



The heroin coast

A political economy along the eastern African seaboard

Simone Haysom, Peter Gastrow and Mark Shaw

Summary

In recent years, the volume of heroin shipped from Afghanistan along a network of maritime routes in East and southern Africa appears to have increased considerably. Most of this heroin is destined for Western markets, but there is a spin-off trade for local consumption. An integrated regional criminal market has developed, both shaping and shaped by political developments in the region. Africa is now experiencing the sharpest increase in heroin use worldwide and a spectrum of criminal networks and political elites in East and southern Africa are substantially enmeshed in the trade. This report focuses on the characteristics of the heroin trade in the region and how it has become embedded in the societies along this route. It also highlights the features of the criminal-governance systems that facilitate drug trafficking along this coastal route.

Recommendations

- The East African heroin market forms an integrated regional criminal economy based on the transit of heroin from Afghanistan to the West.
- The transit economy relies on international ports and other infrastructure, and high levels of political protection.
- There is a rapidly growing consumer drug market in the region – one that is much larger than is commonly acknowledged.
- Despite some positive trends in drug users' ability to access health services in several locations in the region, there are nevertheless gaps in appropriate drug treatment interventions.

This paper focuses on:



Executive summary

Since 2010, several large heroin seizures by the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) – a 32-member-state naval partnership that conducts maritime security operations aimed at countering terrorism and narcotics smuggling – have confirmed that the eastern African coast is playing a significant role in the global heroin trade.¹

Heroin is being shipped from Afghanistan to the east coast of Africa along a maritime route known as the 'southern route'. This is in reality a network of routes stretching along East and southern Africa, with drug consignments eventually making their way to countries in Asia, Africa, Europe and, to a limited extent, North America. The southern route has gained popularity because the land-based Balkan trafficking route to Western Europe is increasingly difficult for traffickers to use owing to conflict and increased law enforcement there.² This has meant that illegal drug flows are diverted by sea to East Africa – and these movements are considerably harder to police. The volume of trade along this route appears to be increasing.

Much of the focus has hitherto been on how heroin shipped along the southern route reaches Europe. However this perspective tends to downplay or even ignore the impact of the trade on transit countries in Africa. Therefore, the focus of this study is on the characteristics of the heroin trade in the region and how the narcotics trade has become embedded in the societies along the southern route.

This report is the culmination of four months of qualitative research based on over 240 interviews conducted in seven countries. This research raises several concerning issues.

In countries all along the eastern seaboard of Africa, from Kismayo to Cape Town, the heroin trade has become embedded in local communities and linked to political elites, where it has taken advantage of the weak checks and balances on political actors and state institutions. The East African heroin market is best understood as forming an integrated regional criminal economy based on the transit of heroin from Afghanistan to the West, and with a spin-off trade for local consumption.

Along this trafficking route, much of the heroin is first shipped to Africa on motorised, wooden seagoing

dhow built in the United Arab Emirates. The vessels are loaded with between 100 kg and 1 000 kg consignments of contraband off the Makran coast of southern Pakistan. The dhows anchor off the coast of Africa in international waters, and flotillas of small boats collect the heroin and ferry it to various beaches, coves or islands, or offload it into small commercial harbours. The research reveals that dozens of such sites are used for landing the consignments along the entire eastern coastline – from north of Kismayo, Somalia, to Angoche, Mozambique. This route is used all year round apart from during the three-month monsoon period.

The East African heroin market is best understood as forming an integrated regional criminal economy

Significantly, the research also suggests that transit traffickers have made use of containers at various deep-water container ports along the coast, and that several ports have fallen under substantial criminal influence and are used to transship a number of other illicit goods, such as elephant ivory and timber.

Most of the heroin that passes through East and southern Africa is destined for markets in Europe, which are far more profitable than the African markets.³ The transit heroin trade is a bulk trade: though shipments are sometimes broken down into smaller consignments in an effort to avoid detection, much heroin transported this way is moved in units of tens or even hundreds of kilograms at a time. As such, the transit economy relies on international ports and highways, and, to a lesser extent, air links. The trade also relies on high-level political protection, so that those involved can benefit from ready access to infrastructure, such as ports along the route, which are ostensibly important to national security and so should be well guarded and controlled by governments.

Initially, the political protection secured for this trade seems to have emerged out of simple transactions between drug traffickers and political figures who exert control over ports, customs and law-enforcement agencies. Heroin traders using this transit route need to arrange for these ports to be permeable, and

ensure their illicit goods are neither seized nor linked to criminal cases against them. Over time, these transactions have evolved in different ways along the coast. This study highlights the particular features of these criminal-governance systems as they occur along this coastal trafficking route:

- In Kenya, which one could characterise as a market where there is 'multipolar competition', drug traffickers have either campaigned directly for political office or they are often linked to political interests. Here, no single group dominates and there is significant competition among a spectrum of players.
- Tanzania is currently going through a series of reforms under President Magufuli that are substantially transforming criminal-political relationships in the country, with signs that this is having the effect of displacing criminal figures to other parts of the region. Tanzania can be labelled as a 'disrupted criminal market'.
- In Mozambique, drug traffickers have consolidated their hold over the market in a remarkably resilient and long-standing quid pro quo with elements linked to the political elite. The authors argue therefore that Mozambique can be regarded as a relatively consolidated criminal market where 'taxing' the proceeds from heroin may have contributed to funding political party campaigns and reinforced local patronage networks. There is also evidence that a period of further evolution in the market may now be under way.
- In South Africa heroin has not been directly linked to political figures, although prominent figures in the broader drug trade have. Here, however, most notably in the Western Cape and in Gauteng, powerful, and often violent, criminal interests are involved in controlling the heroin trade on the street.

Not all heroin is in transit along this route, however. East and southern Africa have a much larger consumer market than is commonly acknowledged. This consumer market gets some of its supply from 'leakage' from the transit trade – through in-kind payments to drivers, fishermen, police officers, etc. – and through small-scale theft from bulk consignments. But there is also some indication that bigger players arrange their own supplies directly from Pakistan or from the kingpins of the transit trade. In South Africa, in particular, the consumer market for heroin is large and growing, and this phenomenon is being driven by organised local and international networks. In this

study, we refer to this as the secondary heroin trade or secondary heroin economy.

South Africa, in fact, stands out as major destination for much of the heroin that enters the region, both as an end destination for local sale and consumption, and for onward shipping because traffickers appear to have greater ease getting containers from South Africa to Europe. (The researchers were told that this is because of a combination of the fact that freight leaving South Africa is considered to be at lower risk of containing contraband, and because there is a large volume of licit trade between South Africa and Europe.) There is also evidence, however, that heroin is making its way westwards across the continent by land through Uganda and onwards to West Africa, though these routes fall outside the scope of this report.

The 2017 *World drug report* noted that Africa is currently experiencing the sharpest increase in heroin use globally

The 2017 *World drug report* noted that Africa is currently experiencing the sharpest increase in heroin use globally, and this has been attributed to Africa's role in the southern route.⁴ According to various sources across the region (see Table 2), in Kenya there are almost 55 000 people who inject heroin (the consumption method that carries the highest health risks associated with this drug), over 32 000 in Tanzania and over 75 000 in South Africa. But the numbers of people smoking heroin, which, for many, will lead to injecting later, are much higher. In most of these countries, the rates of HIV among people who inject drugs (PWID) are several times higher than those among the rest of the population, and there are astronomically high rates of hepatitis C in this group.⁵ Despite a heartening trend that is seeing drug users' rights and their access to health services being placed at the centre of drug treatment approaches in several locations, there are nevertheless gaps in such interventions.

Cities with the biggest consumer markets – like Mombasa, Cape Town and the Johannesburg–Pretoria metropolitan area – are also beset with violence associated with the drug trade. For example, residents

in Mombasa say that local gangs that give protection to heroin barons have mushroomed over the last few years. At the same time, and in the midst of widespread impunity for the people who organise and profit from the drug trade, lynching of drug users by anti-crime vigilante groups has also become commonplace.

In South Africa, *nyaope* and *unga* use has also led to an increase in crime, with addicts financing their habit by resorting to mugging, theft of electrical copper cables and other criminal activities.⁶ More significantly, however, in gang-controlled areas levels of violence have seen huge increases, related both to an influx of guns⁷ and dramatic gang wars over drug turf. The Cape Town murder rate spiralled upwards from around 2011 and has only recently stabilised – albeit at extremely high levels – making the city one of the most violent in the world, on a par with several Latin American capitals.⁸

The heroin trade is therefore linked, both directly and indirectly, to a number of serious developments in the East and southern African region. These include sustaining undemocratic political figures and parties, the role of the trade in making key ports porous, the empty hotels and undeveloped land that serve as fronts for laundering drug money, the spread of HIV and hepatitis C, and violence in the communities caught up in heroin consumer markets.

A separate policy brief accompanying this study⁹ puts forward a number of recommendations, cautions and ideas on how best to respond to the heroin trade in southern and East Africa.¹⁰ The regional integration of the heroin trade raises several critical challenges for both civil-society and law-enforcement responses. There are also, however, important opportunities for action that can be taken now.

Background

Since 2010, when a series of large seizures drew attention to the long-standing heroin trade transiting the eastern coast of Africa, there has been a growing debate about the nature and implications of this criminal economy. The discussion to date, however, has been fragmentary, and heavily reliant on seizure data and on small ad hoc user surveys from which to draw conclusions. As such, attention has focused on the trade itself and failed to capture its broader impact.

Given that these seizures indicate a long chain of criminal activity along the coast, it makes sense to

consider the trade in the region as a whole and to trace its evolution over several decades. This is the motivation for this study.

The heroin trade plays a significant role in local and national politics in countries along the eastern seaboard of Africa. As mentioned, it is best understood as forming an integrated regional criminal economy, based around the transit of heroin from Afghanistan to Europe, and a spin-off trade for local consumption. Political systems across the region show signs of having been significantly captured for criminal ends. Heroin use is growing, while public-health systems are generally struggling to respond to it effectively or with the necessary capacity. The side effects of this trade are damaging to democracy and the prospects for broad-based economic development. Furthermore, in communities where there is widespread use there is much higher risk of HIV and hepatitis C infection, and these communities are wracked by violence associated with the drug trade.

The heroin trade plays a significant role in local and national politics in countries along the eastern seaboard of Africa

This report sets out how the heroin trade operates along a section of the southern route and major routes into and through East and southern Africa. It then turns to how the trade developed, the networks involved and their relationship to political figures, political parties and political finance in the region. It then sets out the major implications of these findings, with a focus on the impact of the trade on democratic institutions, local economies, drug use and dependency, and violence.

The report concludes with a call for serious policy discussion about how best to respond to the heroin trade. When the trade is disrupted in one country, it appears that it is merely displaced to another, and the trade itself is not diminished. Hence, the regional integration of the heroin trade raises several critical challenges for both civil-society and law-enforcement responses.

Methodology

Researching illicit activities is a challenge in any context: those who engage in illegal economic and other activities have strong incentives that their work is not reported on and thus goes unhindered.¹¹ Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that researching organised criminal and illicit activities is possible, and indeed is a necessary step, to present information in a strategic and accessible way for practitioners, policymakers, civil society, journalists, academic specialists and the general public.¹² There is growing consensus that not enough research on illicit economies has been done, with the result that the motivations of many actors are not well understood and that this is essential for a fuller understanding of developments in all societies in the context of the rapid globalisation of crime.¹³

Research work in the area generally follows a triangulation of several approaches. Interviews with people in and around the illicit economy in question are critical. Much information can be obtained by speaking to protagonists and observers, not necessarily on individual cases, but how the system or political economy operates. Research that entails speaking only with law-enforcement authorities is generally accepted to be too skewed to one perspective and is therefore not regarded as providing an accurate assessment on its own.¹⁴ Retired officials, people who are in contact with criminal operators, as well as informed journalists, civil-society actors and others are all crucial sources.

Multiple interviews are essential, and interviews conducted with a spectrum of different people, including locals with good knowledge of the environment in question, are particularly useful if one is to ensure an accurate picture is obtained. Interview material can be collaborated with published sources, such as newspaper articles, court records, government papers, reports from foreign actors and other documentation. Secondary literature also provides a useful means to contextualise historical developments and understand the motivations of various actors.

An important point to make about researching illicit economies is that the output is less about individual cases than providing a strategic picture of what is under way. Therefore, the focus is on trends, the contours of the political economy, the incentives of different actors, the nature of geographic hubs for criminal economies and the reasons for this

concentration, and the like. With some exceptions, the objective of research is to paint a clear picture of the political economy of an illicit activity, so that reporting on individual cases (arrests, seizures, etc.) is contextualised, but also so that a series of policy alternatives can be debated.

Following the overall approach described in the box above, six local researchers were commissioned to conduct research in the countries along the coast and in Uganda. These researchers were able to visit major cities and ports, small towns and villages, remote coastal areas and urban slums in an unobtrusive way and with their senses attuned to local sensitivities. Discretion was important both for their safety and that of their sources. They drew on their existing network and forged new connections with sources close to criminal trades. The researchers conducted semi-structured interviews on the ground between July and August 2017, and submitted field reports based on their findings.

An external expert team from the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime then visited several town and cities in the same areas in September 2017, verifying and triangulating information with previously consulted sources. They also conducted new interviews. The expert team assessed the work of the local researchers and followed up with a number of interlocutors.

The people selected to be interviewed for this study were retired and current customs officials; former and serving police officers; people involved in the maritime trade; drug rehabilitation workers; drug users; journalists and academics; practising and retired lawyers and judges; employees of suspected drug traffickers; port authorities; local religious figures; private-sector informants; politicians; and convicted and imprisoned drug traffickers. Indirectly, the team was also able to gather information from petty drug dealers, stowaways and seamen plying the Indian Ocean trade.

Some 240 people were interviewed in the course of the research by the local researchers and the expert team. In addition to fieldwork in Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa and Uganda,¹⁵ interviews were conducted in the Seychelles and Pakistan. (Please refer to the annexe at the end of this report for a more granular breakdown of the interviews by location and participant occupation.)

In addition to drawing on these interviews with people in, or close to, the illicit trade, the Global Initiative commissioned further research on specific issues and regions that needed discrete consideration. Field reports were also supplemented with a review of relevant local news articles and the academic literature. Public and leaked government documents provided corroboration of several key claims. Our aim was not to act as police investigators, but rather to recognise the premise that to build an accurate conceptual framework, one needs to rely on accessing information that is not in the public domain.

On 13 and 14 November 2017, a draft of this report was presented in Nairobi to an expert group comprising academics, public-health and UN officials, journalists and other civil-society figures familiar with the issues presented in the report. They provided informed critiques and comments, which have been integrated into the final version. Lastly, the report underwent a non-blind peer review by researchers in the ENACT network and experts in the field.

Gaps and challenges in the research methodology

In order to encourage candour among the participants, and to protect our sources, the authors have not used their real names. Many would not have spoken openly if they were to have been named. Instead, generic descriptions of interviewees' professions or roles are given. Where necessary, locations or other descriptors that might serve to identify participants have been changed in anecdotes and examples. The interview dates are provided in the endnotes.

Our networks were able to turn up more information in some countries than in others, and the researchers placed more focus on the areas that are most vulnerable and particularly understudied. Mozambique, and in particular its northern region, is very seldom included in studies, and the authors have paid particular attention to the situation there, which we believe shows evidence of criminal capture.

Because of the authors' long-standing engagement in researching South Africa's criminal economy and their far-reaching networks there, that country is covered with greater detail and synthesis than some other parts of the region under study. In Tanzania, for example, the president's crackdown on the drugs trade

has created a feeling of huge insecurity for anyone who has been involved, or could be accused of being involved, in the drug trade or corruption. The president is also highly intolerant of criticism, and has shut down five newspapers since his term of office began. In this climate, many would-be informants were either too afraid or too risk-averse to speak openly. The researchers' ability to access the 'back story' to Tanzania's current moment was therefore limited by this reticence. The balance of detail and analysis in the report reflects these factors.

