυτὸ τὴν τροφήν, τὸ δὲ τεχνικόν, αὐξητικόν τε καὶ τηρητικόν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἐστί καὶ ζῴοις, ὁ δὲ φύσις ἐστί καὶ ψυχὴ· τοιοῦτου δὲ πυρὸς εἶναι τὴν

unifying Reason and principle of order in the universe, developing out an initial point of departure, seems to have influenced the Platonists. Their doctrine of the *spermatikoi logoi*, as the immanent portions of the eternal fire which order individual substances parallels the Neoplatonic *logoi* which are 'Forms divided among bodies' and the Forms immanent in bodies. Also in Stoicism we find a distinction between the *logos* held in the mind (*endiathetos logos*) and that expressed in speech (*prophorikos logos*).<sup>32</sup> The relation of these two *logoi*, with the second as an expression of or explication of the first, is similar to the Neoplatonic use of *logos* as explication or unfolding of an unexpressed intellectual content.<sup>33</sup> In Stoicism we find that both on a cosmic level, and on the level of

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τῶν ἄσπερων οὐσίαν)." See also Long and Sedley's commentary, p.277ff. and A.A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, p.165-166: "It is the 'creative reason' which ultimately accounts for all particular substances and happenings. Like God in Spinoza's *Ethics*, the *logos* is the 'indwelling cause of all things'. A portion of the cosmic *pneuma* is present in each substance and thereby constitutes the substance as something particular, a stone, a man etc."

<sup>32</sup> This pair of terms is not exclusive to the Stoics. See C. Panaccio, *Le discours intérieur de Platon à Guillaume d'Ockham* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1999) pp.53-93.

<sup>33</sup> See A. Graeser, *Plotinus and the Stoics* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972) p.35: "[In Plotinus this distinction] is used more as a convenient illustration of the analogous relation between the world-soul and the Mind and their respective objects. Plotinus would even say that intelligence is the λόγος of the One, and that Soul is the λόγος of Intelligence (cf. V 1 [10] 6, 45 or 3, 8). That is to say, λόγος appears to be placed on every level as an expression of the preceding level respectively." Graeser makes the point that Plotinus uses the Stoic terminology only with reference to human verbal utterance. However, the structural similarity of this use of *logos*, and Plotinus' more general use, is marked: "But *logos*, whether it is being 'uttered' by a learner or simply emerging on a lower level of reality as Nature's creation, is always an 'unfolding' (*anaptysssein*) or an unrolling (*exelittein, anelittein*) into multiplicity of something more truly itself -- because more one -- at the higher level of Intellect. It is always an expression and explication of a higher and more unified contemplation" [p.19].

See also R.E. Witt, "The Plotinian *Logos* and its Stoic Basis," *Classical Quarterly* xxv, no.2 (1931) pp.103-104.

This character of *logos* as expression and unfolding, in which there is a translation of a unified cognitive/ontological content to a more divided level, has not been sufficiently recognised by contemporary thought. To take one significant example, H.G. Gadamer's analysis of 'Language and *Logos*' and 'Language and Verbum' in *Truth and Method*, 2<sup>nd</sup>, rev.ed., trans. J. Weinsheimer and D.G. Marshall (New York: Crossroad, 1989) pp.405-428, jumps very quickly from Plato's *Cratylus* to Aquinas. He does mention Aristotle, Augustine, and even in passing the Stoic distinction between *logos endiathetos* and *logos prophorikos*, but the entire Neoplatonic development of *logos* is strikingly missing. Consequently, his analysis of the Greek concept of *logos* is tied too much to the idea of *logos* as spoken language mirroring a conceived *eidos*, rather than *logos* as an expression in thought of a unified intellectual insight. Further, his analysis of *verbum* is tied too closely with the Christian doctrine of the *Verbum Dei*, and the polarisation of human and divine thought in Aquinas' epistemology. The one mention of Plotinus present (p.423) is merely an invocation of the fountain metaphor with reference to the Christian procession of the *Verbum* from the Father. "The word of human thought is directed toward the thing, but it cannot contain it as a whole within itself. Thus thought constantly proceeds to new conceptions and is fundamentally incapable of being wholly realised in any. This incapacity for completeness has a positive side: it reveals the true infinity of

individual human thought and speech, a distinction is made between a higher and a lower *logos*, and that in both cases the lower *logos* is an expression of the higher. In Proclus this idea of the expression of a higher reality by a lower *logos* will be spoken of in terms of the unfolding of a paradigm and by the *logos* which is its image.

The Stoic and Platonic schools existed side by side in the ancient world, and it is not surprising that we find in the Middle Platonic schools a number of borrowings and adaptations of Stoic doctrines.<sup>34</sup> The notion of *logos* is taken up by the Middle Platonists, although not in the Stoic materialist sense. In Philo of Alexandria, for example, we find a doctrine of the *Logos* as the divine creative principle by which the Platonic Ideas shape creation. Whether this *Logos* is an instrument of God, or an aspect of his thought, is unclear.<sup>35</sup> In Philo the Stoic *spermatikoi logoi* are adapted to a Platonic use as the models and creative principles of the physical world. Important as well is the idea of the *Logos* as an image (*eikōn*) of God, who is the paradigm (*paradeigma*).<sup>36</sup> As I noted above, the sense of *logos* as image is particularly important for Proclus. Plutarch of Chaeroneia also has a doctrine of the *Logos* as intermediary between God and the cosmos. The *Logos* has a transcendent, unchangeable aspect, and an aspect immanent in body. This latter is a

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the mind, which constantly surpasses itself in a new mental process and in doing so also finds the freedom for constantly new projects [p.425-426]...Because the process of thought is conceived as the process of explication in words, a logical achievement of language becomes apparent that cannot be fully understood in terms of an order of things as they would appear to an infinite mind...when the Greek idea of logic is penetrated by Christian theology, something new is born: the medium of language, in which the mediation of the incarnation event achieves its full truth [p.428]." Because Gadamer situates his analysis within the cliché of the direct influence of Christian theology on Classical Greek concepts, he misses the Neoplatonic development of the *logos* which is an explication directed back to that which it explicates, and in which its perfection and fulfillment is found. Briefly put, the moment of return is missing. This yields the illusion that Aquinas' epistemology supports Gadamer's own inversion of classical categories. For Gadamer it is in the unfolding of human words that truth occurs. For the Greeks and Medievals, words are unfoldings only of human truths, truths which point above themselves, to the Truth itself.

<sup>34</sup> For an account of the early reciprocal influence of Stoicism and Platonism, see G. Reydam-Schils, *Demiurge and providence. Stoic and Platonist readings of Plato's Timaeus* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1999).

<sup>35</sup> See G. Reydam-Schils, *Demiurge and providence. Stoic and Platonist readings of Plato's Timaeus* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1999) p.151.

<sup>36</sup> See J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977, 1996) p.73.

perceptible and changing image of the transcendent principle. The former aspect is the *Logos* as the Platonic Forms which are the thoughts of God.<sup>37</sup>

...another development characteristic of Middle Platonism...arising as a development from Stoicism, that is, the distinguishing of a first and second God. The distinction is between a completely transcendent, self-intelligizing figure, and an active demiurgic one. The later Platonists adopted the Stoic *Logos* into their system as the active force of God in the world, and when they reinstated a transcendent immaterial First Principle, as did Alexandrian Platonism after Antiochus, they arrived at two entities, one basically the Demiurge of the *Timaeus*, the other the Good of the *Republic* and the One of the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides*. In Philo, partly, no doubt, because of his strongly monotheistic inclinations, we have a contrast rather between God and his *Logos* rather between a first and second God, but later Platonists such as Albinus, Apuleius, or Numenius postulate two distinct Gods, both Intellects certainly, but one in repose and turned in upon itself, the other in motion and directed outwards, both above and below itself.<sup>38</sup>

The question of the relation between these two aspects of God, or of the *Logos*, has to be asked. It is certain that the lower was considered in some manner to be an expression of the higher. In the Neoplatonic period it is explicit that the lower is an expression of the higher, and because of this it is an image of the higher.

In the *Enneads*, *logos* is a term which applies only to the lower moment, because the notion of expression which *logos* has is appropriate to the lower, unfolded moment. Hence *logos* is an appropriate term for Soul as that which expresses the Forms in *Nous*: "[Soul] is a sort of image of *Nous*; just as an expressed *logos* (*logos en prophorai*) is an image of the *logos* in Soul, so Soul is the *logos* of *Nous*."<sup>39</sup> This recalls the earlier distinction between the *logos endiathetos* and the *logos prophorikos*, used here more generally to describe the relation of paradigm to image, so that the term *logos* denotes an

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<sup>37</sup> See J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977, 1996) pp.200-202.

<sup>38</sup> See J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977, 1996) p.46.

<sup>39</sup> Plotinus, *Enn.* V.1.3.8-9: εἰκὼν τις ἐστὶ νοῦ· οἷον λόγος ὁ ἐν προφορᾷ λόγου τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ, οὕτω τοι καὶ αὐτὴ λόγος νοῦ. Note that Plotinus does not use the terms *logos prophorikos* and *logos endiathetos*. These exact terms are not found in Plotinus. But the terms *logos en psuchēi* and *logos en prophorai* are obviously parallel.

expression or image of a higher reality. So Soul is the *logos* of *Nous*, in the same manner as speech is the expressed *logos* of the *logos* in Soul (the *logos en psuchêi*). One way to state this development is to say that the word *logos* itself comes to take on more and more the connotation of *logos prophorikos*, and *logos endiathetos* is replaced by the paradigm which the *logos* unfolds. In the case of the Soul this source is the *eidos* in *Nous*.

Soul unfolds *Nous* into *logoi*, and is the principle of order in the Material World, through its *logos*:

[Soul] was given ordered beauty according to a *logos*, because soul has power in it, and throughout the whole of it, the power to set in order according to *logoi*: just as the *logoi* in seeds mould and shape living beings like little ordered universes.<sup>40</sup>

The *logoi* which Soul possesses are not only images of *Nous*, they are also such as to give order to what lies below them. So they are compared to the *logoi* in seeds, which have their expression in mature plants. The *logos* in the seed is thought to be the principle of order according to which the plant develops, and the plant itself is the image of the immaterial *logos* present as the form of the seed.

It is important to note that the *logoi* in Soul and the Material World are not expressions of a *logos* in *Nous*, as if these *logoi* were simple reduplications of what existed in *Nous*. Rather, there is an expansion into multiplicity of the unified content of *Nous*. The Soul's *logoi* are divided unfoldings what exists in *Nous* in a unified manner.

Being and *Nous* are therefore one nature...But they are thought of by us as one before the other because they are divided by our thinking. For the dividing *nous*<sup>41</sup> is a different one, but the individed *Nous* which does not divide is Being and all things.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> *Enn.* IV.3.10.10-13: ἐκοσμεῖτο δὲ κατὰ λόγον ψυχῆς δυνάμει ἐχουσῆς ἐν αὐτῇ δι' ὅλης δυνάμιν κατὰ λόγους κοσμεῖν· οἷα καὶ οἱ ἐν σπέρμασι λόγοι πλάττουσι καὶ μορφοῦσι τὰ ζῶα οἷον μικροὺς τινὰς κόσμους.

<sup>41</sup> The dividing *nous* is Soul. Note the terminological fluidity here. Plotinus is distinguishing between *Nous* and Soul here, in that one divides and one does not, but he also emphasises their kinship by calling them both *nous*.

<sup>42</sup> *Enn.* V.9.8.17-23: μία μὲν οὖν φύσις τὸ τε ὄν ὃ τε νοῦς...ἐπιννοεῖται γε μὴν μεριζομένων ὑφ' ἡμῶν θάτερα πρὸ τῶν ἐτέρων. ἕτερος γὰρ ὁ μερίζων νοῦς, ὁ δὲ ἀμέριστος καὶ μὴ μερίζων τὸ ὄν καὶ τὰ πάντα.

When Soul thinks the content of *Nous* it produces a divided image of it. in a manner parallel to the production of spoken words as a divided image of the thought in the soul:

As the spoken *logos* is an imitation of that in the soul, so the *logos* in the soul is an imitation of that in something else. As the uttered (*en prophorai*) *logos*, then, is broken up into parts as compared with that in the soul, so is that in the soul as compared with that before it, which it interprets (*hermêneus*).<sup>43</sup>

Plotinus, in a famous passage, praises the Egyptians for their use of hieroglyphics, which better capture the non-discursive unity of the Forms in *Nous* than does the discursive reasoning of *dianoia*.<sup>44</sup> Both words written in a phonetic alphabet and hieroglyphics are symbols which point beyond themselves to a prior unity. Hieroglyphics, according to Plotinus, are better signifiers because they are formally more similar to their signified than are words written with an alphabet.<sup>45</sup>

Plotinus criticizes the Stoics for not restricting *logos* to the unfolded moment. The Stoics think that all they need are *logoi*, but for Plotinus this obscures the distinction between source and expression.

But if they [the Stoics] are going to say that *logoi* are enough, they must clearly be eternal; but if they are eternal and not subject to affections, they must be in *Nous*.

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<sup>43</sup> *Enn.* I.2.3.27-30: ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἐν φωνῇ λόγος μίμημα τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἐν ψυχῇ μίμημα τοῦ ἐν ἑτέρῳ. ὡς οὖν μεμερισμένος ὁ ἐν προφορᾷ πρὸς τὸν ἐν ψυχῇ, οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἐν ψυχῇ ἑρμηνεύς ὧν ἐκεῖνου πρὸς τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ.

<sup>44</sup> *Enn.* V.8.6. Plotinus uses the term *dianoësis* in this passage. *Nous* in Plotinus is an atemporal Intellect in which the object of thought is not outside that which thinks. The Forms are *Nous*, and *Nous* is the Forms, or Being is *Nous* which thinks itself as the Forms. A.H. Armstrong traces this conception of *Nous* back, finding influences on Plotinus in Severus' identification of the Soul with mathematics, Atticus' identification of the Platonic Forms as the thoughts of God, Albinus' identification of the Platonic νοητά with the νοητόν in the Aristotelian νόησις νοήσεως, and Alexander of Aphrodisias' identification of the agent intellect with the divine intellect. Armstrong distinguishes correctly between a conception of the Forms as the thoughts of God according to which he carried out his demiurgic activity, and the Plotinian non-demiurgic identity of being and thinking. See A.H. Armstrong, "The background of the doctrine 'That the intelligibles are not outside the Intellect,'" in *Les sources de Plotin* (Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1960) pp.391-425.

<sup>45</sup> There are higher and lower sorts of signs. One could think of the relation between *dianoia* and certain sorts of myth in Proclus as analogous to Plotinus' relation between alphabetic signs and hieroglyphs. However, there are certain sorts of myth, according to Proclus, which signify the gods not by a kinship of their form, but by the contrast between the divine quietude and dispersion and violence portrayed in the myth. See J. Dillon, "Image, symbol and analogy: three basic concepts of Neoplatonic allegorical exegesis," in *The significance of Neoplatonism*, ed. R. Baine Harris (New York: S.U.N.Y., 1976) pp.247-262; and J. Trouillard, *La mystagogie de Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1982) pp.33-51.

and in a *Nous* of this kind, one which is prior to habit and nature and soul: for these are potential.<sup>46</sup>

In effect Plotinus is saying that any *logoi* found in *Nous* are unlike the *logoi* found in Soul. They are distinct in the sense of paradigm and image. Plotinus also, very occasionally, uses the term *logos* to refer to *Nous*. But it is always when describing *Nous* as a divided image of the One.<sup>47</sup> *Logos* is the development of potential (*dunamis*). In the passage cited above, the Soul and Nature are potential with regard to *Nous*. Plotinus uses the analogy of a seed,<sup>48</sup> recalling the Stoic *spermatikos logos*, which has in its *logos* the single principle of development of both the eye and the hand. The *logos* here is not potential in the sense of passivity, but in the sense of having the power to develop a multiplicity out of unity. Both the Soul as *logos* of *Nous*, and the *logoi* in the Material World, refract the unity of *Nous* into a multiplicity. Hence, in Plotinus, *logos* has become a term appropriate only to the unfolding or refraction, and he is not criticising the Stoics so much for putting *logoi* where they don't belong (i.e. in *Nous*), but rather he criticises them for using the same term for both the unified source and the divided expression.

This brief examination is not meant to be exhaustive of the senses of *logos* in Plotinus and the Stoics. It is only meant to give some sense of the background of Proclus' use of *logos* as an 'unfolding' or 'unrolling' of a concentrated intellectual content.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> *Enn.* V.9.5.23-26: εἰ δὲ λόγους φήσουσιν ἀρκεῖν, αἰδίου δῆλον· εἰ δὲ αἰδίου καὶ ἀπαθείς, ἐν νῷ δεῖ εἶναι καὶ τοιοῦτω καὶ προτέρῳ ἕξεως καὶ φύσεως καὶ ψυχῆς· δυνάμει γὰρ ταῦτα.

<sup>47</sup> *Enn.* V.3.15.31-32: "but it [the One] had them [all things] as not distinguished from one another: for it is in the second principle [*Nous*] that they are distinguished according to their *logos* (*τοῖς λόγοις*) (ἀλλ' ἄρα οὕτως εἶχεν ὡς μὴ διακεκριμένα· τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ διεκέκριτο τῷ λόγῳ)": V.1.6.45-46: "as Soul is a *logos* and a kind of activity of *Nous*, just as it [*Nous*] is of that [the One] (οἷον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ λόγος νοῦ καὶ ἐνεργεῖα τις, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἐκείνου)."

<sup>48</sup> *Enn.* V.9.6.15-16: "As for the powers in seeds, then, each of them is one whole *logos* (αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι δυνάμεις ἐκάστη αὐτῶν λόγος εἷς ὅλος)": V.3.8.7-8: "the *logos* in the seed (ὁ λόγος ὁ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι)."

<sup>49</sup> For *logos* in Plotinus see D. O'Meara, *Plotinus, an introduction to the Enneads* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) p.75.; L. Gerson, *Plotinus* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994) p.58ff; J. Heiser, *Logos and language in the philosophy of Plotinus* (Lewiston, Queenston, Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 1991); F. Turlot, "Le 'logos' chez Plotin," *Études Philosophiques* 4 (1985) pp.517-28, p.523:

*Logos* in Proclus has not yet been fully treated. Our examination of *logos* in Proclus will show that it functions in a manner basically the same as that in Plotinus, with the reservation that Proclus' more elaborate systematisation allows him to fix in a more determinate sense than in Plotinus the unity of *logos* in its diverse functions.



### I.iii. Proclus' use of *logos* as unfolding

In Proclus *dianoia* is firmly connected with *logos* and with unfolding

(*anellittein*).<sup>50</sup>

For the *logos* must be similar (*homoion*) to the things [which it describes] (*tois pragmasin*), for it would not be able to describe their nature for any other reason than that it has a kinship towards them. For it is necessary that whatever the thing [*to pragma*] is in a concentrated manner (*sunêirêmenôs*), the *logos* is in an unfolded manner (*anelligmenôs*), in order that it show forth (*ekphainêi*) the thing and be subordinate to its nature.<sup>51</sup>

Perhaps [Plato] means [by the phrase *noêsei meta logou*] that because the *logos* circles around the intelligible (*to noêton*) and is active and moves around it like a centre, it is in this manner that it looks upon [the intelligible]. So that *noêsis* has an unchanging and partless knowledge, while the *logos* dances around the being (*ousia*) of the intelligible in a circle, unfolding the unified existence of all things that is in it (*anellitontas tèn hênômenên en autôi pantôn hupostasin*).<sup>52</sup>

Among beings the Soul, which is the *logos* of the intelligibles (*hê psuchê logos ousa tôn noêtôn*), makes the unified cause of the *logoi* which are in beings appear, having received its existence (*hupostasis*) from them [i.e. the intelligibles].<sup>53</sup>

For the *logos* of the Soul appears from there [from *Nous*], as if out of a sort of inner sanctuary, showing forth the partlessness of *Nous*, and announcing its silence and unspeakable unity.<sup>54</sup>

For everything which is speakable is so either through a *logos* or through a name; but the name is prior, while the *logos* is by nature posterior to the name. For the name imitates the simplicity and the unity of beings, while the *logos* imitates their multiplicity and complexity. Hence the name is one, disclosing at once all that lies under it: the *logos*, on the other hand, runs around from all sides the being of

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<sup>50</sup> See J. Trouillard, "L'activité onomastique selon Proclus," in *De Jamblique à Proclus* (Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1975) pp.239-251; J. Trouillard, "Les degrés du ποιεῖν chez Proclus," *Dionysius* 1 (1977) pp.69-84, see p.80; L. Siorvanes, *Proclus. Neo-Platonic philosophy and science* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996) pp.137-149.

<sup>51</sup> *In Tim.*I.341.4-9: δεῖ γὰρ ὁμοῖον εἶναι τὸν λόγον τοῖς πράγμασιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλως ἂν αὐτῶν τὴν φύσιν ἐξηγήσαιτο ἢ συγγενῶς ἔχων πρὸς αὐτά· δεῖ γὰρ ὃ τὸ πρᾶγμα συνηρημένως ἐστὶ. τοῦτο εἶναι αὐτὸν ἀνελιγμένως, ἵνα καὶ ἐκφαίνει τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ὑφειμένως ἢ τῆς φύσεως αὐτοῦ·

<sup>52</sup> *In Tim.*I.248.1-6: τάχα δὲ ἂν σημαῖνοι καὶ ὅτι περιθέων τὸ νοητὸν ὁ λόγος καὶ ὡς περὶ κέντρον ἐνεργῶν καὶ κινούμενος οὕτως αὐτὸ θεᾶται, τῆς μὲν νοήσεως ἀμεταβάτως αὐτὸ καὶ ἀμερίστως γινωσκούσης, τοῦ δὲ λόγου περιχορεύοντος αὐτοῦ κύκλῳ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἀνελίττοντος τὴν ἠνωμένην ἐν αὐτῷ πάντων ὑπόστασιν.

<sup>53</sup> *In Tim.*I.341.13-16: ἐν δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις ἡ ψυχὴ λόγος οὐσα τῶν νοητῶν ἐκφαίνει τὴν ἠνωμένην τῶν λόγων «τῶν» ἐν αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ἀπ' αὐτῶν λαχοῦσα τὴν ὑπόστασιν·

<sup>54</sup> *In Tim.*II.243.6-9: ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ οἷον ἐξ ἀδύτου τινὸς ἀναφαίνεται ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς λόγος, ἐκφαίνων τοῦ νοῦ τὸ ἀμερές καὶ ἀπαγγέλλων αὐτοῦ τὴν σιγωμένην καὶ ἀφραστον ἔνωσιν·

the thing, unrolling [*anelittôn*] its multiplicity. However, both the name and the *logos* start from the thing <...> of intelligible beings<sup>55</sup>

As in Plotinus, there is a trace of the distinction between the *logos endiathetos* and the *logos prophorikos* in the distinction between the simplicity of Being in *Nous* and its expression in the multiplicity of the *logos* of *dianoia*. And as in Plotinus, the real distinction is between the concentrated, or secret, or hidden intellectual content of *Nous*, and its unfolded, or multiple expression in the Soul's *dianoia*.

For it [*dianoia* as the Soul's knowing] travels out from and unfolds (*anaploi*) the measurelessness of *Nous* and unrolls (*anelissei*) its concentrated intellectual insight, and then gathers together again the things it has distinguished and refers them back to *Nous*.<sup>56</sup>

and again:

For the soul is also *Nous*, unfolding (*anelittôn*) herself by virtue of the *Nous* which is before her, and having become its likeness and external replica. Consequently, if *Nous* is everything after the fashion of intellect, so is the Soul everything after the fashion of Soul; if *Nous* is everything as exemplar, the Soul is everything as copy; if *Nous* is everything in concentration (*sunêirêmenôs*), the Soul is everything as divided (*diêirêmenôs*).<sup>57</sup>

For Proclus, the term *logos* is most properly located in this distinction between the cognitive modes of *Nous* and the Soul.

This distinction between the concentration of *Nous* and the division of *dianoia* is quite clear in Proclus, as is the natural connection between *dianoia* and *logos*. However, the terms Proclus uses to describe the differing cognitions of *Nous* and Soul vary from text to text, and within texts. So he can speak of a primary (*prôtôs*) and secondary (*deuterôs*) possession of Forms (*eidê*), in *Nous* and Soul respectively, in the same passage

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<sup>55</sup> In *Parm.* S.R.M. 231-237 [505.83-89]: πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ῥητὸν ἢ λόγῳ ἢ ὀνόματι ῥητὸν ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὄνομα πρεσβύτερον, ὁ δὲ λόγος φύσει τοῦ ὀνόματος δεύτερος· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἀπλότητα μιμεῖται τῶν ὄντων καὶ τὴν ἑνωσιν, ὁ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν· διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὄνομα ἓν, ὁμοῦ πᾶν δηλοῦν τὸ ὑποκείμενον· ὁ δὲ λόγος περιτρέχει τὴν τοῦ πράγματος οὐσίαν, ἀνελίττων αὐτοῦ τὸ πλῆθος. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ὄνομα καὶ ὁ λόγος ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀρχεται <...> τῶν νοητῶν.

<sup>56</sup> In *Eucl.* 4.11-14: διεξοδεύει μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀναπλοῖ τοῦ νοῦ τὴν ἀμετρίαν καὶ ἀνελίσσει τὸ συνεσπριαμένον τῆς νοερᾶς ἐπιβολῆς, συνάγει δὲ αὐτὸ πάλιν τὰ διηρημένα καὶ ἀναφέρει πρὸς τὸν νοῦν.

<sup>57</sup> In *Eucl.* 16.10-16: νοῦς γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ τὸν πρὸ αὐτοῦ νοῦν ἀνελίττων ἑαυτὸν καὶ εἰκὼν ἐκείνου καὶ τύπος ἔξω γινόμενος, εἰ οὖν ἐκεῖνος πάντα νοερῶς, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ πάντα ψυχικῶς, καὶ εἰ παραδειγματικῶς ἐκεῖνος, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ εἰκονικῶς, καὶ εἰ συνηρημένως, ἡ ψυχὴ διηρημένως.

in which he says that the contents of Soul are essential *logoi*, which are irradiations (*emphaseis*) of the intellectual Forms (*tôn noerôn eidôn*).<sup>58</sup> He may speak of the Soul as a 'company of Forms' (*plêrôma tôn eidôn*) or 'company of *logoi*' (*plêrôma tôn logôn*) and mean the same thing,<sup>59</sup> or switch from using *eidos* to *logos* in the same passage.<sup>60</sup>

So it is not possible to say without qualification that Soul is the *logos* of *Nous*, because in many passages it is not the case that *logoi* and only *logoi* are found in Soul. What we can say without qualification is that *Nous* is a concentrated intelligible which *dianoia* unfolds through a divided thinking. And we can say that most often Proclus uses the term *logos* when speaking of the activity of *dianoia*. However, Proclus will also often use the word *eidos* with reference to the Soul, probably because the word had a general meaning as "intelligible object," and also because of Plato's use of the term.<sup>61</sup> So insofar as the Soul's *dianoia* grasps an intelligible object, *eidos* is as legitimate a word as *logos*, even if it is less accurate. As well, Soul is not simply the *logos* of *Nous*, because *dianoia* is not the highest cognitive activity in which Soul engages. Soul itself also possesses *nous* in a certain manner. If *Nous* and Soul are concentric, then *Nous* is present to the Soul as its centre and intelligible source, and when Soul puts off the dividing activity of *dianoia* it may coincide with the unity of *Nous*.<sup>62</sup>

However, Proclus' use of the term *logos*, and its use in the phrase "projection of the soul's essential *logoi*" (*probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn*) is significant. It points to the character of *dianoia* as an unfolding of *Nous*, and it points to the character of *dianoia* as the medium of *analogia* on the psychic level. Just as the expression of Being in the

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<sup>58</sup> *El. Th. prop.* 194.

<sup>59</sup> For *plêrôma tôn eidôn* see *In Eucl.* 16.6; *In Parm.* 896.4; for *plêrôma tôn logôn* see *In Tim.* II.200.21; *In Eucl.* 55.18. Cf. J. Trouillard, "L'âme 'lieu des idées' selon Proclus," *Sciences ecclésiastiques* (1966) pp.7-24, see p.8-9.

<sup>60</sup> See *In Eucl.* 56.11-22, where Proclus seems to use the three expressions τὸ εἶδος...ἀδιαίρετον, διανοητὸν εἶδος and ὁ ἀμερὴς ἐν ἡμῖν λόγος as equivalent terms for the beginning point of geometrical unfolding.

<sup>61</sup> See, for example *In Parm.* 896.4 where Proclus calls the Soul a *plêrôma tôn eidôn*. He is commenting on *Parmenides* 132b, where Socrates makes his third suggestion, that each of the Forms (*hekaston tôn eidôn*) is a thought (*noëma*).

<sup>62</sup> We will examine the Soul's *nous* in the final chapter of this study.

intelligible genera is one example of the *analogia* which holds at all level of the universe. the *logoi* in *dianoia* which express or manifest *Nous* effect the *analogia* which holds between *Nous* and Soul. Further, the sense of *logos* as unfolding of a unity into a multiplicity allows Proclus to satisfy the Platonic demand to ground the multiplicity of human discursive thought in the prior unity of *Nous*. Platonic and Aristotelian thought is opposed at this point. Aristotle does not seem to need to derive the multiplicity in his system from a prior unity, such that he could explain why, for example, there are ten, and only ten, categories. Proclus, as a representative of the Platonic tradition, holds that every multiplicity participates in and is grounded in a prior unity. The use of the term *logos* as an unfolding allows him to ground the multiplicity of human thought in the unity of *Nous*.

## CHAPTER II

### INDUCTION AND ANAMNĒSIS

We begin our examination of Proclus' account of *dianoia* with an examination of sensation (*aisthēsis*). Proclus' account of the projection of the soul's essential *logoi* (*probolē tôn ousiôdôn logôn*) is his version of the Platonic doctrine of Recollection (*anamnēsis*). Proclus locates the source of *a priori* knowledge in an ontological priority, rather than a temporal priority, and in this shift he thinks he is being faithful to the true meaning of Plato's doctrine of *anamnēsis*. The main competitor in the ancient world to the Platonic theory of *anamnēsis* is the Peripatetic theory of induction. If sensation could be the origin of universals for thought, Platonic *anamnēsis* would be superfluous. In this chapter we will examine Proclus' version of this debate over sensation as the source of universals, by looking at his criticism of induction, and his account of the *probolē tôn ousiôdôn logôn* as a form of *anamnēsis*.

#### II.i. Proclus' criticism of induction

In the Euclid Commentary and the Commentary on the *Parmenides*, Proclus argues against those who claim that induction yields the *logoi* or *eidē* with which the Soul thinks.<sup>63</sup> He calls the Form which his opponents claim is derived from sensation a "later-born Form" (*husterogenes eidos*).<sup>64</sup> Proclus does think that such *husterogeneis logoi* and *eidē* exist, but he does not think that they are derived from sensation. The Soul is both an

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<sup>63</sup> In *Eucl.* 12.2-16.16; In *Parm.* 892.36-894.34.

<sup>64</sup> In *Parm.* 892.21.

image of *Nous* and paradigm of Body, and so when it projects its innate *logoi* it can do so either with an eye to thinking *Nous* or Body. Proclus thinks that the later-born *logoi* of which his opponents speak are in fact the soul's innate *logoi*, when they are used to understand the phantasms drawn from sensation. They come to be in the soul when they are occasioned by sensation, but they are not derived from sensation, because sensation is incapable of yielding this sort of *logos*.<sup>65</sup>

#### II.i.a. The criticism in the Euclid commentary

In his criticism of induction in the Euclid commentary, Proclus speaks throughout of mathematics. It is clear from this commentary that he considers mathematics to be a type of *dianoia*. He establishes at the beginning of the Euclid commentary that mathematics holds a middle place between *Nous* and sensation, just the place that *dianoia* holds.<sup>66</sup> He situates mathematics along with *dianoia* in the same section of Plato's Line.<sup>67</sup> He moves easily from speaking about mathematics to speaking about *dianoia* within the same discussion.<sup>68</sup> Indeed, in the Euclid commentary Proclus almost gives us the impression that mathematics and *dianoia* are to be identified.<sup>69</sup>

However, *dianoia* is not identical with mathematics. Although mathematical are an important type of dianoetic object (*dianoêta*), there are other sorts of *dianoêta*. In all of his works Proclus employs and refers to *logoi* which are not mathematical, but which must be *dianoêta*, simply because written works are accounts of philosophical reasoning, and philosophy is a sort of *dianoia*. Aside from this, there is evidence in the text of the

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<sup>65</sup> Proclus also uses the term "universal" (*to katholou*) in these discussions, but usually as a way to describe the more comprehensive character of the Soul's *logoi* or *eidê*, when compared with particulars. And he uses it to refer to the universal premises of demonstration. He does not use the term "universal" with the frequency with which contemporary metaphysicians use it, to refer to thoughts or entities. He prefers the terms *logos* and *eidos*.

<sup>66</sup> In *Eucl.* 4.6-8.

<sup>67</sup> In *Eucl.* 10.16-12.2.

<sup>68</sup> See for example the transition from speaking of mathematical forms (*eidê*) at 15.16 to the general explanation of the soul's knowledge at 16.4.

<sup>69</sup> See below, chapter IV.

Euclid commentary that in this work Proclus considers mathematical to be only one sort of *dianoêta*. For example, he does not say that *dianoêta* are *mathêmata*, but rather that *mathêmata* are *dianoêta* (*ta mathêmata...dianoêta men esti kata tèn ousian*).<sup>70</sup> He uses the phrase "the mathematical, and the objects of *dianoia* in general" (*ta de mathematika kai holôs ta dianoêta*).<sup>71</sup> Both of these passages seem to imply that *dianoêta* is the wider term. In another place, Proclus speaks of the *Republic* passage where dialectic is said to be the capstone of the studies (*ta mathêmata*).<sup>72</sup> Dialectic is a form of *dianoia*, and so in distinguishing it from mathematics Proclus is here subdividing *dianoia* into a higher and lower part.<sup>73</sup>

As *Nous* is set over *dianoia* and supplies to it its beginning points (*archas*) from above, and perfects *dianoia* from out of itself, in the same manner dialectic, the purest part of philosophy, which is just above mathematics, makes it to be one, and comprehends its entire unfolding (*anelixin*), and gives from itself to the various sciences their perfecting (*telesiourgous*), critical (*kritikas*), and intellectual (*noeras*) powers (*dunameis*) -- the sciences, I mean, of analysis (*anolutikên*), division (*diairetikên*), definition (*horistikên*), and demonstration (*apodeiktikên*).<sup>74</sup>

In a following passage, Proclus distinguishes between the "single and whole science of mathematics which contains in itself in simpler form the principles of all the particular sciences"<sup>75</sup> (*hê mia kai holê mathêmatikê tas pasôn tôn kath' hekasta epistêmôn archas haplousteron en heautêi perechousa*) and "even higher than it, dialectic [which] could be said to be the bond of union among the mathematical sciences" (*anôtêrô d' eti tautês hê dialektikê tôn mathêmatôn an eiê sundesmos*). Dialectic "perfects whole mathematics and

<sup>70</sup> In *Eucl.* 11.10...14.

<sup>71</sup> In *Eucl.* 4.18-19.

<sup>72</sup> *Rep.* 534e.

<sup>73</sup> See ch.IV.

<sup>74</sup> In *Eucl.* 42.13-43.1: καθάπερ ὁ νοῦς ὑπερίδρυται τῆς διανοίας καὶ χορηγεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀνωθεν αὐτῇ καὶ τελειοῖ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὴ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτική, φιλοσοφίας οὖσα τὸ καθαρώτατον μέρος, προσεχῶς ὑπερήπλωται τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ περιέχει τὴν ὅλην αὐτῶν ἀνέλιξιν, καὶ δίδωσι δυνάμεις ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις αὐτῶν παντοίας, τελεσιουργούς καὶ κριτικές καὶ νοεράς, τὴν ἀναλυτικὴν λέγω καὶ τὴν διαιρετικὴν καὶ τὴν ὀριστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν.

<sup>75</sup> Morrow translates *holê mathêmatikê* as "general mathematics." It is difficult to find a good English word for *holê*, so I have fallen back on the cognate "whole." The best definition of this science is this particular passage. Because for Proclus *dianoia* is a division of a prior comprehensive unity, we should expect that he would posit such a unified and simple form of mathematics before all of the particular branches of mathematics.

sends it upwards towards *Nous* through its own powers" (*tên holên mathêmatikên teleioi kai eis nous anapempei tais heautês dunamesi*).<sup>76</sup> We will examine the subdivision of *dianoia* into dialectic and mathematics in chapter IV. At this point it is sufficient to say that mathematical knowledge is the lower part of *dianoia*, and if sensation cannot yield a mathematical universal, it also cannot yield a universal for dialectic.

Proclus' position is that mathematics is a type of knowing which falls short of the simplicity of *Nous*, but which has a precision and stability surpassing both sensation and opinion.<sup>77</sup> Because of its precision, mathematical knowledge cannot be derived from sensation; but it cannot also be derived from the Soul alone. Instead, the being of mathematical Forms and genera (*tên ousian...tôn mathêmatikôn eidôn kai genôn*), is derived from the Soul itself and from *Nous*. He gives three arguments concerning the clarity and precision of mathematics, as opposed to the confusion and unclarity of the sense-world, to show that mathematics cannot be derived from sensation.<sup>78</sup> His first argument focuses on the objects of mathematics and the objects of sense, and their relative clarity. The second focuses rather on the precision of demonstration from universal, rather than particular, premises. The third argument sums up the first two, and

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<sup>76</sup> In *Eucl.* 4.2-13. Cf. Plotinus' discussion of dialectic, and its use of analysis and diairesis. *Enn.* 1.3.4-6: "[Dialectic] is a disposition which is able to say in a *logos* about each thing what each thing is and how it differs from other things and what it has in common with them [4.2-4]...It uses the Platonic method of division (*diairesis*) for the distinction of Forms, to find the essence [of each], even up to the First Genera; and it weaves together intellectually [the Forms] which [issue] from these [First Genera], until it has come to the end of the entire intelligible world, and then returning back it undoes (*analuoussa*) [its intellectual web], returning back to its beginning point/first principle (*ep' archên*) [4.12-16]...So dialectic is an esteemed part of philosophy. For philosophy does have other parts: it investigates nature, taking dialectic as its aid, just as arithmetic and the other arts makes use of dialectic; and indeed [arithmetic] receives aid from dialectic in a much more proximate manner. The part of philosophy which investigates ethics also issues from dialectic [6.1-6]." (ἔστι μὲν δὴ ἡ λόγῳ περὶ ἐκάστου δυναμένη ἕξις εἰπεῖν τί τε ἕκαστον καὶ τί ἄλλων διαφέρει καὶ τίς ἡ κοινότης...τῇ διαιρέσει τῇ Πλάτωνος χρωμένη μὲν καὶ εἰς διάρτισιν τῶν εἰδῶν, χρωμένη δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ τί ἐστὶ, χρωμένη δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα γένη, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων νοερῶς πλέκουσα, ἕως ἂν διέλθῃ πᾶν τὸ νοητόν, καὶ ἀνάπαλιν ἀναλύουσα, εἰς ὃ ἂν ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἔλθῃ...μέρος οὖν τὸ τίμιον· ἔχει γάρ καὶ ἄλλα φιλοσοφία· καὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ οὐσεως θεωρεῖ βοήθειαν παρὰ διαλεκτικῆς λαβοῦσα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἀριθμητικὴ προσχρῶνται <καὶ> αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι· μᾶλλον μέντοι αὕτη ἐγγύθεν κομίζεται παρὰ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς· καὶ περὶ ἡθῶν ὡσαύτως θεωροῦσα μὲν ἐκείθεν)

<sup>77</sup> In *Eucl.* 4.18-23.

<sup>78</sup> In *Eucl.* 12.2-15.15. See also the treatment of Proclus' criticism of induction in J. Trouillard, *L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1972) pp.38-50.



states in general that a soul which derived its *eidē* from sensation would be subordinating itself ontologically to Body, a consequence which is absurd.<sup>79</sup>

He introduces his first two arguments with two technical terms for the possible derivation of mathematical knowledge from sense-objects. The first term is abstraction (*aphairesis*), and the second is collection (*athroisin*, *sunathroisin*). He refers to collection with two phrases, one used at the beginning of his discussion, one at the end. The first is a "collection of the parts into one common *logos*" (*athroisin tôn merikôn eis hena ton koinon logon*),<sup>80</sup> while the second is a "collecting together of what is common in each thing" (*sunathroisin tôn en tois kath' hekasta koinôn*).<sup>81</sup> The two terms taken together, abstraction and collection, cover all of the possible ways in which mathematical knowledge might be derived from sense-objects. The Soul either strips away those characteristics of sense-objects which are extraneous to their underlying mathematical character, through abstraction, or it collects together the particular characters shared by many sense objects, through collection.<sup>82</sup> The first and second arguments address these two possibilities.

### II.i.a.1. First argument: Abstraction

Abstraction is described by Proclus as a process by which the soul looks at circles and triangles in matter, and then draws the form of circle or triangle in the soul itself.

However, Proclus asks, if this were the case, where would the precision (*akribeia*) and

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<sup>79</sup> In his discussion, the question concerning the essence (*ousia*) of mathematical objects, and the question of their status as intelligible objects is treated as the same question. The cognitive and ontological aspects of Soul are two aspects of the same reality. Thus mathematical knowledge has its peculiar precision because of the precise nature of mathematical Forms (*eidē*) or *logoi*, while sensation is murky because of the murky character of the sense-world itself. The can be stated in the converse manner. Mathematical objects are precise because of the sort of precision in mathematical knowing, while sense objects are murky because sensation grasps its object in a murky manner.

<sup>80</sup> *In Eucl.* 12.6-7.

<sup>81</sup> *In Eucl.* 15.17-18.

<sup>82</sup> J. Trouillard, *L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1972) p.29 points out that *aphairesis* is an Aristotelian term, while *athroisin* and *sunathroisin* are likely Stoic terms.

irrefutable character (*anelegton*) of mathematical *logoi* come from? These characters cannot come from sense-objects, because if they did, there would be far more precision in sense-objects than there actually is:

For where among the sensibles do we find anything that is without parts, or without breadth, or without depth? Where do we see the equality of the lines from the centre to the circumference? Where the fixed ratios of the sides? Where the rightness of angles. Do we not see that all sensible things are confused with one another and that no quality in them is pure and free of its opposite, but that all are divisible and extended and changing? How, then, can we attribute a stable being (*ousian*) to unchangeable [mathematical] *logoi*, if they are derived from things that are ever changing from one state to another?<sup>83</sup>

This seems to be a simple statement that unchangeable mathematical *logoi* cannot be derived from changeable sense-objects. Stated in this manner, however, Proclus' argument would amount to a simple assertion of the impossibility of induction. However, there is more to his argument. Just before the passage which is quoted above, Proclus says that in order to know sensibles mathematically, the soul must add to them a perfection and precision which they do not in themselves possess, and that the soul draws these additions from itself (*apo tēs psuchēs*). Only then does he go on to explain that sense-objects themselves *do not possess in any way* the operative characteristics of mathematical being: precision, partlessness, equality, etc.

His contention is that the theory of abstraction assumes that by somehow removing the imprecision from sense-objects the soul will be left with a stable and precise object for thought. On the contrary, he contends, because sense-objects are unstable through and through, it is impossible to arrive at a precise and stable object by removing certain of the characteristics of sense-objects. There would be nothing left, because the character of sense-objects is essentially to be imprecise and changeable.

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<sup>83</sup> *In Eucl.* 12.19-13.1: ποῦ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὸ ἀμερές ἢ τὸ ἀπλατές ἢ τὸ ἀβαθές, ποῦ δὲ ἡ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ κέντρου γραμμῶν ἰσότης, ποῦ δὲ οἱ ἐστῶτες αἰεὶ λόγοι τῶν πλευρῶν, ποῦ δὲ αἱ τῶν γωνιῶν ὀρθότητες; οὐχ ὁρῶμεν, ὥς ἐν ἀλλήλοις πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ συμμέμικται καὶ ὥς οὐδὲν ἐν τούτοις εἰλικρινές οὔδε τοῦ ἐναντίου καθαρεῦον, ἀλλὰ μεριστὰ πάντα καὶ διαστατὰ καὶ κινούμενα; πῶς οὖν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις λόγοις ἐκ τῶν κινουμένων καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἐχόντων αὐτὴν τὴν μόνιμον οὐσίαν δώσομεν;

mixed and confused. So the theory of abstraction assumes that sense-objects actually have a two-fold nature. They have, you might say, an unstable superstructure which must be stripped away, to reveal a stable and precise substructure which can serve as the object of thought. Proponents of this theory must think that there is a mathematical object hidden down there somewhere, 'underneath the surface'. This is simply contrary to the nature of sense-objects, according to Proclus.<sup>84</sup> Thus, if there is to be any stability and precision in mathematical reasoning about sense objects, this stability and precision must come from somewhere else, i.e. from the soul.

What Proclus in fact thinks, we will see, is that the imprecise and unstable *logoi* in sense-objects merely remind the soul of its own stable and precise content. Mathematics has a precision and stability because it is in fact the soul reasoning about itself. Mathematical understanding of sense-objects is possible only when the soul refers its confused sense-impressions to the mathematical paradigms of Body which are resident in the soul itself. However, this process of referring sensations to the precise mathematical objects which the soul projects gives one the illusion of arriving at these objects through abstraction.

#### II.i.a.2. Second argument: Collection

The theory of collection grants Proclus his premise that the objects of sensation are particulars, unlike abstraction, which wants to find underlying universals in sense-objects. If sensation grasps only particulars, but still is to yield the universal of mathematics, then somehow mathematical reasoning proceeds from particular premises.

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<sup>84</sup> This point may of course be contested. However, Proclus has in his tradition the *Theaetetus* to show that total instability is the character of sense-objects. Proclus' commentary on this dialogue, unfortunately, is lost. Proclus assumes that sense-objects are in themselves as unstable and imprecise ontologically as sensation reports them to be. However, for his criticism of induction to go through, this assumption need not be made. Even if the instability in the object is the fault of trying to grasp it through sensation, it is still the case that sensation does not yield an object with an unstable superstructure but a stable substructure. Stability is only for thought.

using a particular demonstration, but yields universal conclusions. However, one cannot conclude, from seeing this right angle added to this other right angle, that when two right angles are added the result will always be a straight line. One can only conclude that it has happened this particular time. In other words, collection tries to violate the Aristotelian rule that particular premises yield particular demonstrations of particulars.<sup>85</sup>

Proclus' own example is the man who demonstrates that the isosceles triangle has the sum of its angles equal to two right angles, a demonstration about a particular sort of triangle, and then draws the universal conclusion that this holds true also of equilateral and scalene triangles. But clearly from the particular demonstration about one particular type of triangle (the isosceles), no universal conclusion concerning the other types of triangle (equilateral and scalene) can be drawn. Rather, what is needed is a demonstration of a universal sort, about triangle without qualification, which only then can yield universal conclusions to be applied to the particular sorts of triangle. This is what Proclus means when he says that demonstration using universal premises is by nature superior to demonstrations about particulars:

Again we say that a universal premise is better for demonstration than a particular, and next that demonstration from universals are more truly demonstrative, and that the premises from which demonstrations proceed are prior and naturally superior to particulars as causes of what is demonstrated.<sup>86</sup>

Because mathematics deals with universals and collection yields only particulars, therefore, collection is insufficient as an explanation of mathematical knowledge.

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<sup>85</sup> *In Eucl.* 14-4.

<sup>86</sup> *In Eucl.* 14.15-20: καὶ πάλιν ὅτι τὸ καθόλου βέλτιον τοῦ κατὰ μέρος πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ ἐξ ἧς ὅτι αἱ ἀποδείξεις ἐκ τῶν καθόλου μάλλον, ἐξ ὧν δὲ αἱ ἀποδείξεις, ταῦτα πρότερα καὶ τῇ φύσει προηγούμενα τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ αἰτία τῶν δεικνυμένων. Proclus mentions that the premises are causes of what is demonstrated. This points to the positions that demonstration proceeds from cause to effect. Although Proclus does not develop this position here, he is indicating that the order of demonstration follows the ontological order. Just as the higher, more simple entity is the cause of the multiplicity of what proceeds from it, so does the order of demonstration proceed from the higher, more simple premise to the diverse conclusions to be drawn from it. In other words, the unfolding of the cosmos and the unfolding of reason are parallel.

## II.i.a.1. Third argument: Ontological priority

Proclus' third argument appeals to the ontological priority of Soul over body, a priority which all of his readers would have accepted as unproblematic. That Proclus regards this position as unproblematic is indicated by his dismissal of the need for a detailed proof of the matter, with the conclusion: "But it is superfluous to refute this doctrine, which has often before been brought to an accounting."<sup>87</sup> His position is that if the soul were to derive its notions from sense-objects, this would make it less honourable than matter (*atimoteran...tês hulês*). For matter would receive *logoi* from Nature which are essential, more fully beings, and clearer (*ta ousiôdê kai mallon onta kai tranestera*), and the soul would possess only "secondary images" and "later-born likenesses" (*deutera...eidôla kai eikonas husterogeneis*) of these *logoi* in matter.

The *logoi* in matter would be by nature inseparable from matter. When the Soul receives the likenesses of these *logoi*, it receives them without matter. Consequently, Proclus argues, it would only be receiving an incomplete, or a diminished version of these *logoi*. In this case, the *logoi* which soul receives would be inferior in being to the *logoi* which are wedded to matter. But it is impossible that the soul possess *logoi* which are inferior to the *logoi* in matter, according to Proclus:

For matter is the locus of embodied *logoi*, the soul the locus of Forms (*eidôn*). The soul, then is the locus of primary, matter of secondary [realities]; the soul the locus of preeminently real beings, matter of things derivative from them: the soul the locus of beings which exist essentially (*kat'ousian*), matter of things which come to be as a result of thought (*kat'epinoian genomenôn*). How, then, can we say that the soul, which is the primary partaker of *Nous* and intellectual being, and is filled with knowledge and the whole of her life from that source, is the receptacle for the murkier forms of what has the lowest seat among beings and is more imperfect in its being than all else?<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> In *Eucl.* 15.14-15: ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ταύτην ἀπαντὰν τὴν δοῦσαν πολλοῖς πολλάκις εὐθύνας δεδωκυῖαν περιέρχον.

<sup>88</sup> In *Eucl.* 15.5-14: τόπος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἡ ὕλη τῶν ἐνύλων λόγων καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν εἰδῶν. ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν τῶν πρώτων ἡ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων. καὶ ἡ μὲν τῶν προηγουμένων ὄντων ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐκείθεν ὑφισταμένων. καὶ ἡ μὲν τῶν κατ' οὐσίαν. ἡ δὲ τῶν κατ' ἐπίνοιαν γενομένων. πῶς οὖν ἡ νοῦ καὶ τῆς νοερᾶς οὐσίας πρώτως μετέχουσα καὶ πληρουμένη τῆς γνώσεως ἐκείθεν καὶ τῆς ὅλης ζωῆς ἀμυδροτέρων εἰδῶν ἐστὶν ὑποδοχὴ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἐν τοῖς οὐσὶν ἔδρας καὶ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι πάντων ἀτελεστέρας;

Soul's superiority to Body is contradicted by the theory that mathematical *logoi* are derived from sensation. So mathematical *logoi* cannot be derived from sensation.

In this third argument Proclus is speaking more in his own voice than in his arguments against abstraction and collection. In effect, he is speaking to Platonists. In order for this summary argument to be effective, his readers must grant the premise that the Soul is superior to Body because it is the cause of Body. Soul is the paradigm of Body, and Body is its image. If the Soul, which is essentially a thinking activity, were to derive its thoughts from Body, then the relation would be reversed, and Soul would be a derivative image of Body. But this is impossible for many reasons which Proclus considers obvious ("But it is superfluous to refute this doctrine, which has often before been brought to an accounting"), and this argument consists merely in pointing out that his opponents make Soul a divided image of Body.

After he has established by these three arguments that the soul cannot derive mathematical *logoi* from sensation, Proclus presents a brief summary of reasons why the soul cannot derive mathematical knowledge from itself alone. Rather, it derives its *logoi* *a priori* both from itself and from *Nous*.

If mathematical *eidê* do not exist either by abstraction from *eidê* in matter, nor by a collection of what is common in each thing, and are not in any way later born and derived from sense-objects, it must be the case that the Soul derives them either from itself, or from *Nous*, or both from itself and from *Nous*. But if it is from itself alone, how would they be images of the intellectual *eidê* (*eikones tauta tôn noerôn eidôn*)? And being intermediate between the indivisible nature and the divisible, how could they receive no perfection of being from the first beings (*mêdemian apo tôn prôtôn eis to einai sumplêrôsin*)? And how could the [Forms] in *Nous* continue to be the primary paradigms of all things? But if it is from *Nous* alone, how could the self-activating (*autenergêton*) and self-moving (*autokinêton*) character of the Soul remain, if the *logoi* in it came to it from elsewhere, like the character of things moved from without (*kata tèn tôn heterokinêtôn hupostasin*)? And how will the Soul be distinguished from matter, which is all things only potentially, but produces none of the Forms which are in it (*gennôsês de ouden tôn enulôn eidôn*)?<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> In *Eucl.* 15.16-16.04: εἰ δὲ μή ἐστι κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν τῶν ἐνύλων τὰ μαθηματικὰ εἶδη μήτε κατὰ συναθροισμὸν τῶν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἑκάστα κοινῶν, μηδ' ὅλως ὑστερογενῇ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν.

We will discuss in subsequent chapters how the Soul derives its *logoi* both from itself and from *Nous*.

## II.i.b. The criticism in the *Parmenides* commentary

Proclus' criticism of induction in the *Parmenides* commentary is more summary than that in the Euclid commentary. Here his discussion is not limited to mathematical *logoi*, a fact which speaks for the application of the Euclid commentary argument to *dianoia* in general. He makes it explicit here that he is criticising Aristotle's position, which states that universals are derived somehow from sensation. But according to Proclus, what "the Peripatetics have in their heads when they go on about the 'later-born' Form (*husterogenes eidos*)"<sup>90</sup> is in fact not a universal derived from sensation, as they think. They think that these *logoi* come to be in souls from an external source, namely the impressions which our senses receive. Proclus agrees that these *logoi* "come to be in souls" (*eggignesthai tais psuchais*), and do not exist in souls essentially (*kat'ousian*).<sup>91</sup> but he denies that they come from our senses. Proclus distinguishes the *logoi* which are the *ousia* of our soul, the *plêroma tôn ousiôdôn logôn*, and the projected *logoi* which come to be through the soul's *dianoia*. Projected *logoi* "come to be in souls" because they are produced in the soul by its own activity as images of the *logoi* in its *ousia*. And it is these projected *logoi* which the Peripatetics mistake for *husterogenes logoi*. He makes four brief points in the *Parmenides* commentary to this effect.

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ἀνάγκη δὴ πού τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ παρ' αὐτῆς ἢ παρὰ νοῦ λαμβάνειν αὐτὰ ἢ καὶ παρ' αὐτῆς καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν παρ' αὐτῆς μόνον, πῶς εἰκόνες ταῦτα τῶν νοερῶν εἰδῶν; πῶς δὲ μεταξὺ τῆς ἀμερίστου φύσεως καὶ τῆς μεριστῆς μηδεμίαν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων εἰς τὸ εἶναι συμπλήρωσιν λαχόντα; πῶς δὲ πρωτοουργὰ παραδείγματα τῶν ὅλων τὰ ἐν νῷ προέστηκεν; εἰ δὲ παρ' ἐκείνου μόνον, πῶς τὸ αὐτενέργητον τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ αὐτοκίνητον δύναται μένειν. εἴπερ οἱ ἐν αὐτῇ λόγοι κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἑτεροκινήτων ὑπόστασιν ἀλλαχόθεν εἰς αὐτὴν ἔρρευσαν; καὶ τί διοίσει τῆς ὕλης τῆς δυνάμει μόνον οὐσης πάντα, γεννώσης δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ἐνύλων εἰδῶν.

<sup>90</sup> *In Parm.* 892.20-21: Καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὅπερ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ Περιπάτου φανταζόμενοι τὸ ὑστερογενές εἶδος θρυλλοῦσιν.

<sup>91</sup> *In Parm.* 892.18-19.

(1.) His first point is that as far as we know, animals are not able to know separate individuals as falling under one common Form:

For whence has a man the power to do this. I mean 'to gather together into one in thought (*eis hen logismōi sunageirein*) what proceeds from a multiplicity of sense-perceptions.'<sup>92</sup> and to postulate as prior to the visible and separate individuals the one, identical, and invisible Form (*eidos*), whereas none of the other mortal animals, so far as we know, see any such common [Form]?<sup>93</sup>

The argument is that if it were possible to derive an *eidos* from sensation, then animals, who are assumed to possess only sensation, would also be able to engage in *dianoia*. Because it seems they are unable to do so, Proclus concludes that more than sensation must be required.<sup>94</sup>

(2.) His second point is stated very briefly. The common nature of things sensed is not derived from sensation, because sensation yields a *phantasma*, i.e. a sort of impression in the imagination (*phantasia*). This *phantasma* is a sort of record of the original sense-impression, and is what allows us to remember the original impression. This *phantasma* must remain true to the original sense-impression, otherwise it could not be an accurate record of it. The conclusion, which Proclus mentions only by stating that we receive from sensation an object of *phantasia* (*phantaston*), not an object of opinion (*doxaston*), is that in the exercise even of opinion the universals we use are more comprehensive than the particular impressions which the senses yield. We are able to opine about all dogs, and not only the particular dogs which we have seen. A *phantasma*, however, is not able to change the 'brown' to 'black' in its impression of 'the brown dog I

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<sup>92</sup> *Phaedrus* 247b7-c1.

<sup>93</sup> *In Parm.* 892.41-893.5: Πόθεν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος μὲν τοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν, λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὼν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ συναγείρειν καὶ πρὸ τῶν φαινομένων καὶ διηρημένων ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τίθεσθαι τὸ ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν καὶ ἀφανὲς εἶδος, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ζώων τῶν θνητῶν τούτων ὅσα καὶ ἴσμεν οὐδὲν θεωρεῖ τοιοῦτο κοινόν:

<sup>94</sup> His general discussion here concerns *dianoia*. But he states that animals are not even able to form general opinions, since they lack the ability to treat a group of individuals as in some way coming under a universal, indicating that he thinks even opinion makes use of universals.



saw yesterday', in order to take into account the fact that the black dog which I now see is the same sort of thing as what I saw yesterday.<sup>95</sup>

(3.) His third point is the same as the point in the Euclid commentary concerning the diminishment of the soul's status if it were to derive its universals from sensation. The soul would then be less honourable (*atimoteran*) than matter.<sup>96</sup>

(4.) His final point is his most substantial. It assumes the general Procline principle that causes ontologically more comprehensive than their effects.<sup>97</sup> The truest sort of causation in Proclus is not the familiar sort, by which bodies bump into other bodies and make them move. True causation is that by which a principle gives rise to a more multiple image of itself. *Nous* gives rise to Soul, and Soul to Body, through this sort of causation. The effect is a declension, or a diminishment of its cause, and makes up for this deficiency by its greater multiplicity. Therefore Proclus can hold the general principle that a true cause is more comprehensive than its effect, because despite its greater multiplicity the effect will never adequate or exhaust the hidden content of the cause.

Proclus applies this ontological principle to the question of the later-born *eidos*. If it is a universal derived from sensation, as the Peripatetics believe, then the sense-object is its cause. Thus the effect of this cause, the later-born universal, is less comprehensive than the sense object. But it is not the case that the universal of *dianoia* is less comprehensive than the particulars.<sup>98</sup> If it were the case, then (a.) the universal could not serve as the medium of knowledge of the particular, and (b.) it could not be the cause of the particular.

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<sup>95</sup> In *Parm.* 893.17-23.

<sup>96</sup> In *Parm.* 893.33.

<sup>97</sup> See J. Trouillard, "L'intelligibilité Proclusienne," in *La philosophie et ses problèmes, recueil d'études de doctrine et d'histoire offert à Monseigneur R. Jolivet* (Paris: Emmanuel Vitte, 1960) pp.83-97.

<sup>98</sup> In *Parm.* 894.7-9: "The later born comprehends each of the many, which is why it is predicated of each of them (τὸ δὲ ὕστερογενὲς περιληπτικὸν ἐκάστου τῶν πολλῶν ὅθεν καὶ κατηγορεῖται τούτων ἐκάστου)."

(4.a.) His first argument is that the universal derived from particulars would not be able to comprehend their particularity. "for each of the particular entities is amplified by additions and accidental accretions."<sup>99</sup> If the universal derived from sensation is to comprehend the particulars *as particulars* it must be able to take into account all of their accidents, or it will be less comprehensive than the individuals themselves. However, we can never experience all of the particulars with infinitely various accidents: "For if it arises from the many themselves, where are we to see that infinite number of men, to all of which we apply the same predicate?"<sup>100</sup> Such a universal would always remain less comprehensive than that which it seeks to comprehend.

(4.b.) His second argument does not assume that the universal derived from sensation has as its aim to comprehend the particulars in their infinite variety. Rather, it is a universal which comprehends them because it arises from the 'commonness' (*koinotêtos*) which is in the many. Here the problem is not that there is no stable object at all in sensation, as in the Euclid commentary criticism of abstraction. Instead, the problem is that such a universal would invert the ontological hierarchy, and make the individual more comprehensive than the species, and the species more comprehensive than the genus. An Aristotelian species, obtained by such a stripping away of all that is not common to the individuals, is less comprehensive than the individuals which fall under it because it has been arrived at precisely by removing a great number of the characteristics of these individuals. Likewise, one has to remove characteristics which belong to the various species in order to arrive at the genus.

This sort of universal is just a shadow of the particular, because it omits much of the being of the particular. Proclus says that with regard to later-born universals, the species has more being (*ousia*) than the genus, and we might add, the individual has more

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<sup>99</sup> In *Parm.* 894.6-7: προσθέσει γὰρ καὶ συμβεβηκόσι τισὶ πλεονάζει τῶν ἀτόμων ἕκαστον.

<sup>100</sup> In *Parm.* 894.14-16: εἴτε γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πολλῶν, ποῦ τοὺς ἀπείρους ἀνθρώπους ἰδοίμεν, καθ' ὧν ἀπάντων ἐπιφέρομεν τὸ αὐτὸ κατηγορούμενον.

than the species.<sup>101</sup> But Proclus thinks that the ground and cause of particulars is their species, and the cause of the species is the genus. The genus Animal has more being and is more comprehensive than all of the species which fall under it, because the collection of animal species, in all their multiplicity, are not able to adequate or exhaust the fertility of the Form Animal which gave rise to them. Likewise, each species has a greater fertility and comprehensiveness than all of the particulars which it causes. The Peripatetics, on the other hand, invert the universe and make the particular dog the cause of its species, and the species the cause of their genera. And this, according to Proclus, is impossible.<sup>102</sup>

These, then, are the four arguments against induction in the *Commentary on the Parmenides*.

## II.ii. The true status of 'later-born' *logoi*

In the *Parmenides* commentary Proclus specifies what he thinks the so-called later-born universals are. He tells us that "in individual souls thoughts (*noēmata*) are of two types: the one is of the essential reason-principles (*tôn ousiōdōn logōn*); the other results from many sensations brought together by reasoning into one (*eis hen logismōi sunairoumenōn*)."<sup>103</sup> This statement does not contradict Proclus' arguments against induction, because the second sort of *noēma* is not an amalgam of sensations, but rather a *logos* produced by the soul to which the various sensations are referred. This sort of universal is the lowest level of intellection, according to Proclus. "This is the last echo of the primary intellection (*tēs prōtēs noēseōs*), insofar as it is a universal and has its

<sup>101</sup> *In Parm.* 894.27-29.

<sup>102</sup> Notice that this argument assumes that species and genera are not simply subjective mental phenomena, and hence they can be accorded causal efficacy. An objection to the effect that Proclus is psychologising here, by granting 'reality' to mere ideas, would beg the entire question of the possibility of Platonism. As with the third argument against induction in the *Euclid* commentary, Proclus' intended audience for this point is most likely his fellow Platonists.

<sup>103</sup> *In Parm.* 895.32-36: ἐν ταῖς μερικαῖς ψυχαῖς διττὰ τὰ νοήματα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν οὐσιωδῶν λόγων, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἐκ πολλῶν ὄντων αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ συναιρουμένων·

existence in the intelligising soul."<sup>104</sup> And as so, it takes its origin from the Soul itself, not from a collection or abstraction of sensations.

It must therefore take its origin from somewhere else [than from sensation], and receive from some other source this power of comprehending each Form. Of this source, indeed, it is an image (*eikōn*), coming into existence in a way contrary to what one would expect, by virtue of Recollection (*anamnēsis*), on the basis of sense objects (*ek tōn phainomenōn*), of the causal principle aroused within us.<sup>105</sup>

The later-born universals come about through *anamnēsis*, which for Proclus is the *probolē tōn ousiōdōn logōn*. Later-born universals are *logoi* which the soul projects, and as such are images of the *logoi* which comprise the soul's *ousia*.

We must, then, as I have said, ascend from the *logoi* in Nature to those in Soul, and not only to the later-born, but also to the essential ones (*tous ousiōdeis*). The later-born, after all, are images of these latter, and are not generated from the sensible particulars.<sup>106</sup>

There is in fact a three-fold distinction in play here. First, Proclus thinks that the Soul's *ousia* is a *plērōma tōn ousiōdōn logōn*, a fullness of essential *logoi*. These unprojected *logoi* are the Soul's participation in *Nous*, and as such are the unified source for the multiple *logoi* which *dianoia* projects. The activity of *dianoia*, however, has a double function. On the one hand the *logoi* which the Soul projects serves to remind it of its own *ousia*. This is the Soul contemplating itself as the image of *Nous*, an activity which takes place without reference to sensation. On the other hand, the projected *logoi* are also paradigms of the *logoi* which order Body, and the Soul may contemplate itself as the paradigm of Body. In this case, it gathers together its various sensations and comprehends them through the *logos* which is their paradigm, and which it has projected out of its own *ousia*. Because the occasion for this lower sort of thinking is usually the

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<sup>104</sup> In *Parm.* 895.38-896.1: τοῦτο δὲ ἔσχατον ἐστὶν ἀπήχημα τῆς πρώτης νοήσεως, καθόσον τέ ἐστι καὶ καθόλου καὶ ἐν τῇ νοούσῃ ψυχῇ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχον.

<sup>105</sup> In *Parm.* 894.19-23: Ἀλλαχόθεν ἄρα τοῦτο ὑφέστηκε, καὶ ἐξ ἄλλου παρεδέξατο ταύτην τὴν περιληπτικὴν ἐκάστου δύναμιν εἶδους· οὐ δὴ καὶ ἔστιν εἰκὼν, παρὰ δόξαν ὑποστάν, κατὰ ἀνάμνησιν ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων τῆς ἔνδον ἀνακινουμένης αἰτίας.

<sup>106</sup> In *Parm.* 896.22-27: Δεῖ τοίνυν ἀπὸ τῶν φυσικῶν λόγων, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, ἀνατρέχειν ἐπὶ τοὺς ψυχικοὺς, οὐ τοὺς ὑστερογενεῖς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς οὐσιώδεις· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ὑστερογενεῖς τούτων εἰσὶν εἰκόνες, οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν πολλῶν αἰσθητῶν τεχθέντες.

presence of a sensory stimulus, we can be misled into thinking that these later-born universals are not innate.

for the former [the higher type] are thoughts of things which are established and always present in us, constituting images of the realm of the real beings (*ta ontôs onta*)...; [the] latter [the later-born] are activities (*energêmata*) stimulated by sense-impressions.<sup>107</sup>

They are innate, according to Proclus. Their production may be stimulated by sensation, but they are projected from the soul's *ousia* all the same. They only differ from other projected *logoi* in the object to which the Soul's attention is turned.<sup>108</sup>

According to Proclus it is impossible that induction yield a true universal. It may be possible to arrive at a sort of shadow of species and genera through abstraction, and this is what the Aristotelians do. However, such a universal can neither allow the soul to know sensible particulars, nor serve as their cause. The true universal through which souls comprehend sensibles is in fact drawn from the Soul itself, through Recollection. Thus, for Proclus, there is no other conclusion than that all *dianoia* is *anamnêsis*. Sensation can be a danger to the Soul, turning its attention outwards towards the passivity of body rather than inwards towards its own *ousia*. But it can also serve as the stimulus for *dianoia*. Because the same *logoi* which are the paradigms of body are also images of *Nous*, the Soul which is sufficiently attentive may begin from sensation, and from thence be led towards the proper object of its thought.

### II.iii. *Anamnêsis*

The sense in which all *dianoia* is *anamnêsis*, according to Proclus, is that the Soul draws forth from itself the *logoi* which it projects, not primarily that there was a time

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<sup>107</sup> In *Parm.* 896.6-9, 16-17: ὑφ' ἐστῶτων γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνα νοήματα καὶ ἀεὶ ὄντων ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄντως ὄντα ἐνεικονιζομένων... ἐνεργήματα γὰρ εἰσὶν ἐκεῖνα ἀπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἀνεγχειρόμενα.

<sup>108</sup> Our concern here is with *dianoia*, and the possibility that *aisthêsis* is the source of the universals with which *dianoia* thinks. For an examination of *aisthêsis* in Proclus, see H.J. Blumenthal, "Proclus on perception," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, 29 (1982) pp.1-11.

when the Soul did not know what it has now recalled. Divine souls, and the souls which are not divine but which enjoy perpetual intellection, never forget their origin and worth. draw forth their *logoi* from themselves, and in this sense even their knowing is *anamnêsis*. However, partial souls fall into forgetfulness, and for them *anamnêsis* has the added sense of a transition from unknowing to knowing.

#### II.iii.a. The *anamnêsis* of the partial soul

Soul is at the middle of the Procline universe. All that lies between the One and matter is constituted by a certain internal proportion of Limit and Unlimited. In the higher orders, Limit prevails. Along with the predominance of Limit comes immunity from motion or change, so the henads and *Nous* are unmoving (*akinêtos*). Body is moved from without (*heterokinêtos*), because in Body the balance of Limit and Unlimited is in favour of Unlimited, and consequently Body does not have the stability of determination which would either allow immunity from change, or allow Body to be its own principle of change. In the Soul Limit and Unlimited are in equilibrium. This means that the Soul is in between *akinêsis* and *heterokinêsis*. It is self-moving (*autokinêtos*), which means that it is its own principle of change. The change which the Soul undergoes is its own act of thinking, measured by Time. This activity is *autokinêsis* because the principle of *dianoia* is the Soul itself. In other words, the Soul's thinking activity issues from itself, and has itself as its directing principle.

Although in Soul as a whole Limit and Unlimited are in equilibrium, in the lower sorts of Soul Unlimited begins to prevail over Limit. This means that while the higher types of Soul are perpetually secure in their *autokinêsis*, the partial soul is not. Partial souls are susceptible to the passions which come to them from Body, and it is possible that in attending to these passions they cease to be their own principle of motion. In this

case they cease to be *autokinêtos* and take on *heterokinêsis*.<sup>109</sup> Such a soul takes the reality reported to it by the senses to be the only reality. Souls in such a state may assume that induction is the source of *dianoia*, mistakenly considering sensation to be the source of thought. They may be in an even worse state, not knowing that there is such a thing as *dianoia*, living completely by appearances.<sup>110</sup>

Sensation is a danger for partial souls, because of its inherent passivity.

For our sense-perceptions bind the soul to divisible things, the objects of imagination fill it with moving shapes, and desires divert it to the life of feeling (*empathê bion*). Every divisible thing is an obstacle to our returning upon ourselves (*epistrophês*), every formed thing muddies our formless knowledge, and every passion (*empathes*) is an impediment to passionless activity (*apathous energeias*).<sup>111</sup>

It is the soul's association with body that brings with it these passions. It is better for the soul to be free of body, because for souls "neither existence with a body nor the life bound to generation is natural; rather the opposite is more appropriate to them, a separate, immaterial and incorporeal life."<sup>112</sup> Proclus compares life with a body to living in a region infected by plague. In such a city, we should expect to find more people infected than not

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<sup>109</sup> *El. Th.* props 206 and 211. See also J. Trouillard, "Réminiscence et procession de l'âme selon Proclus," *La revue philosophique de Louvain*, 69 (1971) p.179: "L'âme est le dernier et le plus complexe des principes de l'univers. Mais dans son ordre même il y a des degrés. L'âme totale gouverne le cosmos, les âmes divines régissent le ciel sans faillir. C'est qu'elles sont plus proches de l'unité (ἐνὰς) psychique originelle. Immuable dans son centre, l'âme est faillible dans son émission. Mais pour savoir dans quelle mesure elle est faillible, il faut se demander ce qu'est l'âme selon Proclus. Si on la définit avec le *Phèdre* 245c par l'automotricité, on en fait un milieu entre l'immutabilité de l'être et la mobilité du devinir. Si on préfère la définir avec le *Timée* 35a comme la médiation de l'indivisible et de la division corporelle, on la conçoit comme «un nombre substantiel qui s'engendre lui-même» (ἀριθμος οὐσιώδης αὐτόγονος) en allant de l'unité à l'unité. L'âme est un indivisible qui se divise lui-même, mais qui, à la différence du sensible, domine toujours sa propre partition, parce qu'il en contient la loi et rend chacune de ses parties totale."

<sup>110</sup> In this chapter we discuss *heterokinêsis* as the beginning point for the partial soul's *anamnêsis*. In chapter V we will examine *autokinêsis* and *heterokinêsis* in the context of the structure of the soul.

<sup>111</sup> In *Eucl.* 46.3-9: αἱ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθήσεις συνάπτουσιν αὐτὴν τοῖς μεριστοῖς, αἱ δὲ φαντασίαι μορφωτικῶν κινήσεων ἀναπιμπλάσιν, αἱ δὲ ὀρέξεις περισπῶσιν εἰς τὸν ἐμπαθῆ βίον. πᾶν δὲ τὸ μεριστὸν ἐμπόδιόν ἐστι τῆς εἰς ἑαυτοῦς ἡμῖν ἐπιστροφῆς, καὶ πᾶν τὸ μορφωτικὸν ἐπιθολοῖ τὴν ἀμόρφωτον γνῶσιν, καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐμπαθὲς κώλυμα τῆς ἀπαθoῦς ἐνεργείας ἐστίν.

<sup>112</sup> In *Alc.* 256.11-14: οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατὰ φύσιν ὁ μετὰ τῶν σωμάτων βίος οὐδὲ ἡ γενεσιουργὸς ζωὴ, τοῦναντίον δὲ ἡ χωριστὴ καὶ αὔλος καὶ ἀσώματος αὐταῖς μᾶλλον προσήκει. This does not include the *ochêma*, that is the immaterial body wedded to the soul. Rather, it refers to the grosser bodies which the soul takes on, like the donning of additional tunics, when it descends towards becoming. See *El. Th.* props. 207-210.

infected. So among embodied souls we find more wicked souls than good, and more souls in the grip of their passions than those who are free.<sup>113</sup>

Association with the body brings with it the attraction of the passions, but not all souls fall prey to temptation. Proclus' word for those who have succumbed is *mochthêra*, which means "heavy burdened," but also means "wicked," and this has the sense of having given over to their passions.<sup>114</sup> All partial souls are able to descend into becoming and be caught by it, but Proclus distinguishes between more base souls, who are more attracted to the passivity of body, and more noble souls, who are able to pass through the region of becoming relatively unscathed. It is likely that the distinction between baser and more noble souls is both ontological and moral. Proclus thinks that there are degrees of souls, and it is possible that within the order of partial souls there are still further degrees, so that those closer to the monad are more noble and more able to resist the passions, while those further away are less able to resist. It is certain, however, that those who become heterokinetic are base, according to Proclus, and this baseness is probably both the cause of their passionate indulgences, and reinforced by these indulgences. Base souls are *mochthêra*, heavy burdened, because they are *mochthêra*, wicked, i.e. they have chosen to burden themselves with bodily passions. Conversely, this burden which comes from their wicked choice to indulge their passions only makes it more likely that they will become more wicked.<sup>115</sup>

In Proclus' commentary on the *Alcibiades I*, the difference between the noble soul and the base soul is illustrated by the noble Alcibiades and the 'vulgar' (*phortikoi*)<sup>116</sup> lovers who have sought his company. This dialogue is an erotic dialogue,<sup>117</sup> according to

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<sup>113</sup> *In Alc.* 257.2-3.

<sup>114</sup> *In Alc.* 257.1-2: "passive and wicked souls (ψυχὰς τὰς ἐμπαθεῖς καὶ μοχθηράς)."

<sup>115</sup> The idea that the ignorant are base, and make themselves more base and ignorant is present in Plato's dialogues. See, for example, the Myth of Er in the *Republic*, and the lesser souls in the divine train in the *Phaedrus*.

<sup>116</sup> *In Alc.* 35.6.

<sup>117</sup> *In Alc.* 27.16ff.



Proclus, displaying the two types of erotic souls. The more noble uses visible beauty only in order to rise towards intelligible beauty. The other type of erotic souls, however,

who have fallen away from the gift from above, due to wicked nourishment (*mochthêran trophên*)...embrace the images of beauty, because they are ignorant of true beauty, and they have affection for material and divisible beauties, *sent outside of themselves, ignorant of what they have suffered*.<sup>118</sup> they separate themselves from all divinity, and are carried away towards the *godlessness and obscurity*<sup>119</sup> of matter.<sup>120</sup>

Base souls have not only "fallen away from the gift from above," they have "perverted the gift from above" (*paratreousas tēn ekeithen dosin*).<sup>121</sup> Their ignorance is due to their morally culpable *erôs* for visible beauty. This identification of ignorance and vice is the converse of the Socratic identification of knowledge and virtue.

Alcibiades is not a base soul. He has forgotten the true nature of his soul, because of his association with the body, but he has resisted the vulgar lovers who sought to tempt him towards a deeper involvement with the body. He is presented as a soul ready to begin *anamnêsis*, and for this he needs the care of Socrates. Proclus' hermeneutic of the Platonic dialogues is to read them as philosophical allegories. So Socrates in the *Alcibiades I* is not only the Socrates of the literal level of interpretation, he is also a 'good *daimôn*'.<sup>122</sup> Socrates is a sort of 'guardian demon', to adapt a Christian term, and Proclus compares his task to that of our parents, who watch over us and keep us from bad influences.<sup>123</sup> On the other hand, the vulgar lovers are 'bad *daimones*', or the 'chthonic

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<sup>118</sup> *Phaedrus* 250a. Proclus deviates from the text of the *Phaedrus*, which runs: ἐκπλήττονται καὶ οὐκέτι <έν> αὐτῶν γίνονται, ὃ δ' ἔστι τὸ πάθος ἀγνοοῦσι.

<sup>119</sup> *Alcibiades I* 134e: εἰς τὸ ἄθεον καὶ τὸ σκοτεινὸν βλέποντες.

<sup>120</sup> *In Alc.* 33.21-34.3: αἱ δὲ αὐτῆς ἐκεῖθεν δόσεως ἀποπεσοῦσαι διὰ μοχθηρὰν τροφήν, φύσιν δὲ ἐρωτικὴν λαχοῦσαι καὶ τοῖς εἰδώλοις τῶν καλῶν προσπίπτουσαι διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀληθινῶν ἀγνοίαν, φιλοφρονοῦνται μὲν τὰ ἐνύλα καὶ μεριστὰ κάλλη καὶ ταῦτα ἐκπλήττονται τὸ ἑαυτῶν ἀγνοοῦσαι πάθος ὃ πεπόνθασιν, ἀοίστανται δὲ τοῦ θείου παντός καὶ εἰς τὸ ἄθεον ὑποφέρονται καὶ σκοτεινὸν τῆς ὕλης.

<sup>121</sup> *In Alc.* 34.14.

<sup>122</sup> *In Alc.* 40.17. The souls which are not divine, but who are not susceptible to *heterokinêsis*, are the *aggeloi*, *daimones*, and *hêrôes*. These higher souls, according to Proclus, can serve as helpers and intermediaries for lower souls.

<sup>123</sup> For a brief analysis of the loves involved here, and of their objects as unity or as the 'multiples' opposed to unity, see J. Trouillard, "Sur un pluriel de Plotin et de Proclus," *Bulletin de l'association Guillaume Budé* (1958, no.2 Juin) pp.88-91.

*daimones*', who surround souls and turn them away from the divine ascent. Socrates appears to Alcibiades in the dialogue only after he has rejected the advances of the vulgar lovers, and they have departed.<sup>124</sup> Allegorically, according to Proclus, this is similar to the situation during the Initiations, where "the divine appears after we are purified of that daimonic crowd which leads the soul downwards towards matter."<sup>125</sup> The divine is always present to us, according to Proclus, but we are unable to see it if we do not attend to it, preferring the 'godlessness and obscurity of matter'.

Alcibiades is prepared for the ministrations of Socrates. He has undergone the best 'training' (*gumnasion*) for those who are 'well born' (*eu pephlukos*);<sup>126</sup> he has frequented the vulgar lovers, but has lifted himself above their base attraction to the body. For this reason he will listen to Socrates, the good *daimôn*, whereas the crowd of vulgar lovers would not. But although he possesses a sort of 'natural virtue' because of his noble birth, he still needs Socrates, because he is in a state of "double ignorance" (*diplê agnoia*), as Proclus calls it.<sup>127</sup> Double ignorance is the common beginning point of interlocutors in the Platonic dialogues. The interlocutor does not know that of which he speaks, but he does not know that he does not know.<sup>128</sup> As long as he remains confident in his false opinion, he will not seek to discover the truth. Therefore, the first step in *anamnêsis* is refutation, according to Proclus, because refutation shows the interlocutor his error, and thus does away with his double ignorance. What results is simple ignorance (*haplê agnoia*), because the interlocutor still does not know the truth of the matter, but at least now he is aware that he does not know. Unlike double ignorance, simple ignorance does not allow the interlocutor to be complacent in his ignorance. He feels his lack of knowledge, and feels it as a desire for the truth which he should possess.

<sup>124</sup> On the vulgar lovers, see *In Alc.* 56.20-58.10.

<sup>125</sup> *In Alc.* 40.12-14: τὸ θεῖον ἐκφαίνεται μετὰ τὴν ἀποκάθαρσιν τοῦ τοιούτου παντός δαιμονίου τοῦ κατάγοντος ἐπὶ τὴν ὕλην τὰς ψυχὰς.

<sup>126</sup> *In Alc.* 59.2.

<sup>127</sup> *In Alc.* 188.23-24. Cf. *Alcibiades I* 118a-b. See also *In Parm.* 989.16. *Diplê agnoia* is not a term found in Plato. See *Sophist* 229b and Plato's use of the term *haploun agnoian* at *Laws* 863c.

<sup>128</sup> *In Alc.* 271.

No one would begin to inquire into that which he think he knows. It is necessary then that simple ignorance is the beginning of inquiry, for inquiry is a desire for knowledge regarding that which we think we do not know.<sup>129</sup>

Socrates refutes Alcibiades in order to bring him to a state of simple ignorance. In order for this to take place, a mere verbal refutation will not do. Alcibiades' soul must move from one state to another. According to Proclus, this shows that the refutation takes place in Alcibiades' soul, so that he in fact refutes himself.

In the *Alcibiades I* commentary, Proclus gives four virtues of dialectical conversation. In the first place, the dialectical *logos* (*ho tropos tōn logōn, ho dialektikos*) makes the interlocutor more attentive than a rhetorical *logos*.<sup>130</sup> Second, dialectic is a great help to inquiry (*zētēsis*) because it persuades the interlocutor to search for the responses himself, i.e. in himself, and hence makes him "revert upon himself, away from the *logoi* which lead him outside of himself" (*epistrephōn auton eis heauton apo tōn exō pheromenōn logōn*).<sup>131</sup> Third, it contributes greatly to purification, because through dialectical refutation the internal contradictions and false opinions which the interlocutor possesses are done away with, and the interlocutor is himself the "accuser of his own ignorance" (*ho elegchomenos tēs heautou katēgoros agnoias*).<sup>132</sup> Finally, and most importantly, dialectic shows us that knowledge is *anamnēsis*.<sup>133</sup>

For discerning the truth in oneself, and being oneself the one who speaks, turning towards oneself (*pros heauton epistrephein*), and contemplating the object of knowledge in oneself, [all] show that learning is really recollection (*ontōs tas mathēseis anamnēseis apophainei*).<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> *In Alc.* 236.20-23: οὐθείς γὰρ ἂν ὁμήσειε ζητεῖν ὃ γε οἶεται γινώσκειν· δεῖ δὴ οὖν ἄρξαι τὴν ἀπλὴν ἀγνοίαν τῆς ζητήσεως· ἡ γὰρ ζήτησις ὁρεξίς ἐστι γνώσεως ἐν οἷς οἰόμεθα ἀγνοεῖν. Cf. *In Alc.* 188.19ff.

<sup>130</sup> *In Alc.* 170.6.

<sup>131</sup> *In Alc.* 170.16-17.

<sup>132</sup> *In Alc.* 170.24.

<sup>133</sup> Notice that Proclus still uses the term *anamnēsis*, but has so transformed it that it no longer means remembering something which you consciously knew at some point in past time. Rather, it means calling to mind something which is known in an unconscious manner, and in so calling it to mind becoming conscious of what you already knew.

<sup>134</sup> *In Alc.* 170.25-28: τὸ γὰρ διορᾶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἀληθές καὶ αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέφειν καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ γνωστὸν θεωρεῖν ὄντως τὰς μαθήσεις ἀναμνήσεις ἀποφαίνει.

In dialectical conversation the answers are drawn from the soul of the interlocutor. The interlocutor must examine himself, and is turned inwards towards himself. He is the producer of the *logoi* which he articulates, and so is the accuser of his own ignorance, and the source of any true knowledge which he discovers. This is *anamnēsis*, according to Proclus, because the important part of the theory of *anamnēsis* is that the interlocutor already possesses the truth which he seeks; it does not come into his soul from outside.

The strongest proof that *dianoia* is *anamnēsis*, according to Proclus, is this difference between the effect of dialectic and the effect of rhetoric. Unlike the dialectical *logos*, which we have said is born inside the soul of the interlocutor, a rhetorical *logos* remains outside of his soul. It may persuade, but if it does so this is only because the soul has lapsed back into double ignorance, taking on the rhetorical *logos* as its own unjustified opinion. In the dialogues, Socrates continually asks his interlocutors if they believe their responses. Someone like Callicles in the *Gorgias* learns nothing from his conversation with Socrates, because he does not believe his responses. His soul has not drawn forth from itself the *logoi* which Socrates articulates, so his responses are merely verbal. Unless the movement of *logoi* which Socrates is trying to spur on takes place in the soul of the interlocutor himself, he will not be refuted and he will not undergo *anamnēsis*. Nothing is transmitted from soul to soul in a dialectical conversation. Instead, there takes place a parallel movement of the soul of the speaker and the interlocutor. Somehow, the speaker must awaken the spontaneity of the interlocutor's soul, so that it itself put forward the *logoi* which are the articulation of the truth of whatever matter is under discussion. Thus *anamnēsis* in Proclus is not a doctrine primarily about memory, as if the interlocutor had forgotten a set of propositions. Rather, it is about the re-awakening of the soul's *autokinēsis*.<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> The common criticism of the example of *anamnēsis* in the *Meno*, that Socrates is feeding the slave boy with answers, is unfair on a Procline reading. It is not necessary that the slave boy come up with the answers himself in the sense that he must do it unaided. Rather, what is needed for recollection is that the motion of the argument take place in his soul. He must himself see the falsity of his initial answers, and

Proclus sees this in all of Plato's dialogues. In the *Meno* the slave boy produces his own responses; in the *Alcibiades I* Socrates refutes Alcibiades in a manner such that it is Alcibiades who refutes himself; in the *Theaetetus* Socrates claims to be a midwife, and to do nothing more than help his patients give birth to their own *logoi*.<sup>136</sup> The speaker in a dialectical conversation brings about *anamnēsis* in his interlocutor by removing the barriers to the interlocutor's *autokinēsis*.