Many would-be informants were either too afraid or too risk-averse to speak openly

It should also be noted that sources, and often the local researchers, faced significant risks by speaking with us, from repercussions that might limit their career to threats of physical harm. We were, nonetheless, able to interview a large and diverse range of people, most of whom spoke frankly and openly, including state officials who are concerned at developments.

Limitations on scope

The southern route encompasses a number of countries bordering the Indian Ocean, and has linkages to countries in the interior of Africa. The remit of this study was to look at the coastal states on the eastern seaboard on Africa, with a focus on Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa, through which much of the southern route heroin filters before transit to consumer markets. In the course of this research, we have also conducted research on Uganda, commissioned research on South Sudan and tasked our Kenyan researcher to investigate the Somali-Kenyan border area. Nonetheless, the analysis is focused on our original brief, which covers the four main countries under study.

The authors note that island states in the Indian Ocean, such as Mauritius and the Seychelles, are also particularly vulnerable to the heroin trade and its effects. And although Zimbabwe did not feature as a prominent transit country in our research, civil-society actors suggest it is, at best, vulnerable and, at worst, has already developed a problem with the drug trade. As Zimbabwe has recently entered a phase of political transition, it is

likely to experience renewed investment and economic growth. At the same time, its institutions are highly compromised or ineffective, so that they will be unable to keep the illicit economy in check. Our research suggests this combination is a huge risk factor for the growth of organised crime. Hence, the island states and Zimbabwe and Somalia deserve further study.

The role of the southern route in the heroin trade

As mentioned, since 2010 several large seizures of heroin by the CMF¹⁶ have confirmed that the eastern African coast is playing a significant role in the global heroin trade, and the network of routes referred to here as the southern route has become more popular for traffickers.

The motorised wooden dhows, in which much of the heroin is initially shipped along the coast, are between 15 m and 23 m in length, which allows them to travel at sea but makes them small enough to evade detection by satellite technology or patrol vessels. The dhows used for smuggling have concealed compartments, which can hold 100 kg to 1 000 kg of heroin. After anchoring 20 km to 100 km off the African coast in international waters, flotillas of small boats collect the drug consignments from the dhows and ferry them to various beaches, coves or islands, or offload them into small commercial harbours. Our information is that there are dozens of such landing sites all along the eastern seaboard, from just north of Kismayo to Angoche, Mozambique.¹⁷

Importantly, interviews we conducted at multiple locations along the coast suggest that transit traffickers have also made use of containers at deep-water ports. Although we do not have seizure data to back this up, several interviewees shed light on how this is probably happening.¹⁸

Techniques used to smuggle heroin in containers include stashing drugs in hidden compartments, theft of whole containers, misdeclaration of end destinations and tampering with goods at overstay warehouses. While there are several reports that scanning equipment has been controlled or sabotaged by powerful traffickers or political figures at several ports, smuggling heroin into containers often takes little more than petty corruption – e.g. bribing a forklift driver, security guard or clearing agent.

Although traffickers using the southern route have their own challenges to contend with, such as piracy off the coast of Somalia and the activities of the CMF, the volume of trade on this route appears to be increasing. Previous estimates suggested that 22 to 40 tonnes of heroin were being trafficked through East Africa annually,¹⁹ and although actual volumes cannot be ascertained with accuracy, our interviews indicate the figure may now be higher (this is discussed in more detail later in the report). The 2017 *World drug report* noted that Africa is currently experiencing the sharpest increase in heroin use globally, and this has been attributed to the role of the southern route.²⁰

Interviews conducted at multiple locations along the coast suggest that transit traffickers have also made use of containers at deep-water ports

Much of the attention regarding southern route has been given to how heroin that transits East and southern Africa is eventually destined for Europe (though heroin is also transported to other end markets, including Asian countries and island states such as the Seychelles and Mauritius). This is understandable, as markets in developed countries are the reason for the existence of this route in the first place, and heroin use and its impact on society there is important. But this perspective tends to downplay, or even ignore, the impact of the heroin trade on the local transit countries. As such, this report does not focus on uncovering how heroin enters Europe, or which networks control this process (although we have uncovered important information that opens up new lines of inquiry into these transshipment routes). Instead, the report focuses on the political economy of the southern route. It looks more closely at the characteristics of the heroin flows in the region and how the narcotics trade has become embedded in the societies along the southern route.

Transit and secondary heroin trade

Most of the heroin that passes through East and southern Africa is en route to markets in Europe, which are far more profitable than African markets.

For example, a gram of heroin costs about US\$20 in Kenya, but in the UK it costs about US\$60 and in Denmark US\$213.²¹

As mentioned, the transit heroin trade is a bulk trade – though shipments are sometimes broken down into a number of smaller consignments to avoid detection. As will be explained in more detail below, many of the major players in the transit trade have been in business for several decades. In Mozambique and Kenya, for example, the first major traffickers were ethnically Asian East Africans who developed links during the 1990s with drug traffickers operating in both Pakistan and Europe, though the mechanisms for this are unclear. In Tanzania a similar process occurred with Zanzibari actors, who later extended their operations to the mainland. There is also a presence of European criminal figures in several locations along the southern route, including South Africa. These have played a role in the drugs trade to a greater or lesser extent in various places for some time.

The growing regional consumer market for heroin gets some of its supply from 'leakage' from the transit trade – through in-kind payments to drivers, fishermen, the police, etc. – and through small-scale theft from bulk consignments. But there is also some indication that bigger players arrange their own supplies from air mules travelling from Pakistan, or buy in bulk from transit traders. We refer to this as the secondary heroin trade. The secondary trade primarily makes use of roads and flight routes to ship heroin around the region and within countries, as well as mules to bring small amounts of drugs over land borders on foot. The secondary trade relies mostly on petty corruption among police and customs officers. The authors believe this trade is more disorganised, and run by a fluctuating set of players trading in smaller volumes. Many African criminal networks are involved in this secondary economy, including local groups close to consumer markets, and this, too, is explored in greater detail in the report.

Geography of the southern route heroin trade: from north to south

Heroin begins its journey through Africa in Afghanistan, where farmers cultivate the poppy plant over hundreds of thousands of acres. Opium paste derived from the poppy seeds is transported to Pakistan, where it is refined into heroin. (Adulteration takes place at various points along the route to its most profitable

markets.) During this study, it was learnt that African drug networks have representatives in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan who are involved in moving heroin shipments to the Balochistan coast.²² There, the heroin is ferried by speedboat and loaded onto dhows, which have travelled from Iran (where there is a fuel subsidy), or concealed in containers or in other boats. The heroin is then shipped to a large number of locations along the African east coast, which are described next from north to south.

African drug networks have representatives in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan


Somalia

The northernmost landing sites are on the 3 700-km-long coastline of Somalia, which is under the authority of a number of military and political groups at different sites. The researchers learnt that sites in or near Ras Afun, Eyl, Obbia, El Maan, Brava, Bosaso, Kismayo, Gobwen, Cape Guardafui, Garowe and Barawa are used to offload heroin shipments.²³ Kismayo is a major point for consolidation, and then onward shipment, by road and boat, to Kenya, often together with other contraband goods that are traded between the two countries.²⁴ At present, the black-market trade out of Kismayo (of which the most significant flows are in sugar, charcoal, counterfeit electronic goods and arms) is controlled by the Kenya Defence Forces and their Somali allies, who tax the goods – licit and illicit – that pass through and have commercial interests in several of these trades.²⁵

Kenya

Kenya, the region's economic powerhouse, hosts a highly dynamic and active matrix of illicit activity. The scale of criminal activity in Kenya appears to be partly a result of its greater economic development – criminal activity is facilitated by the country's relatively advanced infrastructure, both for transport and financial transactions – as well as its proximity to very active conflict-based criminal economies in the Horn and central Africa.²⁶

Indicative overview of sea- and land-based heroin routes across the eastern African coastal states



Source: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, based on interviews across the region, September 2017

Illicit flows traverse Kenya along several routes.²⁷ Apart from the corridor out of Somalia and across the north of Kenya, the centre of Kenya provides a conduit for a wide variety of goods moving from the coast to the interior. Goods are smuggled along this east-west corridor into the interior, including electronics, sugar, rice, motor vehicles, and sometimes arms. Meanwhile, environmental contraband travels in the opposite direction through the interior to Mombasa for export. The interviews suggest that heroin is also trafficked along this corridor in trucks heading to Uganda via Busia and Malaba.²⁸ To the south, heroin is smuggled across the Tanzanian border in both directions, particularly in the area between Tsavo National Park and the coast.

The story of Ronald Katenda (see below) serves to illustrate that there are clearly two trafficking routes out of Kenya – one traversing the continent towards the west. This route is beyond the scope of this report. The heroin trafficking route southwards through Tanzania and beyond appears to be more significant.

Drug running from Mombasa to Kampala: Ronald's story²⁹

Ronald Katenda (not his real name), a 33-year-old, is a graduate in economics from Makerere University, Kampala. He got involved in the drugs trade as a courier. In his first mission, he worked for a 'businessman' – a Pakistani trafficker whose front was a business trading tiles in Mombasa. Katenda's task was simple – to drive a truck loaded with tiles from Mombasa to Kampala via Busia. In addition to tiles, other goods, such as bags of cement, were added to his load. These contained drugs.

Katenda would drive the truck to a warehouse in Banda, a suburb of Kampala, and offload the tiles. There, a group of people with vehicles on standby would wait to transport the boxes containing the drugs to other destinations (he was not given any information about these places). Katenda would be paid his fee after he had returned to Mombasa. He was paid US\$3 000 dollars for every delivery. He did three to four deliveries a month; on each trip he would transport 40 to 50 boxes containing drugs.

Then, one day in 2015, his truck was subjected to a thorough police check, during which the officers discovered 46 boxes containing heroin and cocaine, marked as boxes of tiles. The goods were impounded by the police at the border town of Busia and Katenda was arrested. His employer did not answer

his calls but, later, a man arrived at the police station and negotiated the release of Katenda and the goods by means of a bribe of 75 million Uganda shillings in cash (approximately US \$22 000). The meeting that led to the payment was attended by two police officers and an immigration official.

A few weeks later, Katenda's courier work shifted to the route into Tanzania. His payments for transporting drugs along this route were higher – \$4 500 for every delivery – an increase that reflected the greater difficulty and risk of operating across the Tanzanian border.

Katenda started taking drugs and became dependent. He fell out with his employer, who he claims then tried to have him killed.

Kenya has two key hubs for the heroin trade. Firstly, the Port of Mombasa, which is the largest and busiest seaport in East and central Africa, is a strait through which goods travelling to and from a combined regional population of 200 million people in Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, South Sudan and beyond must flow. One million containers passed through Mombasa in 2015,³⁰ and the volume of freight transiting the port is growing significantly. At the same time, however, scanning capabilities and security resources at the port are limited and corruption is rampant. There is only one scanner, which screens a tiny fraction of the export cargo,³¹ despite official claims that 100% of export goods are scanned.³² This deficit creates significant loopholes for traffickers to exploit.

Mombasa is home to several of Kenya's most prominent heroin traffickers

Unsurprisingly, Mombasa is home to several of Kenya's most prominent heroin traffickers and is a major node for heroin imports – and probably also cocaine. Although figures on the quantities of drugs entering Mombasa by container are not available, seizures at sea would indicate that a large amount of heroin arrives at nearby destinations by dhow, often to be repackaged and transported onwards from Mombasa, and also at Nairobi.

North and south of Mombasa along the coast are numerous small landing sites for drug consignments,

including an 'ungazetted' port in Lamu, a small town that is also a major locus for the drugs trade. There are other ungazetted ports in Kilifi, Malindi, Mombasa Old Port, Vanga and Shimoni.³³ Although customs officers are officially assigned to these ports, in practice, as the Kenya Maritime Authority concedes: 'These ports are not subject to international conventions and many unlicensed boats land there and are never monitored.'³⁴ And besides, there are private jetties along the coast, especially in Malindi, that serve private residences, which facilitate smuggling. Small airstrips in Kijipwa, Ukunda, Lunga Lungu, Voi and Lamu are also used to smuggle drugs to the coast.³⁵ Furthermore, the 1 420-km Kenyan coastline has no coast guard.

Secondly, Nairobi, the locus of Kenya's political power and densest node of economic activity in the country, is also a key hub. Many heroin kingpins began their careers here, because they could take advantage of being able to rub shoulders with certain political actors and there were facilities for money laundering. Nairobi has a dry port³⁶ and lies at the centre of several regional land transport and rail routes.

Tanzania

Tanzania's border region with Kenya, particularly between Kenya's Tsavo National Park and the coast, is a hive of smuggling activity. Goods move in both directions here. In addition to this overland route, heroin also enters Tanzania's ports. It is also transported north overland into Kenya via the Taita, Isebania and Arusha border points.

Landing sites for the dhow-based heroin trade are found all along Tanzania's coast and on Pemba and Unguja (the islands that make up Zanzibar) and Mafia Island.

Zanzibar Port is said to be key to smugglers looking to get a broad range of goods into Tanzania and the rest of East Africa, as well as an exit point for contraband. (The semi-autonomous Zanzibar³⁷ has historically been an entrepôt state, and was a major centre of the Indian Ocean slave trade and the 19th-century ivory trade.)

On the mainland, Dar es Salaam, the largest and most economically important city, which is set to grow to 10 million inhabitants by 2030. The Port of Dar es Salaam is an important base for several kingpins in the heroin trade. Likewise, the deep port of Tanga to the north, which is home to at least one heroin kingpin (whose identity is known to the authors), is close to landing sites in both Tanzania and Kenya.³⁸

Inland, Arusha, which is an international diplomatic hub³⁹ and major tourism destination (being the main access point for people climbing Kilimanjaro and visiting the northern safari circuit), is also a hub for the heroin market. Due to time constraints, the researchers were not able to conduct interviews in Arusha, and we have yet to fully assess the city's importance in terms of the regional transport routes. Nevertheless, Arusha presumably derives its importance in the coastal criminal economy in part from its proximity to Nairobi and Mombasa, key Kenyan hubs (it is roughly equidistant from both cities), and also from its position on the road corridor south from Kenya.

Landing sites for the dhow-based heroin trade are found all along Tanzania's coast

Road transport corridors are also used to traffic drugs across the south and centre of Tanzania, through Mbeya, to Zambia and eventually onwards to South Africa. We do not have information about the exact route taken through the interior southwards, but suspect it passes through Zimbabwe.

Tanzanian networks appear to control, or coordinate, a large portion of the secondary heroin market in the region. These operations, which involve transporting small and medium-sized shipments, have a presence in Kenya, Mozambique and an increasingly strong presence in South Africa, where they now play an important role in fuelling the heroin consumption market (discussed below). The amount trafficked in one shipment can be anything from just a few hundred grams to enough to provide a constant supply to tens of thousands of users in each of the big metros in South Africa.

According to one government source in Kenya, who provided an estimate of the heroin flows, 40 tonnes transit the whole region annually, while about 5 tonnes remain in the region.⁴⁰ An international law-enforcement source in Tanzania gave a similar estimate of the total flow through East Africa.⁴¹ It is not clear if this volume includes drugs trafficked through Mozambique, for which the authors compiled an estimate (based on information about the frequency of dhow drop-offs) of between 10 and 40 tonnes a year.

Mozambique

With a large and tightly controlled transit trade, Mozambique is a conduit for heroin coming from other transit countries en route to South Africa. The activities of the transit trade are concentrated in the north of the country. Mozambique has a large navy, which is active in border protection but does not seem to take part in any meaningful counter-smuggling activities, so there are few checks on smuggling or illegal fishing. In the words of one corruption watchdog representative, the Mozambican coastline is 'a smuggler's paradise'.⁴²

The fishing boats land their consignments on the beaches without attracting much attention

Heroin is transferred from dhows onto small fishing boats in the area north of the coastal town of Pemba⁴³ and among the Quirimbas Islands, an archipelago off the northern coast. The fishing boats land their consignments on the beaches without attracting much attention among the numerous other small vessels plying the area. Others also identified Palma and Ibo as hotspots.⁴⁴ Once on land, the heroin is taken by road to either Nacala or Nampula for consolidation, packaging and onward shipment.⁴⁵ Both of these towns are hubs of the trade. Nacala is the country's biggest and most modern port; Nampula is the third largest city in Mozambique and considered the 'capital' of the north.

The other maritime transport method is for heroin to be hidden in containers imported through (primarily) Nacala Port – evidence for this is described in greater detail below. There are no estimates of how much heroin is imported in this way, however. Also, the information gathered for this study mainly concerns the use of key ports to bring drugs in, and not to export them – though we cannot rule out that exports happen directly from Nacala. On the other hand, there is a lot of evidence that most of the heroin in transit through Mozambique is shipped by road across the country's southern border into South Africa.

The transit trade is said to be controlled by a small number of families of South Asian origin, linked through marriage and business. Two of them have commercial

concerns in Nampula and Nacala. In Nacala they are said to have such informal political and economic influence that they 'own the town'.⁴⁶ These networks are discussed in greater detail below.

There is no verified figure as to how much heroin enters Mozambique this way. However, several people observing the trade along the east coast believe that the amount of heroin entering Mozambique has increased lately as a result of CMF seizures in the waters near Kenya and Tanzania, and the crackdown in Tanzania.⁴⁷ Interviewees estimate that dhows arrive weekly, except during the three-month monsoon season, each carrying 200 to 1 000 kilograms of heroin. This would suggest that 10 to 40 tonnes of heroin a year enter Mozambique.⁴⁸

The secondary trade, and consequently local consumption, in Mozambique does not appear to be as significant as in the other countries in the region. Heroin in the north appears to enter the local market through leakage from (transit) Mozambican trade, and because it is brought over the border in small quantities by small-time dealers in the secondary trade.

Many of the small-scale dealers of hard drugs in northern Mozambique are Tanzanian and they have most likely brought product across the porous northern Mozambican/southern Tanzanian border zone. These dealers' main trade may not be heroin at all – in part because the local heroin market in Mozambique is relatively small – and many are involved in selling cannabis, hashish and other drugs, as well as illicit gemstones (e.g. gold, rubies, tourmaline and emeralds). As well as Tanzanians, people from Mali, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Nigeria and Cameroon are also listed as being among the foreigners involved in northern Mozambican criminal markets. The proceeds of their criminal activities are often reinvested in small shops selling a variety of goods, such as car parts, food and clothes.⁴⁹

There is also evidence that larger shipments of heroin enter Mozambique by road from Tanzania and Kenya en route to South Africa. To pass through the territory, these shipments rely on bribery and general lack of law enforcement, though this criminal system is not watertight – as evidenced by the 600 kilograms seized at the Namoto border in 2013 (discussed below), which was probably a shipment of this nature. Traffic on this route, however, is probably minimal. The roads are poor and there is little traffic, making heroin smugglers more conspicuous. However, traffickers who do use

this route, as told to us by our sources in Mozambique in September 2017, will indirectly benefit from the unofficial prohibition on publicising hard-drug seizures and the degree to which drug enforcement is neglected in Mozambique⁵⁰ (both discussed below).

Another phenomenon in Mozambique is the rise of more modular, smaller, remotely-controlled foreign groups involved in the transit heroin trade on the southern route. This may have arisen as a result of Magufuli's crackdown in Tanzania (see below) and the increased number of seizures off the Kenyan coast by the CMF. According to interviews with security officials:

The new networks appear to be controlled from outside Mozambique, with relatively junior controllers and special warehouses inside Mozambique. Movement of drugs is done by people contracted and paid for specific jobs, often assigned by mobile phone, WhatsApp or Blackberry, which are encrypted. The wide availability of good mobile telephone coverage in north-east Mozambique since about 2015 makes this a sensible model for the expansion of the heroin trade there. Mozambique has now become so corrupted that the freelance drivers working for the new networks are simply given money to bribe the police and other officials; their fee for the job is any money they do not spend on bribes.⁵¹

This trade may employ – on a temporary and ad hoc basis – people involved in the small-scale drug, gems and black-market goods economy in the north.

It is not clear where the packaging for transit heroin is carried out, or if adulteration is done in Mozambique. However, the networks involved in the trade own several businesses in Nacala and Nampula, like trucking companies and hotels, and industrial facilities such as warehouses, which would certainly facilitate this.

In Nampula drugs are hidden in motor vehicles and shipped by road to South Africa – their destination is City Deep, a dry port in Johannesburg (for a more detailed overview, see the next section). This is a journey of some 3 300 km. The drug consignments are typically transported in specially prepared vehicles. A light pickup (known as a bakkie in South Africa) or a 4x4 vehicle, such as a Toyota Hilux, might carry between 20 kg and 100 kg; specially prepared larger trucks can carry 100 kg to 200 kg.⁵²

On the road route from Mozambique to South Africa, partly because of corruption and partly

because Mozambican border control is so severely under-resourced,⁵³ no seizures have been made on the Mozambican side of the border. There have, however, been several large seizures in South Africa of drugs hidden in vehicles that have entered from Mozambique.⁵⁴

South Africa

South Africa has the largest economy in southern and East Africa, well-developed transport infrastructure and modern international telecommunications, a sophisticated banking sector that sits alongside a huge cash-based informal market, and by far the biggest internal consumer market in the region. Interviews suggest much of the region's illicit trade in drugs is destined for South Africa, either for onward traffic to 'the other ocean'⁵⁵ and on to Europe or the US, or for the South African consumer market.

Interviews suggest much of the region's illicit trade in drugs is destined for South Africa

The multiplicity of entry points into the country is worth noting: South Africa has 11 airports that act as ports of entry.⁵⁶ However, the main airports that service international trade are OR Tambo (Johannesburg), King Shaka (Durban) and Cape Town International Airport. Along South Africa's 2 500 kilometres of coastline are eight seaports that operate as ports of entry.⁵⁷ The busiest is Durban Harbour, which handles 60% of all maritime trade destined for South Africa, and which is also used as a transit point for imports and exports coming from or going to other African countries. In such instances, customs duty is not paid in South Africa and in-transit cargo is not checked by South African Customs on arrival or departure. The proximity of this port to a network of trains and truck terminals makes it attractive for smugglers.⁵⁸

South Africa also has a dry port of entry situated at City Deep in Johannesburg. This is Africa's biggest inland port, with a capacity of 400 000 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units) a year. Containers are carried by rail or truck from City Deep to the country's ports, from where they are shipped without further customs inspection. City Deep is near Johannesburg's suburb of Bedfordview,

where key criminal actors in the 'import-export' business have told the authors over months of research that the dry port is critical to the region's criminal operations.⁵⁹

Because of the balance of trade between South Africa and its neighbours, each day hundreds of trucks leave the country with full loads but return with empty containers. In the highly competitive trucking industry, interviewees suggested, agreeing to use the empty container on the return journey to transport illicit goods, or for trafficking people, can add to the company's profit margins.⁶⁰

The country's land borders with neighbouring countries – Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia, Botswana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe – cover approximately 3 500 km. There are 54 official border posts,⁶¹ but in a number of areas the borderline between South Africa and its neighbours is demarcated by nothing more than cattle fencing.

The heroin that supplies South Africa's growing local market is supplied, the authors believe, by perhaps hundreds of small shipments by mules travelling from East Africa on public transport and even on foot over borders.⁶² Some is heroin that is skimmed off transit shipments along the road network (e.g. by the driver). There are also larger consignments of drugs that arrive through ports.

From the Mozambican–South African border, heroin appears to be transported by road to Durban and Pretoria, which are hubs for repackaging and distribution to other cities. Heroin is also moved to Nelson Mandela Bay and Cape Town. In Nelson Mandela Bay, barrels containing heroin are apparently dropped overboard from ships and collected by divers working in abalone poaching networks.⁶³ Once illicit goods are inside the country, there is a comprehensive road network and a very large number of domestic flights, particularly between the two main economic centres, Cape Town and Johannesburg, with no customs checks.

In South Africa the number of ports of entry and long international borders mean that there a range of entry options available to those involved in trafficking illicit goods, and these routes can be changed and shifted should the risks associated with a particular route become too high. (In some cases, the shifting of a route will not be permanent and once the attention of law enforcement shifts, the traffickers will return to that route, albeit with slight changes to their *modus operandi*.) Within this complex network of points of entry for illicit goods, our interviews nonetheless identify

Durban and its port, Johannesburg with the City Deep dry port and OR Tambo Airport, and Cape Town, with its port and airport, as the country's major heroin hubs.

Once in South Africa, heroin is consolidated for smaller shipments and repackaged for onward transport by air or sea.

Once in South Africa, heroin is consolidated for smaller shipments and repackaged for onward transport by air or sea

According to interviews with knowledgeable Mozambicans, in the early years of the regional trade, heroin was sent directly to ports, notably Durban and, to a lesser extent, Maputo, where it was put into containers.⁶⁴ This operational approach has changed, with Johannesburg now being used as the main warehousing and transshipment point.⁶⁵ The corruption endemic in City Deep and the long-standing and extensive corruption at OR Tambo Airport are important factors explaining this shift.⁶⁶

However, other ports in South Africa also appear to be used as major export points. Given what we know about the organised-crime landscape in South Africa, these are likely to be run by certain, possibly competing, criminal networks. For example, Cape Town is also used to export contraband. In June 2017 police in the farming town of Villiersdorp, 250 km from Cape Town, found 963 kg of heroin, one of the largest seizures ever made in the country.⁶⁷ The heroin was divided into 253 packets that were concealed inside cases of wine destined for export.⁶⁸ This was the first heroin seizure in five years in the Western Cape province; it came as a shock to law enforcement, who had not had intelligence that the Cape was a major transshipment corridor. It is believed that the heroin had been made up from a number of smaller shipments from several suppliers, which had later been consolidated.⁶⁹

This seizure corroborated information the authors were given by sources in East Africa – namely that heroin is shipped in containers of non-perishable solid goods – cases of wine, stone, tiles, etc. These are easier to escape scanning and easier to leave for longer in a

European port.⁷⁰ The Port of Cape Town is not renowned for corruption, which gives traffickers an advantage, particularly by using containers carrying export goods that do not normally attract attention, such as wine and fruit, and because containers declaring such export goods will be assigned a relatively low risk rating by customs authorities in the receiving countries, making them less likely to be searched.⁷¹

Criminal governance systems

What drives the heroin trade on the southern route?

Interviews conducted across the region revealed a remarkable similarity in terms of the timelines of surges in organised crime and trafficking in each country under study. In all the countries, small-scale heroin traffickers were operating back in the 1980s, when their markets were often connected to tourism. However, the bulk transit trade really took off in the mid-1990s; later, there was another period of escalation beginning in the early 2000s.

The criminal-governance systems of the 'underworld' mirror the fragmentation, fault lines and politics of the 'upperworld'

Interviews and discussions would suggest that this timeline has been shaped by both internal and external factors. Internally, several of the coastal countries in the region – South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania and Kenya – went through periods of political and economic change in the 1990s, usually involving a move towards multi-party democracy and market liberalisation (this was certainly the case in Mozambique and Tanzania, and, to a lesser degree, South Africa). The argument here, however, is not that democracy per se led to an increase in the illicit economy, but that it gave rise to an urgent need, at least among some actors, for money to fund political-party campaigning and political patronage networks. Illicit economies have become closely linked to these developments.

In terms of the external factors, there were bumper crops of poppies in Afghanistan and surrounding countries in the late 1990s and early part of the following decade, which meant drug cartels were able to shift more product. This trend has not abated. The most recent figures for poppy production were estimated at 328 000 hectares in 2017, a 63% increase on the previous year.⁷² This staggering rise in production is likely to increase the flow of heroin along all routes even further.

Then, for heroin cartels, the two main trafficking routes – across Central Asia and the Balkans – were disrupted by war and more effective enforcement. This made the more circuitous, but much more unguarded southern route along Africa's east coast more attractive and, over the long term, potentially more reliable, despite the geographic diversion it has introduced as a route to market. The route is also built on established networks between Pakistan and individuals on the East African coast.

Global developments that occurred at the same time as these shifts also led countries in this region to become more enmeshed in the wider global illicit economy. Along with East and southern Africa's increase in trade came so-called 'deviant globalisation'⁷³ – in other words, better integration with global money-laundering systems and criminal networks. The position of Dubai and the air linkages between the city and locations along the coast are critical when it comes to understanding money flows and the wider criminal system now present. The heroin market grew at the same time as these developments, creating a perfect storm of converging trends.

Political protection and criminal-market consolidation

The East African coastal criminal economy has been developing for three decades, driven by formative processes of economic liberalisation, globalisation and transitions towards multi-party democracy. As such, the criminal economy is both shaped by and, in turn, contributes to shaping politics across the region. Understanding the criminal governance of the heroin trade in the region is crucial if one is to understand its relationship to political elites, the licit economy and its implications for development. It has been found that the criminal-governance systems of the 'underworld' more or less mirror the fragmentation, fault lines, degree of centralised control and shifts in the politics of the 'upperworld'.

The following sections analyse the history of the heroin trade in the four countries along the coast under study, the major networks that are or have been involved and the development of political protection for the trade. Each case concludes with a comment on criminal-market consolidation and criminal governance.⁷⁴

Kenya

History and illicit networks

In the 1990s, families on the coast of Kenya who had, or established, links with connections to Pakistani drug networks and European buyers began to transship heroin through the region. These included the well-known Akasha family, who achieved notoriety when the family patriarch was murdered in Amsterdam following a drug deal that had gone awry in 2001. After the father's death, the family continued to traffic drugs, but there was infighting, and the family came under scrutiny as the face of Kenya's heroin trade.⁷⁵ As a result, they began to lose political protection, culminating in the extradition of two Akasha brothers, and an Indian and Pakistani associate, in early 2017.⁷⁶

The Akashas were not the only Mombasa family operating in the trade in the 1990s. Another alleged kingpin was Tahir Sheikh Said, who died in 2017.⁷⁷

Later, as drug trafficking and politics shifted into closer orbit, the trade moved inland and Nairobi became a key hub. Many major figures were active in Nairobi in the early 2000s, having begun their careers there.⁷⁸

Between 2001 and 2008, there were numerous public allegations of drug trafficking in Kenya, and several MPs and their associates were named.⁷⁹ Of those listed in a US embassy report, and subsequently named in Parliament as being linked to the narcotics trade, six are current or former holders of political office. Among them, five have held (or still do hold) political office in Kenya's Eastern Province: William Kabogo, former Kiambu County governor; Gideon Mbuvi (alias Mike Sonko), 2nd Governor of Nairobi; John Harun Mwau, former assistant minister and former MP for Kilome; Simon Mbugua, former MP for Kamukunji (in Nairobi); and Mary Wambui, former MP for Othaya.

From the coastal region, Ali Hassan Joho, Governor of Mombasa, and his brother Abubakar, as well as Mombasa businessman Ali Punjani, were also named as prominent drug traffickers in the same report (in

fact, the US report allegedly claims that Punjani and several other traffickers funded Ali Hassan Joho's 2007 campaign to win a seat as an MP for Mombasa⁸⁰). Harun Mwau, along with businesswoman Mwanaidi Mfundo (alias Mama Lela), who is now in prison in Tanzania on drug-trafficking charges, were listed as drug 'kingpins' by the US in 2011.⁸¹ All have denied these allegations. A subsequent investigation into claims made in the Kenyan Parliament by police was said to have absolved them, but in very controversial circumstances.⁸²

Harun Mwau, perhaps the most prominent figure caught up in these allegations, has been widely cited by our interlocutors as an early 'model' of how to combine the shadow economy, politics and business.⁸³ Mwau has repeatedly denied being involved in drug trafficking. He is a prominent businessman and former shareholder in the region's biggest supermarket chain, Nakumatt (holding shares worth US\$10 million, which he has since offloaded). He owned a bank (Charterhouse), and has had a varied political career: he headed the anti-corruption agency and was a national lawmaker; he also ran for president. He was a major funder of Mwai Kibaki's election campaign as president and was subsequently appointed as assistant transport minister, a position in which he appears to have been responsible for Kenya's container transport arrangements and for the Kenya Ports Authority, which controls all ports of entry and inland container terminals in Kenya.⁸⁴ Mwau resigned from this position after being named in Parliament as being linked to drug trafficking. For many years, Mwau operated an inland container depot at Athi River on the outskirts of Nairobi, known as the Pepe Container Freight Station.