Just as the gods both purify us and work to our benefit through our own [actions], and in general move us in a manner such that we move ourselves (*autokinētois*), in the same manner Socrates has devised a refutation in such a manner that he who is refuted will think that he has been refuted by himself, and he himself who is bringing to birth (*maieuomenos*) serves as his own midwife.<sup>137</sup>

*Autokinēsis* is bringing to birth *logoi* from out of one's soul. It is not a recalling of distinct pieces of data, is if the *anamnēsis* were like trying to recall a friend's address.<sup>138</sup> Rather, *anamnēsis* is the drawing forth from the soul of its own immanent *logoi*. In the *Meno*, the slave boy must follow the unfolding of the *logos* which is the proof; he doesn't simply remember the answer as a piece of stand-alone data. *Anamnēsis* is a spontaneous self-unfolding into discursive multiplicity of the *logoi* which are the soul's essence. The *logoi* in the soul's *ousia* are not distinct, like a collection of propositions. Their

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the necessity of the solution. His soul must draw the proper *logos* from itself. This is in fact accomplished in the dialogue. Socrates does not simply tell him the answer, as in a rhetorical discourse. He acts as the boy's midwife, putting him in a state where he sees the correct answer, and sees why that answer is correct. Thus the movement does in fact take place in the slave boy's soul. Hence, he has drawn the knowledge from himself, and learning is nothing but recollection. In the *Meno* the slave boy does not end up with knowledge, but rather with true opinion which may be converted into knowledge by further examination.

<sup>136</sup> See *Theaetetus* 150d, *Meno* 85b, *Alcibiades I* 112e-113c.

<sup>137</sup> In *Alc.* 241.18-23: ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ θεοὶ καὶ καθαίρουσιν ἡμᾶς καὶ εὐεργετοῦσι δι' ἑαυτῶν, καὶ ὅλως οὕτω κινουσιν ὡς αὐτοκινήτους, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης μεμηχάνηται τοιοῦτον ἐλέγχων τρόπον δι' οὗ καὶ ὁ ἐλεγχόμενος αὐτὸς ἐλέγχεσθαι δοῖται παρ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ὁ μαιευόμενος αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν μαιεῖται.

<sup>138</sup> We should notice that the account of *anamnēsis* as it is in the *Meno* does not solve the learner's paradox. If the soul cannot learn after its birth, because it would not seek to learn what it does not know, why would it seek to do so before its birth? My own interpretation of this account is that Plato does not intend us to take it literally as a claim that we learned everything at some point before our birth. He states the theory as a myth, and has Socrates express doubt about its particulars. Socrates says that "I would not rely on the other details of my account with much confidence," but that we will be better and braver if we believe that if we persist, we can actually learn (*Meno* 86b-c). This seems to be more an affirmation of the possibility of *a priori* knowledge than a confirmation of the story about the preexistence of souls, and an opposition to an epistemological defeatism which would destroy the soul's erotic connection to knowledge.

projection is not a simple reduplication. Rather, they contain in a unified manner the plan of their own unfolding. It is in this sense that for Proclus *anamnêsis* is the soul's *autokinêsis*, and its bringing its own knowledge to birth.<sup>139</sup>

## II.iii.b. The secret possession of *logoi*

If *anamnêsis* is an unfolding of *logoi* from within the soul, then the soul must already be in possession of the *logoi* which it unfolds. The soul cannot be a *tabula rasa*, as Aristotle characterises it in the *De Anima*.<sup>140</sup> Proclus rejects this notion at the end of his criticism of induction, in the Euclid commentary:

There is left only the conclusion that soul draws her concepts both from herself and from *Nous*, and that she is herself the company of the Forms (*plêrôma tôn eidôn*), which receive their constitution from the intellectual paradigms, but come forward into being in virtue of themselves (*autogonôs*). The soul therefore was never a writing-tablet bare of *logoi*; she is a tablet that has always been inscribed and is always writing itself and being written on by *Nous*.<sup>141</sup>

A fuller explanation is given in the Alcibiades commentary:

And so, therefore, this argument (*logos*), adequately pressed, shows clearly that learning is recollection (*tas mathêseis anamnêseis einai*). For it is a strong proof of this opinion, that respondents draw everything which they say from themselves, so that their souls project the *logoi* from themselves (*proballousin aph' heautôn*

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<sup>139</sup> See J. Trouillard, "Réminiscence et procession de l'âme selon Proclus," *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 69 (1971) p.178.: "Si on peut cependant l'appeler [i.e. the soul] «plêrôme des raisons mathématiques», c'est en tant qu'elle les enveloppe toutes substantiellement (οὐσιωδῶς) ou à la façon d'un principe (ἀρχοειδῶς) et qu'elle les projette à partir d'elle-même. Mais elle les contient sans figure, sans distance, sans discrimination numérique. Car sa relative simplicité refuse leur complexité inépuisable, et son indivisibilité leur dissociation dans «la matière intelligible». La réminiscence ne consiste donc pas à retrouver des articulations toutes faites, mais à réveiller une présence inépuisable à travers son propre déploiement. Comme si un centre ne pouvait être rejoint qu'à travers la circonférence qui est sa détente, ou comme si une intuition indivisible ne pouvait être atteinte dans sa totalité simultanée sans qu'on déroule le discours successif qui la symbolise. La réminiscence ne prétend pas égaler son terme, mais plutôt l'actualiser." See also a revised version of this article published as chapter III of J. Trouillard, *La mystagogie de Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1982) pp.53-70. See also J. Trouillard, "L'âme 'lieu des idées' selon Proclus," *Sciences ecclésiastiques* (1966) pp.7-24.

<sup>140</sup> *De An.* 430a1-2: ὥσπερ ἐν γραμματεῖ ὃ μεθὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχεῖα γεγραμμένον· ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ.

<sup>141</sup> *In Eucl.* 16.4-10: λείπεται δὴ οὖν καὶ παρ' αὐτῆς καὶ παρὰ νοῦ ταῦτα παράγειν καὶ εἶναι πλήρωμα τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτήν, ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν νοερῶν παραδειγμάτων ὑφισταμένων, αὐτογόνως δὲ τὴν εἰς τὸ εἶναι πάροdon λαγχανόντων, καὶ οὐκ ἄρα ἦν ἡ ψυχὴ γραμματεῖον καὶ τῶν λόγων κενόν, ἀλλὰ γεγραμμένον αἰεὶ καὶ γράφον ἑαυτὸ καὶ ὑπὸ νοῦ γραφόμενον.

*hai psuchai tous logous*) and are only in need of someone to awaken them, and are not *unwritten tablets*<sup>142</sup> which receive their impression from outside. Rather, they have always been written on, and he who writes is inside the soul. But they are not all able to know what is written, nor indeed to know at all that they have been written on, because their eye has become clouded by the forgetfulness of the world of becoming and the passions which rush into the souls like revelers, due to this forgetfulness.<sup>143</sup>

If the soul is already in possession of its *logoi*, why are we not aware of these *logoi* always? This is a point which any doctrine of Recollection must address, as must any theory of *a priori* knowledge. One could say that we remain ignorant of our own *logoi* because of our distraction by body. However, once we have been purified of our double ignorance and regain our autokinetic activity, we should very quickly become aware of all our innate *logoi*. But this does not seem to happen.

It does not happen because the *logoi* in our soul do not exist in a separate and distinct manner, such that we can be immediately aware of them. The *ousia* of our soul is our closest contact with *Nous*. From the perspective of *Nous*, our *ousia* is a multiplicity of *logoi*, a *plêroma tôn ousiôdôn logôn*. But from the perspective of the Soul's activity, our *ousia* is a unity akin to *Nous*, whose *logoi* can only be mutually distinguished by the projection which is discursive thinking. Proclus describes our *ousiôdeis logoi* as "hidden" or "concealed" in the soul (*kruphiôs*).<sup>144</sup> "*Kruphiôs*" has overtones of 'secretly'.

<sup>142</sup> *De An.* 430a1-2.

<sup>143</sup> *In Alc.* 280.24-281.8: "Ἐτι τοίνυν τὸ τὰς μαθήσεις ἀναμνήσεις εἶναι δείκνυσιν ἐναργῶς ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἰκανῶς πεισθεὶς. μέγα γάρ τοῦτο τεκμήριόν ἐστι, τὸ αὐτοὺς παρ' ἑαυτῶν πάντα λέγειν τοὺς ἀποκρινομένους, τοῦ τοιοῦτου δόγματος, ὅτι προβάλλουσιν ἅφ' ἑαυτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ τοὺς λόγους καὶ ὡς τοῦ ἀνεγείροντος ἐδέοντο μόνον καὶ οὐκ εἰσιν ἄγραφα γραμματεῖα δεχόμενα τοὺς τύπους ἔξωθεν. ἀλλὰ γέγραπται μὲν αἰεὶ καὶ ὁ γράφων ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστί, γινώσκειν δὲ οὐ πᾶσαι τὰ γεγραμμένα δύνανται οὐδὲ αὐτὸ [ὅτι ὁλως] γέγραπται, λημῶντος αὐταῖς τοῦ ὁμματος ὑπὸ τῆς γενεσιουργοῦ λήθης καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς λήθης ἐπεισχωμασάντων εἰς αὐτάς παθῶν. See note 1 to p.318 on p.435 of A. Segonds' edition of *Sur le premier Alcibiade de Platon* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1986) for a discussion of and references to the phrase *tabula rasa*. See also C. Steel, *The changing self. A study on the soul in later Neoplatonism. Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus* (Verhandelingen van de koninklijke academie voor wetenschappen, letteren en schone kunsten van België, klasse der letteren jaargang xl, nr 85) (Brussels: Paleis der Academiën, 1978) pp.148-150, and C. Steel, "Breathing thought: Proclus on the innate knowledge of the soul," *The perennial tradition of neoplatonism*, ed. J.Cleary (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1997) pp.293-309; see p.299.

<sup>144</sup> *In Eucl.* 46.1: "It possesses them all in an essential and secret manner (ἔχει δ' οὖν πᾶσας οὐσιωδῶς καὶ κρυφίως); 56.13: "but whatever is in it in a secret manner (ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα κρυφίως ἐστὶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ). See C. Steel, "Breathing thought: Proclus on the innate knowledge of the soul," *The perennial tradition of neoplatonism*, ed. J.Cleary (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1997) pp.293-309.

perhaps secret as the images of the religious mysteries are secret. Though they exist as a unity before their projection, the *logoi* in our *ousia* are not simply a potentiality, in the sense of passive potentiality. These *logoi* cannot exist as a passive potentiality for thinking, because this would contradict their nature as *logoi*, and the *ousia* of the soul would then be a passive principle. What would move it to act?<sup>145</sup> Our *ousiôdeis logoi* are, in fact, always active. Proclus uses the metaphors of our breathing and of our heartbeat to explain how our *ousia* can be always cognitively active without our noticing it.<sup>146</sup>

because they possess the *logoi* of things, as a sort of heartbeat, they have notions (*ennoias*) of those things, but because they are conquered by the draught of oblivion they are unable make their own notions articulate and send them forth towards knowledge (*epistêmê*). Thus they carry them around as if suffocating, and scarcely drawing breath.<sup>147</sup>

And again: "We possess the *logoi* in our *ousia* and knowledge of these *logoi* as a sort of breathing, but we do not possess them as projected and actualised."<sup>148</sup>

The best modern parallel of this description might perhaps be a sufficiently modified account of the Kantian Forms of Intuition, and the Categories. These are present at all times, as conditions of the possibility of spatial and temporal experience, and of judgement, but they are seldom themselves consciously reflected upon. Of course, the Procline account differs in two important ways. The Procline account is not a transcendental idealism, because the *logoi* in the partial soul are the paradigms of the *logoi* which structure Body. As well, psychic *logoi* in Proclus are not purely formal

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<sup>145</sup> I agree with C. Steel, "Breathing thought: Proclus on the innate knowledge of the soul," *The perennial tradition of neoplatonism*, ed. J. Cleary (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1997) pp.293-309; see p.296: "By definition, *logoi* cannot be what they are (i.e. "reasons"), without involving some sort of cognitive ("rational") activity, particularly in those souls which are called *logikai* ("rational"). Indeed, all forms without matter, be they *εἶδη* or *λόγοι*, are necessarily totally intelligible, and therefore must always be the objects of an intelligising activity."

<sup>146</sup> See J. Trouillard, *L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1972) pp.42-43.

<sup>147</sup> *In Alc.* 189.6-11: καὶ τῷ μὲν ἔχειν τοὺς λόγους τῶν πραγμάτων οἷον σφύζοντας ἐννοίας ἔχουσι περὶ αὐτῶν, τῷ δὲ τῆς λήθης πόματι κρατούμεναι διαρθροῦν τὰς ἐαυτῶν ἀδυνατούσιν ἐννοίας καὶ εἰς ἐπιστήμην ἀναπέμπειν, οἷον οὖν ἀπεψυγμένους αὐτὰς περιφέρουσι καὶ μόλις ἀναπνεύουσας.

<sup>148</sup> *In Alc.* 192.2-5: κατ' οὐσίαν μὲν ἔχοντες τοὺς λόγους καὶ οἷον ἀποπνεύοντες τὰς τοῦτων γνώσεις, κατ' ἐνέργειαν δὲ καὶ κατὰ προβολὴν οὐκ ἔχοντες.



principles of synthesis, requiring an intuition to be given content. Nevertheless, the notion is quite similar. The unprojected Procline *logoi* are active in our soul in a manner such that they are both unnoticed by us, and such that they structure our experience. Without reflecting on the *logoi* themselves, we are aware that some things are greater or lesser than others, that some things are in motion and others at rest, and so on. We are aware of these things even without a conscious inquiry into the nature of number, motion and rest themselves.<sup>149</sup> If we did not already employ, as an unconscious feature of our experience, these *logoi* which structure material reality, then we would not be able to experience material reality at all.<sup>150</sup>

So the soul is not a *tabula rasa*, but it is also not a collection of *logoi* immediately present to itself. In order for the Soul to become conscious of its own content, it must unfold the hidden content of these *logoi*. Beginning from the unitary principles of number, identity, difference, etc... the soul may draw forth the sciences of number, metaphysics, and so on. The unprojected *logoi* are not deficient when compared to the developed sciences which result from their projection. The deficiency is not in the unprojected *logoi* themselves, but in our grasp of them. The unity and fertility of our *ousiôdeis logoi* surpass the power of *dianoia*, and our projection of the various sciences is our attempt to grasp these *logoi* in an adequate manner.

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<sup>149</sup> J. Trouillard, *La mystagogie de Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1982) p.135-136: "L'idée n'est un objet que métaphoriquement, en tant qu'on projette sur elle ce qu'elle illumine. Elle n'est pas thématizable, mais ce par quoi il y a indéfiniment des objets doués de tel ou tel caractère. Elle n'est ni une catégorie au sens d'Aristote ni une idée régulatrice kantienne, encore que ce second rapprochement soit plus éclairant. Elle se dévoile inadéquatement à travers une opération, un impératif, un jugement. Où saisissons-nous l'idée du juste si ce n'est dans l'inadéquation perpétuelle des actions à notre exigence de rectitude ou bien dans l'invention de conduites de moins en moins iniques? L'idée de grandeur est-elle grande? Non, répond Proclus, si on la prend pour une structure objective, au lieu de la considérer comme une puissance de dépassement."

<sup>150</sup> Notice that this is not the Kantian justification of the categories and forms of intuition as necessary conditions for the possibility of experience. The Kantian justification leaves open the possibility of a noumenal world which is not as we experience it, thus the categories and forms of intuition are justified for employment in our experience because it is precisely *our* experience that they make possible. The Procline account is rather an observation of the following sort. We have coherent sense experience even without engaging in *dianoia* because the *logoi* which structure Body are images of the *logoi* present in Soul and always cognitively active in the Soul. The possibility of an unknown noumenal world is eliminated because Body is itself an image of Soul.

For *dianoia* possesses the *logoi* but, not being powerful enough to see them when they are wrapped up, unfolds and exposes them (*anaploi te autous kai hupektithetai*) and presents them to *phantasia* sitting in the vestibule.<sup>151</sup>

Although they surpass the power of *dianoia*, it is the activity of these *ousiôdeis logoi* which allow us to navigate our everyday world.

However, the rudimentary notions of things (*ennoiai*) which arise from our *ousiôdeis logoi* without conscious projection can hinder us from attaining true knowledge through *anamnêsis*, according to Proclus. A soul who has lapsed into *heterokinêsis* is used to navigating the world by means of these *ennoiai*, and has the illusion that it actually knows things in the world around it. It thinks it knows, but it does not, because it has not projected and examined the *logoi* themselves. Because the souls "carry [their *logoi*] around as if suffocating, and scarcely drawing breath," Proclus continues, "this is the reason that they acquire the double ignorance, thinking that they know on account of these notions (*ennoias*), but really being in a state of ignorance through their forgetfulness. From this comes both deception and the conceit of knowledge."<sup>152</sup> This is sufficiently illustrated by the state of such Platonic interlocutors as Euthyphro. He must have some notion (*ennoia*) of piety in order to act and think as he does. He does have such an *ennoia*, because the *logos* of piety in his soul's *ousia* is active, like a cognitive heartbeat. But because Euthyphro has not examined this *logos* sufficiently, not projected it and examined it in detail by unfolding it, he remains ignorant of what piety is. Moreover, he is doubly ignorant, because he regards as sufficient his habitual employment of the notion of piety when he thinks of things as pious or impious, and so would never even begin to inquire into the nature of piety itself were he not refuted by Socrates.

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<sup>151</sup> In *Eucl.* 54.27-55.02: ἔχουσα γὰρ ἡ διάνοια τοὺς λόγους, ἀσθενοῦσα δὲ συνεπτυγμένης ἰδεῖν ἀναπλοῖ τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ὑπεκτίθεται καὶ εἰς τὴν φαντασίαν ἐν προθύροις κειμένην.

<sup>152</sup> In *Alc.* 189.10-14: οἷον οὖν ἀπειφυγμένας αὐτὰς περιφέρουσι καὶ μόλις ἀναπνεύουσας, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κτῶνται τὴν διπλὴν ἀγνοίαν, οἰόμεναι μὲν εἰδέναι διὰ τὰς ἐννοίας ταύτας, ἀγνοοῦσαι δὲ διὰ τὴν λήθην· καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη καὶ ἡ δόκησις τῆς γνώσεως ἐντεῦθεν.

Proclus gives a more traditional explanation of the status of the *ousiôdeis logoi*.

using the first meaning of 'actuality' or 'activity' (*energeia*) from Aristotle's *De Anima*.

by psychic *logos* (*logon psuchikon*) I mean that which remains in the *ousia* of souls, looking towards which we say that the soul is all of the Forms (*panta einai ta eidê*), and that the soul is the place of the Forms (*topos tôn eidôn*), these being present in it not only potentially, as Aristotle says,<sup>153</sup> but in actuality, according to the first meaning (*eidōs*) of 'in actuality',<sup>154</sup> as he defines it.<sup>155</sup>

The first meaning of 'in actuality' is explained by Aristotle as the sort of possession of, for example, geometrical knowledge by the geometer, when he is not engaged in geometrical reasoning. The second meaning is the actual employment of this knowledge in geometrical reasoning. These states of actuality are distinct, and they are both to be distinguished from the potentiality (*dunamis*) of the beginning student of geometry eventually to possess actual geometrical knowledge. Compared to the second state of 'in actuality', the first state is in potency. However, it is clearly a sort of actuality, as it is able to be called upon whenever the geometer wishes, without the person undergoing a change from total ignorance to a state of knowledge. Proclus takes this Aristotelian distinction and adapts it to his own understanding of *dunamis* and *energeia*.

The spiritual hierarchy unfolds in triads, in Proclus' system. Each member of the hierarchy is a self-related activity which arises from a prior cause, separates itself from its cause, and defines itself in relation to its cause. So all things between the One and Body

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<sup>153</sup> *De An.* 429a27-29: καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν...οὔτε ἐντελεχεία ἀλλὰ δυνάμει τὰ εἶδη.

<sup>154</sup> *De An.* 417a21ff. Proclus gets the point of the Aristotelian text correct, but is mistaken about the details. In this passage Aristotle distinguished between two senses of potentiality, the first being the potentiality of a man to become wise because he belongs to the genus of beings whose matter is such that they may become wise, the second being the potentiality of a man who has learned grammar to exercise that wisdom. The man who is exercising his wisdom is wise in actuality. So Aristotle makes a distinction between two states of potentiality and one state of actuality. However, in describing the use of wisdom, that state is called actuality in the proper sense of the term (*kuriōs*). Hence, one may draw the conclusion that there is a lesser state of actuality, corresponding to the second state of potentiality, in which the man possesses grammatical knowledge but is not exercising it. If one reads the text in this manner, then the 'first' definition of actuality in the Aristotelian text is as Proclus describes it.

<sup>155</sup> *In Parm.* 892.22-28: λέγω δὲ λόγον ψυχικὸν τὸν μένοντα κατ' οὐσίαν ἐν αὐταῖς, εἰς ὃν βλέποντες καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν πάντα εἶναι τὰ εἶδη φασί, καὶ τόπον τῶν εἰδῶν τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐχὶ δυνάμει μόνον ἐνόντων, ὡς φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης, ἀλλ' ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ πρότερον εἶδος τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ, ὡς αὐτὸς διορίζειται.

are structured by the three moments of remaining, procession, and return (*monê, proodos, epistrophê*). The triadic structure of things is expressed differently, depending on which order of reality is being described, and which point of view it is being described from. The triad of Being, Life, and *Nous* (*on, zôê, nous*) most properly describes the inner life of *Nous*, but because each member of this triad is a cause of lower things, this triad can also be said to structure Soul. The triad of essence, power, and activity or actuality (*ousia, dunamis, energeia*) is another way to think of the self-related activity of *Nous* and Soul. It makes use of Aristotelian terms, but has arranged them such that they have become Neoplatonised. *Dunamis* is here power, not passive potentiality, and is a principle of the procession of activity from the essence of a thing.<sup>156</sup> Each moment in these parallel triads is present in a certain sense to the other moments.

And even though there is such a great distinction according to this triad in the beings at the extremities [i.e. above or below the soul], in the soul being (*on*), life and *nous* are unified with each other. Being (*on*) is life and *nous*, life is *nous* and being (*ousia*), and *nous* is being (*ousia*) and life. For there is one simplicity and one existence in the soul, and neither life nor *nous* is added from outside. Rather its *nous* is living and exists in the manner of being (*ousiôdês*), its life is intellectual in its being (*noera kat' ousian*), and its being (*ousia*) [is intellectual and vital]<sup>157</sup>

*Nous* and Soul do not have parts, in the sense of spatial parts. Rather, they are self-related activities in which moments can be distinguished. It is a function of the divided discourse which is *dianoia* that when we speak of the triadic structure of spiritual realities we seem to separate them into parts.<sup>158</sup> With regard to the *ousia, dunamis, and energeia*

<sup>156</sup> See discussion by L.Siorvanes in *Proclus, Neo-Platonic philosophy and science* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996) pp.109-110.

<sup>157</sup> In *Alc.* 321.10-17: καὶ ὅμως τοιαύτης οὐσης ἐν τοῖς ἄκροις κατὰ τὴν τριάδα ταύτην διαφορᾶς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ συνήντωνται ἀλλήλοις, καὶ τὸ μὲν ὄν ζωὴ τε καὶ νοὺς ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ζωὴ νοὺς καὶ οὐσία, ὁ δὲ νοὺς οὐσία καὶ ζωή, μία γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀπλότης ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ὑπόστασις μία, [καὶ] οὔτε τὸ ζῆν ἐπακτὸν οὔτε τὸ νοεῖν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν νοὺς αὐτῆς ζῶν καὶ οὐσιώδης ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ζωὴ νοερά κατ' οὐσίαν, ἡ δὲ οὐσία [νοερά καὶ ζωτική]. Note that Proclus switches back and forth between *on* and *ousia*. In English it is impossible to convey the close connection between these two words with the translation of *ousia* as essence. Hence I have translated both as being in this passage, and placed the Greek behind each instance. For the interpenetration of these triads, see S.Gersh, *From Iamblichus to Eriugena* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978) pp.143-150.

<sup>158</sup> As I noted at the end of the introduction to this study, the we have the same problem when we

of the Soul, the interpenetration of the moments means that we should not think of a static *ousia*, somehow aloof and separate from the *energeia* of thinking. The whole soul is *ousia*, *dunamis*, and *energeia*. It is a being which is cognitively active in virtue of its power: a power which issues in the activity of being; or an activity by which the power of being is articulated. The three terms are simply applied to three moments of the self-related reality which is the Soul. If we focus on the soul's thinking, we can say that the Soul is an *energeia* whose issue is a multiplicity of *logoi* which are the unfolded expressions of its point of origin.

So *anamnêsis* is the Soul's activity, self-actualisation, *autokinêsis*. The difference between this activity and the *energeia* of *Nous* is that Soul's *energeia* is measured by Time. In the stepwise declension of the universe into multiplicity, *Nous* exhibits the dividedness of inner determination, and distinction of thinker and thought. Soul exhibits these divisions, and also the division between thinker and thought such that although the Soul is both thinker and thought, it does not grasp itself in one simple act of knowing. Rather, the soul thinks itself by parcelling itself out to itself, *logos* by *logos*. Hence its activity is measured by Time. It is for this reason that the soul of the interlocutor who has been purified of his double ignorance does not in that instant become aware of the entire content of his own soul. Proclus' term for this temporal activity by which we become aware of our own soul's *logoi* is *probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn*, the projection<sup>159</sup> of the *logoi* of the soul's *ousia*.<sup>160</sup>

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try to say that souls are distinct from each other, while at the same time not separate from the total reality which is Soul.

<sup>159</sup> *Probolê* means literally "a throwing forth," as does "projection."

<sup>160</sup> J. Trouillard, "Réminiscence et procession de l'âme selon Proclus," *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 69 (1971) pp. 182-183: "L'âme se pose donc comme être ou substance, comme vie ou puissance, comme pensée ou activité. Proclus s'accorde l'identification de la vie et de la puissance, et celle de la pensée et de l'activité. Mais quelque nom qu'il donne à ces trois fonctions, elles sont pour lui dans le même rapport que *μὴν*, *πρόοδος* et *ἐπιστροφή*. Elles sont donc intérieures les unes aux autres. Chacun des termes contient les deux autres, mais ici sous le mode substantiel, là sous le mode vital ou dynamique, là enfin de façon énergétique ou noétique. Par conséquent, de même que la vie et la pensée psychique ne sont pas infra-substantielles, la substance de l'âme en tant que substance est déjà vie et pensée. Dans ces conditions, aucune âme ne pourra se donner dans sa puissance et son activité ce qu'elle ne posséderait pas déjà sous le mode substantiel. Telle est la racine de la réminiscence, qui consiste à réveiller ce que Proclus

In an important passage in the Euclid commentary, Proclus brings together the soul's possession of *ousiôdeis logoi*, *anamnêsis*, *autokinêsis*, and the *probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn*.

This is why Socrates in the *Meno* uses this kind of argument [i.e. a geometrical proof] to prove that learning (*mathêsis*) is nothing but the soul's remembering its own *logoi*. The reason for this is that what remembers is the dianoetic part of the soul. The part of the soul has its essence (*ousiôtai*) in mathematical *logoi*, and it has a prior knowledge of them, even when it is not using them. It possesses them all in its essence (*ousiôdôs*), in a hidden fashion (*kruphiôs*), and brings each of them to light when it is set free of the hindrances that arise from sensation. For our sense-perceptions bind the soul to divisible things, the objects of imagination fill it with moving shapes, and desires divert it to the life of feeling. Every divisible thing is an obstacle to our returning upon ourselves (*eis heautous hêmin epistrophês*), every formed thing muddies our formless knowledge, and every feeling is an impediment to passionless activity. Consequently, when we remove these hindrances from *dianoia*, we are able to know through *dianoia* the *logoi* which are in our *dianoia*, and then we become knowers in actuality (*kat'energeian*), and project (*proballein*) our essential (*ousiôdê*) knowledge.<sup>161</sup>

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appelle «les raisons substantielles» (οὐσιώδεις λόγοι) par opposition aux généralités abstraites des sensations. Ces raisons substantielles ont, en effet, besoin d'être réveillées chez un être qui n'est pas assez présent à lui-même pour se recueillir sans détour." See also J.F. Phillips, "Stoic 'common notions' in Plotinus," *Dionysius*, 11 (1987) pp.33-52. Phillips gives a good explanation of Plotinus' transformation of the Stoic doctrine of *koinai ennoiai*, or common notions, such that they may be employed in his transformation of Platonic *anamnêsis*. See pp.40-41: "discursive reason, as a thing of parts, cannot comprehend intelligible, nonpartitive unity. So it is exactly the discursive mind's desire to demonstrate the truth of unity's omnipresence 'by piecing together the particulars' that prevents it from recognizing the immediate certainty of that truth. By contrast, if only the *ἐννοια* were active in our thought we would cease from all such activity and find rest in identity with the oneness we contemplate... What these remarks represent is an inversion of the later Stoic view that common notions are inchoate and inarticulate. For Plotinus they are fully formed ideas and manifestations of a more direct contact with common truth than is afforded by *λόγος*... For the Stoics common notions were empirically derived, and so were 'natural' only in the strict sense that they were untaught (*ἀδίδακτοι, ἀνεπιτεχνήτοι*) by custom or doctrine. It is Plotinus' view, on the other hand, that the *κοινή ἐννοια* is an innate idea which to some degree operates within us before all experience and constitutes the internal dialogue of the soul ([*Enn.*] VI.5.1.8-12)." See also *Enn.* IV.3.25.27-35: "we cannot assert that soul remembers in the sense that we say soul remembers its innate ideas which it possesses; these ideas soul, as it comes into this (lower) sphere, possesses but has not exercised. The process of souls exercising the ideas they possess the ancient philosophers customarily call memory and recollection. So this is another form of memory, for time is not an attribute of what is here termed memory [οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ ψυχὴν σατέον μνημονεύειν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οἷον λόγουμεν τὸ μνημονεύειν εἶναι ὃν ἔχει συμφύτων, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἐστίν, ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν κατ' αὐτά, καὶ μάλιστα ἐνταῦθα ἡκούση, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργεῖν ἤδη -- ταῖς ἐνεργοῦσαις ἃ εἶχον μνήμην καὶ ἀνάμνησιν προστιθέναι ἑοίκασιν οἱ παλαιοί, ὥσθ' ἕτερον εἶδος μνήμης τοῦτο· διὸ καὶ χρόνος οὐ πρόσεστι τῇ οὕτω λεγομένη μνήμῃ.."] [trans. Phillips, op.cit. p.43] Proclus' doctrine of *anamnêsis* is a further development of this idea. In Proclus the innate idea is the *logos* in the *ousia* of the soul, which is its participation in *Nous*, and which is developed in discursive thought.

<sup>161</sup> In *Eucl.* 45.18-46.13: ὁθεν δὴ καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ Μένωνι Σωκράτης ἐκ τοῦδε τοῦ τρόπου τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως ἐπέδειξεν, ὅτι τὸ μανθάνειν οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστίν ἢ ἀναμνήσκεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν

We will examine the *probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn* in detail in the following chapter.

II.iv. Note: the ethical dimension of *anamnêsis*

As a final note regarding *anamnêsis*, we should mention Proclus' comments in the Alcibiades commentary regarding its necessary preliminaries. In a passage reminiscent of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Proclus tells us that the soul which associates with the body has three parts: an irrational part (*alogon*), a part which chooses (*proairetikon*), and a part which knows (*gnôstikon*). The lowest part must be put in order and educated by a rightness of habits (*dia tês orthotêtos...tôn ethôn*), the second by admonitions and educational discourses (*dia tês nouthesias kai tôn didaskalikôn logôn*), and the third must be awakened by *anamnêsis*.<sup>162</sup> This seems to indicate that Proclus accepts the Aristotelian account of virtue and the inculcation of virtue. In a sense this is true. However, Proclus transforms the, perhaps problematic, relation between the moral and intellectual virtues in a characteristically Neoplatonic manner. Rather than integrating the life of moral virtue into a fuller life crowned by intellectual virtue, the moral virtues are merely the beginning stage of an ascent, a stage which is to be left behind as quickly as possible. The lower parts of the soul are only of significance insofar as their proper habituation and education keep the soul from sinking to the position of the vulgar lovers in the *Alcibiades I*, over whom dialectical conversation has no power, and who consequently are unlikely to undergo *anamnêsis*. Indeed, in the same passage Proclus

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ἐαυτῆς λόγων. αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀναμνησκόμενόν ἐστι τὸ διανοητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐσίωται τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας αὐτῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ προεῖληφεν. κἀν μὴ ἐνεργῇ κατ' αὐτάς, ἔχει δ' οὖν πάσας οὐσιωδῶς καὶ κρυφίως, προφαίνει δὲ ἐκάστην, ὅταν ἀφαιρεθῇ τῶν ἐμποδίων τῶν ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, αἱ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθήσεις συνάπτουσιν αὐτὴν τοῖς μεριστοῖς, αἱ δὲ φαντασίαι μορφωτικῶν κινήσεων ἀναπιπλάσιν, αἱ δὲ ὁρέξεις περισπῶσιν εἰς τὸν ἐμπαθεῖ βίον. πᾶν δὲ τὸ μεριστὸν ἐμπόδιόν ἐστι τῆς εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἡμῖν ἐπιστροφῆς, καὶ πᾶν τὸ μορφωτικὸν ἐπιβολαὶ τὴν ἀμόρφωτον γνῶσιν, καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐμπαθεὲς κώλυμα τῆς ἀπαθοῦς ἐνεργείας ἐστίν. ὅταν οὖν ταῦτα τῆς διανοίας ἀφέλῳμεν, τότε κατ' αὐτὴν γιγνώσκειν τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ δυνάμεθα λόγους, καὶ ἐπιστήμονες εἶναι κατ' ἐνέργειαν καὶ γνῶσιν τὴν οὐσιώδη προβάλλειν.

<sup>162</sup> In Alc. 225.4-9.

characterises the two lower parts of the soul as *additions* to the soul, due to its descent into the body.

It is necessary therefore that the soul, which comes from there [the realm of the divine], who intends to be turned in a correct manner towards that nature which is always awake, must put in order the powers of second and third rank (*tas deuterās kai tritās dunameis*), which have been joined to it, just as seaweed and oysters were attached to Glaucus in the ocean.<sup>163</sup>

The soul's true body is its immaterial vehicle, or *ochéma*.<sup>164</sup> and the grosser bodies which it takes on in its association with becoming serve as only a hindrance to it, and a source of disturbances and passions.<sup>165</sup> The perfection of the soul, from this position, would occur once the soul has left the body, and has no longer any need for habits, since it no longer possess an irrational part. This is the reason for the marked absence in Neoplatonic writings of any significant interest in ethical or political concerns. Ethics and politics may prepare the soul for *anamnēsis*, but they are eventually to be left behind.

Indeed, the moral virtues are subordinate to another group of virtues, in Neoplatonic thinking. In the *Platonic Theology* Proclus writes that his auditors must first possess all the moral virtues.<sup>166</sup> But higher than these are other virtues, such as the intellectual. Highest of all are the cathartic or purificatory virtues, the theurgic virtues, such as those which Marinus ascribes to Proclus in his hagiography.<sup>167</sup> H.-D. Saffrey writes of the description of a statue of Plato, by one of Proclus' students:

It is not the path of human virtues that Plato now shows to Athens, but rather the path of the virtues which are the work of the gods themselves in the spirit and the heart of men. We are familiar with them; they are the purificative virtues, the theoretical and theurgic virtues, those which we could call mystical virtues. It was

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<sup>163</sup> *In Alc.* 224.8-12: δεῖ τοίνυν τὴν ἐντεῦθεν μέλλουσαν ὀρθῶς ἐπ' ἐκείνην τὴν ἄγρυπνον περιάγεσθαι φύσιν κοσμήσαι μὲν τὰς δευτέρας καὶ τρίτας δυνάμεις τὰς συνηρημένας αὐτῇ καθάπερ τῷ θαλαττίῳ Γλαύκῳ τὰ φύκια καὶ τὰ ὀστρεα.

<sup>164</sup> *El. Th.* props. 205-210. For the Soul's various sorts of vehicles, see L. Siorvanes, *Proclus. Neoplatonic philosophy and science* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996) pp. 131-133.

<sup>165</sup> This position has to be nuanced, as Proclus does think that some good comes from the soul's association with material body. See my discussion in chapter V.

<sup>166</sup> *Plat. Theol.* I. 10. 11-11.7.

<sup>167</sup> *Vita Procli* xxvi-xxxiii.



towards this mystical theology that the school of Proclus was essentially oriented.<sup>168</sup>

As long as the soul has need of the moral virtues, it is still managing its passions. Much better is to rid oneself of them, through the purification of philosophy and ritual.

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<sup>168</sup> H.-D. Saffrey, "Théologie et anthropologie d'après quelques préfaces de Proclus." *Images of man in Ancient and Medieval thought, studia Gerardo Verbeke ab amicis et collegis dicata* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1976) pp.199-212; see p.203. The student was the poet Christodorus, who described the statue in the following manner: "Next stood the godlike Plato, who in bygone days showed to Athens the secret paths of the god-wrought virtues (Εἰστήκει δὲ Πλάτων θεοεἰκελός, ὁ πρὶν Ἀθῆναις / δειξάς κρυπτά κέλευθα θεοκράντων ἀρετῶν)."

### CHAPTER III

#### DIANOIA AS A PROJECTION OF THE SOUL'S OUSIÔDEIS LOGOI

##### III.i. Proclus' situation of *dianoia* on Plato's line

As a preliminary to our discussion of *dianoia* as the *probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn*, we will examine briefly Proclus' situation of *dianoia* between *nous* and *aisthêsis*. At the beginning the first prologue to his Euclid Commentary, Proclus makes an initial division of the sorts of Being, in order to place mathematical beings in their proper place. As we have seen above, his remarks concerning the objects of mathematics (*ta mathêmatika*) may be taken to apply to all objects of *dianoia* (*ta dianoêta*). His distinction is three-fold: indivisible beings, divisible beings, and beings which are intermediate between the completely indivisible and completely divisible. The highest sort are described as partless (*ameristos*), simple (*haplous*), incomposite (*asunthetos*) and indivisible (*adiuiretos*) existences (*hypostaseis*) or beings (*onta*). The lowest are described as having parts (*meristos*) and being "in all sorts of compositions and containing manifold divisions" (*en sunthesesin pantoiais kai poikilais diairesesin*), and as being in matter (*en hulêi*).<sup>169</sup> The middle rank of beings is superior to the lowest because the *logoi* which are about it (*peri autên*) are unchangeable (*aei kata tauta echon*), stable (*monimos*) and irrefutable (*anelegktos*). However, it falls short of the highest division because its reasonings (*epibolai*) are discursive (*diexodikos*), "make use of extension in underlying matter" (*to tais diastasesi tôn hupokeimenôn proschrômenon*), i.e. treats their subject as

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<sup>169</sup> In Eucl. 3.4-9.

extended.<sup>170</sup> and "use different principles for different objects" (*to ap' allôn archôn alla prokataskeuazon*).

Corresponding to this division of Being is a division of the appropriate types of cognition (*gnôseis*) which lay hold of these different sorts of beings. He assigns intellection (*noêsis*) to the highest because it grasps the intelligible objects (*ta noêta*) "all at once and with simplicity" (*athroôs kai meta haplotêtos*), and because it is superior to other types of knowledge "due to its immaterial, pure and unitary approach and grasp of beings" (*têi te aulilai kai têi katharotêti kai têi henoeidei prosbolêi kai epaphêi tôn ontôn*). To the lowest division he assigns opinion (*doxa*), "which grasps truth obscurely" (*amudras alêtheias antilambanomenên*). This lowest division is also said to correspond to what is grasped by the senses (*aisthêtois hapasî*).<sup>171</sup>

To the intermediate type he assigns *dianoia*. It is second in rank to *nous*, but more perfect (*teleiōtera*), precise (*akribestera*) and pure (*katherōtera*) than opinion. And in general,

it travels out from and unfolds the measurelessness of *Nous* and unrolls (*anelissei*) its concentrated (*sunespeiramenon*, i.e. 'rolled up') intellectual insight, and then

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<sup>170</sup> We should note one peculiarity of Proclus' description of the middle sort of being in this passage. He says that the *logoi* which *dianoia* projects make use of extension in underlying matter. This is a reference to the role of imagination (*phantasia*) in illustrating for the soul the extension of geometrical figures. However, most of the *logoi* of *dianoia* do not assume extension in the intelligible matter of *phantasia*. *Phantasia* is the lowest level of *dianoia*, because it is the paradigm of bodily extension. The geometrical *logoi* which are projected in *phantasia* are extended, but without matter, as perfect paradigms of the bodies which are their deficient image. See our discussion in chapter IV. Proclus likely refers to *phantasia* in this division of being because the commentary as a whole has as its topic geometry. See also *In Eucl.* 50ff: 86-87; and 94-96. See especially *In Eucl.* 53.27ff. where Proclus says that the *logos* in *dianoia* is partless, and is unfolded into extension by *phantasia*.

<sup>171</sup> Proclus will often present what seem to be exhaustive divisions, but will leave out terms, or lump two distinct terms together, as he does here to *doxa* and *aisthêsis*. The reason for this is emphasis. His main interest here is in the distinction between indivisible, divisible, and intermediate knowing, so it is not important to point out the distinction between *doxa* and *aisthêsis* as two types of divisible knowing. This is an example of the relativity of discursive *logoi*. The division which Proclus makes here has as its intention to bring the soul of the reader to realise the difference between these three types of knowing and being. While this way of dividing knowing and being is a true way, it is not the only way to divide it. And this way of dividing excludes some other ways. For example, if Proclus had listed all of the many orders of the universe in this discussion, the three-fold distinction which he wanted his readers to see would have been obscured. The *logos* which Proclus unfolds here is a partial truth, in the sense that it is the truth about a part of reality, not all of it.

gathers together again the things it has distinguished and refers them back to *Nous*.<sup>172</sup>

Proclus describes this type of knowledge as having a middle position (*mesên taxin*), by which Proclus means that it shares some of the characteristics of each of its higher and lower neighbours. Its objects share precision and immateriality with the objects of *Nous*, but like the objects of sense fall short of their indivisibility and simplicity.

Proclus is following Plato's division at *Republic* 511c-d, in which there is a division between *nous*, *dianoia* and *doxa*. Further on (10.16-27) he makes a further distinction, again following Plato, this time his summary at *Republic* 511d-e, where Plato lists intelligence (*noësis*), discursive reasoning (*dianoia*), belief (*pistis*) and images (*eikasia*). Proclus says Plato makes an initial distinction between intelligibles (*noêta*) and sensibles (*aisthêta*). He subdivides intelligibles into intelligibles (*noêta*) and objects of discursive reason (*dianoêta*), and the sensibles into sensibles (*aisthêta*) and images (*eikasta*). To these four divisions Proclus, following Plato, assigns *noësis*, *dianoia*, *pistis* and *eikasia*. Proclus describes the second division of each group as an image or likeness of the first division of each group. *Eikasia* grasps the images (*eidôla*) of sense objects, while *dianoia* grasps the likenesses (*eikonas*) of the *noêta*, i.e. of the first, simple and partless Forms (*eidê*) which have descended into multiplicity and division (*tas apo tôn prôtôn kai haplôn kai ameristôn eidôn eis plêthos kai diairesin hupobasas*).

Plato does not say that the objects of *dianoia* are images of the *eidê*, but rather that *dianoia* makes use of the *aisthêta* but treats them as images, much in the way that the geometer uses a line drawn in the sand but knows that it is only an image of the true line. Proclus, however, does think that the objects of *dianoia* are images of the *eidê* in *Nous*, and thinks that Plato has said this.<sup>173</sup> This relation of paradigm and image is important for Proclus' theory of *dianoia*. An image is at the same time the same as its paradigm.

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<sup>172</sup> In *Eucl.* 4.11-14: διεξοδεύει μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀναπλοῖ τοῦ νοῦ τὴν ἀμετρίαν καὶ ἀνελίσσει τὸ συνεσπειραμένον τῆς νοεῖας ἐπιβολῆς, συνάγει δὲ αὐτὸ πάλιν τὰ διηρημένα καὶ ἀναφέρει πρὸς τὸν νοῦν.

<sup>173</sup> See discussion of this passage of the *Republic* in chapter IV.

and different from it. It refers to its paradigm by being what the paradigm is, but being so in its own peculiar manner. Proclus' universe is a hierarchy in which the different orders are related as paradigm and image, and this relation is what allows *dianoia* to know the orders which lie above and below it, because it is possible, according to Proclus, to see the paradigms in the images and move from the images to the paradigms.<sup>174</sup>

### III.ii. *Monê, proodos, epistrophê* and the *probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn*

As we have seen from Proclus' criticism of induction, he does not think that the soul can gain its ideas from sensation. Moreover, his doctrine of *anamnêsis* is sophisticated enough to explain why it is that the soul does not have the entire intelligible cosmos explicit to itself immediately upon turning inwards. The *logoi* which constitute its *ousia* are at first possessed in a hidden manner (*kruphiôs*). They exist in the soul's *ousia* as a unity, and only take on discursive multiplicity through the the soul's discursive thinking (*dianoia*). *Dianoia* draws the *logoi* out from the soul's *ousia*, such that their internal plan of unfolding is followed, and they take on the multiplicity which characterises discursive thought. Proclus describes this drawing forth metaphorically as a "throwing forth" (*probolê*), a "projection." His technical phrase is the "projection of the soul's essential *logoi*" (*probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn*).

All spiritual entities have a threefold structure of remaining, procession and return (*monê, proodos, epistrophê*) with regard to the cause from which they arise.<sup>175</sup> In the *Elements of Theology*,<sup>176</sup> Proclus describes this triad in terms of identity, difference and

<sup>174</sup> In *Tim.* II.246.7-9.

<sup>175</sup> For an analysis of remaining, procession, and return in Proclus see S. Gersh, *KINHΣΙΣ AKINHΤΟΣ* (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1973) pp.49-80. Gersh's analysis is restricted explicitly to an examination of spiritual motion in Proclus' *Nous*. The interesting thing about this triad in the Soul, as opposed to *Nous*, is that the circular motion of power which is described as remaining, procession, and return, takes place in time. Hence it is the case that in the case of any given soul, the circle of their activity is such that its end has *not yet* linked up with its beginning. Thus the activity of the Soul is discursive. In this manner as well arises the possibility that the end not at all link up with the beginning, and a given soul become lost in its fascination with lower things, and fail to return upon itself and upon *Nous*.

<sup>176</sup> *El.Th.* props.28-32.

similarity. The moment of remaining is the identity of the effect with its cause, difference is the procession, and the togetherness of identity and difference in similarity is the moment of return. What this analysis in terms of identity, difference and similarity intends to capture is the continuity of the spiritual hierarchy. The declension of what arises from the One into successive orders is not haphazard. Each order is similar to its next superior order, because it is an image of that superior order: each order is the manifestation of the content hidden in the unity of the higher order. It is important to understand the nature of an image, according to Proclus. An image is the the existence of a particular perspective of the paradigm. The paradigm as a whole is present to the image, but the manner of existence which belongs to the image draws out a particular aspect of the paradigm. This is the mixture of identity and difference which Proclus says is similarity. Because the image is similar, not identical, to its paradigm, it does not perfectly adequate its paradigm, even though it is a manifestation of the paradigm. This is why Proclus characterises a paradigm as fertile and filled with power. The paradigm gives rise to many images, each of which manifest the paradigm in a different manner, none of which exhaust its power to produce more images. Moreover, according to Proclus, no sum of images could exhaust the fertility of a paradigm. Being itself is not equivalent to the sum total of beings. Rather, it is the paradigm whose fertility issues in an endless variety of beings which manifest its nature. Justice itself is not the sum of just acts, but rather a Form which is the ground of an endless variety of acts of justice. While no image completely adequates its paradigm, no image is completely other than its paradigm either. Similarity is not identity, but it is also not difference. In knowing the image you also know the paradigm, according to Proclus, and you can be led from the image to the paradigm because of the similarity of image to paradigm.<sup>177</sup> The universe is

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<sup>177</sup> Note that Proclus thinks similarity is not a reciprocal relation in these sorts of cases. The image is similar to the paradigm, but not vice-versa. Otherwise, the similarity of *Nous* to the One would require that the One be similar to *Nous*. But the One cannot enter into any such relation without destroying its ineffable character. This non-reciprocal similarity solves the second and fourth problems of participation in

a hierarchy of orders, such that each refracts and manifests the higher orders, each being itself a divided image of its causes.

Soul as an hypostasis remains in *Nous*, proceeds from it, and returns to it. It is an image of *Nous*. This means that Soul thinks the same Forms which *Nous* thinks, but does so by producing *logoi* which are images of those Forms. While each of the Soul's *logoi* is a manifestation of the *eidê* in *Nous*, each is an image and so does not adequate its *eidos*. So although Soul as a whole manifests the content of *Nous*, it cannot exhaust the fertility of *Nous*. This is why Soul's activity of projecting *logoi* is never finished, according to Proclus. Soul is a continuing activity of producing itself as a divided image of *Nous*, a refraction of the unity of *Nous* into discursive multiplicity. One of the most important consequences of the manner in which Soul projects *logoi* from *Nous* is Time. Strictly speaking, Time in Proclus is not a consequence of the Soul's motion, rather, it is a *nous* which is the measure of that motion.<sup>178</sup> What this means, however, is that the *nous* which is the monad of Time is the fertile source of the divided activity of Soul. Soul's activity is divided in the sense that it does not project its *logoi* all at once. It draws out its *logoi* one by one, thinking the *eidê* first from one side, then from another. Soul is a divided image of *Nous*, divided because it is its *logos*, and divided in Time. Body, in its turn, is a divided image of Soul. Its division is brought about by the multiple manner in which it manifest the unified fertility of the psychic *logoi*. As well, it is divided by spatial extension.<sup>179</sup>

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Plato's *Parmenides*, the third man arguments, according to Proclus. See *In Parm.* 890.2ff; and 911.33ff.

<sup>178</sup> See chapter VI.

<sup>179</sup> Time and space in this system are two manners in which a being may fail to grasp itself completely. The moment of return (*epistrophê*) is the moment in which an entity is completely present to itself, or grasps itself. Soul does not have an immediate return, and so does not have the immediate self-identity of *Nous*, because of the division of its projection and its concomitant temporality. Body is incapable of grasping itself, because its parts may never overlap and occupy the same position. The only sort of self-identity which it may have is the identity of kind. Self-grasping is the motion of thinking, in Proclus. Because spatial extension rules out the thoroughgoing presence to self which is thinking, bodies cannot think.

This process by which the Soul projects *logoi* from the fertility of *Nous* is described structurally by Proclus as the triadic structure, or moments, or movement of the Soul: *monê*, *proodos*, and *epistrophê*. The soul remains in *Nous*, and hence has a moment of identity with *Nous*: the *logoi* which it projects begin from the *eidê* in *Nous*. It proceeds from *Nous*, and differs from it in that its *logoi* are divided images of the *eidê*, and are possessed under the Soul's condition of temporal activity. Soul's return upon *Nous* is its moment of similarity, the togetherness of identity and difference. The return is the completion of the first two moments. In Soul's *epistrophê* Soul possesses its *logoi* in its own manner, as the temporally divided and numerically multiple images of *eidê* in *Nous*, but possesses them with the awareness that its projected *logoi* are the unfoldings of the *eidê* in *Nous* according to their own plan of self-unfolding. This moment of return might initially seem redundant, as a simple reiteration of the first two moments. But what Proclus is describing is a continuous spiritual motion, not the connexion of three independent and distinct moments. Hence, the third moment is necessary to express the inner connexion between the first two moments. If our description of this continuous motion included only the first two moments, we would have a false sense of the rupture between *Nous* and Soul, and indeed, have a false idea of an internal chasm within Soul itself. It is not that one aspect of Soul is identical to *Nous*, and another separate aspect differs, but that in its identity with *Nous* it differs, and in its difference it is identical.<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> The structure of remaining, procession, and return governs not only the emergence of one spiritual principle from another, but also the internal structure of *Nous* and Soul. Already in Plotinus' analysis of the inner movement of *Nous* the three moments are distinct. *Nous* proceeds from the One by a moment of self-determination by which the fertility of an indeterminate procession of Life is determined by its own return upon its source. The knowing moment of *Nous* is the point where the indeterminate dynamism of power which issues from the One orders itself as the totality of Ideas. See P. Hadot, "Être, Vie, Pensée chez Plotin et avant Plotin," in *Les sources de Plotin* (Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1960) pp. 105-141; see pp. 134-5: "il y a donc une première phase de mouvement aveugle, d'altérité pure, de pur éloignement. Puis, ce mouvement – et c'est là tout son mystère – peut se convertir vers l'Un et se définir. Il est difficile de ne pas rapprocher ces deux phases, avec les deux phases rencontrées plus haut: illimitation de la vie, puis conversion de la vie qui s'achèvera dans la constitution plénière de l'Intelligence. La vie issue de l'Un, et de soi illimitée, se convertit vers l'Un et se convertissant, devient l'Intelligence, dans la mesure où elle est définie dans sa conversion. La vie représente donc un mouvement d'autodétermination, d'autoactualisation de l'être: elle est le mouvement de la matière intelligible qui se donne à elle-même forme et détermination, en se tournant vers l'Un. L'être et la pensée, don't l'unité constitue l'Intelligence.



This triadic activity of self-unfolding is described by Proclus as a "period" (*periodos*).<sup>181</sup> because Proclus thinks of this activity metaphorically as a circle. At the end of this period the Soul returns upon *Nous*. It does not itself become *Nous*, or somehow re-absorb itself into *Nous*. Rather, at the end of its period Soul has constituted itself as a divided image of *Nous*, expressing in its temporally projected *logoi* the noetic *eidê*.

The triad essence, power and activity (*ousia, dunamis, energeia*) is another way of describing the reality of *monê, proodos, and epistrophê*.<sup>182</sup> So the soul's *monê* or moment of identity with *Nous* is its essence (*ousia*), its *dunamis* is manifest in its *proodos*, and its *energeia* is an *epistrophê* upon *Nous*. We should examine briefly the Soul's *ousia*.

Proclus says that the Soul's *ousia* is a fullness of essential *logoi* (*plêrôma tôn ousiôdôn logôn*).<sup>183</sup> By *logos* Proclus means an image of an *eidos*, or the secondary existence of an

apparaissent alors comme le produit de l'autodétermination de la vie... On entrevoit dans ce schéma plotinien le futur schéma du néoplatonisme postérieur: repos, procession, conversion, intimement lié à la triade être-vie-pensée."

<sup>181</sup> lit. "a journey around."

<sup>182</sup> From the perspective of this description we find another reason for the moment of return. A spiritual entity is a circular movement from the essence, through power, to full actuality/activity. Similarly, the constitution of a spiritual entity from its cause contains a moment of remaining, by which the cause determines the nature of the effect: a moment of procession, in which the power of the cause is expressed by the coming into being of the effect; and a moment of reversion, in which the effect may be said finally to be a being in its own right. For a discussion of the different triads in Proclus as forms of "dynamic identity," see W. Beierwaltes, *Proklos, Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1965) pp.48-164. A. Smith finds it difficult to accept the notion of potentiality (*dunamis*) in *Nous*, in either Plotinus or Proclus. However, he seems not to pay enough attention to the identity of *dunamis* as power rather than potentiality. See A. Smith, "Potentiality and the problem of plurality in the intelligible world," in *Neoplatonism and early Christian thought, essays in honour of A.H. Armstrong*, ed. H.J. Blumenthal and R.A. Markus (London: Variorum, 1981) pp.99-107. See also *El.Th.* prop.169, which states that every *nous* has its *ousia, dunamis, and energeia* in Eternity.

<sup>183</sup> See *In Alc.* 250.19-23: "But the soul should go inside itself to seek the true and the good and the eternal *logoi* of beings. For its essence is full of these *logoi*, but it is hidden by the forgetfulness of the world of generation (ἀλλ' αὐτὴν ἰούσαν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν ἑαυτῇ ζητεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τοὺς αἰδίου τῶν ὄντων λόγους, πλήρης γὰρ ἔστιν αὐτῆς ἡ οὐσία τούτων, ἐπικρύπτεται δὲ ἐκ τῆς γενεσιουργοῦ λήθης)"; *In Eucl.* 16.22-27: "All mathematical are thus first present in the soul. Before the numbers the self-moving numbers, before the visible figures the living figures, before the harmonised parts the *logoi* of harmony, before the bodies moving in a circle the invisible circles are already constructed, and the soul is the fullness of them all (πάντα ἄρα τὰ μαθηματικὰ πρῶτον ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ πρὸ τῶν ἀριθμῶν οἱ αὐτοκίνητοι καὶ πρὸ τῶν φαινομένων σχημάτων τὰ ζωδιακὰ σχήματα καὶ πρὸ τῶν ἡρμοσμένων οἱ ἁρμονικοὶ λόγοι καὶ πρὸ τῶν κύκλῳ κινουμένων σωμάτων οἱ ἀφανεῖς κύκλοι δεδημιούργηται καὶ πλήρωμα τῶν πάντων ἡ ψυχὴ)"; *In Eucl.* 17.22-26: "The mathematical *logoi* which fill the soul are essential and self-moving, and when *dianoia* projects and unfolds them it gives rise to all the variety of the mathematical sciences (οὐσιώδεις ἄρα καὶ αὐτοκίνητοι τῶν μαθημάτων εἰσὶν οἱ λόγοι συμπληροῦντες τὰς ψυχάς, οὓς δὴ καὶ προβάλλουσα ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἐξελίττουσα πᾶσαν τὴν ποικιλίαν

*eidos*. These statements are equivalent, because the image is the unfolding into multiplicity of the *eidos* itself. Recall our discussion in chapter I, where we stated that the word *logos* was appropriate to the unfolded moment. It is an *eidos*, which the Soul's *logos* unfolds.

Proclus' canonical statement of the secondary existence of *eidê* in the Soul is prop.194 of the *Elements of Theology*: "Every soul possesses all of the Forms (*eidê*), which *Nous* possesses in a primary manner (*prôtôs*)."<sup>184</sup> The more general statement of this principle is found in Prop.18: "Everything which bestows a character on others in virtue of its being (*tôî eînai*) possess in a primary manner that character which it communicates to its recipients."<sup>185</sup> Proclus' proof in proposition 18 turns on the need for an element of identity between cause and effect, so that a given cause be the cause of a given effect. However, cause and effect can not be completely identical, otherwise there would be no ontological distinction between cause and effect. So the moment of identity is together with a moment of difference. This difference means that the cause is ontologically superior to the effect,<sup>186</sup> which in Proclus means that it is more unified and hence more fertile than the effect. Thus the character which the cause communicates is said to exist primarily (*prôtôs*) in the cause and secondarily (*deuterôs*) in the effect. *Nous* causes Soul in virtue of its being (*autôî tôi eînai*), thus it possesses the Forms primarily while the soul possesses them secondarily.<sup>187</sup> In prop.194 Proclus says that the Soul

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υφίστησι τῶν μαθηματικῶν ἐπιστημῶν"; *In Eucl.* 55.13-18: "But if it should ever be able to roll up its extensions and figures and view their plurality as a unity without figure, then in turning back to itself it would view quite differently the partless, unextended, and essential geometrical *logoi* of which it is the fullness (εἰ δέ ποτε συμπύξασα τὰς διαστάσεις καὶ τοὺς τύπους καὶ τὸ πλήθος ἀτυπώτως καὶ ἐνοειδῶς θεασαμένη πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἐπιστρέψαι δυνηθείη, τότε ἂν διαφερόντως τοὺς λόγους τοὺς γεωμετρικοὺς ἴδοι τοὺς ἀμερίστους, τοὺς ἀδιαστάτους, τοὺς οὐσιώδεις, ὧν ἐστὶ πλήρωμα)": *In Tim.* II.200.21-23: "After these matters we say that the soul is a fullness of *logoi*; more simple than sensibles but more composite than intelligibles (Τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα λόγων πλήρωμα τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι φάμεν, ἀπλουστέραν μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν, συνθετωτέραν δὲ τῶν νοητῶν)."

<sup>184</sup> Πᾶσα ψυχὴ πάντα ἔχει τὰ εἶδη, ἃ ὁ νοῦς πρῶτως ἔχει.

<sup>185</sup> Πάν τὸ τῷ εἶναι χορηγοῦν ἄλλοις αὐτὸ πρῶτως ἐστὶ τοῦτο, οὐ μεταδίδωσι τοῖς χορηγουμένοις.

<sup>186</sup> See prop.7.

<sup>187</sup> Causation αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι is different from causation which takes place due to some activity of the entity in question. Only the former sort of causation gives rise to an effect which is a divided image of

possesses essential *logoi* (*ousiôdeis logoi*), which are secondary irradiations (*emphaseis*) of the intellectual Forms (*tôn noerôn ara eidôn psuchê deuterôs echei tas emphaseis*). Thus the distinction between the contents of *Nous* and the contents of Soul is a distinction between the primary and secondary possession of the Forms, where the secondary manner of possession is as essential *logoi*.

I refer to the possession of the Forms, rather than their existence. The structure of *Nous* is also triadic,<sup>188</sup> with the first moment being the true intelligible moment, and the third the knowing moment which embraces the first moment as its object.<sup>189</sup> Hence the true intelligible for *Nous* is its first moment, because this first moment is itself the Forms.<sup>190</sup> The third moment of *Nous* is the intellectual moment, the moment which can be said to possess the Forms. It is the intellectual moment of *Nous* which possesses the Forms in a primary manner. However, as the ultimate intelligible, the Forms are the true objects of thought for the Soul as well as for *Nous*. So the distinction between *Nous* and Soul is that *Nous* embraces the Forms as its intelligible object, through its own intellectual moment, while the *logoi* in the soul embrace the Forms as their intelligible

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the cause. For this reason the sort of causation which holds between moving bodies is not a matter of the coming into existence of an image of the cause, because this causation is not αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι. This study does not have as its topic this sort of causation, but assumes its presence in Procline metaphysics, because it is this sort of causation which allows the levels of the Procline hierarchy to be related as paradigm and image. And this relation is what allows *dianoia* to know that which lies both above and below it. For causation αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι See J. Trouillard, "'Agir par son être même', la causalité selon Proclus," *Revue des sciences religieuses*, 32 (1958) pp.347-357; and a more detailed study by the same author, "Les degrés du ποιεῖν chez Proclus," *Dionysius*, 1 (1977) pp.69-84, see pp.75-80.

<sup>188</sup> The three moments of *Nous* are intelligible, intelligible-and-intellectual, and intellectual (*noëtos, noëtos kai noeros, noeros*).

<sup>189</sup> More properly, the third moment is the moment in which thinker and thought have emerged as distinct. In the intelligible itself this distinction has not yet emerged. This is why for Proclus the intelligible is more than a simple object for thought, but rather an activity of thinking superior to all others. J. Trouillard comments well on the relation between the intelligible-and-intellectual orders of *Nous*, in "'Agir par son être même', la causalité selon Proclus," *Revue des sciences religieuses*, 32 (1958) pp.347-357; p.350: "Proclus affirme la supériorité de l'intelligible. Cela ne signifie pas le primat de l'objet ni son détachement de la subjectivité. Car, selon la loi de la hiérarchie proclusienne, l'inférieur est dans le supérieur sous une meilleure forme qu'en lui-même. L'intelligible n'est pas le néant de pensée, mais une immédiation plus étroite d'objet et de sujet en laquelle l'activité est ramenée à la substance plutôt que la substance à l'action."

<sup>190</sup> This first moment is itself divided into three intelligible triads: Being, Life, and *Nous*, where *Nous* is the *autozôion*, or totality of intelligible genera.

object, but do so in a derivative manner.<sup>191</sup> So when Proclus says that "the projections of the essential *logoi* are thoughts, which is the manner in which we understand the soul to be the fullness of all the Forms (*plêrôma esti tôn eidôn*),"<sup>192</sup> he is able to conflate *logos* and *eidos* while distinguishing them. The *logos* in soul is distinct from the third moment of *Nous*, in that it embraces the intelligible in a different manner than does *Nous*. However, insofar as it does embrace the intelligible, Soul's thought may in a secondary manner be called an *eidos*, and the soul the fullness of *eidê*.<sup>193</sup> So although Proclus uses both phrases, "fullness of *eidê*" and "fullness of *logoi*", he does distinguish the true *eidê* in *Nous* from the secondary contents of Soul. For purposes of clarity I will restrict myself to the term *logos* for the contents of the soul, using the phrases "fullness of *logoi*" (*probolê tôn logôn*) and "essential *logoi*" (*ousiôdeis logoi*), understanding that a *logos* is a secondary possession of the intelligible *eidê*, and that the primary possession of the intelligible *eidê* belongs to *Nous*.<sup>194</sup>

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<sup>191</sup> *In Parm.* 899.23-32: "If then, the thought (*noëma*) is of the object of thought (*noëton*), not only in us, but also in the divine and veritable *Nous*, it is plain that the object of thought is prior to the thought, and it is by virtue of its striving towards this that the *logos* in soul is a thought. For the discursive and divided and transitive aspect of the *logoi* in the soul manifests sufficiently in its activities that the intelligible Form (*noëton eidos*) is something else again, that which unitarily and indivisibly contains the cause of all the *logoi* (Εἰ δὲ τὸ νόημα τοῦ νοητοῦ ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον ἐν ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ θεῷ νῶ καὶ ἀληθινῷ, δῆλον ὅτι ἐστὶ πρὸ τοῦ νοήματος τὸ νοητόν, εἰς ὃ καὶ ἀπεριδόμενος ὁ ἐν ψυχῇ λόγος νόημα ἐστὶ. Τὸ γὰρ ἀνειλεγμένον τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λόγων καὶ τὸ διηρημένον καὶ τὸ μεταβατικὸν ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ἱκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσιν, ὅτι ἄρα ἄλλο ἐστὶ τὸ νοητόν εἶδος, τὸ ἡνωμένως καὶ ἀδιαίρετως τὴν αἰτίαν περιέχον πάντων τῶν λόγων)."

<sup>192</sup> *In Parm.* 896.1-4: Τὰς δὲ τῶν οὐσιωδῶν λόγων προβολὰς νοήματα λέγοντες, καθ' ἃς γινώσκουμεν ὅπως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ πάντων πλήρωμά ἐστι τῶν εἰδῶν.

<sup>193</sup> Other examples of Proclus' casual use of both Form and *logos* to refer to the contents of the soul are found in abundance in the Euclid commentary. See *In Eucl.* 16.04-10: "There is left only the conclusion that soul draws her concepts both from herself and from *Nous*, and that she is herself the company of the Forms (*plêrôma tôn eidôn*), which receive their constitution from the intellectual paradigms, but come forward into being in virtue of themselves. The soul therefore was never a writing-tablet bare of *logoi*; she is a tablet that has always been inscribed and is always writing itself and being written on by *Nous* (λείπεται δὴ οὖν καὶ παρ' αὐτῆς καὶ παρὰ νοῦ ταῦτα παράγειν καὶ εἶναι πλήρωμα τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτήν, ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν νοερῶν παραδειγμάτων ὑφισταμένων, αὐτογόνως δὲ τὴν εἰς τὸ εἶναι πάροdon λαγγανόντων, καὶ οὐκ ἄρα ἦν ἡ ψυχὴ γραμματεῖον καὶ τῶν λόγων κενόν, ἀλλὰ γεγραμμένον ἀεὶ καὶ γράφον ἑαυτὸ καὶ ὑπὸ νοῦ γραφόμενον)": *In Eucl.* 17.04-06: "And whenever the Soul projects its *logoi*, it brings to light all of the sciences and virtues. Indeed, the Soul has its *ousia* (*ousiôtai*) in these Forms (*eidesi*) (καὶ ὅτ' ἂν προβάλλῃ τοὺς αὐτοῦ λόγους, τότε καὶ ἐπιστήμας προφαίνει πάσας καὶ ἀρετάς, οὐσίωται οὖν ἐν τούτοις ἡ ψυχὴ τοῖς εἰδεσι)."

<sup>194</sup> Proclus distinguishes between intelligible and intellectual Forms (*noëta eidê*, and *noëra eidê*). So the knowing moment of *Nous* is the place of *noëra eidê*.

Proclus says that the *ousia* of the Soul is a fullness of *logoi*. But he also sometimes refers simply to the Soul as a fullness of *logoi*, without referring explicitly to its *ousia*. Or he says that the Soul is a fullness of *ousiôdeis logoi*. We should be wary of thinking of the *ousia* of the Soul too separately from its *dunamis* and *energeia*. Both the analysis of the Soul as *ousia*, *dunamis*, and *energeia*, and the analysis as *monê*, *proodos*, and *epistrophê* are ways of dividing the continuous motion which is Soul. If we forget this, we will end up with two separate levels of *logoi*. First we would have the unprojected *logoi* which are the *ousia* of the Soul, and which are images of the *eidê* in *Nous*. Second, we would have the projected *logoi* which are the *energeia* of the Soul, which are images not only of the *eidê* in *Nous*, but of the *ousiôdeis logoi*. I do not think such a distinction of levels would capture what Proclus has in mind. The point is rather that Soul as a whole is a divided expression of *Nous*. Its embrace of its intelligible objects takes place in a more multiple manner than does that of *Nous*. So where *Nous'* distinction between an intelligible moment and an intellectual moment is immediately overcome in the atemporal unity of its moments, this is not the case for Soul. Soul constitutes itself as an image of *Nous* by a continuous temporal unfolding of *eidê* into multiple *logoi*. The beginning point of this unfolding is *Nous*, or the Soul's *monê*, or the Soul's *ousia*. These are all ways of describing the same thing, with the proviso that *Nous* itself is not the soul's *monê* or *ousia*.<sup>195</sup> So the distinction between unprojected and projected *logoi* is not a distinction between two separate levels of *logoi*, as if there were a reduplication of *logoi* in the Soul. Rather, it is a distinction between the beginning and the end of a continuous process of intelligible unfolding.

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<sup>195</sup> There is an analogy here with a point and a line. The point from which the line begins has no magnitude, so it may be considered not to be a part of the line. In this manner, the unity of *Nous* is not a part of the expansion which is Soul. From another perspective, however, the line is that which stretches forth from the point, so the point is part of the line as its origin. In this manner, the *monê* and the *ousia* are part of the Soul. The *ousia*, however, has more the connotation of the origin point and the first part of the line, than does the *monê*. All of these are metaphors which try to capture the continuous motion of the single power which is the self-articulation of Being.

It is perhaps easier to see the continuity of the motion of the Soul in Proclus if we think of it by analogy with the Plotinian *Nous*. Plotinus speaks of two 'phases' in the production of *Nous* from the One,<sup>196</sup> the first being an sort of indistinct production of *Nous* as a procession from the One, followed by a halting and turning back to the One, by which *Nous* gains determinacy and definition. These must be thought of, however, as two moments in the continuous motion which is the production of *Nous* from the One, and as at most logically distinct. They certainly cannot be in a temporal succession, as *Nous* is outside of time. The strong sense that they are two, and separate, is caused by the temporal succession of our thinking. Other manners of thinking about this production do not contain this duality, such as the metaphor of the light produced by the Sun.<sup>197</sup> Plotinus has the same problem in describing the distinction and unity of subject and object in *Nous*. They are in one sense distinct, but in another sense they are one, and their distinction is only a product of the inability of discursive reason to grasp their unity.<sup>198</sup> In Proclus we have a similar situation. The production of Soul from *Nous* is a continuous motion of remaining, procession, and return, by which the Soul distinguishes itself from *Nous* and gives itself its own determinations. *Dianoia* by its nature is a dividing thinking, and so the moments of this self-definition are described by it as three distinct phases. It is the Soul as a whole, however, which is this continuous self-motion of remaining, procession, and return. And is this continuous motion by which the Soul constitutes itself as a divided image of *Nous* that Proclus means when he speaks of the projection of the Soul's essential *logoi* (*probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn*).<sup>199</sup>

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<sup>196</sup> For example, see *Enn.* V.1.7.

<sup>197</sup> See *Enn.* V.1.7.

<sup>198</sup> See *Enn.* V.8.11.

<sup>199</sup> For a discussion of the projection of the soul's essential *logoi* (*probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn*) see Dominic J. O'Meara, *Pythagoras Revived* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) pp.167-169, 198-204. For the origin of the *probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn*, with regard to mathematics, in Syrianus' *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics*, see O'Meara p.133.

### III.iii. The Soul as a divided image of *Nous*

Proclus' account of discursive reason (*dianoia*) is that it is a temporal unfolding of the *logoi* resident in the Soul's *ousia*, to the end that the Soul be conscious of its own contents. The temporal unfolding is necessary because the soul is unable to grasp itself in a simple, atemporal vision:

For *dianoia* possesses the *logoi* but, not being powerful enough to see them when they are wrapped up, unfolds and exposes them and presents them to the imagination (*phantasia*) sitting in the vestibule.<sup>200</sup>

The Form itself (*to ge eidos auto*) is without motion, ungenerated, indivisible and free of all underlying matter. But whatever exists secretly (*kruphiôs*) in it is brought to the imagination separately and dividedly. That which projects is *dianoia*; that from which it is projected is the dianoetic Form (*dianoêton eidos*); that in which what is projected exists is this thing called 'passive *Nous*' (*pathêtikos houtos kaloumenos nous*) that unfolds itself [circling] around the true *Nous*, divides out itself from the undividedness of pure intellection (*akraiphnous noêseôs*), shapes itself according to the shapeless Forms (*eidê*) and becomes all things, all that *dianoia* and the partless *logos* in us is.<sup>201</sup>

*Dianoia* begins from a unified point of origin, whether it be called the unprojected *logos*, or the dianoetic *eidos*, and unfolds this source into the multiplicity of projected *logoi*. So *dianoia*, according to Proclus, just is the movement which we have been examining: the Soul's *monê*, *proodos*, and *epistrophê*, or the motion whose moments are *ousia*, *dunamis*, and *energeia*.<sup>202</sup>

The proper description of *dianoia* depends on the perspective from which one describes it. From the perspective which emphasises the continuity of the spiritual hierarchy, *dianoia* is the procession of the intelligible *eidê* into temporal division. From

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<sup>200</sup> In *Eucl.* 54.27-55.02: ἔχουσα γὰρ ἡ διάνοια τοὺς λόγους, ἀσθενοῦσα δὲ συνεπτυγμένης ἰδεῖν ἀναπλοῖ τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ὑπεκτίθεται καὶ εἰς τὴν φαντασίαν ἐν προθύροις κειμένην.

<sup>201</sup> In *Eucl.* 56.11-22: ἐπεὶ τὸ γε εἶδος αὐτὸ ἀκίνητόν ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ παντὸς ὑποκειμένου καθαρεῦον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα κρυφίως ἐστὶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ, διαστατῶς καὶ μεριστῶς εἰς φαντασίαν προάγεται καὶ τὸ μὲν προβάλλον ἡ διάνοια, τὸ δὲ ἀφ' οὗ προβάλλεται τὸ διανοητὸν εἶδος, τὸ δὲ ἐν ᾧ τὸ προβαλλόμενον παθητικὸς οὗτος καλούμενος νοῦς, ἐξελιττων ἑαυτὸν περὶ τὴν ἀμέρειαν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς νοῦ καὶ διίστάς ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἀδιάστατον τῆς ἀκραιφνοῦς νοήσεως καὶ μορφῶν ἑαυτὸν κατὰ πάντα τὰ ἀμόρφωτα εἶδη καὶ πάντα γιγνόμενος, ἃ ἐστὶν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ὁ ἀμερὴς ἐν ἡμῖν λόγος.

<sup>202</sup> Both of these passages are from the commentary on Euclid's *Elements of Geometry*, and so both mention the imagination (*phantasia*). *Phantasia* is the medium only of the unfolding into matterless extension of geometrical figures, and hence plays a role only in geometrical cognition. We will discuss *phantasia* in chapter IV.

the perspective which emphasises the moments of the hierarchy, *dianoia* is an activity of Soul by which it unfolds itself as a divided image of *Nous*. Both points of view recognise the psychic *logos* as an unfolding, whether it be a self-unfolding of *Nous* as the higher principle, or an activity of Soul as the lower principle unfolding its source. There is another duality of perspective. *Dianoia*, regarded as activity of the lower principle, is as much Soul's unfolding of itself as it is Soul's unfolding of *Nous*. This two dualities are a result of the concentricity of *Nous* and Soul. This concentricity is expressed in various ways, as we have seen, by saying that the Soul remains in *Nous*, or that the Soul's *ousia* is a *pléroma tôn ousiôdôn logôn* which are its participation in *Nous*. Both of these expressions mean that the Soul makes itself to be a divided image of *Nous*, and in unfolding itself from its beginning point, which is *Nous*, it is at the same time unfolding *Nous*. The motion of power from the One is continuous, and from a perspective which emphasises Proclus' monism you can say that the division between *Nous* and Soul is one only of the degree of multiplicity of the self-same power.<sup>203</sup>

It is hard to resist spatial metaphors when speaking of an hierarchical system such as Proclus'. Metaphors such as the circle metaphor indicate the reality which Proclus speaks about more simply and immediately than an extended discussion. However, spatial metaphors must also be corrected. It is natural to think of the transcendence of *Nous* with regard to the One, or the One's transcendence, in spatial terms. We think of *Nous* as above Soul, or outside of Soul, or Soul outside of *Nous*. In doing this we obscure the point that before body there is no inside or outside, above or below, in a spatial sense. The only difference between *Nous* and Soul is the manner in which the intelligible is

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<sup>203</sup> J. Trouillard, "L'âme 'lieu des idées' selon Proclus," *Sciences ecclésiastiques* (1966) pp.7-24; p.11: "L'intelligible n'est pas pour l'âme un modèle extrinsèque à copier. L'esprit ne se donne pas à elle dans le déploiement de ses déterminations, mais comme une puissance indivise qui suscite dans son dérivé l'universalité et l'autonomie dont il est la norme. Autrement dit, il y a un point en lequel la spontanéité du principe et celle du procédant coïncident, et ce point simple fournit d'un seul coup au dérivé toute la perfection et toutes les différences qu'il pourra jamais se donner." See also S. Breton, *Philosophie et mathématique chez Proclus, suivi de, Principes philosophiques des mathématiques, par N. Hartmann, traduit de l'allemand par Geneviève de Peslouan* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1969) pp.97-103 for a good discussion of infinite power in Proclus.



grasped by them. There is nothing to prevent them from being completely present to each other, as indeed they are. *Nous* is not outside Soul, or above Soul. It is separate from it only because it differs from it. As Plotinus says, "there is nothing in between but the fact that they are different."<sup>204</sup> Thus in saying that *Nous* is the centre of Soul, and the One is the centre of *Nous*, we are using a spatial metaphor, but one which corrects the impression of externality conveyed by metaphor which says that *Nous* is above Soul, and the One above *Nous*. It is important to correct this metaphor, because otherwise we will have the impression that the Soul has to receive something from outside of itself, from *Nous* which is situated above it, in order to think, or that when the Soul itself becomes active as *nous* it has somehow left itself behind to voyage upwards out of itself. This is not the case. The intelligible is completely present to Soul, as is the One. There is nothing in between except the fact that they are different. So the Soul already possesses the entire intelligible cosmos, grasping it in *dianoia* as a temporal succession of *logoi*.<sup>205</sup>

*Dianoia* is a dividing activity, according to Proclus. This is an unfamiliar characterisation for us, because after Kant we are used to thinking of discursive reason as a synthesis of terms. English speaking philosophy even goes so far as to model discursive reason as a formal system, with the emphasis on formal. The proliferation of formal logic as the preferred model of thinking means that when we think of the operation of reason itself, our attention has been shifted from the content of thought to its formal properties, which is to say, to the sorts of syntheses of terms which can be made without

<sup>204</sup> *Enn.* V.1.3.22: οὐδὲν γὰρ μεταξύ ἢ τὸ ἑτέροισι εἶναι.

<sup>205</sup> J.Trouillard points out that Proclus often uses the prefix "*pro*" (before) rather than "*hyper*" (above) to indicate the superiority of *Nous* and the One. This is to substitute a temporal metaphor for a spatial one. In a sense both of these sorts of metaphor correct each other, because *Nous* is neither literally above, nor before Soul. J.Trouillard, *La mystagogie de Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1982) p.103: "Pourtant le renversement de métaphore que produit le passage de l'ὑπὲρ au πρὸ apporte une leçon qui n'est pas négligeable. Elle exprime l'antériorité plus que la supériorité ou bien elle appuie celle-ci sur celle-là. Le schéma qu'elle évoque n'est plus la progression vers un au-delà inaccessible, mais la régression vers un en-deçà donné. Le premier mouvement était la visée d'une transcendance, le second est la reconnaissance d'une présence trop immanente pour être immédiatement consciente. On ne se tend plus vers ce qui nous dépasse, on se retourne vers ce qui nous prévient et nous investit de telle sorte que, quoi qu'on fasse, l'origine est toujours déjà là et c'est par elle qu'on la recherche. La fin n'est autre que le principe, selon le processus cyclique cher aux néoplatoniciens, qui garantit l'autonomie de l'esprit."

contradiction. Thinking becomes a connecting, but a connecting which is not itself the arbiter of what may or may not be connected, because of itself it yields only the formal rules of its operation. It is for this reason that Kant thought the connecting activity of thinking had to be supplemented by an intuition which would show that the terms in question were *in fact* connected. Any judgements which could not be hung on an intuition in some manner could not be justified. By this manner is ruled out the majority of traditional metaphysics, whose judgements were one and all synthetic *a priori*, most of which Kant did not think could be justified as conditions for the possibility of experience.

Proclus does not think that discursive reason is primarily a synthesis of terms, but rather a dividing of a given unity so that the Soul may see what is implicit in that unity.<sup>206</sup>

The divine and demiurgic *Nous* comprehends (*periechei*) the multiples in a unified manner, that which has parts in a partless manner, and the divided in a manner without division. For Soul is the primary divider (*prôton diairoun*) of that which pre-exists in *Nous* in the height of unity (*ta en ekeinôî prouparchonta kat'akran henôsin*), and not just our soul, but also the Divine Soul. For because She has not received intellections (*noêseis*) which are seated only in Eternity, and because she aims at grasping the concentrated *energeia* of *Nous*, desiring the perfection in it and its one and its simple Form of intellection (*haplou tês noêseôs eidous*), She runs around it and dances around it in a circle. And by means of the transitions in her own attention she divides the partlessness of the Forms, looking at Beauty itself separately (*to autokalon chôris*), looking at Justice itself, and looking at each of the other Forms, intelligising each of them by itself and not all together. For, in short, because Soul holds the third station from the One, it has appropriately such an *energeia*. For the One is only One and is before intellection (*pro noêseôs*); *Nous* intelligises all things as one: Soul sees everthing individually.<sup>207</sup>

<sup>206</sup> J. Trouillard, *La mystagogie de Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1982) p. 144: "Comment les idées forment une réseau ou une totalité, c'est un problème que Platon, qui partait d'intelligibles discontinus, obtenus à des horizons divers de l'expérience et de l'action, a passé sa vie à résoudre. Le néoplatonisme se place inversement au terme de la médiation platonicienne et retourne ce problème de conjonction en problème de disjonction. Il va du tout aux parties et part d'une intuition globale qui révèle peu à peu sa complexité interne. Car toutes les divisions de l'intelligible sont présentes dans la simplicité de l'acte autoconstituant." Cf. *Plat. Theol.* V.41.7ff.

<sup>207</sup> *In Parm.* 807.29-808.19: 'Ο μὲν θεῖος καὶ δημιουργικὸς νοῦς ἡνωμένως τὰ πεπληθυσμένα καὶ ἀμερίστως τὰ μεριστὰ καὶ ἀδιαιρέτως περιέχει τὰ διηρημένα, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον διαιροῦν τὰ ἐν ἐκείνῳ προϋπάρχοντα κατ' ἄκραν ἔνωσιν ψυχὴ ἐστίν, οὐχὶ ἡ μετέρα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ θεία. Διότι γὰρ ἐν αἰῶνι μόνον τὰς νοήσεις ἰδρυμένας οὐκ ἔλαχεν, ἐφίεται δὲ τὴν ἀθρόαν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ νοῦ περιλαβεῖν, ὀρεγομένη τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τελειότητος καὶ τοῦ ἐνός ἐκείνου καὶ ἀπλοῦ τῆς νοήσεως εἶδους περιθεῖ τε αὐτὸν καὶ περιχορεύει κύκλῳ, καὶ ταῖς μεταβάσεσι τῶν ἐπιβολῶν διαίρει τὸ ἀμέριστον τῶν εἰδῶν.

The Soul divides the *eidē* which are present to it as a source, and this dividing activity results in discursive *logoi*.<sup>208</sup> J. Trouillard points out that for Proclus definitions lie at the origin of philosophic demonstrations. One must know what Justice itself is in order to argue about justice, given that just acts have an infinite diversity of contexts. One cannot arrive at the definition of Justice by generalising from particulars, because as we have seen above, this would yield only a shadow of a universal, which would not encompass

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καθορώσα μὲν τὸ αὐτόκαλον χωρὶς, καθορώσα δὲ τὸ αὐτοδίκαιον, καθορώσα δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ καθ' ἓν πάντα καὶ οὐχ' ὁμοῦ πάντα νοοῦσα. Τρίτην γὰρ ἔχουσα τάξιν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνός, ὡς συλλήβδην εἰπεῖν, εἰκότως τοιαύτην ἔχει τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ ἓν μόνον ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸ νοήσεως· ὁ δὲ νοὺς ὡς ἓν πάντα νοεῖ, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ καθ' ἓν πάντα ὁρᾷ.

<sup>208</sup> This disagreement over the nature of thinking is also at the root of the contention of certain contemporary scholars that the thoughts of Plotinus' *Nous* are propositions. R. Sorabji, in *Time, creation and the continuum, theories in antiquity and the early middle ages* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983) pp.137-156 makes a case for this position. His argument is that where there is complexity of thought, there is predication. I do not find this convincing, for the following reasons. First, as I have pointed out above, in the contemporary analytical context out of which Sorabji writes, propositional thought connotes more than complexity. It is usually understood, whether tacitly or explicitly, to involve a synthesis of terms. As I am arguing, in Neoplatonism thinking is not a synthesis, but rather a division of a prior unity. Hence the Kantian demand for a justification of *a priori* synthetic propositions is mistaken. Rather, it is the implicit grasp of the prior unity which allows the division which produces the multiplicity of terms in the first place. Second, the intelligibles at least in *Nous* cannot be propositions because the moment of subjectivity does not emerge until the intellectual moment of *Nous*, and thus there can be no division of subject and predicate. This is clear in Proclus, and I take it to be implicit in Plotinus. Further, for the position that the thought of *Nous* is propositional as a whole, including the intellectual moment, to have any real content it is necessary that there be a real difference between subject and predicate. Thus *Nous* would think a Form by thinking that it is something, and this something must be something else than the original Form if all of *Nous*' thoughts are not to be analytic. But what would *Nous* think the Forms are other than themselves? Why is the conception that all of *Nous*' thoughts are of the form "X is X" more attractive than the conception that *Nous*' thought is a non-propositional resting in itself? If this position is pushed, the only sort of propositions which *Nous* could think would be relational, of the sort "X is not Y," or "X mixed with Y," or "X does not mix with Y." But in this case there is only content for thought in the relations of X to Y, or Z. The thought of X itself is an empty analytic proposition. Or if the analytic proposition "X is X" is not empty, then again, why is this more attractive than the non-propositional thinking which is a grasp of X itself? Finally, a proposition implies logical motion from the subject to the predicate, mediated by being. The mind moves from the concept of the subject, through the concept of being, to the concept of the predicate. The motion in *Nous* seems much more to be a unified splintering of Being itself which produces its own determinations, which then can stand as subjects and predicates for discursive thinking. Propositional thought is not such as to give rise to the original genera of Being, but the thought of *Nous* does in fact do this, according to Plotinus and Proclus. For these reasons I think Sorabji is mistaken in calling the thought of *Nous* in Plotinus propositional. See also J. Bussanich, "Non-discursive thought in Plotinus and Proclus," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale*, 8 (1997) pp.191-210. See also *Enn.* V.3.9.20-23: "And the Soul must string together *logoi* about *Nous*, beginning its investigation from itself. But *Nous* knows itself without stringing together *logoi* about itself (καὶ αὐτὴ μὲν περὶ νοῦ συλλογιζομένη οἷος ἄφ' ἑαυτῆς σκοπούμενη, νοῦς δὲ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν οὐ συλλογιζόμενος περὶ αὐτοῦ)"; and *Enn.* V.8.4.48-50: "But we have not arrived at understanding this [i.e. the wisdom of *Nous*], because we consider that the branches of knowledge are made of up theorems and a collection of premises (ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς εἰς σύνεσιν οὐκ ἤλθομεν. ὅτι καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας θεωρήματα καὶ συμφορήσιν νενομίκαμεν προτάσεων εἶναι)." Notice that Plotinus explicitly uses the logical term *protasis* here, as the premise of a syllogism.

the infinite diversity of just acts. Rather, it is by division of a prior genus, or *eidos*, that one arrives at the definition in question. As Trouillard says, "il ne consiste pas à enrichir un terme de déterminations nouvelles, mais à dérouler l'autodétermination d'un genre à travers ses différences substantielles immanentes."<sup>209</sup> Further, in order for the Soul to deepen its understanding of the *logos* of Justice, it unfolds it with its dividing activity, examining it from all sides and in a variety of contexts, drawing forth its internal connexion with the other *logoi* which Soul projects. This is the deficiency of *dianoia*, that it cannot rest with the *eidos* itself, but must grasp the *eidos* through the divided *logoi* which it projects as an image of the *eidos*. If *dianoia* were happy with the *eidos*, not needing to unfold into *logoi* the *eidos* of Justice, for example, it would have ceased to be *dianoia*, and have passed over into *nous*. It is important to recognise that for Proclus this dividing activity does not impose anything foreign on the *eidos*, but rather follows the internal self-development of the *eidos*. All that is novel is the multiplicity brought about by the dividing, but this multiplicity is thought of by Proclus as the emergence of the hidden content of the *eidos* itself. This is why Soul is an image, both identical and different from *Nous*. The unfolding of beings from the five greatest kinds (being, same, different, rest, motion), the intelligible genera in *Nous*, is the unfolding of the multiplicity of ways in which things can be, be the same, be different, be at rest, and be at motion. All of this diversity is present in a unified and hidden manner in these greatest kinds. The dividing activity of *dianoia* simply draws this content forth.