These are just the most public figures linked to the trade. Reportedly, there are other Swahili-Arab families from the coastal region involved in the drug trade, who are said to have kept a low profile but remain active and successful in the trade.⁸⁵ 'Arab coastal networks have several hundred years of diplomacy behind them,' said one anti-corruption activist. 'They would never threaten you to your face. There is a grace to the way they do things. They cooperate with the [drug traffickers operating out of Nairobi].'⁸⁶

It is difficult to put an exact figure to the number of kingpins and barons involved in Kenya's drug trade. But numerous interviews suggest that the country's narco-industry is controlled by syndicates that are fluid. In the past 15 years, a number of individuals and groups have

collapsed, while new ones have been formed to fill the void. In addition to local traffickers, numerous foreign individuals and foreign networks have been involved in the heroin trade in Kenya. (The box below provides more detail.)

The Kenyan drugs trade has evolved and now has many different manifestations. It was labelled as 'chaotic' in one 2014 analysis, the implication being that it is fragmented and often highly competitive.⁸⁷ Arguably, one can make a useful (though not entirely neat) distinction between kingpins and what are generally described as 'barons' by locals in the region. The former trade in large volumes for transit, operating almost exclusively by sea transport, either through dhow deliveries or container deliveries of drugs. These kingpins include coastal families, who mostly run kinship-based businesses and tend to keep a lower profile, as well as prominent Nairobi businessmen cum politicians, who tend to be more public figures.

Foreign networks in Kenya's drugs trade

In line with the notion that Kenya is a fragmented drugs market, which allows openings for outsiders who can forge local relations, various foreigners seem to have worked their way into the trade with the help of Kenyan partners over the last decade. These syndicates operate (or operated) mostly in Nairobi, but with bases in Mombasa. Among them have been Pakistanis, South Africans, Seychellois and Mauritians, some of them barons from these countries or from Uganda, Tanzania and West Africa.

One example is Clement Serge Bristol, a Seychellois who was arrested with three Kenyans (Mohamed Bakari Mohamed, Sharif Mzee Mohamed and Ahmed Hussein Salim) in possession of 7.6 kg of heroin on a luxury yacht that had just arrived from Kilifi, on the Kenyan coast. The yacht, the *Baby Iris*, was registered in Singapore and owned by a Briton. It was blown up and sunk by the Kenyan police – thereby also destroying a key exhibit in the ensuing court case.

Another example is the network controlled by the so-called Artur Brothers (Artur Margaryan and Artur Sargsyan), Armenians who teamed up with Mary Wambui (rumoured to be former president Kibaki's mistress). The brothers were expelled in June 2006, having been in Kenya for only a few months. Eight guns and 100 rounds of ammunition were found in their compound after their departure. To justify their stay in Kenya, the brothers were appointed to top positions in the Kenyan government – remarkably, as

assistant police commissioners – and were deployed to harass those critical of the Kibaki regime. At one time, they travelled as 'prominent Kenyan businessmen' on a presidential jet to Uganda.

As well as Gulam Hussein and Vijaygiri Goswami, deported alongside the Akasha brothers, two other drug barons, Dominguez and Nedy Micock (nationals of the Seychelles), and Barend Nolte and Marc Faivelewitz (South Africans) were deported in February 2017, a month after the Akashas were extradited to the US.

The criminal organisation with the most established footprint in East Africa is the Italian mafia, particularly figures linked to the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, who have an established presence on the Kenyan coast and in southern Africa. The authors were told that the mafia is also present in Zanzibar but were unable to verify this. The Kenyan coastal town of Malindi is said to be the base from where Italian mafia members run money laundering, drugs, prostitution and weapon-trafficking rackets, across both Kenya and Somalia.⁸⁸ For example, Mario Mele, an Italian businessman and fugitive from Italian justice, who has been linked to the Cosa Nostra, owns a popular cafe in Malindi.⁸⁹ Italians in Malindi have been repeatedly linked to the cocaine trade in East Africa and, to a lesser extent, the heroin trade. Malindi is also reportedly home to fugitives from Germany and Eastern Europe. According to journalist Paul Gitau, 'The Law Society of Kenya says it has evidence that the coastal town is firmly in the grip of the Italian Mafia, which controls and compromises the administration of justice.'⁹⁰

The Cosa Nostra has also had a presence and business operations further south. Vito Palazzolo, a 'banker' for the Cosa Nostra, took refuge in South Africa for several decades before being apprehended and imprisoned in Italy. And in 2011, Antonino Messicati Vitale, a one-time boss of the Cosa Nostra visited southern Africa and was linked to diamond deals in Zimbabwe and South Africa.⁹¹

The Kenyan drug barons run smaller amounts of heroin (in batches of several kilograms at a time) into and through Kenya, and supply local and regional consumer markets. They also send small amounts to European markets by air.⁹² They primarily deploy drug mules, who travel by air and land, to move the product into and out of Kenya.⁹³ They may also have a network of street dealers, who sell product for them in Mombasa and Nairobi. These barons have had a presence since the 1990s; their mule routes switched from using

Kenyan airports to Entebbe, Uganda, when security became tighter.⁹⁴

Many drug-trafficking figures – at the kingpin and baron levels in the hierarchy – combine the smuggling of narcotics and other commodities (such as sugar, rice and electronics) with poaching and counterfeiting. By adopting this diversified approach to business, they can readily switch their activities to stay afloat during a downturn in any of their business lines, or when they come under pressure from the authorities.

They also run legal businesses, such as clearing and forwarding companies, which facilitate their illicit trade. Of the 'big names' linked to narcotics in Kenya's Parliament in 2010, nine own (or at least used to own) import and export companies, cargo-clearing establishments and container freight stations, in Mombasa and Nairobi. Some have owned retail businesses, which can be used to disguise imports and launder money.

One of the notable evolutions in Kenya's criminal economy is the increased integration of drug networks and political office

One of the most notable evolutions in Kenya's criminal economy is the exponential increase in the integration of drug networks and political office. Money derived from heroin and cocaine has been used to fund multiple election campaigns, and drug traffickers themselves have campaigned for political power funded by drug money. 'They are no longer seeking to compromise the political system,' said one interviewee. 'They are seeking to control the political system.'⁹⁵

Political protection

In the 1990s, the Akashas initially operated without high-level political protection but, as they began to accumulate more wealth, they allegedly attracted the attention of some political leaders in the ruling party. The Akashas were reportedly offered – or it was demanded that they accept – protection in exchange for political donations.⁹⁶ This form of political involvement

has never been proven or documented, however. Kenya was purely a corridor for heroin at this point, and one long-term observer believes that the first wave of major heroin traffickers cut a deal, similar to the one that has arguably prevailed in Mozambique (discussed further below), whereby it was agreed there would be no local selling and thus no local consumption. The deal was soon broken.⁹⁷

After Kenya's transition to multi-party democracy, political elites' ability to provide protection would have diminished and new power holders emerged on the scene. Drug dealers began to fund actors across the political spectrum (and sometimes more than one) to secure protection of their trade, and the number of those involved in the drug economy increased.

Harun Mwau's alleged involvement in drug trafficking was said to have flourished during both the Daniel arap Moi and, later, Mwai Kibaki presidencies. However, since President Uhuru Kenyatta assumed power, his fortunes have faded. The Akashas' interests were also said to have been damaged by the transition from Moi to Kibaki, after which, weakened by infighting, they fell prey to extortion by successive regimes. Interviews with journalists in Mombasa indicate that the Akashas and their associates were extradited to the US, more than a year after the official request for extradition, only after they refused to pay more bribes to top politicians.⁹⁸

Kenyatta seems to have effected a moderate crackdown on the trade – reportedly to curry favour with the US, which is seen as a key security partner for Kenya. By contrast, in the current phase of the evolution of Kenya's heroin networks, it has become more and more common for heroin traffickers to campaign directly for political power.

This phenomenon is fuelled by the relationship between money and politics, and the huge expenses incurred by Kenya's electoral processes. Campaigners estimate that in Kenya's recent election, the incumbent, Kenyatta, spent US\$50 million on his re-election campaign. Media reports suggest it costs as much as US\$6 million for a successful governorship campaign alone.⁹⁹ One of our key interlocutors, a person who is active in the logistics of political campaigning in Mombasa, claimed it costs at least US\$2 million to contest a gubernatorial position in his county.¹⁰⁰ (The Kenyan government spent at least US\$500 million on the election itself, making it one of the most expensive in the world.)¹⁰¹ For decades now, the political patronage system has been influenced by

money – cash that is needed to bribe, buy votes and manipulate the political process.

Whereas those already in power can derive substantial resources through the state, people who are not yet in power must look to other sources for political funding. Our interviews suggest that, for some candidates, these political slush funds come from those involved in transnational crime, including drug trafficking, money laundering, pirating, human trafficking, terrorism financing etc. In the words of one opposition politician, '[The heroin traffickers] know the whole deficiency that the system has – particularly the opposition. These people manifest themselves as backers of political parties, and part of their incentive is that they will recoup the investment. As a result, they ingrain themselves in the political system, in order to protect their business.'¹⁰²

Political slush funds come from those involved in transnational crime, including drug trafficking

This system is facilitated by the nature of party politics in Kenya, which is highly individualised. Said one interviewee: 'Political parties here belong to leaders – they can change them at will. That's why the drug money all goes to individuals.'¹⁰³ This individualised nature of political influence can also lead to the need to back several horses in order to secure full protection, and to manage the tensions that arise from numerous competing (and fluid) allegiances between traffickers and politicians.

Multipolar competition

The move by drug traffickers into politics has apparently arisen, in part, because of the transaction costs associated with preventing conflict with other traffickers, who are all vying for market space to operate, and to secure political protection in a fluid political system. In short, in Kenya, becoming an MP or senator is a way of cutting out the middle man and acquiring political protection more directly. It is not attractive to all players, however: the gamble inherent in the move is that public office does increase scrutiny, albeit in a system with a large amount of impunity for organised criminals.

At the same time, these efforts to contain conflict have not been wholly successful, and illicit markets are feeding violence and instability. According to one participant, 'Whenever there is a change of government, some cartels benefit and others lose out. And those that lose out don't go out quietly.'¹⁰⁴ Senior police and intelligence officers have been killed in turf wars between crime lords. Mombasa chief detective Hassan Abdillahi was assassinated in 2006. Two brothers of William Kabogo, a former MP linked to the drug trade, were arrested over the murder.¹⁰⁵ It is claimed that a rival drug cartel felt that Abdillahi was close to the Akasha family. Another victim, Erastus Kirui Chemorei, who controlled access to a US\$60 million cocaine haul seized in a villa in Malindi, was gunned down by a contingent of 70 police officers in February 2005, after he was branded as a rogue policeman. It emerged later that he was a victim of a turf war between cartels linked to Harun Mwau and that of Wambui.¹⁰⁶

Drawing on the evidence we have accumulated, we feel it accurate to characterise the northern area of the east coast criminal economy, centred on Nairobi and Mombasa, as one of multipolar competition. This means that there are multiple powerful figures who control part of one, or part of several, illicit markets. These figures sometimes operate with managed harmony but, in some cases, compete fiercely for market share. While competing, however, criminal actors also keep an eye on achieving a degree of stability, without which criminal business would not be possible in the first place. New entrants can start trading in these markets, but they have to bide their time if they are to challenge the bigger established players. Political protection can be sought in a variety of ways. In the words of a prominent civil society leader, 'Fragmentation is a characteristic of Kenyan politics – and, as a result, also of the Kenyan underworld.'¹⁰⁷

Several participants in this study remarked on something that has accompanied the integration of these various criminal economies into Kenya's licit economy and political system – in the midst of both impunity and a vibrant press: that there is a deleterious mix of complacency and expediency.

Alongside this, there is a recognition that money is needed to acquire political power. Meanwhile, the marked degree of polarisation along ethnic and other lines in the country, which produces a 'winner takes all' attitude to elections, means that political candidates

are not punished for unsavoury associations. Said one expert commentator on corruption and the illicit economy: 'We are increasingly more and more forgiving of misconduct that we would otherwise disapprove of, if it creates opportunity for the political side we support to get ahead.'

In Kenya's 2017 elections, in which Raila Odinga, the main opposition candidate, had substantial financial (and public) backing from Hassan Joho, governor of Mombasa, Kenyans referred to individuals linked to drug dealing in their political camps as their 'pharmacists'. 'In the 80s and 90s it was very, very different – there was a real sense of revulsion towards drug barons,'¹⁰⁸ said a lawyer and human-rights activist.

In general, people we spoke to were extremely cynical about the prospect for any major change, including efforts towards dismantling Kenya's illicit networks, as the structural features that allow for the current situation show no signs of changing.

Tanzania

History and networks

Geographically at the centre of the coastal criminal economy, Tanzania has, for decades, provided a conducive setting for transnational organised smuggling rings centred on heroin and the illegal wildlife trade to flourish. The country has also been, until recently, a safe launching pad for trans-border sorties into Kenya and Mozambique for poaching and drug running. But, just as Tanzania may have played an important role in solidifying the coastal market, it is now playing an equally important role in its disruption and displacement.

In the 1980s, Tanzania's traffickers sourced small amounts of heroin from Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India through mules. Those networks would provide local couriers with tickets for international travel and dupe them into believing that they were going to be offered jobs abroad.¹⁰⁹ This situation changed in the mid-1990s, when larger volumes of drugs began arriving in Tanzania. Some people believe that heroin use – and the lucrative heroin-smuggling trade – spread from Zanzibar to mainland Tanzania. In the mid-1990s, the semi-autonomous island had opened itself up to the global tourism economy, and heroin was brought to the island by drug mules to supply the foreign tourist population, which created a local-user base. This

market remained small until around 2000, when the amount, type and price of heroin changed, and use then escalated rapidly.¹¹⁰

The relationship between political protection and heroin in Tanzania did not become obvious to the public until the early 2000s, when relatives of prominent politicians began to be linked to the heroin trade.¹¹¹ The number of high-profile arrests of Tanzanians outside the country rose, as did the number of heroin addicts on the streets. By the middle of that decade, the heroin economy, in the words of one investigative journalist, 'became normal ... drugs became prevalent, the intelligence agency and police were almost openly involved, and everyone [linked to the trade] became rich. It was routine to hear that politicians and police were involved.'¹¹²

Tanzania has, for decades, provided a conducive setting for transnational organised smuggling rings

Tanzanian intelligence found that heroin was entering the country through dhows around 2006, though it was not clear that this knowledge led to any effective measures against the trade. There hadn't been many large seizures around that time but, then, in September 2011, Tanzanian authorities seized 210 kg of heroin in the coastal town of Lindi, which had been brought in by dhow.

The heroin networks operating in Zanzibar are reportedly composed of elite local businessmen, hotel owners and public officials. The so-called 'big dealers', or kingpins, keep a very low profile in Zanzibar. As a close observer of the drug market said: 'The big dealers do their work in secret. There are about seven to ten big dealers in Zanzibar. There are some dealers who are hidden and have power in government. Some are big in the police.'¹¹³ In Dar es Salaam, kingpins named by the government in the current crackdown include politicians, businessmen, musicians and a famous preacher.

By contrast, the regular dealers, who deploy pushers to sell *katte*, small pellets of heroin, on the street are usually well known among the local communities because of their rapid rise in wealth.¹¹⁴

In recent years, a significant mainland local heroin trade and addiction crisis have developed and spread across the country, driven by home-grown drug gangs. On the mainland, use has spread across Dar es Salaam, where *unga* houses (places for smoking heroin) are ubiquitous in the slums, and along the coast, even into rural villages in the coastal region.