The crucial point in this account of *dianoia* is that through its *dianoia* Soul makes itself to be a divided image of *Nous*. Soul thinks the same *eidê* that *Nous* does, and for this to be the case, it must be possible for what is in some sense the same thing to exist in a different manner, in different degrees of multiplicity. To adopt an Aristotelian phrase for a decidedly un-Aristotelian conception, Being is said in many ways. Being is the

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<sup>209</sup> J. Trouillard, *L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres) p.49.

unity of the monad of Being. Being is the intelligible genera, Being is the Demiurge, it is the Soul's *ousia*, *dunamis*, and *energeia*, and it is the division of Body. The same thing, namely Being, exists as all of these levels of unity or multiplicity. Likewise with Limit, Unlimited, Same, Other, Rest, Motion, Good, Beauty, etc... They each exist in many ways. They exist in themselves, at whatever station of the hierarchy they first appear, but they also exist as divided images of themselves in their participants. Rest exists in both *Nous* and Soul, but it differs, and is the same. It is this idea of the hierarchy of the same things taken over and over again on ever more multiple levels that Proclus tries to convey with his conception of the series which depend from the henads. The series which begin with the henads have as their members the primary determinations of Being, as well as all of the subsequent determinations. Any determination you settle upon can be traced back to its proper henad, and on the way passes through a multitude of paradigms and images, all of which are the 'same' reality as it exists on different levels.

So the *monê*, *proodos*, and *epistrophê* of the Soul is not a motion by which the Soul exits *Nous* and then in its thinking is subsumed back into *Nous*. The Soul proceeds from *Nous*, and in its return it constitutes itself as a divided image of *Nous*. It thinks the same things as *Nous*, but in its own manner. If this were not the case, Soul would not be a hypostasis in its own right, able to produce its own effect, and the cosmogonic function of *monê*, *proodos*, and *epistrophê* would disappear. Thus the Soul as a dianoetic being is incapable of a full return upon *Nous*. However, we cannot say that the Soul as a whole is incapable of a full return upon *Nous*, because the Soul is not only *dianoia*; it is also *nous*. *Nous* is completely present to the Soul as its centre, as we have said above. So when the Soul puts off its dividing activity, and is content only with the unity of its centre, then the Soul has passed from *dianoia* to *nous*.<sup>210</sup>

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<sup>210</sup> We will discuss this possibility in chapter VII.

That the Soul both can and cannot attain unity with *Nous* is not a flaw in Proclus' system, or a bad ambiguity, but a consequence of the complexity of Soul, and also of the partial nature of any description of this complex being. The only way to capture the reality which is Soul is through complementary descriptions. One of Proclus' favourite ways of doing this is through the metaphor of the circle, in which *Nous* is thought of as a point, and the Soul as the circumference of a circle. This metaphor can be used in three complementary ways to describe the various aspects of the Soul, resulting from the various philosophical tasks which the motion of *monê*, *proodos*, and *epistrophê* performs.

(A.) First, *monê*, *proodos*, and *epistrophê* is the motion by which the partial soul is rescued from its *heterokinêsis*, through its return upon itself and *Nous*. In this use, *Nous* is a point from which the Soul as the circumference of a circle takes its origin, and to which it returns, completing the circle. That the circumference joins again its point of origin is a metaphor both for *dianoia*'s possession of the *eidê*, albeit in a secondary manner, and for the partial soul's ability to leave *dianoia* behind in favour of its own *nous*.

(B.) Second, *monê*, *proodos*, and *epistrophê* is the motion by which the universe comes into existence. Each order remains, proceeds, and returns, and in the completion of its return serves as a cause of the subsequent order. Here *Nous* is a point from which the Soul as circumference proceeds, but the circumference does not circle around to join the original point. Instead, it makes a spiral around to a position aligned with the original point, and from there a new procession begins. The spiral represents the fact that the return is not a subsumption back into *Nous*.

(C.) Finally, *monê*, *proodos*, and *epistrophê* illustrates *dianoia*'s activity as a divided image of *Nous*. Here *Nous* is a point at the centre of a circle, and the circumference is the Soul, which in its activity moves from point to point around the centre, viewing it from all sides. The circumference has a necessary relation to the centre, because it is in virtue of the centre that it has come into being, but it never coincides with the centre. This is a metaphor of the status of the soul's

*logoi* as images of the *eidē* in *Nous*.<sup>211</sup> All three of these metaphors describe the reality which is Soul, and must be understood as complementary, not contradictory.

The idea that the Soul is divided image of *Nous* depends on the wider conception of the universe as a hierarchy of paradigm and image.<sup>212</sup> This, in turn, depends on an understanding of a paradigm as a fertile unity, able to give rise to images of itself which themselves are fertile in a lesser manner.<sup>213</sup> Proclus assimilates to this notion the relation of genus and species; the difference between genera and their species is the difference between different levels of Forms, related as paradigm and image. In commenting on *Timaeus* 35a,<sup>214</sup> Proclus says:

[Plato's phrase] "species of being"<sup>215</sup> [i.e. the species of being composed out of unchanging and undivisible being and the divided being which becomes in bodies] shows us sufficiently the comprehension (*periochē*) of the effects in their causes. For if the being in the demiurge is a genus, while that in the Soul is a species (*eidos*) the one is comprehensive (*periektikē*) of the other (it is clear which is comprehensive of which), and it should be called a genus because it transcends and produces the other. In virtue of its transcendence it differs from the genera which are ranged in order in the species, and because it produces the other it stands above [the genera] which are later-born, for they are not generative of species. So one must take these genera and species<sup>216</sup> in a different sense: as fertile (*gonima*), filled with power (*dunameōs plērē*), comprehensive of particular

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<sup>211</sup> See *In Eucl.* 148.5-150.12 for the first and third circle metaphors. Proclus does not use the spiral metaphor explicitly for this, but we can arrive at it if we combine the first and third circle metaphors. In later thinkers the spiral is thought of as a metaphor for reversion, being a combination of the circle, thought of as remaining, and the straight line, thought of as procession. See S. Gersh, *From Iamblichus to Eriugena* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978) pp.72-76. See also A. Charles-Saget, *L'architecture du divin, mathématique et philosophie chez Plotin et Proclus* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1982) pp.281-284.

<sup>212</sup> *El.Th.* prop.195: "Every Soul is all things, the sensibles in the manner of a paradigm, the intelligibles in the manner of an image (Πᾶσα ψυχὴ πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα, παραδειγματικῶς μὲν τὰ αἰσθητά, εἰκονικῶς δὲ τὰ νοητά)."

<sup>213</sup> See J. Trouillard, "L'intelligibilité Proclusienne", *La Philosophie et ses Problèmes* (Paris, Emmanuel Vitte, 1960) pp.83-97.

<sup>214</sup> *Tim.* 35a: "Between the indivisible Being that is ever in the same and the divisible Being that becomes in bodies he compounded a third Form of Being (*ousias eidos*) out of both (Τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ αἰεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὐτὴ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος)."

<sup>215</sup> "*ousias eidos*": I translate *eidos* by "species" in this passage in order to bring out the contrast with the term genus.

<sup>216</sup> Festugière understands genera here to be Being, Same and Other, and the species to be Indivisible, Divisible and the μέσον in each of the genera. This seems to be correct, and shows that Proclus thinks of both genera and species in the Demiurge as well as in Soul. For our purposes the terms used by Proclus are not crucial. Rather, it is the relation between the lower and higher which is of interest.

species, and as possessing a transcendent nature. Indeed the being in the demiurge is a genus, of which Indivisible being is a species, and the being which is in the middle between the Indivisible and that which is divided among bodies is a second species. Third is the being which is divided among body (*hê peri to sôma meristê*), and the being which is the Form of body (*sômatoeidês*) is the last.<sup>217</sup> Among these species there is priority and posteriority, because the genera are productive of the species, and bring into existence first, middle and final species. And all intellectual [being] is indivisible, in that it is one; that which is divided among bodies is multiplied through its division among body; and that which is in between these is one and not one.<sup>218</sup>

The relation between genus and species here is the relation between various levels of Forms. The being which is in the demiurge is a genus with regard to four types of being: indivisible being, the being which is in the middle between the indivisible and that which is divided among body, that which is divided among body, and that which is the Form of body. We might add that above the being which is in the demiurge is the being which is in the *autozôion*, one of the "greatest kinds" (*megista genê*) of the *Sophist*, and above that is the monad of Being, the first moment of the first intelligible triad. The relation between all of these sorts of being is that they are all species of the one highest genus of being, the monad of Being.<sup>219</sup> However, there is priority and posteriority among them. The genus itself is productive of all of the species, because the power of a cause extends further than that of its effect. But each member of this series is also productive of its subsequent, so that the entire series of Forms of being is a causal chain, in which the

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<sup>217</sup> The 2nd level is soul, and the level of body seems to be divided into the Forms in body taken as singular and divided out to many bodies, and as the single Form inhering in a particular body.

<sup>218</sup> *In Tim.* II.151.13-152.2: τὸ γε μὴν τῆς οὐσίας εἶδος ἱκανῶς ἡμῖν ἐπιδείκνυται τὴν ἐν τοῖς αἰτίοις περιοχὴν τῶν αἰτιατῶν· εἰ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἐν τῷ δημιουργῷ οὐσία γένος ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ εἶδος, περιεκτικὴ τῆς ἐτέρας ἐστίν ἡ ἐτέρα (δηλον δέ, ποτέρα ποτέρας), γένος δὲ καλοῖτο ἂν ἐξηρημένη τε αὐτῆς καὶ γεννώσα αὐτὴν καὶ τῷ μὲν ἐξηρηθῆαι διαφέρουσα τῶν ἐν τοῖς εἶδεσι γενῶν τῶν κατατεταγμένων, τῷ δὲ γεννᾶν αὐτὴν ὑπερέχουσα τῶν ὑστερογενῶν· ἄγονα γὰρ ἐκεῖνα τῶν εἰδῶν, ἄλλον ἄρα τρόπον τὰ γένη ταῦτα καὶ τὰ εἶδη ληπτέα, γόνιμα, δυνάμει πλήρη, περιεκτικὰ τῶν εἰδῶν τῶν ἀτόμων, ἐξηρημένην ἔχοντα φύσιν, ἐστὶν οὖν γένος μὲν ἡ ἐν τῷ δημιουργῷ οὐσία, ταύτης δὲ εἶδος ἡ ἀμέριστος οὐσία, καὶ δευτέρον εἶδος ἡ μέση οὐσία τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστῆς, καὶ τρίτον ἡ περὶ τὸ σῶμα μεριστῆ, καὶ ἔσχατον ἡ σωματοειδής· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς εἶδεσι τούτοις τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερόν ἐστι, διότι τὰ γένη ποιητικὰ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστὶ καὶ ὑποστατικὰ πρῶτων καὶ μέσων καὶ τελευταίων εἰδῶν, καὶ ἡ μὲν νοερά πᾶσα ἀμέριστος, ὡς μία, ἡ δὲ μεριστὴ περὶ τοῖς σώμασι πεπληθυσμένη διὰ τὸν περὶ τοῖς σώμασι μερισμόν, ἡ δὲ μέση τούτων μία καὶ οὐ μία·

<sup>219</sup> This monad is itself caused, and an image of a henad. But the henad is beyond being.



higher members are fertile (*gonima*), and comprehensive (*periektikê*) of the lower members.

As we have already seen, the genus in Proclus' system is not comprehensive of the species which fall under it as an abstraction or as a sort of sum.<sup>220</sup> If the genus were an abstraction, it would be lesser than the species, and unable to produce the species. If the genus were a sum of all the characteristics exhibited by the species, it would not be a cause in any way, but rather a set whose members are uncaused. Rather than a sum or an abstraction, Proclus thinks that the genera are unified sources, "fertile, filled with power, comprehensive of particular species, and...possessing a transcendent nature." They are causes of their species, and in the species aspects of the reality which the genus is emerge, aspects which are not distinguished in the genus. The fertility of the genus is productive of its species as images of themselves, refractions into ever increasingly multiple versions of itself. Proclus illustrates this idea with regard to figure (*schêma*) in the Euclid commentary:

There are figures produced by art (for example, by modeling or sculpturing) in accordance with the *logos* preexisting in the art: the art projects the Form, while the matter receives its shape, beauty and shapeliness. More august and imposing figures than these are the works of Nature's craftsmanship, some of them containing the constitutive *logoi* in the sublunary elements, others in the heavens defining the powers and motions of the heavenly bodies. For the heavenly bodies, both in themselves and in their relations to one another, present a great and marvellous variety of figures, exhibiting now one and now another of the shapes that bear the likeness of the intellectual (*noera*) Forms: and they copy in their rhythmic choruses the bodiless and immaterial powers of the figures. Beyond these are the figures of souls, the purest and most perfect in beauty, full of life, by their self-motion preeminent over things that are moved by external causes, and by their immateriality and lack of extendedness superior to extended and embodied things. About them the *Timaeus* has instructed us by unfolding the demiurgic and essential (*ousiôdes*) nature of the figure that belongs to souls. And indeed, much more divine than the figures of souls are the intellectual (*noera*) figures: they are in every way superior to divided beings (*ousiai*), shining

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<sup>220</sup> J. Trouillard, "L'intelligibilité Proclusienne," p.85 and *L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1972) p.46. See also J. Trouillard, *La mystagogie de Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1982) p.211: "Le genre ici est l'être démiurgique, parce qu'il est à la fois l'exemplaire, la norme et le producteur."

everywhere with indivisible and intellectual light, generating, effecting, perfecting all things, being present equally in all of them though themselves steadfast and unmoved, bringing unity to the figures of souls and keeping the aberrations of sensible figures within appropriate bounds. And high above all these are the perfect, uniform (*henoeidē*), unknowable, and ineffable figures of the gods<sup>221</sup> which, being mounted on the intellectual figures, impose limits upon the whole universe of figures and hold everything together in their unifying boundaries.<sup>222</sup>

Figure exists at all of these levels, from the henads to body, and in all of its various instantiations it is still figure, because all of its instantiations are caused by and are images of the highest figure. The distinction between them is greater or lesser perfection, which in Proclus' system means greater or lesser unity or multiplicity: the figures of the henads are completely unified; those in *Nous* include the idea of progression into multiplicity: figures in the soul are actually distinct from each other: the figures of the heavenly bodies are in something other than themselves and are divisible: while figures in matter lack the perfection of the absolute straightness of lines, or partlessness of points.

Figure, then, begins above with the gods themselves and extends down to the lowest orders of beings, exhibiting even in them its derivation from the first of causes. For the perfect figures are necessarily prior to the imperfect, those grounded in themselves prior to those that exist in other beings, and those that preserve their nature undefiled to those that are stuffed with their own privations. Material figures partake of the unshapeliness of matter and lack the purity that they should have: the figures in the heavens are divisible and have their existence in other things; the figures of souls admit of differentiation and variety and

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<sup>221</sup> The henads. See *In Eucl.* 142.5.

<sup>222</sup> *In Eucl.* 137.3-138.10: ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τέχνης οἷον πλαστικῆς ἡ ἀνδριαντοποιητικῆς ἀπογεννώμενον κατὰ τὸν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ προυπάρχοντα λόγον, τῆς μὲν τέχνης προβαλλούσης τὸ εἶδος, τῆς δὲ ὕλης δεχομένης τὴν μορφήν καὶ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὴν εὐσχημοσύνην ἐκείθεν. ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἔτι σεμνότερα καὶ διαπρεπέστερα σχήματα, φύσεως δημιουργήματα, τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ σελήνῃ στοιχείοις συνεκτικὰ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς λόγων, τὰ δὲ κατ' οὐρανὸν τὰς τε δυνάμεις αὐτῶν ἀφορίζοντα καὶ τὰς κινήσεις, καὶ γὰρ καθ' ἑαυτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλα τὰ οὐράνια σώματα πολλὴν καὶ θαυμαστὴν προτείνει σχημάτων ποικιλίαν καὶ ἀλλοτε ἄλλας δεικνύσι μορφὰς εἰκόνα φερούσας τῶν νοερῶν εἰδῶν, καὶ ταῖς εὐρύθμοις ἑαυτὸν χορεῖαις ἀπογράφεται τὰς ἀσωμάτων καὶ αὐλῶν τῶν σχημάτων δυνάμεις, ἔστι δ' αὖ καὶ τούτων ἐπέκεινα κάλλει καθαρῶτα καὶ τελειότατα τὰ σχήματα τῶν ψυχῶν ζωῆς ὄντα μεστὰ καὶ αὐτοκίνητα προϋφαστά τῶν ἑτεροκινήτων καὶ αὐλῶν καὶ ἀδιαστάτως ὄντα πρὸ τῶν διαστατῶν καὶ ἐνύλων, περὶ ὧν καὶ ὁ Τιμαίος ἡμᾶς ἀνεδίδαξε τὸ δημιουργικόν καὶ οὐσιώδες σχῆμα τῶν ψυχῶν ἀναπλώσας, ἔστι γε μὴν καὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν σχημάτων τὰ νοερά πολὺ θεϊότερα πάντα μὲν ὑπερ-έχοντα τῶν μεριστῶν οὐσιῶν, πάντα δὲ διαλάμποντα τῷ ἀμερίστῳ καὶ νοερῷ φωτί, γόνιμα δὲ καὶ δραστήρια καὶ τελεσιουργὰ τῶν ὅλων καὶ πᾶσιν ἐξ ἴσου παρόντα καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς μονίμως ἐστώτα καὶ τοῖς μὲν ψυχικοῖς σχήμασι τὴν ἑνῶσιν ἐπάγοντα, τῶν δὲ αἰσθητῶν τὴν παράλλαξιν εἰς τὸν οἰκεῖον ὅρον ἀνακαλούμενα, ἔστιν δ' ἄρα καὶ τούτων ἀπάντων ἐξηρημένα τὰ τέλεια καὶ ἐνοειδῆ καὶ ἄγνωστα καὶ ἄφραστα σχήματα τῶν θεῶν, ἐποχούμενα μὲν τοῖς νοεροῖς σχήμασι, περατοῦντα δὲ ἡνωμένως τὰ ὅλα σχήματα, συνέχοντα δὲ τὰ πάντα τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ἐνιαίοις ὅροις.

unfoldings of every kind; the intellectual figures, together with unity, contain procession (*proodon*) to plurality; and at the head of them all stand the very figures of the gods, independent, uniform, simple, generative, having all perfection in themselves and from themselves offering to all things the perfecting agency of the forms.<sup>223</sup>

The production of subsequent levels is thought of as a declension into ever greater multiplicity, which means lesser and lesser perfection and fertility. The figures of the gods are generative because they have "all perfection in themselves." This is a way of speaking of the unity of the henads. What it means is that the henads contain already all of the perfections which emerge in the beings which stand below them in their series. All of these various perfections are in the henads in a unified, hidden, or secret manner, contained in the way that the effect exists in the cause. The effect exists in the cause in a hidden manner, according to Proclus, otherwise a given cause would not be such as to give rise to a given effect.<sup>224</sup> From this perspective, all of the orders which come to be from the henads are deficient manners of the existence of those henads. They are particularisations, or limitations, of the unitary fertility of the henads. Any given level of the universe in Proclus' system is comprehensive of the lower levels because, being more perfect than they are, it is ontologically richer than its subsequent manifestations.

As we have seen in chapter II, this is a reversal of the Aristotelian conception of genus and species,<sup>225</sup> in which the higher level is arrived at by a process of stripping away

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<sup>223</sup> In *Eucl.* 138.22-139.12: ἄνωθεν ἅρα τὸ σχῆμα ἀρχόμενον ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν θεῶν διατείνει μέχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων καὶ τούτοις ἐμοανταζόμενον ἀπὸ τῶν πρωτίστων αἰτίων. δεῖ γὰρ πρὸ τῶν ἀτελῶν ὑφεστάναι τὰ τέλεια καὶ τῶν ἐν ἄλλοις ὄντων τὰ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ἰδρυμένα καὶ τῶν ἀναπεπλησμένων τῆς ἑαυτῶν στερήσεως τὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν εἰλικρινῆ διασώζοντα. Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐνυλὰ σχήματα μετέχει τῆς ὑλικῆς ἀσχημοσύνης καὶ οὐκ ἔχει τὴν προσήκουσαν αὐτοῖς καθαρότητα, τὰ δὲ οὐράνια μεριστά ἐστι καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ὑφέστηκε, τὰ δὲ ψυχικὰ διαιρέσεως καὶ ποικιλίας μετέειληθεν καὶ ἀνελίξεως παντοίας, τὰ δὲ νοερά μετὰ τῆς ἐνώσεως ἔχει τὴν εἰς πλῆθος πρόοδον, αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ τῶν θεῶν καὶ ἀπόλυτα καὶ ἐνοειδῆ καὶ ἀπλά καὶ γεννητικὰ πρὸ τῶν ὅλων ὑφέστηκεν, ἐν ἑαυτοῖς πᾶσαν ἔχοντα τὴν τελειότητα καὶ ὡς ἑαυτῶν τοῖς πᾶσι προτείνοντα τὴν τελεσιουργίαν τῶν εἰδῶν.

<sup>224</sup> *El. Th. prop.* 18.

<sup>225</sup> See J. Trouillard, *L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1972) p.45. See also the earlier version of this chapter of *L'Un et l'âme*: "L'âme 'lieu des idées' selon Proclus," *Sciences ecclésiastiques* (1966) pp.7-24; p.16: "La logique néoplatonicienne est ici inverse de celle d'Aristote. La compréhension croît avec l'extension. L'universel ne reçoit pas ses différences du dehors, mais se les donne du dedans. Le genre contient ses espèces et celles-ci les individus. L'art de diviser a pour tâche de suivre cette causalité immanente des idées, cette particularisation progressive des formes. S'il est vrai que les particuliers sont indéterminés dans les universels, ce n'est pas comme dans la puissance passive d'une matière, mais comme dans la puissance active d'un générateur. La compréhension n'est pas une

part of the content of the lower level.<sup>226</sup> On the contrary, in Proclus, the richness of the higher is not attained by the lower level. Take as an example the Form of animal in which all the species of animals and all particular animals participate. An Aristotelian way of thinking about the relation between these levels would be to say that the movement from the diversity of species to the genus animal would require the omission, for example, of the number of legs possessed by any given species, because some species are quadrupeds and some are bipeds. A Procline understanding of the genus, on the contrary, would say that both quadrupedality and bipedality must preexist in the genus in a unified manner, because although the genus has no legs it is the foundation and producer of both quadrupedality and bipedality. In comparison with the genus, the species are less rich. Each species can participate only in one of the aspects of the power of the genus, either quadrupedality or bipedality, and a particular animal participating in its species is either a quadruped or a biped. Because the genus has not descended to that level of specificity, however, it has the fertility of both. Another example would be the

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capitalisation de déterminations, mais un ordre d'efficacité, un univers de constitution. Proclus se plaît à redire que tout *genre* véritable est *générateur*." See also "L'intelligibilité Proclusienne," in *La philosophie et ses problèmes, recueil d'études de doctrine et d'histoire offert à Monseigneur R. Jolivet* (Paris: Emmanuel Vitte, 1960) pp.83-97; see p.85: "Le genre, chez Proclus, comme chez Plotin, est beaucoup plus qu'une notion logique obtenue par une abstraction, même fondée (ὁστερογενής). Ce n'est pas un cadre, destiné à recevoir des enrichissements et précisions du dehors. Mais ce n'est pas davantage un principe dont on tirerait par déduction des spécifications subordonnées comme des conséquences. Les particuliers ne sont pas des notions formelles incluses dans les universaux. Ceux-ci ne sont même pas reliés à ceux-là par une exigence logique formulable.... Si le genre est un tout, ce n'est ni comme une somme ni comme un organisme tout immergé en ses composants, mais comme un structure qui détermine *a priori* ses expressions, à l'image de son ordre entier. Si le genre fructifie, il le fait en ramenant à soi ses rejetons, en leur infusant une exigence d'assimilation à leur origine. De telle sorte les particuliers deviennent des parties totales, des monades qu'un simple déroulement logique n'expliquera jamais."

<sup>226</sup> A related difference between Proclus and Aristotle is explained well by C. Steel, "Proclus et Aristote sur la causalité efficiente de l'intellect divin," in *Proclus lecteur et interprète des anciens. Actes du Colloque internationale du C.N.R.S., Paris 2-4 oct. 1985*, ed. J. Pépin et H.-D. Saffrey (Paris: C.N.R.S., 1987) pp.213-225. Proclus criticises Aristotle for making the Unmoved Mover only the final cause of the motion of the physical world, and not also the efficient and exemplary cause of its existence. Just as the genus must be the foundation of the species by having within it a richness which is manifested by the species, Proclus thinks that the cause of the existence of the physical cosmos must be an efficient cause by containing Forms which are manifested in a lower manner by the *logoi* in bodies. So for Aristotle's Unmoved Mover as final cause, Proclus substitutes the Demiurgic *Nous* as efficient cause and the Intelligible Model as exemplary cause; and he points out that the One/Good is the true final cause, but that, *contra* Aristotle, it is above thinking.

variation of characteristics among animals of the same species. A particular person may have two blue eyes or two brown eyes, but not two blue eyes and two brown eyes. But both of these contrary characteristics exist in the species Man, as the power to produce particular men with either blue or brown eyes. The genus does not possess all that it causes in a distinct manner, as if it exhibited all of the contrary characteristics at once. It possesses them in the manner in which the Form of motion contains the ideas of locomotion and alteration, because these are two ways of determining the reality which is motion.<sup>227</sup>

Proclus gives another good example of this hierarchy of paradigm and image in the Euclid commentary, in a passage about the circle, the "first and simplest and most perfect"<sup>228</sup> of figures.

From what has been said it is clear that the circle everywhere has primacy over the other figures. But we must also contemplate the entire series to which the circle gives rise. Beginning above and ending in the lowest depth of things, it perfects all of them according to their suitability for participation in what they receive from it. On the gods it confers reversion towards and unification with their own causes, remaining in themselves and not departing from their own blessedness. The highest unities among them it sets up as centres, as the aiming-points for the secondary divinities, fixing the plurality of powers in the secondary divinities firmly about these centres and holding them together by the simplicity of these centres. To intellectual beings the circle gives everlasting activity in relation to themselves, granting them to be filled from themselves with knowledge, to grasp together the intelligibles in themselves and to bring to perfection their intellections from out of themselves. For all *Nous* tends to itself its intelligible object, and this object is as a centre to *Nous*: *Nous* holds together around it.

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<sup>227</sup> See J. Trouillard, *L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1972) pp.150-151: "La complication des puissances est donc une loi qui régit et la manence du dérivé dans son principe et la conversion qui la rejoint. Le procédant compense ainsi dans une certaine mesure l'écart de sa procession. Il fait proliférer ses puissances et les diversifie, parce qu'étant plus faible que son principe il ne peut assimiler d'un seul coup la plénitude de sa communication ni participer d'une seule façon à sa propre genèse. Cette complication ne fera que croître au fur et à mesure que nous descendrons les degrés de la procession, c'est-à-dire des négations, jusqu'à l'âme." See also S. Breton, *Philosophie et mathématique chez Proclus, suivi de, Principes philosophiques des mathématiques, par N. Hartmann, traduit de l'allemand par Geneviève de Peslouan* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1969) p.98. Breton points us to *El.Th.prop.93*, which states that all that which is unlimited (*ἄπειρον*) in beings is so neither to itself, nor to its superiors. The unlimited is so only to inferior orders, because their infinity consists in not being able to be circumscribed by the inferior order.

<sup>228</sup> *In Eucl.* I.46.24-25: "The first and simplest and most perfect of figures is the circle (*Τὸ πρῶτιστον καὶ ἀπλούστατον τῶν σχημάτων καὶ τελειότατον ὁ κύκλος ἐστίν.*)"

desires it, and is unified towards it from all sides through the entirety of its intellectual powers. The Living Being<sup>229</sup> illuminates Souls, conferring upon them their self-motion, that is, their reversion towards *Nous* and their circling dance about it, and their re-establishment through their own periods which unfold the partlessness of *Nous*. Here again the intellectual orders, like centres, will have preeminence over souls, while the souls have a circular activity about them. For every soul, through its own intellectual part, is centred about the Highest, the One itself, but because of its multiplicity it travels around its own *Nous* in a circle, desiring to embrace it and fold itself around it. On the heavenly bodies the circle confers their likeness to *Nous*, i.e. their homogeneity and uniformity, their function of enclosing the universe within limits, their fixed and measured revolutions, their eternal existence without beginning or end, and all such things. The sublunary elements owe to the circle the periodicity in their changes (*tên periodon tēn en tais metabolais*), which is an image of the heavenly cycle, the presence of the ungenerated among things generated, of the stationary amidst changing things, and of the bounded amongst divisibles. All things exist eternally through the cycle of generation, and the equilibrium among them all is maintained by its balancing destruction; for if generation were not recurrent, the order of things and the whole cosmic scheme would soon have been dissolved. Animals and plants owe to the circle the likeness between parents and offspring. For animals and plants are born from seed and produce seed in their turn: generation becomes reciprocal, with a recurring cycle of growth from the immature to the fully grown and back again, so that decay accompanies generation. On things that we call 'contrary to nature' the circle imposes order by limiting their boundlessness and regulating even them rightly by using the last traces of the powers resident in it. Hence such unnatural events recur at bounded intervals, and times of dearth as well as of fruitfulness are based on the revolutions of the circles, as the myth of the Muses has it. All evils may have been banished from the divine to this mortal region, yet even they are in revolution, as Socrates says,<sup>230</sup> and have a share of the circular period and ordering. Hence nothing is unmixedly evil and abandoned by the gods; rather the providence that perfects all things brings even the boundless variety of evils around to the limit and ordering appropriate to them.<sup>231</sup>

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<sup>229</sup> Proclus seems to be referring to a circle below the highest, if it is the case that by the gods he means the henads. The *autozōion* is the model towards which the demiurge looks. It is the third intelligible triad of *Nous*, and contains the intelligible genera, one of which is presumably the circle.

<sup>230</sup> *Theaet.* 176a.

<sup>231</sup> *In Eucl.* 148.5-150.12: 'Ἄλλ' ὅτι μὲν πανταχοῦ τὸ πρωτεῖον ὁ κύκλος ἔλαχεν ὡς πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα σχήματα, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὴν πᾶσαν αὐτοῦ σειρὰν θεωρεῖν ἄνωθεν ἀρχομένην καὶ τελευτῶσαν ἄχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων καὶ πάντα τελειοῦσαν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα τῶν δεχομένων αὐτοῦ τὴν μετουσίαν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν θεοῖς ἐπιστροφὴν καὶ ἔνωσιν παρέχεται πρὸς τὰς ἑαυτῶν αἰτίας καὶ τὸ μένειν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ μὴ ἐξίστασθαι τῆς οἰκείας μακαριότητος, τὰς μὲν ἄκρας αὐτῶν ἐνώσεις ὡς κέντρα προστησάμενος ἕορτὰ τοῖς δευτέροις, τὰ δὲ πλήθη τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς δυνάμεων περὶ ἐκεῖνα σταθερῶς ἰδρύων καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων ἀπλότητα συνεχῶν, ταῖς δὲ νοεραῖς οὐσίαις τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὰς ἐνεργεῖν διαιωνίως, παρέχων καὶ παρ' ἑαυτῶν πληροῦσθαι τῆς γνώσεως ἐν ἑαυταῖς τε συνηρηκέναι τὰ νοητὰ καὶ ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν τὰς νοήσεις τελειοῦν, πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς καὶ τὸ νοητὸν ἑαυτῷ προτείνει, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ὡς κέντρον ἐστὶν τῷ νῷ, ὃ δὲ νοῦς συνέχει περὶ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐρᾷ καὶ ἐνίζεται πρὸς αὐτὸ ταῖς νοεραῖς ὕλαις πανταχοῦθεν ἐνεργείαις, ταῖς δὲ ψυχαῖς ἐπιλάμπει τὸ αὐτόζων, τὸ αὐτοκίνητον, τὸ πρὸς νοῦν ἐστράφθαι καὶ περιχορεύειν τὸν νοῦν, τὸ ἀποκαθίστασθαι κατὰ τὰς

This passage shows clearly that Proclus considers the universe to be an ordered hierarchy, in which the determinations which begin with the henads govern a procession into multiplicity, such that the same things exist at each level, because each level is an image of the higher.<sup>232</sup> The circle confers its power to all of reality by making that which falls under it 'circular' in some manner. For the gods the circle is the source of identity with self, while for *Nous* the circle confers self-identity through self-embrace in the cycle of procession and return. The circularity of the soul is its periodic revolution around its

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οἰκείας περιόδους ἀνελιττούσας τοῦ νοῦ τὴν ἀμέρειαν. πάλιν γὰρ αἱ μὲν νοεραὶ τάξεις ὥσπερ τὰ κέντρα τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἔξουσιν πρὸς τὰς ψυχάς, αἱ δὲ ψυχαὶ περὶ αὐτάς κατὰ κύκλον ἐνεργήσουσι, καὶ γὰρ πᾶσα ψυχὴ κατὰ μὲν τὸ νοερὸν ἑαυτῆς καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀκρότατον κεκέντρωται, κατὰ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος κυκλικῶς περιπορεύεται, περιπλύσσασθαι ποθοῦσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς νοῦν, -τοῖς δὲ οὐρανίοις σώμασιν τὴν πρὸς τὸν νοῦν ἀφομοίωσιν, τὴν ὁμοιότητα, τὴν ὁμαλότητα, τὴν ἐν πέρασι τῶν ὅλων περιοχὴν, τὰς ἐν μέτροις ὀρισμένοις ἀνακυκλήσεις, τὴν αἰδίων ὑπόστασιν, τὸ ἀναρχον καὶ ἀτελεύτητον, ἅπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, -τοῖς δὲ ὑπὸ σελήνην στοιχείοις τὴν περίοδον τὴν ἐν ταῖς μεταβολαῖς, τὴν πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀπεικασίαν, τὸ ἐν τοῖς γενητοῖς ἀγένητον καὶ ἐν τοῖς κινουμένοις ἐστῶς καὶ ἐν τοῖς μεριστοῖς ὀρισμένον· πάντα γὰρ αἰεὶ ἔστι διὰ τὸν κύκλον τῆς γενέσεως· καὶ τὸ ἰσοκρατὲς ἐν πᾶσι διὰ τὴν ἀνταπόδυσιν τῆς θορᾶς, εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀνέκαμψεν ἡ γένεσις, ταχὺ ἂν ἡ τάξις αὐτῶν διελύθη καὶ ἡ σύμπασα διακύσμησις, -τοῖς δ' αὖ ζώοις καὶ οὐτοῖς τὴν ἐν ταῖς ἀπογεννήσεσιν ὁμοιότητα ἐνδίδωσιν, ἐκ τε γὰρ τῶν σπερμάτων ταῦτα γίνονται καὶ σπέρματα ἐκ τούτων, γένεσις τε ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἀποτελεῖται καὶ ἀνακύκλησις ἀπὸ τε τοῦ ἀτελοῦς ἐπὶ τὸ τέλειον καὶ ἔμπαλιν, ἵνα καὶ θήσις ἢ μετὰ τῆς γενέσεως, -τοῖς δὲ γε παρὰ φύσιν λεγομένοις τάξιν ἐπιτίθῃσιν καὶ τὴν ἀοριστίαν αὐτῶν εἰς ὅρον περιάγῃ καὶ διακοσμεῖ, καὶ ταῦτα δεόντως τοῖς τελευταίοις ἵχνεσι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεων· διὸ καὶ κατὰ ἀριθμοὺς ὀρισμένους ἀνακυκλεῖται καὶ οὐ φορεῖ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀφορεῖ κατὰ τὰς περιτροπὰς ὑφίστανται τῶν κύκλων, ὥς ὁ τῶν μουσῶν λόγος, καὶ πάντα τὰ κακὰ εἰ καὶ ἀπέρριπται τῶν θεῶν εἰς τὸν θνητῶν τόπον, ἀλλὰ περιπολεῖ καὶ ταῦτα, φησὶν ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ μέτεστι καὶ τούτοις τῆς κυκλικῆς περιόδου καὶ τάξεως, ἵνα μηδὲν ἄκρατον ἢ κακόν, μηδὲ ἔρημον τῶν θεῶν, ἀλλ' ἡ τελεσιουργὸς πρόνοια τῶν ὅλων καὶ τὴν ἀτέραντον τῶν κακῶν ποικιλίαν εἰς ὅρον περιάγῃ καὶ τάξιν τὴν αὐτοῖς πρέπουσαν.

<sup>232</sup> Each principle exercises two types of causation. *Nous* as a whole is the cause of the particular *noes* by declension (καθ' ὑπόβασιν), and of souls by procession (κατὰ πρόοδον) [see *In Parm.* 746]. Likewise Soul as a whole gives rise to souls by declension, and to body by procession. It is causation by procession which is the unfolding of a principle into a divided image of itself. Causation by declension does not produce a divided image of the cause, but rather a weaker instance of the cause. So *Nous* as a whole gives rise to its own coordinate series of *noes*, and this whole order is the paradigm of the whole Soul order. See J. Trouillard, "Âme et esprit selon Proclus," *Revue des études Augustiniennes*, 5 (1959) pp. 1-12; see pp. 8-9. Cf. Jean Trouillard, "La monadologie de Proclus," *La revue philosophique de Louvain*, 57 (1959) pp. 309-320; see p. 312: "Nous obtenons dès lors un univers qui réalise les deux sens de συνεχές: «contenu» et «concentré», et qui ressemble à l'un autant qu'il est possible: συγγενὲς γὰρ τῷ ἐνὶ τὸ συνεχές [*In Remp.* 1.288]. En somme, une chaîne continue de tous qui se déroulent en se particularisant (un, être, vie, esprit, âme...), qui se retrouvent à l'intérieur de chaque série, elle-même répliquée en n'importe lequel de ses points. Une universalité proportionnelle à l'intériorisation. Le jeu des correspondances partout complet et partout récapitulé, distinguant chaque être, le rendant solidaire de tous et le rapportant aux principes. Telle est la loi de l'univers de Proclus, en lequel toute valeur s'exprime selon une infinité de relations pour la plus ample des hénophanies... Une précision importante est requise ici. Plus un principe est parfait dans la hiérarchie proclienne, moins il contient ses dérivés de façon distincte et déterminée en les enveloppant κατ' αἰτίαν ou ἀρχοειδῶς. Inversement, dans la mesure où les degrés perdent en clarté, ils ne retiennent plus de leurs causes qu'un reflet exténué, ils contiennent celles-ci seulement εἰκονικῶς [*El. Theol.* prop. 65]."

centre, which is *Nous*. Again, this is a cycle of procession and return through which Soul possesses self-identity, although at this level self-identity is attained through its temporal activity. This is repeated at the level of the heavenly bodies, the elements, plants and animals, and even the natural disasters which might be thought to lie outside of the order of nature. All of these are seen to be in a periodic motion from point of origin, out into multiplicity, and then back to their beginning point again, as is the case with bodily generation. The living thing begins as a seed, and then eventually produces seed again. At this low level, however, there is no numerical identity, but rather the more shadowy identity of the species. All of these are described as circles by Proclus, and are thought to show forth the influence on the rest of the cosmos of the highest circle itself, the henadic circle. Notice that in this passage, none of the things which Proclus mentions are in fact circles, in the geometrical sense. The geometrical circle is a member of this series, and Proclus uses it as a metaphor in order to manifest the one reality which runs through the whole series.

In the following passage from the *Timaeus* commentary, Proclus described how the relation of paradigm and image means that the same things exist in different manners as the different orders of the universe.

Looking at the realities themselves from the beginning again, let us speak, bringing the arguments (*logoi*) to bear on the soul's *ousia*. Let us first determine (*diorisômetha*) the following: with regard to the mathematical sciences, the continuous (*to te suneches*) and that which is distinguished (*to diôrismenon*) are distinguished from one another, and are in a certain manner opposed to each other, for that which is distinguished cannot be continuous, nor the continuous be that which is distinguished. However, in the Soul both of these come together (*suntrechei*). I mean both unification (*henôsis*) and distinction (*diairesis*). For the soul is both a monad and a number (*arithmos*), both one *logos* and a multitude (*plêthos*), one and many (*hen te kai polla*). Insofar as it is a whole it is continuous, insofar as it is a number it is distinguished according to the *logoi* that are in it. Through the continuous it is made similar to the unification (*henôsis*) of the intelligibles, through the multitude it is made similar to their division (*diakrisin*). Yet higher than these, according to its unification the Soul possesses an image (*eikôn*) and manifestation (*emphasin*) of the One, through its distinction (*diairesin*) and the multitude it possesses an image and manifestation of the divine



numbers (*tôn theiôn arithmôn*). For this reason the soul does not possess only an arithmetical *ousia* (for it would not have been continuous), nor only a geometrical *ousia* (for it would not have been distinguished). Rather, the *ousia* of the soul is both of these at once, and one must say that it is both arithmetical and geometrical. However, insofar as the soul is arithmetical, it also has at the same time the harmonical in its *ousia* (*kat'ousian*) (for the multitude in the *ousia* of the soul is harmonised, and both absolute and relative quantity have been comprehended in the Same). Insofar as it is geometrical, it also has at the same time the spherical in its *ousia*. For the circles in the soul are both unmoving and in motion. With regard to its *ousia* (*kat'ousian*) they are unmoving, and with regard to the *energeia* of its life (*kat'energeian de zōtikên*) they are in motion. Or rather they are both at once. For they are self-moving (*autokinêtoi*). That which is self-moving moves and is unmoving at the same time, for it moves itself. Its motion is that of an unmoved power (*to de kineîn akinêtou dunameôs esti*).<sup>233</sup>

In mathematical beings, the continuous and the divided are mutually opposed, but in the Soul's *ousia* they exist in such a manner that they come together. Further, the unity and multiplicity which the Soul's *ousia* possesses allows it to immitate in its own manner the various orders of the gods. Proclus' language suggests that the relation which holds here is that the lower order is a different manner of existence of the same thing. *To suneches* and *to diôrismenon* exist both on the level of the Soul's *ousia* and its mathematical projection. On the higher level they are not opposed; on the lower they are. Likewise, *henôsis* and *diairesis* exist in the order of the gods, and in the Soul, but they exist in different manners in each order. So this relation of paradigm and image really is an

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<sup>233</sup> In *Tim.* II.238.10-239.5: ἐξ ἀρχῆς δὲ πάλιν αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα θεωροῦντες λέγωμεν πρὸς τὴν ψυχικὴν οὐσίαν ἐπανάγοντες τοὺς λόγους, καὶ πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο διωρισώμεθα, ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰς μαθηματικὰς ἐπιστήμας διήρηται ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὸ τε συνεχὲς καὶ τὸ διωρισμένον καὶ ἀντίκειται πρὸς ἀλλήλα τρόπον τινά, καὶ οὔτε τὸ διωρισμένον συνεχὲς εἶναι δυνατόν οὔτε τὸ συνεχὲς διωρισμένον. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀμφοτέρω συντρέχει, καὶ ἡ ἑνωσις καὶ ἡ διαίρεσις· καὶ γὰρ μονάς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀριθμός, καὶ εἷς λόγος καὶ πλῆθος, ἓν τε καὶ πολλά, καὶ ὡς μὲν ὅλον οὐσα συνεχὴς ἐστίν, ὡς δὲ ἀριθμὸς διηρημένη κατὰ τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ λόγους, καὶ διὰ μὲν τῆς συνεχείας ὁμοιούμενη πρὸς τὴν ἑνωσιν τῶν νοητῶν, διὰ δὲ τοῦ πλῆθους πρὸς τὴν διάκρισιν, καὶ ἔτι τούτων ἀνωτέρω κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἑνωσιν εἰκόνα καὶ ἔμωσιν ἔχουσα τοῦ ἑνός, κατὰ δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν θεῶν ἀριθμῶν, διόπερ οὔτε ἀριθμητικὴν ἔχει μόνον τὴν οὐσίαν (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν συνεχὴς), οὔτε γεωμετρικὴν (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν διωρισμένη), ἀμα δὲ ἐστὶν ἀμφοτέρω, καὶ ἀριθμητικὴν ἄρα καὶ γεωμετρικὴν αὐτὴν ῥητέον, ἀλλὰ καθόσον ἀριθμητικὴ ἐστίν, ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἀρμονικὴν ὁμοῦ κατ' οὐσίαν (τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος ἡρμωσμένον ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ τε καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ πρὸς τι ποσὸν συνείληφεν), καθόσον δὲ γεωμετρικὴ, τὴν σφαιρικὴν· οἱ γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ κύκλοι καὶ ἀκίνητοί εἰσι καὶ κινούμενοι, κατ' οὐσίαν μὲν ἀκίνητοι, κατ' ἐνέργειαν δὲ ζωτικὴν κινούμενοι, μᾶλλον δὲ ὁμοῦ τὸ συναμφοτέρον ἔχοντες· αὐτοκίνητοι γὰρ εἰσι· τὸ δὲ αὐτοκίνητον ὁμοῦ κινεῖται καὶ ἀκίνητόν ἐστιν· ἑαυτὸ γὰρ κινεῖ· τὸ δὲ κινεῖν ἀκινήτου δυνάμει ἐστίν.

unfolding, a manifestation, of the source. The image is not a foreign addition, but rather the lower manner of existence of the higher, richer source.

The conception of the richness of the paradigm which is manifested in a divided way in its image serves to make comprehensible Proclus' explanation of the dialectical method set out in Plato's *Parmenides*.<sup>234</sup> Proclus' explanation of this method expands the systematic consideration of an entity or a proposition by finding in Parmenides' nine hypotheses<sup>235</sup> four groups of six propositions. One must consider, if a subject exists, (A) what is true, false, and both true and false of it in relation to itself and in relation to others, and (B) what is true, false, and both true and false of the others in relation to themselves and to the subject. One must also consider, if a subject does not exist, (C) what is true, false, and both true and false of it in relation to itself and in relation to others, and (D) what is true, false, and both true and false of the others in relation to themselves and to the subject.<sup>236</sup> This makes a total of twenty-four propositions to be considered. This dialectical method, Proclus says, has as its aim to allow us to discover the properties of a thing and its causal relations to other things, and to itself.<sup>237</sup> However, as Proclus demonstrates the method, it is obvious that one must know already, at least in some manner, the properties of the entity in question. His application of the method to the Soul is only possible because he already knows in advance what sort of a thing the Soul is, and what its relation to bodies is. In fact, this method does not have as its aim to produce new knowledge, in the sense that you will at its end have added new pieces data to what you knew at the beginning. Rather, it allows you to work out the implications of what you already know about an entity with rigorous completeness. Proclus criticises Aristotle's method in the *Prior Analytics* in the light of this dialectical method just on this

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<sup>234</sup> *Parm.* 136a-c.

<sup>235</sup> Proclus finds nine hypotheses instead of eight, because he subdivides the second hypothesis at *Parm.* 155e.

<sup>236</sup> *In Parm.* 1000.14-1003.02.

<sup>237</sup> *In Parm.* 1006.07-10.

point, that the system which Parmenides sets out is far more complete, and allows the Soul to exercise itself in all of the ways in which it is able to investigate a thing.<sup>238</sup> The other parts of dialectic, namely definition, division, demonstration, and analysis, are subordinated to this complete dialectical method, as partial employments of it.<sup>239</sup> Dialectic, according to Proclus, allows the Soul to look at a thing from all sides. We must say, because this is obviously what Proclus does in the few demonstrations of the method which he gives in the *Parmenides* commentary, that the Soul begins from something which it already knows, and then proceeds to develop its knowledge of this something by an exhaustive consideration of its relations to itself and to other things. This procedure only works if one thinks that the original thing which is to be considered is rich in the manner that a higher form is rich, such that its hidden content may be brought forth by multiple considerations like the ones which Proclus gives us in his examples. One may note that many more things could have been said to be true or false about the Soul and other things than Proclus in fact says in his examples. So while in one sense the method is exhaustive, in another sense it does not exhaust the content of the subject.

Proclus has taken the method in the *Parmenides* and assimilated it to the *probolê tón ousiôdôn logôn*, so that this method is one manner of unfolding the concentrated content of the *logoi* in our *ousia*.<sup>240</sup> Further evidence of this is that in the Euclid commentary, Proclus speaks of dialectic unifying the mathematical sciences, i.e. analysis, division, definition, and demonstration, the same four divisions of dialectic which are

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<sup>238</sup> In *Parm.* 1007.10-34.

<sup>239</sup> In *Parm.* 1003.02-1004.08; In *Eucl.* 42.09-43.21. For a discussion of the relation between division and definition, see J. Trouillard, *L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1972) pp.48-50. Division is that by which we arrive at definitions. And for the definition to be truly comprehensive of particulars, it must be richer than the particulars because it is itself an unfolding of still higher and richer genera. See Trouillard p.49: "Mais l'art de diviser n'est plus qu'un mot s'il dispose seulement de notions résiduelles. Car il ne consiste pas à enrichir un terme de déterminations nouvelles, mais à dérouler l'autodétermination d'un genre à travers ses différences substantielles immanentes."

<sup>240</sup> I say that it is one manner, because Proclus does not employ it other than in the examples given in the *In Parmenidem*, and, as I hold, his entire corpus is an unfolding of the *logoi* in our *ousia*.

found in the *Parmenides* commentary. The passage in the Euclid commentary continues, explicitly connecting dialectic with the *probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn*, such that dialectic perfects the multiplicity in mathematics, and sends it upwards towards the non-discursivity of *Nous*.<sup>241</sup> In the *Parmenides* commentary, as well, the ultimate aim of this dialectical method is not the multiplicity which results from it, but rather that through it as a training ground the soul may reach *Nous*.<sup>242</sup>

That the universe is ordered as a hierarchy of paradigm and image means, according to Proclus, that the same thing can exist in three different ways. It may exist in a higher manner in its cause, or it may exist as it is in itself, or finally it may exist as a participation in its effect. Proclus' terms are *kat'aitian*, *kath'huparxin*, and *kata methexin*.<sup>243</sup> Existence in its cause is just what we have already seen, that the cause embraces the reality of the effect, because the effect has come about as a declension of the fertility of the cause.<sup>244</sup> Existence as a participation is the converse of this, it is the presence to the effect of the reality which is the cause, a presence which is accepted by the effect in the particular manner in which the effect is able to receive the power of the cause, or in another manner of speaking, in the particular manner in which the effect is able to manifest the power of the cause. Existence as itself is existence as a particular

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<sup>241</sup> In *Eucl.* 43.22-44.24.

<sup>242</sup> In *Parm.* 1015.33-41. See J. Dillon, "Proclus and the *Parmenidean* dialectic," in *Proclus lecteur et interprète des anciens. Actes du Colloque internationale du C.N.R.S., Paris 2-4 oct. 1985*. J. Pépin et H.-D. Saffrey (Paris: C.N.R.S., 1987) pp.165-175. Dillon suggests the point, without committing himself strongly to it, that for Proclus all metaphysical truths are analytic, and that this method is meant simply to order one's intuitions about metaphysical entities. I think this is exactly right, in the sense that this ordering is a drawing forth of what is implicit in one's intuitions, because those intuitions are one's grasp the *logoi* which are one's *ousia*.

<sup>243</sup> See *El.Th.* prop.65, and C. Steel, "Ἵπαρξις chez Proclus," in *Hyparxis e Hypostasis nel Neoplatonismo (atti del I colloquio internazionale del centro di ricerca sul neoplatonismo, università degli studi di catania, 1-3 ottobre 1992)* ed. F. Romano e D.P. Taormina (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1994) pp.79-100. See also E. Moutsopoulos, "Sur la notion d'*eidolon* chez Proclus," in *Néoplatonisme, Mélanges offerts à Jean Trouillard* (Paris: Les Cahiers de Fontenay, 1981) pp.265-274; and E. Moutsopoulos, *Les structures de l'imaginaire dans la philosophie de Proclus* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1985) pp.15-41.

<sup>244</sup> For the paradigm as cause, see E. Moutsopoulos, *Les structures de l'imaginaire dans la philosophie de Proclus* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1985) pp.43-60.

member of the particular series, manifesting the character of the series as a whole in the manner appropriate to whatever order an entity occupies.

This triple mode of existence can also be expressed by the relation between whole and part, according to Proclus. S. Breton discusses the relation between whole and part in Proclus and the finite and infinite.<sup>245</sup> According to Proclus, a whole is either anterior to its parts (i.e. the monad which generates the parts, or as we have been saying, the paradigm), or composed of parts, or immanent in a part.<sup>246</sup> The second sort of whole is the normal sort of part and whole with which we are familiar, the whole which is the sum of its parts.<sup>247</sup> The whole anterior to the part is the cause, as the principle which encompasses the reality of the effect. The whole immanent in the effect is the existence of the effect as an image of the cause. Breton discusses this doctrine in concert with the idea of an infinity of power. Proclus is a finitist, because he rejects the possibility of an actual infinity in extension, i.e. an infinite distance, or an actual infinity of elements, such as points in a line. Thus there are in Proclus' universe only a finite number of members of any given order or reality.<sup>248</sup> However, Proclus does admit what we might call an intensive infinity. He says that no real being is infinite in multiplicity or size, only in power.<sup>249</sup> In other words, the cause, or paradigm, possesses the power to make images of itself, *ad infinitum*, but at no point will there be an actual infinity of images which reflect the reality of the paradigm. The infinite fertility of the paradigm, the limitlessness of its unfolding into a lower level, does not produce the 'bad infinity' which would render the image unintelligible. The clarifies the nature of a divided image somewhat. According to

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<sup>245</sup> S. Breton, *Philosophie et mathématique chez Proclus, suivi de, Principes philosophiques des mathématiques, par N. Hartmann, traduit de l'allemand par Geneviève de Peslouan* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1969) pp.95-105.

<sup>246</sup> *El. Th.* prop.67.

<sup>247</sup> One can distinguish between such wholes which are true sums of their parts, such as a mathematical set, and other such wholes which are organic unities, and not strictly sums, such as the parts of a body.

<sup>248</sup> This is in line with Aristotle's contention that an actual infinite would be unintelligible. See *Met.* II.2. Proclus' universe does not present an actual infinite for thought.

<sup>249</sup> *El. Th.* prop.86.

Proclus, a divided image is one of a finite, if ever expanding, number of refractions of its paradigm, in which the whole reality of the paradigm exists in the manner of the particular point of view which the image is. In terms of the circle metaphor, the Soul travelling around *Nous* obtains perspective after perspective, each of which is a vision of the centre. But the Soul circling around *Nous* is engaged in an activity which can be continued indefinitely. It never has a completed infinity of perspectives behind it. Thus its knowledge of the infinite power of *Nous* is always finite, and does not exhaust the richness of *Nous*.

It is with the relation between paradigm and divided image that we should read Proclus' thesis that all things are in all things, each according to the appropriate manner.<sup>250</sup> The same thing exists in its cause, in itself, or in its effect, in the manner appropriate to these three ways of existing: or it exists as a whole anterior to the parts, or as a sum or parts, or as a whole immanent in a part, in each case in the manner appropriate to the thing in question. So Proclus says that among the gods, "each is all things, according to the peculiar character of each, and has the causes of all things."<sup>251</sup> Later in the same text Proclus says that

The sensible cosmos imitates, in this manner, the intelligible cosmos. And just as in the intelligible cosmos all things are in all things, but in the manner of each (*oikeiôs en hekastôi*), i.e. intelligibly in the intelligible and intellectually in *nous*, as a whole in the wholes and as a part in the divisibles (*en tois merikois*), in the same manner the sensible cosmos has all things according to all of its own parts (*kata pasas heautou tas moiras*).<sup>252</sup>

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<sup>250</sup> See *El.Th.* prop.92

<sup>251</sup> *In Tim.* I.36.7-9: ἕκαστος δὲ κατὰ τὴν ιδιότητα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ πάντων ἔχει τὴν αἰτίαν.

<sup>252</sup> *In Tim.* II.26.24-29: μιμεῖται γὰρ καὶ ταύτῃ τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον ὁ αἰσθητός, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν ἐκείνῳ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οἰκειῶς ἐν ἑκάστῳ, νοητῶς μὲν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, νοερῶς δὲ ἐν τῷ νῷ, καὶ ὀλικῶς μὲν ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις, μερικῶς δὲ ἐν τοῖς μερικοῖς, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ὁ αἰσθητός κόσμος πάντα ἔχει κατὰ πάσας ἑαυτοῦ τὰς μοίρας

Still later in the same text the same principle is stated, and is connected explicitly with the principle of *analogia*, by which the effect is a divided image of its cause: "and to state it correctly, all things are everywhere analogically (*panta pantachou ana logon esti*)."<sup>253</sup>

### III.iv. *Analogia*, and *dianoia* as metaphor

It is this conception of the universe that allows Proclus to be confident about the Soul's ability to know both that which lies above it and that which lies below it. We noticed that none of the circles which Proclus spoke of in the splendid passage on the circle quoted above were actually circles. The geometrical circle, the figure whose circumference is equidistant from its centre, lies in the series which Proclus has articulated. What Proclus is doing is seeing "the paradigms in the images, and [moving] through the images to the paradigms."<sup>254</sup> The mathematical circle is an image of the self-reversion of souls and of *Nous*, and of the steadfastness of the gods. Likewise the mathematical circle is the proximate immaterial ordering principle of body, and is also the paradigm of the recurrence of such things as the species of living things, and the bounded nature of disasters. Proclus was using a geometrical figure as a metaphor for things which are themselves not geometrical.

We should realise as well that Proclus' description of the entire series of the circle is the written record of a discursive train of thought, and this means that it is all dianoetic *logoi*. Somehow through *logoi*, which are peculiar to the Soul, Proclus is able to manifest to his reader the entire series, from the most unified to the most dispersed, without his reader having to unify with *Nous* or have sensory experience of natural cycles. *Dianoia* is able to speak of all realities without giving up its divided *logoi*, because the proper objects of *dianoia* (e.g. circles, etc.... and not gods and not animals) are both images and paradigms. *Dianoia* is always self-knowledge, in this sense, that even when it turns its

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<sup>253</sup> In *Tim.* III.169.10-11: εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς φάμεν, πάντα πανταχοῦ ἀνὰ λόγον ἐστί.

<sup>254</sup> In *Tim.* II.246.7-9.

attention to realities above or below the Soul, it knows them through its own *logoi*.

Proclus illustrates this in a wonderful passage from the commentary on Euclid.

Let us now turn back for another look at the science of geometry as a whole, to see what its starting-point is and how far it ranges from it, so as to get a view of the ordered cosmos of its *logoi*. Let us note that it is coextensive (*sumparekteinomenên*) with all beings, applies the reasonings of its *dianoia* to them all, and comprehends (*periechousan*) all their Forms (*eidê*) in itself. At its highest and most intellectual point it inspects from all sides the region of genuine Being (*ta ontôs onta periathrousan*), teaching us through images (*di' eikonôn*) the special properties of the divine orders and the powers of the intellectual Forms (*noerôn eidôn*), for it contains even the *logoi* of these beings within its range of vision. Here it shows us what figures are appropriate to the gods, which ones belong to primary beings and which ones to the souls' manner of existing (*tais psuchais hupostasesi*). In the middle regions of knowledge it unfolds the *logoi* that are in *dianoia*: it unrolls and investigates their variety, exhibiting their modes of existence (*huparxeis*) and their properties (*pathê*), their similarities and differences; and the forms of figures shaped from them in imagination it comprehends within fixed boundaries and refers back to the existence of the *logoi* in its essence (*ôusiôdê tôn logôn hupostasin*). At the third level of the progression of *dianoia* (*tas tritas tês dianêseôs diexodous*) it examines Nature, that is, the Forms of the elements of perceptible bodies and the powers associated with them, and explains how they are contained in causal form (*kai' aitian*) in its own *logoi*. It contains images (*eikonas*) of all intelligible genera and paradigms (*paradeigmata*) of sensible ones: but the Forms of *dianoia* constitute its essence (*ousiôtai de kata ta eidê ta dianoêta*), and through these Middle Forms (*mesôn toutôn*) it rises up and it descends along the entirety of being and becoming (*eph' hola ta onta kai ta ginomena*).<sup>255</sup>

Geometry is coextensive (*sumparekteinomenên*) with all beings in the sense that as a form of *dianoia* it may reason about all things, through its own *logoi*. Its *logoi* are "images

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<sup>255</sup> In Eucl.61.25-62.26: ἄνωθεν δὲ πάλιν ἐπιόντες κατίδωμεν τὴν ὅλην γεωμετρίαν, ὅθεν τε ὥρμηται καὶ μέχρι τίνος πρόεισιν. οὕτω γὰρ τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ διάκοσμον τῶν λόγων θεασώμεθα. νοήσωμεν δὴ πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν αὐτὴν συμπαρεκτεινομένην καὶ πᾶσιν ἐπιβάλλουσιν τὰς ἐαυτῆς διανοήσεις καὶ πάντων ἐν ἑαυτῇ περιέχουσιν τὰ εἶδη, κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἀκρότατον αὐτῆς καὶ νοερώτατον τὰ ὄντως ὄντα περιαθροῦσαν καὶ δι' εἰκόνων ἀναδιδᾶσκουσιν τὰς τε τῶν θείων διακόσμων ιδιότητας καὶ τὰς τῶν νοερῶν εἰδῶν δυνάμεις-ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τούτων τοὺς λόγους ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις θεάμασι καὶ δείκνυσιν, τίνα μὲν ἐστὶ τὰ θεοῖς ὡς προσήκοντα σχήματα, τίνα δὲ ταῖς πρώταις οὐσίαις, τίνα δὲ ταῖς τῶν ψυχῶν ὑποστάσεσι-κατὰ δὲ τὰς μέσας γνώσεις ἀνελίσσεται τοὺς διανοητικούς λόγους καὶ ἐξαπλοῖ καὶ θεωρεῖ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς ποικιλίαν καὶ τὰς ὑπάρξεις αὐτῶν ἐκκαίνει καὶ τὰ περὶ αὐτοὺς πάθη, τὰς τε κοινωνίας αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς διαφορότητας, ἀφ' ὧν δὴ καὶ τὰς φανταστάς διαμορφώσεις σχημάτων ἐν πέρασιν ὥρισμένοις περιλαμβάνει καὶ ἀνάγει πρὸς τὴν οὐσιώδη τῶν λόγων ὑπόστασιν-κατὰ δὲ τὰς τρίτας τῆς διανοήσεως διεξόδους τὴν φύσιν ἐπισκοπεῖ καὶ τὰ εἶδη τῶν αἰσθητῶν στοιχείων καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὰ δυνάμεων, ὅπως κατ' αἰτίαν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῆς προεἰληπταί, παραδίδωσιν, ἔχει γὰρ εἰκόνας μὲν τῶν νοητῶν ὅλων γενῶν, παραδείγματα δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, οὐσίωται δὲ κατὰ τὰ εἶδη τὰ διανοητὰ καὶ διὰ μέσων τούτων ἀνεισὶ τε καὶ κάτεισιν ἐφ' ὅλα τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὰ γινόμενα.



(*eikonas*) of all intelligible genera and paradigms (*paradeigmata*) of sensible ones."

*Dianoia* is a self-unfolding. It is the *probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn* through which the Soul makes its own *ousia* explicit to itself. But in this self-unfolding the Soul comprehends not only its own nature, but comprehends itself as the paradigm of body, and the image of *Nous* and the One.

This means that all *dianoia*, which includes all philosophy, is given in the Soul's own discourse, and is expressed in the particular sort of division which belongs to psychic *logoi*. In other words, philosophy is not *Nous*, and it is not sensation, but comprehends *Nous* and sensation through its own reasonings.<sup>256</sup> This principle is stated by Proclus as the principle that all that is known is known according to the mode of the knower, not the mode of being of what is known.<sup>257</sup> The Soul possesses sensation as well as its own *nous*, but its most proper manner of knowing is *dianoia*. And *dianoia* knows the objects of sense and *nous* through itself.

The knowledge set in the knower is characterised, with regard to its existence, by the being of the knower itself, and it is evident that the forms of knowledge of the unchangeable beings are in their turn unchangeable in every respect, and those of the changeable are the opposite.<sup>258</sup>

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<sup>256</sup> Cf. A. Charles-Saget, *L'architecture du divin, mathématique et philosophie chez Plotin et Proclus* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1982) p.294: "Le principe de ressemblance efface la discontinuité entre principe et dérivés. De même, le principe d'isomorphisme efface la distinction entre le code et le décodé, entre le code et le message. Car le code est aussi un message, et le message un code. Ce qui signifie, en langage proclien, que tout ordre peut être modèle pour tout les ordres, à partir du moment où l'on sait quelle est sa place dans l'ordre des ordres. Qu'il n'y ait pas de métalangage, signifie que l'on ne peut dépasser le système pour en exposer l'exiématique [*sic*], que l'on reste *dans le système*, que tout langage demeure le langage d'un certain niveau, même s'il semble avoir puissance pour interpréter la totalité."

<sup>257</sup> This principle is also stated by Boethius and Ammonius, one of Proclus' disciples. For the later history of Proclus' theory of the projection of the soul's essential *logoi*, see E. Tempelis, "The school of Ammonius on the *logoi* in the human intellect," in *The perennial tradition of Neoplatonism*, ed. J. Cleary (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1997) pp.310-327. For Boethius see *De Consolatione Philosophiae* V.4.75-77: "Omne enim quod cognoscitur non secundum sui vim sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem."

<sup>258</sup> *Dec. dub.* 7.20-25: "Hoc autem ostenso, dico utique quod cognitio in cognoscente subsistens ab existentia caracterizatur secundum id quod sui ipsius esse cognoscentis, manifestum iam et quod intransmutabilium quidem secundum omnia et cognitiones tales, transmutabilium autem contrarie." A work with the same title as that of Proclus (*Ten problems concerning providence*) was written in Greek by the Byzantine Isaac Komnenos in the twelfth century, and includes many portions from Proclus' work. Only the Latin of Moerbeke survives of Proclus' work, but the Greek of Komnenos is extant. It is published in D. Isaac's Budé edition of Proclus' *Dix problèmes concernant la providence*. The Komnenos passage which

And again, "knowledge is determined according to the character of the knower."<sup>259</sup> And from the *Timaeus* commentary:

We should not suppose that [various forms of] knowledge are characterised by the nature of the things which are known, nor that that which is not steadfast is not steadfast among the gods... Rather we should suppose that the manner of knowing varies according to the differences in the knowers. For the same object God knows in a unified manner (*hênóménōs*). *Nous* knows as a whole (*holikōs*), *logos* knows as a universal (*katholikōs*), imagination knows as a shape (*morphôtikōs*), and sensation knows through a passion (*pathêtikōs*). And it is not the case that because the object known is one and the same, there is only one [sort of] knowledge [of it].<sup>260</sup>

If this were not the case, then whenever we turned our attention to body, we would be sensing, and whenever we turned out attention to the intelligibles, we would experience the unified vision of *Nous*. But we turn our attention to both of these objects without

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parallels Proclus' is 7.57-61: Δειχθέντος δὲ τοῦ τὴν γνῶσιν ὑφesseτεκυῖαν ἐν τῷ γινώσκοντι χαρακτηρίσθαι κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτῆς εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦτου ὑπάρξεως, φανερόν ἤδη ὅτι τῶν μὲν ἀμεταβόλων καὶ αἱ γνῶσεις κατὰ πάντα τοιαῦται, τῶν δὲ μεταβλητῶν ἐναντίαι. Notice that working from the Greek, we can see Moerbeke's very literal style of translation. As well, the sense of this passage comes out in the Greek more clearly than in the Latin. Further, the phrasing of the two passages seems to be inverse. Either Komnenos modified his source, or Moerbeke translated Proclus literally but changed the word order. It seems that "secundum id quod sui ipsius esse cognoscentis" translates κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτῆς εἶναι and "ab existentia" translates ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦτου ὑπάρξεως. This would rule out a natural translation which construed *ab existentia* as modifying the manner in which the knowledge subsists in the knower. However, as the gendered articles of the Greek make clear, the first Greek phrase refers to the *hyparxis* of the knower (*ginōskōn*) while the second phrase refers to the *einai* of the knowledge (*gnōsis*). In the Latin the order has been inverted, so that by doing violence to Latin grammar we can take *ab existentia* to refer not to the *existentia* of the knower, as in the Greek, but of the knowledge itself. The *id quod sui ipsius esse* refers to the *esse* of the knower rather than the *esse* of the knowledge, as in the Greek. Moerbeke has perhaps helped us out by adding *cognoscentis* in order to make the reference clear in the absence of gendered articles. The sense is the same, in that in both versions the character of the knowledge depends on the knower, ruling out the possibility that it depends on the thing known, but the technical terms have been switched. In Greek the knowledge is characterised with respect to its *einai* (*esse*) by the *hyparxis* (*existentia*) of the knower, while in Latin the knowledge is characterised with respect to its *existentia* (*hyparxis*) by the *esse* (*einai*) of the knower. The end of the passage is likewise clearer in Komnenos' Greek than in Moerbeke's Latin. See also for this principle *El. Th. props.* 123 and 124.

<sup>259</sup> *Dec. dub.* 7.45-50: "secundum cognoscentis proprietatem et cognitio determinata est." And in Komnenos 7.76-77: ἡ μὲν γνῶσις κατὰ τὴν τοῦ γινώσκοντος ἀφώρισται ιδιότητα.

<sup>260</sup> *In Tim.* I.352.11-19: μὴ γὰρ οἰηθῶμεν, ὅτι ταῖς τῶν γνωστῶν φύσεσιν αἱ γνῶσεις χαρακτηρίζονται, μηδ' ὅτι τὸ μὴ ἀραρὸς οὐκ ἀραρὸς ἐστὶ παρὰ θεοῖς... ἀλλ' ὅτι ταῖς τῶν γινωσκόντων διαφοραῖς ἀλλοίος γίνεται τῆς γνώσεως ὁ τρόπος: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ γινώσκει θεὸς μὲν ἡνωμένως, νοῦς δὲ ὀλικῶς, λόγος δὲ καθολικῶς, φαντασία δὲ μορφωτικῶς, αἴσθησις δὲ παθητικῶς, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι τὸ γνωστὸν ἓν, μία καὶ ἡ γνῶσις.

leaving aside *dianoia*. The Soul can sense, and it can experience *Nous*, but it can also understand body and the intelligible through its own *logoi*.<sup>261</sup>

This means that in Proclus' system all philosophical reasoning about anything other than the Soul is done through metaphor. *Dianoia* grasps *Nous* because it grasps itself as its image, and so it knows *Nous* through an image. Likewise, *dianoia* knows Body by inspecting itself as the principle of body. This metaphorical nature of philosophical discourse is an aspect of Proclus' system which is not emphasised sufficiently in the literature.<sup>262</sup> I am using the term metaphor in a very precise sense. By metaphor I mean a manner of speaking in which one order of reality is used to describe another order of reality. To state it another way, metaphorical understanding is the understanding of an order of reality through another order of reality, whether this be through an image or a paradigm. It is clear from our study so far that *dianoia*'s grasp of *Nous* and the One, and of Body is this sort of metaphorical knowing. But even Soul's grasp of itself is metaphor in the sense that it understands its own unified *ousia* through the divided images which are its projected *logoi*. As we have seen from the beginning of

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<sup>261</sup> The question of Soul's knowledge of what is higher according to its own mode of knowing is in a sense the inverse of the question concerning divine providence. The Soul can know the higher through itself because it is a divided image of the higher. Conversely, the higher can exercise providence over the lower because in knowing itself, it knows all that the lower image is. In this sense, knowledge of effect through the cause, and of cause through effect, is only possible because of the relation between paradigm and image. See L. Obertello, "Proclus, Ammonius and Boethius on divine knowledge," *Dionysius* 5 (1981) pp.127-164; and J. Dillon, "The concept of two intellects: a footnote to the history of Platonism," *Phronesis*, 18 (1973) pp.176-185.

<sup>262</sup> But see D. Isaac, "Le thème de la genèse chez Proclus ou les servitudes du discours," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 81 (1976) pp.467-477. For a very different approach see C.R. Kordig, "The mathematics of mysticism: Plotinus and Proclus," in *The structure of being. A Neoplatonic approach*, ed. R. Baine Harris (New York: S.U.N.Y., 1982) pp.114-121 and 168-169. Kordig argues that the One cannot consistently be described as having no descriptive predicate applied to it, because 'being such that no descriptive predicate applies to it' is itself a descriptive predicate of the One. So such a predication is self-refuting. Kordig assumes, following R. Brumbaugh, that contemporary set theory describes the formal structure of reality in the best way. Hence it is appropriate for him to use a simple logical contradiction to disprove the Neoplatonic thesis of the One beyond Being. However, this amounts to taking as his first premise not just that humans have at their disposal only the sort of discourse which Proclus says is proper to the soul, but also that all of reality exists in precisely the same manner as does this psychic mode of discourse. Hence from the outset any entity which Proclus posits as higher than the divided being of *dianoia* will be judged to be non-sensical. Kordig has not seen that for Proclus, as for Neoplatonists in general, *dianoia* itself is considered to be deficient. In its deficiency with regard to its source it reveals itself to be an image, pointing beyond itself towards *Nous* and the One.

this study, a *logos* is primarily a divided unfolding of a unified source, and so a *logos* naturally manifests something else, namely its source. So we can say that a *logos* is necessarily a metaphor. This holds for *logoi* considered as images, as well as for *logoi* considered as paradigms. If the Soul knows itself as the paradigm of Body, its own *logoi* are not in this case considered as divided manifestations, but as themselves the source of further divided manifestations, i.e. the source of the *logoi* which order Body. Here too the Soul knows Body metaphorically, i.e. it knows the *logoi* which order Body by grasping its own *logoi*.

Further, the *logoi* which the Soul projects exhibit the relation between paradigm and image in two ways. First, within the *logoi* themselves there is a relation of paradigm and image. By this I mean that when we think of the One, *Nous*, and the Soul, and think of them as related in terms of paradigm and image, the dianoetic *logoi* which we use to think this are related in this manner. This holds also for the relation between higher and lower Forms. If, for example, the five Greatest Kinds are the paradigms of all of the subsequent determinations of being, then the *logoi* through which we think Being, Same, Other, Rest, and Motion are in some sense in the same relation to the the *logoi* through which we think the subordinate determinations. The second manner in which paradigm and image applies to our *logoi* is that the hierarchically ordered system of *logoi* which we project is itself as a whole an image of the actual hierarchy which exists above the Soul. So when we think that *Nous* is a divided image of the One, that thought itself captures the reality of the relation between *Nous* and the One as an image captures its paradigm. It may lead the Soul up to a grasp of the reality itself, but as it stands that thought is not the reality itself, but an image in projected *logoi*.

Here we should bring up again the connection between *logos* and *analogia*. *Analogia* as mathematical proportion is a metaphor of the manner in which the cosmos is ordered as a succession of paradigm and image. In an proportion (*analogia*) the ratio (*logos*) remains the same throughout, so that while the members of a series exhibit great

diversity, they are also bound by identity, in that they all exhibit the same *logos*.

*Analogia* is itself a metaphor, but the reality it points to is what makes possible knowledge through metaphor.

The discussion (*logos*) of the Ideal State [from the *Republic* conversation of the previous day] and the condensed and concise recapitulation of the classes within it contributes to the general presentation of the demiurgy of the cosmos. For it is possible to run back up to the wholes by beginning from these [things], [considering them] as images (*hōs eikonōn*). And indeed this especially was what the Pythagoreans used to pursue, tracking down the similarities among beings (*tas homoiotētas tōn ontōn*), on the basis of *analogiai*, and passing from the images to their paradigms (*tōn eikonōn epi ta paradeigmata*).<sup>263</sup>

So it is the *analogia* which holds between beings that makes the *logos* a divided image of its source.<sup>264</sup>

It is clear in Plotinus that much of his corpus is metaphor. When one reads the *Enneads*, one gets the impression that the author is struggling to express in the Soul's divided speech an experience which transcends the division of that speech. It is easy to overlook this aspect of Proclus' system, because he seldom gives us this impression so common in the *Enneads*. If anything, Proclus' detailed descriptions of the structure of *Nous*, and his ubiquitous reference to the role of beings which lie on a higher ontological level than *Nous*, gives us the impression that he means what he says to be taken as accurate and appropriate descriptions of these things. This cannot be the case, however, because his *oeuvre* is a collection of *logoi*, and all psychic *logoi* are images of the intelligible Forms, not the Forms themselves. Proclus, as much as Plotinus, is struggling to express in divided *logoi* that which transcends divided *logoi*. This is just less obvious in his writings. But in the same manner as the *Enneads* are secondary descriptions of the

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<sup>263</sup> In *Tim.* I.33.4-10: 'Ὁ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας λόγος καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ γενῶν συνεσπειραμένη καὶ σύντομος ἀνακεφαλαίωσις εἰς τὴν ὅλην συντελεῖ τῆς κοσμικῆς δημιουργίας παράδοσιν· ἐξεστὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ τούτων ὡς εἰκόνων ἐπὶ τὰ ὅλα ἀνατρέχειν, καὶ διὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο διαφερόντως οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι μετῆσαν, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναλογιῶν τὰς ὁμοιότητας τῶν ὄντων θηρεύοντες καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰκόνων ἐπὶ τὰ παραδείγματα μεταβαίνοντες.

<sup>264</sup> See J. Dillon, "Image, symbol and analogy: three basic concepts of Neoplatonic allegorical exegesis," in *The significance of Neoplatonism*, ed. R. Baine Harris (New York: S.U.N.Y., 1976) pp.247-262.

primary Forms which Plotinus experienced during his unity with *Nous*. Proclus' writings are unfoldings on the psychic level of the *logoi* in his own soul's *ousia*, which themselves are images of the Forms in *Nous*.

We should not draw the conclusion that because *dianoia* is always metaphor, it does not possess truth. Two considerations should keep us from this conclusion. (A.) The first consideration is that it is difficult to see how *dianoia* could grasp things non-metaphorically, so if *dianoia* has truth at all it has metaphorical truth. By this I mean simply that in thinking about bodies we do not take the bodies themselves into our minds. Aristotle speaks of abstraction, the empiricists speak of generalisations from sense, and contemporary epistemologists speak of a correspondance theory of truth. All of these are ways of trying to explain how we think of bodies by means of something which is not body, or at least, is not the body in question.<sup>265</sup> Even in Hegel, although the senses have their truth, this truth leads beyond itself, and is taken up on the new grasp and the new object, which in turn leads beyond itself. Only in Absolute Knowing is Spirit known through itself in an adequate manner. But this final position would be considered by Neoplatonists to be an incorrect conflation of *Nous* and *dianoia*. So if our thinking about bodies can be true, and is metaphorical in the sense in which I am using the term, then metaphor is not a barrier to truth.

(B.) The second consideration is what makes metaphorical truth possible. Proclus' theory of knowledge results from an ontology which supplies a compelling answer to the question of how my thought can refer to something outside of it. I can know bodies because the *logos* which informs the body in question is an image of the *logos* which my *dianoia* projects. The Soul can know dianoetically only because it *dianoia* is metaphorical, i.e. only because its *logoi* are images of their causes and paradigms of their effects. So far from metaphor being a hindrance to truth, in Proclus it

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<sup>265</sup> Neuroscience would likely say that we think with a body, i.e. with our brains.

is what allows *dianoia* to be true. The manner in which *logoi* are images of their causes is such that the cause itself is present as the *logoi* in a divided manner. This sort of image is the presence of the source in the image. In the commentary on the *Timaeus*, Proclus discusses whether the intelligible model is in the demiurge, or outside of it.

If the demiurge sees the intelligible (*to noêton*), does it see it through a return upon itself, or only [by looking] outside of itself? But if it is only outside of itself, it will see only images (*eidōla*) of being, and it will have *aisthêsis* instead of *noêsis*. If it [it sees the intelligible by looking] towards itself, then the object which is thought (*to nooumenon*) is in it. So that the paradigm is both before the demiurge and in it, before it in an intelligible manner (*noêtôs*), and in it in an intellectual manner (*noerôs*).<sup>266</sup>

It is this double existence which Proclus says is correct, in the discussion which follows. So while on the one hand distinguishing the thought of the demiurge from *aisthêsis*, because it does not have an *eidōlon*, or we might say an external impression, of its object, he still does think that the demiurge has an image of the intelligible. But it is an image which can also be called the intellectual existence of the intelligible. The Soul's *logoi* are images in the same sense. They are not external impressions, but rather are the Soul's mediation to itself of what is both outside of it, and in it as its centre. They are the intelligibles themselves existing in the divided manner of *logoi*. Because the *logoi* are of this sort, in that sense they are true metaphors.

The consequence of this is that the entire Procline corpus is metaphor. Again, it should be stressed that by metaphor I mean discourse from one sphere of reality used to describe another sphere of reality. So insofar as Proclus' corpus is a written record of his *dianoia* expressing its grasp of *Nous* and the One, as well as Body, it is a collection of metaphorical *logoi*.<sup>267</sup> An important feature of metaphor is that a metaphor manifests

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<sup>266</sup> In *Tim.* I.323.16-22: εἰ δὲ ὁρᾷ τὸ νοητὸν ὁ δημιουργός, πότερον εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐστραμμένος ὁρᾷ, ἢ ἔξω μόνον ἑαυτοῦ; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔξω μόνον ἑαυτοῦ, εἰδῶλα ὁρᾷ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ ἔξει αἰσθησὶν ἀντὶ νοήσεως· εἰ δὲ εἰς ἑαυτὸν, ἔστι καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ νοούμενον· ὥστε καὶ πρὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ τὸ παράδειγμά ἐστι καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, νοητῶς μὲν πρὸ αὐτοῦ, νοερῶς δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ.

<sup>267</sup> I leave aside here the metaphorical status of writing. However, just as *dianoia* is a *logos* of *Nous*, so speaking and writing are *logoi* of *dianoia*. It would be fruitful to examine the particular characteristics of the written *logos*, and germane to contemporary interests, but such an examination lies

what it refers to in a partial manner. *Dianoia* produces a divided image. The source which *dianoia* projects in the *probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn* is generative of a multiplicity of images, each of which manifest a different perspective on, or aspect of the unified source. If this is the case, Proclus' corpus, as *dianoia*, should exhibit the characteristics of a divided image. This is in fact the case. He presents us with a number of different styles of work and the emphasis of each work is slightly different.<sup>268</sup> This diversity of style and content reflects the fact that for Proclus each work is a projection of *logoi* which are images of *Nous*. Their status as projections, as images which are a translation from the level of *Nous* to Soul dictate that they will always be partial. They may always be supplemented by a treatment which draws out an aspect which has not yet been projected. His work should also make liberal use of metaphor, and this is the case. Throughout his interpretation of the Platonic dialogues he continually offers interpretations which are explicitly metaphorical or symbolic. Socrates in the *Commentary on the Alcibiades I* represents a good *daimôn*; Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates in the *Commentary on the Parmenides* represent different aspects of *Nous*, or varying levels of Soul. Proclus thinks that Plato intentionally made use of obscure metaphor to lead the souls of his readers

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outside the scope of this study.

<sup>268</sup> Cf. A. Charles-Saget, *L'architecture du divin, mathématique et philosophie chez Plotin et Proclus* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1982) pp.257-260. Charles-Saget distinguishes between two modes of discourse in Proclus' works. The first is an internal relation of philosophical terms, seen most strongly in the multiplication of intermediaries. This is the discourse of the *Elements of Theology* and the *Platonic Theology*. The other mode, which supplements the first, is found in his Commentaries. This second mode is the discourse of mutual implication, relation, of polysemy and equivocity. For example, each thing in Proclus' system has not only a place, according to Charles-Saget, but also a name, and the name brings with it a host of connotations missing from its hierarchical location. The third intelligible triad is not only the *autozôion*, it is also *Phanes*, the Orphic god by which all things appear: the first three terms of the intellectual hebdomad are also Kronos, Rhea, and Zeus. Charles-Saget, p.259: "La réponse de Proclus consiste, pour pallier cette infirmité [i.e. the weakness of the first mode of discourse], à multiplier les rapports, les transferts, les résonances ou les analogies plus strictes. Si tout est dans tout, tout aussi signifie tout, tout fait signe vers tout. Nous sommes donc en présence d'un langage dont tous les termes sont et doivent être surdéterminés... Il doit accentuer et non pas écarter la polysémie et l'équivocité... usant les termes déjà épurés, il instaure une sorte de jeu poétique, et crée une sphère de résonances sémantiques où les personnages du discours, par d'innombrables conjonctions, cherchent à dépasser en puissance connotative tout ce que le langage ordinaire et littéraire a déjà produit." See also J. Coulter, *The literary microcosm, theories of interpretation in the later neoplatonists* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976) pp.77-94, for a discussion of the unity of scope (*skopos*) of neoplatonic commentaries.



from dianoetic *logoi* to the *eidê* which they manifest.<sup>269</sup> In this Proclus follows Plato, who often uses myth to express various truths. The virtue of realising that *dianoia* is metaphor, is that it allows you to be happy with dianoetic descriptions of reality, while realising their limitations, and while realising that they may be supplemented by other descriptions which emphasise aspects of reality left out of the initial ones. For example, does Plato think that the Soul is absolutely simple (*Phaedo*); or divided into *logos*, *thumos*, and *epithumia* (*Republic*); or divided into reason, noble tendencies, and base tendencies (*Phaedrus*);<sup>270</sup> or into intermediate Being, Same, and Other (*Timaeus*). All of these are complementary ways of leading the Soul to self-understanding, because they are all metaphors. Indeed, according to Proclus' theory of knowledge, the entire history of philosophy is a collection of metaphors about reality. Again, this does not mean that they possess no truth. What it means is that *dianoia* parcels out its truths through divided perspectives.

As a final topic in this section, we should mention the purpose of this metaphorical projection. *Dianoia* can know Body, but its real interest is *Nous* and the One. They are its cause and the source of its good. So the end of *dianoia* is to have the most complete grasp possible of *Nous* and of the One. True *epistêmê*, i.e. true *dianoia*, is found in those sorts of studies which lead the Soul upwards and inwards. So in the *Commentary on the Parmenides* Proclus classifies arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy,<sup>271</sup> as forms of *epistêmê*, as well as "all others that lead the soul upwards and

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<sup>269</sup> See, for example, his description at *In Tim.* II.246.4-9: "But Plato, through secrecy, used mathematical terms as a sort of veil over the truth of things, just as the Theologians make use of myths, and the Pythagoreans make use of symbols. For it is possible to see the paradigms in the images, and to move through the images to the paradigms (ὁ δὲ γε Πλάτων δι' ἐπικρυψιν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς τῶν ὀνομάτων οἷον παραπετάσμασιν ἐχρήσατο τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ἀληθείας, ὥσπερ οἱ μὲν θεολόγοι τοῖς μύθοις, οἱ δὲ Πυθαγόρειοι τοῖς συμβόλοις· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἐν ταῖς εἰκόσι τὰ παραδείγματα θεωρεῖν καὶ διὰ τούτων ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα μεταβαίνειν)."

<sup>270</sup> That the tripartite souls in the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus* are not to be identified with each other is the argument of E. Buccioni, "Soul dynamics in the *Phaedrus*," (unpublished, delivered at the Canadian Philosophical Association meeting, Edmonton, 24 May 2000).

<sup>271</sup> Notice that these are the four divisions of the mathematical sciences, according to the Pythagorean division given in the Euclid commentary, with astronomy here replacing spherics (*In Eucl.* 36.12-38.02). See figure 5, Appendix.

that we require as we move towards the intelligible world."<sup>272</sup> On the other hand, "all those that the soul uses when it is at play, or occupied with mortal things, or ministering to the needs of human life"<sup>273</sup> are not forms of *epistêmê*. Proclus gives us the examples of bronze working and weaving, which come not from the gods (i.e. from *Nous*), but rather from the *daimones*, in this case from Hephaestus and Athena.<sup>274</sup> The aim of *dianoia*'s multiple projection of *logoi* is to leave behind the multiplicity of this projection, and attain the unified knowledge which belongs to *Nous*, and ultimately to surpass all knowing in a union with the One. We will examine this aim of *dianoia* in chapter VII.<sup>275</sup>

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<sup>272</sup> *In Parm.* 828.41.-829.02: καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι ψυχῆς ἀναγωγοί, καὶ ὧν δεόμεθα καὶ εἰς τὸ νοητὸν ἀναδραμόντες. This classification comes in a discussion of whether there are intellectual Forms of various sorts of knowledge. Those which are images of an intellectual Form are *epistêmata*. Proclus is likely exaggerating for emphasis here. Those sorts of knowledge which are not images of an intellectual Form are likely images of things which are images of an intellectual Form. The real distinction is between those that lead the soul towards *Nous*, and those that lead it toward Body.

<sup>273</sup> *In Parm.* 829.02-04: ὅσαι δὲ ψυχῆς εἰσι παιζούσης καὶ περὶ τὰ θνητὰ διατριβούσης καὶ τὰς ἀνθρωπίνης χρείας θεραπευούσης

<sup>274</sup> See J. Trouillard, "Le dynamisme psychique selon Proclus," *Diotima*, 2 (1974) pp.117-124.

<sup>275</sup> A.H. Armstrong draws out the "negative theology" of Proclus in speaking about *Nous*. He is correct in noticing passages which express the inadequacy of *dianoia*'s grasp of *Nous*, and its inability to speak the *noêta* in dianoetic terms. His conclusion is that *dianoia* is a *gymnasia*, an exercise, for that unified vision of intelligible reality which comes when we pass over into *Nous*. However, all too often negative theology is forgotten, and that which is inexpressible is systematised in positive terms nonetheless. Armstrong remarks that the normal mode of proceeding is to distinguish *noêsis* and *dianoia*, and then to proceed to use *dianoia* to speak about what only *noêsis* can grasp. I think Armstrong is missing the aspect of *dianoia* which we are trying to bring out in this study. *Dianoia* could only be a training ground for the philosopher's attainment of *noêsis* if the object of *dianoia* is somehow also the object of *noêsis*. If they are completely other, then how could *dianoia* aid the philosopher in rising on high? So the balance of negative and positive theology which is needed, and which Proclus does present us with, is a negative theology which reminds the philosopher that he is speaking about an image of the intelligibles rather than the intelligibles themselves, and a positive theology which affirms the analogy between image and paradigm, and which holds that in comprehending the image the philosopher is also comprehending the paradigm and is coming closer to that higher apprehension in itself. See A.H. Armstrong, "The negative theology of *Nous* in later Neoplatonism," in *Platonismus und Christentum. Festschrift für Heinrich Dörrie*, hrsg. von H.D. Blume und F. Mann ("Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum," Ergänzungsband 10) (Münster: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1983) pp.31-37.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE SOUL AND MATHEMATICS

Proclus speaks about mathematics at length in only two works, the *Commentary on the Timaeus*, and the *Commentary on the First Book of Euclid's Elements*. If we did not have the Euclid commentary, we might be led to believe that mathematical reasoning held a relatively minor place in Proclus' philosophy.<sup>276</sup> Proclus hardly speaks about mathematics in most of his other works, and we could attribute the prominence of mathematics in the *Timaeus* commentary to the importance of mathematics in Plato's *Timaeus* itself. We might have thought that, although in general Proclus is not very much interested in mathematics, he could not avoid speaking about it in his commentary on Plato's text, because Plato himself uses mathematics as a structuring principle for the creation of the Soul.

Against the background of the rest of Proclus' works, the Euclid commentary is quite striking. In two prologues to this work, one on mathematics in general and one specifically on geometry, Proclus articulates a full and rich theory of mathematical being and thinking. Mathematical being occupies a middle rank in the hierarchy of things, between the intelligibles on the one hand and the sensibles on the other. Likewise, the sort of mathematical reasoning which grasps mathematical being is to be found between the simplicity of *Nous* on the one hand, and the multiplicity of sensation on the other.

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<sup>276</sup> In contrast to his restricted employment of strictly mathematical number, Proclus is very free in use of the term number (*arithmos*) as a name for things which are not, strictly speaking, mathematical. See J. Trouillard, "La puissance secrète du nombre selon Proclus," *Revue de philosophie ancienne*, 1 (1983) pp.227-241; see p.227, "Dans l'univers de Proclus le nombre est partout. Tout est mesurant ou mesuré, du jaillissement de l'intelligible jusqu'au dernier degré des formes."

Proclus account of mathematics as a sort of discursive reason (*dianoia*) in this commentary is one the clearest and most elaborate expositions of his general theory of *dianoia*. Indeed, his exposition of mathematical reasoning and being is so clear and forceful, and his claims about the importance and scope of mathematics are so extravagant,<sup>277</sup> that it seems in the Euclid commentary *dianoia* is in fact completely mathematical, and the being that *dianoia* grasps is likewise only mathematical being.

This is not the case. Mathematics is only half of the the motion of thinking which is *dianoia*. As we have seen, *dianoia* makes the Soul a divided image of *Nous*. However, the Soul is also the paradigm of Body. In this sense the *logoi* which the Soul projects can be regarded in two ways, and *dianoia* has a double motion, depending on whether through it the Soul is regarding *Nous* or Body. In the first case, *dianoia* is dialectic, and in the second it is mathematics. In the first section of this chapter (i.) we will examine Proclus' interpretation of Plato's Divided Line, in order to show that Proclus thinks there are these two parts of *dianoia*. In the rest of the chapter we will examine mathematical *dianoia*: (ii) mathematics as an image of the structure of the Soul's *ousia*; (iii) mathematics as the structuring principle of body; (iv) *phantasia* as in between the Soul's *ousia* and body.<sup>278</sup>

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<sup>277</sup> See *In Eucl.* 20-25. Proclus claims that mathematics is of use in turning the eye of the soul to the intelligibles, and contributes to theology, physics, political philosophy, ethics, and to rhetoric and the other practical arts.

<sup>278</sup> P. Merlan remarks that anyone reading Proclus' description of the mathematical as an intermediate realm of being could not help but think of the description of the Soul in Plato's *Timaeus* as intermediate. The question to be asked, as Merlan points out, is exactly how Proclus identifies and distinguishes the Soul and mathematical. See Merlan's discussion of this in Iamblichus and Proclus, and his ultimate derivation of this mathematical psychology from Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Posidonius, in his *From Platonism to Neoplatonism*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Revised (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960) pp.11-58.

For the derivation of much of the material on Mathematics in Neoplatonism after Plotinus from explicitly Neopythagorean sources, see Dominic J. O'Meara, *Pythagoras Revived* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). See esp. pp.148-149 for the relative importance of Pythagoras and Plato, for Proclus. See as well for the use of Iamblichus' *On Pythagoreanism III* in Proclus' first Prologue pp.157-166. O'Meara argues that the case made by some commentators for Geminus as the source for both Iamblichus and Proclus is untenable, and that Proclus' first Prologue is likely Proclus' own reworking and expansion of much of the material found in Iamblichus. I find O'Meara's argument for this position convincing.

I. Mueller, in "Mathematics and philosophy in Proclus' *Commentary on Book I of Euclid's Elements*," in *Proclus lecteur et interprète des anciens. Actes du Colloque internationale du C.N.R.S., Paris 2-4 oct. 1985*, ed. J. Pépin et H.-D. Saffrey (Paris: C.N.R.S., 1987) pp.305-318, makes a distinction between what he calls "ordinary mathematics" and a Neopythagorean approach to mathematics as embodied

#### IV.i. Dialectic and mathematics according to the Divided Line

We have argued in chapter II that, despite his insistence on the dianoetic character of mathematics in the Euclid commentary, Proclus does not think that all of *dianoia* is mathematical. Mathematical objects are *logoi* projected by the Soul, as other *dianoêta*, hence they share the intermediate character of the Soul.<sup>279</sup> The Soul is a limited multiplicity, whose unity comes from the inner bonds which hold between its parts. This unity is mirrored in the sort of unity which mathematical objects have, and particularly in the unity of the members of a mathematical proportion (*analogia*).

Proclus defines number as a discrete multiplicity. As J.Trouillard points out, all multiplicity arises through a participation in unity (*El.Th.prop.1*).<sup>280</sup> so number is a sort of

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in Iamblichus' *De communi mathematica scientia*. He then notes that in Proclus' Euclid commentary we find these two approaches blended, with the Neopythagorean philosophical approach dominating the two prologues to the work, and a more normal treatment of geometrical axioms and proofs in the main body of the work. This seems to me to be a correct way to look at the Euclid commentary. In the prologues Proclus examines the philosophical question of the status of mathematics, insofar as it is an image of higher realities and can serve an anagogical function with regard to them, and insofar as it is a paradigm of lower realities. In the rest of the work he examines mathematics neither as image nor paradigm, but as it is in itself. In this manner the normal investigation of mathematical truths is situated within Proclus' Neoplatonic, or Neopythagorean philosophical system. Our interest in Proclus' treatment of mathematics is in its epistemological status. Therefore we will make use of the material in the two prologues to his Euclid commentary, and leave aside Proclus' explanation of Euclid's proofs.

In "Iamblichus and Proclus' Euclid commentary," *Hermes*, 115 (1987) pp.334-348, I. Mueller presents an interesting analysis of the similarities and differences between the treatment of Neopythagorean material in Proclus and Iamblichus. Mueller asserts that among the passages which are found in both works (*De communi mathematica scientia* and Proclus' Euclid commentary) and which have a similar topic, the only total divergence in treatment is on the topic of the relation of mathematics to dialectic. Iamblichus insists on the autonomy of mathematics, which as we will see, Proclus does not. In all of the other common passages, Mueller finds a mixture of agreement and disagreement between the two authors, which Mueller attributes more to the philosophical style of the two authors, and to the particular focus of the two works, rather than to major philosophical disagreements over the nature of mathematics.

For a treatment of the relation between mathematics and Proclus' philosophical method, especially in the *Elements of Theology*, see A. Charles-Saget, *L'architecture du divin, mathématique et philosophie chez Plotin et Proclus* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1982).

<sup>279</sup> For a discussion of the dianoetic character of mathematics, see S. Breton, *Philosophie et mathématique chez Proclus, suivi de, Principes philosophiques des mathématiques, par N. Hartmann, traduit de l'allemand par Geneviève de Peslouan* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1969) pp.110-123; see pp.110-111: "Le sujet opérant, dans le commentaire de Proclus, est tantôt l'âme, tantôt, de manière plus précise, cette activité discursive qui déborde l'ordre du deductif et que désigne le terme: *dianoia*... Cette position ontologique de *Metaxu*, à la fois *milieu* et *médiation*, se répète dans l'ordre gnoséologique de la *dianoia*. En ce sens, la théorie de l'âme est l'introduction nécessaire à l'étude de l'agir mathématique en tant qu'expression du discursif."

<sup>280</sup> J.Trouillard, "La puissance secrète du nombre selon Proclus," *Revue de philosophie ancienne*, 1 (1983) pp.227-241; see p.227.

equilibrium between unity and multiplicity, in which the multiple terms are distinct from each other without being an indefinite multitude.

For all number is a multiplicity. But one sort of multiplicity comes into existence in a unified manner, while the other sort in a discrete manner. Now number is a discrete multiplicity (*plêthos...diakrimenon*).<sup>281</sup>

In this sense both the Soul as a whole and the mathematical *logoi* which it projects are sorts of number, because they are both bounded multiplicities. But Proclus distinguishes between mathematical number and the number of the Soul itself.

Proclus characterises the objects of mathematics as follows:

Mathematical objects, and in general all the objects of *dianoia*, have an intermediate position. They go beyond the objects of intellect in being divisible, but they surpass sensible things in being devoid of matter. They are inferior to the former in simplicity yet superior to the latter in precision, reflecting intelligible reality more clearly than do perceptible things. Nevertheless, they are only images, imitating in their divided fashion the indivisible and in their multiform fashion the uniform patterns of being. In short, they stand in the vestibule of the primary forms, announcing their unitary and undivided and generative reality, but have not risen above the particularity and compositeness of *logoi* and the reality that belongs to likenesses: nor have they yet escaped from the soul's varied and discursive ways of thinking and attained conformity with the absolute and simple modes of knowing which are free from all traces of matter.<sup>282</sup>

Here Proclus describes the objects of mathematical reasoning as intermediate. In a passage just before this one, he has described the sort of reason which grasps these objects, *dianoia*, also as intermediate.<sup>283</sup>

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<sup>281</sup> *Plat. Theol.* IV.81.04-06: Πᾶς γὰρ ἀριθμὸς πλῆθος ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ μὲν ἡνωμένως ὑφέστηκεν, τὸ δὲ διακεκριμένως, ὃ δὲ ἀριθμὸς πλῆθος ἐστὶ διακεκριμένον.

<sup>282</sup> *In Eucl.* 4.18-5.10: τὰ δὲ μαθηματικά καὶ ὅλως τὰ διανοητὰ μέσῃν κεκλήρωται τάξιν. τῶν μὲν τῇ διαιρέσει πλεονάζοντα, τῶν δὲ τῇ αὐλῇ προέχοντα, καὶ τῶν μὲν τῇ ἀπλότητι λειπόμενα, τῶν δὲ τῇ ἀκρίβειᾳ προυπάρχοντα καὶ τρανεστέρας μὲν ἐμοῦσιν ἔχοντα τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας, εἰκόνες δὲ ὅμως ὄντα καὶ μεριστῶς μὲν τὰ ἀμερίστα, πολυειδῶς δὲ μονοειδῆ παραδείγματα τῶν ὄντων ἀπομιμούμενα καὶ ὡς συλλήβδην εἰπεῖν ἐν προθύροις μὲν τεταγμένα τῶν πρώτων εἰδῶν καὶ ἐκφαίνοντα τὴν ἡνωμένην καὶ ἀμερῇ καὶ γόνιμον ἐκείνων ὑπαρξίν, οὐπω δὲ ἄρα τοῦ μερισμοῦ καὶ τῆς συνθέσεως τῶν λόγων ὑπερέχοντα καὶ τῆς προσηκούσης ταῖς εἰκόσιν ὑποστάσεως, οὐδὲ ὑπερδράμοντα τὰς ποικίλας καὶ διεξοδικὰς τῆς ψυχῆς νοήσεις καὶ αὐταῖς συναρμοσθέντα ταῖς ἀπλαῖς καὶ ὕλης ἀπάσης καθαρευούσαις γνώσεσιν.

<sup>283</sup> For the intermediate status of mathematical in Iamblichus, and in Neopythagoreanism in general, see Dominic J. O'Meara, *Pythagoras Revived* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) pp.44ff. For this status in Syrianus, see *ibid.* p.132ff. For the discursivity of mathematical reasoning in Iamblichus, see *ibid.* p.47.

To indivisible realities [Plato] assigned *nous* [*tên noêtên*, i.e. *tên noêtên gnôsin*], which discerns the intelligibles as a whole and with simplicity, and is superior to other forms of knowing because of its freedom from matter, its purity, and its uniform (*henoeidei*) approach and grasp of being. To divisible things which have received the lowest nature, that is to all sensibles, he assigned opinion, which lays hold of an obscure truth. To intermediates, such as are mathematical Forms (*hoia dê esti ta tês mathêmatikês eidê*), which leave behind the partless nature and are established above the divisible nature, he assigned *dianoia*.<sup>284</sup>

Early in the Euclid commentary he interprets Plato's Divided Line in a manner consistent with this division between *Nous*, *dianoia*, and opinion or sensation.

In his interpretation of Plato's divided line, given in the Euclid commentary, Proclus articulates the relation between mathematical *dianoia* and non-mathematical *dianoia*, or dialectic. The top two sections of Plato's fourfold divided line are *noêsis* and *dianoia*. In the *Republic*, *dianoia* is described as a downward moving thinking, which depends on unexamined hypotheses, and *noêsis* as an upward moving thinking, which subjects these hypotheses to examination in order to reach the unhypothetical beginning of all reasoning.<sup>285</sup> For his part, Plato does not say that the objects of *dianoia* are images

<sup>284</sup> In *Eucl.* 3.16-4.8: καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀμερίστοις τὴν νοητὴν ἀπεδίδου τὴν ἀθρόως καὶ μετὰ ἀπλότητος διαιροῦσαν τὰ νοητὰ καὶ τῇ τε ἀϋλῇ καὶ τῇ καθαρότητι καὶ τῇ ἐνοεῖδεϊ προσβολῇ καὶ ἐπιστῇ τῶν ὄντων τὰς ἄλλας ὑπεραίρουσαν γνώσεις, τοῖς δὲ μεριστοῖς καὶ οὖσιν ἐσχάτην λαχοῦσι καὶ αἰσθητοῖς ἅπασιν τὴν δόξαν ἀμυδράς ἀληθείας ἀντιλαμβανομένην, τοῖς δὲ μέσοις, οἷα δὴ ἐστὶ τὰ τῆς μαθηματικῆς εἶδη, καὶ τῆς τε ἀμερίστου φύσεως ἀπολειπομένοις καὶ τῆς μεριστῆς ὑπεριδρυμένοις τὴν διάνοιαν.

<sup>285</sup> See *Republic* 509d-511e. The common interpretation of this passage ignores Plato's description of the different motions of reason in the two top parts of the line and instead characterises the top section as Forms and the second as mathematical. This interpretation must hold that Plato thought whenever we made use of dialectic in order to move upwards towards the unhypothetical principle of reasoning, we would be employing Forms in our reasoning, and whenever we left our premises as unexamined hypotheses and reasoned to conclusions, we would be doing geometry or arithmetic. Although we will see that Proclus thinks something like this to be the case, I find this implausible as a picture of reasoning in Plato. The characterisation of the second section of the line as geometrical is only introduced in the *Republic* as an illustration of how reasoning from unexamined hypotheses works. In other words, Socrates responds to Glaucon's confusion with an illustration. Glaucon is familiar with the method of the geometers, which allows Socrates to use geometry as an example of the sort of reasoning he has in mind. But this is only an example. Socrates says, "I think you understand that those who carry on geometry and discursive reasoning (*logismos*) and such things..." At the end of his description of the second part of the line (511b) Glaucon responds by saying, "I understand...that you are talking about what falls under geometry and its kindred arts [*Μανθάνω...ὅτι τὸ ὑπὸ ταῖς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ ταῖς ταύτης ἀδελφαῖς τέχναις λέγεις.*]" If you take kindred to mean other mathematical arts, then you would think that the second division is the mathematical. However, if you think that Glaucon has understood what Socrates has explained and means by "kindred" those arts which proceed in the manner of the geometers, i.e. from unexamined hypotheses to conclusions, then there is no reason to think that mathematical objects exhaust the content of the second division of the line. Compare this passage with *Phaedo* 99d-101e where Socrates lays out his method of

of the objects of *noësis*.<sup>286</sup> However, Proclus thinks that when Plato divided the top part of the line into *noësis* and *dianoia*, he was distinguishing between the second and third hypostases, so that *Nous* is what properly engages in *noësis*, and Soul engages in *dianoia*. Because the *logoi* which *dianoia* makes use of are images of the *eidê* in *Nous*, it is natural for Proclus to read Plato's text as a hierarchy in which all the lower levels are images of all the higher levels. So in the same way as the fourth division (*eikasia*) is an image of the third (*pistis*), according to Proclus the second division (*dianoia*) is an image of the first (*noësis*).

*Dianoia* studies the images (*eikonas*) of the intelligibles (*noêtôn*), which have descended from the first, simple and partless [existence] into plurality and division; for this reason the knowledge which *dianoia* has is dependent on other, prior hypotheses, while *noësis* rises to the unhypothetical principle itself.<sup>287</sup>

This will allow him to find a double movement in *dianoia*, because it is both image of the higher and paradigm of the lower divisions of the line

Proclus thinks that Plato's first division refers to *Nous*. However, the description of *noësis* which we find in the *Republic*, moving from hypothesis to hypothesis in order to reach an unhypothetical first principle, does not accurately describe the internal life of the Neoplatonic *Nous*. Characteristically, Proclus preserves both of two seemingly contradictory readings of the Platonic text. He finds in it a distinction between *Nous* and Soul as hypostases, but he also finds in it a distinction between an upward and a downward moving reason. In order to save his reading of the text, Proclus does not hold

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beginning with a hypothesis and seeing what agrees with it, and if he encounters no difficulties lays down another hypothesis, the one which seems best, which would give an account (*logos*) of the first, and continues until he reaches something sufficient. In the *Phaedo* passage discussing the hypothesis in question, by trying to find another hypothesis which would give an account of it, is distinct from seeing what follows from or is consistent with the hypothesis itself. Plato there makes no mention of mathematics, although he seems to be following the method of the geometers. Consequently, I find it likely that the second part of the line is not exclusively mathematical.

<sup>286</sup> Rather, he says that *dianoia* makes use of the objects of *pistis*, from the third division of the line, and treats the objects of *pistis* only as images, much in the way that the geometer uses a line drawn in the sand but knows that it is only an image of the true line.

<sup>287</sup> In *Eucl.* I.1.4-9: καὶ ἡ διάνοια τὰς τῶν νοητῶν εἰκόνας θεωρεῖ τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων καὶ ἀπλῶν καὶ ἀμεριστῶν εἰδῶν εἰς πλῆθος καὶ διαιρέσιν υποβάσας, δι' ὃ καὶ ταύτης μὲν ἡ γνῶσις ἀπ' ἄλλων υποθέσεων ἡρτῆται πρᾶσβυτέρων, ἡ δὲ νόσις ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἀνεισι τὴν ἀνυπόθετον ἀρχήν.



that the description of upward moving reason in the *Republic* refers to *noêsis*. Rather, he situates both the upward moving reason and the downward moving reason within the second division of the line, within *dianoia* itself.<sup>288</sup> Proclus interprets the downward reasoning of the second division of the line as depending, not only on hypotheses of the sort which Plato had in mind, but ultimately on the *eidê* in *Nous*. As he tells us in the passage above, it is precisely because the objects of *dianoia* are divided and multiple images of the unitary and simple *eidê* in *Nous* that *dianoia* is dependent on other, prior hypotheses. In Procline terms, the *logoi* which the Soul projects are unfoldings of the *eidê* in *Nous* and have their root there. So the distinction between an upward and a downward moving reason becomes for him the distinction between a thinking which follows the unfolding descent of the Forms from *Nous* into Soul and Body, and a thinking which follows the backwards path in order to rise to the originary Forms in *Nous*. Thus for Proclus *dianoia* is double, and following what he thinks is the correct reading of Plato's text, he calls the upward moving *dianoia* dialectic, and the downward moving *dianoia* mathematics, situating both in the second division of the Line.

A diagram comparing Plato and Proclus on this point is helpful. See figure 3. Appendix.

What is the precise relation between dialectic and mathematics? In his first prologue in the Euclid commentary, Proclus responds to certain detractors of mathematics, who say that Plato denied it the name *epistêmê*. They refer to the passage in the *Republic* where Plato says that geometry and other such subjects are only dreaming about being, and are inferior to dialectic because they leave their hypotheses unexamined.<sup>289</sup> In explaining this passage for his misguided opponents, Proclus articulates the relation between dialectic and mathematics. He says that Plato divided

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<sup>288</sup> Cf. A. Lermould, "La dialectique comme science première chez Proclus," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 71 (1987) pp.509-536.

<sup>289</sup> *Rep.* 533b-d.

*epistēmē* in two. One part is unhypothetical, and rises up to the Good as the terminus of its ascent, while the other part posits determinate beginning points, and demonstrates what follows from them. The unhypothetical *epistēmē* moves up towards the principle (*archē*), while the hypothetical *epistēmē* moves downwards towards conclusions. The second sort of *epistēmē* is mathematics, and Plato only denies the name *epistēmē* to it in the *Republic* in order to signify that it comes second to the one highest *epistēmē*, the unhypothetical *epistēmē*, from which it receives its hypotheses.

...whereas mathematics and in general the investigation of eternal realities he calls *epistēmē*. Once more [Plato] wishes to divide *epistēmē*, which we distinguish from the *technai*, into a part which is unhypothetical, and a part which begins from hypotheses. And the unhypothetical *epistēmē* has knowledge of the whole of things, and rises up to the Good and to the highest cause of all things, making the Good the goal of its ascent. The other *epistēmē* posits determinate beginning points (*archas*) and demonstrates what follows from them, moving not towards a principle (*ep' archēn*) but towards a conclusion (*epi teleutēn*). And it is in this manner that he says mathematics, because it makes use of hypotheses, is inferior to the unhypothetical and complete (*teleion*) *epistēmē*. For the true *epistēmē* is one, by which we are able to know all things, and from which [come] all of the principles (*archai*) [of other *epistēmai*], some more immediately and some at further remove. Let us not, therefore, say that Plato excludes mathematics from the *epistēmai*, but that he shows it to be second to the one highest *epistēmē*; nor that he says that it is ignorant of its own beginning points (*archas*), but that, receiving them from that [highest *epistēmē*] and holding them as undemonstrated, it demonstrates what follows from them.<sup>290</sup>

So for Proclus mathematics is an *epistēmē*, which I take to be equivalent to saying it is a form of *dianoia*, which comes immediately after the "one highest *epistēmē*" and receives its principles from it.

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<sup>290</sup> *In Eucl.* 31.9-32.7: τὴν δ' αὖ μαθηματικὴν καὶ ὅλως τὴν τῶν αἰδίων θεωρητικὴν ἐπιστήμην προσαγορεύει. ταύτην δ' αὖ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἣν τῶν τεχνῶν ἀφορίζομεν, διαιρῶν τὴν μὲν ἀνυπόθετον εἶναι βούλεται. τὴν δὲ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὥρμημένην, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀνυπόθετον τῶν ὅλων εἶναι γνωστικὴν μέχρι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀνωτάτω τῶν πάντων αἰτίας ἀναβαίνουσαν καὶ τῆς ἀναγωγῆς τέλος ποιουμένην τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ ὥρισμένης ἀρχᾶς προσησασμένην ἀπὸ τούτων δεικνύναι τὰ ἐπόμενα αὐταῖς οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τελευτὴν ἰούσαν. καὶ οὕτως δὴ τὴν μαθηματικὴν αἶτε ὑποθέσειςιν χρωμένην τῆς ἀνυπόθετου καὶ τελείας ἐπιστήμης ἀπολείπεσθαι φησιν. μία γὰρ ἡ ὄντως ἐπιστήμη, καθ' ἣν τὰ ὄντα πάντα γινώσκειν πεφύκαμεν. καὶ αὐτῇς πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρχαὶ ταῖς μὲν ἐγγυτέρω τεταγμέναις, ταῖς δὲ πορρωτέρω, μὴ δὴ τοίνυν λέγωμεν, ὅτι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ὁ Πλάτων ἀπελάνει τὴν μαθηματικὴν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μίαν ἐπιστήμην αὐτὴν τῆς ἀκροτάτης δευτέραν ἀποφαίνει, μὴδ' ὅτι τὰς οἰκείας ἀρχὰς ἀγνοεῖν αὐτὴν φησιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι παρ' ἐκείνης λαβοῦσαν καὶ ἀναποδείκτως ἔχουσαν ἐκ τούτων τὰ ἐφεξῆς ἀποδεικνύναι.

This one highest *epistēmē* is dialectic.<sup>291</sup> Dialectic makes mathematics to be one, because the diversity of beginning points which mathematics unfolds in its various arguments are all received from dialectic, which in turn is able to refer them all back to the unitary *eidē* in *Nous*.<sup>292</sup>

And we say that just as *Nous* is set over *dianoia* and supplies to it its beginning points (*archas*) from above, and perfects *dianoia* from out of itself, in the same manner dialectic, the purest part of philosophy, which is just above mathematics, makes it to be one.<sup>293</sup> and comprehends its entire unfolding.<sup>294</sup>

In a later passage Proclus describes dialectic as the unifying bond (*sundesmos*) of the mathematical *epistēmai*, and, following Plato (*Rep.* 534e), as their capstone or coping stone (*thrigchos*).

But we should say that the immediate unifying bond [of the various mathematical *epistēmai*] is the one and whole mathematical *epistēmē*<sup>295</sup> which contains in itself in simpler form the beginning points (*archas*) of each of the particular *epistēmai*. It regards what is common between them and in what they differ, and teaches what is identical in all, and what belongs to more or to fewer of them. The ascent for those who are learning [mathematics] rightly is from the many *epistēmai* to this one. But even higher than this, dialectic is the unifying bond or capstone (as is it called in the *Republic*) of mathematics. Dialectic by means of its own powers both perfects the [one and] whole mathematical [*epistēmē*] and sends it upward towards *Nous*, showing that it truly is an *epistēmē* and rendering it stable and irrefutable.<sup>296</sup>

<sup>291</sup> Cf. *In Parm.* 947.1-11.

<sup>292</sup> See A. Charles, "Sur le caractère intermédiaire des mathématiques dans la pensée de Proklos," *Les Études Philosophiques*, 22 (1967) pp.69-80; see pp.74-75.

<sup>293</sup> Morrow translates *υπερήπλωται* as 'hovers attentively over', presumably taking it to be *υπέρ* + *ἀπλέω*, i.e. above – not to be sailing, or to be stationary. It is rather *υπέρ* + *ἀπλόω*, i.e. above – to make single. In this sense dialectic is right next to mathematics (*προσεχώς*), making it to be one from its station above it, as *Nous* is set above *dianoia*.

<sup>294</sup> *In Eucl.* 42.12-18: *καὶ λέγομεν, ὅτι καθάπερ ὁ νοῦς ὑπερίδρυται τῆς διανοίας καὶ χορηγεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀνάθεν αὐτῇ καὶ τελειοῖ τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς αὐτοῦ, κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὴ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ φιλοσοφίας οὕσα τὸ καθαρώτατον μέρος, προσεχώς ὑπερήπλωται τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ περιέχει τὴν ὅλην αὐτῶν ἀνέλιξιν.*

<sup>295</sup> As I mentioned in chapter II, Morrow translates *holē mathēmatikē* as "general mathematics." This is the unified projection of *logoi* as mathematics, which as Proclus says in this passage, is the source of the more multiple projection of the various disciplines of mathematics.

<sup>296</sup> *In Eucl.* 44.1-14: *ἀλλ' ὡς ἡμεῖς ἂν φαίμεν, προσεχῆς μὲν ἐστὶν αὐτῶν σύνδεσμος ἡ μία καὶ ὅλη μαθηματικὴ τὰς πασῶν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα ἐπιστημῶν ἀρχὰς ἀπλοῦστερον ἐν ἑαυτῇ περιέχουσα καὶ τὴν τε κοινωνίαν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἐπεσκεμμένη καὶ ὅσα τὰ αὐτὰ ἐν πάσαις ἀναδιδάσκουσα, καὶ ὅσα πλείους ὑπάρχει καὶ ὅσα ἐλάττωσιν, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἡ ἀνοδος τοῖς κατὰ τρόπον μανθάνουσιν, ἀνωτέρω δ' ἐστὶ ταύτης ἡ διαλεκτικὴ τῶν μαθημάτων ἂν εἴη σύνδεσμος, ἡ καὶ θριγγὼν αὐτῶν, ὡς ἔφην, ἐν πολιτείᾳ προσείρηκεν, αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τὴν ὅλην μαθηματικὴν τελειοῖ καὶ εἰς*

Mathematics is in need of this capstone, because as a downward moving reason it moves from determinate beginning points and proceeds downward into multiplicity. It cannot give itself its own unity, because it does not refer its beginning points back to their ultimate unity. Dialectic, on the other hand, travels the backwards way by gathering the diversity of *logoi* which *dianoia* employs and referring them back to the unity of *Nous*.

However, dialectic in turn is in need of a unifying bond or capstone, because although its ultimate aim is to leave behind the divided *logoi* of *dianoia*, it still makes use of them and cannot escape them. So as mathematics is unified by dialectic, dialectic is unified by *Nous*.

But holding the third place among these unifying bonds is *Nous* itself, which comprehends all of the powers of dialectic in itself in a uniform manner, and which brings together their variousness through simplicity, their partiality through partless knowledge, and their multiplicity through unification. *Nous* folds together the unfoldings of the dialectical methods, binds together from above the discursus of mathematical *logoi*, and is the best end of the upward journey and the activity of knowing.<sup>297</sup>

Proclus thinks that the aim of dialectic is to raise the soul to a sort of knowing higher than dialectic, which is the unity of *Nous*. In this he agrees with Plotinus.

Dialectic and mathematics are both forms of *dianoia*, because they both make use of the divided *logoi* which exist on the level of soul. As we have seen, Proclus thinks that the *ousia* of the soul is a fullness of *logoi* (*plêrôma tôn logôn*) which are always cognitively active. We are essentially cognitive activity, but we are not aware of this activity of our *ousia* because we do not attend to it, as we do not attend to our heartbeat or our breathing.<sup>298</sup> *Dianoia* is that further activity by which we project forth these essential

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νοῦν ἀναπέμπει ταῖς ἑαυτῆς δυνάμεσι, καὶ ἐπιστήμην ὄντως ἀποφαίνει καὶ μόνιμον καὶ ἀνέλεγκτον ἀπεργάζεται.

<sup>297</sup> In *Eucl.* 4.4.14-23: τρίτην δ' ἂν ἔχοι τάξιν ἐν τοῖς συνδέσμοις ὁ νοῦς αὐτός ὁ πάσας τὰς διαλεκτικὰς δυνάμεις ἐν ἑαυτῷ μονοειδῶς περιέχων καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν αὐτῶν διὰ τῆς ἀπλότητος καὶ τὸν μερισμὸν διὰ τῆς ἀμεροῦς γνώσεως καὶ τὸ πλῆθος διὰ τῆς ἐνώσεως συνάγων. αὐτὸς δὲ οὖν συμπτύσσει μὲν τὰς ἀνελίζεις τῶν διαλεκτικῶν μεθόδων, συνδεῖ δὲ ἄνωθεν πᾶσαν τὴν διεξοδὸν τῶν μαθηματικῶν λόγων, τέλος δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἀριστον τῆς ἀναγωγῆς πορείας καὶ τῆς γνωστικῆς ἐνεργείας.

<sup>298</sup> See C. Steel, "Breathing Thought: Proclus on the innate knowledge of the soul," in *The perennial tradition of Neoplatonism*, ed. J. Cleary (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1997) pp.293-309.

*logoi* and become conscious of them. The *logoi* which are our *ousia*, however, do not themselves exist in the same manner as fully projected *logoi*. Our essence is not a collection of philosophical arguments. Rather, our essence is like the one whole mathematical science, which contains in undifferentiated form all of the particular sciences, or it is like the unity of the premises, from which the conclusion may be drawn out. So by projecting its own essential *logoi*, the soul transforms those *logoi*. If the Soul's projected *logoi* are unfoldings of its *ousia*, then the Soul knows even its own *ousia* through the images which its activity calls into being. Further, if *dianoia* has two different motions, it stands to reason that the projected *logoi* which mathematics and dialectic end with will differ from each other, even if both begin from the *logoi* which are resident in the *ousia* of the soul. Things are in the manner in which they are known, so *ousiôdeis logoi* which are projected with an eye to Body will differ from the same *ousiôdeis logoi* projected with an eye to *Nous*.

This general theory of *dianoia* also shows us the status of the hypotheses which Plato speaks about, according to Proclus. The hypotheses in question are the *logoi* which the soul projects out of itself. Dialectic takes the *logoi* which it projects as stepping stones to an unhypothetical grasp of *Nous*. Mathematics, on the other hand, takes the hypotheses which dialectic projects, and lets them stand, travelling downward from them as if they were fixed beginning points. Notice that Proclus understands this distinction in an ontological manner. Moving upward to the unhypothetical is an attending to objects of thought which are ontologically higher, namely the *eidê* in *Nous*. Moving downward from assumed hypotheses is to consider the soul's *logoi* as fixed points from which to descend to the consideration of lower things.

It does not seem to present a problem for us that Proclus should characterise upward moving *dianoia* as dialectic. Plato seems to describe dialectic as an upward moving discursive reason, so this is familiar to us. But it is peculiar to think that

downward moving *dianoia* is mathematical reasoning, i.e. that all discursive reason which makes use of assumed hypotheses is mathematics.

There seem to be two main reasons why Proclus thinks that the *logoi* which downward moving reason projects are mathematical, one hermeneutical and one systematic. However, with both of these reasons we must keep in mind that Proclus calls many more things by mathematical names than we ourselves would. Recall the long passage on the circle which I quoted in chapter III.<sup>299</sup> Although Proclus is clear about the ontological station of mathematical circles, he is very free in his use of the name circle when it comes to non-mathematical things which stand in the same series and are therefore circle-like. He can call the soul a self-moving number, or speak about the figures of the gods, without meaning that either the soul or the gods are, strictly speaking, mathematical entities. He can endorse Plato's mathematical construction of the Soul in the *Timaeus*, while thinking that the soul is not mathematical, but that the arithmetic, harmonic, and geometrical proportions are only images of the structure of the Soul. This sort of terminological fluidity is characteristic of Proclus' thought.

The first reason Proclus thinks that downward moving *dianoia* is mathematics is the simple hermeneutic demand of interpreting the *Republic* passages. While I myself think that in the *Republic* Plato only cites mathematics as an example of *dianoia*, the text is underdetermined, and it is possible to read it such that downward moving reason is mathematical reason and that alone. I think this is the reading that Proclus had, and so when he cites the *Republic* passage in the Euclid commentary he naturally characterises downward moving reason as mathematical.

The second, and more interesting, reason that Proclus holds this position is due to the fact that in his ontological hierarchy mathematical entities are situated 'below' the Soul's *ousia*. Proclus lists four types of number in the *Timaeus* commentary: divine

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<sup>299</sup> In *Eucl.* I 48.5-150.12.

(*theios*).<sup>300</sup> of the order of *ousia* (*ousiôdês*), psychic (*psuchikos*), and physical (*phusikos*). By "the order of *ousia*" Proclus means here the number appropriate to *Nous*, and by "psychic" he means the monads out of which the *ousia* of the Soul is composed. Note that mathematical number is missing from this list. It lies between the Soul's *ousia* and physical number. In speaking about the *ousia* of the Soul, Proclus tells us that the monads in it are not mathematical, because mathematical monads are not of the order of *ousia* (*anousioi*), and they are not physical, because physical monads are in an underlying matter.<sup>301</sup> In other words, mathematical monads are in between the monads which are the *ousia* of the Soul, and the monads which are in body.

This gives us a compelling explanation for why Proclus thinks downward moving *dianoia* is mathematics. A *dianoia* that moves downwards is a *dianoia* that projects the Soul's essential *logoi*, and has as its end the further unfolding of the hidden content of these *logoi*. Dialectic as upward moving *dianoia* has as its end to see the soul's *logoi* as images of the paradigms in *Nous*, and so lead the soul away from the multiplicity of its own projection, in a reversion upon *Nous*. It is in this sense that dialectic seeks the unhypothetical. Downward moving *dianoia*, on the other hand, has as its aim to draw out the implicit content of the Soul's *logoi* in ever increasing multiplicity. But the unfolding of the Soul into ever further multiplicity parallels the unfolding of the cosmos as an image of the Soul itself. In other words, downward moving *dianoia* does not regard the soul's *logoi* as images of *Nous*, but rather as paradigms of Body, i.e. as fixed points from which it can consider the reality below the Soul.

The *logoi* which the Soul projects from its *ousia* are paradigms of Body insofar as they are the proximate ordering principles of Body, without themselves being bodily. They mediate between the immateriality and unity of the Soul's *ousia* and the extension

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<sup>300</sup> In *Tim.* II. 161.25-32. For divine number in Iamblichus, see Dominic J. O'Meara, *Pythagoras Revived* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) pp.79-84.

<sup>301</sup> In *Tim.* II. 164.19-28. Notice Proclus' fluid use of terms: *ousiôdês* refers to *Nous* in the first places, and *anousioi* refers to the *ousia* of Soul, in the second place.

and confusion of Body. In other words, they are the proportions, numbers, and figures which constitute mathematical being. As soon as the Soul departs from the consideration of its *ousia*, and in a downward moving *dianoia* examines that which it produces, it projects mathematical *logoi* as the paradigms through which it can contemplate body. It is for this reason that Proclus thinks downward moving *dianoia* is mathematics.

There is an ambiguity here which we should consider. We can think of the distinction between dialectic and mathematics in two ways. On the one hand, they both make use of *logoi* which the Soul projects. In that sense they should have the same ontological 'station', and differ only in the fact that in the first case the *logoi* are being considered as images of a higher reality, and in the second case they are being considered as paradigms of a lower. From this perspective, the perception that we have that dialectic and mathematics make use of different *logoi*, i.e. that metaphysics does not make use of numbers and ratios, arises because the *logoi* are used as lenses, if you will, to look at different things. And so they themselves seem different depending on what they point to. On the other hand, we can think of the *logoi* which they project as different in station. Dialectic as a motion of thought will tend to give more unity to the *logoi* which it projects, while mathematics as a motion of thought will tend towards greater multiplicity. So the projected *logoi*, while issuing from the same source, are hierarchically ordered in terms of unity and multiplicity. I think we have to understand Proclus' theory in both of these senses, because I don't think he himself thought the distinction through entirely consistently. The biggest problem with this division is that the majority of Proclus' discussions of mathematics in the prologues to the Euclid commentary, and in the *Timaeus* commentary present mathematics as an image of either the *ousia* of the Soul or realities even higher.<sup>302</sup> So although mathematical *logoi* are paradigms of Body, they are

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<sup>302</sup> Cf. A. Lernoùd, "La dialectique comme science première chez Proclus," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 71 (1987) pp.509-536; see p.518: "Mais il est important de souligner que la perfection «formelle» de la science première est inséparable d'une supériorité «matérielle», c'est-à-dire d'une supériorité selon l'objet. Les opérations que sont l'analyse, la division, et toutes les autres, sont plus



also images of the intelligible, and so one can reason dialectically when considering mathematical *logoi*, in the sense that the consideration of mathematical *logoi* can lead the soul upward towards the unhypothetical nature of *Nous*. Conversely, one may make use of the sorts of *logoi* which are the objects of dialectic, such as justice or the five greatest kinds, and take the imperfect projection of them with which the soul begins as assumed beginning points in order to reason about things below the soul. In so doing one is reasoning 'mathematically' but not thinking about mathematical objects.

What Proclus should have in fact said is that *dianoia* has two movements, dialectic and a downward motion, and that an important feature of the downward motion of *dianoia* is that it projects forth mathematical *logoi* when it considers the unfolding of

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pures, le raisonnement est plus serré, en un mot, la puissance dialectique est moins divisée parce qu'elle est appliquée aux objets les moins divisés et parce que l'on remonte jusqu'à la Cause ultime de toutes choses..." Lernould assimilates the epistemological hierarchy within the soul (*nous*, dialectic, mathematics, physics, opinion, sensation) to the cycle of the procession of power (*dunamis*) which S. Gersh has explained in *KINHISIS AKINHTOS* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973) pp.60-72. In this sense a sort of cognition reaches perfection and overflows, establishing a lower level of cognition which is imperfect in power. So dialectic establishes mathematics out of the perfection of power which is proper to it. Mathematics, in turn, reaches its own (lower) perfection of power by reversion upon dialectic, in accepting from dialectic the starting points of mathematics. This description is attractive, and has the virtue of showing forth in the epistemological point of view the same cyclical motion of power which governs the ontological point of view. However, it needs to be nuanced somewhat to see what is taking place in Proclus. While in one sense the cyclical motion of remaining, procession, and return which is the ontological motion of power is the same at all levels of reality between the One and matter, in another sense it is not. This uniform cycle is itself also governed by the interaction of Limit (*πέρας*) and Unlimited (*ἄπειρον*). On a higher ontological level, Limit has more influence than Unlimited, and the cyclical procession of power gives rise to entities which are more unified, more like their causes, and more able to return upon them. When Unlimited dominates, at the lower levels, the reverse is true. Body, for example, is unable to revert upon its causes because of the domination of Limit by Unlimited found in it. In a sense, the cyclical procession of power only functions 'normally' in the middle region; that is to say, for *Nous* and for Soul. A similar gradation should appear from the epistemological viewpoint. Soul is the centre of the universe, in that in Soul neither Limit nor Unlimited dominates. Hence, in the case of the partial soul, we find an ability to mount upwards towards *Nous*, or sink downwards towards the multiplicity of sensation. Soul's own proper mode of cognition, which is *dianoia*, manifests this duality of movement. Its higher half, dialectic, allows the soul to move towards *Nous*, while its lower half, mathematics, is the beginning of the soul's motion towards body. Thus Lernould's epistemological hierarchy should be modified: 1. *Nous*; 2. *dianoia* (comprising: 2.a. dialectic; and 2.b. mathematics); 3. physics/opinion; 4. sensation. *Nous* leads the soul upwards, while physics/opinion and sensation lead it down, analogous to the domination of Limit or Unlimited in their objects. *Dianoia*, on the other hand, reflects the balance of Limit and Unlimited in its objects, as its upper half takes as object intermediate being and mounts towards *Nous*, while its lower half takes the same intermediate being and descends towards body. In this sense, *dianoia* as the soul's own proper mode of knowing manifests the declension in power in the cycle from perfection, to imperfection, to lower perfection of power.

cosmos beginning from the *ousia* of the soul. Proclus' corpus in fact bears out this characterisation of *dianoia*. He has works of dialectic, such as for example the Parmenides commentary with its ending in the silence of the soul. And he also has various arguments which unfold the implicit content of hypotheses which are assumed from other, dialectical, arguments, not all of which are mathematical.

Finally, I am not sure if it is easy to separate out these two motions of *dianoia* in quite the neat manner which Proclus claims in the Euclid commentary. That text is motivated by a need to explain the *Republic* passage, and so will present us with two neatly distinguished motions of thinking. But if we consider a work like the *Elements of Theology*, it is difficult to say whether it is an upward or a downward moving example of *dianoia*. While on the one hand the overall structure of the *Elements* is a deduction, the sort of argument we find in the proofs is overwhelmingly dialectical. Take the proof for the first hypothesis. It takes each logically possible position as a hypothesis, produces absurdities in each hypothesis but one, and thereby proves the first hypothesis. The rest of the work continues this process of drawing out the implications of the first proposition, both to follow the unfolding of the cosmos from the One in a downward moving reason, but also to establish the first proposition as unshakeable, and so lead the soul dialectically up to a more firm grasp of its truth. In this sense I think the *Elements* exhibits both motions of *dianoia*, and shows that in our thinking both of these motions occur simultaneously.

Be this as it may, Proclus understands mathematics as one half of the motion of thinking which is *dianoia*. When *dianoia* as the Soul's *energeia* moves upwards in an attempt to grasp the *ousia* of the Soul itself, and beyond it the Forms in *Nous*, it is dialectic. When *dianoia* as the Soul's *energeia* moves downwards towards body it is as

an image of the *ousia* of the Soul, i.e. as mathematics, and thus as the ordering principle of body.<sup>303</sup>

We should note, as the final point in this section, that although mathematical *logoi* are the proximate ordering principles of Body, they are not identical with the *logoi* that are in Body. So although in one sense downward moving reason is mathematical, this is only the case with regard to the highest part of this movement. In other words, mathematics itself is the investigation of the image of the Soul's *ousia* which is also the ordering principle of body, but there remains the investigation of that which is ordered, body itself, and one must not confuse these two:

After our mathematical consideration of this text, we must turn our investigation towards the physical consideration of it. It is not proper to remain with mathematical *logoi*, and strangle our argument, (for the dialogue concerns physics), nor to neglect mathematical *logoi*, in a wish to attend to sensation alone. Rather, we must join the two, and always weave the study of physical things together with the the study of mathematics, just as the things themselves are woven together, being of the same race and brothers in virtue of their procession from *Nous*. And in general, if the Pythagoreans placed the mathematical being in the middle between the intelligible and the sensible, as more unfolded (*anellittomenên*) than the intelligible, and more universal than the sensible, why should we neglect mathematics and consider physical *logoi* alone? For how is the sensible ordered, and according to what *logoi* is it set in order, and from which *logoi* has it come forth, if not from mathematical *logoi*? At any rate, mathematical *logoi* are primarily in souls, having descended from *Nous*, and then descend from souls into bodies. So we must not remain with mathematical *logoi*, as certain people do. For this position places false opinions in its auditors, such as the idea that physical things are mathematical figures and numbers, and is absurd in other ways. For physical *logoi* do not admit of the precision and fixity of

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<sup>303</sup> For another discussion of the place of mathematics in Proclus, see A. Charles, "Sur le caractère intermédiaire des mathématiques dans la pensée de Proklos," *Les Études Philosophiques*, 22 (1967) pp.69-80. Charles considers the relation between *dianoia* and *phantasia* to be the relation between remaining and proceeding, in that it is in *phantasia* that the unified figures hidden in *dianoia* emerge into distinction (p.72). I think that this is not the case. Mathematics is a part of *dianoia* and the *phantasia* which is employed in geometrical reasoning is hence also a form of *dianoia*. In one sense all *dianoia* is the moment of return, i.e. the *energeia* in the triad *ousia*, *dunamis*, *energeia*, because the *energeia* is the activity or actuality of the soul's knowledge, in its grasp of itself. But in another sense, because the *energeia* is the return only through the *dunamis* to the *ousia* of the soul, in this third moment (*energeia*) the other two are implicit. Thus all forms of *dianoia* involve all three moments: remaining, procession, and return. However, in the stricter sense all *dianoia*, contrary to Charles' characterisation of it as remaining, is the moment of return.

mathematical *logoi*. And moreover we would not be following the rules of demonstration, where it says not to transfer what is known in one genus into another genus. So in no way should we consider physical realities as if they were mathematical realities.<sup>304</sup>

Proclus does not conflate the various levels of his system, even if his more general theories dictate that he should. Here we see that he clearly distinguishes between two sorts of downward moving reason, or two sorts of reason which regard the Soul's *logoi* are paradigms of Body. The one makes use of a higher sort of projected *logos*, the mathematical *logos*, and the other makes use of a lower projected *logos*, the physical *logos*. But of course, the *phusikoi logoi* which are the actual *logoi* in bodies are not the *phusikoi logoi* which Proclus is referring to here, because he is referring to *logoi* which we as Souls are thinking, not *logoi* which are the indwelling organising principles of sensible things.

In the rest of this chapter we will examine various aspects of Proclus' philosophy of mathematics, with regard to the place of mathematics between the Soul's *ousia* and Body.

#### IV.ii. Mathematics as an image of the structure of the Soul's *ousia*

The fundamental text for Proclus' account of the internal structure of the Soul is the passage from Plato's *Timaeus* where the Demiurge creates the Soul of the Cosmos:

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<sup>304</sup> *In Tim.* II.23.9-33: Μετὰ δὴ τὴν μαθηματικὴν ἀνάληψιν τῶν ῥημάτων τούτων ἐπὶ τὴν φυσικὴν δεῖ τρέπεσθαι θεωρίαν, οὐτε γὰρ τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐγκαταμένειν προσήκει τὸν λόγον ἀπαρτῶντας (φυσικός γὰρ ὁ διάλογος) οὐτε ἀμελεῖν τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων τὸ πρὸς αἰσθητὴν μόνον ἐπιζητούντας, ἀλλὰ δεῖ συνάπτειν ἀμφοτέρω καὶ συμπλέκειν αἰεὶ τὰ φυσικὰ τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα συμπλέκεται καὶ ἔστιν ὁμογενὴ καὶ ἀδελφὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ νοῦ πρόοδον, καὶ γὰρ ὅλως εἰ μέσσην ἔταττον οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τὴν μαθηματικὴν οὐσίαν τῶν τε νοητῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ὡς ἀνελιττομένην μὲν τῶν νοητῶν μᾶλλον, καθολικωτέραν δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὖσαν, τί χρὴ ταῦτα παρέντας οὐσιολογίας μόνης φροντίζειν; πῶς γὰρ διακεκῶσμηται τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἢ κατὰ ποίους διατέτακται λόγους ἢ ἀπὸ ποίων προελήλυθε λόγων ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθηματικῶν; οὗτοι γοῦν οἱ λόγοι πρῶτως μὲν εἰσιν ἐν ψυχαῖς ἀπὸ νοῦ καταβάντες, ἔπειτα ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἀπὸ τῶν ψυχῶν, δεῖ δὴ οὖν μὴ μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν, ὥσπερ τινὲς ποιοῦσι τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ψευδεῖς δόξας ἐμποιεῖ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν, ὡς τῶν φυσικῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἀριθμῶν μαθηματικῶν ὄντων, καὶ ἄλλως ἀποπον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιδέχονται τῶν μαθημάτων τὸ ἀκριβὲς καὶ ἐρηρυσμένον οἱ λόγοι τῆς οὐσεως, πρὸς τῷ μὴδὲ τοῖς ἀποδεικτικοῖς ἡμᾶς ἔπεσθαι κανόνιν, ἐν οἷς εἴρηται μὴ μεταφέρειν τὰ ἀπ' ἄλλου γένους ἐπιστητὰ εἰς ἄλλο γένος, οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ τὰ φυσικὰ δυνατόν ἀριθμητικῶς θεωρεῖν. See also *In Tim.* I.8.13-27.

The components from which he made the soul and the way in which he made it were as follows: In between the Being (*ousias*) which is indivisible and always changeless, and the one which is divisible and comes to be in bodies, he mixed a third, intermediate form of being (*ousias eidos*), derived from the other two. Similarly, he made a mixture of the Same, and then one of the Other, intermediate between the indivisible sort [of Same and Other] and the sort [of Same and Other] which is divided among bodies. And he took the three intermediates and mixed them all together to make one thing (*mian panta idean*), forcing the Other, which was hard to mix, into conformity with the Same.<sup>305</sup> Now when he had mixed these two together with Being, and from the three had made a single mixture, he redivided the whole mixture into as many parts as his task required, each part remaining a mixture of the Same, the Other, and of Being. This is how he began the division: first he took one portion away from the whole, and then he took another, twice as large, followed by a third, one and a half times as large as the second and three times as large as the first. The fourth portion he took was twice as large as the second, the fifth three times as large as the third, the sixth eight times that of the first, and the seventh twenty-seven times that of the first.<sup>306</sup>

Plato continues his account by explaining how the Demiurge filled in the intervals between the seven portions of the Soul with various ratios of the original terms, and finally how the Demiurge cut the whole in two lengthwise, and formed these two strips into two circles. These are carried around in a circular motion, and are themselves in revolution, one as the movement of the Same and the other as the movement of the Other.

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<sup>305</sup> The Demiurge begins with six things: Being which is indivisible and Being which is divisible, and likewise two sorts of Same and two of Other. He mixes the indivisible and the divisible Being in order to produce a third sort of Being, intermediate between the original two. He does this as well with Same and Other, so that he produces three new things, and intermediate Being, an intermediate Same, and an intermediate Other. He then takes these three new intermediate mixtures which he has made, and mixed them all together to produce one mixture which has as its components the intermediate Being, the intermediate Same and the intermediate Other.

<sup>306</sup> *Tim.* 35a-c: ἀρξομένου συνεστήσατο ἐκ τῶνδε τε καὶ τοιῶδε τρόπῳ, τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ αἰὲ κατὰ ταῦτα ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς τρίτον ἐξ ἀμοιβῶν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς τε ταύτου φύσεως [αὐτῆς περὶ] καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου, καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα συνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμερούς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ· καὶ τρία λαβὼν αὐτὰ ὄντα συνεκράσατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταῦτόν συναρμότιον βίᾳ, μειγνύς δὲ μετὰ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἐκ τριῶν ποιησάμενος ἓν, πάλιν ὅλον τοῦτο μοίρας ὥσας προσήκον διένειμεν, ἐκάστην δὲ ἐκ τε ταύτου καὶ θατέρου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας μεμειγμένην, ἤρχετο δὲ διαιρεῖν ὧδε, μίαν ἀφείλεν τὸ πρῶτον ἀπὸ παντὸς μοῖραν, μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἀφῆρει διπλασίαν ταύτης, τὴν δ' αὖ τρίτην ἡμιολίαν μὲν τῆς δευτέρας, τριπλασίαν δὲ τῆς πρώτης, τετάρτην δὲ τῆς δευτέρας διπλὴν, πέμπτῃ δὲ τριπλὴν τῆς τρίτης, τὴν δ' ἕκτην τῆς πρώτης ὀκταπλασίαν, ἑβδόμῃ δ' ἑκτακαίεικοσιπλασίαν τῆς πρώτης.

The motion of the Same is left undivided.<sup>307</sup> while the motion of the Other is divided into seven circles which rotate at varying speeds and in varying directions.<sup>308</sup>

Note that Being, Same and Other are three of the Greatest Kinds (*megista genê*) listed in Plato's *Sophist*, the other two being Motion and Rest.<sup>309</sup> For Proclus, the Greatest Kinds are the primary divisions of the Intelligible Forms in *Nous*, and it is in looking to the intelligible patterns that the Demiurge creates the Soul and gives it order. The source for this is the *Timaeus*, where Plato says that the Demiurge creates the world after the pattern of the "living being" which "comprehends within itself all intelligible living beings" (*ta gar dê noêta zôia panta ekeino en heautôi perilabon echei*).<sup>310</sup> or the "complete living being" (*to panteles zôion*).<sup>311</sup> Proclus calls this model the *autozôion*, or the 'living being itself'.<sup>312</sup> The Demiurge orders the Soul and the cosmos according to the Forms which it sees in the *autozôion*, and hence which it also possesses in its own thought.

The Demiurge himself looks towards himself and towards that which precedes him – for it was not permitted him that he should look towards that which is after

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<sup>307</sup> This is the motion of the Earth on its axis, i.e. the plane of the equator.

<sup>308</sup> The motion of the Other is the plane of the Zodiac, which has within itself the seven planets, all of which seem to revolve around the earth at varying speeds. The varying speeds and *directions* of the rotation of the planets is likely Plato's attempt to account for the observed phenomena of planetary motion. See Cornford's excellent explanation of the technical details of this passage in his *Plato's Cosmology* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997 [Routledge, 1935]) pp.72-93.

<sup>309</sup> *Soph.* 254c-255e.

<sup>310</sup> *Tim.* 30c.

<sup>311</sup> *Tim.* 31b.

<sup>312</sup> The structure of *Nous* in Proclus is the following. *Nous* as a whole is divided into the 'intelligible', the 'intelligible-and-intellectual', and the 'intellectual' orders, which correspond roughly to the object of knowledge, the power of this object to be known, and the knowing moment. The first two orders are each subdivided into three triads, producing nine distinctions within the intelligible and within the intelligible-and-intellectual. The αὐτοζῶον is identified with the third triad in the intelligible order. The intellectual order is subdivided into seven levels. The Demiurge holds the third place in this seven-fold division. As complex as this scheme is, its basic import is that the knowing moment of *Nous* orders the lower creation according to the Forms which are its moment as object of thought. For the place of the *autozôion* see *In Tim.* I.419.16; for the place of the Demiurge see *In Tim.* I.310.3ff. A good summary of the levels of *Nous* is given in H. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy, Mysticism, Magic and Platonism in the Later Roman Empire* (Cairo, 1956 [New edition with a contribution by P. Hadot, "Bilan et perspectives sur les Oracles Chaldaïques et une bibliographie de H. Lewy." (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1978)]) pp.483-484.

him – and in looking towards these things the Demiurge brings forth all things and makes the Universe (*to pan*) as a whole to be an image of the intelligible whole.<sup>313</sup>

There is a declension in content in the move from the *autozôion* to the thought of the Demiurge, in the same manner as there is a declension in the move from *Nous* to Soul. The same Forms exist in the *autozôion* and in the thought of the Demiurge, but they exist in an intelligible manner in the intelligible model, and in an intellectual manner in the intellectual Demiurge.

Everything which is in the paradigm is also in the Demiurge, and in creating the cosmos with reference to the model, he is also creating it with reference to himself. For the intelligible integrality (*pantotês*) is different from the intellectual.<sup>314</sup>

The same holds for the difference between the Demiurge and the Soul. Thus in creating the Soul as a mixture of Being, Same and Other, the Demiurge is producing in the Soul a homologous structure on the psychic level of what he himself contains and what he sees in the *autozôion*. Proclus interprets the Platonic statement that the Being, Same and Other which the Demiurge mixes together to make the Soul are of an intermediate status as indicating the intermediate status of the Soul,<sup>315</sup> which is between that which is "indivisible and always changeless" (*Nous*) and that "that is divisible and comes to be in bodies" (the forms divided among bodies).<sup>316</sup> Thus, although Being, Same and Other as the Platonic Greatest Kinds or genera exist in their primary manner in the intelligible

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<sup>313</sup> In *Tim.*I.431.31-432.4: αὐτὸν τε τὸν δημιουργὸν εἰς ἑαυτὸν τε ὁρᾶν καὶ τὰ πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ-πρὸς γὰρ τὰ μετ' αὐτὸν αὐτῷ θέμις οὐκ ἦν ἀποβλέπειν-καὶ ὁρῶντα πρὸς ἐκεῖνα πάντα παράγειν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ὡς πᾶν εἰκόνα ποιεῖν τοῦ νοητοῦ παντός·

<sup>314</sup> In *Tim.*I.432.16-18: πάντ' οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ δημιουργῷ ὅσα περ ἐν τῷ παραδείγματι, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ποιῶν τὸν κόσμον καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖ, παντότης δὲ ἄλλη μὲν ἡ νοητή, ἄλλη δὲ ἡ νοερά· The situation is complex. Not only does the *autozôion* comprehend the intelligible Forms, it also comprehends all of the intellectual orders, of which the Demiurge is a member. It contains them in a different manner: the one being contained as parts of a whole, the other as the effect is comprehended in the cause (In *Tim.*I.432.25-27). Thus the Demiurge contains in its own intellectual manner the intelligible content of the *autozôion* because it itself is comprehended in the *autozôion* causally. This is a good illustration of why the same content exists in the lower orders as in the higher, according to Proclus. It is not that the lower is able to comprehend the higher, but that it itself is comprehended by the higher, thus all that the lower contains pre-exists in the higher principle.

<sup>315</sup> See J. Trouillard, *L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1972) pp.50-67.

<sup>316</sup> There are actually four levels: *Nous*, Soul, Forms divided among bodies but which are distinct from the bodies which they inform, and bodies themselves. See In *Tim.*II.151.13-152.2.

*autozōion*, they exist in a different manner as well in the intellectual Demiurge, in Soul. in the forms divided among bodies and in bodies themselves. These are homologous structures, and the mutual relations between these Kinds hold the same on each level, although the manner of their existence on each level varies in terms of their unity and multiplicity.

What would be surprising if the Whole Soul.<sup>317</sup> which possesses in itself in a manner appropriate to it whatever the Divine *Nous* possesses in a demiurgic manner, were also to embrace in advance the cause of the last things of the cosmos and as it were the sediment of the whole? For the Soul comprehends the invisible Cosmos before the visible, sensible Cosmos.<sup>318</sup>

The soul is subdivided into more than Being, Same and Other. These may be the primary constituents out of which it is formed, but it contains within itself further distinctions. However, although the Soul is divided into a number of parts, each part is considered by Proclus to remain a compound of Being, Same and Other.<sup>319</sup> The further divisions of the Soul are as follows.<sup>320</sup> The primary distinction, as with all spiritual entities, is into the triad of *ousia*, *dunamis*, *energeia* (being, power, activity). *Ousia* itself is subdivided into *hyparxis*, *harmonia*, *eidos*/*schēma*/*idea*<sup>321</sup> (existence, harmony, form).<sup>322</sup> Finally, Proclus reminds us that the *hyparxis* itself, as with all other parts of the soul, is divided into Being (*ousia*), Same and Other.<sup>323</sup> At this point it is apparent why

<sup>317</sup> The Soul of the Cosmos.

<sup>318</sup> *In Tim.* II.231.29-232.3: τί θαυμαστόν τὴν ὅλην ψυχὴν πάντα ἔχουσιν οἰκείως ἑαυτῇ ὅσα δημιουργικῶς ὁ θεὸς νοῦς, καὶ τῶν τελευταίων τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῆς οἰον ὑποστάθμης τῶν ὅλων προειληφέναι τὴν αἰτίαν: πρὸ γὰρ τοῦ φαινομένου καὶ αἰσθητοῦ τὸν ἀσάνῃ κόσμον ἡ ψυχὴ περιέχει.

<sup>319</sup> *In Tim.* 142.30ff.

<sup>320</sup> Soul is the most complex of the Procline principles, and hence the divisions of the Soul of the Cosmos are quite complex. There is no need here for an exhaustive account. Consequently, the divisions listed in the body of the text are the general divisions given in the commentary on the *Timaeus*.

<sup>321</sup> Proclus sometimes uses the term εἶδος for this part of the soul, sometimes σχῆμα, and sometimes ἰδέα. For *eidos* see *In Tim.* II.126.2; for *schēma* see II.316.3; for *idea* see II.127.2 and 9.

<sup>322</sup> For this division see *In Tim.* II.125.10ff. The divisions of the Soul in Proclus correspond to the following passages of the *Timaeus*: 35a1-35b2 (οὐσία); 35b2-36b6 (ἁρμονία); 36b6-36c5 (σχῆμα/εἶδος/ἰδέα); 36c5-35d7 (δύναμις); 36d8-37c5 (ἐνέργεια).

<sup>323</sup> *In Tim.* II.157.30ff. Note that *ousia* is a part of *ousia*. This is not inconsistent. One *ousia* is 'Being' in the sense of the 'essence' of the Soul, as distinguished from its power or activity. The other *ousia* is 'Being' in the sense of the intermediate sort of Being which is mixed with the intermediate Same and Other to produce the Soul. This mixture pervades every part of the Soul, so its *ousia* is in the part of the soul which is its *ousia*. Note that at *In Tim.* II.126.25ff Proclus does not contradict this. He says at this



Motion and Rest, the final two Greatest Kinds from Plato's *Sophist*, are not mentioned in the initial constitution of the Soul. This initial account deals with its *ousia*, as opposed to its *dynamis* and *energeia*, and it is in the *energeia* that Motion and Rest are found.<sup>324</sup>

These divisions should not be considered absolute, because the parts of all spiritual realities are such that they interpenetrate each other in some manner.

Moreover, the Soul is a compound of Limit and Unlimited, which structure all things below the One.<sup>325</sup> This pair, in turn, is used to explain what Plato means by a Being, Same and Other which are intermediate:

What is the characteristic of each of the middle genera? Perhaps that as *ousia* is made of Limit and Unlimited, whenever Limit dominates the Unlimited, it produces the indivisible *ousia*; whenever the Unlimited dominates, it produces the divisible *ousia*; and whenever they are equal, it produces the middle *ousia*.<sup>326</sup>

The middle forms of Same, Other, Rest, and Motion are produced when Same dominates Other, Other dominates Same, or there is equality, producing the indivisible, divisible and middle sorts of 'Same-Other' respectively. Likewise Rest dominates Motion, or vice versa, or there is equality, producing indivisible, divisible and middle 'Rest-Motion.' These

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point that the *ousia* of the Soul is triple, because it is constituted by Being, Same and Other, and that *hyparxis* is defined most strongly by Being, *harmonia* by Same, and *eidos* by Other. This might at first seem to set up these three triads as parallel, such that *hyparxis* does not contain in itself Being, Same and Other. However, the use of the word *μᾶλλον* is important, signifying that in *hyparxis* Being predominates, even though Same and Other are present, and likewise for *harmonia* and *eidos*, the one having Same dominate and the last having Other dominate. So Being, Same and Other are present in all parts, but in varying degrees.

<sup>324</sup> *In Tim.* II.137.8. Motion and Rest are also sometimes ranked above Same and Other, but they are more strongly identified with its *energeia*. See *In Tim.* II.137.8ff. See also the discussion in J. Trouillard, *L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1972) p.65-67. Trouillard quotes the passage from the *In Tim.* which I cite, but leaves out two lines which stress the location of Motion and Rest in the *energeia* of the soul. He does produce other instances of the primacy of Motion and Rest. However, the passage in question is obscure, and there is disagreement between Trouillard and Festugière on how to render II.21-23. The passage is too elliptical to be rendered without a prior interpretation of the place of Motion and Rest in Proclus. As this is not important to our argument, I refrain from further comment on this passage.

<sup>325</sup> See *El.Th.* prop.159, and Dodds note on props.89-92, pp.246-248. This pair of concepts is derived from Plato's *Philebus* 27c. There we find the Unlimited and the Limit, and the being which has come to be by the mixture of Unlimited and Limit.

<sup>326</sup> *In Tim.* II.137.23-27: τί δὲ οὖν χαρακτηριστικόν ἐστὶν ἐκάστου τῶν μέσων γενῶν; ἡ ἐπειδὴ περ ἡ οὐσία ἐκ πέραςτος καὶ ἀπειρου, ὅταν μὲν κρατῇ τὸ πέρας θατέρου, ποιεῖ τὴν ἀμέριστον οὐσίαν, ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἀπειρον, ποιεῖ τὴν μεριστήν, ὅταν δὲ ἐξισάζῃ, τὴν μέσην.

middle forms of Being, 'Same-Other', and 'Rest-Motion' are all produced by the domination or equality of Limit and Unlimited with regard to the five *megista genê*.<sup>327</sup>

This is a straightforward application of Proclus' doctrine of mean terms, that between any two hierarchically ordered terms there is a term which is similar both to the first and to the second term. This doctrine of mean terms allows Proclus to structure his universe in a hierarchy of levels in which an ever increasing multiplicity is found. Hence Soul is intermediate between *Nous* and Body because in Soul Limit and Unlimited are in balance, and this balance is an intermediate term between the domination of Limit and the domination of the Unlimited. Soul is a balance of Limit and Unlimited, and is both at the same time, i.e. it is a limited plurality. It is a plurality because of its unlimited element, but this plurality is not infinite because of the element of limit within it.

For every *hyparxis*, every *dunamis* and *energeia* derives from Limit and Unlimited, and is either of the form of Limit (*peratoeidês*) or of Unlimited (*apeiroeidês*), or is not more one than the other. This is why all of the Intellectual is said to be Limit, and thus Same, so that one may investigate whether there is Other in it, and likewise said to be at Rest, so that one may doubt whether there is any intellectual Motion. All the bodily, on the other hand, is said to be a friend to the Unlimited, and to Other and Motion. Souls are said to manifest at the same time both multiplicity and unification, and both that which is at Rest and that which is in Motion. And indeed, in the intellectual realm there is one *ousia* for each nous, while the *ousia* which is in the soul is both one and not one for each soul. For there are as many *ousiai* in all of the soul [i.e. in all of each soul] as there are parts into which each soul is divided, so that all bodies, being divisible, are divided to infinity, while souls are divided into a limited number, just as a number is divided into units (*monadas*), whence certain people have thought it proper to call the soul a number, because it is divisible, but divisible into indivisible parts which are not divided to infinity. For this reason the indivisible of the soul is double, being both with respect to that which is like its whole and with respect to its ultimate parts. Because each number also with respect to its own proper form (*eidos*) is one and partless, but with respect to what is like its matter (*hylên*) it is divisible, but not with regard to all of its matter, because the ultimate parts in it are indivisible, and are the term of the division.<sup>328</sup>

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<sup>327</sup> See *In Tim.* II.137.28-138.7.

<sup>328</sup> *In Tim.* II.138.6-26: καὶ γὰρ ὑπαρξεις πᾶσα καὶ δύναμις καὶ ἐνέργεια ἐξ ἀμφοῖν καὶ ἡ περατοειδὴς ἡ ἀπειροειδὴς ἢ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τούτων θάτερον. διὸ τὸ μὲν νοερὸν πᾶν πέρας εἶναι λέγεται καὶ οὕτω ταῦτόν, ὡς εἰ καὶ ἔστιν ἑτερότης ἐν αὐτῷ ζητεῖσθαι, καὶ οὕτως ἑστός, ὥστε εἰ καὶ κίνησις ἔστι νοερὰ ἀπορεῖσθαι· τὸ δὲ σωματοειδὲς τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ οἶλον καὶ τῇ ἑτερότητι καὶ τῇ κινήσει.

Hence the balance of Limit and Unlimited in the Soul is such that the Soul is neither one like *Nous*, nor divided into infinity like body, but is rather divided into a finite number of parts, which themselves are not susceptible of further division.

This passage gives us a clue to the manner in which Proclus organises his spiritual hierarchy. We should be reminded of Plotinus' account of the unfolding of *Nous* into the five greatest kinds. *Nous* is Being and Being is *Nous*. But if *Nous* thinks, there must be Otherness and Sameness. If there is thought there must also be Motion, and Rest that the thought think the same. That there are many gives rise to Quantity, and that they differ from each other gives rise to Quality.<sup>329</sup> Plotinus orders the list of the *megista gené* from the *Sophist* in order to describe the natural unfolding of the cosmos into diversity. Proclus' spiritual hierarchy is ordered in this manner even more strongly than is Plotinus'. It unfolds from the One, into Limit and Unlimited, whose various mixtures give rise to the diversity of all the spiritual orders. This is a conception whose closest modern parallel is Hegel's *Logic*. It is also not really a deduction, but rather a content logic as ontology. Every possible mixing of Forms exists, and is ordered in a hierarchy of unity and multiplicity. This not only allows the distinction between orders (One, *Nous*, Soul, Body) but also the internal diversity of the orders themselves.

Proclus is pleased to show that these same principles which form all of the orders and all of their degrees are able to generate totalities which are different each time. It is enough for him to emphasise a genus (movement or rest, for example) in order to distinguish an order. And if one were then to vary the other factors, interior to this order, one would have its degrees.<sup>330</sup>

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τάς δὲ ψυχὰς καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὁμοῦ συνεκθαίνειν καὶ τὴν ἔνωσιν καὶ τὸ ἐστὸς καὶ τὸ κινούμενον· καὶ γὰρ ἡ μὲν οὐσία ἡ ἐκεῖ μία καθ' ἑκάστον νοῦν, ἡ δὲ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ μία καὶ οὐ μία καθ' ἑκάστην· πολλαὶ γὰρ αἱ οὐσίαι κατὰ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν καὶ τοσαῦται, ὅσαι αἱ μοῖραι, εἰς ἁσ' ἑκάστη[ν] διήρηται, ὥσπερ σῶμα πᾶν μεριστὸν ὃν εἰς ἀπειρα διήρηται τῶν ψυχῶν διηρημένων εἰς πεπερασμένα καὶ οὕτως, ὥς ὁ ἀριθμὸς εἰς μονάδας, ὅθεν καὶ ἀριθμὸν αὐτὴν τινες ἡξίουσιν καλεῖν, ὥς μεριστὴν μὲν, εἰς ἀμερῇ δὲ καὶ οὐκ εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά, διὸ καὶ τὸ ἀμεριστὸν αὐτῆς διττόν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ οἶον ὅλον καὶ κατὰ τὰ ἔσχατα τῶν μερῶν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἑκάστος ἀριθμὸς κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον εἶδος εἰς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀμερῆς, κατὰ δὲ τὴν οἶον ὅλην μεριστός, καὶ οὐδὲ ταύτην πᾶσαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔσχατον καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ ἀμερές, εἰς ὃ καὶ ἡ κατάληξις.

<sup>329</sup> *Enn.* V.1.4.26-44.

<sup>330</sup> J. Trouillard, "Convergence des définitions de l'âme chez Proclus," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 45 (1961) pp.3-20; p.7.

Trouillard points us to the *Timaeus* commentary. The Soul is made up of intermediate Being, Same, and Other, as we have seen. The variation in these constituents produces different sorts of souls. Proclus tells us that when Being dominates, a divine soul is produced; when Same dominates, a daimonic soul; and when Other dominates, a partial soul (*merikê psuchê*). The various constituents dominate by means of their various ratios (*logoi*).<sup>331</sup> We should not be surprised that Proclus thinks that reality unfolds from the One according to what we today might think of mere categories of thinking. The first motion of unfolding from the One is the establishment of a principle which makes itself many in attempt to grasp the One. The self-constitution of *Nous* is a motion of thinking which has as its aim to give expression to its contact with the ineffable and inexhaustible source which the One is. So there is no question in Proclus of having to explain why the categories of thought supervene upon the categories of Being. Rather Being itself is organised by the spontaneity of thinking. It is only below the Soul that Being and thinking fall apart, due to dispersion and indeterminacy. But even that there is multiplicity as dispersion and the feebleness of Body is encompassed by the logic of unity and multiplicity which governs the entire hierarchy. We should also remember that the account which Proclus gives is an account from the perspective of Soul, but because Soul is a self-related motion of thinking, the categories which it knows and with which it gives an account of the unfolding of all things from the One, are images of the highest categories in *Nous*.

Returning to the passage from the *Timaeus* commentary cited above,<sup>332</sup> we should note that the constitution of the Soul out of its various constituents does not detract from its own unity. Note the analogy in this passage with the constitution of a particular number. The Platonic conception of a number as Proclus puts it forth in this passage is that a given number as a whole is an indivisible *eidos*. In other words, the number 10 is

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<sup>331</sup> See *In Tim.* III.254.2-10.

<sup>332</sup> *In Tim.* II.138.6-26.

not identical to the sum of ten units, with regard to its *eidos*. The reason for this is most likely that the number 10 is considered to have a particular Form which is not identical with any particular way dividing 10. Saying that 10 is the same as ten units is only one way of dividing the Form. 10 stands aloof, one might say, from the division into  $2+3+5$ , because to identify 10 with that division would be to exclude any other division, such as for example  $3+3+3+1$ . Once you have taken the Form of 10 and divided it into 2, 3 and 5, you cannot subsequently make 3 three times with 1 left over, unless you undo the original division. Thus 10 is distinct from any particular way in which it may be divided, and has a single *eidos* which is the ontological expression of this identity before any division. One might say that this is its Limit before any impingement of Unlimited.

A possible objection to this ontological conception of number might be that the number 10 is simply the set of all possible manners of dividing 10, including as a term in the set leaving 10 undivided, so that there is no such thing as a single *eidos* of 10 which is one and partless, but rather 10 is a single set with each scheme of division as its members. This objection reaches to the heart of Procline metaphysics and its doctrine that before the many there is always a one.<sup>333</sup> In response to this objection recall the relation of genus and species in Proclus. If the genus is to be the cause of the species, it must be such as to *found* their diversity. This means that the species is a diminishment of the content of the genus. But any diminishment must be a diminishment of a prior, more unified reality which is more than the diminished manifestation. Collies exist because 'being a collie' is one partial manner in which the Form of dog may be instantiated, and this partial instantiation does not exhaust the Form itself. In the same manner,  $2+3+5$  is one manner

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<sup>333</sup> The classic statement of this principle is *El.Th.* prop.1. However, its full metaphysical implications only come out in the comprehension of any lower principle in its cause. See C. Steel, "'Υπαρξίς chez Proclus," in *Hyparxis e Hypostasis nel Neoplatonismo (atti del I colloquio internazionale del centro di ricerca sul neoplatonismo, università degli studi di catania, 1-3 ottobre 1992)* ed. F. Romano e D.P. Taormina (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1994) pp.79-100, and J. Trouillard, "L'intelligibilité Proclusienne", in *La philosophie et ses problèmes, recueil d'études de doctrine et d'histoire offert à Monseigneur R. Jolivet* (Paris: Emmanuel Vitte, 1960) pp.83-97.

in which the *eidos* 10 may be divided, but this division does not exhaust 10. And one may not make of 10 or of the Form 'dog' a set of all its instantiations, because that would be to eliminate the prior, richer reality which is being instantiated in these partial forms. The problem with this set-theoretic conception from a Platonic point of view is that it would reverse the order of causation which makes a dog a dog, such that a grouping of particulars would be the cause of the universal 'dog'. We have already examined Proclus' objections to this in our discussion of 'later-born universals' in chapter II.

Hence the Soul, like a number, is an indivisible whole, like the number 10 is an indivisible *eidos*. Yet like the number 10, which may be divided in many ways, and in that sense is in fact the set of all its possible divisions because it is their foundation, while being at the same time different from the set of all its possible divisions, the Soul is also divided into a limited number of parts, which themselves do not admit of further division. So in the Soul Limit and Unlimited are in balance. The Soul is a multiplicity, but it is not an unlimited multiplicity because it is a unity in being a partless whole, like the number 10. But it also has parts because it is also a self-procession into multiplicity. Yet the Soul's division into parts is limited because the number of these parts is finite, and each part is itself indivisible. If each part were not indivisible, the soul would be divisible into an infinite number of parts, like body.

Notice that this is a use of mathematics not as downward moving reason, but as a reason which moves from image to paradigm. The Soul is a number in the sense that the unity of a mathematical number is an image of the unity of the Soul, and leads us upwards to contemplate the Soul's unity. As we will see, Proclus uses mathematics extensively to display the nature of the Soul in the *Timaeus* commentary, especially with regard to the various portions of the Soul and the mathematical means which hold between them.

The balance of Limit and Unlimited in the Soul of the Cosmos is more comprehensive than that found in other souls, because the Soul of the Cosmos is intermediate between the *Nous* of the whole Cosmos and the whole *ousia* which becomes

in bodies,<sup>334</sup> and not just between some particular *nous* and some particular body.<sup>335</sup> This is why it has the Cosmos as its body and not some particular part of the corporeal cosmos as its body.

And it is clear that the Limit in the *ousia* of the Soul of the Cosmos is more unified (*henikôteron*) than the all of the Limits in all other souls and that its Unlimited is more comprehensive than all other [psychic] unlimiteds. For every Limit is not equal to every Limit: some are more universal (*holikôterôn*), while others are more partial, and every Unlimited is not equal to every Unlimited. This is because every *dunamis* is not equal to every *dunamis*, such that every *ousia* is not equal to every *ousia*, but some are universal (*holikê*) and some partial. That which belongs to the *ousia* (*to ousiôdes*) of the Soul of the Whole [i.e. the Cosmic Soul] is more universal than the *ousia* of every [other] soul, and the Limit in it is more universal than all other psychic Limits, and the Unlimited is more universal than all other Unlimiteds in souls.<sup>336</sup>

Directly after this passage Proclus contrasts the Soul of the Cosmos with the soul of the sun and the soul of the moon, which have an essence intermediate between the solar and lunar *noes* and the bodies of the sun and the moon. The conclusion that we may draw from this is that in some manner the *ousia* of the Soul of the Cosmos participates in the intelligible world in a more comprehensive manner than do other souls. Whether this means that it may grasp a greater portion of the intelligible world than other souls, or grasp the intelligible world in a different fashion, is unclear.

Proclus finds in Plato's passage not only the constitution of the *ousia* of the Soul of the Cosmos out of Being, Same and Other, and hence the analogy of Soul with a number, but also the division of the Soul according to certain portions, and the binding together of these portions by the geometric, arithmetical and harmonic means. This binding is the *harmonia* of the soul, as found in the triad *hyparxis, harmonia*,

<sup>334</sup> Note that there is a level of forms which are divided among bodies between Soul and Body itself.

<sup>335</sup> In *Tim.* II. 141. 13.

<sup>336</sup> In *Tim.* II. 141. 23-142. 2: καὶ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ πέρας αὐτῆς τὸ οὐσιῶδες πάντων ἐστὶ περάτων ἐνικώτερον τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πάσαις ψυχαῖς καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον πάντων ἀπείρων περιληπτικώτερον· οὔτε γὰρ πᾶν πέρας ἴσον παντὶ πέρατι, τῶν μὲν ὀλικωτέρων ὄντων, τῶν δὲ μερικωτέρων, οὐδὲ πᾶσα ἀπειρία πάσῃ ἀπειρίᾳ ἴση· διότι μηδὲ πᾶσα δύναμις πάσῃ δυνάμει· ὥστ' οὐδὲ πᾶσα οὐσία ἴση πάσῃ οὐσίᾳ, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν ὀλική, ἢ δὲ μερική, τῆς οὖν τοῦ ὅλου ψυχῆς τὸ οὐσιῶδες ὀλικώτερον πάσης ψυχικῆς οὐσίας, καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ πέρας πάντων περάτων ψυχικῶν, καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον ἀπείρων πάντων τῶν ἐν ψυχαῖς.

*eidos/schēma/idea*. This harmony is necessary for the Soul, so that its parts be parts of One thing. The multiplicity which it contains must be seen to have proceeded from one beginning point, and thus be 'coordinate' with each other. 'Coordination' is in Proclus' Greek *suntaxis*, which has the sense of being of the same 'order', or having proceeded from the same principle. The character of the simple principle is reflected in the coordination of that which proceeds from it, and if there were no such coordination, it would not be the case that the multiplicity in question proceeded from one same principle.

After the Soul as a whole (*tên holotēta tēs psuchēs*), its numerical divisions (*hai diairesieis autōi...hai kat' arithmous*) and the bonds of its divisions according to harmonic *logoi* are taken up. Because the Soul is both one and a multiplicity, whole and parts, both uniform (*monoeidēs*) and multiform (*polueidēs*), it is no doubt necessary that after its unified *huparxis* [Plato] examines the procession from its causes, which makes the soul many. Every multiplicity which stands outside of the One is in need of harmony, if it is not going to be uncoordinated with itself and indefinite (*asuntakton...pros heauton kai aoriston*). The parts of the Soul manifest the multiplicity which is in it, by bringing in a division of its one *ousia*, while the powers of its harmonic *logoi* which hold it together (*hai de sunagōgoi tōn harmonikōn logōn dunameis*) manifest the bonds which are in its *ousia*.<sup>337</sup>

Proclus describes the first portion of the Soul in terms similar to the monad of numbers, i.e. the number 1, which remains in its own unity and from which the rest of the numbers proceed.

For the 'one'<sup>338</sup> portion which God produced must remain one and undivided, and the whole multiplicity of parts which begin from it as their principle must refuse an infinity of divisions. Thus the *ousia* of the Soul is one and not one, having been established according to numerical limits which are definite and stable, so

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<sup>337</sup> In *Tim.* II. 163.25-164.3: μετὰ γὰρ τὴν ὁλότητα τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ τε διαιρέσεις αὐτῷ παραλαμβάνονται αἱ κατ' ἀριθμούς καὶ αἱ συνδέσεις τῶν διηρημένων κατὰ τοὺς ἀρμονικοὺς λόγους· ἐπεὶ γὰρ καὶ ἓν ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πλῆθος καὶ ὅλον καὶ μέρη καὶ μονοειδὴς οὐσία καὶ πολυειδὴς, ἀνάγκη δὴπου μετὰ τὴν ἡνωμένην ὑπαρξιν τὴν πεπληθυσμένην αὐτῆς ἀπὸ τῶν αἰτίων πρόοδον θεωρεῖν. πᾶν δὲ πλῆθος τοῦ ἐνός ἐξιστάμενον δεῖται τῆς ἀρμονίας, εἰ μέλλοι μὴ ἀσύντακτον εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἀόριστον. τὰ μὲν οὖν πλήθη τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ δηλοῦσιν αἱ μοῖραι, διάκρισιν συνεισάγουσαι τῆς μιᾶς οὐσίας, αἱ δὲ συναγωγοὶ τῶν ἀρμονικῶν λόγων δυνάμεις τὰς κατ' οὐσίαν αὐτῶν συνδέσεις.

<sup>338</sup> i.e. the first portion, which is similar to the unit.



that in this it is shown that the Soul is a number, in that it possesses what is like the root of its parts as undivided and truly one.<sup>339</sup>

The first portion of the soul is like the monad, in that it is the 'root' (*rhizan*) from which springs the multiplicity of the parts of the soul. The soul is therefore a number, or numerical. However, is not a number in the sense in which we would normally think of number.