Tanzanian nationals also seem to control or coordinate a large amount of the secondary heroin market in the region. Tanzanian networks, which transport small and medium-sized shipments, have a presence in Kenya and Mozambique, and a strong presence in South Africa, where they control the heroin consumption market.¹¹⁵ As mentioned, the amount that some of them traffic is enough to supply many of thousands of users in South Africa's major cities.¹¹⁶

Tanzanian networks have a presence in Kenya and Mozambique, and a strong presence in South Africa

In a detailed study of Tanzania's 'beachboys' – a name given to Tanzanian men who have formed a community subculture, escaping from Tanzania by stowing away on container ships and temporarily basing themselves in ports around the world before moving on again – author Sean Christie paints a picture of how substantially integrated, in terms of users, mules and pushers, this underworld community is in the regional heroin trade. He describes one such small-scale network:

Freshly deported Beachboys tended to invest a portion of [the compensation they were awarded for deportation] in *unga* [heroin] for smuggling back to South Africa when the time came to return. Not many Cape Town dealers were interested in chasing after such small quantities, but Bath [a Tanzanian dealer in Cape Town] had discovered that these regular infusions – anywhere between 10 and 250 grams per traveller – ensured consistency of supply all year round.¹¹⁷

Political protection

A veteran political and investigative journalist has traced the beginning of political protection of the drugs trade

in Tanzania to the move away from single-party rule to multi-party contestation in the mid-1990s,¹¹⁸ and the shift from a socialist economy to an open market. The change can be seen in particular in the mass privatisation of many of the country's 400-plus state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 1993.¹¹⁹

The drugs problem probably started when we were doing liberalisation. People sold SOEs like giveaway prizes. It was a period of boom. Greed drove it. The market was opening up, everything was coming in, everything was there and people wanted everything! But they didn't have money. So, they did what they need to get money.¹²⁰

Between the mid-1990s and 2015, Tanzania achieved high levels of economic growth, but this happened in a context of numerous grand corruption scandals within the ruling party, and a general failure of political and economic institutions to channel money into broad-based growth. Instead they concentrated wealth and power in a few hands.¹²¹

Despite rising popular discontent with corruption and poverty, the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), continued to be re-elected, though opposition parties, the largest of which was Chadema, led by Freeman Mbowe, made moderate gains in each election.¹²² Between 1995 and 2015, party financing and the amount spent on winning elections grew in aggregate, as did the party's reliance on capital-intensive methods of mobilising attendance at political rallies.¹²³ For example, during President Benjamin Mkapa's administration, the government passed the Traditional Hospitality Act, which allowed politicians to 'reward' their constituents for attending events. Decried by the opposition for creating an unfair advantage for richer parties and for taking advantage of voters' poverty, the act was later repealed.¹²⁴

More recently, writer and academic Dan Paget has noted how helicopters have been increasingly deployed as a highly effective way of mobilising voters:

At one illustrative rally in 2005, Mbowe arrived by helicopter. A local newspaper reported that 'The helicopter hovering within the [town of] Usa River caused major stir in the township as thousands of people left their regular tasks and rushed towards the open air venue'. I have witnessed this mode of aviation drawing crowds first-hand. At a rally in a small village in Iramba, my field notes record that

a helicopter drew a crowd of approximately 600 people [within] just twenty minutes of landing.¹²⁵

The increasing use of helicopters is but one symptom of political campaign trends in Tanzania that have meant growing reliance on party donors, rather than party branches or other 'labour-intensive' methods of canvassing voters. These kinds of heavily financed developments have raised questions about how candidates fund such activities. Gray, for example, has documented the rise of private-sector donors in Tanzania, and over the years a growing number of CCM MPs have been businessmen.¹²⁶ And although the Chadema party claims that its growth in campaign finance has come from absorbing the professional classes into the ranks of its membership,¹²⁷ our interviews suggest that, for some politicians in both the CCM and opposition parties, illicit funds are a crucial source of campaign finance. According to one journalist, it was possible to spot which MPs were taking money from drug traffickers, as they would work together, even across political divides, to prevent legislation or policy measures that would damage the trade.¹²⁸

Several things suggest that drug traffickers were receiving substantial political protection in Tanzania

Several things suggest that drug traffickers were receiving substantial political protection in Tanzania between (at least) 2000 and 2015. For one, anti-drug interventions were ineffective in numerous respects. Tanzania was unable to make seizures at sea. Even though, admittedly, the navy and coast guard are small and underfunded, there does not appear to have been any attempt to prevent the booming dhow-based heroin trade.¹²⁹

Then, during Mkapa's administration, people widely suspected of being drug barons or kingpins were given diplomatic passports.¹³⁰ A National Task Force formed by President Jakaya Kikwete in 2006 seemingly made no ground: government documents reveal that there were no meaningful seizures of heroin during this period. Although UNODC estimated that several tonnes of heroin were transiting through the country

during that time, the largest seizure since 2000 was 400 kilograms in 2014.¹³¹ Hundreds of people were arrested for drug-related offences, but they were mostly street-level dealers; major foreign traffickers and kingpins were never exposed. The average seizure volume associated with arrest was 700 grams.¹³²

There are some exceptions to this pattern, however, such as the arrest and prosecution of Mama Lela (a Kenyan discussed above) and Ally Khatibu Haji, alias Shkuba. These exceptions are also revealing. Both Mama Lela and Shkuba had been listed by the US as kingpins, and there seems to have been substantial international pressure for action to be taken against them. Shkuba was arrested in 2014 as he was about to board a flight to South Africa, where he had been evading arrests for two years. His extradition process was then mired in the courts for three years, until May 2017 when he was summarily (and without due process) extradited to the US under President Magufuli's watch.

In 2014, rumours circulated that a heroin shipment belonging to Ridhiwani Kikwete, the then president's son, had been seized by the Chinese and that Kikwete had been arrested. In exchange for his release, President Kikwete is rumoured to have agreed to lucrative contracts with the Chinese. This was reported in local media in Kenya and Tanzania.¹³³ People who have worked at the Dar es Salaam port claim that senior members of the political elite placed key figures there to facilitate smuggling.¹³⁴ A former government official alleged that, during this same period, there was continual interference from the Presidency in law-enforcement interventions relating to drugs. He also explained that key law-enforcement officials had explicitly avoided questioning Ridhiwani Kikwete during his father's term, as it was seen as being a career-limiting move.¹³⁵

Even if the rumour is entirely baseless, its enduring appeal says something about the perceived relationship between the political elite and the drug trade at the time – as well as the country's perceived vulnerability to external manipulation as a result.

Disrupted market

President Magufuli, who was elected in 2015,¹³⁶ has taken strident moves to address graft, somewhat stealing the wind from the opposition's sails, whose main line of attack against the CCM had been their refusal or inability to deal with corrupt officials.

Drugs did not form part of his election platform, and it came as somewhat of a surprise when, in early 2017, Magufuli announced a major crackdown on the drug trade. Acting through Dar es Salaam's regional commissioner, Paul Makonda, the president released a list (described as the 'list of shame') of 97 people who would be questioned in connection with the drug trade. On the list were Ridhiwani Kikwete and Freeman Mbowe, as well as a host of other high-profile political figures, businessmen and celebrities.¹³⁷ In this move, Magufuli appears to have some backing from civil society, particularly from the Interfaith Council. Religious leaders appear to have been motivated by the impact of the heroin trade on their communities.¹³⁸

Magufuli has also cracked down on corruption at the Port of Dar es Salaam. This seems to have been triggered by the discovery of falsely valued mining shipments for export, the president claims, and therefore his efforts are framed more as an attempt to regain control over accurate tax revenue collection rather than as an anti-contraband initiative. Nevertheless, it is already having an effect on contraband exports, and there are claims that traffickers of wildlife and drugs have begun to avoid using Dar es Salaam's port.¹³⁹ These measures are slated to be replicated in Tanga, a port in the north-east, and Mtwara, a port that has become key because of the discovery of oil and gas in the south. According to someone who works at the Dar es Salaam port, Magufuli is a regular visitor, as is the prime minister, demonstrating the importance of these measures to the president's broader anti-corruption drive¹⁴⁰.

Comments about this crackdown by civil-society actors and law-enforcement officials across the region were mixed. Some observers see a pattern in the anti-drugs crackdown that indicates, without hard evidence being made public to support the allegation, that supporters of Edward Lowassa¹⁴¹, and other key opposition figures, are primary targets and under continuing pressure (though, while this pressure is selective, it is not assumed to be baseless). On the other hand, although Ridhiwani Kikwete was questioned, he was never charged for trafficking drugs, and his mother was nominated as an MP by Magufuli, indicating the family remains in favour.

In this same vein, Magufuli's broader set of anti-graft measures and economic policies have also served to shore up his own power base by 'limit[ing] the political finance available to the official opposition as well as oppositional factions within CCM whilst reinforcing Magufuli's centralized control over resources'.¹⁴² That,

arguably, puts into clearer focus the nature of Magufuli's anti-drugs campaign, which is perhaps, like many corruption crackdowns, shaped by political objectives that are unrelated to its stated objectives.¹⁴³

Magufuli's broader set of anti-graft measures and economic policies have also served to shore up his own power base

Other commentators, who are in principle supportive of the president's crackdown on drug trafficking, are worried that Magufuli's approach was too centralised and too dismissive of institution building to be sustainable. 'It will go when he does,' said one practitioner in drug rehabilitation in the Mombasa area.¹⁴⁴ An official from an intergovernmental organisation spoke with frustration of the way the president's approach to reform often undermined its own objectives: 'He is weakening the institutions by sacking people all the time. People are frightened to make decisions. Management is weak. It's a big disruption.'¹⁴⁵

Many are also worried about Magufuli's authoritarian moves. Much of Magufuli's anti-drug campaign relies on the efforts of Makonda, the regional commissioner for Dar es Salaam. It was Makonda who, for example, announced the 'list of shame', apparently containing the names of key individuals involved in the drug trade. Makonda is considered suspect by some of the interviewees in this study; he was criticised harshly for a disregard for due process.¹⁴⁶ Magufuli is intolerant of criticism and (as mentioned) has shut down five newspapers since he took office in 2015. He has interfered with judicial independence and is seen to rule by executive order. But Magufuli may be just the most visible symbol of a drift towards authoritarianism that has been present in the party for several years.¹⁴⁷ Nonetheless, this aspect of his rule is likely to become more apparent.

Law-enforcement officials claim the anti-drugs effort is going well. Although they have not made any arrests of high-level traffickers to date, they say arrests are in the pipeline.¹⁴⁸ People who work with drug users, however, claim the crackdown has mainly affected users

and small-scale dealers, and that they have even been subjected to human-rights abuses.¹⁴⁹

Military operations in Tanzania's slums are also said to have dispersed hardened Tanzanian gang members to take cover overseas in Maputo, Durban and Cape Town.¹⁵⁰ There is also evidence that the measures the president is enforcing in the Port of Dar es Salaam are merely serving to displace smuggling, rather than reduce its prevalence – a function of the integration of the regional economy. Officials within Magufuli's administration concede that many operators in the drug trade have merely been driven out of the country into Mozambique, and that the drugs return across the border in small quantities once the monsoon period is over.¹⁵¹ And, although the number of ivory seizures has fallen in Dar es Salaam's port,¹⁵² sources in South Africa say that, as regards heroin, heightened port checks in Tanzania merely created a three-week lag in local consumer markets as dealers switched routes in favour of greater reliance on road and rail.¹⁵³

It is because of these measures, following a period of effective impunity for drug kingpins, that the networks that make use of Tanzanian corridors and hubs can be described as 'disrupted'.

Mozambique

History and networks

A small network, composed of a number of Mozambican families of Asian origin and with close ties to the ruling party, has controlled the transit heroin trade in the country for almost three decades. At the top of this network, allegedly, is Mohamed Bachir Suleman (known as MBS), who is accused by the US government of being an international drugs trafficker. MBS is in ill health and has been badly affected by the financial ramifications of the US blacklisting, as well as political shifts within the ruling party. However, a journalist who follows the Maputo underworld closely confirms he maintains an important role in the heroin trade.¹⁵⁴

The MBS-linked cartel is said to control the coast from the Tanzanian border south towards the town of Angoche – a stretch of coastline some 700 km long that encompasses the major deep container ports of Pemba and Nacala, as well as a string of small islands close to the shore. Nacala is considered to be the epicentre of the country's drug business in the north, while Nampula, Mozambique's third largest city, is a close second. The

MBS cartel deals in the bulk transshipment of heroin and hashish, which arrive in dhow-based or container shipments (as described above).

Momade Rassul Abdul Rahim (known primarily as Momade Rassul) has the highest profile of the three family patriarchs reportedly working under MBS. He is a member of FRELIMO and has close links to senior party figures. He is said to have had direct access to Armando Guebuza when he was president. He is one of FRELIMO's designated 'economic agents', which comes with certain privileges. According to one associate, 'He wouldn't succeed if he wasn't in FRELIMO'¹⁵⁵ and his links with the Guebuza administration, including through his wife's charitable work,¹⁵⁶ have been well documented. Rassul owns several hotels and other industrial businesses, and reports a turnover of about US\$60 million a year.¹⁵⁷ There is no proven link between Rassul and the drug trade, though he was arrested in June 2017 in Maputo and charged with money laundering, illegal enrichment and tax fraud.¹⁵⁸

The MBS-linked cartel is said to control the coast from the Tanzanian border south towards the town of Angoche

The second central family is headed by Gulam Rassul Moti, who runs the thriving Moti Group, a car-rental company in Nampula.¹⁵⁹ The Motis are third-generation Mozambican citizens of Pakistani descent, who run a large network of business interests across the country, including import and export of electronic products and clothing, and agricultural investments. Moti also owns a supermarket, called Recheio, in Nampula.¹⁶⁰ According to an ex-resident of Nacala, 20 years ago, Moti 'had one shop selling *capulanas*¹⁶¹ and needles in Nacala – now he controls the port. In addition to his car rental company, he owns a pharmacy.'¹⁶²

The third group is the Ayoob family, though they appear to have less of a connection to Nampula and Nacala, and seem to be more involved in investments in Maputo. Currently, Faruk Ayoob owns and runs Ayoob Comercial,¹⁶³ a toyshop in downtown Maputo; he also recently bought two hotels in Maputo: the Terminus and the Monte Carlo. Faruk's brother Momed was arrested

for drug possession and drug trafficking in separate incidents in Portugal,¹⁶⁴ and for money laundering in Swaziland,¹⁶⁵ before his death in 2012.

Interviewees in Nacala specifically linked Rassul and Moti to smuggling incidents in Nacala.¹⁶⁶ Both were linked to the import of a container of motorbikes in 2013 or thereabouts. It is alleged that heroin was hidden in the petrol tanks of the bikes. Some of these motorbikes – presumably once the heroin had been removed – were subsequently sold at very low prices to Rassul's workers and the rest of were burnt.¹⁶⁷ Moti also regularly imports containers of products for his pharmaceutical business and his supermarket, but there are suspicions they contain drugs. Port workers and employees of the Kudumba cargo-scanning company told colleagues that they were 'forbidden' to scan Moti's containers.¹⁶⁸ According to our sources, the issue of scanning is closely tied up with the MBS network's links to the government, as explained below.

How did such tight control over the transit heroin trade arise in Mozambique? Mozambique suffered a serious civil war from 1977 to 1992. The end of the war was a crucial precondition for the expansion of the heroin market. There is only one major road that runs the length of this long country, and it was frequently made impassable during the war. Traffic between northern and southern Mozambique resumed after the war, and this road became crucial for land-based transport of heroin from the north to Maputo, and on to South Africa.