Now if this is true, it is clear that however many is the number of parts which you take, counting them all together as making the same sum, so many will by the multitude of monads out of which the Soul is composed. And each of these monads will not be mathematical (for mathematical monads are not of the order of *ousia* (*anousioi*)), nor will they be physical (for physical monads are in an underlying matter (*en hupokeimenois*)), but each will be an *ousia* and be in itself without a body (*asômatos*), being composed out of the middle genera.<sup>340</sup> Because of this each will not be a simple one, but will participate in a certain one, yet will not be divisible into similar parts, and in this will differ from the one in bodies, which is infinitely divided into similar parts.<sup>341</sup>

The Soul is a number which is intermediate between intelligible and sensible numbers. Just before the passage quoted above, Proclus lists four sorts of number, as well as four sorts of harmony.<sup>342</sup> The sorts of number are divine (*theios*), of the order of *ousia* (*ousiôdês*), psychic (*psuchikos*) and physical (*phusikos*); which are uniform (*henoeidês*), unmoving (*akinêtos*), self-moving (*autokinêtos*) and moved from without (*heterokinêtos*), respectively.<sup>343</sup> The harmonies which bring coordination, or *suntaxis* to the multiplicity proceeding from the monad of each sort of number are divine (*theios*), that in the real

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<sup>339</sup> In *Tim.* II. 164. 12-19: ἦν γὰρ ὑπέστησε μίαν μοῖραν ὁ θεός, μίαν δεῖ μένειν ἀδιαίρετον, καὶ τὸ ὅλον πλῆθος τῶν μορίων ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρξάμενον τὴν ἀπειρίαν ἀναίνεσθαι τῶν διαιρέσεων, ὥστε καὶ μία ἡ οὐσία τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ οὐ μία μὲν, ἐν ὅροις δὲ ὑφαστώσα κατ' ἀριθμὸν ὠρισμένοις καὶ ἐστῶσιν, ἵνα καὶ ταύτη δεικνύηται ἀριθμὸς οὐσα ἡ ψυχὴ, τὴν οἶον ρίζαν τῶν ἐαυτῆς μερῶν ἀδιαίρετον ἔχουσα καὶ ὄντως μίαν.

<sup>340</sup> i.e. the middle Being, Same and Other.

<sup>341</sup> In *Tim.* II. 164. 19-28: εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, δῆλον ὅτι ὅσος ἂν ὁ ἀριθμὸς ληφθῇ τῶν μοιρῶν εἰς ταῦτόν συλλογισθεῖς, τοσούτων ἔσται καὶ τῶν μονάδων τὸ πλῆθος, ἐξ ὧν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἔσται ἐκάστη τῶν μονάδων οὔτε μαθηματικὴ (ἀνούσιοι γὰρ αἱ τοιαῦται μονάδες) οὔτε φυσικὴ (ἐν ὑποκειμένοις γὰρ αἱ τοιαῦται μονάδες), ἀλλὰ οὐσία μὲν αὐτὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν οὐσα ἀσώματος, οὐσα δὲ ἐκ τῶν μέσων γενῶν, διὰ οὐδὲ αὐτὴ ἐν ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μετέχουσα τινος ἐνός, ἐτι δὲ ἀδιαίρετος εἰς ὅμοια καὶ ταύτη τοῦ ἐν σώμασιν ἐνός διαφέρουσα, ὃ διαιρεῖται εἰς ὅμοια ἐπ' ἀπειρον.

<sup>342</sup> In *Tim.* II. 161. 25-32.

<sup>343</sup> Note here that Proclus says mathematical monads are *anousioi*. He is not referring to the *ousiôdês arithmos* of *Nous*, but to the *ousia* of the Soul. So the number of the Soul's *ousia* is the *psuchikos arithmos*.

beings (*en tois ontôs ousi*), that in souls (*en tais psuchais*), and the harmony in that which is harmonised from without (*en tois hêrmosmenois hup' allôn*). Note that in this list the place occupied by what we normally consider number is missing. Proclus denies that arithmetical number is the same as psychic number, but arithmetical number is also distinct from physical number. It is not uncommon for Proclus to give hierarchical lists, and to omit certain intermediate terms from them. However, the solution to this problem seems to be the following. Mathematical number occupies a position between the number of the soul's *ousia* and number instantiated in bodies, hence Proclus denies that the monads in the Soul's *ousia* are mathematical. Mathematics is a projection of the *logoi* in the Soul's *ousia*, so strictly speaking it is the Soul's *energeia*.

The portions into which the Soul is divided are drawn directly from the *Timaeus*.

This is how he began the division: first he took one portion away from the whole, and then he took another, twice as large, followed by a third, one and a half times as large as the second and three times as large as the first. The fourth portion he took was twice as large as the second, the fifth three times as large as the third, the sixth eight times that of the first, and the seventh twenty-seven times that of the first.<sup>344</sup>

Thus if the first portion is taken as the unit, or the number 1, the series of portions may be expressed arithmetically as 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8 and 27.<sup>345</sup> This series is in effect two series, 1, 2, 4, 8 and 1, 3, 9, 27 in which each term is either double its predecessor, in the first series, or triple its predecessor, in the second series. The proportion which holds between the terms of this series is called the 'geometrical' proportion, i.e. it is a proportion (*analogia*) in which for any three terms, the mean term exceeds the first term by the same ratio as the last term exceeds the mean term. In modern notation the geometrical proportion between a series of numbers A, B, C is the following:  $A:B::B:C$ . Because in

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<sup>344</sup> *Tim.* 35b-c: ἤρχετο δὲ διαιρεῖν ὧδε, μίαν ἀφείλεν τὸ πρῶτον ἀπὸ παντὸς μοῖραν, μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἀφήρει διπλασίαν ταύτης, τὴν δ' αὖ τρίτην ἡμιολίαν μὲν τῆς δευτέρας, τριπλασίαν δὲ τῆς πρώτης, τετάρτην δὲ τῆς δευτέρας διπλὴν, πέμπτην δὲ τριπλὴν τῆς τρίτης, τὴν δ' ἕκτην τῆς πρώτης ὀκταπλασίαν, ἐβδόμην δ' ἑκτακαίκοσιπλασίαν τῆς πρώτης.

<sup>345</sup> For an excellent discussion of the entire account of the portions of the Soul, see Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997 [Routledge, 1935]) pp.66-72.

both series the following term is always either double or triple the term it follows, the same ratio holds throughout. So 2 is double 1, 4 is double 2, and 8 is double 4. Likewise, 3 is triple 1, 9 is triple 3, and 27 is triple 9. Further, the progression begins with the series 1, 2, 3, and is following by the squares and cubes of 2 and 3. We will discuss below how Proclus thinks this represents symbolically the Soul's possession of the paradigms for the progression of reality into two and three dimensions.

The Demiurge then filled in the intervals between each member of this series with two mean terms. One "exceeding the first extreme by the same fraction of the extremes by which it was exceeded by the second"<sup>346</sup> and the second mean "exceeding the first extreme by a number equal to that by which it was exceeded by the second."<sup>347</sup> These two proportions are the harmonic and arithmetical proportions, which with the geometrical make up the three fundamental proportions which Proclus speaks of. The harmonic proportion is a proportion where the middle term exceeds the first term by a certain fraction of the first term and is exceeded by the second term by the same fraction *of the second term*. An example is the series 3, 4, 6. 4 exceeds 3 by 1, which is 1/3 of 3, and is exceeded by 2, which is 1/3 of 6. The arithmetical proportion is a proportion where the middle term exceeds the first by the same number by which it falls short of the last. An example is the series 1, 2, 3. 2 exceeds 1 by 1, and is exceeded by 3 by 1.<sup>348</sup>

These harmonic and arithmetical proportions are placed in between the terms of the double series, and also in between the terms of the triple series. Hence 1, 2, 4, 8 becomes 1, 4/3, 3/2, 2, 8/3, 3, 4, 16/3, 6, 8 and 1, 3, 9, 27 becomes 1, 3/2, 2, 3, 9/2, 6, 9, 27/2, 18, 27. The intervals between the members of these series, as Plato remarks, are 3/2, 4/3 and 9/8.<sup>349</sup> On the musical scale, these correspond to a fifth (3/2), a fourth (4/3)

<sup>346</sup> Tim. 36a: τὴν μὲν ταύτῳ μέρει τῶν ἄκρων αὐτῶν ὑπερέχουσαν καὶ ὑπερεχομένην.

<sup>347</sup> Tim. 36a: τὴν δὲ ἴσῳ μὲν καὶ ἀριθμὸν ὑπερέχουσαν, ἴσῳ δὲ ὑπερεχομένην.

<sup>348</sup> See *In Tim.* II.18.21-20.9.

<sup>349</sup> An interval is simply the distance between two terms, taken as a multiple of the first term. So the interval or distance between for example the terms 4/3 and 3/2 is 9/8, because 4/3 multiplied by 9/8 equals 3/2. Thought of in other terms, if the base note is taken as the unit (1), between the fourth (4/3) and

or a tone (9/8). What this produces is two series with the following intervals of a tone, a fifth or a fourth between members of the series: 1 [fourth] 4/3 [tone] 3/2 [fourth] 2 [fourth] 8/3 [tone] 3 [fourth] 4 [fourth] 16/3 [tone] 6 [fourth] 8; and 1 [fifth] 3/2 [fourth] 2 [fifth] 3 [fifth] 9/2 [fourth] 6 [fifth] 9 [fifth] 27/2 [fourth] 18 [fifth] 27. When the two series are combined we arrive at the following series: 1, 4/3, 3/2, 2, 8/3, 3, 4, 9/2, 16/3, 6, 8, 9, 27/2, 18, 27; the intervals of which are: 1 [fourth] 4/3 [tone] 3/2 [fourth] 2 [fourth] 8/3 [tone] 3 [fourth] 4 [tone] 9/2 [?] <sup>350</sup> 16/3 [tone] 6 [fourth] 8 [tone] 9 [fifth] 27/2 [fourth] 18 [fifth] 27.

Next the intervals of a fourth are filled in with the interval 9/8, i.e. with tones, and with the remainder 256/243, i.e. a semitone. Cornford works this out for the intervals between 1, 4/3, 3/2 and 2, which results in the series 1, 9/8, 81/64, 4/3, 3/2, 27/16, 243/128, 2; whose intervals are 1 [tone] 9/8 [tone] 81/64 [semitone] 4/3 [tone] 3/2 [tone] 27/16 [tone] 243/128 [semitone] 2. As Cornford remarks, "the upshot is that Plato has constructed a section of the diatonic scale, whose range is fixed by considerations extraneous to music."<sup>351</sup>

For our purpose the construction of the diatonic scale itself is not as crucial as the symbolic meaning according to Proclus of the geometrical, harmonic and arithmetical proportions by which it has been constructed, and of the initial seven portions of the Soul separated by the Demiurge.

The proportions are such as to bind the Soul together and unify it even though it has been divided into various portions by the Demiurge. With regard to the seven portions of the Soul,

the one ratio (*logos*) of the geometrical proportion (*geômetrikês analogias*) binds together what has been separated in a manner appropriate to the *ousia* (*ousiôdôs*).

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the fifth (3:2) there is an interval of a tone (9/8).

<sup>350</sup> This interval is two tones, but since the remaining intervals are to be filled in, it does not matter that it is neither a fourth, fifth or tone.

<sup>351</sup> Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997 [Routledge, 1935]) p.72. Proclus' very difficult explanation of this whole passage is to be found at *In Tim.* II.174.15-193.7.

and so does the harmonic mean (*mesotês*) according to the Same, and the arithmetical according to the Other.<sup>352</sup>

Moreover, the harmonic and arithmetical proportions are inserted in between the seven intervals which are in a geometrical proportion, because "every Same and every Other are comprehended (*periechontai*) by *ousia* and the *harmonia* belonging to the *ousia*."<sup>353</sup> The more partial intervals (i.e. the tones and semitones) which fill in the terms already established by the geometrical, harmonic and arithmetical proportions, are for Proclus more partial bonds, because they do not share the universal character of the initial three proportions. He calls the more partial intervals *logoi*, as apposed to *analogiai*, or we might say in English "ratios" instead of "proportions." A proportion is composed of more than one ratio, whether it is the same ratio repeated, as is the case in the geometrical proportion, or whether the proportion contains diverse ratios, as is the case in the harmonic and arithmetical proportions. The symbolic interpretation of this doctrine is that in the *ousia* of the soul there are more universal and more partial *logoi*, which serve as images of various aspects of the higher world, and paradigms for various aspects of the lower.<sup>354</sup>

*Analogiai*, proportions, unify that which is divided, according to Proclus, insofar as they are something which remains identical throughout the diverse members of a given series. Even though the members differ from each other, the proportion which holds between them remains identical. In modern terms, for any given (diverse) member 'n' of a geometrical proportion 'x', n's relation to its prior term is  $n/x$  and its relation to its subsequent term is  $n \cdot x$ . n is always double its prior and half its subsequent, if for example the series increases by a factor of two; or triple its prior and one third its subsequent if it increases by a factor of three. This constancy in relation allows Proclus

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<sup>352</sup> In *Tim.* II.209.32-210.2: διακεκριμένας οὐσιωδῶς μὲν ὁ εἰς λόγος συνδεῖ τῆς γεωμετρικῆς ἀναλογίας, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ταυτὸν ἡ ἀρμονικὴ μεσότης, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἕτερον ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ.

<sup>353</sup> In *Tim.* II.210.4-5: πᾶσα ἡ ταυτότης καὶ πᾶσα ἡ ἑτερότης ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῆς κατ' αὐτὴν ἀρμονίας ἐνοειδῶς περιέχονται.

<sup>354</sup> In *Tim.* II.210.6-211.10.

to describe a proportion in ontological terms as that which unifies and binds what it comprehends. Members of a series in a proportion are 'one' in a sense that a random grouping of numbers are not. Moreover, the manners in which the three different proportions unify their terms are taken as symbolic expressions of how the different parts of the soul, which are composed of Being, Same and Other, are bound and unified.

Now every bond is a sort of unification (*henōsis*) So if the means (*mesotētes*)<sup>355</sup> are bonds, and the bonds are unifications of what they bind, then what follows is clear. These means extend through the entire *ousia*, and make it out of its many parts into one whole, and receive the power to bind together the various different Forms. Of these three means, the geometrical binds all that is of the order of *ousia* in the Soul. For the *ousia* is one *logos* which traverses through all of the Soul, and holds together the first, middle and last parts, just as in the geometrical mean one and the same ratio (*logos*) extends through the three terms completely. The harmonic mean holds together all of the Same which is divided in the Soul, providing a commonness of ratio (*logos*) to the extreme terms and a connatural union, seen more strongly in the more universal parts, and less in the more partial parts, just as is the case with the Same. The arithmetical mean binds the Other of all sorts which belong to the procession (*proodos*) of the Soul, and exist less in the superior members of an order, and more in the smaller members. For Other dominates in the more partial, while Same dominates in the more universal and the greater. And these two means are in a relation of reciprocity with regard to each other (*antipeponthēs in hautai pros allēlas*), just as are Same and Other. And just as *ousia* is the monad of Same and Other, so the geometrical mean is the monad of the harmonic and arithmetical means.<sup>356</sup>

The *ousia* of the Soul is taken as that which is identical all throughout the soul.<sup>357</sup> The manner in which the *ousia* of the soul is unified is the same manner in which the terms of

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<sup>355</sup> "Mean" here is equivalent to proportion, as the sort of relation which the middle term has to the extremes, be it geometrical, harmonic or arithmetical.

<sup>356</sup> In *Tim.* II, 199.02-22: πᾶς δὲ δεσμός ἐνωσίς τις ἐστίν. εἰ οὖν αἱ μεσότητες δεσμοὶ καὶ οἱ δεσμοὶ ἐνώσει τῶν δεδεμένων εἰσί, ὁρᾶται τὸ συμβαῖνον. αὗται δὲ οὖν διὰ πάσης διήκουσι καὶ μίαν αὐτὴν ὅλην ἐκ πολλῶν ἀπεργάζονται, συνδετικήν τῶν ποικίλων εἰδῶν λαχοῦσαι δύναμιν. τριῶν δὲ οὐσῶν αὐτῶν ἡ μὲν γεωμετρικὴ τὸ οὐσιῶδες πᾶν συνδεῖ τῶν ψυχῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ οὐσία λόγος εἷς ἐστίν διὰ πάντων φοιτῶν καὶ συνέχων πρῶτά τε καὶ μέσα καὶ τελευταῖα, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς γεωμετρικῆς εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος διὰ τῶν τριῶν ὁρᾶν διήκει τελῶς. ἡ δὲ ἀρμονικὴ τὴν ταυτότητα πᾶσαν τὴν διηρημένην συνέχει τῶν ψυχῶν, τοῖς ἄκροις παρεχομένη κοινωνίαν λόγων καὶ ὁμοφυῆ σύζευξιν, καὶ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὀλιγωτέροις ὁρῶμένη μᾶλλον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μερικωτέροις ἥττον. ὡς ἡ ταυτότης, ἡ δὲ ἀριθμητικὴ τὴν ἑτερότητα συνδεῖ τὴν παντοίαν τῆς προόδου τῆς ψυχῆς. [καὶ] ἐν μὲν τοῖς μείζουσι κατὰ τὴν τάξιν ἥττον ἐνοῦσα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐλάττωσι μᾶλλον· κρατεῖ γὰρ ἡ ἑτερότης ἐν τοῖς μερικωτέροις, ὡς ἡ ταυτότης ἐν τοῖς ὀλιγωτέροις καὶ κρείττωσι. καὶ ἔχουσιν ἀντιπεπόνθησιν αὗται πρὸς ἀλλήλας ὡς ἡ ταυτότης καὶ ἑτερότης, καὶ ὡς τούτων ἡ οὐσία μονάς, οὕτως ἐκείνων ἡ γεωμετρικὴ μεσότης.

<sup>357</sup> Notice that *ousia* is being used to mean both the *ousia* as opposed to the *dunamis* and *energeia*, and *ousia* as the intermediate sort of being in the Soul, as opposed to the intermediate sort of Same and

the geometrical proportion are unified. Therefore the geometrical proportion, in which the same ratio is held between all members, describes symbolically the relation which holds between the various *ousiai* of the Soul's single *ousia*. The subdivision of the geometrical proportion by the harmonic and arithmetic proportions represents symbolically the portions of Same and Other which are with the *ousiai* in the Soul's single *ousia*. The manner in which the terms in the harmonic proportion are unified is the same manner in which the various divided portions of Same are unified. They are different from each other in the sense that they are divided from each other. And similarly the two extremes in a harmonic proportion differ from each other because they are different numbers, and have a third term in between them. However, in the Soul, these divided portions are both portions of the Same, and in the harmonic proportion, both extremes are related to the mean term by the same fraction of themselves. Hence even though they are divided, they are united by the sameness of ratio. That this is seen more strongly in the more universal parts and less in the more partial is explained by a following passage, where what Proclus seems to be saying is that in a harmonic proportion the interval between the middle term and the superior term is a greater interval, and conversely the interval between the middle term and the inferior is a smaller interval. This is appropriate to the Same because the larger number has a larger interval, and the smaller number a smaller interval.<sup>358</sup>

The various portions of Other are unified in the Soul by the arithmetical proportion, in a manner appropriate to Otherness, i.e. although they are unified they must remain Other. The arithmetical proportion binds, because the intervals between its terms are all identical. However, the arithmetical proportion is appropriate to the Other, because it assigns to the greater number an interval which is a smaller fraction of that number, and to the smaller number an interval which is a greater fraction of that number.

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Other.

<sup>358</sup> In *Tim.* 199.32.

For example, in the arithmetical proportion 4, 5, 6, the interval between every number and its subsequent is an interval of 1. But 1 is 1/4 of 4 while being 1/6 of 6. Hence the larger is assigned the smaller and vice versa, and this proportion is appropriate to Otherness.<sup>359</sup>

Thus the soul's *ousia*, according to Proclus, has a strong kinship with number. It is a limited multiplicity because it is composed out of intermediate *ousia*, Same, and Other, in all of which Limit and Unlimited are in balance. This limited multiplicity is like the unity and multiplicity of the numbers, which are founded in the monad, or unit. Further, this limited multiplicity is bound together by proportion (*analogia*), which is best described through the image of it which is mathematical proportion.

#### IV.iii. Mathematics as the structuring principle of Body

Proclus speaks about the one first proportion (*analogia*) which is a single Life and *logos* running through everything (*mia tis esti zôê kai logos heis phoitôn dia pantôn*), according to which Nature and the Demiurge set the whole of things in order. This Life is

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<sup>359</sup> The manner in which mathematical language may be used to describe the pre-existence of things in the soul may be illustrated further. Proclus mentions the seven sorts of ratios (*logoi*), which are in the soul and make it a fullness of *logoi* (λόγων πλήρωμα). This is a term we have seen before, but here it takes on a more technical language. The various manners in which these seven ratios admit of mathematical division are taken to represent the pre-existence in the Soul of the causes of Cosmos and the genera and species within the Cosmos, according to their divisibility. So the ratios which are indivisible, and divisible in one, two or three manners represent the limiting Form of all things, line, plane and three dimensional body. Most peculiar in this context are the 'superparticular' (*epimorion*) and the 'superpartient' (*epimerèi*), which are  $(1+1/x)$  and  $(1+2/x, 1+3/x, \text{etc.})$  respectively. These represent mathematically the two manners in which an individual may participate in genus and species. For example, an individual man participates in the genus animal, and in one of the species comprehended by that genus, namely Man. The superparticular is an appropriate mathematical representation of the *logos* of this sort of participation, because  $(1+1/x)$  represents a whole ( $1 = \text{the genus}$ ) and one part of the whole. It could be thought of as  $(x/x+1/x)$ . Thus we have a representation of participation in the undivided genus itself, and in one of the species which it contains. However, some things, Proclus tells us, participate in the genus and in more than one species comprehended by the genus. His first example is the mermaid, which participates in the undivided genus animal, and in both the human and fishy species. His second is the sort of dragon which has a head of a lion, participating obviously in the undivided genus animal, and in the species of dragon and of lion. Proclus assures us that there are many such creatures in the earth and in the sea. The *logos* of this sort of participation may be represented by the superpartient, because in a ratio such as  $(1+2/x)$  or  $(1+3/x)$  what we find is a whole and two or more parts of that whole, corresponding to the undivided genus, and two or more species comprehended by that genus. See *In Tim.* II.202.3-30.



a bond (*desmos*) created by universal Nature, the single Soul, and the single *Nous*.

Proclus tells us that *desmos* has three meanings. The first is the common powers of the elements. The second is the one cause of bodies. The third meaning is the bond which is intermediate between the other two, which proceeds from the first cause and makes use of the powers divided among bodies. The single Life is the third sort of *desmos*. It is the bond spoken of by the Theologians (Orphics) as the "golden chain" or "series" (*chrusê seira*).<sup>360</sup>

As we saw in the first part of this study, each order of Proclus' universe is an image of the higher order. This is the meaning of the term *analogia* here. There is a single Life which is the *analogia* of all things. Or to put it another way, the power of the first cause runs through all levels by their imitation of it, and by their imitation there comes into being a chain, or series (*seira*), of causation which links the lower to the higher through similarity. In this manner the Forms in *Nous* are the cause of their imitation by Soul; Soul's internal structure is imaged in pure mathematics, which in turn gives rise to its own images in the elements of body.<sup>361</sup> All things are bound together by proportion, and primarily by geometrical proportion,<sup>362</sup> so that just as in a geometrical proportion each member of the series is to its previous what its subsequent is to it, so Soul is an image of *Nous*, mathematics is an image of the order of the Soul's *ousia*, and body is an image of mathematics.<sup>363</sup>

For proportion (*analogia*), as we have said, imitates the divine unification (*tên theian henôsin*), and is a demiurgic bond (*desmos esti dêmiourgikos*). But the proportion in mathematical objects has precision and is graspable by reason (*epistêmonikon*); for its *logoi* are immaterial. This is not true of the proportion in physical objects. However, the proportion which is in the heavenly bodies

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<sup>360</sup> *In Tim.* II.24.1-27.

<sup>361</sup> For the principle of analogy in Iamblichus, see Dominic J. O'Meara, *Pythagoras Revived* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) pp.50, 69; in Syrianus see *ibid.* 132ff. And see A. Charles, "Sur le caractère intermédiaire des mathématiques dans la pensée de Proklos," *Les Études Philosophiques*, 22 (1967) pp.69-80; see p.75.

<sup>362</sup> Proclus thinks that the geometrical mean is most truly a mean, and that the others are derivative of it. See *In Tim.* II.20.23ff.

<sup>363</sup> *In Tim.* II.39.18-19: καὶ γὰρ τὰ φυσικὰ τῶν μαθηματῶν εἰκόνες εἰσὶ.

participates in a certain precision. The proportion in sublunar bodies less so, because it is in matter (*en hulêi strephomenê*). So here once again appears the ordering of the elements (*hê taxis...tôn stoicheiôn*), and how it is that Plato appropriately draws the confidence he has in physical *logoi* from mathematical realities -- for they are causes, and the demiurgic procession is accomplished through the Soul, and the generation proceeds (*proeisi*) appropriately through mean terms (*diu mesôn*).<sup>364</sup>

It is clear that for Proclus we may use mathematical reason to speak about physical realities because physical reality is an image of mathematical. Moreover, this is only the case because mathematical reality is the proximate cause of the physical. Finally, one may reason more surely about the physical by means of mathematics as its cause, because of the precision and *epistêmonikon* character of mathematical reality.

Certain passages suggest that the manner in which mathematical entities are the causes of physical things is like an unfolding or unrolling, similar to the Soul's unrolling of its own essence by the projection of its *logoi*.

And so, as Plato himself says, the physical proportion exists in numbers, volumes and powers (*dunamesin*). Physical numbers are the Forms which are in matter (*ta eidê ta enula*), and are divided according to their underlying matter (*hupokeimenon*); volumes are the displacements and intervals which come from matter; powers are the <qualities> which hold bodies together and give them their specific character. For the Form (*eidos*) is different from the power which arises from it. The Form is partless and of the order of essence (*ousiôdeis*), but when it has been stretched out and taken on bulk it puts forth powers in matter (*enulous dunameis*), like an exhalation from itself, which are certain qualities. For example, the Form of fire is a partless essence (*ousia*) and is a genuine image of its cause -- for even in divided things there is something which is partless -- but from the Form, which is indivisibly in fire, there comes to be an extension of fire and a displacement with regard to matter, from which are projected (*probeblêtai*) the powers of fire, such as heat or cooling or moisture or some other such thing. And these powers are qualities of the order of essence, but are in no way the essence of fire. For essences are not composed of powers, and essence and power are not the same thing. Rather, everywhere that which is of the order of essence

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<sup>364</sup> In *Tim.* II.51.4-15 (Note that the term 'proportion' used in this passage is not the one Life which runs through all things, but rather the internal proportion of each level): μιμεῖται γάρ, ὡς περ εἶπομεν, ἡ ἀναλογία τὴν θεῖαν ἔνωσιν καὶ δεσμός ἐστι δημιουργικός. ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἀναλογία τὸ ἀκριβές ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν· αὐτοὶ γὰρ εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι. ἡ δὲ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς οὐκέθ' ὁμοίως· ἀλλ' ὅση μὲν ἐν τοῖς οὐρανίοις ἐστί, μετέχει καὶ αὕτη τινός ἀκριβείας. ἡ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ σελήνην ἦττον, ἅτε ἐν ὕλῃ στρεφόμενη, πάλιν οὖν ἡ τάξις διαφαίνεται τῶν στοιχείων καὶ ὡς εἰκότως ὁ Πλάτων ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐπάγει τὴν πίστιν τοῖς φυσικοῖς λόγοις -- αἷτια γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ἡ δημιουργικὴ πρόοδος διὰ ψυχῆς ἐπιτελεῖται, καὶ ἡ ἀπογέννησις οἰκείως πρόεισι διὰ τῶν μέσων

precedes power, and from that one proceeds the plurality of powers, and from the undivided proceeds the divided, just as also from the single power comes many activities (*energeiai*). For however far each thing has proceeded, to that extent is it more multiplied and divided, while remaining partless and undivided in its principle and cause.<sup>365</sup>

Notice that essence, volume and power are not here a triad. Rather, the same triad is operative here as at higher levels, i.e. that of *ousia*, *dunamis*, and *energeia* (essence, power, activity). Volume seems to be the concomitant characteristic of the triad of *ousia*, *dunamis*, and *energeia* at this level, just as being measured by time is of the triad in the Soul. Notice also that the *energeia* of bodies does not revert on the first moment as it does in *Nous* and Soul. Soul is the centre of the universe. That which lies above it possesses itself in motionlessness. Soul possesses itself in a circular self-motion. In that which lies below Soul, the motion ceases to be circular, and become rectilinear. So there is only a weak sort of 'reversion', in the sense that the activities a body are images of its essence. But these activities are directed outwards rather than back towards the essence. They are like an exhalation which produces displacement, interval, and bulk, i.e. volume or extension. For this reason, body is thought by Proclus to be moved from without. Soul is self-moved, because in its activity is a grasping of its essence. Think of it as a moment of desire for itself. The activity of Soul is inherently self-moving because it is such as to seek continually to possess itself. Body is moved from without in the sense that the activities which arise from its essence do not themselves grasp the plan of their own unfolding, as do the activities of Soul. Rather, they issue from the powers and the

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<sup>365</sup> In *Tim.* II.24.31-25.23: οὐκοῦν, ὥς φησιν αὐτός, ἐν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ ὄγκοις καὶ δυνάμεσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ ἀριθμοὶ μὲν οἱ οὐσικοί, τὰ εἶδη τὰ ἐνύλια, τὰ μεριζόμενα περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὄγκοι δὲ αἱ ἐκτάσεις αὐτῶν καὶ αἱ διαστάσεις αἱ περὶ τὴν ὕλην, δυνάμεις δὲ αἱ «ποιότητες αἱ» συνεκτικαὶ καὶ εἰδοποιοὶ τῶν σωμάτων. ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἄλλη ἡ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ δύναμις· αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀμερές ἐστι καὶ οὐσιώδες, ἐκταθὲν δὲ καὶ ὄγκωθ' ὡς οἶον πνοὴν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ προίεται τὰς ἐνύλους δυνάμεις, ποιότητάς τινας οὐσας· οἶον ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρός, τὸ μὲν εἶδος αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐσία ἀμερὴς ἐστι καὶ ὄντως ἄγαλμα τῆς αἰτίας τοῦ πυρός· ἐστὶ γὰρ τι καὶ ἐν τοῖς μεριστοῖς ἀμερές· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ εἶδους ἀμερῶς ὄντος ἐν τῷ πυρὶ διάστασις αὐτοῦ γίγνεται καὶ ἐκτασις περὶ τὴν ὕλην, ἀφ' ἧς αἱ δυνάμεις προβέβληνται τοῦ πυρός, οἶον θερμότης ἢ ψύξις ἢ ὑγρότης ἢ ἄλλη τις τοιαύτη, καὶ εἰσὶν αὗται ποιότητες μὲν οὐσιώδεις, οὐσία δὲ τοῦ πυρός οὐδαμῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ ποιότητων αἱ οὐσίαι οὐδὲ ταῦτόν οὐσία καὶ δύναμις, ἀλλὰ προηγείται πανταχοῦ τὸ οὐσιώδες τῆς δυνάμεως, καὶ ἐξ ἐνός ἐκείνου πληθὸς πρόεισι δυνάμειν καὶ ἐξ ἀδιαιρέτου διηρημένον, ὥσπερ αὐ καὶ ἐκ μιᾶς δυνάμεως ἐνέργειαι πλείους, ὅσῳ γὰρ πρόεισιν ἕκαστον, τοσοῦτ' ἄλλον πληθύεται καὶ διαιρεῖται, κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀμέριστον ὃν καὶ ἀδιαιρέτον.

essence of a body and the plan of their unfolding is resident in the essence from which they came.

And so Nature possesses the Form of the tooth, the eye, and the hand, by which it gives shape to matter; and it is not the whole eye which is extended, but rather it is the case that it possesses somewhere the partless Form. Yet the Soul remains one while possessing in itself both the divine and the irrational (*alogon*), and in the divine it comprehends the irrational powers under a rational manner (*periechei tas alogous dunameis logikôs*), by which it guides aright the irrational, and orders it as it must.<sup>366</sup>

For this reason body is not rational, because cognition is this grasping of self through reversion upon one's essence, and body is incapable of this self-reversion.

We will examine further the manner in which mathematical principles order body while remaining ontologically higher than it by looking at Proclus' discussion of the paradigmatic role of the seven portions of the Soul's *ousia*, and his discussion of the proportion of the four elements.

#### IV.iii.a. The seven portions of the Soul's *ousia*

Proclus summarises his account of the significance of the initial seven portions of the Soul separated by the Demiurge as follows.

And thus the *ousia* of the Soul is in seven parts, as remaining, proceeding and returning: as the cause of the procession and the reversion of both the *ousiai* which are divided among bodies; and of bodies themselves. If you wish, because the Soul has received an existence (*hupostasis*) which is intermediate between the undivided and the divided existences, it imitates the undivided through the triad of terms,<sup>367</sup> and it has embraced in advance the divided through the tetrad.<sup>368</sup>

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<sup>366</sup> In *Tim.* II.47.25-31: καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις οὕτως ὁδόντος ἔχει καὶ ὄφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς εἶδος, ὃ καὶ τὴν ὕλην μορφοῖ, καὶ οὐ πᾶς ὄφθαλμός διαστατός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅπου καὶ ἀμέρες ἔχει τὸ εἶδος. ἔτι δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ μία τέ ἐστι καὶ ἔχει τὸ μὲν θεῖον ἐν ἑαυτῇ, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον, καὶ ἐν τῷ θεῷ περιέχει τὰς ἀλόγους δυνάμεις λογικῶς, αἷς κατευθύνει τὴν ἀλογίαν καὶ τάττει θεόντως.

<sup>367</sup> Proclus separates the seven terms into a triad, consisting of 1, 2, 3, and a tetrad, consisting of 4, 9, 8, 27.

<sup>368</sup> In *Tim.* II.205.24-30: καὶ οὕτως ἐπταμερὴς ἡ οὐσία τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς μένουσα καὶ προϊούσα καὶ ἐπιστρέφουσα καὶ αἰτία τῆς τε προόδου καὶ τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς τῶν τε περὶ τοῖς σώμασι μεριστῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν σωμάτων αὐτῶν· εἰ δὲ βούλει, διότι μέσσην ἔλαχεν ὑπόστασιν τῶν τε ἀμερίστων καὶ τῶν μεριστῶν, ἐκεῖνα μὲν μιμεῖται διὰ τῆς τριάδος τῶν ὄρων, ταῦτα δὲ προείληφε διὰ τῆς τετράδος.

We will examine in greater detail each of these portions.

The first portion, which is represented by the number 1, is the most intellectual (*noerôtaton*) and highest part of the Soul. It unites itself to the One itself, and also to the entire *huparxis* of the Soul, and is named 'one' because of its resemblance to unity. This portion is said to have an *analogia* to the cause and the centre of the Soul, and it is through it that the Soul remains where it is and does not depart from the Whole. In other words, the unit represents the first portion of the Soul because in Proclus' arithmetical thinking the unit is the monad of numbers. It remains, as does the highest portion of the Soul. Subsequent portions of the Soul proceed by departing from the unity of the first portion, in the same manner in which subsequent numbers proceed from the unit as their monad, by departing from the number one, or from unity.<sup>369</sup>

The second portion, represented by the number 2, "multiplies that which is before it through productive processions (*gennêtikais proodois*), which is indicated by the dyad [=2], and it manifests all of the processions of the Soul's *ousia*."<sup>370</sup> The number 2 is here thought to represent procession because it is the first departure from unity, as double the monad. Proclus describes the second portion of the soul as "double" the first, and hence as imitating the "Indefinite Dyad" (*aoriston duada*) and the "Intelligible Unlimited" (*apeiran tèn noêtên*). "Indefinite Dyad" is a term used rarely in Proclus, but this passage shows that in at least this case he considers it to be equivalent to the First Unlimited, which along with the First Limit are the principles immediately below the One.<sup>371</sup> Thus

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<sup>369</sup> In *Tim.* II.203.30-204.21. Proclus makes the point here that the first portion of the Soul is not an absolute one. Rather, it is like the One itself only because it is a unified plurality. Neither is the one of *Nous* a pure one, because it too falls short of the pure one which is the one of the gods.

<sup>370</sup> In *Tim.* II.204.21-23: ἡ δὲ δευτέρα πολλαπλασιάζει τὴν πρὸ αὐτῆς γεννητικαῖς προόδοις, ὥς ἡ δυὰς ἐνδείκνυται, καὶ πάσας τὰς προόδους ἐκκαίνει τῆς οὐσίας.

<sup>371</sup> See In *Tim.* I.176.8-177.3. See also *Plat. Theol.* III.37.21-38.7. In *Tim.* I.176.8-177.3 is the only passage that I have found, other than the one currently under discussion, in which Proclus calls the Unlimited the Indefinite Dyad. Although the earlier In *Timaeum* passage is a discussion of the views of the Pythagoreans and of Philolaus, the passage currently under discussion seems to indicate that Proclus did not think that the name "Indefinite Dyad" was inappropriate to the First Unlimited. However, Proclus much more often uses the term "dyad" to refer to both Limit and Unlimited, as a dyad of principles which come immediately after the One. In this he differs from his master, Syrianus, who posits immediately after the One a Monad and a "Dyad infinite in power" (*apeirodunamos duas*), or an "Indefinite Dyad" (*aoristos*

the second portion of the Soul is analogous to the principle of all multiplicity and procession, the First Unlimited, as the first portion is analogous to the Monad which remains.<sup>372</sup>

The third portion, represented by the number 3, is the moment of reversion within the *ousia* of the Soul itself. It "makes all of the Soul revert back towards its principle...and is that which rolls the Soul together (*sunellisomenon*)<sup>373</sup> towards the principles."<sup>374</sup> In the same way that the number 1 is appropriate to describe the monad of the Soul, and 2 the dyadic principle of procession, Proclus thinks that 3 is appropriate for the moment of reversion. He says that 3 has more affinity with 1 than with 2, because 1 may be divided into 3 by a whole number, whereas 2 does not divide into 3 except through a fraction. This is symbolic of the manner in which the third part is "measured" (*metreitai*) by the first, and is filled with "unification" (*henôsis*) from it, and completely "held together" (*sunechomenon*) by it. Beginning with the third moment as the moment

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*duas*). It is likely that Proclus' language at this point recalls that of his master, and that calling the "intelligible unlimited" here an "indefinite dyad" furthers his demonstration of the affinity of the dyad of the Soul with this principle. The use of the term "indefinite dyad" in Syrianus' sense is unclear. Dillon has argued that it may be attributed to Iamblichus, but this is disputed, because his evidence is drawn from Damascius, who may not simply have been reporting Iamblichus' views. See A. Sheppard, "Monad and Dyad as Cosmic Principles in Syrianus," in *Soul and the structure of being in late Neoplatonism, Syrianus, Proclus and Simplicius*, ed. H.J. Blumenthal and A.C. Lloyd (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1982) pp.1-17. Its ultimate origin may be traced back to Aristotle's attribution of the term to Plato at *Met.*987b35-988a2: "τὸ δὲ δυάδα ποιῆσαι τὴν ἐτέραν οὖσιν διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἔξω τῶν πρώτων εὐθυσῶς ἐξ αὐτῆς γεννᾶσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐκ τινος ἐκμαγείου." Aristotle uses the term indefinite dyad with reference to Plato at *Met.*1082a13 and again at 1091a6, where he reports Plato as saying that number cannot be derived any other way than from the one and the Indefinite Dyad. Note that the generation of the numbers from the One in *Parmenides* 143c-144a does not mention a dyad. Simplicius attributes the doctrine found in Aristotle to Plato, and reports that Porphyry also attributed it to Plato. Hence it is safe to assume that the term Indefinite Dyad as applied to the principle of procession and multiplication is current at least in Neopythagorean circles. As to its role in Aristotle and in Plato himself, that remains a mystery. For an attempt to solve this mystery, see K. Sayre, *Plato's Late Ontology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

<sup>372</sup> In *Tim.*II.204.21-25.

<sup>373</sup> Note the contrast between *sunellisomenon*, which is a rolling back together, and *anelissomenon* as an unfolding or unrolling, used to describe the projection of the Soul's *logoi*.

<sup>374</sup> In *Tim.*II.204.26-27: ἡ δὲ τρίτη πᾶσαν αὐτὴν ἐπιστρέφει πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ ἔστι τὸ τρίτον αὐτῆς τὸ συνελισσόμενον εἰς τὰς ἀρχάς.

of reversion. therefore, Proclus finds it appropriate that Plato assigned to it the number 3. because he considers 3 to refer back to 1 in a way in which it does not refer back to 2.<sup>375</sup>

The numerical designations of the first three portions, which Proclus calls the "triad" of portions, have reference to the remaining, procession and reversion of the Soul itself. The remaining four portions, the "tetrad", govern the entities lower than the Soul, and their numerical designations represent this symbolically. The fourth and fifth portions, which are represented by 4 and 9 respectively, "are intellectual causes of the incorporeal [being] which is divided among bodies."<sup>376</sup> This refers to the intermediate level of Forms or *logoi* which exist between the Soul itself and body. The number 4 and the number 9 are appropriate to describe the causes of this level of being, according to Proclus, because they are plane numbers or square numbers. Proclus does not specify at this point exactly what he means. It could be that planes as two dimension figures are intermediate between the one dimensional and the three dimensional, as the Forms divided among bodies are intermediate between the Soul and body. Or it could be that planes are thought of here as the limit of body, and hence are like the Forms divided among bodies, i.e. they limit them but they are not identical with them. Later Proclus seems to side with the second interpretation, when he says that the Soul through the fourth and five portion produces the sort of being which is incorporeal but also inseparable from body.<sup>377</sup> This does seem to suggest the mathematical analogy by which the plane is thought to be the boundary of the solid, but itself is not a part of it, as the point ends the line but is not a part of the line, because neither the line nor the point are composed of points or planes.<sup>378</sup> There are two portions in this category, one deriving from the second portion and one from the third, which themselves represent procession

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<sup>375</sup> *In Tim.* II.204.25-205.2.

<sup>376</sup> *In Tim.* II.205.3-5: αἰτίαι γὰρ εἰσι τῶν ἀσωμάτων τῶν περὶ τοῖς σώμασι μεριζομένων νοεραὶ.

<sup>377</sup> *In Tim.* II.209.25.

<sup>378</sup> One cannot add together any amount of points and arrive at a line, because a point has no magnitude. Similarly, a plane has magnitude in only two dimensions. Hence insofar as a solid is bounded by a plane, the plane considered in itself is not really a corporeal (i.e. a three dimensional) object.

and reversion in the Soul itself, respectively. Hence the fourth and fifth portions are divided into the portion derived from 2 which contains in itself the cause of the procession and generation of the being divided among bodies, and the portion derived from 3 which contains the cause of the reversion and perfection of the same. More specifically, the fourth portion is the cause of the procession into multiplicity of bodies, i.e. of their divisions, while the fifth portion is the cause of their reversion, which in this context Proclus tells us is cognitive.<sup>379</sup>

As one might expect, the sixth and seventh portions, represented by 8 and 27, refer to the Soul's possession of the causes of the procession and reversion of bodies themselves. This is because 8 and 27 are cubes, i.e. three dimensional numbers, and hence are an appropriate manner of representing the causes of body.<sup>380</sup>

It should be stressed that Proclus does not think that the portions of the Soul are literally the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, and 27. Instead, this double series of numbers represents symbolically the seven initial portions of the Soul. The reason for this is that the numbers are thought by Proclus to have a relationship to each other that is homologous to the relationship which holds between the portions of the Soul. For this reason mathematical representation is able to reveal to us that which is above it, and to raise our minds to the contemplation of that which lies above it. In this case the soul, i.e. our partial soul, is contemplating itself in a certain manner. However, the ontological difference between our thinking and the portions of the Soul of the Cosmos is significant enough that this sort of symbolic representation has a place. Our own discursive thinking

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<sup>379</sup> *In Tim.* II.205.2-17. I disagree with Festugière's interpretation of *In Tim.* II.205.10-15. He translates this passage as: "Et il semble que l'une soit génératrice des parties distinctes qui dans le corps ont purement valeur générative, mais n'en imitent pas moins la procession des forms génératives de l'Ame, et que l'autre soit génératrices des parties qui sans doute sont parties distinctes du corps, mais qui possèdent un pouvoir cognitif et ainsi imitent le mouvement de retour de l'Ame." I think it should rather read: "And it seems that the fourth portion is productive of [the Forms] which are productive of distinct parts [in bodies], as well as the fertile Forms which imitate procession of the Soul; and the fifth part [is productive of the Forms] divided among bodies, but which possess a cognitive power, and thus imitate the reversion of the Soul."

<sup>380</sup> *In Tim.* II.205.17-24. For a summary of all the portions, see *In Tim.* II.205.31-206.29.



takes place on the level of the *energeia* of the partial soul, while what we are contemplating, along with Proclus in his commentary, and Plato in his *Timaeus*, is the *ousia* of the Soul which is in a sense our older sister, the Soul of the Cosmos.

IV.iii.b. The proportions between the elements, and the three quality theory of the elements

The mathematical structure of the cosmos can be illustrated by Proclus' explanation of the proportion which holds between the elements, and the three-quality theory of the elements.<sup>381</sup> Mathematics as we know it is thought by Proclus to be an image of the Soul's *ousia*. However, it is also a cause, and its effect and image is the physical world.

In the *Timaeus*, Plato tells us that there must be a third in between two things which are being put together, which will act as a bond of union if they are to be bound beautifully or well (*kalôs*).

Two things cannot be beautifully (*kalôs*) put together without a third: there must be some bond in between them both which causes them to come together. And the most beautiful (*kallistos*) of bonds is that which makes itself and what it binds as much as possible to be one. And by nature proportion (*analogia*) is the most beautiful thing which accomplishes this.<sup>382</sup>

Proportion makes three things become one in the following manner. If between two numbers there is a mean term,<sup>383</sup> i.e. a number which is related to the last number as the first number is related to it, then this mean makes the three numbers to be one. Take the series 1, 2, 4. What the first is to the mean (i.e. one-half) the mean is to the last. What

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<sup>381</sup> See A. Charles, "Analogie et pensée sérielle chez Proclus," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 23 (1969) pp.69-88; see pp.72-76. Charles notes how the principle of mean terms which is at work in Proclus' discussion of the four elements, and which allows them to have an inner continuity, is applied with the same result in other parts of his philosophy. For example, between the unmoved and that which is moved from without we find the self moved. See below, chapter VI.

<sup>382</sup> *Tim.* 31b-c: δύο δὲ μόνω καλῶς συνίστασθαι τρίτου χωρὶς οὐ δυνατόν· δεσμόν γάρ ἐν μέσῳ δεῖ τινα ἀμφοῖν συναγωγὸς γίγνεσθαι. δεσμών δὲ κάλλιστος ὅς ἂν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ συνδούμενα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐν ποιῇ, τοῦτο δὲ πέφυκεν ἀναλογία κάλλιστα ἀποτελεῖν.

<sup>383</sup> The word "mean" is being used here as the middle term of a proportion, and not as the proportion itself, which is also possible.

the last is to the mean (double) the mean is to the first. So Plato tells us "the mean becomes first and last, and the last and first in turn become the mean."<sup>384</sup> In other words, the first is half and the last is double, and the mean becomes both half and double. But if the mean is the same as the first and the last, they in turn are the same as it. And as Plato says, "having become the same as each other, they all become one."<sup>385</sup> Note that this only holds if there happens to be a mean between the two numbers which one wishes to bind. If there is no mean, then presumably they cannot be bound "beautifully" (*kalós*). Moreover, Plato tells us in this passage that if the world were two-dimensional a single mean would have sufficed to bind it together. But as the world is three-dimensional, two means are necessary. And so God placed water and air as means in between the extremes of fire and earth.

In explaining this passage, Proclus points out that there is one mean between two numbers only if they have two factors in the same ratio. Two such numbers are 18 and 32. 18 can be factored into  $3 \cdot 6$ , which is a ratio of 1:2, and 32 can be factored into  $4 \cdot 8$  which is also a ratio of 1:2. If we think of this geometrically, then any two numbers have a mean if it is possible to construct two similar rectangles with the given numbers as their areas. Obviously this would include any two square numbers, because the sides of all squares are in a ratio of 1:1. One arrives at the mean by multiplying the first factor of one of the numbers by the second factor of the other, beginning with either number. So the mean between 18 and 32 is 24, because  $3 \cdot 8 = 24$  and  $4 \cdot 6 = 24$ . 24 is one and one-third of 18, and 32 is one and one-third of 24, so it is the mean which binds the two extremes, and the three numbers become one. So if the world were two dimensional, i.e. if it were such that what was to be bound were two similar planes, then one mean would suffice.

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<sup>384</sup> *Tim.* 32a: τότε τὸ μέσον μὲν πρῶτον καὶ ἔσχατον γινόμενον, τὸ δ' ἔσχατον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον αὐτὰ μέσα ἀμφοτέρω.

<sup>385</sup> *Tim.* 32a: τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ γεγόμενα ἀλλήλοις ἐν πάντα ἔσται.

However, the world is not two dimensional. And three dimensional numbers, if they are to be bound with means, may only be bound by two means. By three dimensional numbers I mean numbers which, if they are to be bound, must be bound by using three factors of each, in the same ratio. Take as an example 24 and 192. These can be factored into  $2*3*4$  and  $4*6*8$ . These factors are related such that the second is one and one-half the first, and the last is one and one-third the second. This is true for both numbers. The means are arrived at by multiplication of factors. The first mean is arrived at by multiplying two factors of the first extreme<sup>386</sup> by one of the second, and the second mean is arrived at by multiplying one factor of the first extreme by two of the second. This only works if the place of the factors is conserved, so that if one uses the third factor of the second number, one substitutes it for the third factor of the first number. The means between 24 and 192 are 48 and 96. In the series 24, 48, 96, 192, each term is double its previous, so that all terms are made one through two mean terms. This is the mathematical explanation of the text, according to Proclus.<sup>387</sup>

The physical explanation is as follows. Just as two numbers which must be factored into three terms are joined by two means, so the elements are each characterised by three qualities, and hence they must be joined by two means. Fire is subtle (S), penetrating (P) and has great mobility (M); earth is dense (D), obtuse (O) and is immobile (I). Subtlety is opposed to density, penetration to obtusity, and mobility to immobility. Fire and earth, as opposites with regard to all three qualities, must be bound by two

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<sup>386</sup> An "extreme" is one of the original two terms, not one of the means.

<sup>387</sup> Calcidius goes even further. He illustrates the two means between three dimensional numbers through solid geometry. See Calcidius' commentary on the *Timaeus* chapters XVIII-XXII, pp.68-73 Klibansky edition. Imagine the factors of the two original numbers as the lengths of the sides of two similar rectilinear solids. Calcidius tells us that the two means mediate between the two original solids, because they can be placed between them such that the first shares one face with the first mean, with no overlap. The first mean shares one face with the second mean, and the second mean shares one face with the final solid. And for two solids to share a face they must have the lengths of at least two sides in common, otherwise one would stick out beyond the other. See figure 4, Appendix.

Note that the volumes of the four rectilinear solids are the same as the four terms in the arithmetic progression 24, 48, 96, 192. Thus the reason that 48 and 96 are the means, according to Calcidius, is that they are the volumes of solids which allow the solids with volumes of 24 and 192 actually to be stuck together.

means, air and water. Air shares two qualities with fire and water shares two with earth. And air and water also share two qualities with each other. In this way, each of the four elements is bound, as they are all joined in the proportion by which each is the same as its neighbour in two qualities and differs from it in one. Air is subtle, obtuse and has great mobility, and water is dense, obtuse and has great mobility. Hence we have the following progression:

Fire: S-P-M

Air: S-O-M

Water: D-O-M

Earth: D-O-I

It is so Fire and Earth be bound together most beautifully that God placed a mean between them, and because Fire and Earth have three principle qualities that in fact God placed between them the two means of Air and Water.

Notice that this explanation is intelligible for Proclus because mathematical entities are the causes of physical entities. Hence the relations which hold between physical entities are images of the relations which hold between mathematical entities. Thus the proportion which binds two three dimensional numbers has its image in the proportion of the elements.

As a note to this section, I would like to extend this reasoning concerning the need for two means between three-dimensional numbers, and hence between the elements. There is an interesting progression that Proclus does not mention, but which is in the spirit of this thinking on these matters, from arithmetic, through solid geometry, to physics. With regard to all sets of three 'dimensions', whether taken as factors of a three-dimensional number, sides of rectilinear solid or as qualities of an element, there are six possible means between the extremes. This is because each place can hold one of two things, i.e. a number from the beginning or ending extreme. Eg. if the solids are 1,2,4 and 2,4,8 the first place can either hold a 1 or a 2, the second a 2 or a 4 and the third a 4 or an

8. This is  $2*2*2$  for a total of eight possible combinations. Two of the combinations are the extremes, leaving 6 combinations as means:

- A.  $1 * 2 * 4 = 8$  -- the first extreme
- B.  $1 * 2 * 8 = 16$  -- the first mean number
- C.  $1 * 4 * 4 = 16$  -- the first mean number
- D.  $2 * 2 * 4 = 16$  -- the first mean number
- E.  $2 * 4 * 4 = 32$  -- the second mean number
- F.  $2 * 2 * 8 = 32$  -- the second mean number
- G.  $1 * 4 * 8 = 32$  -- the second mean number
- H.  $2 * 4 * 8 = 64$  -- the second extreme

From the point of view of arithmetic there are two mean numbers, which may be arrived at by any of the three combinations in each set. All that matters is the product, so it doesn't matter which factor sets you choose to arrive at the proper means.

From the point of view of solid geometry, the combinations could be thought to be more restricted. If we follow Calcidius' account, in which the geometrical means actually fit together, such that the first mean has two sides matching the first extreme figure, and will hook onto that surface: the second mean has two sides which match the second extreme figure, and will hook onto it by that side. But also the two means themselves must be contiguous and hook on to each other, so that the means themselves must have two sides which are of the same length. So if the first mean is B the second mean can be F or G, but cannot be E. If the first mean is C, the second can be E or G, but not F. If the first mean is D, the second can be E or F, but not G.

From the point of view of physics the choices are even more limited. The scheme would look like the following:

- A. subtlety -- penetration -- mobility = Fire (8)
- B. subtlety -- penetration -- immobility = \_\_\_\_ (16)
- C. subtlety -- obtusity -- mobility = Air (16)

D. density -- penetration -- mobility = \_\_\_\_ (16)

E. density -- obtusity -- mobility = Water (32)

F. density -- penetration -- immobility = \_\_\_\_ (32)

G. subtlety -- obtusity -- immobility = \_\_\_\_ (32)

H. density -- obtusity -- immobility = Earth

In this scheme there are two qualities which are shared only by one element:

penetration and immobility; two which are shared by two elements: subtlety and density; and two which are shared by three elements: mobility and obtusity. However, there is no mathematical necessity which dictates that the two intermediates be what they are. The necessity, such as it is, must be thought to be physical, i.e. once you have decided that penetration is only possessed by Fire, then the second intermediate must be Air, because B and D both contain penetration, which is ruled out from the start. This sort of arbitrary physical necessity is not present in solid geometry, because you may stick the first mean onto any one of the sides of the first extreme. The second intermediate can also not contain penetration, so must either be Water (=density, obtusity and mobility) or element G (=subtlety, obtusity and immobility). However, if you have already decided that immobility is possessed only by Earth, because of physical necessity, then you are required to choose Water over element G as the second intermediate, because G contains immobility. At *In Tim.* II.40.3 Proclus discusses Fire and Earth, and points out that Fire is penetrating and able to pass through (*diadunon*) all the other elements. Think of how anything may be burned or heated -- eg. the way metal may glow, indicating that Fire has penetrated it and passes through it. Earth, on the other hand, is very difficult to move, which is not the case for Water and Air. In his discussion at *In Tim.* II.40.23 it is significant that Proclus says that if you remove penetration from Fire, you get Air, and then he starts from Earth, and says if you remove immobility you get Water.

So it is arithmetically and geometrically possible that the demiurge could have created other very different elements instead of Air and Water, but because there are Fire

and Earth, which are the only elements to have penetration and immobility respectively. physical necessity dictates that the intermediates be Air and Water. It seems that this scheme works even more nicely than Proclus realised, if we consider this movement from arithmetic, through solid geometry, to physics. Arithmetic is more universal than geometry, in the sense that the multiplicity of manners of arriving at the mean have no bearing on the mean itself. Geometry is a sort of intermediate, in the sense that one may begin with any of the three possibilities for the first mean, but then subsequently one is constrained in one's construction of the second mean by one's arbitrary choice of the first mean. In the physical world arbitrary necessity almost overpowers the universality of thought, because although the physical mediation is an image of the means in arithmetic and geometry, one is restricted to what actually exists, and by the particular characteristics which are actually possessed by the extremes and only by the extremes.

#### IV.iv. *Phantasia* in between Soul and Body

At the beginning of the second prologue to the Euclid commentary,<sup>388</sup> Proclus raises a question about the ontological status of geometrical matter (*tên geômetrikên hulên*),<sup>389</sup> which leads him to a discussion of *phantasia* as a projection of geometrical *logoi*.<sup>390</sup> On the one hand, if the figures which geometers speak about are sensible, and therefore are wedded to sensible matter, then it seems that they could not lead us to the contemplation of the intelligibles by making us used to thinking the immaterial. Moreover, we do not find among sensibles the perfect angles, straight lines, or points

<sup>388</sup> The first prologue is about mathematics in general. The second is about geometry.

<sup>389</sup> Morrow unfortunately translates τὴν γεωμετρικὴν ὕλην as "the subject-matter of geometry."

<sup>390</sup> For a brief discussion of geometry as the *probolê tôn ousdiôdôn logôn* in the Euclid commentary, see Dominic J. O'Meara, *Pythagoras Revived* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) pp.167-169. See also I. Mueller, "Mathematics and Philosophy in Proclus' *Commentary on Book I of Euclid's Elements*," in *Proclus lecteur et interprète des anciens. Actes du Colloque internationale du C.N.R.S., Paris 2-4 oct. 1985*, ed. J. Pépin et H.-D. Saffrey (Paris: C.N.R.S., 1987) pp.305-318. Mueller recognises Proclus' "projectionist" philosophy of geometry (see pp.316-317). However, he does not point out that it is an application of his wider doctrine of the projection of the soul's *logoi*.

without breadth which we do find in the objects of geometry. As well, how could geometrical conclusions be irrefutable if the figures about which they speak are in the ever-changing matter of sense-objects?<sup>391</sup> However, if it were the case that the underlying in geometry was outside of matter (*exô tês hulês esti ta hupokeimena tēi geômetriai*), pure and separate from sensible objects, other problems arise. In this second case, geometrical objects will have neither parts, nor body, nor magnitude.

For *logoi* have present to them magnitude, bulk, and extension in general in virtue of the matter which is their receptacle, a receptacle which receives the indivisible in a divided manner, the unextended through extension, and the motionless as moving.<sup>392</sup>

The consequence of this is that the normal operations of the geometer become impossible, because it is impossible to perform bisections, make comparisons of size, and speak of contact between figures which have no magnitude, extension, or bulk. Thus it must be the case that geometrical matter (*hulê*) is divisible, but not sensible.

Proclus' solution to this dilemma is to distinguish between two types of underlying matter (*hupokeimenên hulên*):

for matter likewise is twofold, as Aristotle says somewhere: the matter of things tied to sensation and the matter of imagined objects (*tôn phantastôn*) – and we shall admit that the corresponding universal is of two kinds: the one sensible, because it is participated by sensible things, and the other imaginary (*phantaston*), because it has its existence in the multiplicity of imagination (*phantasia*).<sup>393</sup>

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<sup>391</sup> *In Eucl.* 49.4ff.

<sup>392</sup> *In Eucl.* 49.27-50.02: ἑκτασις γάρ καὶ ὄγκος καὶ ὕλως διάστασις τοῖς λόγοις διὰ τὴν ὑλικὴν ὑποδοχὴν παραγίνεται, τὰ μὲν ἀμέριστα μεριστῶς, τὰ δὲ ἀδιάστατα διαστατῶς, τὰ δὲ ἀκίνητα κινουμένως δεχομένην.

<sup>393</sup> *In Eucl.* 51.15-17: καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὕλη διττή, καὶ ἡ μὲν τῶν αἰσθησεί συζυγούντων ἡ δὲ τῶν φανταστῶν, ὡς πού καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶ -- διττὸν εἶναι τὸ καθόλου τὸ κατατεταγμένον συγχωρήσωμεν, τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν ὡς μετεχόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, τὸ δὲ φανταστὸν ὡς ἐν τοῖς τῆς φαντασίας πλήθεσιν ὑφεισθηκός. Morrow notes at this point that he does not follow Friedlein's punctuation, but rather follows Barocius and Schönberger in understanding ὡς πού καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶ to go with the previous clause rather than the following διττὸν εἶναι τὸ καθόλου. I follow Morrow in this. He also notes that Aristotle distinguishes (*Met.* 1036a9-12) between ὕλη αἰσθητή and ὕλη νοητή rather than between ὕλη αἰσθητή and ὕλη τῶν φανταστῶν. However, Morrow thinks that Proclus is justified in this modification, because at *De Anima* 433a10 Aristotle assumes that *phantasia* is a form of *noësis*. Whether or not this is a justifiable reading of Aristotle in general, it is certainly justified for Proclus. We have seen that he is comfortable applying terminology in a very fluid manner, even if he thinks that the ontological realities which he names are precisely delineated: so his use of both *eidê* and *logoi* to refer to the contents of



*Phantasia* has in it a universal which is different from the universal in sense-objects. But it is also different from the universal in *dianoia*.<sup>394</sup> And this universal in *phantasia* finds itself in a matter which is likewise in between the matter of sense and the immateriality of *dianoia*.<sup>395</sup> *Phantasia* is able to have in it figures which have extension and are divisible, "through its formative motion, and the fact that it has its existence with and in the body."<sup>396</sup> Thus the mathematical objects in *phantasia* are able to admit of divisions and comparisons, and differences of magnitude, because they do have extension in matter. But the matter in which they have their extension is not the matter of sensibles, with its imperfection and ever-changing nature.

In the Euclid commentary Proclus thinks that *phantasia* is in between *dianoia* and sensation.<sup>397</sup> This is why Aristotle called it passive *nous* (*noun pathêtikon*), according to

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the soul's *ousia*. Here it would be natural for Proclus to think of Aristotle's contrast between the sensible and the intelligible as a contrast between the sensible and the *phantaston*. Indeed, in a passage just following he mentions Aristotle's phrase *noun pathêtikon*, and says that *phantasia* is called "*nous*" because of its kinship with the highest sort of knowledge, and "passive" because of its kinship with the lowest. This name manifests its intermediate character. See our discussion of the various sorts of *noësis*, of which the lowest is *phantasia*, in chapter VII.

<sup>394</sup> Of course, Proclus has already said that *ta mathēmatika* are a form of *dianoëta*. Again we run into Proclus' fluid terminology. Geometrical objects are classed below non-mathematical *dianoëta*, and below the objects of arithmetic. So one may think of them as the lowest sort of *dianoëta*, as Proclus does when talking about mathematics in general. On the other hand, one may distinguish them from the *dianoëta*, because of the extension of their underlying matter, as Proclus does here.

<sup>395</sup> At this point Proclus brings up his three-fold distinction between the universal (a.) before the many particulars, (b.) in the many particulars, and (c.) as posterior to and arising from the many particulars. He mentions this distinction, and then remarks that for each of these universals there is a difference in the underlying matter. Proclus then goes on to the passage quoted above, where he says there is a difference in the matter of *aisthēta* and *phantasta*. Morrow's translation gives one the impression that this latter distinction should be mapped onto two of the three terms mentioned above: the universal before the many, in the many, and posterior to the many. However, the phrase *καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτὰ διττὰ θέμενοι* should be read as: "and we must also posit the universal which is participated [i.e. the universal in the many] itself as double." So what Proclus is doing is subdividing the middle term of the three-fold initial division. This fits with his other writings, where the universal before the many is unparticipated, the universal in the many is the participated moment – participated here either by sensible or imaginary matter –, and the universal after the many is the later-born universal produced by Aristotelian abstraction.

<sup>396</sup> *In Eucl.* 51.21-22.: *διὰ τε τὴν μορφωτικὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὸ μετὰ σώματος καὶ ἐν σώματι τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχειν.*

<sup>397</sup> The status of *phantasia* in Proclus is a controversial issue. H. Blumenthal is of the opinion that in Proclus' early works, especially the *In Timaeum*, *doxa* is thought of as the main faculty between sensation and *dianoia*. This place is gradually usurped by *phantasia*, so that in the late *In Euclidem doxa* is mentioned only marginally, and *phantasia* has become the main faculty occupying this middle position. See H. J. Blumenthal, "Plutarch's exposition of the *De Anima* and the psychology of Proclus," in *De Jamblique à Proclus* (Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1975) pp.123-147. This may be the case. Our interest in *phantasia*,

Proclus.<sup>398</sup> As he often does, Proclus analyses this name into its elements, and states that Aristotle called *phantasia* passive *nous* in order to show both its kinship with the higher, *nous*, and the lower, the passivity of sensation. Being in-between, it is both the same as and different from its upper and lower neighbours. It is similar to *dianoia* as its upper neighbour because it projects what it knows out of the centre which is itself, rather than receiving its *logoi* passively from outside. It is similar to *aisthēsis* because the *logoi* which it projects reside in a matter which introduces extension into them, which is not the case for the *logoi* in *dianoia*.

By contrast *phantasia*, occupying a position in the centre, in the middle of these types of knowing, is moved by itself to project (*proballei*) its object of knowledge (*to gnōston*), but because it is not outside the body, it leads its objects out of the undivided centre of its life into division, extension, and figure. For this reason everything that it thinks is a figure (*tupos*) or a shape of its thought. It thinks the circle as extended, and although this circle is free of external matter, it possesses an intelligible matter provided by *phantasia* itself. This is why there is more than one circle in *phantasia*, as there is more than one circle in the sense world: for with extension there appear also differences in size and number among circles and triangles.<sup>399</sup>

All of the circles in *phantasia* are identical in that they are all instances of the same *logos* (*pantas homoious allēlois kath' hena logon hupostantas*), i.e. they are all circles. But

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however, is in its role in the *probolē tōn oustōdōn logōn*, a role which is present almost exclusively in the *In Euclidem*. For Proclus on *phantasia* see A. Charles, "L'imagination, miroir de l'âme selon Proclus," in *Le Néoplatonisme* (Paris: C.N.R.S., 1971) pp.241-248; H.J. Blumenthal, "Neoplatonic interpretations of Aristotle on *Phantasia*," *The Review of Metaphysics*, 31 (1977) pp.242-257; E. Moutsopoulos, *Les structures de l'imaginaire dans la philosophie de Proclus*, (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1985); and S. Breton, *Philosophie et mathématique chez Proclus, suivi de, Principes philosophiques des mathématiques, par N. Hartmann, traduit de l'allemand par Geneviève de Peslouan* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1969) pp.112-123.

<sup>398</sup> Morrow refers us to *De An.*430a24. At this point Aristotle is not referring to *phantasia*, but to the two types of *nous*, one which becomes all things and one which makes all things. Morrow refers us as well to *In Tim.*1.244.20 and III.158.9.

<sup>399</sup> *In Eucl.*52.20-53.05: ἡ δ' αὖ φαντασία τὸ μέσον κέντρον κατέχουσα τῶν γνώσεων ἀνεγείρεται μὲν ἀφ' ἐαυτῆς καὶ προβάλλει τὸ γνωστόν, ἅτε δὲ οὐκ ἔξω σώματος οὕσα ἐκ τοῦ ἀμεροῦς τῆς ζωῆς εἰς μερισμὸν καὶ διάστασιν καὶ σχῆμα προάγει τὰ γνωστά αὐτῆς, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πᾶν, ὅπερ ἂν νοῆ, τύπος ἐστὶ καὶ μορφή νοήματος, καὶ τὸν τε κύκλον διαστατῶς νοεῖ τῆς μὲν ἐκτὸς ὕλης καθαρεύοντα νοητὴν δὲ ὕλην ἔχοντα τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐχ εἷς ἐν αὐτῇ κύκλος, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, ἅμα γὰρ διάστασις ἀναφαίνεται καὶ τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἔλασσον καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν τε κύκλων καὶ τῶν τριγώνων.

they will differ in their size from each other, due to the extension afforded by intelligible matter.

*Phantasia* is situated between *dianoia* and *aisthêsis*. However, Proclus also sets up a parallel between *dianoia* and Nature (*phusis*) on the one hand, and *phantasia* and sense objects on the other.<sup>400</sup> Prior to the universal in sense objects is the universal in *phusis*, and prior to the universal in *phantasia* is the universal in *dianoia*. The structure of the sensible world is afforded to it through the mathematical principles which it receives through Nature, standing under the Soul of the Cosmos. Thus the Soul of the Cosmos, or the World Soul, puts forth the undivided mathematical *logoi* which it possesses through the medium of Nature, and produces body. Our partial souls, however, being only little sisters of the World Soul, put forth the undivided mathematical *logoi* which we possess into the matter produced by *phantasia*.

I think Proclus' account here suffers from an internal conflict produced by the difference between the World Soul and the partial soul. Structurally, *phantasia* lies between *dianoia* and sense, and this should hold for all souls, because all souls share the same structure. Most of his discussion of *phantasia* at the beginning of the second prologue to the Euclid commentary stays with this account of *phantasia* as in-between. However, at *In Eucl.* 53.18ff Proclus seems to remember that he is speaking of *phantasia* in a geometrical context, and that it would be strange to think of the World Soul as performing bisections, and other such operations which the geometer performs. Hence he speaks of *phusis* as lying above the universal in sense objects, and *dianoia* as lying above the universal in *phantasia*. After this one mention of *phusis*, however, both *phusis* and sensation seem to be forgotten, and Proclus returns to an account in which we find only *dianoia* and *phantasia*. One presumes that in this account sensation has resumed its place below *phantasia*.

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<sup>400</sup> *In Eucl.* 53.18ff.

This account which Proclus gives of *phantasia* is quite interesting, because it contains some of the most explicit descriptions of the *probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn* in the Procline corpus. Thus it is in the context of geometry, and its need to project its figures into the matter of *phantasia*, that Proclus says:

For *dianoia* possesses the *logoi* but, not being powerful enough to see them when they are wrapped up, unfolds and exposes them and presents them to *phantasia* sitting in the vestibule.<sup>401</sup>

Thus thinking (*noësis*) [in geometry] makes use of *phantasia*, and the syntheses and divisions of its figures are imaginary (*phantastai*). Its knowing (*gnôsis*) is a journey (*hodos*) towards the dianoetic being (*dianoêtiken ousian*), but it has not yet reached it, because *dianoia* is looking towards the outside, and although investigating what is outside by means of what it has within, and making use of projections of *logoi* (*proholaïs logôn*), it is from itself moving to what lies outside. But if it should ever be able to roll up its extensions and figures and view their plurality as a unity without figure, then in turning back to itself it would view quite differently the partless, unextended, and essential geometrical *logoi* of which it is the fullness (*plêrôma*).<sup>402</sup>

The Form itself (*to ge eidos auto*) is without motion, ungenerated, indivisible and free of all underlying matter. But whatever exists secretly (*kruptiôs*) in it is brought to *phantasia* separately and dividedly. That which projects is *dianoia*; that from which it is projected is the dianoetic Form (*dianoêton eidos*); that in which what is projected exists is this thing called 'passive *Nous*' (*pathêtikos houtos kaloumenos nous*) that unfolds itself [circling] around the true *Nous*, divides out itself from the undividedness of pure intellection (*akraiphnous noëseôs*), shapes itself according to the shapeless Forms (*eidê*) and becomes all things, all that *dianoia* and the partless *logos* in us is.<sup>403</sup>

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<sup>401</sup> In *Eucf.* 54.27-55.02: ἔχουσα γὰρ ἡ διάνοια τοὺς λόγους, ἀσθενοῦσα δὲ συνεπτυγμένως ἰδεῖν ἀναπλοῖ τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ὑπεκτίθεται καὶ εἰς τὴν φαντασίαν ἐν προθύροις κειμένην.

<sup>402</sup> In *Eucf.* 55.6-18: ὅθεν καὶ ἡ νόησις αὐτῆς μετὰ φαντασίας αἱ τε συνθέσεις τῶν σχημάτων καὶ αἱ διαιρέσεις φαντασται καὶ ἡ γνῶσις ὁδὸς μὲν εἰς τὴν διανοητικὴν ἐστὶν οὐσίαν, οὐπω δὲ εἰς ἐκείνην ἀναδεδράμηκε. τῆς διανοίας εἰς τὰ ἔξω βλεπούσης καὶ ταῦτα κατὰ τὰ ἐνδοθεν θεωρούσης καὶ προβολαῖς μὲν χρωμένης λόγων ἀλλ' ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς εἰς τὸ ἔξω κινουμένης, εἰ δὲ ποτε συμπτύξασα τὰς διαστάσεις καὶ τοὺς τύπους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀτυπώτως καὶ ἐνοειδῶς θεασαμένη πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἐπιστρέψαι δυνηθεῖη, τότε ἂν διαφερόντως τοὺς λόγους τοὺς γεωμετρικοὺς ἴδοι τοὺς ἀμερίστους, τοὺς ἀδιαστάτους, τοὺς οὐσιώδεις, ὧν ἐστὶ πλῆρωμα.

<sup>403</sup> In *Eucf.* 56.11-22: ἐπεὶ τὸ γε εἶδος αὐτὸ ἀκίνητόν ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ παντὸς ὑποκειμένου καθαρῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα κρυφίως ἐστὶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ, διαστατῶς καὶ μεριστῶς εἰς φαντασίαν προάγεται καὶ τὸ μὲν προβάλλον ἡ διάνοια, τὸ δὲ ἀφ' οὗ προβάλλεται τὸ διανοητὸν εἶδος, τὸ δὲ ἐν ᾧ τὸ προβαλλόμενον παθητικὸς οὗτος καλούμενος νοῦς, ἐξελίττων ἑαυτὸν περὶ τὴν ἀμέρειαν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς νοῦ καὶ διῃστάς ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἀδιάστατον τῆς ἀκραίφονους νοήσεως καὶ μορφῶν ἑαυτὸν κατὰ πάντα τὰ ἀμόρωτα εἶδη καὶ πάντα γινόμενος, ᾧ ἐστὶν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ὁ ἀμερὴς ἐν ἡμῖν λόγος.

All of the elements of Proclus' main account of the *probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn* are present. *Dianoia* is thought of as a unified fullness of *logoi*, which produces out of itself the divided projections which are its own thoughts. These thoughts produce the divided sciences which we know of as the dianoetic sciences which have as their aim to lead the soul back towards its unified centre, and to pass from these to the higher unity which is *Nous*. However, we should also notice the contrast with the account of *dianoia* as a projection of the soul's *logoi* which we examined in earlier chapters. The account of *dianoia* in the Euclid commentary seems to present *dianoia* as a unified *plêrôma*, which is subsequently unfolded by *phantasia*. In the account we examined earlier, it is the *ousia* of the soul which is the *plêrôma tôn ousiôdôn logôn*, and this *plêrôma* is unfolded by the soul's *dianoia*. We have here an example of the relativity of Proclus' descriptions. The *probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn* is moving at this point from one level of multiplicity, the temporal, to another level, the spatial. From the lower perspective, the multiplicity of the projection of the soul's *logoi* in *dianoia* appears to be a dianoetic unity. Further, Proclus goes back and forth between a description of *dianoia* as the projector and that which is projected. Proclus says both that it is *phantasia* which projects geometrical *logoi* (*In Eucl.*52.20-53.05) and that it is *dianoia* which projects them into *phantasia* (*In Eucl.*56.11-22).

There is another important difference between this account in the Euclid commentary and the main account of the *probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn*, however, and it has to do with the passivity of *phantasia* as a receptacle for the projected geometrical *logoi*. At *In Eucl.*56.14-15, Morrow translates *diastatôs kai meristôs eis phantasian proagetai* as "produced distinctly and individually on the screen of imagination." In his forward to the 1992 edition of Morrow's translation, Ian Mueller writes,

[Imagination in Neoplatonism] serves as a kind of depository for sensations and thus provides the basis for an account of empirical knowledge. But more

importantly, particularly in Proclus' Euclid commentary, it serves as a kind of movie screen on which *dianoia* projects images for mathematical reflection.<sup>404</sup>

The other accounts which we have of the *probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn* do not include this element of passivity in the projection. Rather, the usual description is of a spontaneous throwing forth of the *ousiôdeis logoi* into a multiplicity which is the soul's *energeia*. So it is necessary here to find some reason for the shift in Proclus' language.

The solution is that the characterisation of *phantasia* as a projection screen is accurate in a certain sense, but is also misleading, because it overemphasises the 'passivity' in this account of geometrical projection, while covering over the importance of the emergence of spatiality. Mueller points out that Proclus refers to *phantasia* as a sort of mirror. This reference would make one feel comfortable with a characterisation of *phantasia* as simply a screen on which *dianoia* projects *logoi*, and hence as a mere passivity.<sup>405</sup> However, the context of that passage is Euclid's definition of the plane. Proclus says that it is reasonable for Euclid to have chosen one of the two sorts of simple surfaces, the plane surface as opposed to the spherical surface, as the subject in which he will study the figures and their properties. The reason for this is that it is more easily done on a plane than on a sphere, because there are certain figures which cannot be represented on a sphere, such as a straight line or a rectilinear angle. For this reason we should think of *phantasia* as a plane projected in front of us, and of *dianoia* as writing everything on it, so that *phantasia* is like a plane mirror to which *dianoia* sends reflexions of itself. Clearly here the emphasis is on the sort of surface which is most useful and basic for geometrical demonstrations, rather than on the function of *phantasia* as a passive screen.

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<sup>404</sup> p.xx.

<sup>405</sup> In Eucl.120.25-121.07: εικότως οὖν καὶ ὥριστο ταύτην τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν, καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῆς πάντα ἐκτιθέμενος πραγματεύεται. καὶ γὰρ τὴν πραγματείαν ἐντεῦθεν ἐπίπεδον προσεῖρηκεν καὶ οὕτω δεῖ νοεῖν τὸ μὲν ἐπίπεδον οἷον προβεβλημένον καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων κείμενον, πάντα δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦτω τὴν διάνοιαν γράφουσιν, τῆς μὲν φαντασίας οἷον ἐπιπέδῳ κατόπτρῳ προσεικασμένης, τῶν δὲ ἐν διανοίᾳ λόγων τὰς ἐαυτῶν ἐμφάσεις εἰς ἐκεῖνο καταπεμπόντων.

Further, the most explicit passage in which *phantasia* is called 'passive' is the phrase at *In Eucl.* 56.16-18 "*to de en hōi to proballomenon pathêtikos houtos kaloumenos nous*." I have translated this above as, "that in which what is projected exists is this thing called 'passive *Nous*.'" This is an obvious reference back to *In Eucl.* 52.3-4 where Proclus refers to someone (Aristotle) who referred to *phantasia* as "passive *nous*." But the phrase that Proclus uses in this place is "*noun pathêtikon tis autên proseipein ouk ôknêsen*," which literally means "someone did not shrink from calling [*phantasia*] passive *nous*." The phrase 'did not shrink from' indicates that Proclus thinks that this appellation is a bit strange. Indeed, he goes on to ask how anything could be *nous* and passive at the same time. The solution is that this name points towards the upper neighbour of *phantasia*, which is a sort of *nous*, and towards the lower neighbour, which is passive. We cannot draw the conclusion here, then, that *phantasia* itself is passive at all. Further, we cannot draw this conclusion from the use of the phrase at *In Eucl.* 56.16-18, because it is a clear reference back to *In Eucl.* 52.3-4. Finally, there are clear indications that *phantasia* is as much activity as passivity. The strongest indication of this is at *In Eucl.* 52.22, "[*phantasia*] is moved by itself to project (*proballei*) its object of knowledge (*anegeiretai men aph' heautês kai proballei to gnôston*)." So while a case might be made for the passivity of *phantasia* because it is that in which the *logoi* which *dianoia* projects exist, it is more likely itself an activity, itself a projection of mathematical *logoi*. It is possible that Proclus' thoughts here are ambiguous, because *phantasia* holds this middle place between the activity of *dianoia*'s active projection, and the passivity of *aisthêsis*.

Be all this as it may, what is missed in the account of *phantasia* as a mere passive screen is that the sort of *probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn* which *phantasia* performs is really a projection of explicitly spatial *logoi*.<sup>406</sup> The *logoi* in question are lines, angles, and

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<sup>406</sup> This projection is active and passive, active in the sense that all projection is *energeia*, and passive in the sense that the *logoi* once projected seem to be their own receptacle, i.e. they are themselves both the 'mirror' of imagination and what is seen in the mirror. S. Breton proposes that imagination creates spatial things, and as such the imagination of a partial soul creates its ὄχρημα. See S. Breton, *Philosophie et*

figures. *Phantasia* is the moment of the unfolding of the cosmos where space, as interval (*diastasis*), emerges, just as *dianoia* is the moment where time emerges. The Soul is the first principle to exist in time, because it is unable to view all of the *logoi* which it possesses in its *ousia* in one simple act. Its movement from one *logos* to the next is described as a circling around the *nous* in which it participates; a viewing of the *nous* which is its centre from the various points on the circumference of a circle.<sup>407</sup> Thus the particular sort of multiplicity which is an inability for the instantaneous unity with the totality of *logoi* constituting its essence generates the motion of the Soul, which is measured by Time.

With mathematical projection, spatiality begins to emerge. It is proper to think of the Procline hierarchy of principles in terms of their most basic characteristic: their relative unity and multiplicity, or their proximity or distance from the One. The One is simple. The henads are likewise simple, yet there are more than one of them. *Nous* has an inner multiplicity, yet each element of that multiplicity is able to be present to each other element. Soul is an inner multiplicity in which each element is not able to be present to all other elements at once. The activity of Soul is a serial activity in which its contents are consciously present, but one at a time. It is this division or multiplicity which is measured by Time. Body has sunk to a level of multiplicity in which none of its elements are able to be present to any other of its elements at all, i.e. the parts of bodies cannot occupy the same position.<sup>408</sup> We call this spatiality. The object of *phantasia* holds an interesting place between the Soul, as temporal but non-spatial, and Body. Geometrical figures may be thought to occupy the same space, and so two adjacent

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*mathématique chez Proclus, suivi de, Principes philosophiques des mathématiques, par N. Hartmann, traduit de l'allemand par Geneviève de Peslouan* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1969) pp.122-123. A. Charles argues convincingly against this point, and agrees with us in the role of *phantasia* as providing the paradigm of material spatiality, and not of producing spatial things. See A. Charles, "L'imagination, miroir de l'âme selon Proclus," in *Le Néoplatonisme* (Paris: C.N.R.S., 1971) pp.241-248.

<sup>407</sup> The temporality of Soul's projection will be investigated in detail in chapter VII.

<sup>408</sup> See *El.Th.* prop.15, where all that is capable of self-reversion must be incorporeal.



figures may make use of the same line as a boundary, and the line is simultaneously an element of both figures. However, the shapes of the figures themselves cannot be violated. The two opposite sides of a square, for example, can never be thought of as occupying the same position while the figure retains its identity. This inability of elements of one figure to leave their place and be present to the other elements of the same figure is the key characteristic of the sort of multiplicity which is spatial multiplicity. Hence in *phantasia* we see the emergence of ideal space. The spatiality of body is merely an intensification of this sort of multiplicity, because the inability to be mutually present which holds for a given figure now holds between different bodies. Notice the transformation of the notion of *hulê* here. Rather than the potentiality of Form, matter has become a sort of concomitant characteristic of a certain sort of Form. Geometrical *logoi* are in intelligible matter because they are a sort of Form or *logos* which have extension, or interval. Above we have seen Proclus describe physical *logoi* in a similar manner, where volume is a sort of "exhalation," rather than the product of the unity of Form with individuating matter.

Thus the sort of spatiality which emerges in *phantasia* is not the spatiality of Body, but rather is a cause or paradigm of the spatiality of Body. According to Proclus' doctrine of mean terms, in between that which possess the perfection and precision of the unextended, and that which is extended but admits of all sorts of imprecision, is that which is both extended and precise. In between *dianoia* and *aisthêsis* is *phantasia*. These geometrical figures which are extended but precise are the causes of the imprecise order in Body. We have seen the beginning of this in Proclus' account of the mathematical portions of the Soul. The Soul possesses in its seven main portions the principles of the remaining, procession, and return of both two and three dimensional being. But these portions of the Soul's *ousia* are not themselves the proximate causes of Body because they are not themselves two or three dimensional. They are rather the principles in which two and three dimensional being exist, as in their cause. They are

portions of the *ousia* of the Soul which proceed outward into the *dunamis* and *energeia* of the Soul. *Phantasia* is between the Soul's *ousia* and Body, because unlike the *ousia* of the Soul, which is the cause of two and three-dimensionality, it actually is ideal two and three-dimensionality, without the imperfection of Body.<sup>409</sup> It is with and in Body, yet the sort of matter in which it projects its ideas is intelligible matter. "Intelligible matter" in this sense is a peculiarly Neoplatonic invention: i.e. an entity which must exist because of other principles, such as the doctrine of mean terms, but which seems at first blush to be an oxymoron. And its being with and in Body is likely parallel to the way in which the boundaries of a solid are with and in it, without themselves being three-dimensional.

These mathematical *logoi* which the Soul projects in *phantasia* are caused by and are images of the portions of the Soul's *ousia*, and are themselves the proximate causes of the order in the physical cosmos. The physical cosmos is ordered according to mathematical principles, as we have seen above with regard to the insertion of Air and Water as means between Fire and Earth. The mathematical principles which reside in the *ousia* of the Soul are not ontologically the same *logoi* which reside in particular particles of Fire, Air, Water, and Earth, for those *logoi* lack the simplicity and precision of the Soul's *logoi*. Nor are the *logoi* which order the physical world a direct image of the *logoi* in the Soul's *ousia*. Rather, the Soul's *ousia* is itself ordered, and this order is mirrored in the structure of mathematics.

Thus mathematics is an ordering which emerges as we know it through the *energeia* of the Soul's projection of an image of its own *ousia*, and this projection is arithmetical and geometrical. *Phantasia* as geometrical projection is the first point at which spatiality emerges, as the inability of different parts of the same figure to be present to each other. There is an ambiguous sort of passivity in this projection, but in

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<sup>409</sup> Proclus does not allow us to pin him down here, but it is likely that he thought of *phantasia* as a sort of *energeia* of the Soul. The *energeia* is that which projects the *ousiôdeis logoi*, as *phantasia* projects geometrical *logoi*; the Soul's *energeia* is its self-motion, as *phantasia* has a "formative motion (*morphôtiken kinēsin*).\" See *In Eucl.*51.21.

essence it is still the activity of the *probolé tôn ousiôdôn logôn*. Finally, the emergence of two and three-dimensionality in geometrical projection is the proximate paradigm for the three-dimensionality of body.<sup>410</sup>

#### IV.v. Conclusion: *analogia*

We can see from the account of the proportions in the *ousia* of the Soul of the Cosmos, which holds as well for other souls, that Proclus uses mathematical language as a metaphorical way of speaking about that which is above mathematical number. He also uses it to speak about physical reality, which is below mathematical number. I am using 'metaphorical' here in the manner in which I used it in chapter III, as language drawn from one sphere of reality applied to another sphere of reality, which keeps its truth because of the homologous structure which holds between each level of reality. Proclus' statement of the principle of this metaphorical use of number is quite clear.

But Plato, through secrecy, used mathematical terms as a sort of veil over the truth of things, just as the Theologians make use of myths, and the Pythagoreans make use of symbols. For it is possible to see the paradigms in the images, and to move through the images to the paradigms.<sup>411</sup>

Thus mathematical number is an image of the number of the Soul, which as we saw above consisted in having an *ousia* which was like a numerical monad, composed in turn of indivisible *ousiai* which themselves were monads. Further, the Soul was harmonised

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<sup>410</sup> S. Breton, in *Philosophie et mathématique chez Proclus, suivi de, Principes philosophiques des mathématiques*, par N. Hartmann, traduit de l'allemand par Geneviève de Peslouan (Paris: Beauchesne, 1969) pp.85-87 points out that the classification of mathematical sciences which Proclus gives, following Geminus (Proclus gives two classification systems), is part of this procession into multiplicity. The classification of mathematics into fundamental and applied, with the applied sciences, such as optics and canonic, being divided images of either arithmetic or geometry, show that "la descente de l'intelligible dans le sensible s'opère donc par degrés. En chaque groupe, le premier de ligne exerce une fonction rectrice sur le second. Cette régulation se répète de niveau à niveau, comme si un même courant de lumière traversait tout l'intervalle et s'affectait de couleurs diverses à chacun des paliers, définis par une corrélation originale de la discipline et de son objet" (p.87). For Proclus' two systems of classification, see *In Eucl.* 36.12-38.02 for the Pythagorean classification, and 38.02-42.08 for Geminus'. See also figures 5 and 6, Appendix.

<sup>411</sup> *In Tim.* II.246.4-9: ὁ δὲ γε Πλάτων δι' ἐπικρυψιν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς τῶν ὀνομάτων οἷον παραπετάσασιν ἐχρήσατο τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ἀληθείας, ὥσπερ οἱ μὲν θεολόγοι τοῖς μύθοις, οἱ δὲ Πυθαγόρειοι τοῖς συμβόλοις· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἐν ταῖς εἰκόσι τὰ παραδείγματα θεωρεῖν καὶ διὰ τούτων ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα μεταβαίνειν.

through the proportions which held between the portions of the *ousia* which the Demiurge separated out within it, and the numbers which Plato assigns to these portions portray in a symbolic form the relations of remaining, procession and return which exist, both in the soul itself and as the paradigm of two and three dimensional procession and return, i.e. as the procession and return of the Forms divided among bodies and of bodies themselves. In other words, the *ousia* of the soul is the paradigm of mathematical number which is its image, hence as Proclus says, mathematical number is a particularly useful means of representing to oneself the structure of the *ousia* of the soul, because "it is possible to see the paradigms in the images, and to move through the images to the paradigms."<sup>12</sup>

As we have seen above, Proclus' own term for what I am calling 'metaphor' is *analogia*. We have discussed how *analogia* as mathematical proportion is that which remains identical throughout a given series of numbers. This sort of *analogia* is itself and

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<sup>12</sup> P. Merlan examines Proclus' mathematical psychology, and concludes that Proclus is intent on opposing those who find in the soul only one branch of mathematics, such as Aristander and Numenius who find only arithmetic, or Severus, who find only geometry. It is not the identification of the Soul and mathematics which is the problem, according to Merlan, but rather that these thinkers identify the Soul with only one branch of mathematics. Both Proclus and Iamblichus, on the other hand, say that all branches of mathematics are to be found in the Soul, according to Merlan. It is correct to say that Proclus opposes those who find only one branch of mathematics in the Soul, but not quite correct simply to say that he identifies the Soul with all three branches of mathematics. As I have argued, Proclus is arguing equally against those who do not distinguish between the essence of the soul and mathematical being. What we think of as mathematical being is an image of the structure of the Soul's essence: it has a homologous structure to, and thus is an image of the Soul's essence. For this reason the essence of the soul can contain, for example, all of the figures of geometry in a manner without shape. So it is insufficient simply to say that the Soul is a unity of all three branches of mathematics. For this reason, despite his contribution to the earlier history of a mathematical psychology, Merlan cannot be taken to speak with authority about the mathematical character of the Procline Soul. See P. Merlan, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Revised (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960) pp.22-24, 27.

Further, Merlan sees an opposition of doctrine between the earlier and the later books of Iamblichus' *De communi mathematica scientia*. In the earlier books mathematics must be said to be its own sort of being in order to preserve it from motion and change. Merlan thinks this produces a quadripartite division of being, rather than a tripartite division: intelligible, mathematical, psychic, sensible (not necessarily in that order). In the later chapters, Iamblichus identifies the soul with all branches of mathematics. Leaving aside the question of *De communi mathematica scientia*, we can see that in Proclus there is a tripartite division of Being. Mathematics are found in the *energeia* of the Soul, and are moving only in the sense that the *energeia* of the Soul moves. It moves from object to object. See Merlan, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism*, pp.28-29. For the mathematical circle as an image of the internal structure of *Nous*, see W. Beierwaltes, *Proklos, Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1965) pp.166-173.

image of the more general *analogia* which holds between all levels of Proclus' universe.<sup>413</sup> These two uses of *analogia* are related. One might think of an ascending series of numbers in a certain *analogia* as an image of the unfolding of the Cosmos from the One. Although the intervals between the numbers, and the numbers themselves, partake of ever increasing magnitudes, and in that sense are becoming more and more diverse, running through them all as that which is ever the same is the structure of their mutual relationship, their *analogia*. Just as in a mathematical series, the terms may change but their relation remains the same, in Proclus' ordered universe the terms at each level of the hierarchy change, but the mutual relations between them remain the same, or at least similar enough that there be an *analogia* from one level to the other. Proclus even uses the term *homologa* to describe the relation of various levels. This word should be familiar to us, because this conception of the similarity which holds between the various

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<sup>413</sup> In *Tim.* I.373.7-20.: "And how could there be any gap if there first comes the beings which are *itself* (*auto*), second the *from itself* (*autou*), third the *from itself and from another* (*autou kai allou*), fourth the beings which have come to be *from another* (*allou gegonotōn*), and fifth place is held by those beings which are *other* (*allōn ontōn*), and if ranged among each of these there are the beings which are similar in a dissimilar manner, and if there is a continuity in beings this great? And what is left out if there are first the beings which are established as unmoving (*akinētōn hidrumenōn*), second the self-moving beings (*autokinētōn*), and third those moved from without (*heterokinētōn*), which indeed are the last of beings – for things have been filled up by the beings which have been enumerated – and in general, the production of things has been demonstrated to be continuous by many approaches, and if you wish to speak this way, that there is an *analogia* from above right down to the last beings, according to the well-ordered procession (*proodon*) of all things from the One (καὶ τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη κενὸν πρῶτων μὲν ὄντων τῶν αὐτό, δευτέρων δὲ τῶν αὐτοῦ, τρίτων δὲ τῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλου, τετάρτων δὲ τῶν ἄλλου γεγονότων, πέμπτην δὲ τάξιν ἔχόντων τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων, ἐφ' ἑκάτερα δὲ τούτων τῶν ἀνομοίως ὁμοίων τεταγμένων καὶ τοσαύτης ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι τῆς συνεχείας οὐσης; τί δ' ἂν ἐλλείποι πρῶτων μὲν τῶν ἀκινήτων ἰδρυμένων, δευτέρων δὲ τῶν αὐτοκινήτων, τρίτων δὲ τῶν ἑτεροκινήτων, ἃ δὴ πάντων ἔσχατα τῶν ὄντων ἐστί-πάντα γὰρ συμπληρῶνται τὰ ὄντα τοῖς εἰρημένους-καὶ ὅλως κατὰ πολλὰς ἐφόδους τῆς παραγωγῆς τῶν πραγμάτων συνεχῶς δεικνυμένης καὶ εἰ βούλει λέγειν ἀναλογίας οὐσης ἀνωθεν ἄχρι τῶν τελευταίων κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς τῶν πάντων πρῶτον εὐτακτον:)." See S. Gersh, *KINHSEIS AKINHOTOS* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973) pp.83-90, and A. Charles, "Analogie et pensée sérielle chez Proclus," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 23 (1969) pp.69-88; see p.75-82. Charles points out that the principle of analogy holds not only in the vertical series of procession from one hypostatic order to the next, but also within each order itself, of henads, intellects, or souls. The procession and reversion by which souls emerge from the monad of soul is such that each member of the order is homologous with each other member, and with the monad. The relation between members is one of analogy, which allows both for the conservation of identity in the order, and for the difference involved in the declension (ὑπόβασις) of terms by which distance from the monad is measured. See also J. Dillon, "Image, symbol and analogy: three basic concepts of Neoplatonic allegorical exegesis," in *The significance of Neoplatonism*, ed. R. Baine Harris (New York: S.U.N.Y., 1976) pp.247-262.

levels of reality is what we mean when we speak of 'homologous structures' in different organisms. Further, it is the homologous, or analogous nature of the structure of reality which allows use to have any knowledge at all of that which lies above or below us.

The Soul thus has taken up in advance in its essence (*ousiôdôs*) all of the sciences (*epistêmas*); the geometrical science according to its totality, its figure (*schêma*) and its lines (*grammas*);<sup>414</sup> the arithmetical science according to the multitude and the essential monads in it (*tas ousiôdeis en autêi monas*), as has been shown above; the harmonic science according to the ratios (*logoi*) of its numbers; the spherical science according to the two revolutions [i.e. of the Same and the Different]. And the Soul is this true bond of the sciences (*tôn mathêmatôn*): an essential (*ousiôdês*) [bond], intellectual (*noeros*), unified (*henômenos*), it comprehends them all without shape (*amorphôs*) and purely -- figures, [it comprehends] without figure; that which is distinguished, in a unified manner: the extended, without extension. These things belong to the *ousia* of the Soul, and we must see all things in it in this manner. Moreover, from what has been said, one must accept the following: that every secondary reality is analogous to what precedes it, and that everywhere the one has precedence over the many...And just as the things which precede (*hégoumena*) are with regard to each other, so are those which follow with regard to each other, and all things are homologous (*homologa*) with each other: the *ousia*, the harmony, the Form (*eidos*), and all things are throughout, because of the fact that the Soul's life consists of parts which are like each other and are of the same character. And although the Same and the Triple belong more in the Circle of the Same, and the Different and the Double more in the Circle of the Different, yet all of the proportions (*logoi*) exist throughout, but in a different manner in the primary and in the secondary realities. In the primary they exist intellectually (*noerôs*), as wholes (*holikôs*), and in a unified manner (*hênômenôs*), while in the secondary they exist in the mode of opinion (*doxastikôs*), as distinguished (*diêrêmenôs*), and partially (*merikôs*).<sup>415</sup>

<sup>414</sup> *grammas*: lines in the sense of the lines of a geometrical figure.

<sup>415</sup> In *Tim.* II.239.5-240.2: πάσας ἄρα τὰς ἐπιστήμας οὐσιωδῶς ἡ ψυχὴ προεἰληφε· τὴν μὲν γεωμετρίαν κατὰ τὴν ὁλότητα, κατὰ τὸ σχῆμα, κατὰ τὰς γραμμάς· τὴν δὲ ἀριθμητικὴν κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὰς οὐσιώδεις ἐν αὐτῇ μονάδας, ὡς ἐδείξαμεν ἔμπροσθεν· τὴν δὲ ἁρμονικὴν κατὰ τοὺς λόγους τῶν ἀριθμῶν· τὴν δὲ σφαιρικὴν κατὰ τὰς διττὰς περιφοράς· καὶ ὁ ὡς ἀληθῶς σύνδεσμος τῶν μαθημάτων οὗτός ἐστιν, οὐσιώδης, αὐτοκίνητος, νοερός, ἡνωμένος, ἀμόρφως καὶ καθαρῶς τὰ πάντα περιέχων, ἀσχηματίστως μὲν τὰ σχήματα, ἡνωμένως δὲ τὰ διωρισμένα, ἀδιαστάτως δὲ τὰ διαστατά· ταῦτα γὰρ προσήκει τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ δεῖ πάντα ἐν αὐτῇ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον θεωρεῖν, καὶ μὴ καὶ ἐκεῖνο λαμβάνειν ἐκ τῶν κειμένων δεῖ τὸ πάντα τὰ δευτέρα τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν ἀναλογεῖν καὶ πανταχοῦ προηγῆσθαι τοῦ πλῆθους τὸ ἐν...καὶ ὡς τὰ ἡγούμενα πρὸς τὰ ἡγούμενα, οὕτω τὰ ἐπόμενα πρὸς τὰ ἐπόμενα, καὶ πάντα ἀλλήλοις ὁμόλογα, ἡ οὐσία, ἡ ἁρμονία, τὸ εἶδος, καὶ πανταχοῦ μὲν πάντα διὰ τὸ ὁμόχρουν καὶ ὁμοιομερὲς τῆς ψυχικῆς ζωῆς, μᾶλλον μὴ ἐν «μὲν» τῷ ταύτου κύκλῳ τὸ ταυτὸν καὶ τὸ τριπλάσιον, ἐν δὲ τῷ θατέρῳ τὸ θάτερον καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον, καὶ οἱ λόγοι πανταχοῦ μὲν πάντες, ἀλλὰ τρόπον ἕτερον ἐν τε τοῖς πρωτίστοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς δευτέροις, οὐ μὲν νοερῶς καὶ ὁλικῶς καὶ ἡνωμένως, οὐ δὲ δοξαστικῶς καὶ διηρημένως καὶ μερικῶς.

Thus as we saw in chapter III, when the soul projects its *logoi* and unrolls its own *ousia* what it produces is a divided image of its source. And as its source is to the Soul, so is the Soul to the image it itself produces. The relations and structures which hold within the objects of our divided thought are homologous, or analogous, to the relations and structures which hold in the higher and the lower realities.<sup>416</sup> However, analogy does not mean identity. It must be the case that the same thing may exist in many ways, otherwise there would be no such things as image and paradigm. And image just is the same thing taken in a novel way, but not in a way which is utterly alien to the paradigm.<sup>417</sup>

The causal influence of the One, through the henads, shines forth in what Proclus calls "chains" or "series" (*seira*). The power of a henad is present to the intelligibles and to all successive orders, and each intelligible in turn is present causally to its consequents, and so on. In each member of a causal series, each member is manifest, either as the cause exists in the effect, or in its own manner of existing, or as the effect pre-exists in the cause. So all that exists above the soul is present to it through its causal influence, and hence all of the higher orders are present to the soul. Likewise, all that the Soul gives rise to is present to it under the manner of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause. So both the higher and lower orders are present to the Soul according to the Soul's own mode of existing. The Soul's reception of the influence of higher entities is through its own self-related activity. As we will see in the next chapter, in this manner the Soul is

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<sup>416</sup> See J. Trouillard, "La puissance secrète du nombre selon Proclus," *Revue de philosophie ancienne*, 1 (1983) pp.227-241; see p.233: "Puisque l'âme est nombre, penser le nombre est pour elle se penser elle-même à travers ce qu'elle projette et étale devant son regard. Elle tire d'elle-même les raisons mathématiques qu'elle forme. Elle s'extériorise pour s'intérioriser, pour gagner dans son activité à travers ce circuit une conscience d'elle-même plus claire que la présence obscure qu'elle détenait déjà dans sa substance autoconstituante. Par sa raison diadémique (*διδάμοια*) elle projette dans la matière imaginative les nombres et les figures."

<sup>417</sup> J. Trouillard, *La mystagogie de Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1982) p.237: "Une troisième erreur serait de croire que ce déroulement est régi par une logique analytique, en sorte que dans ce processus il n'y aurait ni création ni nouveauté, mais seulement explication. La pluralité expressive ne sort pas de l'unité par déduction, par allongement ou redoublement. Chaque ordre est une totalité originale. Exprimer, c'est créer."

constituted by the influence of its antecedents and by its own activity. Proclus' word for this is "self-constituting" (*authupostatos*). This conception of the order of things is what allows Proclus to say that each order is an image or paradigm of each other order.<sup>418</sup>

If we strip this conception of analogy of the anagogical character which allows us to rise to the contemplation of higher realities, and focus on its application to the lower, then Proclus' doctrine of the analogical use of mathematics should be familiar to us, for in fact it parallels the use of mathematics by modern science. Modern science does not say that physical reality *is number*, but rather that the most convenient, useful, and precise way of representing physical reality in our thought is through mathematical equations. In a like manner, Proclus does not think that the number in the Soul, or the number in the physical world *is mathematical number*, but rather mathematical number is a convenient, useful and precise way of representing in our thought the reality which is both above and below mathematical number itself.<sup>419</sup> For modern physical scientists to be realists, i.e. to hold that their equations actually do reveal the structure of physical reality in some way, they must at least implicitly hold a similar ontological doctrine as Proclus with regard to the homologous or analogous structure between mathematical and physical reality, otherwise language drawn from one sphere would be inapplicable to another. Proclus goes beyond modern science, of course, because he holds this doctrine of homologous structures with regard to all levels of reality between the One and indeterminate matter, while modern science generally holds that it exists only between mathematics and

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<sup>418</sup> Cf. J. Trouillard, *La mystagogie de Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1982) pp.69-70: "Puisque tout être rayonne la perfection qu'il se donne, l'âme sera illuminée par les ordres qui lui sont antérieurs. Chacun diffusera en elle son caractère dominant, de telle sorte qu'elle recueillera autant d'éléments qu'elle a de principes [*In Tim.* II.135.13-14]. Plus précisément, du moment que l'âme doit se réaliser, se vivifier et se penser elle-même, chaque série supérieure éveillera en elle un aspect de sa causalité d'elle-même sur elle-même. Sous la motion fondamentale qui est celle de l'Un, l'âme éveillant ce germe de non-être se fera substance avec l'être, puissance avec la vie, activité avec la pensée. Elle refera en entier le chemin de la procession, en particularisant par degrés son pouvoir unifiant jusqu'à devenir un nombre automateur. [*In Tim.* II.193.25-27]. La procession ne s'étale donc pas en étapes discontinues. Toujours identique et toujours différente, elle est tout entière immanente en chaque foyer de manifestation."

<sup>419</sup> For a similar interpretation of Proclus' use of mathematics in reasoning about the physical world, see Dominic J. O'Meara, *Pythagoras Revived* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) pp.185-192.



physical phenomena. Further, Proclus accounts for this analogy, while modern scientists do not.<sup>420</sup>

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<sup>420</sup> Social phenomena may also be included here, if one thinks of the use of statistics in the social sciences. Dominic J. O'Meara, *Pythagoras Revived* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) pp.193-4 makes that point that Proclus' use of mathematics in physics differs from the modern use in two important ways. First, for Proclus both mathematical and physical entities are derived from a common, higher source. Second, Proclus thinks that the order of the physical world is an image not only of what we would think of today as the mathematical characteristics of mathematical entities, but also of the metaphysical characteristics which Proclus thinks mathematical entities have due to their status as images of still higher entities. These two points are valid, but they do not change the fact that both Proclus and contemporary science considers the structure of mathematics in some way to show forth the structure of physical reality, and in that sense they both hold that there is an analogous or homologous relation between mathematical and physical being.

## CHAPTER V

### *AUTOKINËSIS AND HETEROKINËSIS*

This chapter examines the fallibility of the partial soul's *dianoia*. The Soul's *dianoia* in Proclus is more than what we would think of as mere cognition. The *probolê tón ousiôdôn* is also the act by which it brings itself into being. Because Soul is a cognitive hypostasis, its cognitive self-reversion through *monê*, *proodos*, and *epistrophê* is also its act of self-constitution. In the first part of this chapter we will examine the related concepts of self-sufficiency, self-constitution, and self-motion.

Self-motion (*autokinêsis*) is a characteristic of all Soul. However, the partial soul lies at that level of Proclus universe where the self-related activity characteristic of Soul begins to dwindle into the passivity of Body. That is, it is possible for the partial soul to cease its autokinetic activity of thinking, and succumb to *heterokinêsis*, or motion from without. Such is no longer its own principle of motion, but is moved by sensations and passions. In the second part of this chapter we will examine this fall of the partial soul.

Such a soul may be rescued from its passivity through dialectical conversation. In the third part of this chapter we will examine the case of Alcibiades. Socrates is able, through dialectical conversation, to make Alcibiades revert upon himself, and begin the process of *anamnêsis*. In so doing, he removes the impression of *heterokinêsis* from Alcibiades' soul, and restores its *autokinêsis*.

Proclus says that the Soul is self-moved (*autokinêtos*). *Autokinêsis* is a mean term between the unmoved (*akinêtos*) and that which is moved by an external principle, or moved by another (*heterkinêtos*).

For imagine all things to be at rest: what will be the first thing set in motion? Not the unmoved, by the law of its nature. And not the extrinsically moved, since its motion is communicated from without. It remains, then, that the first thing set in motion is the self-moved, which is in fact the link between the unmoved and the things which are moved extrinsically. At once mover and moved, the self-moved is a kind of mean term between the unmoved mover and that which is merely moved.<sup>421</sup>

And again:

Soul again, being moved by itself, has a rank inferior to the unmoved principle which is unmoved even in its activity. For of all things that are moved the self-moved has primacy; and of all movers, the unmoved. If, therefore, soul is a self-moved cause of motion, there must exist a prior cause of motion which is unmoved. Now *Nous* is such an unmoved cause of motion, eternally active without change. It is through *Nous* that soul participates in perpetuity of thought, as body in self-movement through soul.<sup>422</sup>

From these passages it seems that *autokinêsis* has to do with motion commonly understood. However, the motion of the Soul is not spatial motion. Soul's motion is the motion of thought, from one intelligible object to another. So *autokinêsis* is one way of describing the *proholê tôn ousiôdôn logôn*.

*Autokinêsis* stands in an analogical relation to two other important concepts in Proclus: the self-sufficient (*autarkês*) and the self-constituting (*authupostatos*). *Autokinêsis* is the manner in which the Soul is both *autarkês* and *authupostatos*. These two terms, the *autarkês* and the *authupostatos*, are explained in detail in the *Elements of*

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<sup>421</sup> *El. Th. prop. 14*: εἰ γὰρ σταίη τὰ πάντα, τί ποτε ἔσται τὸ πρῶτως κινούμενον; οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀκίνητον (οὐ γὰρ πέφυκεν) οὔτε τὸ ἑτεροκίνητον (ὑπ' ἄλλου γὰρ κινεῖται): λείπεται ἄρα τὸ αὐτοκίνητον εἶναι τὸ πρῶτως κινούμενον· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ τῷ ἀκινήτῳ τὰ ἑτεροκίνητα συνάπτον, μέσον πως ὄν, κινεῖν τε ἅμα καὶ κινούμενον· ἐκείνων γὰρ τὸ μὲν κινεῖ μόνον, τὸ δὲ κινεῖται μόνον.

<sup>422</sup> *El. Th. prop. 20*: πάλιν δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ κινουμένη ὑφ' ἑαυτῆς δευτέραν ἔχει τάξιν τῆς ἀκινήτου οὐσεως καὶ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀκινήτου ὑφεστώσης· διότι πάντων μὲν τῶν κινουμένων ἡγεῖται τὸ αὐτοκίνητον, πάντων δὲ τῶν κινούντων τὸ ἀκίνητον. εἰ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ κινουμένη ὑφ' ἑαυτῆς τὰ ἄλλα κινεῖ, δεῖ πρὸ αὐτῆς εἶναι τὸ ἀκινήτως κινεῖν. νοῦς δὲ κινεῖ ἀκινήτως ὧν καὶ αἰεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐνεργῶν, καὶ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ διὰ νοῦν μετέχει τοῦ αἰεὶ νοεῖν, ὥσπερ σῶμα διὰ ψυχὴν τοῦ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν.

*Theology*, but their important relation to the Soul's *autokinêsis* is not brought out fully in that text. In the *Commentary on the Alcibiades I*, however, the connexion between these three terms is made explicit. Moreover, in the *Commentary on the Alcibiades I*, it is made explicit that the fall of the partial soul is due to the failure of its *autokinêsis*.

In this section we will briefly examine the *autarkês*, the *authupostatatos*, and the *autokinêtos* in the *Elements of Theology*, and then in the next section turn to their connexion in the *Commentary on the Alcibiades I*.

#### V.i.a. The *autarkês*

The *autarkês* is the self-sufficient. It is that which supplies its own good to itself. It is a mean term between the Good or the One itself, which is above self-sufficiency, and those things which receive their good from an external principle.<sup>423</sup>

For what else is the self-sufficient than that which has its good from and in itself? And this means that it is indeed fulfilled (*plêres*) with goodness, and participates good, but is not the unqualified Good itself: for the latter, as has been shown, transcends participation and fulfilment. If, then, the self-sufficient has fulfilled itself with goodness, that from which it has fulfilled itself must be superior to the self-sufficient and beyond self-sufficiency. The unqualified Good lacks nothing, since it has no desire towards another (for desire in it would be failure of goodness); but it is not self-sufficient (for so it would be a principle fulfilled with goodness, not the primal Good).<sup>424</sup>

*Autarkês* means to be self-sufficient, strong enough, sufficient in oneself. It is derived from *arkeô*, which means to defend, ward off, be strong enough, suffice, satisfy.<sup>425</sup> Self-sufficiency in Proclus has come to mean being able to furnish oneself with one's own good, or to have fulfilled oneself with one's own good (*to autarkês peplêrôken heauto tou*

<sup>423</sup> See *El. Th.* props. 8-10, and J. Trouillard, *La mystagogie de Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1982) pp. 187-206.

<sup>424</sup> *El. Th.* prop. 10: τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο τὸ αὐταρκες ἢ τὸ παρ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν κεκτημένον; τοῦτο δὲ ἤδη πλήρες ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ μετέχον, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν. ἐκεῖνο γάρ καὶ τοῦ μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ πλήρες εἶναι κρείττον, ὡς δέδεικται. εἰ οὖν τὸ αὐταρκες πεπλήρωκεν ἑαυτὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἀφ' οὗ πεπλήρωκεν ἑαυτὸ κρείττον ἂν εἴη τοῦ αὐτάρκους καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτάρκειαν, καὶ οὔτε ἐνδεὲς τινος τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν. οὐ γὰρ ἐφίεται ἄλλου (εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἐλλιπὲς ἀγαθὸν κατὰ τὴν ἐοῆσιν)· οὔτε αὐταρκες· εἴη γὰρ ἂν πλήρες ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ οὐ τὰγαθὸν πρῶτως.

<sup>425</sup> See L.S.J. entry for *autarkês* and *arkeô*.

*agathou*). But the self-sufficient also participates the Good itself, because what distinguishes it from the Good itself is the former's transcendence of participation and fulfillment. So while supplying itself its own good, the self-sufficient also participates the Good and is fulfilled with good from it. All things have the Good as their principle (*archê*) and First Cause (*aitia prôtistê*), and the Good is the source of the unity, and hence goodness, to all things.<sup>426</sup>

How can one and the same entity be both self-sufficient and dependent on the Good? The notion of fulfillment is important here. Each entity is *filled* with its own good. This implies that at some point this entity exists but is not filled with its own good, and hence it implies a transition from an unfulfilled state to a state of fulfillment. This transition from initial state to the perfection which comes from being filled or perfected through possession of its good is described by Proclus, as we have seen in previous chapters, by the triads of *monê*, *proodos*, and *epistrophê*, and *ousia*, *dunamis*, and *energeia*. Spiritual entities have a cyclical activity, such that their triadic moments really mark stages of the movement of the *energeia* which is the entity from a state of imperfection to perfection.<sup>427</sup> We must avoid thinking of this transition in temporal terms, because in *Nous* it is an atemporal dynamism, a logical dynamism, and only in Soul does Time become the index of movement along the circuit of the Soul's periodic *energeia*. Further, even in Soul the temporality of its movement marks a more fundamental logical dynamism.

The self-sufficient must participate in the Good, because the power of the higher, more perfect, cause has greater influence than that of the lower.

All that is produced by secondary beings is in a greater measure [*meizonôs*] produced from those prior and more determinative [*aitiōtērôn*] principles from which the secondary were themselves derived. For if the secondary has its whole existence from the prior, thence also it receives its power of further production.

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<sup>426</sup> *El. Th.* props. 11-13.

<sup>427</sup> See *El. Th.* prop. 33; and S. Gersh *KINHΣΙΣ AKINHΤΟΣ* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973) p. 120-121.

since productive powers reside in producers in virtue of their existence and form part of their being. But if it owes to the superior cause its power of production, to that superior it owes its character as a cause in so far as it is a cause, a character meted out to it from thence in proportion to its constitutive capacity. If so, the things which proceed from it are caused in virtue of its prior [*dia to pro autou*]: for the same principle which makes the one a cause makes the other an effect. If so, the effect owes to the superior cause its character as an effect.<sup>428</sup>

And following:

Every cause both operates prior to its consequent and gives rise to a greater number of posterior terms. For if it is a cause, it is more perfect and more powerful than its consequent. And if so, it must produce a greater number of effects...But again, the powers which are in the consequent are present in a greater measure in the cause [*hosa dunatai to aitiaton, meizonos ekeino dunatai*]. For all that is produced by secondary beings is produced in a greater measure by prior and more determinate principles. The cause, then, is co-operative in all that the consequent is capable of producing.<sup>429</sup>

Proclus' corollary to this proposition is that all of Soul's effects are also produced by *Nous*, but not vice versa, since *Nous* as prior and more powerful extends farther down.

Likewise the causation of the Good extends to the lowest level of reality, and also causes all that *Nous* (and Soul) causes, while *Nous* does not cause all that the Good causes, since its weaker power does not extend as far down as that of the Good. Thus the self-sufficient must participate in the Good because the Good as first principle is the most fully causal power and extends to all things by giving them existence.

In what sense is the self-sufficient dependent on the Good, and in what sense does it supply its own good to itself? The causation of the Good operates prior to all other causes, and bestows on all things its proper effect, which is unity. All things, in order to

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<sup>428</sup> *El. Th. prop. 56*: Πάν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν δευτέρων παραγόμενον καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν προτέρων καὶ αἰτιωτέρων παράγεται μειζόνως, ὅφ' ὧν καὶ τὰ δευτέρα παρήγето. εἰ γὰρ τὸ δεύτερον ὅλην ἔχει τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπὸ τοῦ πρό αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῇ τοῦ παράγειν ἐκείθεν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αἰ παρακτικαὶ κατ' οὐσίαν εἰσὶν ἐν τοῖς παράγουσι, καὶ συμπληροῦσιν αὐτῶν τὴν οὐσίαν. εἰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ παράγειν δύναμιν ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερκειμένης αἰτίας ἔλαχε, παρ' ἐκείνης ἔχει τὸ εἶναι αἰτιον ὧν ἐστὶν αἰτιον, μετρηθὲν ἐκείθεν κατὰ τὴν ὑποστατικὴν δύναμιν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὰ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ προϊόντα αἰτιατά ἐστι διὰ τὸ πρό αὐτοῦ· τὸ γὰρ θάτερον ἀποτελέσαν αἰτιον καὶ θάτερον αἰτιατόν ἀποτελεῖ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ αἰτιατόν ἐκείθεν ἀποτελεῖται τοιοῦτον.

<sup>429</sup> *El. Th. prop. 57*: Πάν αἰτιον καὶ πρό τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ ἐνεργεῖ καὶ μετ' αὐτὸ πλείονων ἐστὶν ὑποστατικόν. εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶν αἰτιον, τελειωτέρον ἐστὶ καὶ δυνατώτερον τοῦ μετ' αὐτό. καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, πλείονων αἰτιον·...ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὅσα δύναται τὸ αἰτιατόν, μειζόνως ἐκεῖνο δύναται. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν δευτέρων παραγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν προτέρων καὶ αἰτιωτέρων παράγεται μειζόνως. συνυφίστησιν ἄρα αὐτῇ πάντα ὅσα πέφυκε παράγειν.

exist. must partake of unity in order to exist, because existence in Proclus' system is always existence as one particular sort of thing. The particular sort of unity for each entity, however, is not determined by the One. The One only bestows unity *simpliciter*, or rather, the One makes all things *exist*. It does not make them exist in the particular manner in which they exist, or it does not determine before hand the particular manner in which an entity partakes of unity. For self-sufficient entities, this particularisation of unity comes about from their own self-development, from their own *monê*, *proodos*, and *epistrophê* by which they remain in their causes, depart from their causes in their own manner, and revert upon their causes in their own manner. So *Nous* is self-sufficient, because it is the internal development of *Nous* which makes it to be what it is, a fullness of intelligible and intellectual moments: thought and thinker as one and as distinct. So while dependent on the One, *Nous* is also an entity which fills itself with its own good, because it is its own self-development which makes it to be what it is, and furnishes itself with the good proper to itself as an atemporal cognitive entity. The same goes for Soul. The Soul is dependent on *Nous* and the One, but the good proper to Soul is furnished by itself to itself through its own manner of cognitive self-reversion. The *probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn* is the activity by which Soul grasps its own *ousia* and *Nous*, and therefore it is through the *probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn* that Soul determines for itself the manner in which it possesses its own good. In this manner, self-sufficient entities bring themselves into being in the manner proper to themselves, and are not only self-sufficient, but self-constituting (*authupostatatos*).

#### V.i.b. The *authupostatatos*

Self-constitution is another way of describing self-sufficiency. The *autarkês* is that which gives to itself its own good, by being itself the principle of its manner of participation in its causes, and ultimately in the One. The *authupostatatos* is that which

brings itself into being, in the sense that it causes itself to exist *in its own peculiar manner*.<sup>430</sup> The One is the source of the existence of an *authupostatos* entity, but it itself is a cyclical *energeia* for whom the plan of its self-unfolding is contained in its first moment. The Soul, through the *probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn*, draws forth what is present *kruphiôs* in its *ousia*, or *monê*. The *epistrophê/energeia* of a self-constituted entity is a self-reversion, because it is the moment in which the implicit content of the *ousia/monê* has been developed into an explicit multiplicity. But it is also a reversion on its higher causes, because the *ousia* considered as the beginning point of the circular activity is the moment of *monê*, or remaining in the higher cause. Self-explication is an activity by which the entity explicates its own remaining in its cause, which is its moment of identity with its cause.<sup>431</sup> by translating it to a level of increased multiplicity.<sup>432</sup> Thus the self-constituted reverts simultaneously upon its originary cause and upon itself. So the Soul's *probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn* is a projection both of itself and of *Nous*.<sup>433</sup>

All that is self-constituted is self-reversive:

For if it proceeds from itself it will also revert upon itself, since the source of the procession of any term is the goal of the corresponding reversion. If, proceeding from itself, it should in proceeding not revert, it could never have appetition of its proper good, a good which it can bestow upon itself. For every cause can bestow upon its product, along with the existence which it gives, the well-being which

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<sup>430</sup> See A. Charles, "La raison et le divin chez Proclus," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 87 (1969) pp.458-482: see p.467.

<sup>431</sup> *El. Th.* prop.30, 32.

<sup>432</sup> Cf. J. Trouillard, *L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1972) p.20. "L'antithèse intérieure à l'idée est donc celle de deux fonctions, l'une retenant l'unité en soi-même, l'autre s'élançant vers une indéfinie multiplicité. Proclus appellera la première *μὴν* et la seconde *πρόοδος*. La synthèse de ces tendances opposées sera l'*ἐπιστροφή* qui récupère le multiple et ramène l'expansion à son centre en enveloppant le système entier des déterminations. Chaque intelligible n'est donc pas seulement une détermination, mais une autodétermination qui ne peut s'accomplir sans s'opposer sa propre indétermination."

<sup>433</sup> Jean Trouillard discusses the self-constitution of the Soul in relation to the cycle of negations found in Plato's *Parmenides*. The characteristics which are negated of the One are generative of the affirmations of the same characteristics with regard to what comes after the One. What is negated of the One is negated just because it is other than the One, or what is produced by the One rather than the pure One itself. See J. Trouillard, *L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1972) chapitre V. "Théologie négative et psychogonie," pp.133-154. See our discussion of the position of Trouillard, and the presence of the One to the Soul as the *anthos psuches*, in chapter VII.



belongs to that existence: hence it can bestow the latter upon itself also, and this is the proper good of the self-constituted.<sup>434</sup>

This proposition is followed by its inverse, that all that is self-reversive is self-constituted.<sup>435</sup> This marks the boundary of the self-constituted at Soul, because Soul is capable of self-reversion, while body is not.

For it is not in the nature of any body to revert upon itself. That which reverts upon anything is conjoined with that upon which it reverts: hence it is evident that every part of a body reverted upon itself must be conjoined with every other part – since self-reversion is precisely the case in which the reverted subject and that upon which it has reverted become identical. But this is impossible for body, and universally for any divisible substance: for the whole of a divisible substance cannot be conjoined with the whole of itself, because of the separation of its parts, which occupy different positions in space.<sup>436</sup>

However, Proclus nuances the self-constitution of Soul, by saying that the self-constituted is perpetual (*aidion*), and is above the passage of Time, which marks non-being.<sup>437</sup> He seems to be thinking of Time here as equivalent to *genesis*, rather than as the *Nous* which is the measure of the Soul's motion (see chapter VI). Be that as it may, he is very careful to say that the self-constituted transcends that which is measured by Time in respect of its *ousia*. The Soul, however, is not measured by Time in respect of its *ousia*, but only its *energeia*.

Every participated soul has an eternal existence but a temporal activity: For either it will have both its existence and its activity in eternity, or both in time, or else one in eternity and the other in time. But it cannot have both in eternity: otherwise it will be undivided Being, and there will be nothing to distinguish the psychic nature from intellectual substance, the self-moved principle from the unmoved. Nor can it have both in time: otherwise it will be purely a thing of

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<sup>434</sup> *El. Th. prop. 42*: εἰ γὰρ ἄφ' ἑαυτοῦ πρόεισι, καὶ τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν ποιήσεται πρὸς ἑαυτό· ἄφ' οὗ γὰρ ἡ πρόοδος ἐκάστοις, εἰς τοῦτο καὶ ἡ τῇ προόδῳ σύστοιχος ἐπιστροφή. εἰ γὰρ πρόεισιν ἄφ' ἑαυτοῦ μόνον, μὴ ἐπιστρέφουσι δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτό, οὐκ ἂν ποτε τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ ὀρέγοντο καὶ ὁ δύναται ἑαυτῷ παρέχειν. δύναται δὲ πᾶν τὸ αἷτιον τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ διδόναι μετὰ τῆς οὐσίας, ἥς δίδωσι, καὶ τὸ εὖ τῆς οὐσίας, ἥς δίδωσι, συζυγές· ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ, τοῦτο ἄρα τὸ οἰκείμενον τῷ αὐθυποστάτῳ ἀγαθόν.

<sup>435</sup> *El. Th. prop. 43*.

<sup>436</sup> *El. Th. prop. 15*: οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων πρὸς ἑαυτό πέουκεν ἐπιστρέφειν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐπιστρέφον πρὸς τι συνάπτεται ἐκείνῳ πρὸς ὃ ἐπιστρέφει, δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος πάντα πρὸς πάντα συνάψει τοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτό ἐπιστραφέντος· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτό ἐπιστρέφειν, ὅταν ἐν γένηται ἅμω, τὸ τε ἐπιστραφέν καὶ πρὸς ὃ ἐπεστράφη, ἀδύνατον δὲ ἐπὶ σώματος τοῦτο, καὶ ὅλως τῶν μεριστῶν πάντων· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον ὅλῳ συνάπτεται ἑαυτῷ τὸ μεριστὸν διὰ τὸν τῶν μερῶν χωρισμόν, ἄλλων ἀλλαχοῦ κειμένων.

<sup>437</sup> *El. Th. prop. 49-51*.

process, and neither self-activated nor self-constituted; for nothing which is measured by time in respect of its existence (*kat' ousian*) is self-constituted. But the soul is self-constituted; for that which reverts upon itself in its activity is also self-reversive in respect of its existence (*kat' ousian*), that is, it proceeds from itself as cause.<sup>438</sup>

This strong division between the *ousia* of the soul and its *energeia* is present only in the *Elements of Theology*. The distinction between *ousia*, *dunamis*, and *energeia* is also present in the *Commentary on the Timaeus*, as we have seen in chapter IV, but in that work the distinction is not presented in such strongly dichotomous terms as it is in the *Elements of Theology*. The Soul is a self-moving motion of thinking, in which the *ousia*, *dunamis*, and *energeia* are moments of its self-development. Thus it is likely that the strong distinction which we find in the *Elements of Theology* is due to the highly discursive nature of that text. As we have seen in previous chapters, it is the nature of *dianoia* to take what is in itself a unity and translate it into a multiplicity of *logoi*. This seems to be most true of the *Elements of Theology*. What we end up with in the *Elements of Theology* is not a false account, but rather an account which must be balanced by other Procline texts in which more symbolically loaded terms are used to allow the entities in question to appear in their inner unity.<sup>439</sup>

#### V.i.c. The *autokinētos*

The Soul is self-moving. If it is self-moving it is self-reversive, because true self motion inheres in that which is both mover and moved, and not with respect to different parts of the entity in question.

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<sup>438</sup> *El.Th.*prop.191: Πᾶσα ψυχὴ μεθεκτὴ τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν αἰώνιον ἔχει, τὴν δὲ ἐνέργειαν κατὰ χρόνον. ἢ γὰρ ἄμω αἰωνίως ἔξει, ἢ ἄμω κατὰ χρόνον. ἢ τὸ μὲν αἰωνίως, τὸ δὲ κατὰ χρόνον. ἀλλ' οὔτε ἄμω αἰωνίως (ἔσται γὰρ ἀμέριστος οὐσία, καὶ οὐδὲν διοίσει τῆς νοερᾶς ὑποστάσεως ἡ ψυχῆς φύσις, τῆς ἀκινήτου ἢ αὐτοκινήτου) οὔτε ἄμω κατὰ χρόνον· εἴη γὰρ ἂν γεννητὴ μόνον καὶ οὔτε αὐτόζως οὔτε ἀυθυπόστατος· οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ὑπὸ χρόνου κατ' οὐσίαν μετρουμένων ἀυθυπόστατον. ἢ δὲ ψυχὴ ἀυθυπόστατος· τὸ γὰρ κατ' ἐνέργειαν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρέφον καὶ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐπιστρεπτικόν ἐστι πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἄσ' ἑαυτοῦ προῖον.

<sup>439</sup> See A. Charles, "La raison et le divin chez Proclus," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 87 (1969) pp.458-482; see 464ff.

And if one and the same thing moves and is moved, it will (as a self-mover) have its activity of motion directed upon itself. But to direct activity upon anything is to turn towards that thing. Everything, therefore, which is originally self-moving is capable of reversion upon itself.<sup>440</sup>

But all that is capable of self-reversion has an existence separable from body,<sup>441</sup> and is self-constituting.<sup>442</sup> Thus we know that the Soul is self-constituting and self-sufficient because we know that it is self-moving. Further, Soul's self-motion is a motion of thinking, because its motion is its own movement of self-development by which it reverts upon its own *ousia* in thinking it. That there is motion in this *energeia* is the mark of the multiplicity proper to soul, measured by Time. So it is its self-motion which marks it as an in-between principle.

For being intermediate between the indivisible principles and those which are divided in association with body, [the Soul] produces and originates the latter and likewise manifests its own causes, from which it has proceeded. Now those things whereof it is the pre-existent cause it pre-embraces in the exemplary mode, and those from which it took its origin it possesses by participation as generated products of the primal orders. Accordingly it pre-embraces all sensible things after the manner of a cause, possessing the *logoi* of material things immaterially, of bodily things incorporeally, of extended things without extension; on the other hand it possesses as images the intelligible principles, and has received their Forms – the Forms of undivided existents parcelwise, of unitary existents as a manifold, of unmoved existents as self-moved. Thus every soul is all that is, the primal orders by participation and those posterior to it in the exemplary mode.<sup>443</sup>

Soul is all things, those above and below it, after the manner of image or of cause.<sup>444</sup> It is self-sufficient and self-constituting, yet also is caused by principles above it. Hence its

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<sup>440</sup> *El. Th. prop. 17*: εἰ δὲ ἐν καὶ ταὐτὸν κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται, τὴν τοῦ κινεῖν ἐνέργειαν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἔξει, κινητικὸν ἑαυτοῦ ὄν, πρὸς ὃ δὲ ἐνεργεῖ, πρὸς τοῦτο ἐπέστραπται, πᾶν ἄρα τὸ ἑαυτὸ κινουὶν πρῶτως πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐστὶν ἐπιστρεπτικόν.

<sup>441</sup> *El. Th. prop. 16*.

<sup>442</sup> *El. Th. prop. 43*.

<sup>443</sup> *El. Th. prop. 195*: μέση γὰρ οὖσα τῶν ἀμερίστων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα μεριστῶν, τὰ μὲν παράγει καὶ ὑφίστησι, τὰ δὲ αἰτία προσεστήσατο ἑαυτῆς, ἀφ' ὧν προελήλυθεν, ὧν μὲν οὖν αἰτία προϋπάρχει, ταῦτα προεἶληψε παραδειγματικῶς· ἀφ' ὧν δὲ ὑπέστη, ταῦτα κατὰ μέθεξιν ἔχει καὶ ὡς γεννήματα τῶν πρώτων, τὰ μὲν ἄρα αἰσθητὰ πάντα κατ' αἰτίαν προεἶληψε, καὶ τοὺς λόγους τῶν ἐνύλων ἀύλως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν ἀσωμάτως καὶ τῶν διαστατῶν ἀδιαστάτως ἔχει· τὰ δὲ νοητὰ εἰκονικῶς, καὶ τὰ εἶδη τὰ ἐκείνων μεριστῶς μὲν τῶν ἀμερίστων, πεπληθυσμένως δὲ τῶν ἐνταίων, αὐτοκινήτως δὲ τῶν ἀκινήτων ὑπεδέξατο, πᾶντα ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα, τὰ μὲν κατὰ μέθεξιν, τὰ πρῶτα· τὰ δὲ παραδειγματικῶς, τὰ μετ' αὐτήν.

<sup>444</sup> C. Steel, "Υπαρξίς chez Proclus," in *Hyparxis e Hypostasis nel Neoplatonismo fatti del I colloquio internazionale del centro di ricerca sul neoplatonismo, università degli studi di catania, 1-3 ottobre 1992* ed. F. Romano e D.P. Taormina (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1994) pp.79-100.

self-sufficiency and self-constitution must lie in that it gives to itself its own good through its own manner of participating its causes. And it does this parcelwise, as a manifold, and as self-moved. Its motion is the motion of thinking measured by Time.<sup>445</sup> Thus Soul's intermediacy is manifested in an important way in its self-moving temporal motion of thinking. It is this manner of self-constitution, however, and the intermediate state which it holds, that allows the partial soul (*merikê psuchê*) to fall into *genesis*.

#### V.ii. The fall of the *merikê psuchê* into *heterokinêsis*

At the beginning of his *Commentary on the Alcibiades I*, Proclus tells us that the most proper and assured principle of all of the Platonic dialogues, and indeed of all philosophical investigation (*pasês...tês philosophou theôrias*), is a discrimination (*diagnôsis*) of our *ousia*. Just as things have a different being (*einai*), so too does their perfection differ, according to the declension of their *ousia* (*kata tèn tês ousias huphesin*).

According to this, the good is different for different things, and doubtless the good which is in them naturally is coordinate to the nature of each. For this reason the perfection of *Nous* is in eternity, and that of Soul in time. And the good of the Soul is to be in accordance with *Nous*, and that of body to be in accordance with Nature.<sup>446</sup>

The good for the Soul begins with self-knowledge, because it is this which allows us to assimilate ourselves to *Nous* as much as possible. The discrimination of our *ousia*, or self knowledge, is the beginning of philosophy and its leading principle. "Now we have said that self-knowledge leads every other question, and, so to speak, leads [*proêgeisthai*] all philosophical investigation."<sup>447</sup> As we have seen, the soul thinks all things by projecting the *logoi* in its *ousia*, and thus the soul in seeking to know all things must begin by

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<sup>445</sup> See chapter VI.

<sup>446</sup> *In Alc.*3.11-15: κατὰ ταύτην δὴ οὖν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλοις, καὶ τῇ ἐκάστου φύσει σύστοιχον τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ δῆπου πέφυκεν ἀγαθόν. διὸ νοῦ μέν ἐστιν ἐν αἰῶνι τὸ τέλειον, ψυχῆς δὲ ἐν χρόνῳ· καὶ ψυχῆς μέν κατὰ νοῦν τὸ ἀγαθόν, σώματος δὲ κατὰ φύσιν·

<sup>447</sup> *In Alc.*7.12-14: Ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν προηγείσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γνῶσιν παντὸς ἄλλου σκέμματος καὶ πάσης ὡς εἰπεῖν τῆς φιλοσόφου θεωρίας, εἴρηται·

looking to its own *ousia*. Thus the aim of the *Alcibiades I*, according to Proclus, is both care of the soul and self-knowledge.<sup>448</sup> In one sense the care of the soul and self-knowledge are the same, in that the care of the soul begins with self-knowledge. However, the care of the soul has to do not only with the assimilation of the soul to *Nous*, but also to the One, so while care of the soul begins with knowledge, it eventually leaves it behind. "One must say then that in this dialogue that assimilation to the divine through the care of one's own has an analogy to the Good, and that self-knowledge has an analogy to *Nous*."<sup>449</sup> So self-knowledge is the beginning of self-reversion, which is also a reversion on *Nous*, and ultimately on the One.<sup>450</sup>

Notice that the epistemological and ontological aspects of this account are drawn together: self-knowledge and self-reversion are the same.

The third argument, in showing that the one who answers is the one who affirms (*ton apokrinomenon einai ton legonta deiknuss*) makes appear the *autokinêsia* of the soul and the projections of its *logoi* (*proholas tôn logôn*), and makes clear that what one learns one recollects (*anamnêseis*), and is nothing else than the one who is being perfected reverting upon himself (*pros heauton epistrephei ton teleiounenon*).<sup>451</sup>

*Dianoia* is a sort of thinking, but it is through this thinking that the Soul confers on itself its own manner of being, which is its own good. *Diunoia* is *monê*, *proodos*, and *epistrophê*. It is *autokinêsis*. So because Proclus thinks that the partial soul can fall into ignorance, and cease its dianoetic activity, he thinks that the partial soul can become heterokinetic. It can be subject to the *pathêmata* which come from sensation, living

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<sup>448</sup> In *Alc.* 9.19-20: "Now if one should say that the aim of the dialogue is the care of oneself and the knowledge of this care, then this would well put forth (Επει και εἴ τις λέγοι τέλος εἶναι τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἐπιμελειαν και τὴν ταύτης γνῶσιν τῷ διαλόγῳ, τίθεται μὲν ὀρθῶς)."

<sup>449</sup> In *Alc.* 10.8-10: λεγέσθω δὴ οὖν κἀν τούτοις τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ τὸ ὁμοιωθῆναι τῷ θεῷ διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἐπιμελείας ἀναλογεῖν, τῷ δὲ νῷ τὸ γινῶναι ἑαυτούς

<sup>450</sup> See P. Courcelle's survey of the Neoplatonic interpretations of the delphic "know thyself" (γνῶθι σεαυτὸν), and the influence of the Platonic *Alcibiades I*, in Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Julian, Proclus, Hermias, Damascius, Hierocles, Simplicius, Olympiodorus, and the Pseudo-Dionysius: "Le 'connais-toi toi-même' chez les Néo-platoniciens Grecs," in *Le Néoplatonisme* (Paris: C.N.R.S., 1971) pp.153-166.

<sup>451</sup> In *Alc.* 15.12-16: ὁ δὲ τρίτος τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα δεικνύς τὴν αὐτοκίνησιαν ἐμφανῇ ποιεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὰς προβολὰς τῶν λόγων καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ἀναμνήσεις οὕσας ἀποφαίνει, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέφει τὸν τελειούμενον.

according to appearances and taking its opinions from outside, rather than be itself the source of its own thinking motion.<sup>452</sup>

Proclus says that there are two sorts of *erôs*. One sort is an inspiration from above which leads the soul up from sensible beauty to the source of all beauty itself, and souls which possess this sort of *erôs* are able even to lead less perfect souls up to this higher beauty. The worse sort of *erôs*, however, is possessed by souls which are erotic, but which are cherish partial and material beauty. As I mentioned in chapter II, the souls who possess this lower *erôs* are those

who have fallen away from the gift from above, due to wicked nourishment (*mochthêran trophên*)...[and] embrace the images of beauty, because they are ignorant of true beauty, and they have affection for material and divisible beauties, *sent outside of themselves, ignorant of what they have suffered*.<sup>453</sup> They separate themselves from all divinity, and are carried away towards the *godlessness and obscurity*<sup>454</sup> of matter.<sup>455</sup>

As I pointed out above, Proclus describes the weaker souls as not only having fallen away from the gift from above, but as having "perverted the gift from above" (*paratreposas tēn ekeithen dosin*).<sup>456</sup> The susceptibility of certain partial souls to *heterokinêsis* may be explained by the declension in the coordinate Soul order. Some partial souls are 'further away' from the monad, and are more dominated by Unlimited than others are. But the actual cause for any particular partial soul to fall from *autokinêsis* to *heterokinêsis* is a serious problem in Neoplatonism, and Proclus' account of it is as good as we find in this school. The likely cause of the fall of any partial soul is its partial grasp of *Nous*. If the soul is a cyclical *energeia* whose self-explication comes about in Time, then the soul which begins from its moment of *monê* and is engaged in its *proodos* will not yet have the

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<sup>452</sup> Cf. J. Trouillard, *L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres) pp.36-37.

<sup>453</sup> *Phaedrus* 250a. Proclus deviates from the text of the *Phaedrus*, which runs: ἐκπλήττονται καὶ οὐκέτ' <ἐν> αὐτῶν γίνονται, ὃ δ' ἔστι τὸ πάθος ἀγνοοῦσι.

<sup>454</sup> *Alcibiades I* 134e: εἰς τὸ ἄθεον καὶ τὸ σκοτεινὸν βλέποντες.

<sup>455</sup> *In Alc.* 33.21-34.3 αἱ δὲ αὐτῆς ἐκεῖθεν δόσεως ἀποπεσοῦσαι διὰ μοχθηρὰν τροφήν, οὓσιν δὲ ἐρωτικὴν λαχοῦσαι καὶ τοῖς εἰδώλοις τῶν καλῶν προσπίπτουσαι διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀληθινῶν ἀγνοίαν, φιλοφρονοῦνται μὲν τὰ ἐνυλὰ καὶ μεριστὰ κάλλη καὶ ταῦτα ἐκπλήττονται τὸ ἑαυτῶν ἀγνοοῦσαι πάθος ὃ πεπόνθασιν, ἀφίστανται δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ παντός καὶ εἰς τὸ ἄθεον ὑποφέρονται καὶ σκοτεινὸν τῆς ὕλης

<sup>456</sup> *In Alc.* 34.14.

entire intelligible world consciously present to it. Hence the possibility exists for the soul, as yet ignorant of the true beauty of the intelligible world, to become overly enamoured of the images of this beauty which it sees in the sensible world. Therefore each soul must make its way through this dangerous time of its partial unfolding of its own *logoi*, moving towards its own perfection by the full projection of its *logoi*. However, even this solution is problematic. Firstly, Soul's grasp of *Nous* is never 'full' in the sense of being finished. *Nous* is a centre around which the Soul may circle indefinitely, without exhausting it as a source for the projection of *logoi*. Secondly, the Soul's self-development is measured by Time, but its origin from *Nous* is not temporal. In Proclus' account of *anamnêsis* the time before birth when we knew all things is replaced by the moment of *monê* in *Nous*, or the unconscious possession of the *logoi* of all things in the soul's *ousia*. This is an ontological, not a temporal, origin. Even though the activity of all souls is measured by Time, Proclus does not seem to think that there was a point in time when any given soul came into existence. It is likely that he thinks all souls existed during the infinity of past time. So we are left with the question of why some partial souls fall into *heterokinêsis* and others do not. This question is not adequately answered in Proclus, or indeed in all of Neoplatonism.<sup>457</sup>

Be this as it may, the partial soul which pays too much attention to sensation and the passions arising from it is caught by the multiform and varied images which it presents, and enters a state of forgetfulness of its own *ousia*. The *logoi* which the soul projects are multiple, but they are also still universal in a manner in which the particular impacts of sensible objects are not. More importantly, the objects of sensation, or of *phantasia*, remain outside of the soul, and cause it to tend towards *heterokinêsis*, rather than to its own *autokinêsis*.

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<sup>457</sup> See the discussion of the various types of souls, and the role of mediator played by superior souls such as Socrates, in Dominic J. O'Meara, *Pythagoras Revived* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) pp. 149ff.

For by nature purification does not come to us from outside, but it is set in motion from within, from the soul itself. For all evil is from outside and is brought into the soul from outside, but the good is from inside, for by nature the soul is boniform (*agathoeidēs*). And insofar as the soul becomes more perfect, to that extent the soul receives an autokinetic life, so that it becomes heterokinetic through being joined with bodies and sharing their passivity (*tên pros auta sumpatheian*). For this reason everything which the soul receives from outside remains situated outside of it, such as the objects of *phantasia*<sup>458</sup> and sensation, and the only things which are in it are those things which the soul does from itself towards itself, and are projected (*proballetai*) from itself.<sup>459</sup>

We have the impression from this passage that the body is simply an evil for the Soul.

And indeed Proclus does speak of the body in very strong terms, saying that life with a body is not natural for the Soul, and that for the Soul to be in the world of *genesis* is like travelling in a region infected by the plague.<sup>460</sup>

However, this position is more nuanced in Proclus than we often assume. The descent of the Soul into body is dangerous for the Soul, because of the possibility of its fascination with what comes from the body. However, this descent is also a good for the Soul. Proclus gives two reasons for the descent. First, it allows the Soul to immitate the providence of the gods. The perfection of the gods is of two sorts: an intellectual perfection (*tês men noeras*), and a providential perfection (*tês de pronôêtikês*). The first is in Rest, and the second in Motion. Souls immitate the first sort of perfection through contemplation (*dia tês theôrias*), and the second through a life associated with *genesis* (*dia tês genesiourgou zôês*). So the Soul's association with body allows it to immitate the providential perfection of the gods by having the care of a body. The second reason for the descent, according to Proclus, is the perfection of the World. It is fitting that between

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<sup>458</sup> Segonds proposes φαντασὰ for φάσματα. *Phantasia* here seems to be used in a standard Aristotelian manner, as a storehouse for sensory images, and not in the special manner in which it was used in the Euclid commentary. Compare my discussion of *phantasia* at the end of chapter IV.

<sup>459</sup> *In Alc.* 280.3-13: οὐ γὰρ ἔξωθεν ἡμῖν ἡ κάθαρσις προσγίγνεσθαι πέφυκεν, ἀλλὰ ἐνδοθεν ἀπ' αὐτῆς ὥρμηται τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ μὲν γὰρ κακὸν πᾶν ἔξωθεν καὶ ἐπείσασκτόν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἐνδοθεν· οὖσαι γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀγαθοειδῆς· καὶ ὅσω τελειότερα γίνεται, τοσοῦτω τὴν αὐτοκίνητον ἀπολαμβάνει ζωὴν, οἷον ἑτεροκίνητος γενομένη διὰ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων συνάρτησιν καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὰ συμπάθειαν, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἂν ἔξωθεν εἰσδέχεται μένει κείμενον ἐκτὸς αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ τὰ φάσματα καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά, μόνα δὲ ἐκεῖνα ἐν αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ὅσα παρ' αὐτῆς εἰς αὐτὴν δρᾶται καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῆς προβάλλεται.

<sup>460</sup> *In Alc.* 256.11-17.



those beings which are immortal and rational, and those which are mortal and irrational, there be beings which are mortal and rational. The idea of perfection here has the notion of completion. Proclus thinks it fitting that all sorts of beings exist, and if this intermediate sort did not exist, there would be a sort of gap in creation. So the soul's association with body allows there to come into existence beings which are mortal and also rational.<sup>461</sup> So the descent into an association with body is a mixed good for the Soul. It allows it to share in the completion of the World, and to immitate the providence of the gods. However, because the Soul is not itself a god, it is not able to exercise its providence over its body with the gods' freedom from infection by the lower.

Now perfecting the worse and exercising providence over inferiors does belong to souls *qua* souls, since their descent comes to be for them due to their providence for things in *genesis* and their care over mortal things. But not to receive anything from the things which they administer and not to be mixed with the inferior, but rather to order them without being held in check by them belongs to the gods and to the good *daimones*. And whenever this also belongs to human souls, it is there because of a certain *divine* or daimonic gift<sup>462</sup> (*kata tina theian ē daimonian dosin*).<sup>463</sup>

Because of the intermediate position of the Soul, it can exercise providence over inferiors without being infected by them only through the care of those entities superior to itself.

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<sup>461</sup> *In Tim.* III.04-24. See J. Trouillard, "Le lien de l'âme et du corps selon Proclus," *Diotima*, 8 (1980) pp.128-133. Trouillard also points out the the descent of the Soul into body allows the soul to actualise itself more completely (see *In Tim.* III.284.16ff). By the addition of the three sorts of body the Soul is able to exercise its *phantasia*, its common sense, and its proper senses. This seems to be the case. However, the Soul only possesses these senses due to its association with body. So Trouillard seems to have put his finger on a consequent of the descent into body rather than a reason for it. The strongest case could be made for the need to actualise the Soul's *phantasia*, as we have seen in chapter V, i.e. the exercise of *phantasia* allows the Soul to be the cause of body. However, the exercise of *phantasia* needs at most the highest sort of body: the "immaterial vehicle" (ὄχημα ἄϋλόν) of *El.Th.* prop.208. There seems to be no reason to don the other two sorts of body except for the exercise of providence over them, and for the completion of the orders of being in the world.

<sup>462</sup> "Divine gift" is from *Phaedrus* 244a7-8, where it refers to the *mania* which is a gift of the gods.

<sup>463</sup> *In Alc.* 62.24-63.08: τὸ μὲν γὰρ τελειοῦν τὰ χειρόνα καὶ προνοεῖν τῶν καταδεεστέρων ὑπάρχει καὶ ψυχαῖς ὡς ψυχαῖς, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ καθοδὸς αὐταῖς διὰ τὴν πρόνοιαν τῶν ἐν γενέσει πραγμάτων καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν θνητῶν ἐγένετο· τὸ δὲ μηδὲν ἀπὸ τῶν διοικουμένων εἰσδέχεσθαι μηδὲ ἀναμίγνυσθαι τοῖς χειρόσιν, ἀλλὰ ἀσχέτως αὐτὰ διακοσμεῖν, θεοῖς προσήκει καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς δαίμοσι, καὶ ὅταν ὑπάρχη καὶ ταῖς ἀνθρωπίναις ψυχαῖς, κατὰ τινα θεῖαν ἢ δαιμονίαν δύσιν ὑπάρχει.

The descent of the Soul is also described by Proclus as a consequence of synthetic reasoning. In the *Alcibiades I* commentary he tells us that there are two sorts of reasoning (*logos*): synthetic and analytic. These do not correspond exactly to the Kantian terms.<sup>464</sup> Rather, synthesis is reasoning by affirmation (*kataphasis*), and analysis is reasoning by negation (*apophasis*).

And you see how, if the argument (*ho logos*) proceeds in this manner, that sometimes we make our way through synthesis and sometimes through analysis; and in reasoning synthetically we make affirmations (*ta men kataphatika legontes sunthetikôs*) and in reasoning analytically we make negations (*ta de apophatika analutikôs*). Synthesis and analysis belong wholly to the nature of the Soul. It descends from the more perfect to the more imperfect through syntheses of *logoi* and the addition of certain foreign tunics (*prostheseôs tinôn allotriôn chitônôn*), such that it is walled up in this thick and rigid bond [i.e. the body]. It ascends through analyses and the shedding (*aphaireseôs*) of that which in no way belongs to it, such that it becomes *nude* (*gumnêtis*) (as the *Chaldaean Oracle* says), and unites with the immaterial and separate Forms themselves. For these reasons the syllogism which proceeds through affirmations proceeds from the more perfect to the less perfect, and the syllogism which proceeds through negations is the reverse.<sup>465</sup>

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<sup>464</sup> In the Kantian epistemology, a synthesis is a judgement which joins two ideas which in themselves have no connection. For this reason Kant is forced to rely on experience, which yields an already completed synthesis. Even *a priori* synthetic judgements are ultimately justified through the already given synthesis of empirical experience. Analytic judgements, on the other hand, are simply the repetition of what is already contained within the first term, and hence add nothing to our knowledge. In Proclus, however, a synthesis seems to function more as the unfolding of the hidden content of the idea itself, as when we think the Form Animal and then add to it Dog as one of its manners of unfolding. This synthesis considered in one manner adds nothing to the original idea, as it is only possible because Animal already contains in a hidden manner the idea Dog. In another manner, however, this synthesis does add to the Idea Animal, because in our thinking the Idea departs from its simplicity into a complexity which belongs to a lower ontological level. Analysis, on the other hand, is a sort of setting free of the Idea of Animal, for example, from the actual complexity of what it may contain implicitly. For Proclus, the truest manner of understanding the Form Animal is to think it without thinking of the endless production of various animal species, neither synthetically nor analytically, but in noetic simplicity. However, the soul already lost in the material world must begin to think this form in its simplicity by first analysing it, i.e. stripping it of all the particularity of different animal species which belong to the material world. It must think of these species in order to let them go.

<sup>465</sup> *In Alc.* 179.11-180.06: καὶ ὁρᾷς ὅπως, εἰ ταύτη προάγοιτο ὁ λόγος, τότε μὲν ὀδεύομεν κατὰ σύνθεσιν, τότε δὲ κατὰ ἀνάλυσιν, τὰ μὲν καταφατικά λέγοντες συνθετικῶς, τὰ δὲ ἀποφατικά ἀναλυτικῶς, ταῦτα δὲ, ἢ σύνθεσις καὶ ἢ ἀνάλυσις, προσήκει πάντως τῇ φύσει τῆς ψυχῆς, κατιούσης μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν τελειοτέρων ἐπὶ τὰ ἀτελέστερα διὰ συνθέσεως λόγων καὶ προσθέσεως τινῶν ἀλλοτρίων χιτῶνων, ἕως ἂν τὸν παχὺν τοῦτον καὶ ἀντίτυπον περιστοιχίσῃται δεσμὸν, ἀνιούσης δὲ δι' ἀναλύσεως καὶ ἀσπαρέσεως τῶν μηδὲν αὐτῇ προσηκόντων, ἕως ἂν γυμνήτῃς γενομένη κατὰ τὸ λόγιον αὐτοῖς συνασθῇ τοῖς αὐλοῖς εἶδεσι καὶ χωριστοῖς, διὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ὁ μὲν διὰ τῶν καταφάσεων συλλογισμὸς ἀπὸ τῶν τελειοτέρων ἐπὶ τὰ ἀτελέστερα πρόεισιν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τῶν ἀποφάσεων ἀνάπαλιν.

It is interesting in this passage that Proclus gives an ontological dimension to *kataphatic* and *apophatic* reasoning. These two forms of reasoning are of course familiar to us from their Christian theological use, as positive and negative ways of speaking about God. However, here the sense is the addition or subtraction of one term from another, through a syllogism. And because this addition or subtraction is really a motion of the Soul itself in its *proholê tôn ousdiôdôn logôn*, it is an addition or subtraction from the Soul's own multiplicity. A Soul which engages in *kataphasis* is burdening itself with more and more specific *logoi*, and thus departing from the simplicity of *Nous* towards the particularity of matter. Proclus describes it as like putting on a certain number of tunics (*chitônes*) which are strangers to the Soul and serve to imprison it. *Apophasis*, on the other hand, is like stripping off clothes to become nude, a state in which one possesses only what is oneself and nothing foreign to oneself. However, one presumes that both of these modes of reasoning make use of *logoi*. So why is it that one sort burdens the Soul and the other does not, if they both involve a multiplication of *logoi*? It is likely that Proclus thinks of *kataphasis* as a sort of syllogistic reasoning in which the entire unfolding of *logoi* must stay in place in order for the knowledge which comes about through it to remain. The predications which are part of a positive argument must hold their place in the mind in order for the knowledge which they encapsulate to remain. In contrast, *apophasis* projects *logoi* only to leave them behind.<sup>466</sup> In the *Parmenides* commentary the whole

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<sup>466</sup> Cf. A. Lernould, "La dialectique comme science première chez Proclus," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 71 (1987) pp.509-536; see pp.527-534. Lernould gives an excellent discussion of the hypothesis "The One which is" (i.e. the One-Being) in Proclus' *Commentary on the Parmenides*. This is the principal hypothesis which dialectic makes use of, and the one which allows the soul either to rise to a vision of the One itself, remain in an investigation of the One-Being, or descend to an examination of all reality derived from the One-Being. His position is that synthesis and analysis form a dialectical unity (p.530) by which the soul, through synthesis, is also able through analysis to mount on high. I think this is correct. In other words, the same hypothesis and chain of *logoi* following from it is synthetic in that it establishes the characteristics of the various divine orders, and in that this can be held to and left in place by the soul; but it is also analytic insofar as these are the characteristics which must be negated of the One itself, and left behind by the soul in seeking to rise to that One. I think there is an overlap here with Proclus' distinction between dialectic and mathematics. If dialectic is upward moving *dianoia*, and mathematics is downward moving *dianoia*, then the first makes use of analysis and the second of synthesis. However, the analytic/synthetic distinction seems to be more general than the dialectic/mathematics distinction. In *In Alc.* 179.11-180.06 (above) Proclus points out that "synthesis and

development of *logoi* has but one purpose: to remove all positive designations from the One. In fact, its purpose is even more extreme, according to Proclus. It intends to do away with all designations for the One, positive or negative. One is left simply to contemplate the One in silence. This sort of leaving behind of all discourse is not possible with *kataphasis*, whose whole intent is to establish meaningful terms for discourse. *Apophasis*, on the other hand, makes use of *logoi* only to leave them behind. It is likely for this reason that Proclus says the descent of the Soul involves a synthesis of *logoi*, and its ascent involves an analysis.

However, even though the Soul descends towards body through a synthesis of *logoi*, it is possible for the Soul which projects *logoi* synthetically from its *ousia* also to ascend analytically. Synthesis itself is not the problem. The real problem for the Soul comes when it surrenders to the passivity of the body, and ceases to project its *logoi* from itself. It then forgets who and what it is, because it has ceased to carry on its own proper activity. Why does it do this?

Why is it that in descending into *genesis* the partial souls are infected with material disorder of this sort and with these sorts of evils? It is because of their voluntary downward inclination: because of their excessive appropriation of the body: because of their sympathy (*sumpatheian*) with their own image (*peri to eidōlon autēs*) – that which is called "animation" (*empsuchian*) –; because of their change (*metabolē*) which happens all at once from the intelligible to the sensible, and from that which is a rest to that which is completely in motion: and because of the disorderly circumstances which are natural to the association of such dissimilar terms: the immortal and the mortal, the intellectual and the irrational, the extended and the indivisible.<sup>467</sup>

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analysis belong wholly to the nature of the soul." i.e. insofar as the soul can descend below or rise above its proper station, down to a fascination with body or up to the partlessness of the One, this motion even beyond *dianoia* takes place by the means of synthesis and analysis.

<sup>467</sup> In *Tim.* III.324.25-325.02: διὰ τί οὖν κατελθούσαι εἰς γένεσιν αἱ μερικαὶ ψυχαὶ ταραχῆς τοιαύτης ἐνύλου καὶ κακῶν ἀναπλέωνται τοιούτων: διὰ τὴν αὐτεξούσιον ῥοπήν, διὰ τὴν σοδορὰν περὶ τὸ σῶμα οἰκείωσιν, διὰ τὴν συμπάθειαν τὴν περὶ τὸ εἶδωλον αὐτῆς, ὃ δὴ καλοῦσιν ἐμψυχίαν, διὰ τὴν ἀθρόαν μεταβολὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡσυχίου πρὸς τὸ πάντη κινητὸν, διὰ τὴν ἀτακτον συντυχίαν τὴν ἐμφυομένην τοῖς ἀπὸ τοσούτων ἀνομοίων συνισταμένοις, ἀθανάτου καὶ θνητοῦ, νοεροῦ καὶ ἀνοήτου, διαστατοῦ καὶ ἀμεροῦς.

Proclus has not really answered the question of why a Soul would have a "voluntary" (*autexousion*) inclination towards and and excessive accomadation to the body in the first place. But be that as it may, once the Soul does incline towards the body voluntarily and excessively, it undergoes a sort of shock due to the swift passage from immobility to mobility, and the peculiar juxtaposition of its own nature and that of the body. Proclus says a few lines later that we pursue the mobile which always flees us (*diôkomen gar to pheugon uei kinoumenon*).<sup>468</sup> One could think of a man first introduced to the flickering images of a television screen. After much time in front of the screen, the man becomes accustomed to the mobility of this medium. His attention becomes truncated, and he becomes unable to engage in activities which require long concentration. In Proclus' account, the Soul pursues the changing sensible images, and very soon cannot find its way back to its immobile centre. In this manner, Proclus says, the mortal participates in *nous*, and the intellectual in death (*to men gar thnêton nou metalanchanei, to de noeron thumatou*).<sup>469</sup>

This association with the body causes the Soul to receive an *emphasis*, a reflexion<sup>470</sup> of *heterokinêsis*.

The soul is *autokinêtos* by its *ousia* (*kat' ousian men gar estin autokinêtos hê psuchê*), but when it associates with the body it takes part in *heterokinêsis* in some manner. Just as the soul has given the lowest appearance of *autokinêsis* to the body, so it has received in return the reflexion of *heterokinêsis*, through the natural condition of body. Now, it is through its power (*dunamis*) of *autokinêsis* that the soul is inventive of and apt to discover and productive of *logoi* and *epistêmai*. But it is through its impression of *heterokinêsis* that the soul at times needs to be set in motion by others. So that the more perfect souls are more apt to discover [*logoi* and *epistêmai*], and the less perfect are more in need of external aid. The first are more *autokinêtoi* and less infected with the worse, while the second are less *autokinêtoi* and are more affected by the nature of the body.

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<sup>468</sup> In *Tim.* III.325.05.

<sup>469</sup> In *Tim.* III.325.08-09.

<sup>470</sup> *Emphasis* has the notion of an appearance, image, or reflexion. The sense is that the Soul is by nature autokinetic, but due to the influence of the body, it takes on an outward show of *heterokinêsis*, as something foreign to it and added to it, like the tunic-like bodies the Soul dons as it descends into towards *genesis*.

Nevertheless, they also proceed in perfection, and once they have been roused from the body and have collected their own powers together away from matter they become more productive and more apt to discover of those things above which earlier they were infertile and without resources, due to the idleness which came to them from matter, and due to the non-life and the fruits of *genesis* (*dia tēn ek tēs hulēs ephékousan argian kai tēn azōian kai ton ek tēs geneseōs karon*).<sup>471</sup>

The soul which attends to sensation, and thinks that it knows reality through sensation, rather than through its *probolē tōn ousdiōdōn logōn*, is a soul which has become heterokinetic. It is the nature of body to be moved from without, and the soul when it suffers the passion of sensation is also moved from without. When this becomes the case, the soul forgets the truth which it already possesses in its *ousia*, and takes the moving images of the sense-world for the truth.

The first cause of self-conceit, vanity, and deceit for the souls is the body, and matter, and the imaginary sketch of the Forms which are in matter. We run after them as if they were true, and admire them as if they were real, and we pride ourselves in them as if they were pure goods, because we are deceived by them.<sup>472</sup>

And this deception tends to render the soul more apt to be deceived, because it renders the soul more heterokinetic, and more apt to take that which comes from without (*ta aisthēmata*) as the primary reality.

The soul's *autokinēsis* consists in its ability to give itself its own good through its own activity. However, if the soul takes what it receives from its senses to be the primary reality, it will think of itself as a thing like body. But it is not the nature of body to give

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<sup>471</sup> In Alc.225.14-226.08: κατ' οὐσίαν μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν αὐτοκίνητος ἡ ψυχὴ, κοινωνήσασα δὲ τῷ σώματι μετέσχε πως τῆς ἑτεροκινήσεως, ὥς γὰρ τῷ σώματι δέδωκεν αὐτοκινήσεως ἔσχατον ἵνδαλμα, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἑτεροκινήσεως ἔμφασιν διὰ τὴν περὶ τοῦτο σχέσιν ἀντέλαβε, διὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν τῆς αὐτοκινήσεως δύναμιν πόριμός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ εὐρετικὴ καὶ γόνιμος τῶν λόγων καὶ ἐπιστημῶν· διὰ δὲ τὴν τῆς ἑτεροκινήσεως ἔμφασιν δεῖται ποτε τῆς παρ' ἄλλων ἀνακινήσεως, ὅτε δὴ καὶ αἱ μὲν τελειότεραι τῶν ψυχῶν εὐρετικώτεραι μᾶλλον εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἀτελέστεραι πλειόνως ἐνδεεῖς τῆς ἐξωθεν βοηθείας, αἱ μὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον εἰσιν αὐτοκίνητοι καὶ ἥττον ἀναπεπλησμένοι τοῦ χειρόνος, αἱ δὲ ἥττον αὐτοκίνητοι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐκ τῆς σωματικῆς φύσεως παθοῦσαι, προϊούσαι δ' ὁμως ἐν τῷ τελειοῦσθαι καὶ αὐταὶ καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀνεγείρομεναι καὶ συλλέγουσαι τὰς ἑαυτῶν δυνάμεις ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης γονιμώτεραι γίνονται καὶ εὐρετικώτεραι τοῦτων περὶ ἃ πρότερον ἦσαν ἄγονοι καὶ ἄποροι διὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς ὕλης ἐφίκουσιν ἀργίαν καὶ τὴν ἀζωϊαν καὶ τὸν ἐκ τῆς γενέσεως κάρον.

<sup>472</sup> In Alc.108.11-16: ἡ πρώτη τῆς οἰήσεως αἰτία καὶ τοῦ τύφου καὶ τῆς ἀπάτης ταῖς ψυχαῖς τὸ σῶμά ἐστι καὶ ἡ ὕλη καὶ ἡ περὶ αὐτὴν εἰδωλικὴ σκιαγραφία τῶν εἰδῶν, ἐπιτρέχοντες γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὡς ἀληθεῖς καὶ θαυμάζομεν αὐτὰ ὡς ὄντα καὶ μέγα ὀφροῦμεν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὡς τοῖς εἰλικρινέσιν ἀγαθοῖς, ἀπατῶμενοι ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

itself its own good. Hence the soul, in thinking of body as the primary reality and of itself as akin to body, forgets that it gives itself its own good. It thinks that it receives its good from without.

And indeed the soul which has been assimilated (*homoioumenê*) to *Nous* seeks the good in itself, and is truly self-sufficient (*autarkês*). But the soul which is corporeiform (*sômatoeidês*) submits to the passivity of bodies (*to tôn sômatôn hupomenêi pathos*) and thinks that its own good lies in other things – money, friends, honours, or other such things – so that it has only an illusion (*phantasma*) of self-sufficiency, and not the real thing. For that which is not sufficient in itself, but depends on other things, things which moreover are manifold and unstable, is not of a nature to be self-sufficient.<sup>473</sup>

In his commentary on the *Alcibiades I*, Proclus discusses Alcibiades' belief that he is self-sufficient, because he is happy. The major premise which Alcibiades employs, that "he who is happy is self-sufficient," is true, because it is projected from the *koinai ennoiai* and from *logos*. However, the minor premise which Alcibiades employs, that "I am happy because of my body, my family, my friends, and my wealth," is false. Thus Alcibiades draws the false conclusion that self-sufficiency comes from these external things, and that he is self-sufficient. His mistake is in his false minor premise: Alcibiades is in fact not happy (*eudaimôn*). And if he is not happy he cannot be self-sufficient, because the converse of the major premise is assumed to be true: "he who is self-sufficient is happy." Alcibiades' mistaken notion of happiness, and hence of self-sufficiency, comes about because his minor premise is not arrived at by the *probolê tôn ousdiôdôn logôn*, but rather is drawn from "phantasia, from sensation, and from irrational passions (*apo phantasias, apo aisthêseôs, apo tôn alogôn...pathôn*)."<sup>474</sup> The passions are the source of fragmentation and disaccord for souls. Proclus makes a very nice point here. Those who reason about happiness incorrectly are still in agreement about the

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<sup>473</sup> In *Alc.* 106.21-107.08: καὶ ψυχὴ τοίνυν ἡ μὲν νῶ ὁμοιουμένη ζητεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν ἑαυτῇ καὶ ἔστιν ὡς ἀληθῶς αὐτάρκης· ἡ δὲ σωματοειδὴς τὸ τῶν σωμάτων ὑπομένει πάθος καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν ἑτέροις οἶεται κεῖσθαι τὸ ἑαυτῆς, ἢ χρήμασιν ἢ φίλοις ἢ τιμαῖς ἢ ἄλλοις τισὶ τοιοῦτοις, ὥστε φάντασμα μὲν αὐταρκείας ἔχειν, αὐτὴν δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἑαυτῷ ἀρκούμενον, ἀλλ' ἑτέρων ἐξηρημένον, καὶ τούτων παντοδαπῶν καὶ ἀστάτων, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῆς αὐτάρκειος φύσεως.

<sup>474</sup> In *Alc.* 104.24-25.

major premise, "that the good for man is happiness," because this is drawn from *logos*. However, they are in disagreement with each other, because they draw the minor premise from their passions, which are specific to each individual. Hence the avaricious man thinks that money is happiness, because his passions tend towards money, while the dissolute man thinks that sex is happiness, because his passions tend towards sex.<sup>475</sup>

### V.iii. The rescue and perfection of the *merikê psuchê*

In order for the partial soul lost in materiality and the passivity associated with body to be rescued, it must somehow recover its natural *autokinêsis*. We are describing this in ontological terms, but we must remember that the soul's *autokinêsis* is its *probolê tòn ousdiôdôn logôn*. Thus the conversion of the soul from *heterokinêsis* to *autokinêsis* is a cognitive conversion: a conversion from the soul's acceptance of *aisthêsis* as the source of knowledge to a projection of *logoi* from its own centre. Not surprisingly, Proclus takes the sort of philosophical conversation which is found in the Platonic dialogues as the paradigm of such a conversion. We have seen the importance for Proclus of Socrates' claim that it is the interlocutor himself who comes up with the answers in dialectical conversation, because this is the proof that all knowledge is *anamnêsis* and that the soul already knows all things.<sup>476</sup> In Procline terms, this is the proof that the soul is naturally autokinetic.

From the ontological perspective, this conversion has two related aspects. Because the soul has lapsed into *heterokinêsis*, if it is to move it must be moved from without, at least initially. However, the goal of this conversion is *autokinêsis*, so any motion imparted to the soul from without must be a motion by which the soul comes to move itself. So Proclus' account of Socrates' ministrations to his interlocutors is one

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<sup>475</sup> *In Alc.* 104.18-26.

<sup>476</sup> See especially the geometrical proof at *Meno* 85b-c and Socrates' claim to midwifery at *Theaetetus* 149a-151d. The key passage for Proclus is Alcibiades' self-refutation at *Alcibiades I* 112e-113c.



where Socrates moves his interlocutors' souls such that they move themselves. It is a peculiar *heterokinêsis* which is also from the point of the soul of the interlocutor an *autokinêsis*.

In the *Alcibiades I* Socrates asks Alcibiades how he could know what the Just is. He has not had a teacher who has taught him what the Just was, and he has never thought to investigate it on his own because there was never a time when he thought he did not know what the Just was.<sup>477</sup> Proclus comments that these are the only two ways which lead to learning (*mathêsis*) and discovery (*heuresis*): the first is to search for it (*zêtêsis*) and the second is to be taught it (*didaskalia*).<sup>478</sup> The soul which is heterokinetic, however, cannot engage in *zêtêsis*, because of double ignorance. It thinks that it knows when it does not, because it is fooled by the images of the Forms which come from *aisthêsis*. It is only after the soul's double ignorance has been taken away through refutation that it can engage in *zêtêsis*. In this sense, *zêtêsis* may be thought of as the *probolê tôn ousdiôdôn logôn* itself, because it is present only in an autokinetic soul. *Didaskalia*, on the other hand, is the sort of *heterokinêsis* which is also *autokinêsis*, according to Proclus, and is needed because the soul must be moved from without due to its adoption of the *heterokinêsis* of body.

The cause of this is that the human soul (*hê anthrôpinê psuchê*) is married to the body and lives a life in common with the body and has been added to from the nature of body [such that] it is necessary for it to be roused into motion (*anakinêsai*) by external powers. For imperfect *nous* is guided by perfect *nous*, just as an imperfect nature (*hê atelês phusis*) is brought to perfection by a nature already perfect in actuality (*hupo tês teleias kat' energeian êdê*). So a soul, in regarding another soul, sees in what they have akin its own proper knowledge (*en tôi suggenei tên heautês gnôsin horai*), and in this manner its deficiency in perfection is brought around to perfection, and its ignorance to knowledge.<sup>479</sup>

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<sup>477</sup> *Alcibiades I* 109d-110d.

<sup>478</sup> *In Alc.* 236.13-15.

<sup>479</sup> *In Alc.* 235.9-18: τὸ δὲ αἷτιον, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ σώματι συνεζύγη καὶ ζῇ τὴν μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ζωὴν τὴν κοινὴν καὶ ἐπιπροσθεῖται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος καὶ δεῖται τῶν ἔξωθεν αὐτὴν ἀνακινήσαι δυναμένων. ὁ γὰρ ἀτελής νοῦς ὑπὸ τοῦ τελείου ποδηγεῖται, καθάπερ δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀτελής φύσις ὑπὸ τῆς τελείας κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἤδη τελεσιουργεῖται. ψυχὴ οὖν εἰς ἄλλην ὁρώσα ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ συγγενεῖ τὴν ἑαυτῆς γνῶσιν ὁρᾷ καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὸ ἐλλείπον εἰς τὸ τέλειον περιάγει καὶ τὴν ἀγνοίαν εἰς γνῶσιν.

Notice the modified Aristotelian principle at work here, that act is prior to potency in all but time. Thus Socrates can prove that Alcibiades does not know what the Just is. He has never thought to search for it, due to his double ignorance, and neither can he name his teacher, i.e. he has not been roused from without to put forth the *logos* of justice.<sup>480</sup>

This is both *autokinēsis* and *heterokinēsis*. The soul is moved from without, by the questioning of Socrates, yet it is the interlocuter who accuses himself of his own ignorance. In the passage above we see another aspect. After refuting itself and showing forth to itself its own ignorance, the soul sees in another soul the knowledge which is akin to itself and which is its own by right, and thus is spurred on to put forth that knowledge from its own *ousia*. So although this is *heterokinēsis* due to the questions of Socrates, it is also *autokinēsis* because Alcibiades refutes himself and is spurred on to his own proper *probolē tōn ousdiōdōn logōn*.<sup>481</sup>

So the soul lost in materiality must be moved from without in a manner that it is also moved by itself. Recall a passage which we examined in chapter II of this study.

Again it is right to admire the appropriateness of Socrates' [words]. For, after he refutes Alcibiades he does not reproach his ignorance, but concluding that he has neither learned nor discovered [what the Just is], he asks, "how and from where do you know [the Just]?" Now this at the same time contributes towards Alcibiades' bringing to birth, and to his appropriate treatment, so that Alcibiades himself should be in a certain manner his own refuter. For just as the gods both purify us and work to our benefit through our own [actions], and in general move us in an manner such that we move ourselves (*autokinētous*), in the same manner Socrates has devised a refutation in such a manner that he who is refuted will think that he has been refuted by himself, and he himself who is bringing to birth (*maieuomenos*) serves as his own midwife.<sup>482</sup>

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<sup>480</sup> Later in the dialogue (110e) Alcibiades names the many (*hoi polloi*) as his teachers. However, Socrates shows that due to their disagreement among themselves as to the nature of the Just, they cannot know what the Just is, and hence cannot teach it.

<sup>481</sup> See Dominic J. O'Meara, *Pythagoras Revived* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) pp.152-155; J. Trouillard, *L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1972) pp.36-37.

<sup>482</sup> *In Alc.* 241.13-23: Πάλιν τίνυν τὸ ἐμμελές τοῦ Σωκράτους θαύματος ἄξιον. καὶ γὰρ μετὰ τὸν ἐλέγχον οὐκ ὀνειδίζει τὴν ἀγνοίαν αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ συναγαγὼν ὥς οὔτε ἔμαθεν οὔτε εὗρεν ἐρωτᾷ. πῶς οἶσθα καὶ πόθεν; τοῦτο γὰρ ἅμα μὲν εἰς μαιεῖαν συντελεῖ, ἅμα δὲ εἰς ἐμμελῆ θεραπείαν, ἵν' αὐτὸς ἢ τρόπον τινὰ ὁ ἑαυτὸν ἐλέγχων, ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ θεοὶ καὶ καθαίρουσιν ἡμᾶς καὶ εὐεργετοῦσι δι' ἑαυτῶν, καὶ ὅλως οὕτω κινουῦσιν ὥς αὐτοκινήτους, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης μεμηχάνηται τοιοῦτον ἐλέγχων τρόπον δι' οὗ καὶ ὁ ἐλεγχόμενος αὐτὸς ἐλέγχεσθαι δοῖται παρ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ὁ μαιευόμενος αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν

Proclus says that "he who is refuted *will think* (doxei) that he has been refuted by himself." This might seem to indicate that this impression of self-refutation is a false impression. However, the tone of the rest of the passage states very clearly that in fact the interlocutor does refute himself and is his own midwife.<sup>483</sup> It is likely, rather, that the use of *doxei* indicates that this *autokinêsis* is a strange sort of *autokinêsis*, because it is also a sort of *heterokinêsis* due to the questioning of Socrates. But Socrates devises his heterokinetic questioning in a manner such that his own motion is minimised, and the interlocutor's amazement at bringing forth answers out of himself will be increased.