Furthermore, the war was hugely destructive, and Mozambique faced a mammoth rebuilding task, which was highly reliant on closely monitored international aid, and so, according to our sources, the ruling party sought avenues to generate revenue that did not have strings attached, and which could also be put to use to fund the party.¹⁶⁹ At around the same time, the country also moved towards a market-based economy, and the way this was done laid the foundation for an enmeshment between crime, politics and business.¹⁷⁰

The war may also have shaped who was able to dominate illicit markets in the post-war period. It is notable that several of Mozambique's criminal markets¹⁷¹ are dominated by people from the country's relatively small Asian-origin community. Some commentators argue that this situation has arisen out of a combination of their historical role as traders and their international connections. Before independence, these families were small-time traders in rural areas, and after

independence they moved into towns and occupied the trading niches left unoccupied by departing white settlers.

At the same time, unsure what would happen in Mozambique, some Asian-origin Mozambicans, according to a report by an expert on Mozambique:

... carefully divided their families, with some members maintaining businesses in Mozambique while other members went to Portugal and still others went to Dubai, India and Pakistan. These links have been maintained and have been important for money laundering and the heroin, hashish and mandrax trades. With the end of the war, a small group of Asian-origin trading families based in Nampula city and the port of Nacala became important, particularly in importing electrical goods.¹⁷²

A South African police analyst who worked extensively on regional crime networks in the aftermath of apartheid has argued that during the war, Mozambican traders of Asian origin cornered the trade in black-market currency, as well as other black-market goods made scarce by war shortages and the disruptions of the conflict.¹⁷³ At the end of the war, these traders were among the few Mozambicans with sufficient capital to take advantage of economic opportunities as the country adopted a market economy. They also came to own currency-exchange bureaux, which proliferated during this period. For those with an eye on illegal trades, access to cash then funded the corruption of senior officials.

While heroin appears to have begun moving through Mozambique in the early or mid-1990s, the links between MBS, Mozambique's original (and still dominant) drug baron, and the ruling party appear to have been established during the administration of President Joaquim Chissano. Chissano assumed leadership of FRELIMO, and the country, in 1986 when the then president, Samora Machel, died. Discussions in our interviews frequently made a comparison between FRELIMO's position on corruption and contraband before and after Machel. 'The people who run the scene in FRELIMO, they are not the liberators, they are the new entrepreneurs,' one informant told us. '... The old guard – they had some sort of moral code.'¹⁷⁴ The Machel regime was said to be ideologically stricter and that it maintained a consistent rhetoric that linked corruption to betrayal of the party, the revolution and the people. In 1983, for example, the authorities

famously executed in public Gulam Nabi, a prominent member of the Muslim community, for his involvement in black-market trade of prawns, without granting him a right to defend himself.¹⁷⁵

Chissano, on the other hand, presided over a period of great economic, political and ideological transition. He signed a peace deal with the opposition party, RENAMO; the financial system was deregulated; and Mozambique moved from a centrally planned to a free-market economy. Along with massive economic growth, this period is associated with the mushrooming of organised-crime networks in the country. Chissano's administration was, according to journalists and academics we interviewed in Maputo in September 2017, colloquially referred to as '*deixa andar*', meaning 'to let things go'. By the early 2000s, President Chissano was publicly linked with MBS – he even attended MBS's son's wedding in 2001.¹⁷⁶

Interviewees speculated that some level of state regulation of the heroin trade was arranged in this period. According to Hanlon, Chissano had been FRELIMO's head of security for many years, and "had the personal contacts needed to organise and regulate the trade".¹⁷⁷ "There is no direct evidence of high-level regulation, and any witnesses to such meetings are unlikely to speak out". But, on the basis of the research findings it could be argued, there are *symptoms* that such a practice is in place, which we describe below.

Rather than any written or formally acknowledged set of rules, this 'regulation' can be understood as a long-standing, resilient 'practice' between top drug traffickers and top officials. It is believed to be based on a broad understanding among some members of the leadership elite – not all of whom may be directly involved – that a *quid pro quo* exists around the heroin trafficking economy, whereby government protection is extended to the trade. In return, traffickers make payments that benefit representatives of the ruling elite, ensure there is little local consumption, and make investments in the Mozambican economy out of the proceeds of their trade. In the two decades that Mozambique has been a transit corridor for large volumes of heroin, there have been no public drug wars between the 'heroin families' and no convictions; and in the past two decades, there have been no arrests of senior figures in the heroin and hashish trades.¹⁷⁸ Officially recorded heroin seizures have been insignificant in Mozambique.¹⁷⁹ This analysis stems from our interviews with a range of sources in

Mozambique, as shown in the examples put forward as evidence of this '*quid pro quo*' in this report.

Our sources suggest that any political protection that might have existed during Chissano's administration also existed during Armando Guebuza's, and may in fact have increased. Guebuza became president in 2005 publicly visited MBS's Maputo shopping centre twice in his first term (on 22 June 2006 and for the official opening on 8 May 2007). The US\$32 million complex was then the largest in Mozambique, and Guebuza praised it as a model of private investment. MBS was reported to have made a US\$1 million contribution to Guebuza's 2009 electoral campaign.¹⁸⁰

Officially recorded heroin seizures have been insignificant in Mozambique

Interventions by the US between 2009 and 2010 provide some contemporaneous evidence that entrenched corrupt relationships between the ruling party and major drug traffickers were considered a serious concern. In 2009 and 2010, Todd Chapman, chargé d'affaires at the US Embassy in Maputo, alleged that MBS 'has direct ties to President Guebuza and former President Chissano'.¹⁸¹ This was followed by the blacklisting of MBS as a drugs kingpin by the US Treasury in 2010.¹⁸²

Several informants characterised Guebuza's administration as one in which corruption in Mozambique increased rapidly in scale and visibility, with widely acknowledged links to organised crime. Conservation activists, for example, described Guebuza's term as 'devastating' for wildlife and anti-poaching endeavours. It is not clear to what extent this relates to his specific style of leadership, or if it reflects the cumulative pressure of various external factors, such as the uptick in drugs trafficked in the southern route and the surge in Asian demand for wildlife products.

Under the current president, Filipe Nyusi, there appears to be a slight destabilisation of the ruling party's relationship with the major traffickers, discussed further below. Nonetheless, in the following section the 'symptoms' of political protection for the Mozambican transit heroin trade are described, or what could be called the mechanisms for impunity. These have been

uncovered through numerous interviews in the north of the country and from documentary research.

Political protection

The history of the heroin trade and the post-war development of Mozambique's criminal economy already say much about the evolution of the connections between the illicit economy and the political sphere in the country. The questions examined here are, how has each side benefited from this arrangement and what evidence can be found for this?

That the MBS group is able to move illicit goods through Mozambique's ports unhindered comes from several interviewees. Controversially, the scanners used in all Mozambique ports were supplied by a company that is owned by a FRELIMO holding company.¹⁸³ The authors were told in two interviews with people who had close associations with those working with scanners in the ports (one in Maputo and one in Nacala) that certain containers are never scanned – namely, those imported by FRELIMO and those imported by MBS or one of his associates (Moti or Rassul).¹⁸⁴ (In Nacala, we were told that containers filled with timber, which is not connected to the MBS group but is a source of funding for FRELIMO and party figures, are also not scanned.)

The government has also been proven to have awarded associates of MBS other significant and lucrative privileges connected to Mozambique's ports. A 2014 investigation by the Centro de Integridade Pública (Centre for Public Integrity) in Maputo found that the ruling party had been selling tax exemptions to Mozambican companies owned by a number of traders in Beira, Nampula and Nacala to import large volumes of goods to be sold in their retail outlets.¹⁸⁵ Among the beneficiaries of this scheme, the investigation found, was Momade Rassul, the businessman linked to the MBS group of drug traffickers.

To do this, the government exploited Mozambican Law 7/91, which grants political parties the rights to import, with tax exemption, goods for political activities. The party transmitted its rights to state-designated 'economic agents', such as Rassul. In exchange, such agents paid money directly to the party, rather than to the tax authority.¹⁸⁶ Rassul Trading benefited heavily from these exemptions, and documents show that the company imported multiple containers of motorcycles, freezers, tyres, school notebooks, and fabrics.¹⁸⁷

The exemption scandal has not been directly linked to the import of drugs, nor has it been publicly documented that containers linked to the MBS group are not scanned. But these accusations were made during interviews, and well-informed respondents whom we spoke to also linked the tax-exemption scandal to the general state of exception applied to imports by politically connected businessmen, and MBS in particular.

This impression that it is linked, however, was bolstered by the description of Nacala Port as the personal fiefdom of businessmen linked to illicit trades. The authors were told in several interviews that Nacala was a major hub because, in the words of a journalist interviewed for this study, the heroin traffickers 'control it – so they have to use [that port]'.¹⁸⁸ The same informant described the appointment of customs and port officials as being symptomatic of control exercised by senior party officials in Maputo. 'The head of Nacala Port is part of it ... he is always a senior, trusted person in the party. He always has guns and money.'

Agents from Mozambique's State Security and Intelligence Service (known as SISE)¹⁸⁹ were also allegedly installed in the port, undercover, as customs officers. 'They are not permanent, they change often. When they leave the post, they leave rich.'¹⁹⁰ Another source confirmed that, in general, customs officers have little leeway to do their jobs effectively. 'Customs officers cannot simply go where they please at a seaport; they must get permission from the port management to move around.'¹⁹¹

Furthermore, the traffickers are also said to have some level of political protection on the cross-country road network. At the start of the transit heroin trade and the elite pact, some sources claim, heroin shipments along the N1 road used to be accompanied by the police, so that they could pass the checkpoints.¹⁹² Since then, road protection has evolved – with the expansion of mobile phone infrastructure and coverage – into a system of remotely controlled protection. Informants said that several of the main figures in the drugs trade had the ability to contact people in Maputo – presumably senior figures in the party or the police – if any of their road shipments were searched or stopped, or they were able to forewarn their contacts of upcoming shipments to prevent this happening in the first place. A low-level government official in Nampula, who had spoken to people who were once involved in the heroin trade and to a truck driver who had transported drugs from Nacala, said:

Nacala is very interesting because it is controlled by [Mozambicans of Pakistani and Indian descent. When they deliver the drugs to [Nampula] then their trucks take them on to another place ... FRELIMO and the drug networks ... do work together. For example, Gulam [Moti] can use his trucks and no one can stop that truck that goes to Maputo. If it is stopped, the driver will phone. The police officer will be told that he must let the truck go.¹⁹³

When asked who in the government received the money from this arrangement, he merely said, 'The money goes to positions higher than mine.'¹⁹⁴

Evidence of an 'elite pact' can be found in the decades-long cover-up of the heroin trade in Mozambique. The authors have found evidence that suggests that government officials intervene to disguise the presence of the heroin trade in the country. Primarily, this evidence concerns discrepancies in the official documentation, corroborated by interviews with law-enforcement officials who have first-hand experience of the incidents.

A policeman based in a small town in Nampula Province told the research team that he and his colleagues never declare 'heavy drugs' (e.g. heroin and cocaine) because it is established practice to keep these drugs for personal sale and not let them enter the police seizure system. If a drug seizure is declared at all, it will be declared as *cannabis sativa*.¹⁹⁵ A more senior official stationed in the same town confirmed that this practice was routine.¹⁹⁶ A well-informed source who is familiar with routes and locations in northern Mozambique told us that heroin is an important source of income for police and customs officers:

Heroin represents important income to police and customs officials. When they find drugs and the dealers, they negotiate with them and receive [either] 1) [an] amount of money, 2) money and some quantities of drug to sell them in Mozambican market, or 3) they confiscate the drug and let the dealers go.¹⁹⁷

An official working in a state department with a mandate related to drugs – one who played a key role in generating official statistics – also claimed that their office did not report the true type of drugs that were seized. 'Beyond changing the name,' the informant told us, 'the police and customs officers don't declare the real quantities of drugs seized. In 2014, we found 56 packages of 50 kg of *cannabis sativa*, but when we took the packages to be burned, we noted that the quantities were not those declared.'¹⁹⁸

This may just seem like petty corruption on the part of low-level police and customs officers, but if one were to do a reckoning of drug seizures reported in the press, those reported in district or provincial reports, and those reported in the interviews for this study, and compare these with the official statistics, it reveals the systematic suppression of data about heroin seizures at more senior levels. Refer to Table 1, which shows the total heroin seizures – according to various government sources – nationally, and in Nampula and Pemba. In all the years shown in the table, the seizures are tiny or non-existent. Indeed, as the table shows, there are few cases of any heavy drugs – such as cocaine, meth or mandrax – having been seized in the Cabo Delgado Province from 2012 to 2016. Yet there are at least two documented cases of police seizures of large amounts of heroin in the

Table 1: Mozambican seizures of heroin, 2012 to 2016 (volumes in grams)

Name of report institution	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
General Prosecutor (annual national report)	4 114	4 335	1 957	946	1 469
Gabinete Provincial de Combate a Droga (Nampula)	30	-	40	50	486.70
Gabinete Provincial de Combate a Droga (Pemba)	-	-	-	-	2
Criminal Investigation Police in Nampula	-	-	24 capsule units	-	486.70
Criminal Investigation Police in Pemba	-	600	-	-	-
National Customs Services reports	-	-	1 000 and 61 capsule units	-	-

Sources: General Prosecutor reports, Gabinetes Provinciais de Combate a Droga em Nampula e Cabo Delgado (Provincial Strategic Plans to Fight and Prevent Drugs in Nampula and Cabo Delgado) and police data

north – these are recorded in the press and corroborated through our interviews.

On 6 March 2013, Mozambican police searched a Toyota Hiace (a small van) with Democratic Republic of the Congo number plates trying to cross the border from Tanzania at the Namoto border crossing in Cabo Delgado Province.¹⁹⁹ Hidden in the truck the police found 600 kg of heroin packed in 5 kg bags. Despite this heroin seizure being reported in the press,²⁰⁰ it is not reflected in national or provincial statistics. A reliable source told the authors that they had seen test results from the Customs Department that confirmed it was heroin, yet the drug was recorded as N-Acetylanthranilic acid by the provincial authorities.²⁰¹ And indeed, the provincial records show that there was a 603.7 kg seizure in 2013 – of N-Acetylanthranilic acid (see the table in the annexe). Then in 2015, the newspaper *Noticias* ran a story highlighting government information that 13 kg of heroin had been seized in Montepuez.²⁰² Likewise, this seizure does not appear in the official records.

Similarly, in the Gabinete Provincial de Combate a Droga document (Provincial Strategic Plan to Fight and Prevent Drugs in Cabo Delgado, 2016–2020), there are no heroin seizures registered in the whole of the Cabo Delgado Province, from 2010 to 2016. Yet the reports refer to the fact that in 2011 the Cabo Delgado health authorities assisted and treated one heroin consumer in Montepuez. And in the same document, in a separate discussion, three arrests for heroin trafficking are recorded. The presence of heroin traffickers and a heroin user but the absence of any seized heroin do not add up.

These discrepancies and oral testimonies suggest three things are happening:

- National and provincial statistics are subverted, possibly by actors in centralised statistical units.
- Drugs, mainly heroin, are being taken out of the system by police or customs officials.
- Heroin is being misdeclared as other drugs by police or customs officers.

Our local sources say that different incentives work together to produce the final outcome: suppression of evidence of the transit heroin trade in Mozambique. At the national level, the incentive is to mask the trafficking that the ruling party benefits from, but at the provincial and district level more direct financial benefits from corruption may provide adequate incentive – corruption

that it is politically expedient for more senior officials to overlook.²⁰³

Our documentary evidence concerns events in the last few years. However, listening to accounts from residents of Cabo Delgado of earlier large hashish busts and the hashish trade that used to be obvious along the coast in the early 2000s, we suggest the possibility that some of these seizures may in fact have been of heroin, and that the ‘hashish’ trade may have become more hidden after the government had to intervene to calm down upset local residents.²⁰⁴

This suppression of information about the heroin trade may go beyond protecting operators from media and public scrutiny. One quid pro quo of the party’s protection of the trade may be that heroin does not leak out into the general drug market. Mozambique’s role as a transit – rather than a consumer country – probably also determined the original set of decisions around protecting the trade (a situation that later became path dependent). It does appear that rates of heroin consumption are low in Mozambique, though the data is quite sparse.

Another facet of the elite pact may be local investment: many people we spoke to claimed that much of the property boom in the north, and many luxury residential and commercial properties in Maputo, had been funded by drug money.

‘They sent guns to divide us,’ a FRELIMO politician told one of our informants. ‘Now we send this drug to divide them.’

With few Mozambican heroin users on the streets, and millions invested in local assets, it is easy for people protecting the trade to argue that it is a victimless crime – especially, they would argue, as heroin users are considered to be found only in the wealthy Global North – in other words, the states that once sought to overthrow FRELIMO, that sold weapons to its enemies and funded the devastation of the country during the civil war. ‘They sent guns to divide us,’ a FRELIMO politician told one of our informants, a former senior policeman. ‘Now we send this drug to divide them.’²⁰⁵

Yet the primary victims of Mozambique's role as a heroin corridor are not quite so far away. With a burgeoning *unga*, *woonga* and *nyaope* problem in South Africa's townships, and gang wars over control of the drug trade, many of them are to be found just across the border.

Historical consolidation with recent evolution

In Mozambique, the findings suggest a close connection between political figures in the ruling party and traffickers, creating a level of protection and advantage that closes the market off for other operators. But, just as opposition parties are starting to make inroads and are claiming key urban centres in Mozambique, the criminal market shows signs of destabilisation.

The drug trade continues under Nyusi but there is seemingly less protection for the major players

And it is a destabilisation, it seems, that has its roots in the ruling party's more tenuous position as Mozambique's dominant force following the secret loans crisis²⁰⁶ and the withdrawal of budget support in the context of consistently low global gas prices. In January 2015, Nyusi took over as president, and his moves since then have attempted to reverse some of this centralisation and curb some of the more rapacious illegal trading in the country. This has led to a loss of influence for former president Guebuza because, with his sidelining, MBS and his associates seem to be at a greater distance from the party.

The drugs trade continues – perhaps even at higher volumes – under Nyusi but there is seemingly less protection for the major players. There are no reports of Nyusi having the same personal links with MBS and Rassul; party links seem to now be at lower and more decentralised levels.

There is, perhaps consequently, also greater volatility in the business of the kingpins. As mentioned above, Momade Rassul was arrested in 2017 in Maputo and charged with money laundering, illegal enrichment and tax fraud,²⁰⁷ and later released on bail. Interviews conducted for this study suggest there is growing

tension between the mayor of Nacala, Rui Chong Saw, and Rassul over control of key pieces of land and their development in Nacala.²⁰⁸

Further north, in Cabo Delgado, there are some claims from residents that a group referred to locally as al-Shabaab²⁰⁹ is making a move into the drug market – albeit in the cannabis trade²¹⁰ – in coastal territory that is key to the heroin traffickers. This group has moved into towns in the north in the last three years, taking control of existing mosques or establishing their own and preaching an anti-state ideology.²¹¹ The government's response to the group has reportedly been heavy-handed for a while, with the arrest and imprisonment of the group's leaders. This spilled out into open conflict in October 2017, when members of this group stormed a police station in Mocimboa da Praia (a port in the north), ostensibly to free members who had been imprisoned. The result was a prolonged firefight with security forces.²¹²

South Africa

History and networks

Drugs and drug traffickers have always been present to some degree in South Africa.²¹³ In the 1980s and early 1990s, heroin was trafficked through South Africa in relatively small quantities, its use largely confined to a small group of mostly middle-class, white, male drug users who injected the drug, and who mostly sourced their supply in Hillbrow, Johannesburg.

However, in the 1990s, with the country's transition to democracy and the liberalisation of the economy – and changing social mores – the amount and type of illicit drugs trafficked in and through South Africa grew, as did local consumption markets. This was driven both by the growth in the presence of international organised crime in the country and the marketing of drugs across the racial spectrum.²¹⁴

In the last decade, methamphetamines, and recently heroin, have become prevalent in South Africa. In about 2003, consumption of crystal meth (locally known as '*tik*') took hold in Cape Town and soon spread to other parts of the country. *Tik* is cheap, making it accessible to lower-income markets and it soon became a serious competitor to mandrax, and it remains popular. *Tik* is linked to soaring rates of violence as a result of both competition over the trade and crime committed by users.²¹⁵

Although heroin use grew after the lifting of sanctions on South Africa and the relaxation of border control as part of the democratic transition, the amount consumed was relatively small compared with that of cocaine, methaqualone and methamphetamines. Use has risen dramatically, however, in all the major metros in the last four years. This rise has been obscured, in public debate, partly because it is being marketed as a new drug – *nyaope* (Johannesburg) and *unga* (Cape Town – also sometimes referred to as *woonga*). In Indian areas, heroin is called ‘sugar’. Heroin use has exploded in small towns, like Middleburg, along the road corridor from Mozambique to Johannesburg, and a number of fatal overdoses and a crime wave have accompanied this.²¹⁶

As previously explained, this trade happens through much more diverse routes and networks, and in lower volumes, than the transit trade. In Pretoria and Johannesburg, the secondary trade in heroin is dominated by Tanzanian networks. Interestingly, whereas ‘Nigerian’ is virtually synonymous with ‘drug dealer’ in South Africa, Tanzanians involved in the trade have kept a remarkably low profile for several decades. According to interviews with people involved in heroin rehabilitation, ‘Tanzanians have been running the show in southern Africa since the beginning’.²¹⁷

It appears that Tanzanians opened up the heroin market in the country’s townships. *Unga* and *nyaope* were an innovation in the drug market, in the sense that they provided low-grade heroin mixed with a concoction of different substances, which was cheap and could be smoked. This way, these drugs broke into low-income markets where there was an aversion to injecting.

Tanzanian networks in Gauteng are well organised, and with the surge in use there is now a big market with ‘more than enough people making money, so that there is no need for violence’.²¹⁸ Originally, Nigerians traded in heroin as well as their mainstay, cocaine, but now there seems to be an agreement whereby they control cocaine and the Tanzanians control the heroin market.

According to a Cape Town police officer, heroin was first marketed in the Cape Flats in 2008 by the Americans gang: ‘I had the feeling someone was testing the market,’ he said. This test was not hugely successful, and heroin use did not take off until 2011 to 2013, when *unga* hit the market.²¹⁹ Tanzanian gangs have gradually become a more powerful group in the Cape underworld, and now they operate in the Cape Flats alongside the traditional, local Cape gangs.²²⁰ When *unga* use became prevalent

on the Flats, it potentially eclipsed the *tik* crisis, which has devastated poor areas in the city for the last decade.


To market *unga*, dealers in Pretoria, Johannesburg and Cape Town have adopted a range of offers. They are said to hand out free bags on Sundays. Then there is also the use of ‘starter packs’ – a reward for frequent purchases. In Pretoria, this deal started out with one free bag for every four R30 bags bought; then, to deter customers from shopping around with other dealers this changed to two free bags for every seven bought, and then three free bags after 10 purchases.²²¹

Nyaope and *unga* are marketed at taxi ranks, at informal markets, on street corners and in schools. One community worker from Chatsworth, Durban, described the usage of both heroin and *nyaope* in his area:

In Chatsworth and Phoenix we have more ‘sugars’ [the local street name for heroin] than Hulett’s [a brand of sugar]. Its use is very rife – such that kids at 12 years use sugars. Areas that were previously known for mandrax are now seeing heroin-based drugs start to emerge as the drugs of choice.²²²

This rise in heroin use can be seen in the escalating rates of people seeking treatment for heroin dependency (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: National trends in heroin treatment, South Africa (1998–2016)



Source: S Dada et al, South African Community Epidemiology Network on Drug Use, Monitoring Alcohol and Drug Abuse Trends in South Africa, Phase 35, Cape Town, 2014

Although the scale of the secondary heroin market is mostly underappreciated in South Africa (in part because it is not widely understood that *unga*, *woonga* and *nyaope* are all heroin-based drugs), the transit heroin trade is even less known to the general public – and to law enforcement, too, it appears. Seizures over the last decade, however, indicate that the amount of heroin being trafficked in South Africa has escalated.²²³ Reported heroin seizures since 1998 paint a picture of a steep rise in trafficking since 2013. In 1998 the amount of heroin seized in South Africa was 5.4 kg;²²⁴ by 2002 it had gone up to 15.02 kg; and by 2007 to 28.2 kg.²²⁵ During 2014/15 the police seized 212.36 kg of heroin; by 2015/16, the amount had risen to 344.75 kg.²²⁶

Seizures over the last decade indicate that the amount of heroin being trafficked in South Africa has escalated

These seizures – and their growing scale – provide some measure of the growth in heroin trafficking but they do not provide a full picture of the trade. None of these seizures had any effect on drug prices in South Africa, indicating they were insignificant in terms of the total amount being trafficked for domestic consumption. At the same time, law-enforcement officials also believe that the rate of heroin seizures from small-time dealers or users may be undercounted because police do not always identify *nyaope* and other adulterated versions as heroin.²²⁷ Perhaps most importantly for understanding the true dimensions of the trade, there have been no seizures at the container ports, meaning that the true picture of heroin exports remains very unclear.²²⁸

The use of South African seaports to export heroin had not been documented until very recently. In June 2017 (as mentioned earlier in this report), South African police in the Overberg region of the Western Cape, 250 km from Cape Town, seized 963 kg of heroin, the largest heroin seizure ever.²²⁹

Despite the repeated references in our interviews to the use of Durban's port to bring in drugs, including heroin,²³⁰ there have never been any major seizures of heroin there. The authors were told that there is no big figure controlling the port or ensuring protection for smugglers,

but rather that petty corruption and poor management have allowed it to become an entry point. It is not clear exactly which networks have interests in this port.

The Overberg seizure and an earlier seizure made at Heathrow Airport of heroin trafficked on a flight from South Africa²³¹ may point to an increasing number of Western European traffickers operating in South Africa. One police officer interviewed claimed that certain wealthy Europeans who have bought properties in Gauteng and the Western Cape are operating under the facade of corporate businessmen in order to traffic in drugs:

They operate in the upper world and their pipeline does not seem to be linked to the underworld gangs. They fly under the radar and because of our perceptions of who is involved in drug trafficking, they often go undetected. We only know about them by chance or because Interpol approaches us about them.²³²

Often, these people are involved in the transshipment of drugs into countries in Europe, and Canada and Australia. The traffickers involved in the Overberg shipment had strategically planned to operate in South Africa because they were at less risk of arrest there and because, according to law-enforcement officials, 'with the euro exchange rate, you can get better-quality lawyers for cheaper'.²³³

Our interviews also suggest that the Cape gangs have developed key (and corrupt) links to the management of the port.²³⁴ This suggests the existence of – or the possibility for – an overlap between the criminal networks controlling the local consumption markets and those that control the bulk transit trade.

In Cape Town, as noted earlier, Tanzanians are considered a violent group in their own right; they also pay for protection from other gangs.²³⁵ This appears to have brought the Cape Flats gangs into the heroin trade, which may compound both the local and international aspects of South Africa's role in the heroin trade. The Cape gangs have partnerships with Russian, Chinese and Nigerian organised-crime networks in South Africa, who are 'now dependent on maintaining relations with the gang bosses to survive in the area'.²³⁶

Cape gangs are also suspected to be trying to build their own links to external markets. This point was supported by a former senior police officer who has worked extensively on gangs and criminal networks

in the Western Cape, who said, 'There is evidence that some of the key gang leaders are travelling abroad to form new international networks.'²³⁷ International ambitions have been driven by increased organisation as the local drug market has grown. To give one example, Jerome 'Donkie' Booyesen, the leader of the notorious Sexy Boys gang, is said to have 'brought a certain level of administration and organisation to the way the criminal network is run'.²³⁸

Political protection

The research did not turn up any direct links between the heroin trade and the political establishment, but there are long-standing allegations of political protection of the South African drug trade more broadly, and in particular of corrupt relationships between gang figures and foreign mafiosos, and individual ministers, senior policemen and even the ex-president himself.

As in the other countries discussed in this report, the links between the drug trade and state officials are only part of a broader picture of criminal penetration and capture of state institutions. In South Africa, a number of criminals in other illicit trades have been linked to state actors who provide political protection. These include alleged illicit tobacco kingpins Yusuf Kajee and Adriano Mazzotti, alleged rhino horn smuggler Guan Jiang Guang, and club and alleged drugs kingpin Mark Lifman. In a recent exposé, long-time criminal Glenn Agliotti is said to have been caught on tape telling a selection of Johannesburg crooks that they can expect to be protected because the former president, Jacob Zuma, is 'a gangster just like us'.²³⁹

But the biggest criminal racket in South Africa is not linked to contraband at all, but rather to the extraction of bribes, kickbacks, corrupt tender allocations and the looting of state-owned enterprises, which have funnelled perhaps hundreds of millions of dollars to the Gupta family, close friends of the ex-president.

However, what is significant for the drug trade now in South Africa is that the ANC, the ruling party, has undergone a shift in leadership. This is causing huge volatility in the underworld, as the legacy of the weakening of state institutions combines with the current destabilisation of a range of corrupt relationships that formed under Zuma's administration. The symptoms are to be found in, among others, rising levels of violence in nightclubs in the country's two major cities, and a massive rise in gang-related conflict.

In Johannesburg, the vacuum left by the arrest and imprisonment of Czech mafioso Radovan Krejcir from the underworld in 2016 has slowly been filled by other actors linked to illicit tobacco, who had previously been kept in check by a law-enforcement unit of the South African Revenue Service. (This unit had been disbanded under false allegations of illegal activities, after it began investigations into the president and many of his allies, including some of the criminal operators mentioned above.²⁴⁰) With the disbandment of the unit, some commentators have pointed to an upsurge in the illicit cigarette trade, as criminals involved in this trade had become more emboldened.

Part of this emboldenment has been the attempted expansion by a specific group in Johannesburg into control of the city's nightclubs and the drug trade. The illicit tobacco group appears to have three aims: to shift traditional drug trafficking routes between Cape Town and Johannesburg,²⁴¹ to pit gangs in the Western Cape against one another and take over their share of the market, and, related to this, to use the large amounts of cash made from their illicit tobacco trade to cut prices of drugs and cigarettes in the Western Cape. In Johannesburg, where they have been recruiting muscle from Eldorado Park and Westbury, there has been an upsurge in violence.²⁴²

At the same time, between 2016 and 2018 a war has been going on in Cape Town between this group, Nafiz Modack, a suspected extortion syndicate boss, and the reigning club kingpin, Lifman. Recently, the authors were informed that Lifman, who controlled the city's nightclubs for at least a decade, has been effectively displaced by Modack, who some suspect is being protected by police crime intelligence.²⁴³ Lifman also appears to have once had high political connections: he was photographed with a senior ANC official at Zuma's birthday celebrations.²⁴⁴

Modack also claims he is moving into the Johannesburg market. The three-way competition for nightlife security has become extremely volatile. It has led to a series of shootings at venues in both Cape Town and Johannesburg, and is said to be the reason for the shooting of gang leader Jerome Booyesen at Cape Town International Airport and to a spate of shootings in Westbury and Eldorado Park. In the words of one journalist, 'As part of the war, drugs are being flooded into the market in quantities never seen before.'²⁴⁵

A fragmented market in violent transition

One can characterise the criminal economy of South Africa as being in the midst of a dramatic underworld transition that is linked to criminal actors in several places, but primarily Johannesburg and Cape Town. This transition is a symptom of shifts in the make-up of the upperworld, shifts which may be calling into question the political protection that key actors have enjoyed for around a decade. Although it would be an exaggeration to suggest that the flow of heroin down Africa's east coast is the only factor at play, what is clear is that cheap heroin is beginning to make its presence felt. Heroin is displacing other forms of drug use in the Cape Flats – a critical vector for nationwide drug use.