Socrates' questioning allows the soul to regain its *autokinêsis* because it in drawing forth *logoi* from itself, the soul becomes aware again of the content of its own *ousia*. Further, the soul which is awakened in this manner regains its true *erôs* for the intelligible and leaves aside the *erôs* for the body and bodily things in which it had indulged. This self-love, through which the soul loves the higher realities which are its source, is what draws the soul on, and is the completion and source of its *autokinêsis*. This *erôs* may then be identified with the *energeia* of the soul, as a conscious embrace of what it is in its *ousia*.<sup>484</sup>

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<sup>483</sup> Cf. *In Tim.* III.302.22-24: "For the gods wish to rule the self-moving such that they move themselves (καὶ γὰρ οἱ θεοὶ βούλονται τῶν αὐτοκινήτων ἄρχειν ὡς αὐτοκινήτων ὄντων).

<sup>484</sup> According to Proclus, Socrates practices three sciences: dialectic, maieutic, erotic. Although he uses all three at once, in the *Alcibiades* the erotic has first importance, whereas, for example, in the *Theaetetus* the maieutic is most important. W. Beierwaltes points out that the erotic unites and completes the dialectic and the maieutic. The *logoi* which are brought to birth through Socratic questioning are spurred on by the desire which is present in the soul, and which is revealed to the soul through refutation. Socrates' midwifery is erotic in that it reveals to the soul its own *erôs*, and allows the soul to begin the erotic dialectical ascent towards its own source: *Nous*. See W. Beierwaltes, "The love of beauty and the love of God," in *Classical Mediterranean spirituality. Egyptian, Greek, Roman*, ed. A.H. Armstrong (New York: Crossroad, 1986) pp.293-313. See also C. Steel, "l'anagogie par les apories," in *Proclus et son influence. Actes du colloque de Neuchâtel, juin 1985*, ed. G. Boss and C. Steel (Zürich: Éditions du Grand Midi, 1987) pp.101-128. Steel's article examines how Proclus thinks the first part of the *Parmenides* is a maieutic dialogue. The five difficulties (Proclus actually finds six, subdividing the fifth) with the theory of Forms which Parmenides articulates are not meant to be a refutation of the theory, according to Proclus, but rather to draw forth out of the soul of the young Socrates a higher understanding of the Forms. This too is an erotic ascent, because the *aporiai* concerning the Forms lead Socrates from an examination of Forms in matter to the henads themselves. This ascent in argument allows the Soul to turn its thought upwards, and prepares it for the examination of the One as the cause of all that comes after it, contained in the second part of the dialogue.

We are left at this point with a strange situation. The soul is rescued from *genesis* and set on the road to perfection by a *heterokinêsis* which is also *autokinêsis*. This *autokinêsis* is the *probolê tôn ousdiôdôn logôn*, and this projection of *logoi* is the circular motion of remaining in, proceeding from, and returning to *Nous*. However, *Nous* has a knowing which is not multiple in the manner in which soul's projection of *logoi* is multiple. If we take the Platonic dialogues as an example, we can see that the road from refutation to knowledge wanders down many side paths and requires a great multiplication of arguments on the way to knowledge of the Forms. So if the aim of the rescue of the soul is to lead it back not only to its own activity, but to *Nous*, we must be able to answer the following question: How is the multiplication of *logoi* inherent in the *probolê tôn ousdiôdôn logôn* not simply a falling away from the unity of *Nous*, and how does this multiplication lead ultimately back to unity?

Proclus has an answer to this question, but it is not entirely satisfactory. His answer is that the *probolê tôn ousdiôdôn logôn* is not an indeterminate multiplicity, but is rather a unified multiplicity all of which is oriented back to its source in *Nous*. This is sort of a middle solution. It keeps the soul's normal activity of the *probolê tôn ousdiôdôn logôn* from being simply an evil and a fall from *Nous*, but it does not do away with the inherent multiplicity of *dianoia*. Ultimately, Proclus' solution will be to break his system in the following sense. The soul is the only entity in the entire cosmos which is able to leave behind its own station and take on the unity of *Nous*. In this Proclus agrees with Plotinus. Thus unification does not come about through *dianoia*, but through that in soul which is higher than *dianoia*.

Although this is the case, it is significant that *dianoia* itself is a unified multiplicity. If this were not the case, *dianoia* would only lead away from *Nous*, and not back towards it, as Proclus contends. In the final two chapters of this study we will examine the manner in which *dianoia* is a unified multiplicity, due to its orientation

towards the monad of Time. and the manner in which the Soul may surpass *dianoia*.  
through its own *nous* and its own one.

## CHAPTER VI

### TIME

In the previous chapter we saw how the partial soul was seduced by its own fascination with the passions arising from the body, and in turning its attention to the body converted its native *autokinêsis* to *heterokinêsis*. The salvation of the partial soul, according to Proclus in the *Alcibiades I* commentary, began with a refutation of its double ignorance, and was completed through the recollection brought about by philosophical conversation. However, we were left with a problem with this account. The aim of philosophical conversation was to convert the soul towards its own *ousia*, but also to turn it ultimately towards the unity of *Nous*. But the medium of philosophical conversation is the *probolê tôn ousdiôdôn logôn*. This drawing out of *logoi* from the *ousia* of the soul must be a multiplication of *logoi*. It is on the one hand a retreat from the indeterminate multiplicity of body. But on the other hand the knowing which the soul has of its own *ousia* is through a multiplicity of projected *logoi*, *logoi* which allow the soul to see its own *ousia* from a number of sides.

Our reflection on the Form of justice, for example, comes about through examination of various aspects of this Form, and how it interacts with other Forms, and even how it is embodied in human action in the material world. Our understanding of the Form of triangle, likewise, comes about through an examination of various sorts of triangle: equilateral, scalene, isoceles. It is through an examination of the various manners in which "having internal angles add up to 180 degrees" may play out that we understand just what this definition means. The paradox of human knowing, however, is

that our knowledge of triangle is not identical to all of our projections, to all of our examinations of the various aspects of this idea. According to Proclus, these projections have as their ultimate aim to allow us to rest in the unity of the idea itself, but rest in it consciously, rather than merely employing it as an unexamined cognitive heartbeat or breath.

Stated another way, the ultimate aim of *dianoia* is to leave aside *dianoia* for the unified knowing of *Nous*, and for the unification (*henôsis*) by which we touch the One. How does the autokinetic movement of the Soul from its *ousia*, through its *dunamis*, to its multiple *energeia* allow the Soul to attain the unity which is itself higher than the Soul's own *ousia*? The same problem in fact occurs at the level of *Nous*. How is it that *Nous* is a reflection of the One, which is absolute simplicity, through the multiplicity of *eidê* in its knowing moment? Somehow *Nous* is able to grasp the One in its knowing, but in another sense it fails to grasp the One due to its own multiplicity. The problem is more pressing with regard to the partial soul, however, because it is a common doctrine of Neoplatonism that the partial soul descends into materiality and is able to rise again from materiality to its own station, and even above its own station to some sort of union with *Nous* and the One.<sup>485</sup> In Plotinus the status of the partial soul is quite ambiguous, with one part descending from *Nous*, and another part remaining undescended. In Proclus we find the celebrated denial of the doctrine of the undescended soul, in proposition 211 of the *Elements of Theology*: "Every partial soul in descending towards *genesis* descends as a whole: and there is not a part of it which remains above and a part which descends."<sup>486</sup> However, this denial is not as clearly a departure from Plotinus as it seems at first, because even in Proclus the *ousia* of the soul is a fullness of *logoi*, which is its

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<sup>485</sup> See the excellent analysis of the partial soul's mobility in Iamblichus, Damascius, and Priscianus in C. Steel, *The changing self. A study on the soul in later Neoplatonism. Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus* (Verhandelingen van de koninklijke academie voor wetenschappen, letteren en schone kunsten van België, klasse der letteren jaargang xl, nr 85) (Brussels: Paleis der Academiën, 1978).

<sup>486</sup> *El. Th.* prop. 211: Πᾶσα μερική ψυχή κατιούσα εἰς γένεσιν ὅλη κάτεισι, καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς ἄνω μένει, τὸ δὲ κάτεισιν.

participation in and remaining in *Nous*. So while Proclus does not have the doctrine of the undescended soul *per se*, he does agree with Plotinus that there is a part of the soul, namely its *ousia* as moment of remaining, which is always in contact with or participates in *Nous*.

Be this as it may, we are left with a situation in which the partial soul seeks the unity of *Nous* through an increase of its own multiplicity in the *probolê tôn ousdiôdôn logôn*. The solution to this problem in Proclus is the following. The Forms in *Nous* and the projected *logoi* in Soul are not simply multiplicities which have no relation to the sources from which they arise. Rather, both *Nous* and Soul are described by Proclus as a dynamic coming forth of a unified source into a multiplicity which is an expression of that source and oriented back towards that source. So the multiplicity of *logoi* in Soul is not simply an indeterminate manyness of projections. Every projection arises from the unified centre of the Soul and has as its aim an explication of that centre. Thus the multiplicity of *logoi* in Soul is a unified multiplicity, i.e. a multiplicity which is unified by its source in the same manner in which the circumference of the circle is unified by its centre.<sup>487</sup>

In this chapter we will examine this principle of unity for the Soul's projections, focusing once again on the partial soul. The unifying principle in Proclus is the monad of Time, around which the Soul circles. Time is a moving image of Eternity, in the sense that whereas time is the unifying principle of the multiplicity of *logoi* in the Soul, Eternity is the unifying principle of the multiplicity of *eidê* in *Nous*. Consequently, we will examine i) the manner in which Eternity unifies the intelligibles; ii) the manner in which Time is a moving image of Eternity; and iii) the manner in which Time unifies the Soul's projection.<sup>488</sup>

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<sup>487</sup> Cf. A. Charles, "La raison et le divin chez Proclus," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 87 (1969) pp.458-482.

<sup>488</sup> For a brief explanation of Eternity and Time in Proclus, see W. O'Neill, "Time and Eternity in Proclus," *Phronesis*, 7 (1962) pp.161-165; see also J.Trouillard, "La procession du temps selon Proclus."



In the *Timaeus* Plato tells us that the model (*paradeigma*) after which the Demiurge made the all (*tode to pan*) is an Eternal Living Creature (*zōon aīdion on*), and that he made this all more similar (*homoion*) to its model through the fabrication of Time:

And as the nature of the Living Creature was to be eternal, it was impossible to bind this nature in its entirety to becoming (*tōi gennētōi*). So he planned to make a certain moving image of Eternity (*eikō... kinēton tina aiōnos*), and then in setting the Heavens in order, he made of that Eternity which remains in a One an eternal image, which proceeds according to number. And it is this image which we call Time.<sup>489</sup>

Proclus comments on this passage at length in the *In Timaeum*.<sup>490</sup> As we have said, for Proclus, Eternity is the principle which unifies the intelligible genera, while Time is the intellectual principle which unifies the divided activity of Soul, as well as all else which shares in becoming.

Eternity dwells in the intelligible. But where in the intelligible does it reside?

Proclus asks in what order (*taxis*) of the intelligible (*noēta*) it exists.

And now we must look at things differently, and follow Plato [rather than Aristotle] in asking what Eternity and Time are. And we must not make of Time simply an image of Time, nor must we say that Eternity is simply a certain intelligible God. Rather, we must establish first in which order of the intelligibles Eternity has its existence.<sup>491</sup>

In order to understand this question, we must speak briefly about the structure of Proclus' spiritual hierarchy. In Proclus the divisions which emerged in the Plotinian *Nous* have been systematically related to each other through a logic of unity and multiplicity.

Plotinus speaks about a division between subject and object in *Nous*, and about a

*Diotima*, 4 (1976) pp.104-115; and see a later version of this article, published as part of chapter VIII of J. Trouillard, *La mystagogie de Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1982) pp.171-185.

<sup>489</sup> *Timaeus* 37d: ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζώου φύσις ἐτύγχανεν οὐσα αἰώνιος, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν τῷ γενητῷ παντελῶς προσάπτειν οὐκ ἦν δυνατόν· εἰκὼ δὲ ἐπινοεῖ κινητὸν τινα αἰῶνος ποιῆσαι, καὶ διακοσμῶν ἅμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἐνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἱούσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα τοῦτον ὃν δὴ χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν.

<sup>490</sup> *In Tim.* III.8.18-34.14.

<sup>491</sup> *In Tim.* III.10.02-07: Δεῖ δὲ ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ παρόντι διαφερόντως ἰδεῖν, τίς ὁ αἰὼν κατὰ Πλάτωνα καὶ τίς ὁ χρόνος, καὶ μήτε τὸ εἶδωλον τοῦ χρόνου χρόνον τίθεσθαι μόνον μήτε τὸν αἰῶνα νοητὸν ἀπλῶς εἶναι τινα θεόν, ἀλλ' ἐν ποίᾳ τάξει τῶν νοητῶν ὑφέστηκε πρῶτον καταδήσασθαι.

multiplicity of genera of Being in *Nous*, while also asserting the unity of *Nous*. Proclus holds to the unity of *Nous*, but he subjects the reality which is *Nous* to an exhaustive analysis, in order to distinguish more clearly its moments. It is crucial to remember about this analysis, as we have been saying throughout this study, that the terms through which we understand *Nous* are not themselves noetic. Our thought is dianoetic, and as such the simultaneous division and unity which is *Nous* cannot be expressed by us adequately. We can hold only to one side or the other, and we finally fall back on a mode of expression by which we say *Nous* is a thinking which is both completely unified and divided, even though this is not something we experience in our own thinking.

Proclus refers to the distinction between object and subject in *Nous* as a division between intelligible (*noêta*) and intellectual (*noera*) orders of *Nous*. Further, between the intelligible and the intellectual is an intermediate order which is referred to as intelligible-and-intellectual (*noêta kai noera*). This distinction between orders is at first misleading, because it gives one the impression that the intelligible orders are merely object of thought without the activity of thinking, while the intellectual orders are merely activity which looks up to the intelligible for their object. This is not the case. *Nous* is an hypostasis, which means for Proclus that it is a mind which is a unity in plurality, in which the total structure is mirrored in each part.<sup>492</sup> Similarly, *Nous* is one mind, but at the same time each of its parts is a reflection of the whole and thus are also individual minds. Thus all of the orders have these three moments in them in some manner, and their hierarchical arrangement is a matter of emphasis.<sup>493</sup> The intelligible has more the

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<sup>492</sup> S. Gersh, *KINHΣIZ AKINHOTOS* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973) pp.19ff; 51-58.

<sup>493</sup> See the excellent article by P. Hadot, "Être, Vie, Pensée chez Plotin et avant Plotin," in *Les sources de Plotin* (Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1960) pp.105-141. Hadot traces the history of the triad Being, Life, and *Nous* which structures *Nous* in Plotinus. Although *Nous* in Plotinus is less complex a hypostasis than in Proclus, the same triadic structure is present in both. Moreover, the doctrine of the interpenetration of each moment by the two others is common to Plotinus and Proclus, and as Hadot shows, to the tradition before them. As Hadot says, "Au point de vue des Idées, c'est-à-dire de l'Être ou de l'Intelligible, la vie correspond au mouvement de division intérieure de l'être qui l'organise en une hiérarchie de genres et d'espèces. Au point de vue de l'Intelligence, la vie correspond à l'activité de la pensée qui exige sans cesse un passage de l'identité à l'altérité et un retour à l'identité... Autrement dit, l'Intelligence plotinienne est douée d'un mouvement intérieur qui n'est autre que la vie" (p.132). In Proclus this interpenetrating triadic

character of cause, and thus Proclus distinguishes out three intelligible triads which stand above and give rise to the other orders. Thus next there come to be three intelligible-and-intellectual triads,<sup>494</sup> and after these comes an intellectual hebdomad.<sup>495</sup> So while *Nous* as a whole is a unity, its various moments as intelligible, intelligible-and-intellectual, and intellectual are to be thought of both as an articulation of the interior nature of the thought of *Nous* as a whole, and as an articulation of the *noes* (intellects) which make up the different orders of *Nous*, all without losing the unity which *Nous* has as the unity of a thinking mind.

So Proclus' question about the place of Eternity is important. If Eternity is in *Nous*, and in one of the three intelligible orders of *Nous* rather than in the lower orders, then it is important to specify exactly which intelligible triad it is. In other words, asking about the place of Eternity in the intelligible is asking what role Eternity plays in the unfolding of the One into the multiplicity of intelligible *eidē* which found the subsequent diversity of the cosmos. Proclus thinks that the three intelligible triads in *Nous* are, in order, the One-Being, Eternity, and the Eternal Living Being, or *autozōion*. The final intelligible triad, the *autozōion*, is the paradigm to which the Demiurge (who is in the

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structure governs not only the whole of *Nous* itself, divided into intelligible, intelligible-and-intellectual, and intellectual orders, but also the internal structure of at least the first two orders. For the triads intelligible, intelligible-and-intellectual, and intellectual, and Being, Life, *Nous*, see W. Beierwaltes, *Proklos, Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1965) pp.89-118; and J. Pépin, "Éléments pour une histoire de la relation entre l'intelligence et l'intelligible chez Platon et dans le néoplatonisme," *Revue philosophique*, 146 (1956) pp.39-64.

<sup>494</sup> He speaks of triads because each is a triad of remaining, proceeding, and returning moments, which are the ubiquitous structuring principles of the Procline cosmos.

<sup>495</sup> That there is a seven-fold division of the intellectual order indicates that Proclus is not following only the inner logic of *dianoia*, because his system unfolds in triads. It is likely, therefore, this division is drawn from the *Chaldaean Oracles*, which Proclus considers to be a higher revelation of the hidden secrets of divinity than is *dianoia*. For Proclus' relation to the *Chaldaean Oracles*, see H. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy, Mysticism, Magic and Platonism in the Later Roman Empire* (Cairo, 1956 [New edition with a contribution by P. Hadot, "Bilan et perspectives sur les Oracles Chaldaïques et une bibliographie de H. Lewy," (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1978)]) pp.481-485, and A. J. Festugière, "Contemplation philosophique et art théurgique chez Proclus," in *Études de la philosophie Grecque* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1971) pp.585-596; and E. des Places, "La religion de Jamblique," in *De Jamblique à Proclus* (Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1975) pp.69-94. For the intellectual hebdomad, see L. Siorvanes, *Proclus, Neo-Platonic philosophy and science* (New Haven: Yale University Press., 1996) p.150. Notice as well that there are seven planetary spheres. It is possible that Proclus thought of the planetary spheres as an image of the intellectual hebdomad.

intellectual hebdomad) looks when he orders the cosmos. As such, it contains all of the genera of Being, but in a manner best described by Plotinus, where all is in each and each in all, without any mixture or confusion.

For it is "the easy life" there, and truth is their mother and nurse and being and food – and they see all things, not those to which coming to be (*genesis*), but those to which real being (*ousia*) belongs, and they see themselves in other things: for all things there are transparent, and there is nothing dark or opaque: everything and all things are clear to the inmost part to everything; for light is transparent to light. Each there has everything in itself and sees all things in every other, so that all are everywhere and each and every one is all and the glory is unbounded; for each of them is great, because even the small is great; the sun there is all the stars, and each star is the sun and all the others. A different kind of being stands out in each, but in each all are manifest.<sup>496</sup>

One may be tempted to think of this multiplicity of intelligible genera as a static set of categories. Perhaps they are the *megista genē* of Plato's *Sophist*. Proclus does speak of them at times in these terms.<sup>497</sup> Yet it is not the case that a static set of intelligible categories can easily be thought of as all in each and each in all. The dynamism of the Plotinian *Nous* seems to rule out a conception of the this first multiplicity of Being along Aristotelian or Kantian lines, from the *Categories* or the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The Plotinian *eidē* are alive. It is as proper to speak of them as gods as it is to speak of them as the primary division of Being. And they are Being as thought, and thought as the *energeia* of thought. They are Being as thinking activity.

If this is the case, then the intelligible order of *Nous* cannot merely contain the *autozōion*. Proclus has analysed the thinking of *Nous* into its moments, one of which is the multiplicity of intelligible genera which is the *autozōion*. But just as there is more to the description of *Nous* in Plotinus than its multiplicity, so in Proclus this multiplicity

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<sup>496</sup> *Enn.* V.8.4.1-12: καὶ γὰρ τὸ ρεῖα ζῶειν ἐκεῖ, καὶ ἀλήθεια δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ γενέτειρα καὶ τροφὸς καὶ οὐσία καὶ τροφή – καὶ ὁρῶσι τὰ πάντα, οὐχ οἷς γένεσις πρόσσεστιν, ἀλλ' οἷς οὐσία, καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἐν ἄλλοις· διαφανῇ γὰρ πάντα καὶ σκοτεινὸν οὐδὲ ἀντίτυπον οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ πᾶς παντὶ φανερός· εἰς τὸ εἶσω καὶ πάντα· ὥς γὰρ φωτὶ, καὶ γὰρ ἔχει πᾶς πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁρᾷ ἐν ἄλλῳ πάντα, ὥστε πανταχοῦ πάντα καὶ πᾶν πᾶν καὶ ἕκαστον πᾶν καὶ ἄπειρος ἡ αἵγλη· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν μέγα, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν μέγα· καὶ ἥλιος ἐκεῖ πάντα ἄστρα, καὶ ἕκαστον ἥλιος αὐτὸς καὶ πάντα. ἐξέχει δ' ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἄλλο, ἐμφαίνει δὲ καὶ πάντα.

<sup>497</sup> See the discussion of the mixture of Forms at *In Parm.* 768ff.

must be embraced by and be an expression of a prior unity. The unity here is Eternity as the second intelligible triad. As such Eternity is not a genus of Being, because the genera of Being only make their appearance with the *autozōion*. Proclus remarks that the genera of Being imply their opposites, but Eternity is not opposed to any of the genera in the way in which Rest, for example, is opposed to motion.

All of these are equally eternal: Same, Different, Rest, Motion. This would not be the case if Eternity were one [genus of Being] among them. For Rest is not equally Rest and Motion, but all of the intelligibles are equally always in existence and eternal. So Eternity is opposed to none of these, nor to anything which comes after it.<sup>498</sup>

If this is the case, then neither is Time opposed to Eternity. Rather than being the opposite of Eternity, Time is its image. This is important for Proclus' conception of the structure of the whole of things. Being does not fall into two different genera: that which is eternal and that which is temporal. If it did, then the eternal and the temporal would be related to each other in the same manner as any other two genera into which Being falls, such as Rest and Motion, or Sameness and Rest. Instead, in Proclus, we find that the temporal is related to the eternal not as simply other than it, but rather as its image. As we will see below, this means that Time is the unifying principle of the temporal, and is not ranked itself as being in Time, in the way that Eternity is the unifying principle of the intelligible genera without itself being one of these genera.

So Eternity cannot be a genus of Being, and if it is not a genus of Being it cannot be in the *autozōion*, the third intelligible triad. Rather, it is the comprehensive principle of the intelligible genera in the *autozōion*. It is Eternity which brings them to birth and is the cause of their unchanging permanence.

...and [Eternity is] the cause of the unchanging permanence of all [the intelligible genera], a cause which is neither among the many intelligible [genera] themselves, nor comes from them by [a sort of] collection, but is raised above them and

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<sup>498</sup> In *Tim.* III.11.23-28: πάντα γοῦν ὁμοίως αἰώνια ταῦτα, τὸ ταυτόν, τὸ ἕτερον, ἡ στάσις, ἡ κίνησις, οὐκ ἂν δέ, εἰ ἐν τι τούτων ἦν ὁ αἰὼν· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως στάσις ἡ στάσις καὶ ἡ κίνησις, πάντα δὲ νοητά ὁμοίως ἔστιν αἰεὶ ὄντα καὶ αἰώνια, πρὸς οὐδέν οὖν ἀντίθετος ὁ αἰὼν ἡ τούτων ἡ τῶν μετ' αὐτόν·

present to them, and by itself arranges them and as it were gives them shape, and it does this by making them to be as a whole all at once. For the manifold Form of the intelligibles (*hê pantodapê tôn noêtôn idea*) is not brought forth immediately after the Good, which is without any trace of multiplicity. Rather, there are certain natures in between, more unified than the multiplicity of the All-Complete [i.e. the *autozôion*], and shewing forth in themselves the pangs of childbirth and the signs of the generation of the Wholes and the unifying bond.<sup>499</sup>

Eternity is one of these natures which are "in between," as the principle immediately prior to the *autozôion*. The term "pangs of childbirth" (*ódina*) is an interesting term for Proclus to use with regard to the emergence of the intelligible genera from Eternity. Throughout Proclus we find that multiplicity is brought forth from unity. Hence Eternity, as the principle of bringing forth, is not ranked with the intelligible genera, because it is a prior unity which brings them forth. Proclus quotes the Chaldaean Oracles, and takes up their motif of the "Paternal *Nous*" (*patrikos nous*) and the "Flower of *Nous*" (*noou anthos*). He comments:

[Eternity] is saturated [*diakorês*] with Paternal Divinity, which [the Oracles] call "the Flower of *Nous*." It shines down on all things, as the source of their *nous* and their eternally unchanging knowing, and their erotic turning towards (*strophesthai*) and activity around the cause of all.<sup>500</sup>

Eternity is not only the source of the bringing to birth of the intelligible genera, it also is the source of their *nous* and hence of their circular movement back towards the source of their birth. These two motifs, of paternity and of a turning towards or return (*epistrophê*) indicate what is really going on in Proclus' conception of *Nous*. In general in Neoplatonism that which in its fertility brings an effect into being by conferring unity on its effect is in so doing also the source of its good. This is indicated by the identification

<sup>499</sup> In *Tim.* III.12.18-27: καὶ αἰτία τῆς ἀνεξαλλάκτου πάντων διαμονῆς, οὐκ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐσα τοῖς πολλοῖς νοητοῖς οὐδ' ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀθροίζομένη, ἀλλ' ἐξηρημένως αὐτοῖς παρούσα καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὴν αὐτὰ διατιθεῖσα καὶ οἰονεῖ μορφοῦσα καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὧτ' ὅτι ὅλα εἶναι ποιοῦσα: οὐ γὰρ εὐθέως μετὰ τάχαθ' ὅτι τὸ πάντῃ πλήθους ἀνεμφοσάτον ἢ παντοδαπὴ τῶν νοητῶν ἰδέα παράγεται. ἀλλ' εἰσὶ τινες μεταξὺ οὐσαις ἡνωμέναι μὲν μᾶλλον τοῦ πλήθους τοῦ παντελοῦς, ὥδινά δὲ καὶ ἔμφασιν τῆς ἀπογεννήσεως τῶν ὅλων καὶ τῆς συνοχῆς ἐν ἑαυταῖς ἐπιδεικνύμεναι.

<sup>500</sup> In *Tim.* III.14.11-14: πατρικῆς γὰρ θεότητος διακορῆς ὧν, ἣν καλεῖ νόου ἄνθος, νοῦν ἐπιλάμπει τοῖς πάσι καὶ τὸ αἰεὶ ὡσαύτως νοεῖν καὶ ἐρωτικῶς περὶ τὴν πάντων ἀρχὴν στρέφεσθαι καὶ ἐνεργεῖν.

of the Platonic One and the Platonic Good.<sup>501</sup> The multiplicity of intelligible genera in the *autozôion* are not merely a static set of categories, because they themselves are living *eidê* which have *been brought to birth*. And in their being brought to birth they look back to their source, they strive towards it erotically, and they attain its unity and perfection in the only way they can, i.e. through their own multiplicity.<sup>502</sup> *Nous* as a whole has the unity of a mind whose thought is of itself. *Nous* as intellectual, or as act of thinking, has a unity afforded through its orientation back towards the intelligible genera. But these genera themselves also have the unity afforded by their erotic orientation towards their own source. This unity afforded by being oriented towards a prior unity is the sort of unity which Time affords the multiplicity inherent in *dianoia*.<sup>503</sup>

So in Proclus' metaphysics, even at the highest levels of *Nous*, Being is a dynamic coming forth into multiplicity of that which is hidden in a prior unity.<sup>504</sup> So that which

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<sup>501</sup> See C. Steel, "L'Un et le Bien. Les raisons d'une identification dans la tradition platonicienne," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 73 (1989) pp.69-85.

<sup>502</sup> This internal dynamism by which *Nous* is a hypostasis which brings itself to birth is already present in Plotinus. See P. Hadot, "Être, Vie, Pensée chez Plotin et avant Plotin," in *Les sources de Plotin* (Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1960) pp.105-141; see pp.136-137: "l'unité, la continuité de ce mouvement impliquent que *la vie est déjà pensée*, qu'il y a une sorte d'unité préintellectuelle don't l'Intelligence n'est que le développement. L'unité multiple de l'être et la connaissance définie de la *pensée* intellectuelle sont préformées dans le dynamisme de la *vie*. L'étude de la triade être-vie-pensée chez Plotin semble bien nous conduire à conclure que l'intuition centrale de Plotin est celle d'une vie qui utilise la détermination intellectuelle pour essayer de rejoindre sa source. On pourrait voir là une transposition de l'expérience familière à tout homme, celle de désir d'expression. La volonté d'expression devient en nous d'abord sens, puis phrase exprimée, sans que la phrase exprimée puisse jamais rendre adéquatement ce qui voulait s'exprimer. Certaines expressions de Plotin, par exemple celles par lesquelles il représente le rapport de l'âme à l'intelligence, comme analogue à celui du *logos* proféré au *logos* intérieur, pourrait justifier cette interprétation."

<sup>503</sup> Plotinus' treatment of Eternity differs from Proclus' in the same way that his treatment of *Nous* differs. In both authors the same dynamism of thinker and thought is present, but while Plotinus focuses on the unity of such an unchanging multiplicity, as we see from our discussion Proclus takes this unity and divides it into its various moments. So for Plotinus: "The life, then, which belongs to that which exists and is in being, all together and full, completely without extension or interval, is that which we are looking for, eternity [Γίνεται τοῖνυν ἡ περὶ τὸ ὄν ἐν τῷ εἶναι ζωὴ ὁμοῦ πάσα καὶ πλήρης ἀδιάστατος πανταχῇ τοῦτο, ὃ δὴ ζητοῦμεν, αἰών]." Because Proclus has distinguished the moment of life as that which gives birth to *energeia* as the intelligible genera, Proclus holds that Eternity is the life of *Nous* in the intelligible, but not that Eternity is the life of the intelligibles themselves. See *Enn.* III.7.3. For Plotinus, Eternity is in a certain manner identical with *Nous* itself. See *Enn.* III.7.5.18. For a comparable difference between Plotinus and Proclus, with regard to the internal structure of *Nous*, and the Demiurge, see J. Dillon, "Plotinus, *Enn.* 3.9.1, and later views on the intelligible world," *Transactions and proceedings of the American philological association*, 100 (1969) pp.63-70.

<sup>504</sup> This dynamic coming forth of a multiplicity from a previous unity is forceably stated by J.

emerges into multiplicity has a certain unity about it, as having sprung from a single source and as returning to the same source. Such a multiplicity may be thought of as vectorial, i.e. as pointing the way back towards its own origin. Or it may be thought of as the circumference of a circle, whose infinity of points are all made into one figure by their orientation towards the centre, i.e. by their equidistance from the centre.

*Nous* as a dynamic coming forth of a prior unity into multiplicity is not so much like the common sense which gives unity to the proper senses, in Aristotle, or the transcendental unity of apperception which allows us to add the 'I think' to all of our thoughts, in Kant. Rather, it is closer to the self-articulation of *Geist* in Hegel, or the revealing of itself of Being in Heidegger. In both these thinkers we have a coming forth into multiplicity, but both differ from Proclus' conception of the prior unity which emerges into this multiplicity. *Nous* gives rise to a multiplicity of intelligible genera, but it is first a primal unity which actualises itself in these multiple ways. Being is itself a power, a unity, which expresses itself in the multiplicity which it brings to birth, yet all that multiplicity of thought which is brought to birth seeks the unity which Being in itself is. Thus besides the third intelligible triad, the *autozôion* which is the multiplicity of intelligible genera, there must be a prior principle which brings this multiplicity to birth. And this is Eternity, the second intelligible triad.

Let us concede that there must be a principle before the *autozôion*. Why is it Eternity, and why is there also another intelligible triad before Eternity? Briefly stated, Proclus tells us that from Plato we know that the *autozôion* is eternal. But to be eternal

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Trouillard. See: "L'intelligibilité Proclusienne," in *La Philosophie et ses Problèmes, Recueil d'études de doctrine de l'histoire* (Paris: Emmanuel Vitte, 1960) p.86: "Le genre n'est pas seulement la raison efficace des ressemblances, mais aussi de l'infinie diversification des espèces et des individus. Car par l'ἁπλῆς qu'il contient uni à son πᾶς il peut alimenter dans une ligne donnée les antithèses mutuelles des termes subordonnés. Et cette synthèse d'autre et de même forme la série appropriée ou le nombre connoturel à chaque unité qualifiée... Cela ne signifie nullement que le genre soit ce qu'il produit en ce sens qu'il enfermerait d'avance l'idée distincte de ses participations. Celles-ci peuvent lui ressembler sans que lui leur ressemble. Il faudrait plutôt dire qu'il les fonde selon tout leur être, parce qu'il a en lui beaucoup plus qu'il ne faut pour justifier leur apparition..." See also S. Gersh, *KINHΣΙΣ AKINHOTOS* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973) pp.120-121. E. Moutsopoulos, *Les structures de l'imaginaire dans la philosophie de Proclus* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1985) pp.61-72 gives a good discussion of Time in Proclus in relation to causation.



means to participate in Eternity, not to be Eternity itself. So we know that Eternity is distinct from, and higher than, the *autozôion*. Further, by analogy with Time and the World, we know that Eternity is the next thing above the *autozôion*. Proclus tells us that the World is the first thing to participate in Time, because Time did not exist before the creation of the World. In other words, *genesis* as a whole participates in Time as a whole, and is its primary participant. Likewise, the *autozôion* participates in Eternity as a whole, and is its primary participant, because it is the primary locus of eternal beings. Hence Eternity is the second intelligible triad, which brings to birth the *autozôion* as the third intelligible triad.<sup>505</sup>

What is before Eternity? Eternity is not itself the primal unity of Being, but rather, it is the principle of giving birth. It is the second moment: the *dunamis* in the triad *pater/dunamis/nous*; the *zôê* in the triad *on/zôê/nous*; the *proodos* in the triad *monê/proodos/epistrophê*.<sup>506</sup> As power, life, and procession. Eternity is the principle of emergence, and what emerges is before it. Remember also that not all which is is eternal. Therefore Being must be a principle which is more comprehensive than Eternity, and in Procline metaphysics the higher principle is more comprehensive than the lower. Thus the unity to which Eternity looks is Being itself, and it is Being which Eternity causes to be expressed and brought to birth in multiplicity in the *autozôion*. Being is the first intelligible triad, called by Proclus the One-Being. Proclus interprets the phrase "Eternity which remains in a One" from Plato's *Timaeus* to refer to this. The One in which Eternity remains is not the One itself, but rather the unity of the One-Being.

If Eternity manifests a duality, even if we are often silent about this in our haste – for the "always" is bound to "being" (*tôi ontî*) in one unity (*kata tauton*) and "Eternity" (*aiôn*) is "that which always is" (*ho aei ôn*) – it seems that that before

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<sup>505</sup> In *Tim.* III. 12.31 ff.

<sup>506</sup> See In *Tim.* III. 10.29-30 where Eternity is called "Infinite Life" (*zôê apeiros*). Each triad possesses each of these three sets of moments. However, the structure is repeated on a higher level, so that the three intelligible triads themselves may be thought to follow these sets of moments.

Eternity there is the monad of Being, the One-Being, and remaining in this One [i.e. in the One-Being].<sup>507</sup>

The monad of Being is the One-Being, so that it is this that Eternity remains in. Eternity manifests the duality of "being" and "eternal." But the Being which lies before it also manifests a duality: that of "One" and "Being." The One itself as absolute simplicity does not admit of this any duality, and so cannot be said to *be*. So because the unity which Eternity makes manifest is a unity of Being, it is the One-Being, and not the One itself.

So we see that Being does not fall into eternal and temporal as genera of itself. Rather, Being gives forth the eternal genera in the *autozōion*, which themselves give rise to a temporal image. Because Time is an image of Eternity, rather than simply a different mode of existence for beings, we should expect that Time will also be a principle of bringing to birth and of unification. So to sum up, the three moments of the intelligible in *Nous* are the simple source which remains in itself, the One-Being; Eternity as the principle which brings to birth the intelligible genera and unifies and comprehends them; and the *autozōion* which is a living multiplicity of intelligible genera, erotically turned towards the unity which is their source.

#### VI.ii. Time as a moving image of eternity

In what manner is Time a moving image of Eternity? Proclus tells us that Eternity measures the intelligible, as a unity, while Time measures the things which are in becoming, as numbered. Eternity is a measure in the sense that the multiplicity of intelligibles in the *autozōion* are all beings, and as such they are all expressions of the unity which is the One-Being. Eternity is the principle which brings them forth into a permanent existence, and leads them back beyond itself to the One-Being, specifically because they manifest in a multiple form the unity which is the One-Being. It is a

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<sup>507</sup> In *Tim.* III.15.11-15: εἰ δὲ ὁ αἰὼν δυάδα ἐμφαίνει, κἂν πολλάκις αὐτὸ κρύπτειν σπουδάζωμεν (τὸ γὰρ αἰεὶ τῷ ὄντι συνάπτεται κατὰ ταύτὸν καὶ ἔστιν αἰὼν ὁ αἰεὶ ὢν), εἴοικεν ἔχειν τὴν μονάδα τοῦ ὄντος πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἐν ὄν καὶ μένειν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ἐνί

measure because the eternal multiplicity of intelligible genera strive towards the unity which it reveals while manifesting it in their own multiple way.

Beings which come to be and pass away, on the other hand, do not partake of the permanence of Eternity. They have only an image of that permanence, which is duration. Thus the principle which is their measure, the unity which they strive towards and manifest, is not Eternity, but Time.

So in the same manner as the cosmos is said to be an image (*eikôn*) of the intelligible, so the cosmic measure is named an "image" of the measure of the intelligible. But Eternity is a measure because it is a unity (*hōs to hen*), while Time is a measure because it is a number. Both of them measure, but Eternity measures what is unified, while Time measures what is numbered; Eternity measures the permanence of beings (*diamonên tōn ontōn*), while Time measures the duration of things which become (*paratastin tōn ginomenōn*). The supposed opposition between between them [Eternity and Time] does not indicate <some sort of> dissimilarity between the measures, but rather indicates the derivation of the secondary realities from the older ones. For procreation (*proodos*) derives from remaining (*monēs*) and number derives from unity (*tou henos*).<sup>508</sup>

Plato tells us that Time "proceeds according to number,"<sup>509</sup> and measures things which become as numbered. Proclus contrasts this with Eternity which "remains in a One" and measures things as a unity. Eternity measures things as a unity because that which it measures is an unchanging multiplicity, or rather, a singular multiple reflection of the One-Being. Time, on the other hand, measures things as numbered, because things which come to be and pass away exhibit a diversity of periods, or cyclical activities, which makes up for them their duration. More importantly, their duration is numbered because they do not exist as a whole all at once, and if they are not to be completely without order their duration must be numbered. We should understand "number" here both in the common sense manner, as the number assigned to the periodic orbit of a planet, and in the

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<sup>508</sup> In *Tim.* III.17.25-18.02: καθάπερ οὖν ὁ κόσμος εἰκὼν εἶρηται τοῦ νοητοῦ, καὶ τὸ κοσμικὸν μέτρον εἰκὼν τοῦ μέτρου τοῦ νοητοῦ κατωνόμασται, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν αἰὼν μέτρον ὡς τὸ ἓν, ὁ δὲ χρόνος ὡς ὁ ἀριθμὸς· μετρεῖ γὰρ ἑκάτερος, ὁ μὲν τὰ ἐνιζόμενα, ὁ δὲ τὰ ἀριθμούμενα, καὶ ὁ μὲν τὴν διαμονὴν τῶν ὄντων, ὁ δὲ τὴν παράτασιν τῶν γινομένων, αἱ δὲ δοκοῦσαι ἀντιθέσεις αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀνομοιότητά· ὡς τιναν τῶν μέτρων ἐμφαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ παρῆχθαι τὰ δευτέρα παρὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων· ἢ τε γὰρ πρόοδος ἀπὸ τῆς μονῆς καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνός.

<sup>509</sup> *Timaeus* 37d.

more metaphysical sense which we have seen in chapter IV. In this second sense, Time is the measure of encosmic beings because it is the number or order of their unfolding into multiplicity.<sup>510</sup> Hence it contains the plan both of their unfolding and of their perfection.

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<sup>510</sup> See Plotinus *Enn.* III.7: "On Eternity and Time." For Plotinus' treatment of Time see especially chapters 11-13. Proclus does not differ from Plotinus in essence, despite the fact that Plotinus rejects the idea of Time as a measure of motion (*Enn.* III.7.9) and Proclus accepts it, and that Plotinus has Time being made by the Soul, while Proclus does not. In this I disagree with S. Sambursky, "The concept of time in late Neoplatonism," *Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities*, 2 (1968) pp.153-167. Sambursky points out that Iamblichus and Proclus hypostasise time and eternity, while Plotinus does not. This is an important difference, and in this I agree with Sambursky. However, in my opinion it is an example of how Plotinus and Proclus can express substantially the same philosophical content in divergent ways, with the former expressing the continuity of the spiritual world, and the latter expressing its moments. Sambursky's analysis of Plotinus is much fuller than his treatment of Proclus. For a brief treatment of time in Proclus, with conclusions different from mine, see P.C. Plass, "Timeless time in Neoplatonism," *The Modern Schoolman*, 55 (Nov. 1977) pp.1-19.

Plotinus *Enn.* III.7.11.27-32: "in the same way Soul, making the world of sense in imitation of that other world, moving with a motion which is not that which exists There, but like it, and intending to be an image of it, first of all put itself into time, which it made instead of eternity, and then handed over that which came into being as a slave to time [οὕτω δὴ καὶ αὐτὴ κόσμον ποιούσα αἰσθητὸν μιμήσει ἐκείνου κινούμενον κίνησιν οὐ τὴν ἐκεῖ, ὁμοίαν δὲ τῇ ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐθέλουσαν εἰκόνα ἐκείνης εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν ἑαυτὴν ἐχρῶνσεν ἀντὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος τοῦτον ποιήσασα. ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῷ γενομένῳ ἔδωκε δουλεῦειν χρόνῳ]." For both Proclus and Plotinus there is a dynamism in *Nous* and in the Soul, and the first dynamism is somehow Eternity and the second Time. They agree substantially on what takes place in the emergence of Time from the eternal, but they differ on exactly which moment they apply the name "Time" to. So, for example, while both discuss Time in the context of the Soul's multiple manifestation of the Forms in *Nous*, Plotinus calls time "the life of soul in a movement of passage from one way of life to another [ἐν κινήσει μεταβατικῇ ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλον βίον ζῶειν]" (*Enn.* III.7.11.44-45)" while Proclus says that this same movement of passage is what is *in Time*, and is numbered or measured by the monad of Time. See also Plotinus' acceptance of Time as a measure in the sense of "what is measured" at *Enn.* III.7.13.15. Proclus' tendency to multiply entities through his dividing analysis is at fault here, for as we will see there are many levels of Time for Proclus, and the Time which moves in its participants is likely the Time which Plotinus pointed to. But we must remember that this multiplication of entities in Proclus is a result of the dividing activity of *dianoia*, and it describes a reality which is every bit as one and continuous as it is in Plotinus. It is interesting that although Proclus mentions many others in his exposition of Time, such as Aristotle, Iamblichus, Porphyry, and Syrianus, he does not mention Plotinus, not even when he is criticising Plotinus' view at *In Tim.* III.22.01-29. See L.Gerson's treatment for the structure of Time in Plotinus in his *Plotinus* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994) pp.115-124. See also P.Manchester's "Time and the soul in Plotinus, III 7 [45], 11," *Dionysius*, 2 (1978) pp.101-136. Manchester's excellent treatment brings out the relation between temporality and *logos* as a principle of emergence, i.e. the dynamism in the movement from the eternal to the temporal which is needed to make sense of Time as a moving image of Eternity. Manchester is interested in the kinship between Neoplatonic treatments of temporality and contemporary phenomenological treatments such as Husserl's. He refrains from turning Plotinus into Husserl or Heidegger, while at the same time making a convincing case for their mutual relevance. For a clear summary of the hermeneutical principle at work in articles such as Manchester's, see W. Beierwaltes, "Image and counterimage? Reflections on Neoplatonic thought with respect to its place today," in *Neoplatonism and early Christian thought, essays in honour of A.H. Armstrong*, ed. H.J. Blumenthal and R.A. Markus (London: Variorum, 1981) pp.236-248; see p.237. See also W. Beierwaltes, *Proklos, Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1965) pp.196-200.

Perhaps also Time is an image of Eternity because it is that which brings encosmic beings to perfection, just as Eternity does for [eternal] beings, as "that which holds them together" (*sunochous*) and "guardian" (*phrouros*).<sup>511</sup> So that things which are unable to live according to *nous* are brought under the order of Fate (*hupo tēn tēs heimarmenēs agetai taxin*), lest they flee the divine completely and come to be without order. Thus even that which has departed from Eternity and is unable to partake wholly in the perfection of Rest by remaining always all at once the same (*hama kai aei tauta*) is perfected through the sovereignty of Time. [Temporal things] are roused by Time into activities (*energeias*) which are profitable for them, and through certain recurrent periods are able to enjoy the perfection which is appropriate to them.<sup>512</sup>

Each thing which is in becoming has its own period, and thus its own numbering of its period, which sets its boundaries and its circuit. In his characterisation of temporal things as periodic, Proclus has in mind primarily the periodic activity of Soul. However, he also has in mind the circular orbits of the planets, whose periodic return to their starting points is an image of the activity of Soul; and the periodic return of things to their point of origin in Nature, such as the seasons, and the procreation of animal species.<sup>513</sup> The circuit of the species oak tree from acorn to maturity and then back to acorn again illustrates how Proclus thinks about this. The oak species has a period in the sense that there is a return to the beginning point, in the offspring. This period is numbered because it usually takes a certain number of years. However, it is also numbered in the sense that this period progresses along a certain bound circuit – acorns don't mature into elm trees, for example – and this boundary to the circuit of the life of this species is set according to Proclus by the monad of Time and the species' participation of the Forms in the monad of Time.

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<sup>511</sup> For these two Chaldaean terms Festugière refers us to H. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy, Mysticism, Magic and Platonism in the Later Roman Empire* (Cairo, 1956 [New edition with a contribution by P. Hadot, "Bilan et perspectives sur les Oracles Chaldaïques et une bibliographie de H. Lewy," (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1978)] pp.129-131.

<sup>512</sup> *In Tim.* III.18.02-12: μήποτε δὲ καὶ εἰκὼν ὁ χρόνος διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ αἰῶνος, διότι τῆς τελειότητός ἐστι τῶν ἐγκοσμίων ποιητικός, ὥσπερ ὁ αἰὼν τῆς τῶν ὄντων, ὡς συνοχεὺς καὶ φρουρός· ὡς γὰρ τὰ μὴ δυνάμενα κατὰ νοῦν ζῆν ὑπὸ τὴν τῆς εἰμαρμένης ἄγεται τάξιν, ἵνα μὴ φυγόντα τὸ θεῖον τελέως ἄτακτα γένηται, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ προελθόντα τοῦ αἰῶνος καὶ μὴ δυνηθέντα μετέχειν τῆς ἐσώσεως τελειότητος ὅλης ἅμα καὶ αἰεὶ ταῦτα τελεῖ μὲν εἰς τὴν ἐπικράτειαν τοῦ χρόνου, διεγείρεται δὲ παρ' αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὰς προσφόρους ἑαυτοῖς ἐνέργειας, δι' ὧν τοῦ προσήκοντος αὐτοῖς τέλους διὰ τινων περιόδων ἀποκαταστατικῶν ἀπολαύειν δυνήσεται.

<sup>513</sup> *In Tim.* III.19.24-32.

While this characterisation of Time applies to all encosmic things, we will speak here only of the participation of the Soul in Time.

Time is not only an image of Eternity, it is a moving image of Eternity. However, Proclus points out that nothing can move with regard to the whole of itself, as there must be a subject for movement which remains the same and undergoes the motion. Otherwise there would be a substantial change, and in moving with regard to the whole of itself Time would cease to be Time.

and the image of Eternity especially is bound to possess in some way "remaining always the same" and stability. Thus Time cannot be in motion with regard to all of itself, given that nothing else is. Necessarily some part of it must remain stable, if everything which moves moves with regard to a part of it which remains stable.<sup>514</sup>

Thus the monad of Time is in itself unmoving, and only moves in its participants.

Proclus tells us that,

So indeed the monad of Time remains (*menei*), because it is suspended from the Demiurge, but being filled with measuring power, and wishing to measure the motions of the soul's *ousia*, and the *energeiai* and *pathēmata* of the physical and bodily, it proceeded according to number. Time, remaining in its own partlessness and internal *energeia*, with regard to its external [*energeia*], that which is contained by what is measured by it, proceeds according to number, that is according to certain intellectual *eidē*, or rather according to the first number itself, which presides over the intellectuals (*ta noēta*), in a manner analogous to the One Being, as Parmenides says, which presides over the intelligibles. Time proceeds then according to that number, on account of which it provides the appropriate measure to each of the species (*eidē*) of encosmic beings.<sup>515</sup>

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<sup>514</sup> *In Tim.* III.18.30-19.01: διαφερόντως δὲ ἡ τοῦ αἰῶνος εἰκὼν τὸ αἰεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχειν πη ὀφείλει καὶ τὸ στάσιμον· ὥστε ἀδύνατον τὸν χρόνον καθ' ὅλον ἑαυτὸν εἶναι κινητόν, εἴπερ μὴδὲ ἄλλο τι τῶν πάντων, δεῖ οὖν αὐτοῦ τι μένειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, εἴπερ πᾶν κινούμενον κινεῖται κατὰ τι μένον ἑαυτοῦ.

<sup>515</sup> *In Tim.* III.19.02-14: μένει τοίνυν καὶ ἡ τοῦ χρόνου μονάς, ἐξηρημένη τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, πλήρης δὲ οὖσα μετρητικῆς δυνάμεως καὶ βουλευθεῖσα μετρήσαι τῆς τε ψυχικῆς οὐσίας τὰς κινήσεις καὶ τῆς φυσικῆς τε καὶ σωματικῆς τὸ ἴδιον καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ τὰ παθήματα προήλθε κατ' ἀριθμόν, μένων οὖν ὁ χρόνος τῇ ἀμερεῖ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἑνδον ἐνεργεῖα τῇ ἔξω καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν μετρούμενων κατεχομένη πρόεισι κατ' ἀριθμόν, τουτέστι κατὰ τινὰ εἶδη νοερά, μᾶλλον δὲ κατ' αὐτὸν τὸν πρῶτιστον ἀριθμόν, ὃς ἀνὰ λόγον τῷ ἐνὶ ὄντι προέστηκε τῶν νοερῶν, φαίη ἂν ὁ Παρμενίδης, ὡς ἐκεῖνο τῶν νοητῶν, κατ' ἀριθμόν οὖν ἐκεῖνον πρόεισι, διὸ καὶ ἐκάστοις τῶν ἐγκοσμίων εἰδῶν τὸ πρόσφορον ἀπονέμει μέτρον.

The monad of Time itself stands above that which it measures, as Eternity stands above the intelligible genera. Notice that in order to be analogous to the intellectual orders, Proclus has distinguished the "first number itself" (*auton ton prôtiston arithmon*) from the monad of Time. This number is a higher unity than Time, just as the One-Being is a higher unity than Eternity. We can take this as an example of Proclus' idea of the analogous structures which hold between different levels of the universe. As there are higher unities than Time, Time itself not only measures, it is itself measured.

Time itself is also measured, but not by anything extended (for it would be ridiculous to say that that which possesses the elder nature and worthiness is measured by that which comes after it). Rather, Time is measured by the single monad of Time, which its procession (*proodos*) is said to unfold (*anelittein*), and much more primarily by the Demiurge and by Eternity itself, of which we say it is an image, and with regard to which it is rendered mobile.<sup>516</sup>

In other words, just as the intelligible genera unfold Eternity and the One-Being, that which partakes of Time unfolds the monad of Time, and the Demiurge, and Eternity. All unfoldings are multiple reflections not only of their immediate superiors, but of every analogous order above them. As that which measures, Time is a number. But it is a number in the sense of an intellectual *eidos*, so it measures its participants because it is an intellectual *eidos* which its participants unfold.

So Time has various levels: i) it is number as "what is numbered" or measured by itself, i.e. its presence in what participates in Time;<sup>517</sup> ii) it is number as the measure of its participants, i.e. through itself as the monad which is the unmoving moment of Time itself; iii) and finally, Time as a whole is measured by what stands above it, by the Demiurge, and Eternity. So Time as number exists in its participants as that which is

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<sup>516</sup> In *Tim.* III.31.04-10: μετρεῖται δὲ ὁμῶς καὶ αὐτὴ ἐξ οὐδενὸς μὲν διαστατοῦ (καὶ γὰρ γελοῖον ἐκ τῶν ὑπὲρ τῶν μετρεῖσθαι λέγειν τὰ πρεσβυτέραν ἔχοντα τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν ἀξίαν), ἐκ μόνης δὲ τῆς χρονικῆς μονάδος, ἣν ἀνελίττειν ἡ πρόοδος εἴρηται, καὶ πολὺ πρότερον ἐκ τε τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ αἰῶνος, οὗ δὴ λέγεται καὶ εἰκὼν, πρὸς ὃν καὶ κινητὸς ἀπετελέσθη.

<sup>517</sup> The procession of Time considered as a whole is a simple, undifferentiated, and regular motion, even if the procession of its participants is complex, differentiated and irregular motion. See In *Tim.* III.30.11ff.

measured by itself, as itself the measure of its participants, and as itself being measured by higher principles.

Proclus tells us that Time does proceed according to a number which is the intelligible number, referring either to the *autozôion*, Eternity, or the intelligible as a whole. However, when Timaeus says that Time proceeds according to number, he is referring primarily to Time itself as the intellectual number which numbers or measures the simple procession of Time and the complex procession of things in Time.

So Time does proceed according to the intelligible number, and also in that it itself numbers its participants, and also again it proceeds according to the number in its participants by which they are numbered. This [last] is [Time as] numbered, and possesses only a sort of image (*eidôlon ti*) of essential Time (*ousiôdous chronou*), by which everything is numbered through the larger or smaller numbers of their own life, so that a cow lives for a certain time, a man for a certain time, and the sun, the moon, Saturn, and the other planets have their return and make their periodic revolutions by this or that measure.<sup>518</sup>

It is this middle sort of measure, Time as the measure of its participants, which is important for us here.

Time measures the duration of the life of its participants. More importantly, Time measures their circular activity, most prominently the orbits of the planets, and the circular activity of the partial soul. Time brings itself to imitate Eternity, because as Eternity is comprehensive of the intelligible genera, Time is comprehensive of its participants. But it also brings temporal things themselves into a closer imitation of the intelligibles. Things in Time do not share in the permanence and unchanging identity of the intelligibles, but through their circular revolutions and periodic returns to their beginning points they imitate this intelligible immobile permanence.<sup>519</sup> Think of the orbit

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<sup>518</sup> In *Tim.* III.19.24-32: προῖτω μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν νοητὸν ἀριθμὸν, πρόεισι δὲ καὶ καθ' ὃν αὐτὸς ἀριθμεῖ τὰ μετέχοντα, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ ἐν τούτοις ἀνάπαλιν κατὰ τὸν ἀριθμοῦντα πρόεισιν, αὐτὸς ὢν ὁ ἀριθμητὸς, εἰδωλὸν τι ἔχων τοῦ οὐσιώδους χρόνου, δι' ὃν πάντα ἀριθμεῖται μείζοσι καὶ ἐλάσσοσι τῆς ἑαυτῶν ζωῆς ἀριθμοῖς, ὡς βούν μὲν τοσόνδε ζῆν χρόνον, ἀνθρώπων δὲ τοσόνδε, ἥλιον δὲ ἐν τοσῷδε ἀποκαθίστασθαι καὶ σελήνην καὶ φαίνοντα καὶ ἄλλους κατ' ἄλλα μέτρα ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἑαυτῶν περιόδους.

<sup>519</sup> In *Tim.* III.20.00-21.05.



of a planet. The circular orbit is in one sense a motion, but in another sense it is a being at rest, because the planet always returns to the place from which it begins. In a certain sense the orbit of a planet has no beginning point, so that one might think of the planet as desiring the rest of the centre of the circle which is its orbit, but being unable to attain that rest, it imitates it by its unbroken circling motion. In contrast, rectilinear motion leaves its point of departure, never to approach it again. However, Time also embraces rectilinear motion, because even that which is below things which move in a circle are measured by their duration. For this reason Proclus says that Time is said to move in a spiral (*helikoeidê*), because the spiral embraces in one single Form both the circular and the rectilinear.<sup>520</sup>

This measurement of the periodic *energeiai* of things is the primary sense of Time for Proclus. Time perfects things, and brings them to imitate the intelligible paradigms by measuring their periodic revolution around itself. Proclus does concede that we have another sort of measurement of Time, in our marking of the passage of Time. But the sort of measuring which we do, and which we normally consider to be Time in the primary sense, is performed with a certain *ennoia* which is only "about" Time and is not Time itself (*touta gar hê ennoia drâi hê peri chronou kai ouk autos ho chronos*).<sup>521</sup> If Time is to be the measure of our motion, it certainly could not be an *ennoia* which is in us. Even the motions of the heavenly bodies, which we think of as marking Time, are not the primary measure, because they themselves are also measured. They have determinate periods to their circular *energeiai*. The primary measure must be the monad of Time itself, which is a moving image of Eternity. "Image" because it embraces its participants with its number in the way Eternity embraces the intelligibles with its unity, and "moving" because its participants are in motion, although it itself is at rest.

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<sup>520</sup> *In Tim.* III.21.02-05.

<sup>521</sup> *In Tim.* III.20.02-03.

What is the monad of Time itself and how does it measure the circular activity of the Soul? According to Proclus, it is a *nous* which is unfolded and unrolled by the activity of things in Time, but primarily by the dianoetic activity of the Soul.

For as *Nous* is to the Soul, so is Eternity to Time, and inversely, so that Time is before the Soul, just as Eternity is before *Nous*. And Time should be participated by the Soul, and does not participate in the Soul, just as *Nous* does not participate in Eternity, but the inverse. So Time possesses a certain intellectual nature (*noeran...tina phusin*) which moves in a circle everything which participates in it, and particularly souls.<sup>522</sup>

Time is an intellectual *nous* (*nous noeros*), i.e. a *nous* in the intellectual hebdomad of *Nous* as a whole ranged below the Demiurge. As we have seen in earlier chapters.

Proclus thinks that *dianoia* is the Soul's projection of the *logoi* which constitute its *ousia*, and these *logoi* are themselves the Soul's participation in *Nous*. The particular *nous* which souls participate, according to the *Timaeus* commentary, is the monad of Time.

Because the *logoi* which constitute the Soul's *ousia* are the its own participation in *Nous*, the dianoetic activity of Soul as an unfolding of its own *ousia* is also an unfolding of *Nous* itself. And because the particular *nous* which the Soul unfolds is the monad of Time, this is the sense in which Time is a measure of the Soul's activity. The Soul unfolds and unrolls the *nous* which is the monad of Time, through a thinking activity which may be understood metaphorically as a circle, circuit, or period which has Time as its centre.

And so, Time is eternal, and a monad, and a centre by its essence and its activity which has remained at rest in itself; and at the same time it is continuous, and is a number, and a circle by its procession and what participates in it. [Time] then is a certain proceeding *nous*, since it could not bring to perfection the resemblance of encosmic beings to their paradigms unless it itself were first suspended from

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<sup>522</sup> *In Tim.* III.27.20-26: ὥς γὰρ νοῦς πρὸς ψυχὴν, οὕτως αἰὼν ἔσται πρὸς χρόνον, καὶ ἐναλλάξ· ὥστε χρόνος πρὸ ψυχῆς, ὥς πρὸ νοῦ αἰὼν, καὶ μετέχουτο μὲν ὧν ὑπ' αὐτῆς, οὐ μετέχου δ' ἂν αὐτῆς, ὥς οὐδὲ τοῦ νοῦ ὁ αἰὼν, ἀλλ' ἐμπαλιν, νοεράν ἄρα τινὰ φύσιν ἔχων κατ' ἀριθμὸν περιάγει τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ, τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς·

[these paradigms], but it also proceeds and flows *en masse* towards the things [*ta pragmata*] over which it keeps guard.<sup>523</sup>

The Soul partakes of Time, but not in its *ousia*. Rather, it is the changing *energeia* of Soul which participates in Time. The Soul unfolds its own unchanging *ousia*, but this *ousia* participates in *Nous* atemporally. It is only in the activity of unrolling and unfolding its own *ousia* in the *probolê tôn ousdiôdôn logôn* that the Soul participates in Time. Why not identify the monad of Time with the *ousia* of the Soul? This is a complex issue, and amounts to the question "why is the *ousia* of the Soul not itself *Nous*?" The answer is likely that the Soul's *ousia* is not identical to *Nous*, but rather is a remaining in *Nous* because *Nous* is the Soul's point of departure, and that towards which its *energeia* strives in its return. Again we must resist thinking of *ousia*, *dunamis*, and *energeia* as three absolutely separate things. They are moments of the unfolding of Soul as a whole. So the *ousia* of the Soul is not identical to *Nous* in the same manner in which the point of departure is not identical to the first leg of a journey.

Time is at rest both in its *ousia* and its *energeia* while the Soul is at rest only in its *ousia*, and is in motion in its *energeia*. However, Time proceeds in its participants, so the description of Time as at rest has to be understood in such a way that in itself Time is at rest, both in its *ousia* and its internal *energeia*, but is also in motion in its participants, or in its external *energeia*.

For Time is eternal not only in its *ousia*, but also in its internal *energeia*, remaining always the same. It is in motion only insofar as it is participated by that which is outside of it, extending to them its portion and coinciding with them. By contrast, every Soul is moved in a transitional manner (*metabaticôs*) both with regard to its internal *energeia* and its external *energeia*, that through which it moves bodies.<sup>524</sup>

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<sup>523</sup> In *Tim.* III.26.30-27.08: ἔστιν οὖν αἰώνιος μὲν καὶ μονὰς καὶ κέντρον κατ' οὐσίαν ὁ χρόνος καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ μείνας ἐνέργειαν. συνεχὴς δὲ ἅμα καὶ ἀριθμὸς καὶ κύκλος κατὰ τὸ προῖον καὶ τὸ μετεχόμενον. νοῦς ἄρα τις οὗτός ἐστι προῖον, ἰδρυμένος μὲν ἐν αἰῶνι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αἰώνιος καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν λεγόμενος, ἐπεὶ μὴδὲ ἄλλως εἰς τελειοτέραν ἀφομοίωσιν τῶν παραδειγμάτων τοῖς ἐγκοσμίους συνετέλεσεν. εἰ μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸς ἐκείνων ἐξήρητο, προῖον δὲ καὶ πολὺς ῥέων ἐπὶ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ φρουρούμενα πράγματα.

<sup>524</sup> In *Tim.* III.27.26-32: καὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν χρόνος αἰώνιος ἐστὶν οὐ τῇ οὐσίᾳ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τῇ ἐνδον αἰεὶ ὁ αὐτός ὢν, καθ' ἣν δὲ μετέχεται μόνην ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξω κινητός ἐστι συνεκτείνων ἐκείνοις τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δόσιν καὶ ἐφαρμόζων. ψυχὴ δὲ πᾶσα καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐνδον ἐνεργείας μεταβατικῶς

Notice that being at rest and being eternal are identified here. Notice as well that Time's presence in its participants and its external *energeia* must be identified. If we take the three terms – *ousia*, internal *energeia*, and external *energeia* – we are able to rank Eternity, Time, and the Soul with regard to a greater and greater share in motion. Eternity is at rest in its *ousia*, internal *energeia*, and external *energeia*. Time as *Nous* is at rest in its *ousia*, and its internal *energeia*, but it is in motion in its external *energeia*, i.e. in its participants. The Soul, on the other hand, remains in *Nous*, and so is said to have an *ousia* which is at rest and eternal. Yet neither its internal nor external *energeia* is at rest.<sup>525</sup>

Proclus describes the *energeia* of the Soul as a circle, circuit, or period around the centre which is Time. The circle metaphor is extremely important for Proclus, as it is his primary metaphor for describing the relation between *dianoia* and *Nous*. It may be thought of in two complementary ways. In one way of thinking, *Nous* is a point on the circumference of the circle. The circumference, as the activity of Soul, circles forth, unrolls the concentrated content of *Nous*, and returns back to its beginning point in *Nous* at the end of its period. As we saw in chapter III, this version of the circle metaphor may end with the circumference reaching its initial point, or failing to reach the initial point. One version emphasises the ability of lower things to unite with their causes, and the other version emphasises the independent existence of the effect. In the context of the Soul's circuit around the monad of Time the complementary point of view is more important. Here *Nous* is not a point on the circumference of the circle which is the Soul's activity. Instead *Nous*, as Time, is the centre of the circle, and the Soul's activity is the circumference. The distance of the circumference from the centre indicates that the Soul has proceeded from *Nous*. And the orientation of the circumference around the centre indicates the circling return by which the Soul tries to attain the unity of *Nous*, but makes

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κινεῖται καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐκτός, δι' ὧν τὰ σώματα κινεῖ.  
<sup>525</sup> In *Tim.* III.24.02ff: 25.11ff.

itself many in its own thinking. The Soul circles around *Nous*, viewing it from different sides, and it is the various points of view which constitute the divided *logoi* which are the conceptions of the Soul's *dianoia*.

And so the procession of Time is a dividing and unfolding motion [*kinêsis*] which makes appear part by part the power which remains partless, like a sort of number which receives in a divided manner all of the *eidê* of the monad and which returns back towards itself and begins the circle anew.<sup>526</sup>

The motion of Time, this dividing *energeia* of Soul which participates in Time, is measured by the Monad of Time, and even higher, by the Demiurge, and by Eternity. The sense of measure becomes clear here. These higher unities are a measure in the sense that they are the paradigm which the divided image in the thought of Soul seeks to reflect.

They measure, because the term of the Soul's period, its metaphorical circuit or circumference, is oriented back towards an explication of the centre which is *Nous*. They measure, because they are the comprehensive source, and the originary touchstone for the divided *energeia* which is the activity of Soul. In virtue of this measure the multiplicity of Soul's *energeia* is an ordered multiplicity, rather than an indeterminate multitude.<sup>527</sup>

Proclus states that the monad of Time and the dianoetic activity of the Soul which unfolds it is an image of Eternity and the intelligible genera in the *autozôion*. It is extremely important to take this statement seriously. Just like Eternity, Time is a principle of bringing to birth, or dynamic coming forth. It is a principle which divides up the unity of *Nous* and gives rise to the multiple *energeia* which is the periodic motion of the Soul. In knowing *Nous* through its own *logoi*, the Soul gives rise to the ontological

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<sup>526</sup> In *Tim.* III.30.26-30: πρόεισιν οὖν ἡ τοῦ χρόνου κίνησις ἀνελίπτουσα καὶ διαιροῦσα καὶ μεριστῶς ἐκφαίνουσα τὴν ἀμερῇ καὶ μείνανσαν δύναμιν, καθάπερ τις ἀριθμὸς πάντα τὰ εἶδη τῆς μονάδος διηρημένως ὑποδεχόμενος καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέφων καὶ ἀνακυκλούμενος.

<sup>527</sup> See J. Trouillard, "La procession du temps selon Proclus," *Diotima*, 4 (1976) pp. 104-115; see p. 110: "Le temps n'est pas seulement une détente, mais une rythme. Il n'est pas essentiellement un glissement indéfini, mais une récupération de cette fluxion par la puissance nombrante qui procède de l'éternité. Il n'est pas avant tout un mouvement, mais la mesure immobile qui impose un ordre au mouvement. De même que la monade, maîtrisant la dyade indéfinie, fait naître nombres et rapports, ainsi le nombre informant le mouvement tout entier, l'organise en périodes définies." See J. Trouillard, *La mystagogie de Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1982) pp. 165-167, for a discussion of the circle as a metaphor for the activity of *Nous* and Soul by which the spiritual hierarchy is articulated.

and epistemological station which it occupies. The Soul's activity is that by which it brings itself to birth, by coming forth from *Nous*.<sup>528</sup> Eternity gives rise to multiplicity as simultaneous presence. Time, on the other hand, gives rise to serial motion. We as souls do not have the entirety of the intelligible *eidê* present to our minds. Rather, we strive erotically towards them through a dividing thinking which sees them dimly, part by part. So while Eternity and Time are both principles of bringing forth multiplicity, of giving birth to a multiple image of a prior unity, they themselves differ from each other as paradigm and image. The whole of Eternity is present to the intelligibles, and so the whole of Time is present to its participants, but while Eternity is present to the *autozôion* all at once, Time is broken up in its participants into what Proclus calls the *eidê* of Time: was, is, and will be.<sup>529</sup> This difference is expressed in a lovely way even in the names for Eternity and Time, according to Proclus. Eternity (*Aiôna*) is *to aei einai*, i.e. the being which always is; while Time (*chronos*) is *choronous*, i.e. the *nous* which dances in a circle like the chorus.<sup>530</sup>

Moreover, both Eternity and Time are principles not only of bringing to birth, but of unification. The intelligible genera in the *autozôion* are not simply a disordered collection of Forms. Rather, they are a complete totality of living Forms which are unified as a single reflection of the unity of the One-Being. The *logoi* which the Soul projects, as long as its *autokinêsis* is not infected with the *heterokinêsis* which arises from body, are not simply disordered thoughts about this or that. They are multiple, and in that sense are a descent from the unity of *Nous*. However, they are each of them vectors back towards the *Nous* which is the centre of their life. Hence the unfolding of *logoi* in the *probolê tôn ousdiôdôn logôn* allows the Soul to leave this unfolding behind, by making

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<sup>528</sup> Cf. A. Charles-Saget, *L'architecture du divin, mathématique et philosophie chez Plotin et Proclus* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1982) p.256: "La parole philosophique ne prétend donc pas dire strictement ce qui est, elle produit à partir de ce qui est. Par ce lien indiscernable entre le modèle chaché et ce qu'il inspire, la philosophie est à la fois révélation et production."

<sup>529</sup> In *Tim.* III.37.01; 50.22-51.22.

<sup>530</sup> In *Tim.* III.9.16-18; 28.00.

more and more clear that the Soul itself is an image, and in doing so pointing more and more clearly the way towards *Nous* as the paradigm.

But as long as our thinking remains *dianoia* without passing over into *Nous* it will seek wholeness without achieving it.

The difficulty on this point is that the substantial autoconstitution of the Soul is eternal (*aiónion*), while its power and activity are temporal [*El.Th.*191]. Without doubt this temporality is implicit in the complex subsistence (*huparxis*) of the Soul [*In Tim.*II.147.29-148.5]. But [its *huparxis*] remains no less a simultaneous totality (*holon hama*) [*El.Th.*52], and it is impossible for that which is successive to adequate it. It is for this reason that duration expands without limit, in order to mimic through an indefinit extension the infinite intension of its centre. The cosmos, according to Proclus, can neither begin nor end: it never ceases to unfold its instants, because it has never finished expressing its principles. It repeats its passage into being unceasingly, because it cannot receive the infinite power of its cause in a single instant. In the same manner, each intuition has need of an indefinite circuit of discourse; and each singular psychic essence has need of an unlimited unfolding of individual histories in order to express itself in becoming [*El.Th.*206]. This is without doubt one of the meanings of the Myth of Er.<sup>531</sup>

The birth of dianoetic *logoi* will not cease until we reach the goal of all *dianoia*, which is to leave behind *dianoia* altogether.

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<sup>531</sup> J.Trouillard, *La mystagogie de Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1982) pp.63-64.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE SOUL'S *NOËSIS* AND *HENÔSIS*

*Dianoia* makes the Soul to be a divided image of *Nous*. However, *dianoia* is not the only thing in the Soul. It possesses opinion and sensation, and it also possesses *nous*, and its own "one." In this chapter we will examine the Soul's *noësis* and *henôsis*.

Plotinus was criticised by later Neoplatonists for his doctrine of the undescended soul, the idea that there is a part of the soul which is always unified with *Nous*. When the Soul puts off its divided powers, it retreats into this part of itself, a part which has never left *Nous*, and through this part it knows the intelligibles. If this is the case, say his successors, then the Soul is always in possession of complete intellectual virtue, for it is always grasping the intelligibles. But this seems to contradict the misery and vice which we find in many souls. The final proposition of Proclus' *Elements of Theology* is directed against the doctrine of the undescended soul: "Every partial soul, when it descends into *genesis* descends as a whole, and there is not a part which remains above and a part which descends."<sup>532</sup> This proposition gives the impression that the soul which has descended into *genesis* has nothing whatsoever in it higher than its temporally divided activity. However, this can not be the case. We know from other texts that Proclus thinks the soul has its own *nous*, and its own one, and it is unlikely that these parts disappear when the soul descends into *genesis*. The most obvious contradiction of the idea of a soul whose highest part is *dianoia* is the first proposition of the *Elements of Theology*: "Every

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<sup>532</sup> *El.Th.* prop.211: Πᾶσα μερικὴ ψυχὴ κατιοῦσα εἰς γένεσιν ὅλη κάτεισι, καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς ἄνω μένει, τὸ δὲ κάτεισιν. See Dodds' note *ad loc.*



multiplicity participates in some way in the One."<sup>533</sup> Certainly the soul which has descended into *genesis* still participates the One. And just as the One is present to all things as the unity which confers determination on them, so the Soul has its own unity, which is the presence to it of the One.

I think there is a better way to understand this final proposition of the *Elements of Theology*, and with it to understand Proclus' objection to the undescended soul. We must remember that although spatial metaphors are useful, they can also be misleading. When the soul 'descends' into *genesis*, it is not going anywhere. If we take this metaphor too literally, we begin to think that the soul who has come *down here*, into *genesis*, cannot also possess *nous*, because *nous* is not *down here*, it is *up there*, in its own place, and that place is not *down here*. But this motion of the soul into *genesis* is not a spatial translation, rather, it is a motion by which it ceases to direct its attention towards one thing, and directs it towards another. To use a different spatial metaphor, the soul descending into *genesis* ceases to attend to the *Nous* which is present to it, and instead attends to the body which is outside. And when it does this, it does so with its entire attention. And so Proclus says that when the soul descends towards *genesis*, it does so completely, and there is not a part of it which remains above. But this means that the soul which attends to body is not also attending to *nous*. In other words, Plotinus' mistake was to bifurcate the soul's attention, and to hold that a soul can at the same time attend to body with one part of itself, and even be subdued by the passions arising from body, while at the same time attending to the intelligibles with another part of itself. Thus the Plotinian soul can at the same time enjoy the highest bliss and the deepest misery. Proclus does not think this is possible. So while he does think that *Nous* and the One are always present to the Soul, as they are present to everything else, he does not think that the soul always attends to them. In his threefold classification of Souls in *El.Th.* proposition 184 he tells

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<sup>533</sup> *El.Th.* prop. I.: Πᾶν πλῆθος μετέχει πῇ τοῦ ἐνός.

us that partial souls move from intellection to unintellection (*apo nou eis anoian*). This is what marks them off from higher souls. Partial souls are also the only souls which descend into *genesis*. So I think there is good reason to identify the descent into *genesis* with the move from intellection to unintellection. In other words, the descent is really a movement of attention from the intelligible to the bodily. So while Proclus does think that the One and *Nous* are always present to the soul, even to the descended soul, he does not hold the Plotinian doctrine of the undescended soul, as I understand it.

In most other ways, however, Proclus agrees with Plotinus about the Soul. Proclus' description of the Soul is more detailed and systematic than is the account found in the *Enneads*. But in its main points the account is the same.<sup>534</sup> In both authors the Soul is distinguished from *Nous* by the temporal division of its activity, but in both authors the soul can take on the unity of *Nous*.<sup>535</sup> And in both authors, the soul rises above its proper station in this way by shedding itself of its native multiplicity. In his

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<sup>534</sup> For a different view, see H.J. Blumenthal, "Some problems about body and soul in later pagan Neoplatonism: do they follow a pattern?" in *Platonismus und Christentum. Festschrift für Heinrich Dörrie*, hrsg. von H.D. Blume und F. Mann ("Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum", Ergänzungsband 10) (Münster: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1983) pp.75-84. Blumenthal takes the position that later Neoplatonists after Plotinus have a tendency on the one hand to multiply entities by inserting terms in between entities. On the other hand, they were also concerned with what he calls "tidiness." They were concerned not to blur the distinctions between the entities which they described. Hence they rejected the Plotinian doctrine of the undescended soul because, among other reasons, it would make the soul very untidy. The soul would then extend from the intelligible down to lower bodily functions, and its precise outline would be blurred. While this is true in a sense about Proclus, in another sense it misses what is at work in Proclus. Blumenthal accuses Proclus of an alarming inconsistency in his use of terms. We have seen in this study that he is equally happy calling the *ousia* of the soul a fullness of *logoi* or *eidē*, even though he could have reserved the term *logoi* for soul and *eidē* for *Nous*. I think there are two sides to Proclus' thought. On the one hand, he is engaged in an elaborate description of the moments of the motion of power which unfolds out of the One, into *Nous*, Soul, and the Material World. It is important to distinguish these moments one from the other in as explicit detail as possible. The discursive reason which is philosophy looks at reality part by part, and the motion of this power is reality. On the other hand, this power which *dianoia* breaks into its moments is one continuous dynamic motion of power. *Logoi* really are *eidē* which have descended into the serial motion of the Soul. So these entities which are described as distinct in Proclus' thought are also not distinct. From this point of view Proclus seems much more like Plotinus. Hence he too can hold that we can rise to *Nous* and the One, even if from the other perspective this would seem to make the soul 'untidy'. It is this second perspective which allows for the continuity in Proclus' universe, and for the immanence of the higher in the lower, which must always balance out the aspect of transcendence.

<sup>535</sup> See for example *Enn.* V.3.8-9.

discussion at the end of the commentary on the *Parmenides*. Proclus closes with the injunction that the soul ascending to *Nous* may not ascend

with its multitude of powers, but it must let go of everything which is akin to it and whatever divides its activities. And having mounted on high and come to be there, and having come to anchor in the One-Being, it must bring itself towards the One itself, and make itself one, not being curiously busy about many things...but rather closing its eyes altogether and gathering together all its activity and being satisfied with unity alone.<sup>536</sup>

It is clear that the Soul can not unite with *Nous* or the One through *dianoia*. Just before this passage, Proclus had spoken of the insufficiency of all knowledge for grasping the One:

Do not regard only the knowledge which is in us (for it is partial and there is nothing honourable in it, for it does not know the One); but regard also the daimonic knowledge, through which they contemplate beings; and the angelic, through which they have intellection of the things which precede them; and that of the encosmic gods, through which they follow upon the absolute gods, their leaders (*apolutois hegemosin*); and that of the absolute gods themselves, by which they have their activity in a detached manner about the intelligible; and higher still, that of the assimilative gods, through which they primarily assimilate themselves to the intellectual gods; and, in addition to these, regard the primal source of knowledge, which is united to the intelligible objects themselves, and which the *Phaedrus* called "knowledge-itself" (*autoepistēmē*); and above all of these, regard the intelligible union which remains inside the innermost sanctuary of Being, secret and unutterable.<sup>537</sup>

The soul's knowledge is "partial and there is nothing honourable in it." This partial knowledge is *dianoia*. We have seen in chapter III the Procline principle that the

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<sup>536</sup> *In Parm.* S.R.M..690-694 [520.35-41]: μετὰ πλήθους δυνάμεων ἀναβείναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἀοιεῖν τὰ ἐαυτῇ συγγενῇ καὶ ὅσα διαιρεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτῆς· ὑπερβεβηκυῖαν δὲ καὶ ἐκεῖ γενομένην καὶ ὁρμισθεῖσαν ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ ὄντι πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ προσάγειν καὶ ἐνίζειν μὴ πολυπραγμονοῦσαν...ἀλλὰ πανταχὴ μύουσιν καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ἐνέργειαν συστέλλουσιν καὶ ἀρकुομένην τῇ ἐνώσει μόνον. See also the wider passage. *In Parm.* S.R.M..687-723 [520.34-521.69].

<sup>537</sup> *In Parm.* S.R.M..281-291 [506.34-507.44]: μὴ μόνον ἰδεῖν ἐν ἡμῖν – μερικὴ γὰρ αὕτη καὶ οὐδὲν σεμνὸν ἐν αὐτῇ· οὐ γάρ· γινώσκει τὸ ἐν – ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν δαιμονίαν ἐπιστήμην, δι' ἧς τὰ ὄντα θεῶνται, καὶ τὴν ἀγγελικὴν, δι' ἧς νοοῦσι τὰ πρὸ αὐτῶν· καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐγκοσμίων θεῶν, δι' ἧς ἔπονται τοῖς ἀπολύτοις ἡγεμόσιν· καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀπολύτων αὐτῶν, καθ' ἣν ἀπολύτως περὶ τὸ νοητὸν ἐνεργοῦσιν· καὶ ἀνωτέρω τὴν τῶν ἀσμοιωτικῶν, δι' ἧς ἐαυτοὺς πρῶτως ἀσμοιοῦσι τοῖς νοεροῖς θεοῖς· καὶ σὺν τούτοις ἔτι τὴν πηγαίαν ἐπιστήμην τὴν αὐτοῖς ἡνωμένην τοῖς νοητοῖς, ἣν καὶ αὐτοεπιστήμην ὁ Φαῖδρος προσηγόρευεν· καὶ ὑπὲρ πασῶν τὴν νοητὴν γνῶσιν ἔνδον μένουσαν ἐν τῷ ἀδύτῳ τοῦ ὄντος, κρυφαῖαν οὖσαν καὶ ἀθεγνόν.

knowledge in the knower is characterised by the knower itself, not the object known.<sup>538</sup> and so that sensation, *phantasia*, *dianoia*, and *nous* all know their object in their own manner.<sup>539</sup> The converse of this is that the various degrees of reality are known by the power appropriate to them.

For we say that in all degrees of reality like is known by like: the object of sensation is of course grasped by sensation, the object of opinion by opinion, the object of *dianoia* by *dianoia*, the intelligible object by *nous*, so that that which is most one is grasped by the one and the ineffable is grasped by the ineffable. Socrates in the *Alcibiades* said rightly that the soul in entering itself sees all other things and sees god. For inclining towards its own unity (*henōsin*) and the centre of its entire life, and pulling away from multiplicity and diversity of the varied powers in it, the soul rises to the highest point of view itself of beings.<sup>540</sup>

So the Soul which rises to *Nous* and the One does so through its own *nous*, and its own one. In this chapter we will discuss the Soul's *noēsis*, and its union with the One (*henōsis*). In the first part we will examine a passage from the *In Timaeum* which draws together *dianoia* and *noēsis* as closely as they can be drawn together. In the second part we will examine the flower of *nous* and the flower of the soul, by which the Soul surpasses *dianoia*. We will also look briefly at the interpretation of the relation between the Soul and the One in Jean Trouillard, and the theory behind the practice of theurgy.

#### VII.i. *Noēsis* and *dianoia* in *In Timaeum* I.243.27-248.6

In this section we will examine an important passage from Proclus' commentary on the *Timaeus*.<sup>541</sup> In this passage Proclus distinguishes between six levels of intellection (*noēsis*). It is important for our study, because in it Proclus draws together *noēsis* and

<sup>538</sup> *Dec. dub.* 7.20-25.

<sup>539</sup> *In Tim.* I.352.11-19.

<sup>540</sup> *Plat. Theol.* I.15.17-16.1: Τῷ γὰρ ὁμοίῳ πανταχοῦ φαμέν τὰ ὅμοια γινώσκεισθαι· τῇ μὲν αἰσθήσει δηλαδὴ τὸ αἰσθητόν, τῇ δὲ δόξῃ τὸ δοξαστόν, τῇ δὲ διανοίᾳ τὸ διανοητόν, τῷ δὲ νῶι τὸ νοητόν, ὥστε καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ τὸ ἐνικώτατον καὶ τῷ ἄρρητῳ τὸ ἄρρητον. Ὁρθῶς γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἐν Ἀλκιβιάδῃ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν εἰς ἑαυτὴν εἰσιούσαν τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ τε ἄλλα πάντα κατόψεσθαι καὶ τὸν θεόν· συνενέουσα γὰρ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἑνωσιν καὶ τὸ κέντρον τῆς συμπάσης ζωῆς καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀποσκευαζομένη καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ παντοδαπῶν δυνάμεων, ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἀνεισι τὴν ἄκραν τῶν ὄντων περιωπὴν.

<sup>541</sup> *In Tim.* I.243.27-248.6.

*dianoia* more closely than anywhere else, such that the perfection of *dianoia* leads the Soul to *noësis*.

In the passage in question, Proclus is commenting on the following lemma: "That which is grasped by *noësis* with *logos* is always the same. That which is opined by opinion with unreasoning sense-perception (*met' aisthêsêôs alogou*) comes to be and passes away, and never really is."<sup>542</sup> Plato makes here a two-fold distinction, which is both ontological and cognitive. Corresponding to "the being which is always the same" (*aei kata tauta on*) and "that which comes into existence and passes away" (*gignomenon kai apollumenon*) there are "*noësis* with *logos*" (*noësis meta logou*) and "opinion with sense-perception" (*doxa met' aisthêsêôs*). This two-fold distinction corresponds to the later passage of the *Timaeus* where the movements of the Circle of the Same and Circle of the Other give rise to knowledge and to opinion.

This two-fold distinction is insufficient for Proclus' more complex metaphysics. Proclus must interpret Plato's text in such a manner that it stands as it is, without error, yet holds within itself the further distinctions needed for Proclus' own system. From a non-Neoplatonic reading of the text, Plato's phrase *noësis meta logou* might be taken say that there is one sort of cognitive activity, called *noësis*, which knows unchanging being, and that this *noësis* includes a *logos* in some way. On a Neoplatonic reading, this draws *noësis* and *logos* too closely together, and runs the risk of identifying *nous* and *dianoia*. Rather than a two-fold distinction, Proclus find four orders of knowing clearly distinguished in Plato's text: *noësis*, *logos*, *doxa*, and *aisthêsis*.<sup>543</sup> In order to show that this is in fact the correct interpretation of Plato's text, Proclus gives a long and interesting discussion of the lemma in question, distinguishing between six levels of *noësis*, and the

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<sup>542</sup> *Tim.* 28a: Τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσῃ μετὰ λόγου περιληπτὸν αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτά ὄν, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθησεως ἀλόγου δοξαστὸν γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὥτως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν. The previous lemma has set the subject of the difference between the being which always is, and that which becomes and never is. *Tim.* 27d: "What is that which always is, and never possesses coming to be, and what is that which comes to be, and never is (τί τὸ ὄν αἰεὶ, γένεσις δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γεγόμενον μὲν, ὃν δὲ οὐδέποτε)?"

<sup>543</sup> Cf. the divided line the *Republic*.

various senses of *logos*, distinguishing *logos* from *noêsis* on the one hand, and from *doxa* on the other.

The first three levels of *noêsis* correspond to the three moments of the hypostasis of *Nous*: intelligible, intelligible-and-intellectual, and intellectual moments (*noêton*, *noêton kai noeron*, *noeron*). This is not the same triad as we have seen in chapter VI. Being, Eternity, and the *autozôion* are the three intelligible triads, and as such they constitute the *noêton* order. The *noêton* of *Nous* as a whole is also called Being, the *noêton kai noeron* is Life, and the *noeron* is also called *Nous*.<sup>544</sup> So the first three levels of *noêsis* correspond to the *noêsis* of Being, Life and *Nous* (*on*, *zôê*, *nous*). As mentioned above, the triad of Being, Life and *Nous* parallels the triads of *ousia*, *dunamis*, and *energeia*, and the triad of *monê*, *proodos*, and *epistrophê*. These three moments are the moments of the self-unfolding of *Nous*, beginning from Being as the object of thought and the origin of all determinations. Life is the power of Being to grasp itself, in knowledge, and *Nous* proper is the knowing moment.

The first level of *noêsis*, called "*noêsis he noêtê*," or intelligible intellection.

The first type of *noêsis* is intelligible *noêsis*, which is agreement with the intelligible, and is nothing other than the intelligible. It is *noêsis* in the manner of being, and being itself (*ousiôdês esti noêsis kai autoousia*), because all that is in the intelligible exists in this manner, in the manner of being and intelligibly (*ousiôdôs kai noêtôs*).<sup>545</sup>

This is the moment of Being in *Nous*, considered as a type of *noêsis* insofar as it shares in the third moment of *Nous*. As we have remarked with regard to the triadic structure of the Soul, we should be cautious about distinguishing too sharply between the moments of *Nous*. *Nous* is one reality, and these triadic analyses are intended to trace the moments of the motion of a single power. So each of the moments share in each of the others. That is

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<sup>544</sup> Proclus gives the same name to both a triad as a whole and one of its constituents, in order to emphasise the predominance of that constituent in the triad.

<sup>545</sup> *In Tim.*I.243.29-244.2.: πρώτη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ νόησις ἡ νοητή, εἰς ταῦτον ἤκουσα τῷ νοητῷ καὶ οὐχ ἕτερον οὐσα παρὰ τὸ νοητόν, ἥ καὶ οὐσιώδης ἐστὶ νόησις καὶ αὐτοουσία, διότι πᾶν τὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τοῦτον ὑφέστηκε τὸν τρόπον, οὐσιωδῶς καὶ νοητῶς.

why the first moment, the *noêton*, or intelligible, also thinks, according to Proclus. It too has its own *noêsis* insofar as the third moment is present to it.

The second type of *noêsis* is the life and power which joins *nous* to the intelligible object dealt with in a similar manner.

The second [type of *noêsis*] joins *nous* to the intelligible. It has a character which binds together and leads together the extremes, and it is life and power (*zôê kai dunamis*). It fills *nous* from out of the intelligible, and establishes *nous* towards the intelligible.<sup>546</sup>

The words "filling" (*plêrousa*) and "founding" or "establishing" (*enidruousa*), with the prepositions "from" (*apo*) and "towards" (*eis*), give the sense of a double motion. *Nous* is filled by a motion arising from the intelligible, and is in turn drawn back towards the intelligible which fills it. The medium of this double motion is the second moment of the hypostasis, Life. Life is also said to have a *noêsis*, for the same reason as Being is said to have a *noêsis*. The they both share in the third moment, and it in them.

Third is the *noêsis* of the third moment. *Nous* itself.

Third is the *noêsis* wedded (*suzugos*) to the divine *Nous* itself. This *noêsis* is the *energeia* of *Nous*,<sup>547</sup> through which it has grasped the intelligible which is in it, and in accordance with which it knows itself, and in virtue of which it is itself. It is an *energeia*, and it *noêsis* itself (*autonoêsis*), but it is not intelligible *noêsis*, nor *noêsis* as *dunamis*, but as *energeia*, as has been said, and intellectual *noêsis* (*noera noêsis*).<sup>548</sup>

Proclus says that this is *noêsis* itself. What he means by this is that *noêsis* is the act of knowing, of grasping the determinations of Being, and this is the moment of *Nous* which is the knowing moment, grasping Being as the first moment of *Nous*. This is why this

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<sup>546</sup> In Tim. I.244.2-6.: δευτέρα δὲ ἡ συνάπτουσα τῷ νοητῷ τὸν νοῦν, συνεκτικὴν ἔχουσα καὶ συναγωγὸν τῶν ἄκρων ιδιότητα καὶ οὕσα ζωὴ καὶ δύναμις, πληροῦσα μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ τὸν νοῦν, ἐνιδρύουσα δὲ τὸν νοῦν εἰς τὸ νοητόν.

<sup>547</sup> This *Nous* is the hypostasis as a whole, the previous *Nous* is the third moment. So this *noêsis* is wedded to the third moment, which is the *energeia* of the hypostasis as a whole, through which it has grasped the first moment of the hypostasis.

<sup>548</sup> In Tim. I.244.6-11.: τρίτη δὲ ἡ [ἐν] αὐτῷ τῷ θεῷ νῷ σύζυγος νόησις, ἐνέργεια οὕσα τοῦ νοῦ, δι' ἧς τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ νοητὸν συνεῖληψε καὶ καθ' ἣν ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ καὶ ἡ αὐτὸς ἐστίν· ἐνέργεια γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτονόησις, ἀλλ' οὐ νοητὴ νόησις, οὐδὲ ὡς δύναμις, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνέργεια, καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ νοερὰ νόησις.

moment has the same name as the entire hypostasis, because it is what makes *Nous* as a whole a knowing hypostasis. Insofar as the the lower types of *noêsis* are types of *noêsis*, it is because they too grasp the intelligible. So the first three types of *noêsis*, then, are intelligible *noêsis* (*noêtê noêsis*), *noêsis* as power (*dunamis*), and intellectual *noêsis* (*noera noêsis*), corresponding to the three moments of the hypostasis of *Nous*.

The fourth level of *noêsis* is the *noêsis* of the partial intellects (*hê tôn merikôn noôn noêsis*). These are the *noes* which are stand in the coordinate series, emanating from the monad of *Nous*. Contemporary Neoplatonic scholarship often uses a spatial metaphor to distinguish between a monad's coordinate and subordinate causation. So we speak of a vertical and a horizontal scheme of causation. Standing in the horizontal scheme is the One, *Nous*, Soul, and Body. The horizontal scheme is the causation of henads by the One, *noes* by the monad of *Nous*, souls by the monad of Soul, and bodies by Nature. The partial *Noes* have the same internal structure as does *Nous* itself, containing its three moments: the intelligible object, the intelligible object's power to be known, and the knowing grasp of the intelligible object. Proclus does not assign to them three sorts of *noêsis* in this classification, although he does distinguish their internal moments.

The *noêsis* of the partial intellects holds the fourth place, since each of them has both a certain intelligible object [*noêton*] completely wedded to itself, and *noêsis*. Rather, each has all of them in a partial manner, *nous*, *noêsis*, *noêton*, through which each of them is joined to the wholes and intelligises the whole intelligible cosmos.<sup>549</sup>

Proclus has neglected to mention the moment of life and power which is in the partial *nous*, but we can be confident that it is there. His point is that even in the partial *nous*, *noêsis* is a grasping of the intelligible object. And so the partial *nous* must somehow

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<sup>549</sup> In *Tim.*1.244.11-16: τετάρτην δὲ ἔχει τάξιν ἡ τῶν μερικῶν νόων νόησις, ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτων ἕκαστος ἔχει καὶ νοητὸν τι πάντως ἑαυτῷ συζυγοῦν καὶ νόησιν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἕκαστος πάντα ἔχει μερικῶς, νοῦν, νόησιν, νοητὸν, δι' ὧν καὶ συνάπτεται τοῖς ὅλοις καὶ τὸν ὅλον νοητὸν κόσμον νοεῖ καὶ τούτων ἕκαστος.



have the *noêton* present to it.<sup>550</sup> The difference between *Nous* as a whole and the partial *nous* is that the partial *nous* has all three moments in a partial manner (*merikôs*). Just below this passage, Proclus recaps his discussion of the first four levels of *noêsis* by saying the following:

But where in the [first] case *noêsis* is the known object (*gnôston*) [i.e. being], in the second case [i.e. life] it possesses the first [i.e. being]. In the third case [*nous*] it possesses the second [life], and sees the first [being] as a whole (*holikôs*). In the next case [i.e. the partial *noes*] it is the known object in a partial manner (*esti men to gnôston merikôs*), and sees the wholes through the part (*horai de kai ta hola dia tou merikou*).<sup>551</sup>

Proclus juxtaposes 'as a whole' (*holikôs*) and 'in a partial manner' (*merikôs*). We will examine this distinction in more detail when we speak of the *noêsis* of the partial soul.

Proclus does not say very much about this partial *noes* in this passage, saying he has explained them in detail elsewhere.<sup>552</sup> However, he does say quite a bit concerning the relation of the partial *noes* to the rational soul. We will look at this below.

Before examining the fifth sort of *noêsis*, the *noêsis* of the Soul, which in this passage Proclus calls the "Soul which has *logoi*" (*logikê psuchê*), we will mention briefly the sixth sort of *noêsis*, the knowledge gained through the imagination (*phantasia*).

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<sup>550</sup> At this point Festugère seems to think there is a corruption in the text, because it states that each partial *nous* contains *nous*: "il est étrange de lire que chaque νοῦς possède μερικῶς le νοῦς: peut-être νοῦς, νόησις, νοητόν (sic CMP: νοῦν νόησιν sont une correction de la vulgate) sont-ils une glose comme le conjecture Diehl." [Festugère, *Commentaire sur le Timée*, vol.2, p.79, note 2] Festugère wishes to change the accusative, *noun*, to the nominative, *nous*, in order to correct the sense. However, I think Festugère is mistaken here. If the hypostasis, which is called *Nous*, contains as its third moment '*nous*', as *energeia*, it makes sense that each partial *Nous* will contain a third moment similarly called *nous*. This is not an ontological confusion on Proclus' part, but rather a terminological difficulty arising from giving the same name to the hypostasis as a whole and to its third moment.

<sup>551</sup> In *Tim.*I.244.13-17: ἀλλ' ὅπου μὲν ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τὸ γνωστὸν ἢ νόησις· ὅπου δὲ ἔστι μὲν τὸ δεῦτερον, ἔχει δὲ τὸ πρῶτον· ὅπου δὲ ἔστι μὲν τὸ τρίτον, ἔχει δὲ τὸ δεῦτερον, ὁρᾷ δὲ τὸ πρῶτον ὀλικῶς· ὅπου δὲ ἔστι μὲν τὸ γνωστὸν μερικῶς, ὁρᾷ δὲ καὶ τὰ ὅλα διὰ τοῦ μερικου·

<sup>552</sup> At this point Festugère laments that Proclus seems not to have given a more explicit explication of the partial *noes* elsewhere: "Il est dommage que Proclus n'ait pas été ici plus explicite, car, autant qu'il semble, on ne voit pas qu'il ait donné ailleurs (ἐν ἄλλοις 245.22) de doctrine précise et complète sur le μερικὸς νοῦς. Diehl renvoie à *El. Theol.*, prop. 109 (96.23 ss. Dodds), mais ce n'est qu'un des lieux de cet ouvrage où paraisse le μερικὸς νοῦς, il est en ce lieu supposé connu, non défini ni expliqué, et il ne sert que pour l'application à un cas particulier du principe plus général énoncé prop. 108."

Sixth, if you wish to count even this, the knowledge gained through *phantasia* (*hê phantastikê gnôsis*) is called *noêsis* by some people, and *phantasia* passive *nous* (*nous hê phantasia pathêtikos*), because it knows what it knows interiorly, making use of impressions and figures.<sup>553</sup>

Proclus seems fairly non-committal about this sort of *noêsis*, and seems to include it only for completeness. When recapping his discussion, Proclus seems to deny that *phantasia* is a *noêsis* at all. It uses form and figure (*schêma* and *morphê*), but eternal being is what is most far from these. Further, *phantasia* does not contain a *logos*. He calls it an irrational type of knowing (*gnôsis alogos*), and no knowledge without a *logos* is able to grasp being itself. The implication of this is that *dianoia*, which does make use of a *logos*, is in fact able to grasp being itself in some manner. Finally, *phantasia* is not able to grasp a universal (*to katholou...hairein*), whereas the *noêsis* of the *logikê psuchê* has just been said to grasp the wholes in a partial manner (*horai men ta hola, alla merikôs hama kai ouk athroôs*).<sup>554</sup> Proclus seems to be using *phantasia* here as a storehouse of sensory impressions, rather than the medium of the unfolding of geometrical *logoi*.<sup>555</sup> In any case, it seems that the *logos* of the Soul is the lowest level which can correctly be called *noêsis*.

Proclus' initial treatment of the *logikê psuchê* is brief. He says:

The *noêsis* of the rational soul (*tês psuchês tês logikês*) is fifth. As the rational soul is called (*legetai*) *nous*, so is its knowledge (*gnôsis*) *noêsis*, i.e. a *noêsis* which passes from one thing to another (*metabatikê noêsis*) and has time connatural (*sumphuê*) to itself.<sup>556</sup>

The phrase *metabatikê noêsis* must refer to *dianoia*, because it is *dianoia* that is *metabatikê*. *Dianoia* is classed as a type of *noêsis* here, because *dianoia* does have a grasp of the intelligible. Just as the higher sorts of *noêsis* were qualified, however, so is

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<sup>553</sup> In *Tim.*I.244.19-22: ἕκτη δέ, εἰ βούλει καὶ ταύτην συναριθμεῖν, ἡ φανταστικὴ γνῶσις ὑπὸ τινων προσαγορεύεται νόσις καὶ νοῦς ἢ φαντασία παθητικός, ὅτι καὶ ἔνδον καὶ μετὰ τύπων καὶ σχημάτων γινώσκει ὅσα γινώσκει.

<sup>554</sup> In *Tim.*I.244.31-245.5.

<sup>555</sup> Cf. our discussion in chapter IV.

<sup>556</sup> In *Tim.*I.244.16-19: πέμπτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς λογικῆς νόσις· ὥς γὰρ νοῦς λέγεται ἡ λογικὴ ψυχή, οὕτω καὶ ἡ γνῶσις αὐτῆς νόσις καὶ μεταβατικὴ νόσις καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἔχουσα συμφυὴ πρὸς ἐαυτήν.

*dianoia noêsis* in a qualified manner. The difference between *dianoia* as *noêsis* and the *noêsis* of the partial *nous* is that the partial *nous* sees the whole of Being through a part in a single grasp, while *dianoia* must move from part to part, Form to Form, in order to see the whole of Being. The function of calling *dianoia noêsis* is to bring *dianoia* and *noêsis* closer than one might otherwise think. They are different types of the same activity, the grasping of intelligible being.

If we consider the declension from the hypostasis of *Nous*, to the partial *noes*, to the *logikê psuchê*, we will notice the sort of diminishment in cognitive powers which Proclus means to convey. *Nous* has a third moment (*Nous*) which is able to grasp its first moment (Being) as a whole. Partial *noes* are weaker than the monad of *Nous*, and although they still grasp Being as a whole, they grasp the whole which is reflected in the part, and this grasping takes place without time. *Logikai psuchai*, finally, are not able to grasp the whole of being through any one part, but must move from part to part, their motion of thinking measured by Time, and so come to grasp the whole. There is a logic at play here, by which Proclus travels from 'whole in the whole', to 'whole in the part', and finally to 'whole in the totality of parts'. The next stage in the declension of cognition is *phantasia*, which cannot grasp the whole of Being at all.

As we said in our introduction, there are various sorts of souls, according to Proclus. Above the partial souls are the heroes, angels, and demons who are intermediate between partial souls and the divine souls who occupy the highest place. Proclus' discussion turns at this point towards the partial soul, distinguishing it from the angelic and daimonic.<sup>557</sup> Proclus takes Plato's two phrases from the *Timaeus* lemma under discussion, 'noêsis with logos' (*noêsis meta logou*) and 'opinion with sense-perception' (*doxa met' aistheseôs*), and divides each phrase into two terms, saying that in the second phrase one of the terms (*aisthêsis*) lies below the rational soul, while in the first phrase

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<sup>557</sup> In *Tim.* I.245.18-20.

one of the terms (*noêsis*) lies above it. It is important that Proclus qualifies *noêsis* here, saying that "*noêsis* considered in itself is above" the soul (*hê noêsis anôterô kat' autên*).<sup>558</sup> Although *noêsis* in itself lies above the rational soul, *dianoia* is both a sort of *noêsis*, and able to lead the soul towards this higher sort of *noêsis*.

For the partial *nous* is established immediately above our *ousia*, leading it up and perfecting it. It is towards this that we are turned (*epistrephometha*) when we are purified through philosophy, and bind our own intellectual power (*noeran dunamin*) to the *noêsis* of that *Nous*.<sup>559</sup>

"Being turned towards" is *epistrephometha*, which has the technical sense of the *epistrophê* in *monê*, *proodos*, and *epistrophê*. So this text says that the aim of philosophy is a purification which allows our own noetic power to be bound to *Nous* itself, through the *epistrophê* of the partial soul. Proclus says three things about the relation of the partial soul to the partial *nous*. (A.) There is not a one-to-one correspondance between them, so there are numerically more partial souls than partial *noes*. (B.) Second, the partial *nous* is not participated directly (*autothen*) by the partial soul, but requires intermediaries. (C.) Finally, these intermediaries are the angelic and daimonic souls which, unlike the partial soul, are always active about the partial *nous*. It is through these angelic and daimonic souls that the partial souls "at times participate in the intellectual light (*pote metechousi tou noerou phôtos*)."<sup>560</sup> Although Proclus does make use of the idea of Socrates as a *daimôn* who causes Alcibiades to regain his *autokinêsis*, in the *Commentary on the Alcibiades I*, and makes similar points in the *Parmenides* commentary, he does not very often make use of this feature of his system. However, he has said both that the partial *nous* is established immediately (*prosechôs*) above our *ousia*, and that it is not participated directly (*autothen*) by the partial soul.

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<sup>558</sup> In *Tim.*I.245.13.

<sup>559</sup> In *Tim.*I.245.13-17: ὁ γὰρ μερικὸς νοῦς προσεχῶς ὑπερίδρυται τῆς ἡμετέρας οὐσίας, ἀνάγων αὐτὴν καὶ τελειῶν, πρὸς ὃν ἐπιστρεφόμεθα καθαράμενοι διὰ φιλοσοφίας καὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν νοερὰν δύναμιν τῇ ἐκείνου νοήσει συνάψαντες.

<sup>560</sup> In *Tim.*I.245.21.

Perhaps Proclus means by "our *ousia*" the *ousia* of Soul in general, and so the partial *nous* is established immediately above the Soul's *ousia*, even though there are gradations of souls. Be that as it may, the partial soul does not always participate the partial *nous*.

For now we have assumed this much, that the entirety of the partial *nous* is immediately (*prosechōs*) participated by other souls than ours, the daimonic souls, but it shines out towards our souls (*ellampeí de eis tas hēmeteras*) whenever we return towards it, and perfect the *logos* in us by making it intellectual (*ton en hēmin logon noeron apotelesōmen*). And just as in the *Phaedrus* [247c-d], [Plato] calls this the steersman of the soul, and says that only it knows being, and says that with it the soul feeds on *nous* and *epistēmē*, so here too *noēsis* is before the soul, and that is truly *noēsis*, and it is participated by the soul, whenever its *logos* should be actualised in an intellectual manner (*hotan ho logos energēi noerōs*).<sup>561</sup>

Proclus contrasts the immediate participation of the partial *nous* by the daimonic souls, with the non-immediate participation by the partial soul. Both the daimonic souls and the partial souls participate in *Nous* through the monad of Soul, according to the *Elements of Theology*.<sup>562</sup> They differ because daimonic souls (as well as angelic and heroic souls) do not pass from *nous* to *agnoian*. Partial souls, on the other hand, possess *nous* only occasionally. And they must return upon *nous*, and perfect their *logos* by making it *noeros*. The verb *apoteleō* here should be taken both with the sense of 'to render something such and such', and 'to complete or perfect something'. When the *logos* of the does become active *noerōs*, it in a sense ceases to be *logos* and becomes *nous*, and also finds its own perfection. The aim of *dianoia* is a grasp of intelligible being, and the culmination of *dianoia* is a grasp of the intelligible by which it takes on the character of *nous* as much as is possible. At this highest point of *dianoia*, the soul's transitory activity takes on as much unity as it can.

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<sup>561</sup> In *Tim.*I.245.22-31: νῦν δὲ εἰλήφθω τοσοῦτον, ὅτι μετέχεται μὲν οὗτος ὑπὲρ ἄλλων προσεχῶς ψυχῶν δαιμονίων πᾶς, ἐλλάμπει δὲ εἰς τὰς ἡμετέρας, ὁπότεν ἐπιστρέφωμεν εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν λόγον νοερὸν ἀποτελέσωμεν. καὶ ὥς ἐν Φαίδρῳ κυβερνήτην τοῦτον ἐκάλεσε τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μόνον εἶπε τὸ ὄν νοεῖν, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν μετὰ τούτου νῶ καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ τρεφομένην, οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὴν νόησιν εἶναι καὶ πρό ψυχῆς καὶ ὄντως εἶναι νόησιν ἐκείνην, μετέχεσθαι δὲ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς, ὅταν ὁ λόγος ἐνεργῇ νοερῶς.

<sup>562</sup> See introduction.

When *logos* intelligises (*noēi*) eternal being, insofar as it is *logos* it is active by passing from one thing to another (*metabatikōs*), insofar as it is intelligising (*noôn*) [it is active] with simplicity (*meta haplotētos*). It intelligises each thing as at once simple, but it does not [intelligise] all things at once. It [intelligises] by passing from some things to other things, intelligising all that it intelligises while passing as one and simple.<sup>563</sup>

So the highest point of the *logos* in the *logikê psuchê* approaches the simplicity of *nous* insofar as all that it knows it knows as one and as simple, as does *nous*. However, even at its height, in this passage, the *logos* of the *logikê psuchê* does not lose its character as *metabatikos*, because it must pass from one thing which it knows as one and simple to the next thing which it knows in the same manner, and so on.

At I.246.10 Proclus turns to the nature of the *logos* itself. He first mentions, and then leaves to one side, the three sense of *logos* found in Plato's *Theaetetus*.<sup>564</sup> He leaves these aside because all of these senses imply composition (*synthesis*) and division (*diairesis*) and are not suited for grasping eternal being. Note that Proclus' point here depends on Plato's inclusion of *logos* with *noēsis* in the *Timaeus* lemma, as that which grasps eternal being. I think that he is exhibiting the terminological fluidity of his system here. Strictly speaking, a *logos* is an unfolding into multiplicity, and so will involve *diairesis* and *synthesis*. However, a *logos* is also that by which *dianoia* grasps being, so in that sense Proclus can extend the term to all of the Soul's ways of grasping being. In this passage he tells us our entire *ousia* is *logos*: *pasa de hēmōn hē ousia logos estin*. But in fact not all of our *ousia* is *logos*, unless he is stretching the term. This is in fact what he is doing. Because there are three things in us, opinion (*doxa*), discursive thinking (*dianoia*), and *nous*, he says that *logos* is said in three senses with regard to our soul: *logos* as opinative (*doxastikos*), *logos* as discursive (*epistēmonikos*), and *logos* as intellectual (*noeros*).<sup>565</sup> By *nous* here Proclus says he means the highest part of *dianoia*

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<sup>563</sup> In *Tim.*I.246.5-9: ὅταν γε λόγος νοῇ τὸ αἰεὶ ὄν, ὡς μὲν λόγος ἐνεργεῖ μεταβατικῶς, ὡς δὲ νοῶν μετὰ ἀπλότητος, ἕκαστον μὲν ὡς ἀπλοῦν ἅμα νοῶν, οὐ πάντα δὲ ἅμα, ἀλλὰ μεταβαίνων ἀπ' ἄλλων ἐπ' ἄλλα, νοῶν δὲ πᾶν ὁ νοεῖ μεταβαίνων ὡς ἐν καὶ ἀπλοῦν.

(*legô de noun en toutois to tês dianoias akrotaton*).<sup>566</sup> This term *akrotaton* is significant, and calls to mind the flower of the soul, the one of the soul, the highest point of the soul.

In fact, Proclus draws together the highest part of the soul and the highest part of *dianoia*.

And neither is *dianoia*, to the extent to which it proceeds towards multiplicity and division (*kath'hoson eis plêthos chôrei kai diairesin*), capable of running back towards *Nous*. Rather, the opposite is the case. It separates itself from the intellectual partlessness through the variousness of its *logoi* (*aphistatai dia tês tôn logôn poikilias tês noeras amereias*). There is left only the highest part of the soul (*to akrotaton tês psuchês*) and the most 'one-like' part of *dianoia* (*to henoeidestaton tês dianoias*) to be founded in the *noêsis* of the partial *nous*, bound to it through its kinship with it.<sup>567</sup>

Proclus is saying at the same time that *dianoia* is a *probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn* which has as its culmination a multiplicity of *logoi*, and that *dianoia* has as a highest part which is bound to the *noêsis* of the partial *nous*. I think that these two statements are consistent. *Dianoia* is an activity by which the Soul draws forth the content of its own *ousia*, at the same time drawing forth the *eidê* of *Nous* into the multiplicity of its own *logoi*. However, the metaphorical knowing which is *dianoia* has as its aim to point the soul back up towards the source which *dianoia* unfolds. The aim of *dianoia* is not ultimately to rest with the multiplicity of its projected *logoi*, but as the culmination of its circling around *nous* as its centre, to allow the Soul to put aside the divided perspectives for the unity of *nous*. Proclus thinks that this is possible, and so he thinks that there is something which he calls here the *henoeidestaton tês dianoias*. If ultimately Proclus is a mystic, who thinks that the end of knowing is an unknowing unity, he is a very intellectual mystic.

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<sup>564</sup> The 'enunciative' *logos*: a *logos* as running through the elements of a thing; and a *logos* which sets out the characteristics of a thing which differentiate it from other things. In *Tim.*I.246.11-13: ὁ τε προφορικὸς καὶ ἡ διὰ τῶν στοιχείων διέξοδος καὶ ὁ τῶν ἐκά-στου πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα διαφορῶν παραστατικὸς.

<sup>565</sup> Notice that in this exhaustive list Proclus has omitted *aisthêsis*.

<sup>566</sup> In *Tim.*I.246.21-22.

<sup>567</sup> In *Tim.*I.246.26-31: οὕτε ἡ διάνοια, καθ' ὅσον εἰς πλῆθος χωρεῖ καὶ διαίρεσιν, οἷα τέ ἐστιν εἰς νοῦν ἀνατρέχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑναντίον αἰσίσταται διὰ τῆς τῶν λόγων ποικιλίας τῆς νοεράς ἀμερείας· λείπεται ἄρα τὸ ἀκρότατον τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ ἐνοειδέστατον τῆς διανοίας ἐνιδρῦσθαι τῇ νοήσει τοῦ μερικοῦ νοῦ, διὰ συγγένειαν αὐτῇ συναπτόμενον.

because the road to *Nous* for the partial soul is *dianoia*, and the road to the One is through *nous*.

It is this *henoeidestaton tês dianoias* which Proclus says is the *logos* in us that knows the intelligible. "Indeed this is the *logos*, the *logos* in us which intelligises the intelligibles (*touto dê oun estin ho logos, to nooun hêmôn ta noêta*)."<sup>568</sup> Proclus is at the same time saying that there is something in us which surpasses *dianoia* and *logos*, and that this is also a *logos*. I think in doing this he is trying to mark both the distinction between and the continuity of the partial soul's *dianoia* and *nous*. Proclus says that Plato in the *Republic* calls the *energeia* of this *logos* *noêsis*.<sup>569</sup> And because *noêsis* is the *energeia* of a *nous*, so this *logos* must be a sort of *nous*.

If its activity (*energeia*) is *noêsis*, then this *logos* would be a sort of *nous*, which in the following passages [37a-d] Plato says comes to be in the soul when it moves around the intelligible object.<sup>570</sup>

Whereas before *dianoia* was called *noêsis*, now *logos* is a sort of *nous*.

What Proclus has done in his commentary on this passage is move in his account from a consideration of *dianoia*, to a consideration of the partial soul's *nous*, while remaining within the same framework of terms. Plato's text says that the soul knows the being which is always the same through *noêsis* with *logos*. Proclus first distinguished between *noêsis* proper and *logos*. *Noêsis* proper belongs to the three moments of *Nous* itself, and the partial *nous*; *logos* belongs to the soul's *dianoia*. Then Proclus

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<sup>568</sup> In *Tim.*I.246.11-12.

<sup>569</sup> Diehl refers us to *Rep.*511d-e: "And it seems to me that you call the habit of mind of geometers and other such people *dianoia*, and not *nous*, because *dianoia* is something in between opinion (*doxa*) and *nous*. Your interpretation is quite sufficient, I said. And now, answering to these four sections, assume four passions (*pathêmata*) which come to be in the soul: *noêsis* for the highest, *dianoia* for the second, belief (*pistis*) for the third, and seeming (*eikasia*) for the last (διάνοιαν δὲ καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὴν τῶν γεωμετρικῶν τε καὶ τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἔξιν ἀλλ' οὐ νοῦν, ὡς μεταξὺ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν οὖσαν: ἰκανώτατα ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀπεδέξω. καὶ μοι ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτταρσι τμήμασι τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενα λαβέ, νόεσιν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτῳ, διάνοιαν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν ἀπόδος καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ εἰκασίαν)." However, Plato does not use the term *energeia* in this text. In fact this term does not appear in Plato at all.

<sup>570</sup> In *Tim.*I.247.2-5: εἰ δὲ νόησις αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια, νοῦς ἂν τις εἴη οὗτος ὁ λόγος, ὃν ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις ἐγγίγνεσθαι φησι τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὸ νοητὸν κινουμένη.



distinguished between the soul's *noêsis* and its *dianoia*, by saying that although the soul has *noêsis*, its *noêsis* is *metabaticôs*. What he really means is that *dianoia* as a form of *noêsis* is lower than true *noêsis*. Finally, at the end of his exegesis he says that there is in fact true *noêsis* in the soul, and draws this sort of *noêsis* together with the soul's *dianoia*, so that the completion of *dianoia* is this higher *noêsis*. At the beginning of his account he extends the term *noêsis* even down to the divided level of *dianoia*. At the end he extends the terms *logos* and *dianoia* even up to the soul's unified *noêsis*. By both distinguishing and binding together the soul's two ways of knowing the intelligible, Proclus is able to give a complete account of the passage at *Timaeus* 28a, which says that the soul knows the intelligible through *noêsis* with *logos* (*noêsei meta logou*).

He makes it clear at the end of his exegesis that there is true *noêsis* in the Soul, and that it comes about by the highest and most unified part of the Soul. This does not mean that *dianoia* or *logos*, in the strict sense of these terms, is *noêsis*, in the strict sense of the term. But that the Soul who is active dianoetically may be led, as the completion of this activity, to a higher grasp of the intelligibles.

For whenever the soul should stand off from all *phantasia*, opinion, and multiple and indeterminate knowledge, and should run up towards its own partlessness, according to which it is rooted in the partial *Nous*, and in running up joins its own *energeia* to the *noêsis* of the partial *nous*, then in fact it does intelligise eternal being in concert with the partial *nous*, even though its *energeia* is both one and double, and sameness and division exist in its intelligising. At that time the *noêsis* of the soul takes place 'at once' to a greater degree (*athroôtera ginetai*) and it becomes closer to the eternal things, so that it grasps the intelligible object together at once with *Nous*, and acts as a smaller light does with a larger light, as the *logos* in us runs in under the *noêsis* of *Nous*, and the intelligible object comes to be comprehended by *noêsis* with *logos*.<sup>571</sup> For our *logos* in concert with *noêsis* grasps (*hairei*) the intelligible, while the *noêsis* of *Nous* always both *is* and *sees* the intelligible, and our *logos* is joined to *Nous* whenever this *logos* becomes 'noiform' (*noeidês*).<sup>572</sup>

<sup>571</sup> *Timaeus* 28a.

<sup>572</sup> In *Tim.* I.247.10-25: ὅταν γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ φαντασίας ἀποστῇ καὶ δόξης καὶ τῆς ποικίλης καὶ ἀορίστου γνώσεως, ἀναδράμῃ δὲ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἀμέρειαν, καθ' ἣν ἐνεργίζωται τῷ μερικῷ νῷ, καὶ ἀναδραμούσα συνάψεται τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἐνέργειαν πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου νόησιν, τότε δὴ μετ' ἐκείνου νοεῖ τὸ αἰεὶ ὄν, μιᾶς τε τῆς ἐνεργείας οὐσης καὶ δυοειδούς καὶ ταυτότητος καὶ διακρίσεως ἐν ταῖς νοήσεσιν

In the second part of this chapter we will examine "the highest part of the soul (*to akrotaton tēs psuchēs*) and the most 'one-like' part of *dianoia* (*to henoeidestaton tēs dianoias*)."

## VII.ii. The *anthos nou* and the *anthos tēs psuchēs*

In the *Timaeus* commentary Proclus indicates that we have more in us than *dianoia*.

This is because man is a microcosm (*mikros kosmos ho anthrōpos*) and everything which is in the cosmos in a divine manner, and as a whole, is in man as well, in a partial manner. For there is in us *nous* in act (*nous...ho kat' energeian*); and a rational soul (*psuchē logikē*) which came from the same Father and the same life giving Goddess as [the Soul of] the All; and an ethereal vehicle (*ochēma*) which is to us as the heavens [are to the World Soul] (*analogon tōi ouranōi*); and an earthy body mixed from the four elements, and which is of the same order as them.<sup>573</sup>

Notice that from this passage that what is "in us" is more than just the *logikē psuchē*.

This recalls passages from the *Enneads* where Plotinus distinguishes between "us" and the soul.<sup>574</sup> In the strictest sense, man is a soul. But in a more metaphorical sense, we can say that "we" are more than a soul, because we animate bodies of various gradations, and because "in us," or present to us, are both *Nous* and the One. So what Proclus is saying here is that, although in general the reality which we are has the characteristics of discursivity and temporality which emerge with the order of Soul, the reality which we

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ὑπαρχούσης. τηνικαῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἀθροωτέρα γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ νόησις καὶ ἐγγυτέρω τῶν αἰωνίων πραγμάτων. ἵνα καὶ ἕλῃ τὸ νοητὸν ἅμα τῷ νῷ καὶ οἷον φῶς ἔλαττον μετὰ μείζονος φωτὸς ἐνεργήσῃ. τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν λόγου τὴν νόησιν ὑποτρέχοντος τοῦ νοῦ. καὶ γένηται τὸ νοητὸν νοήσῃ μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἡμέτερος λόγος μετὰ τῆς νοήσεως αἰρεῖ τὸ νοητόν. ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ νόησις αἰεὶ καὶ ἔστι καὶ ὄρα τὸ νοητόν. συνάπτει δὲ αὐτῷ τὸν λόγον. ὅταν καὶ οὗτος γένηται νοοειδής.

<sup>573</sup> In *Tim.* I.5.11-17: ἡ διότι μικρὸς κόσμος ὁ ἀνθρώπος καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἐν τούτῳ πάντα μερικῶς. ὅσα ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ θεῖως τε καὶ ὀλικῶς· νοῦς τε γὰρ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ψυχὴ λογικὴ προελθοῦσα ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ζωογόνου θεᾶς τῇ ὅλῃ, καὶ ὄχημα αἰθέριον ἀνάλογον τῷ οὐρανῷ, καὶ σῶμα γήινον ἐκ τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων φυραθέν. οἷς καὶ σύστοιχόν ἐστιν.

<sup>574</sup> See for example *Enn.* V.8.10-11. At the end of ch.10 Plotinus speaks of the beauty which has penetrated through their whole soul when they come to be in the intelligible. In the next chapter the word soul does not appear. Rather the language shifts to presenting oneself to oneself, and being with the god, and leaving sense-perception behind.

are also includes the higher and lower, because these are in the Soul as well. The centre of the Soul is *Nous*, and the centre of the *nous* in the Soul is the One itself.

For every soul, through its own intellectual part, is centred about the Highest, the One itself, but because of its multiplicity it travels around its own *Nous* in a circle, desiring to embrace it and fold itself around it.<sup>575</sup>

Dianoia is the manner of embracing the intelligible which emerges on the psychic level, and is the activity which most properly belongs to the Soul. In order for *dianoia* to be possible, however, its unified source must be already present to it in its centre. Proclus says that the *ousia* of the soul is a *plêroma tôn ousiôdôn logôn*, meaning by this that the *logoi* which the Soul projects are already present and waiting to be unfolded into multiplicity. But if the *ousia* is such a *plêroma*, the source of the *plêroma*, *Nous* itself, must also be present to the Soul. And likewise the One must be present.<sup>576</sup> They are of course not separate from the Soul spatially, and if their causal power reaches to the Soul, as it does, then they must be present to it.

Proclus has a number of terms by which he refers to the presence of *Nous* and of the One in the soul: the "flower of *nous*" (*anthos nou*).<sup>577</sup> the "flower of the soul" (*anthos tês psuchês*).<sup>578</sup> the "one of the soul" (*hen tês psuchês*)<sup>579</sup> or "most unified part of the soul" (*henoeidestatôn tês psuchês*)<sup>580</sup> or "highest part of the soul" (*akrotatôn tês psuchês*)<sup>581</sup> of the soul, and the "huparxis of the soul" (*huparxis psuchês*).<sup>582</sup>

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<sup>575</sup> In *Eucl.* 149.5-8: καὶ γὰρ πᾶσα ψυχὴ κατὰ μὲν τὸ νοερὸν ἑαυτῆς καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀκρότατον κεκέντρωται, κατὰ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος κυκλικῶς περιπορεύεται, περιπτύσσασθαι ποθοῦσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς νοῦν.

<sup>576</sup> J. Trouillard, *L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres) p.34: "Ce schème géométrique ne risque donc pas d'enfermer l'âme dans sa sphère psychique, puisqu'elle est concentrique à l'esprit et à l'Un. Partir d'elle-même, c'est partir de ses principes. Proclus s'efforce ainsi de satisfaire en même temps deux exigences platoniciennes: d'une part l'autoconstitution de l'âme qui se fait subsister elle-même en émettant ses raisons – d'autre part son illumination par les intelligibles et l'esprit selon l'ordre de la procession."

<sup>577</sup> *Phil. Chald.* (des Places) 210.29.

<sup>578</sup> In *Parm.* 1071.30.

<sup>579</sup> In *Parm.* 1071.26.

<sup>580</sup> *Phil. Chald.* (des Places) 210.30.

<sup>581</sup> In *Tim.* II.203.31.

<sup>582</sup> *Plat. Theol.* I.15.16.

This is the source [i.e. the unique cause of all], I suppose, of the intellectual character (*noeron idiōma*) of the soul, by which it grasps the intellectual Forms and the differences within them, and also of the highest part of [our] *nous*, which they call the flower, and this is the source of its *huparxis*, by which it unites with (*sunaptesthai pros*) the henads of being, and through these with the the hidden unity (*henōsin*) itself of all the divine henads. For there are in us many knowing powers (*dunameōn...gnōristikōn*), but it is through this alone that we can by nature come together with and participate in that [unity]. For the class of gods is not grasped by sensation, if indeed it transcends all bodies; nor by opinion or *dianoia*, because these are divided and lay hold of things which are multiform; nor by *noēsis* with *logos* (*noēsei meta logou*),<sup>583</sup> because forms of cognition such as these are of the real beings (*tōn...ontōs ontōn*). But the divine *huparxis* (*tōn theōn huparxis*) is mounted above [the level of] beings and is delimited by this unity itself of [all] beings. So if indeed the divine is knowable in any manner, there remains only that it is it graspable by the *huparxis* of the Soul (*tēi tēs psuchēs huparxei*), and that it is known through this, as much as is possible. For we say that in all degrees of reality like is known by like: the object of sensation is of course grasped by sensation, the object of opinion by opinion, the object of *dianoia* by *dianoia*, the intelligible object by *nous*, so that that which is most one is grasped by the one and the ineffable is grasped by the ineffable. Socrates in the *Alcibiades* said rightly that the soul in entering itself sees all other things and sees god. For inclining towards its own unity (*henōsin*) and the centre of its entire life, and pulling away from multiplicity and diversity of the varied powers in it, the soul rises to the highest point of view itself of beings.<sup>584</sup>

It is clear from this passage that Proclus thinks the Soul has a life higher than *dianoia*.<sup>585</sup>

In the *Commentary on the Parmenides* Proclus distinguishes between *Nous* and Soul, but emphasises that the *eidē* are present to us.<sup>586</sup> We are not aware of them because we do

<sup>583</sup> *Tim.* 28a.

<sup>584</sup> *Plat. Theol.* I.15.1-16.1.: "Ὅθεν οἶμαι καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν νοερὸν ἰδίωμα καταληπτικὸν ὑπάρχειν τῶν νοερῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς διαφορᾶς, τὴν δὲ ἀκρότητα τοῦ νοῦ καὶ, ὡς φασί, τὸ ἄνθος καὶ τὴν ὑπαρξίν συνάπτεσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἐνάδας τῶν ὄντων καὶ διὰ τούτων πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν πασῶν τῶν θεῶν ἐνάδων ἀπόκρυφον ἔνωσιν. Πολλῶν γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν δυνάμεων οὐσῶν γνωριστικῶν, κατὰ ταύτην μὲν τῷ θεῷ συγγίνεσθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἐκείνου πεφύκαμεν· οὔτε γὰρ αἰσθήσει τὸ θεῶν γένος ληπτόν, εἴπερ ἐστὶ σωματῶν ἀπάντων ἐξηρημένον, οὔτε δόξη καὶ διανοίᾳ, μερισταὶ γὰρ αὐταὶ καὶ πολυειδῶν ἐσάπτονται πραγμάτων, οὔτε νοήσει μετὰ λόγου, τῶν γὰρ ὄντως ὄντων εἰσὶν αἱ τοιαῦται γνώσεις, ἡ δὲ τῶν θεῶν ὑπαρξὶς ἐποχεῖται τοῖς οὐσί καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν ἀφώρισταί τὴν ἔνωσιν τῶν ὅλων. Λείπεται οὖν, εἴπερ ἐστὶ καὶ ὁπωσοῦν τὸ θεῖον γνωστόν, τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπάρξει καταληπτὸν ὑπάρχειν καὶ διὰ ταύτης γνωρίζεσθαι καθ' ὅσον δυνατόν. Τῷ γὰρ ὁμοίῳ πανταχοῦ φαμέν τὰ ὅμοια γινώσκεισθαι· τῇ μὲν αἰσθήσει δηλαδὴ τὸ αἰσθητόν, τῇ δὲ δόξῃ τὸ δοξαστόν, τῇ δὲ διανοίᾳ τὸ διανοητόν, τῷ δὲ νῷ τὸ νοητόν, ὥστε καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ τῷ ἐνικώτατον καὶ τῷ ἁρρητῷ τὸ ἁρρητόν. Ὅρθως γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἐν Ἀλκιβιάδῃ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν εἰς ἑαυτὴν εἰσιούσαν τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ τε ἄλλα πάντα κατόψεσθαι καὶ τὸν θεόν· συννεύουσα γὰρ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἔνωσιν καὶ τὸ κέντρον τῆς συμπάσης ζωῆς καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀποσκευαζομένη καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ παντοδαπῶν δυνάμεων, ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἀνεισι τὴν ἄκραν τῶν ὄντων περιωπτήν.

<sup>585</sup> See also the three types of life in *In Rep.* I.177.15ff.

<sup>586</sup> See *In Parm.* 930-931; 947-950.

not usually exist in their unified manner. In order to grasp them we must become like them, and put off all of our native division. In this way we can be active noetically.

In the *Commentary on the Timaeus* Proclus speaks of the Soul's *noêsis*.

For after the wandering of genesis, and the purification, and light of *epistêmê*, the intelligent activity and the *nous* in us (*to noeron energêma kai ho en êmin nous*) takes flame. It brings the soul to harbour in the Father and establishes it unpolluted in the demiurgic *noêseis*, and joins light to light, not like the light of *epistêmê*, but more beautiful and more intellectual (*noerôteron*) and more like the One (*henoeidesteron*). This is the paternal haven, the finding of the Father, the unpolluted union with him.<sup>587</sup>

And in a passage just following:

For the finding did not belong to a speaking soul, but to one keeping holy silence and lying open to the divine light: it did not belong to a soul moving with its own motion but to one which keeps a kind of silence: for since the soul cannot naturally grasp the *ousia* of the other things by a name, or a limiting definition (*horisitikês apodoseôs*), or *epistêmê*, but only by *noêsis*, as he [Plato] says himself in his Letters [*Seventh letter* 342.a-d], how could it find the *ousia* of the Demiurge in another way than noetically (*noerôs*)? But how, when it has found in this way, could it express its vision by nouns and verbs and disclose it to others? For discursivity (*diexodos*) which moves in syntheses is unable to present the one-like and simple nature (*henoeidê kai haplên...phusin*). 'Well then,' someone might say, 'do we not say a great deal about the Demiurge and the other gods and the One itself?' We do indeed speak about them, but we do not speak each one's real self, and we are able to speak in the manner of *epistêmê* (*epistêmonikôs*), but not in the manner of *nous* (*noerôs*). For this is finding, as we said before. But if findings belong to the silent soul, how could the talk which flows through the mouth suffice to bring to light what we have found?<sup>588</sup>

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<sup>587</sup> In *Tim.* I.302.17-25: μετὰ γὰρ τὴν πλάνην τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τὴν κάθαρσιν καὶ μετὰ τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης φῶς ἀναλάμπει τὸ νοερὸν ἐνέργημα καὶ ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦς, ὁρμίζων τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ἐνιδρύων αὐτὴν ἀχράντως ἐν ταῖς δημιουργικαῖς νοήσεσι καὶ φῶς φωτὶ συνάπτων, οὐχ οἷον τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦδε κάλλιον καὶ νοερώτερον καὶ ἐνοειδέστερον οὗτος γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ πατρικὸς ὄρμος, ἡ εὕρεσις τοῦ πατρός, ἡ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀχραντος ἐνωσις.

<sup>588</sup> In *Tim.* I.303.5-23: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ εὕρεσις λεγούσης τι τῆς ψυχῆς ἦν, ἀλλὰ μυούσης καὶ ὑπεστροφόμενης πρὸς τὸ θεῖον φῶς, οὐδὲ κινουμένης οἰκείαν κίνησιν, ἀλλὰ σιωπῆς τὴν οἷον σιωπὴν ὅπου γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων πραγμάτων οὐσίαν πέφυκεν ἡ δι' ὀνόματος αἰρεῖν ἢ δι' ὀριστικῆς ἀποδόσεως ἢ δι' ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ διὰ νοήσεως μόνης, ὥς φησιν ἐν ταῖς Ἐπιστολαῖς αὐτός, πῶς ἂν τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ δύναιτο τρόπον ἕτερον εὐρεῖν ἢ νοερώς; πῶς δ' ἂν οὕτως εὐρούσα δύναιτο δι' ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων ἐξαγγεῖλαι τὸ ὁφθέν καὶ εἰς ἄλλους ἐξενεγκεῖν; ἡ γὰρ ἐν συνθέσει φερομένη διεξοδος ἀδυνατεῖ τὴν ἐνοειδῆ καὶ ἀπλὴν παρίστανειν φύσιν, τί οὖν; φαίη τις ἂν οὐχὶ πολλὰ καὶ περὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐνός αὐτοῦ λέγομεν; ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν μὲν λέγομεν, αὐτὸ δὲ ἕκαστον οὐ λέγομεν, καὶ ἐπιστημονικῶς μὲν δυνάμεθα λέγειν, νοερώς δὲ οὐ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ εὐρεῖν, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν πρότερον, εἰ δὲ ἡ εὕρεσις σιωπῆς ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, πῶς ἂν ἀρκέσειε τὸ εὐρεθὲν οἷον ἐστὶν ὁ διὰ τοῦ στόματος ῥέων λόγος εἰς φῶς ἐξενεγκεῖν;

In these passages Proclus speaks of the Soul joining itself with a higher power, and of the Soul putting off its own division. I interpret this to mean that when the Soul ceases to be active in its own dianoetic manner, it is able to unify itself with the higher realities which are present to it. This is different from the lack of *dianoia* which marks souls moved by their passions. *Heterokinēsis* is indeed empty of the divisions of *dianoia*, but only because it is marked by the more extreme divisions of sensation. The Soul must have been purified of this passivity, and undergone *anamnēsis* in order to return upon its own *ousia*, in order to be ready for the silence of *nous* and the One. In this sense, *dianoia* is a sort of preparatory purification. It purifies the Soul not just of the *pathemata* of sense, but ultimately it purifies it of its own dianoetic *logoi*.

Proclus speaks of the flower of *nous* (*anthos tou nou*), or the highest part of *nous*, or the one of *nous*, in the soul. This is the part of the Soul which grasps the intelligible in a manner proper to the intelligible itself. We can say that it is a part of the Soul, or we can say that it is the presence to the Soul of the intelligible itself. In either way of speaking, the Soul is able to surpass *dianoia* through the flower of *nous*. In a fragment of Damascius' commentary of the *Chaldaean Oracles* we find a reference to a certain intelligible which must be grasped by the flower of *nous*. It must be grasped by the flower of *nous*, and further, "one must not conceive of this intelligible with vehemence, but rather with the subtle flame of a subtle *nous*."<sup>589</sup> In a fragment which is likely from Proclus' lost commentary on the *Chaldaean Oracles*, Proclus calls this the most unified part of the *nous* in us.

For indeed perhaps the flower of *nous* (*anthos nou*) is not the same as the flower of the entirety of our soul. The former is the most unified part of our intellectual life (*tēs noeras hēmōn zōēs to henoeidestaton*), while the latter is the one of all of the powers of the soul (*hapasōn tōn psuchikōn dunameōn hen*), which are quite varied. For we are not only *nous*, but also *dianoia* and opinion (*doxa*) and

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<sup>589</sup> See Fr. I.1-6, p.66 *Phil.Chald.* (des Places): Οὐ δὲ χρὴ σφοδρότητι νοεῖν τὸ νοητὸν ἐκεῖνο ἀλλὰ νόου ταναοῦ ταναῆ φλογί.

attention (*prosoché*) and choice (*prouiresis*). And before these powers we are an *ousia* which is one and many, divided and indivisible.<sup>590</sup>

The *anthos nou* is the highest thinking part of the Soul. It is the unity by which we become one with the intelligible thought itself. We should be reminded of Plotinus' unification with the Form of Beauty, which is really a unification with *Nous* itself, in *Ennead* V.8. It is by putting off all multiplicity that both Proclus and Plotinus think the Soul becomes like the intelligible which is already present in its centre.

Proclus speaks about another one, highest part, or flower in the Soul. Rather than calling it the flower of *nous*, he calls it the flower of the Soul (*anthos tês psuchês*). In the fragment from his commentary on the *Chaldaean Oracles* just above, Proclus seems to indicate that the *anthos nou* is only the highest part of the Soul's *nous*, and that there needs to be another *anthos*, an *anthos* of the whole Soul, because there is more in the Soul than *nous*. If we think of the Soul on the analogy of a circle, whose circumference is the Soul's dianoetic activity, and whose centre is its *ousia*, then we can distinguish in the centre itself further centres, such that the original centre becomes a circumference to an even more unified centre. So if the Soul's *ousia* is its centre, then the flower of *nous* is the centre of the Soul's *ousia*. However, the flower of *nous* allows the Soul to grasp only the highest intelligible moment, it cannot be that by which the Soul grasps the One itself. So inside the flower of *nous* we must find another centre, which Proclus calls the flower of the whole Soul, and which is that by which we are unified with the One.<sup>591</sup> These

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<sup>590</sup> *Phil. Chald.* (des Places) 210.28-211.4.: Μήποτε οὖν οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτόν νοῦ ἄνθος καὶ πάσης ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνθος· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἔστι τῆς νοεράς ἡμῶν ζωῆς τὸ ἐνοειδέστατον, τὸ δὲ ἀπασῶν τῶν ψυχικῶν δυνάμεων ἓν, πολυειδῶν οὐσῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσμεν νοῦς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διάνοια καὶ δόξα καὶ προσοχή καὶ προαίρεσις, καὶ πρὸ τῶν δυνάμεων τούτων οὐσία μία τε καὶ πολλή καὶ μεριστή τε καὶ ἀμερής.

<sup>591</sup> In "L'hyparxis de l'âme et la fleur de l'intellect dans la mystagogie de Proclus," *Proclus – lecteur et interprète des anciens* (Paris: C.N.R.S., 1987) pp.335-345 Christian Guérard argues that the flower of *nous* and the flower of the soul are like the lower and higher points of the mystical plane of the soul, lying above both discursive and non-discursive thought. They are moments of the soul's *hyparxis*, in one of the various uses of that term. I find his argument convincing, especially in his insistence on the distinction between the three terms: *hyparxis* of the soul, flower of intellect, and flower of the soul. C. Steel, "'Ὑπαρξις chez Proclus," in *Hyparxis e Hypostasis nel Neoplatonismo (atti del I colloquio internazionale del centro di ricerca sul neoplatonismo, università degli studi di catania, 1-3 ottobre 1992)* ed. F. Romano e D.P. Taormina (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1994) pp.79-100, follows Guérard in his distinction of the flower of intellect from the flower of the soul (see pp.95-100). However, Steel points us to passages from the

flowers, or ones, or highest points, are the direct presence to the soul of the summits of those things in which it participates. As there is in *Nous* itself as a hypostasis a highest moment, the summit of the intelligible, this highest moment is also present to Soul which participates in it, as the flower of the *nous* in soul, the Chaldaean *anthos nou*. But because soul also participates in the One through the henad which is immediately present to it, there is also a flower or one of the soul itself, through which the soul may surpass even the intelligible.<sup>592</sup>

The intelligible and the One can be present to us because "there is nothing in between but the fact that they are different."<sup>593</sup> When Proclus says that we rise to *Nous* through the *nous* in us, this is not a matter of a spatial journey. The traidic motion from *ousia*, *dunamis*, to *energeia* which is the Soul's projection of *logoi* is its own manner of mediating to itself the *Nous* which is present to it as its centre. The same reasoning holds for the One. If *Nous* is a divided image of the One, then in mediating *Nous* to itself the Soul also mediates to itself the One. So if *Nous* is present as its centre, so is the One. C. Guérard argues strongly for the position that the *henades hyperousioi* are not a separate

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*Platonic Theology* and the *In Alcibiadem* which do seem to identify the one of the soul (i.e. the flower of the soul) and its *hyperxis*. Steel thinks that Proclus' language remains ambiguous, sometimes identifying and sometimes distinguishing between these two terms. For our purposes it is only important to recognise the distinction between the flower of the soul and the flower of *nous*, therefore we will leave the question of the soul's *hyperxis* open. See also T. Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists. A study in the history of Hellenism*, 4th ed., with a Supplement on the Commentaries of Proclus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928) pp.261-264; L.J. Rosán, *The Philosophy of Proclus* (New York: Cosmos, 1949) pp.214-217; S.E. Gersh, *From Iamblichus to Eriugena* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978) pp.119-121; J.M. Rist, "Mysticism and transcendence in later Neoplatonism," *Hermes*, 92 (1964) pp.215-219; A. Smith, *Porphyry's place in the Neoplatonic tradition* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974) pp.120-121; A. Sheppard, "Proclus' attitude to theurgy," *Classical Quarterly*, 32 (1982) p.221.

<sup>592</sup> Guérard argues that not only are these two flowers distinct, they are the upper and lower reaches of the *hyperxis* of the soul. He also points out that in *Nous* itself there would not be two flowers, because the Flower of *Nous* would be its own highest moment, the presence to it of its henad, and that through which *Nous* itself surpasses its own noetic character. So in the Soul the Flower of *Nous* is the highest noetic moment, and the Flower of the Soul itself is the highest moment of all. See C. Guérard, "L'hyperxis de l'âme et la fleur d'intellect dans la mystagogie de Proclus," in *Proclus lecteur et interprète des anciens. Actes du Colloque internationale du C.N.R.S., Paris 2-4 oct. 1985*. J. Pépin et H.-D. Saffrey (Paris: C.N.R.S., 1987) pp.335-343. For a brief argument *contra* see C. Steel, "ὑπερξίς chez Proclus," in *Hyperxis e Hypostasis nel Neoplatonismo (atti del I colloquio internazionale del centro di ricerca sul neoplatonismo, università degli studi di catania, 1-3 ottobre 1992)* ed. F. Romano e D.P. Taormina (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1994) pp.79-100; see p.99.

<sup>593</sup> *Enn.* V.1.3.22: οὐδὲν γὰρ μεταξὺ ἢ τὸ ἐτέροις εἶναι.



hypostasis. Rather, they are the pure procession of the One, and as such are a multiplicity of ones participated *directly* by the lower orders. Thus they are the immediate presence of the One to all things, a presence which also allows the One itself to remain aloof. Thus the one, or flower, of the soul would be the presence to the soul of the henad in which it participates.<sup>594</sup>

### VII.iii. The One and the Soul according to Jean Trouillard

Jean Trouillard was the most prolific modern Proclus scholar. His focus was always on the Soul, and most often on what he considered to be the immediate relation between the One and the Soul. Trouillard considered the Soul to be "la plus claire et la mieux déployées des structures, celle dans laquelle on peut lire le plus distinctement la loi structurale de réel."<sup>595</sup> The Soul is the point, according to Trouillard, at which the expansion into multiplicity of the One's power begins to be a dispersion into indeterminacy. The Soul is the most complex image of the procession of all things from the One, because in Body we have less intelligible complexity than unintelligible multiplicity.

Trouillard describes three different schemes of procession from the One, which he names the *schéma dégressif*, the *schéma rayonnant*, and the *schéma monadologique*. The third scheme integrates into itself both of the first two schemes. In effect, Trouillard is pointing out that in one sense the power of the One is manifested through intermediaries, so that according to the digressive scheme there is a series of One – Being – Life – *Nous* – Soul. In another sense, however, the One is immediately present to all of its effects, so that in the radiating scheme there is no series, and the One is immediately present to

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<sup>594</sup> See C. Guérard, "La théorie des hénades et la mystique de Proclus," *Dionysius*, 6 (1982) pp.73-82. See *In Parm.* 1081.1-10; 1071.19-29; 1079.20ff; 1082.8ff; S.R.M. 345-358 [509.96-509.10]; *El Th.* prop. 125.

<sup>595</sup> J. Trouillard, *La mystagogie de Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1982) pp.123-124.

Being, Life, *Nous*, and to Soul. Trouillard thinks that each successor in the digressive scheme contains all that which precedes it:

Selon cette interprétation, il faudrait dire que chaque série (et chaque degré de chaque série) contient toutes les séries qui la précèdent dans l'ordre processif, si bien que celui-ci se déroule de façon intégrale et distincte à l'intérieur de la dernière, c'est-à-dire de la série psychique.<sup>596</sup>

Therefore, according to the monadological scheme the Soul is not only Soul, but rather is One-Being-Life-*Nous*-Soul. Similarly, *Nous* is in fact One-Being-Life-*Nous*, and so on.

Trouillard thinks that all of these principles are present to the Soul in a very strong manner, and therefore he thinks that the self-unfolding of the Soul is also the self-unfolding of the principles anterior to the Soul.

Ainsi chaque âme contient toutes les séries, et donc autant de fois déterminant [Limit] et infini [Unlimited] et autant de formes du déterminant et de l'infini qu'il y a de séries antérieures à l'âme dans l'ordre dégressif. Autrement dit, l'âme enveloppe la série entière du déterminant et la série entière de l'infini. Et par chacune elle communique directement avec l'Un. L'âme récapitule donc tous les modes selon lesquels le Principe s'exprime comme un infini et tous ceux selon lesquels il se manifeste comme déterminant. Elle enveloppe tous les principes don't elle dérive et ceux-ci deviennent ses éléments, parce qu'ils sont tous, comme elle-même, des modes direct de l'Un [*In Parm.* 1219.30-1220.24].<sup>597</sup>

Trouillard states this point very strongly. The Soul contains the entire series which precedes it, and all of the manners of existing of Limit and Unlimited which constitute the things before it. By each of these series the Soul communicated *directly* with the One. This is because each of the principles from which the Soul derives are 'direct modes of the One' and become elements of the Soul. What Trouillard seems to mean by this is that the Soul is in an immediate relation with the One, according to which the Soul manifests in itself the entire diversity of the procession of things from the One to the Soul. Even more so, the Limit and Unlimited are only powers of the One in virtue of the procession and reversion of *Nous* and Soul: "*c'est l'autoconstituant qui constitue les puissances du*

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<sup>596</sup> J. Trouillard, *L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1972) p. 77.

<sup>597</sup> J. Trouillard, *L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1972) p. 77.

*Principe* en se formant à partir de lui."<sup>598</sup> For Trouillard the transcendence of the One above the Soul is in effect an immanence of the One in it, as a sort of inexhaustible departure point for the Soul. Thus Trouillard depicts the Soul's rising to *Nous* as an internal journey. "Philosopher, c'est donc chercher à se connaître soi-même intégralement. Et jouir de l'union mystique, c'est reconnaître que le centre de l'âme coïncide avec le centre universel."<sup>599</sup>

I find it difficult to disagree with most of Trouillard's points, but I find that he has an emphasis on the immediate presence to the Soul of the One which skews his interpretation somewhat. What seems to drop out of his discussion is the relation between *Nous* and the Soul, and the Soul's *noësis*. Rather, he interprets *dianoia* as an activity which arises out of the immediate negation of the One as an inexhaustible source, taking the 'night of negations' of the *Parmenides* as his model. But *dianoia* does not have the One as its proximate source, even if it is its ultimate source. Rather, through *dianoia* the Soul makes itself to be a divided image of *Nous*. And even if this means that it is a divided image of the One, because *Nous* itself is a divided image of the One, it is important not to leave out the level of *Nous*. It is the intelligible in *Nous* which is the proximate aim of our striving, and only after attaining this can the Soul anchor in the "paternal haven" which is the One.

A clue to the motivation for this emphasis on the direct relation of Soul to One, and the corresponding lack of emphasis on *Nous*, is provided by S. Breton.

Car il y est question, comme nous y avons insisté, des deux possibilités fondamentales de la pensée. En gros, et pour reprendre une formule célèbre, mais en nous méfiant de la formule, ce qui se joue dans ces grands jeux, c'est l'alternative entre hénologie et ontologie, entre la participation à l'être et l'inspiration de l'Un, entre une onto-théologie et une «mé-ontologie».<sup>600</sup>

<sup>598</sup> J. Trouillard, *L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1972) p.85.

<sup>599</sup> J. Trouillard, *L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1972) p.85.

<sup>600</sup> S. Breton, "Âme spinoziste, Âme néo-platonicienne," *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 71 (Mai 1973) pp.210-224; p.220-221. For Breton's position see also "Jean Trouillard, philosophe néo-platonicien," *Revue de l'Institut catholique de Paris*, 16 (1985) pp.51-63; and "Négation et négativité proclusiennes dans l'oeuvre de Jean Trouillard," in *Proclus et son influence, actes du Colloque de*

In short, at least for Breton, the virtue of Proclus' system is that it falls outside the trap of onto-theology, and so is immune to Heidegger's criticism of Western Metaphysics.<sup>601</sup>

The infinite source which is the One seems to answer Heidegger's concern that in our thinking we not cover over Being, encrust it by trapping it within categories, and make it a formula. All this happens once we make Being into a being, even most perfect being, or *ens realissimum*. From this point of view the school of Neoplatonism running through Proclus to, for example, the Pseudo-Dionysius is more attractive than school running through Porphyry, to Victorinus and Augustine, because Porphyry made the mistake of thinking that being (*einai*) was an appropriate name for the First. It may be the case that Trouillard is influenced by this concern in interpretation of Proclus. To his great credit, however, despite his over-emphasis on the immediate relation of the One and the Soul, his readings of Proclus are good and comprehensive. With regard to onto-theology, it seems to me that a more genuine confrontation of Neoplatonism and Heidegger is needed. Many of the philosophical concerns which Heidegger thinks are satisfied by his historicism seem already to have been addressed within the Neoplatonic tradition itself. Most important in this respect is the topic of this study, the idea of *dianoia* as a metaphorical knowledge, as productive of a divided image of *Nous*. Rather than encrusting Being in static categories, it seems that Proclus' account of our discursive projection of *logoi* allows us always to go back and supplement the picture of Being that we have so far.

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Neuchâtel, Jun, 1985 (Zürich: Éditions du Grand Midi, 1987) pp.81-100.

<sup>601</sup> Another thinker who seems to have accepted the validity of Heidegger's criticism is H. Duméry. See "Proclus et la puissance de produire," in *Néoplatonisme. Mélanges offerts à Jean Trouillard* (Paris: Les cahiers de Fontenay, 1981) pp.159-190. Both he and Trouillard were influenced by Maurice Blondel. W.J. Hankey says of Blondel, "so far as Blondel conceived metaphysics as trapped within a logic of self-objectification by a pretense to speculative completeness apart from action, he followed Bergson's indications as to the way out." For the history of the relation between French Neoplatonic scholars and Heidegger, see W.J. Hankey, "French Neoplatonism in the 20<sup>th</sup> century," *Animus*, 4 (1999) <http://www.mun.ca/animus>.

Proclus was a great devotee of religious cults. The goddess Athena visited him twice in his life, once to reveal to him his philosophical vocation and once to inform him of her intention to live in his household after the removal of her cult statue from the Acropolis.<sup>602</sup> In *La mystagogie de Proclus*,<sup>603</sup> J.Trouillard asks if in Proclus we have a philosopher with a sort of 'split personality'. Is he a rational man in his philosophical work, while being an irrational fanatic in his religious life? Trouillard's conclusion, with which I agree, is that Proclus does not have a split personality. His devotion to cult and his devotion to philosophy are part of the same character of the man. Such things as Athena's visits in bodily form, coming to him in a dream, have their place in his system, and can be explained because there is more in us than *dianoia*.<sup>604</sup>

As we have said before, according to Proclus things are known according to the power of the knower, not the thing which is known. And when the power of the gods, by which Proclus means the higher orders in the spiritual hierarchy, be they in the given case *daimones*, individual *noes*, or *henads*, is communicated to human beings, it is received according to our own mode. So we comprehend it in an ineffable intellectual grasp, according to the *nous* which is in us, we unroll its concentrated content according to the *dianoia* which is in us, and we receive this power in the form of visions and portents according to the power of *phantasia* which we have because of our bodily nature. Proclus' belief in divine dreams and visions is a consistent application of his general epistemological principles. Just as when our *dianoia* is directed towards the ineffable One which is present to us as an inexhaustible source it produces divided *logoi*, so when our *phantasia* is directed towards this centre of ourselves it produces visions and dreams, myths and divine symbols. We do not just make these up, according to Proclus. They are

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<sup>602</sup> Marinus, *Vita Procli* ch.9; ch.30.

<sup>603</sup> ch.II, pp.33-51, and in an earlier version of this chapter, published as "Le merveilleux dans la vie et la pensée de Proclus," *Revue philosophique*, 163 (1973) pp.439-452.

<sup>604</sup> See also A.J. Festugière, "Proclus et la religion traditionnelle," in *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire offerts à André Piganiol* (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1966) pp.1581-1590.

manifestations of *Nous* and the One on the level of sensibility, just as philosophy is their manifestation on the level of *dianoia*.

These 'alternate' ways of unifying with the One are generally two, depending on whether they minister to the part of us which is below *dianoia* or above. The first includes certain forms of dreams and visions, and especially the ritual practice of theurgy. The second includes the contemplation of various sorts of symbols, such as the names of the gods, and above all prayer. These principles are also applied to textual interpretation by Proclus, so that various texts or parts of texts can be read as elaborate allegories, designed to lift the soul in a different manner than discursive reason.<sup>605</sup>

Since Iamblichus theurgy was an accepted practice among most Pagan Neoplatonists. Those who were skilled in the theurgic art were able to consecrate or

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<sup>605</sup> J. Dillon examines *eikōn*, *symbolon*, and *analogia* in Proclus' allegorical exegesis of Platonic texts. See "Image, symbol and analogy: three basic concepts of Neoplatonic allegorical exegesis," in *The significance of Neoplatonism*, ed. R. Baine Harris (New York: S.U.N.Y., 1976) pp.247-262. He finds in Proclus a report of a three-stage process by which the Pythagoreans revealed their doctrine. First, images (*eikōnes*) of the divine realities would be set before the initiates. These images would reflect the divine reality in such a way as to be obviously representative, and not be in discord with the realities themselves. Then would be brought forth symbols (*symbola*), which reflect reality in a higher manner, because they are more difficult to discern as allegories, and because they represent more ineffable truths. Symbols, as opposed to images, are an inversion of the reality which they symbolise. By a coincidence of opposites, the vulgarity and monstrosity of the symbol makes the mind rise to the purity of what it symbolises. The Platonic myths would be examples of *eikōnes*, while the Homeric myths would be *symbola*. However, Dillon finds that Proclus does not preserve this distinction and uses *eikōn* and *symbolon* interchangeably. He also thinks, and I agree, that in practice such a distinction would be difficult to preserve. Be that as it may, both images and symbols are used in the allegorical exegesis of a text, in which the surface meaning of the text is seen to be analogous to the divine realities. So, in the Parmenides commentary, Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates are taken to be analogous to unparticipated *Nous*, the *Nous* participated by the Divine Soul, and individual *nous*; or alternately to the Being, Life and *Nous* within *Nous* as a whole. There is a correspondance between the lower levels of reality and the higher, so that the internal structure of the lower is analogous in some manner to the higher. So the function of *eikōnes* and *symbola* rely on *analogia*, as does the *probolē tōn ousiōdōn logōn*. In the same manner the surface meaning of certain texts (divinely inspired texts) is analogous to divine reality. See also J. Coulter, *The literary microcosm, theories of interpretation in the later neoplatonists* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976) pp.39-72; see p.45: "the key mechanism which the allegorical critics employed in the interpretation of a text which had declared itself to be symbolic was that of analogy or correspondance. Again and again, it is by the ladder of analogy that a commentator will ascend from the surface of the text to its hidden meaning." See also J. Trouillard, "Le symbolisme chez Proclus," *Dialogues d'histoire ancienne*, 7 (1981) pp.297-307. According to Proclus Plato criticises Homer in the Republic not for the use of symbol understood in this manner, but in order to ensure that such symbols be kept from the masses, who are easily led astray. See p.299: "Il semble à Proclus que Platon lui-même n'a pas éliminé totalement la diffusion de mythes tenus pour monstrueux. S'il est nécessaire d'en parler, dit l'auteur de la République (378a), il faudrait le faire en secret, devant le plus petit nombre possible d'auditeurs et après l'immolation non d'un porc, mais d'une victime plus rare et plus coûteuse."

animate statues in order to obtain oracular pronouncements from them, presumably by imprisoning in the objects certain *daimones*. Or they were able to obtain oracles through the use of a medium, who would enter an entranced state. The principle behind theurgy is likely the *sympatheia* which holds between higher and lower members of the same *seira*, or series.<sup>606</sup> The need for theurgy as a supplement to philosophy is likely due to the fact that the human being is not only a soul, but a soul wedded to an immaterial pneumatic body, or vehicle (*ochêma*). The practice of theurgy has as its aim to purify the body of all material associations, just as the practice of philosophy has as its aim to purify the soul of all multiplicity.<sup>607</sup> Indeed, Proclus and all of the Pagan Neoplatonists were particularly devout men, and in addition to theurgic practice, observed the rituals and practices associated with the worship of the traditional pagan Greek gods.<sup>608</sup> Just as dreams and visions minister to the *phantasia* and *aisthêsis* of the Soul, so theurgy has an effect not on the higher power themselves, but on the practitioners of the sacred rites. It is a purification from baser bodily association adapted to beings who have bodies. A similar characterisation can be found in certain explanations of Catholic sacramentalism. Men have a need for sacraments because they are a union of both soul and body.

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<sup>606</sup> See E.R. Dodds, "Theurgy and its relationship to Neoplatonism," *Journal of Roman Studies*, 37 (1947) pp.55-69; and H. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy; Mysticism, Magic and Platonism in the Later Roman Empire* (Cairo, 1956 [New edition with a contribution by P. Hadot, "Bilan et perspectives sur les Oracles Chaldaïques et une bibliographie de H. Lewy," (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1978)]). See also A. Sheppard, "Proclus' attitude to theurgy," *Classical Quarterly*, 32 (1982) pp.212-224. Dodds is deeply antipathetic to the mystical and religious side of Iamblichus and post-Iamblican Neoplatonism.

Festugière is also not attracted by late Antique religion. A positive evaluation of it only appears in mainstream modern Neoplatonic studies with figures such as P. Hadot and J. Trouillard. For this history, see W.J. Hankey, "French Neoplatonism in the 20<sup>th</sup> century," *Animus*, 4 (1999) <http://www.mun.ca/animus>.

<sup>607</sup> This is the opinion of A. J. Festugière, "Contemplation philosophique et art théurgique chez Proclus," in *Études de la philosophie Grecque* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1971) pp.585-596. See also E. des Places, "La religion de Jamblique," in *De Jamblique à Proclus* (Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1975) pp.69-94, and J. Trouillard, *L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1972) pp.171-189.

<sup>608</sup> See H.-D. Saffrey, "Neoplatonist spirituality, II: From Iamblichus to Proclus and Damascius," in *Classical Mediterranean Spirituality. Egyptian, Greek, Roman*. Ed. A.H. Armstrong ("World spirituality. An encyclopedic history of the religious quest." 15) (New York, 1986) pp.250-265 [translation of "Quelques aspects de la spiritualité des philosophes néoplatoniciens. De Jamblique à Proclus et Damascius," *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, 68 (1984) pp.169-182].

Prayer ministers not to *phantasia* and *aisthēsis*, but rather is a way of describing how the soul surpasses *dianoia*. As we have seen, all of the higher orders are present to the Soul, and the Soul can pass over into their mode of existing if it puts off its multiplicity. The Soul does this by concentration on the divinely revealed names of the gods,<sup>609</sup> or by a silence higher than names. In essence, prayer is a religious description of unifying with the One through the one or flower of the Soul. Indeed, Proclus' prayer is a very intellectual prayer. Perfect prayer is knowledge of the degrees of the divine hierarchy to which the one who prays ascends, because you cannot have intimate commerce with the gods if you don't know the particular character of each. The five degrees of prayer are in fact five different epistemological/ontological perspectives, through which the soul passes, culminating in the perspective of the One and the henads, which is *henōsis*.<sup>610</sup>

As with most things in Proclus, we should be careful of separating out too strongly theurgy, philosophy, and prayer. Theurgy mediates to the body, but it is informed by philosophy, and is in a sense philosophy in bodily action. Prayer, on the other hand, is the completion of philosophy, because it leads to the *noēsis* and *henōsis* which philosophy ultimately seeks, according to Proclus.

"La foi qu'exalte ainsi Proclus n'est pas la croyance en des vérités déterminées. elle établit au contraire les âmes dans l'absolu indétermination divine. C'est «un silence unitif» qui fixe l'âme dans l'ineffabilité des dieux...Elle nous permet d'atteindre l'Ineffable par l'ineffable... parce qu'elle actualise ce qu'il y a d'indéterminé en nous, que notre néoplatonicien désigne souvent par ce mot *hyparxis*. Ce terme fréquemment synonyme de «l'un de l'âme» est plus hénologique qu'ontologique...Nous voyons pourquoi le symbole est plus opératoire que l'image [*eikōn*]. Si le néoplatonisme voulait nous entraîner vers une simple contemplation, il pourrait se contenter de figures. Mais, du moment qu'il place notre centre ainsi que le centre universel au delà de l'intelligible..., il

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<sup>609</sup> In *Parm.* S.R.M. 231-237 [505.83-89].

<sup>610</sup> The five degrees are (1) knowledge (*gnōsis*); (2) appropriation/taking as one's own (*oikeiōsis*); (3) contact (*sunaphē*); (4) approach (*empelasis*); (5) and union (*henōsis*). See In *Tim.* I.211.8-212.1. See also A. Brémond, "Un texte de Proclus sur la prière et l'union divine." *Recherches de science religieuse*, 19 (1929) pp.448-462.



doit recourir à des procédés don't l'efficacité déborde celle de la connaissance, comme les mythes initiatiques (qui sont le paysage du rite) et les rites (qui sont les mythes en acte)... Notre philosophe savait bien qu'Athéna, Asclépios ou Apollon n'étaient que les figures mythiques de telle ou telle fonction divine. Et ce qui donnait corps à ces puissances inaccessibles aux sens, c'était la nécessité de leur faire traverser l'âme entière de dedans au dehors et de les exprimer dans l'imagination et la sensibilité sous une forme appropriée à ces modes de représentation. Dès lors le symbole est notre oeuvre... Il est oeuvre collective en tant que les mythes sont le produit d'une communauté humaine, mais aussi oeuvre individuelle en tant que chacun les évoque pour son propre compte et dans sa situation particulière. Mais cette oeuvre est effectuée par nous sous une inspiration secrète de la divinité et comme un témoignage de cette motion... On voit en quel sens l'âme proclienne est créatrice des symboles. En les formant, elle s'affecte elle-même sous l'action divine, elle se donne à elle-même ce qu'elle reçoit des dieux.<sup>611</sup>

I think Trouillard is correct in his characterisation here. For Proclus, myth and symbol are ways in which we mediate the ineffable to ourselves, as is philosophy. Myth and philosophy overlap, and that overlap is most obvious in the name which philosophy uses for the Highest: the One.

Si l'un se justifie comme le meilleur symbole de la divinité sur le plan spéculatif, il est aussi le plus incantatoire. Car la théologie néoplatonicienne n'est pas simple théorie, mais également conversion. Elle ne peut être entièrement détachée de la théurgie et du mythe «initiatique» don't elle sort et vers lesquels elle nous tourne. Son efficacité déborde le langage rationnel pour employer celui de la poésie inspirée [*In Remp.*I.177.16-23; 178.10-179.03]... Le terme «Un» n'évoque ni une hypostase transcendante qui serait inaffirmable, ni un simple état immanent qui inviterait à un narcissisme peu platonicien, mais une présence qui, ne pouvant ni se thématiser ni se réfléchir adéquatement, appelle toutes les ressources de l'expression. Ce qui ne peut être conçu peut être suggéré, joué et chanté.<sup>612</sup>

According to Proclus, *dianoia* makes the Soul to be a divided image of *Nous*, and in that sense all *dianoia* is metaphor. But *dianoia* is not the only metaphor which points the soul towards its Father.

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<sup>611</sup> See J. Trouillard, "Le symbolisme chez Proclus," *Dialogues d'histoire ancienne*, 7 (1981) pp.297-307; see pp.303-306.

<sup>612</sup> J. Trouillard, *La mystagogie de Proclus* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1982) pp.99-100.

## CONCLUSION

It is fair to say that Proclus' account of *dianoia* is the highest point of ancient epistemology. Plato's account of knowing shows us that Being cannot be grasped by sensation or opinion (*Theaetetus*). Moreover, he seeks to persuade us that the soul can, indeed, come to know Being if it persist in the search (*Meno*). This is because Being and the soul are akin, and in some sense we already know what we seek. A full account of the manner in which the soul already grasps the Forms, however, is not given in Plato. In some sense, this contributes to the worth of the dialogues. Their underdetermination on just this most important point allows them to serve as fertile points of departure for our own thinking.

Aristotle's account of active and passive intellect is important, because it supplements the Platonic notion of intellectual *erôs* with the notions of activity and potentiality. However, it is unclear in Aristotle's works why it is that the soul would be such as to know formal causes of things. One can assert that the rational soul simply is such as to receive the forms of things in an immaterial manner. However, one is left with the unanswered question of the ground of the kinship between thinking and Being. Just as Aristotle has no answer as to why there are ten, and only ten, categories, he has no account of this ground.

I believe that it is for this reason that Aristotelian epistemology was less popular in subsequent Greek philosophy than was Platonic epistemology. Indeed, very soon even those philosophers who called themselves Peripatetics Platonised their Aristotle at least to some extent. The union of Plato and Aristotle in Middle and Neoplatonism sought to

provide an answer to the question of this ground. Thought and Being go together because ultimately they are two sides of the same reality. We can know all things because both thought and Being are derived from the one principle of all things.

The Neoplatonic thesis of the One beyond Being/*Nous* expresses this in a particularly powerful way. Both Being and thinking are multiple expressions of the simple cause of all. In *Nous*, Being is thinking, because it is thinking which brings into existence the determinations into which Being falls, as a multiple reflection of its simple source. Also in Neoplatonism the important distinction between *Nous* and *dianoia* is expressed most clearly and coherently. It is not our thinking which produces the primary determinations of Being, but our thinking grasps these determinations because it is itself an image of the primary thinking of *Nous*. In Proclus we find the moments of this declension of thought and Being examined in the most systematic and complete manner in all of Neoplatonism. His system is not so much a departure from Plotinus, as a minute examination of the moments which Plotinus first articulated. If the Soul is an image of *Nous* in Plotinus, Proclus gives us an account of the details of this relation. If Soul's thought is a division of the *eidē* in *Nous*, in Plotinus, Proclus gives us an account of the nature of Soul's dividing activity. He gives an account of its inner articulations, and of its upper and lower limits. Further, in Proclus' account, the ontological and epistemological aspects of *dianoia* are drawn together in such a way that we can see why it is that in our everyday experience we do not always realise why, or that, thinking and Being go together.

Proclus' account of *dianoia* also provides compelling answers to aspects of our thinking which had not been sufficiently treated in his predecessors. The Soul's status as a divided image of *Nous* explains why it is that we seem on the one hand to be able to know intelligible reality, but on the other hand are not able to know it comprehensively or completely. Proclus can explain why it is that there is a history of philosophy. *Dianoia* is measured by Time, and the projection of *logoi* which manifest *Nous* which we know of as speculative philosophy takes place through the activity of men who are immersed in

*genesis*. There is no necessary progression in the history of philosophy, because each system is the record of a soul's thinking which begins from the same point, from *Nous*. However, through reading the works of our predecessors, we are able to have a sort of conversation with them, and their ideas may move us from without such that we regain in some measure our native *autokinêsis*. In this sense alone is there progression in the history of philosophy. But it is not necessary, and it depends on the character of each individual who takes up the works from the past, and it depends on which works they choose to take up. All of this is determined to a great extent by their own inner motion of *logoi*, as they are attracted to certain thinkers and not to others.

We ourselves, therefore, have this relation to Proclus. Our interest in his epistemology is informed by the subsequent history of philosophy, insofar as each of us is familiar with it, and has taken it more or less to heart. Because of this certain aspects of his account of *dianoia* are thrown into higher relief for us than they probably were for Proclus himself. One such aspect is his distinction between *dianoia* and *Nous*. In post Cartesian philosophy this distinction seems to have been lost. So in Descartes we find the demand for certainty in discursive knowing. The Cartesian demand for certainty, a demand which is still felt in philosophy today, is misguided from a Procline perspective, because it conflates *Nous* and *dianoia*. *Dianoia* is a dividing activity, an activity which unfolds its source, and because of this it is an activity which can never adequately its source. It does give rise to true *logoi*, but these *logoi* always point back beyond themselves to their source. This character of *logos* is missing in Descartes. In effect, the demand for certainty throws into doubt the entire question of the source of discursive thought.

Another aspect of *dianoia* in Proclus which is important for us is its character as a dividing activity. I have contrasted this dividing activity, earlier in this study, with the synthetic character of reason as we know it from Kant. Kant's account of synthetic *a priori* judgements ignores exactly this dividing character. In effect, if *dianoia* is a dividing, then

it must be the case that we have *a priori* intuition. Otherwise there would be nothing to divide. *Dianoia*'s *logoi* are divided images of *eidê*, and if so, then we must have an *a priori* grasp of the *eidê*. If this were not the case, we would conclude, as Kant does, that the majority of *logoi* (i.e. *a priori* synthetic judgements) are groundless.

Finally, the partial aspect of the *probolê tôn ousiôdôn logôn* resonates with the concerns of contemporary phenomenology. Heidegger's deconstruction of the history of ontology had as its aim to free Being from what had become the categories of Being, through centuries of encrustation. Thoughts which have become mere *formulae* are no longer thinking Being, but rather cover it over. His account of Being as a source for poetic thinking, his account of language as the House of Being, is extremely powerful. However, it seems that Proclus has also taken account of need for *dianoia* ever to be fresh, and ever to return to its source. The thinking which is *dianoia* is always only on the way to *Nous*. Systematic philosophy, therefore, is by its nature unable to give a complete account of the determinations of Being. It produces divided images of the primary determinations in *Nous*, and it may continue to produce such divided images indefinitely. Proclus seems to be aware of this aspect of his account, in his tendency to give alternate 'exhaustive' lists of the orders of the universe, and in his very different treatment of the same topics in his various works. But he nowhere comes out and says that this partial nature of *dianoia* is a virtue. As I have said above, it is likely that this aspect stands out in high relief only for us.

## APPENDIX: FIGURES

### THE LEVELS OF CAUSATION IN PROCLUS

#### onta

to hen, which is uncaused, has maximal unity

to on, which is caused by to hen, has unity and maximal being

zôê, which is caused by to hen and to on, has unity, being, and maximal life

nous, which is caused by to hen, to on and zôê, has unity, being, life, and maximal intelligence

psuchê, which is caused by to hen, to on, zôê, and nous, has unity, being, life, intelligence, and dianora

#### ginomena

zôia, which are caused by to hen, to on, zôê, and nous, have unity, being, life, and minimal intelligence

phuta, which are caused by to hen, to on and zôê, have unity, being, and minimal life

nekra sômata (to opsuchon), which are caused by to hen and to on, have unity and minimal being

huiê, which is caused by to hen, has minimal unity





Figure 1: The levels of causation in Proclus (adapted from p.232. note to props.58 and 59. in Dodd's edition of the *Elements of Theology*)

## THE LEVELS OF SOUL IN PROCLUS



\*Divine Souls participate in  $\tau$  nous through the unparticipated monad of soul, and also participate in an individual nous. Lower sorts of souls participate in  $\tau$  nous only through the Monad of Soul.

Figure 2: The levels of Soul in Proclus

## A COMPARISON OF THE DIVIDED LINE IN PLATO AND PROCLUS

### Plato's Line

Noësis: Upward moving reason, which uses only Forms, and moves towards an unhypothetical first principle

Dianoia: Downward moving reason, which uses assumed hypotheses and treats the objects of *pistis* as images of its own objects

*Pistis*: Opinion

*Eikasia*: Seeming

### Proclus Line

*Nous*: Has an atemporal grasp of itself as the primary locus of Forms

Soul's *ousia*: A fullness of *logoi*, which are images of the Forms in *Nous*

Soul's *dunamis*: Intermediate between the Soul's *ousia* and *energeia*

Soul's *energeia* as dialectic: Projection of *logoi* whose purpose is to grasp the Soul's *ousia*, and lead the Soul to a grasp of *Nous*; i.e. upward moving *dianoia* where projected *logoi* are treated as images

Soul's *energeia* as mathematics: Projection of *logoi* whose purpose is to grasp Soul as the ordering principle of body; i.e. downward moving *dianoia* where projected *logoi* are treated as paradigms

*Pistis*: Opinion

*Eikasia*: Seeming


Note that the proportions between the sections of Proclus' Line should be the same as between Plato's, but there is not enough space here to permit this)

Figure 3: A comparison of the Divided Line in Plato and Proclus



# CALCIDIUS' GEOMETRICAL MEANS

First Mean



Volumes:  
 First Term: 24  
 First Mean: 48  
 Second Mean: 96  
 Final Term: 192

Figure 4: Calcidius' geometrical means

## THE PYTHAGOREAN CLASSIFICATION OF THE MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES

QUANTITY — Arithmetic (*quantity considered in itself*)

Music (*quantity considered in relation to another quantity*)

MAGNITUDE — Geometry (*stationary magnitudes*)

Spherics (*magnitudes in motion*)

Proclus explains that the Pythagoreans are correct in their classification, because it agrees with Plato's doctrine in the *Timaeus*. It is by the Soul's plurality and diversity of *logoi* that it projects Arithmetic, and by its bonds that it projects Music. As the Soul is first divided by the demiurge, and then bound together by *logoi*, Arithmetic is older than Music.


Further, it is from the one figure in its *ousia* that the Soul projects Geometry, and from its motion that it projects Spherics. So Geometry is older than Spherics.

Figure 5: The Pythagorean classification of the mathematical sciences. *In Eucl.*36.12-

38.02

## GEMINUS' CLASSIFICATION OF THE MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES

### INTELLIGIBLES



### SET ISIBLES (parallel to geometry or arithmetic)

- Geodesy (geometry) (*heaps of earth considered as cones, etc.*)
- Calculation (arithmetic) (*numbers of sheep, cups, etc.*)
- Optics (geometry) — Optics (*illusory appearance of objects seen at a distance*)  
                               Catoptrics (*various ways in which light is reflected* -- related to scene painting, i.e. representing objects so that they do not seem disproportionate)
- Canonicus (arithmetic) (*perceptible ratios between notes of the musical scale*)

### SET ISIBLES (not parallel to geometry or arithmetic)




Figure 6: Geminus' classification of the mathematical sciences. *In Eucl.* 38.02-42.08

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