A certain level of stability in the underworld may have been broken yet the future is uncertain, and South Africa is in a very important interim phase, which makes it easier for new entrants to muscle their way into the market. This process is as violent as ever, if not more so. The Global Initiative has sought to measure the number of criminal assassinations – those carried out for criminal, political or 'business' purposes – in South Africa since 2000. It is a mark of the violence and instability in South Africa's underworld that assassinations have soared since 2015 (see Figure 2). This is a reflection of political instability, but also of a fight for control in the underworld. What is important too is that recent data reveals that assassinations have spread to many other parts of the country.²⁴⁶

Figure 2: Hits in South Africa (2000–31 October 2017)



Source: Data from Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

Understanding the impact and implications of the regional heroin trade

Development, democracy and the drug trade

Too often, analyses of trafficking networks in Africa rely on the banal trio of corruption, poverty and weak rule of law to explain why transnational criminal activity flourishes. There is seldom more differentiation of the processes involved or explanation of how political cultures and criminal markets interact in different ways in each context. Yet customs officials who take petty bribes to look the other way as a means of supplementing a meagre income represent an instance of corruption that, in order of magnitude, is different from senior individuals within the political or state administration who, for example, systematically arrange for ports to be porous. Though the two forms of corruption are often closely interconnected, accounts that characterise both situations as organised crime abetted by corruption and poverty fail to identify the degree to which intertwined political economies of crime develop and sustain themselves.

We also argue that traffickers benefit not only from the lack of development in the region, but also from its infrastructure improvements and economic growth. Certainly, the dhow-based delivery system for drugs is facilitated by the obscurity and remoteness of much of the region's long coastline. As mentioned earlier in this report, there are dozens of small harbours and islands that serve as landing points for heroin smugglers using dhow routes to traffic drugs from the Makran coast to the African shore. These movements are still largely shaped by the monsoons and masked by regular activities of ancient fishing villages and the enduring small-scale dhow (licit) trade from Asia.

However, major trading centres in the countries along the eastern African seaboard play a key role in this trade too. In a globalised economy, and riding a boom driven largely by Chinese investment and Asian, European and North American demand for resources, they are the exit point for much of the natural-resource wealth of the interior, and the gatekeepers of imported goods that supply the needs of millions of inland people. A slew of multi-billion dollar projects are scheduled to expand transport and trade infrastructure. These include

the modernisation and expansion of ports in Lamu, Kenya, and Bagamoyo, Tanzania; facilities for extracting gas in southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique; and a number of energy-generation projects – these in addition to the new Nairobi–Mombasa express railway, which opened in 2017.

Such developments, rather than mitigating organised criminal activities, have often exacerbated organised crime by facilitating the transport of illicit goods through infrastructure investments and by masking illegal activity in the flurry of ‘boom town’ economies, often along the coast. Licit and illicit businesses are integrated throughout the region, a relationship between economic liberalisation and organised crime typified by the rise of ‘business-style’ traffickers with a diverse portfolio of commercial concerns – and key political connections.

At the same time, organised crime has perverse effects on local economies. Interview respondents lamented the ‘bandit economies’, ‘vulture capitalists’, and the phenomenon of seaside towns overrun with empty hotels. Money laundered into businesses distorts the market for other entrepreneurs who find it hard to compete with businesses that have slush funds and do not need to turn a profit. The money that is invested locally – and not siphoned to tax havens – does not benefit the many, or create a better environment for business. The incentive of criminal actors to keep deep container ports porous opens countries up to a wide range of negative consequences of poor port security, from the import of dangerous goods, like arms, and counterfeits, which damage local industry, to the loss of tax revenue.

The results of the distorted economies created by these trades are visible everywhere in the north of Mozambique, where, in the three hubs at the centre of this commerce, stand many half-completed or glitzy but empty hotels. For example, evidence of a recent property boom is everywhere in Nampula: new supermarkets, shops, buildings, hotels, guesthouses, restaurants and bars. Yet, according to hotel workers, many hotels consistently operate at 30% or 40% capacity.²⁴⁷ The same phenomenon is apparent along Kenya’s coast around Mombasa; it is damaging to the business prospects for legitimate entrepreneurs.²⁴⁸ Sources also said that the illicit economy – in which heroin plays a key part – has driven rampant property speculation in Dar es Salaam.²⁴⁹

The heroin trade also has a strong relationship with the finances of multi-party democracy. These findings

echo the conclusion of a recent book on mafias, which concludes that mafia networks ‘thrive in democracies’, albeit through different mechanisms.²⁵⁰

The drug trade picked up at exactly the same time that political parties began to need more and more money

In many parts of the world, democracy is an increasingly expensive endeavour. In East and southern Africa, where many countries emerged from long periods of single-party rule in the 1990s, the drug trade picked up at exactly the same time that political parties began to need more and more money simply to compete in – and win – elections. Since then, the cost of campaigning for political office – and the performances that accompany it – has escalated. As a recent insider account of party political financing in South Africa concludes:

In the battle for political survival [in local government], politicians make deals in order to raise the resources they need to campaign. Once they set off down this path [and the story recounts how the pressures to do so are high], they soon wade into a murky world of deals within deals that become ever more complex in order to evade public scrutiny. All of this is justified, on the face of it, by the party’s interests or some greater good. But for many, extraction of personal benefits or a facilitation ‘fee’ is a short step behind.²⁵¹

This phenomenon requires further study and analysis, but the authors’ understanding is that it is closely related to, more broadly, the rising cost of African elections, the growing need for political slush funds for ‘capital intensive’ campaigning, and the lack of transparency about campaign financing.

These slush funds are by no means necessarily, or even primarily, derived from illicit trades. They might be created by donations from genuine businessmen, or for incumbent political parties, by corruptly extracting resources from the state itself. ‘We know that during election campaigns, FRELIMO receives funds from many illegal sources,’ one investigative journalist who closely follows the drug trade told us.²⁵² Indeed, several criminal activities have been linked to party funding, such as

profits from tax exemptions and tax evasion, logging, trade in rubies and grey goods, etc.²⁵³ Funds from drug traffickers are a part of this mix, but we cannot put a figure to that and we cannot say that the majority of funds for FRELIMO come from drugs.²⁵⁴

Nevertheless, interviews across the region reiterated the point that illicit funds, particularly from the heroin trade, were valuable because they were 'quick money'. A grand corruption scheme might take months or even years to pull off. A policy change or investment promised to a legitimate businessman who backs an opposition political party may require gaining cross-party agreements that can be hard to deliver once in power. But all officials need to do to facilitate the heroin trade is to ensure a few things are not done: that trucks are not stopped or containers are not checked. Although South Africa demonstrates some of the same challenges with relation to political-party funding as the other countries examined, there is no evidence of a direct link between the heroin trade and party funding.

Illicit funding is part of the way that the high costs of election campaigns have been sustained and, by the same token, is part of the reason why the barrier to entry for new blood in the political system is raised. When honest money cannot compete, then only people who are already compromised will enter the political race. Illicit funding helps entrench long-standing ruling parties, and where there is no long-standing party, it ties all parties to campaign donors who expect favours in return.²⁵⁵ Capital-intensive election strategies have also fostered a growing gap between political parties and their rank and file, and have weakened branch structures, which are no longer as relevant for mobilising voters.²⁵⁶

All of these effects have undermined the wave of democratisation that swept through the region in the 1990s. All come together in looking at how organised crime affects the development of state institutions.

Effect on institutions

Our interviews repeatedly turned up examples of the intentional sabotage of state institutions in order to facilitate organised crime, or at least they informed the notion that institution building had suffered severely through the influence of criminal networks.

South Africa provides a prime example of how the effects of corruption, weak accountability and organised

crime reinforce one another. In 2014 the Public Protector released a report detailing the extent to which President Zuma and his administration had formed corrupt relationships with a small group of people outside government. Foremost among these is the Gupta family, owners of a number of businesses. The report revealed that they used their influence over the president to control the operation of certain government departments and manipulate decisions made by individual state employees and the running of SOEs.²⁵⁷ This phenomenon has been termed 'state capture'.

The parts of the state that have been most affected by state capture are SOEs, which have been fleeced through irregular tender processes while other crucial management functions have been neglected, sometimes to the point that they face bankruptcy. The criminal-justice system has also been thoroughly eroded by the appointment of political lackeys who were part of Zuma's patronage network to key positions. Once in place, they were deployed to either prevent investigations, or to initiate cases against people who threatened Zuma's network. Highly effective special investigation units were dismantled. Experienced people who were determined to investigate others accused of corruption were sidelined, persecuted or falsely charged themselves.²⁵⁸

The sum effect of these moves is that the criminal-justice system under Zuma was substantially reconfigured in order to selectively serve a purpose that is counter to its mandate – namely, to let crime flourish. Any staff who were unwilling to take part in corrupt activities would avoid embarking on investigations or prosecuting cases that might upset their political principals. In this situation, it is only the media and the courts that provide any semblance of accountability.²⁵⁹ In this context – where the criminal-justice system is both weakened and compromised – addressing organised-criminal activity through law enforcement is almost impossible.

In Mozambique, the opposite manifestation is also apparent:²⁶⁰ authorities that might play a role in keeping the drug trade in check are undermined through neglect. Notwithstanding the difficulties of enforcing rule of law in a poor country with a bureaucracy that has been severely compromised by war, law-enforcement agencies appear to be severely neglected and underfunded for a country that has seen high economic growth rates for two decades.²⁶¹

Similarly, political weight is not thrown behind laws that exist to curb criminal activity. This is not centrally related to the heroin trade, but rather to the degree to which individuals in the government have become implicated in criminal activities, and to which the party's own system for generating funds relies on a lack of the rule of law.

The ease with which illicit funds can be laundered and can leave the country is a good example of this. In 2013, the Mozambican Parliament approved Law No. 14/2013 against money laundering. This law gave the judicial system substantial powers to access information about financial transactions. According to an acting judge, this legal framework 'is probably one of the best in the region, but agencies and regulators do little to enforce it'.²⁶² Money laundering and cash transfers abroad have been a problem in Mozambique since the mid-1980s. Currently, despite existing legislation relating to banking, a retired bank employee told us that 'if anyone wants to make a deposit, nobody would ask him where the money comes from'.²⁶³

In April 2017, the annual report of the General Attorney declared that the Mozambican state had suffered financial losses of 1.88 billion meticals (US\$30 million) from money-laundering operations. According to one anti-corruption analyst: 'Legislation that could be used to tackle money-laundering, illegal enrichment, or seize assets is not used. There is no political will or encouragement to do so, because politicians or persons of high social status fear, if it is employed against criminals, the day will come when it is employed against them'.²⁶⁴

It also seems that most government efforts to improve Mozambique's border control or law-enforcement capacity – such as the installation of customs scanners part owned by the ruling party's holding company (discussed above) – have been incidents of 'false compliance'. In deeply implicated states, such investments in security are too easily a fig leaf to conceal failure to ensure better criminal control.

People who use heroin and their access to treatment

This research suggests there is an urgent need to understand the prevalence, scale and public-health implications of heroin use across the region.

From our interviews, and this is corroborated by other studies, we know that in the 1980s heroin use was

isolated to a few places, with a small number of users. Then, local users were primarily people in contact with tourists in Zanzibar and Mombasa, and, in South Africa, primarily white, middle-aged people who inject drugs (PWID), many of them in Hillbrow, Johannesburg.

There is an urgent need to understand the implications of heroin use across the region

There was a big uptick in heroin supply in East Africa – and then an escalation in use – in the mid-1990s. This first shift was accompanied by a move from 'brown sugar' to 'white crest' (different types of heroin), indicating that heroin supply had moved from East Asian sources to the Afghan heroin route, which now dominates the African coast.²⁶⁵ From tourist beach towns, heroin spread to major ports, like Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, and then inland, along coastal roads and to inland towns. For example, in 2001 in Tanzania, injecting drug users were found to be a major concern in inland Arusha and an emerging problem in Mwanza.²⁶⁶ And in 2002, a study in Dar es Salaam found that 75% of multi-drug users were using heroin, and 18.3% of the sample were injecting drugs.²⁶⁷

The surge in supply and then transit repeated itself in the early 2000s, though sudden increases in use vary in their timing, linked as they are to the development or expansion of a local market. In the mid-2000s, heroin use in the Kenyan counties of Kwale, Kilifi, Mombasa and Lamu was rife, and heroin users could also be found in Kisumu, a city in the west of Kenya. In South Africa, it was only around 2010 that heroin use began to shift from being predominantly a white, middle-class drug problem, and started becoming prevalent in poor, black and Indian townships.

Table 2 indicates the latest figures for the number of people who inject drugs in the four coastal transit countries under study. A number of discrete issues should be noted. Firstly, in Mozambique, all data is based on one study using a relatively small sample. Secondly, the figures for Tanzania cover only the mainland, and not Zanzibar, which has a separate health department and drug authority. Although we do have figures for Zanzibar, the estimate of PWID is quite outdated (198 in 2006).

Table 2: People who inject drugs, and HIV and HCV prevalence (Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa)

Country	Adult population using heroin (%)	Estimated number of PWID (2015)	National HIV prevalence rate (%) ²⁶⁸	HIV prevalence among PWID (%) ²⁶⁹	HCV prevalence among PWID (%)
Kenya	0.21 ²⁷⁰	54 262	5.40	18.30 ²⁷¹	70.30 ²⁷²
Tanzania	0.12 ²⁷³	32 351	4.70	36.00 ²⁷⁴	75.50 ²⁷⁵
Mozambique	0.01 ²⁷⁶	1 971	12.30	43.50 ²⁷⁷	69.50 ²⁷⁸
South Africa	0.21 ²⁷⁹	75 701	19.00	14.00 ²⁸⁰	60.00 ²⁸¹

Note on sources: This table compiles information from multiple sources using data from different time periods and estimates using diverse methodologies (see the notes). As such, it should be treated as illustrative only.

Injecting drug users are only a subset of total heroin users. Most heroin users in the region smoke heroin, often mixed with other drugs, particularly tobacco and cannabis. However, over the medium term many users will begin injecting, which carries much higher health risks, because without public-health interventions (including awareness raising, but often including the provision of free supplies) drug users share equipment. Injecting brings considerably higher public-health risk, raising the risk of spreading diseases such as HIV and HCV.

Injecting drug use is already present in all the centres of highest heroin use. Kenya experienced a shift from smoking to injecting in around 2005. It appears South Africa is currently undergoing such a shift.

As shown in Table 2, HIV and HCV rates are high among PWID in the region. Although all four countries provide ARVs, not all offer or run harm-reduction approaches for drug users, which have been shown to reduce the incidence of HIV and HCV, and to increase adherence to treatment. Currently, only Kenya provides treatment for HCV, and even then only to a very small number of people in Nairobi.

Table 3: Adoption of harm-reduction programmes in public healthcare systems²⁸²

Country	Needle and syringe programmes (NSP)	Opioid substitution therapy (OST)
Kenya	Yes	Yes
Tanzania	Yes	Yes
Mozambique	No	No
South Africa	No	No

Source: Interviews with public health professionals or civil society organisations in Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa in September and November 2017.

Across the region, the practice of 'flashblood' (East Africa) or 'bluetoothing' (South Africa) has also been documented, though it is not believed to be widespread. This practice involves a person injecting the blood of another intoxicated user into his or her own veins, in order to 'share' the drugs. This is a very ineffective method of becoming intoxicated, but one that greatly increases one's chance of contracting infectious diseases. In fact, one public-health activist believes that in South Africa the phenomenon was driven by the media, with sensationalist stories of the effectiveness of 'bluetoothing' having driven users to experiment with the practice.²⁸³

However, as concerning as these figures are, and while the political response to heroin trafficking remains so dire, several East African countries have shown some progressive leadership in their public-health responses to injecting drug use. A large body of evidence suggests that needle and syringe programmes (NSP) and opioid substitution therapy (OST) are the most effective approaches for reducing HIV and HCV infection rates among people who inject drugs, and for encouraging adherence to treatment for HIV and tuberculosis. These approaches have been adopted and embedded in health responses in Tanzania and Kenya (see Table 3). The coverage rates of these services are still low, according to World Health Organization indicators, but their adoption is encouraging, and provision appears to be growing in both countries.²⁸⁴

In February 2011 in Tanzania the first OST and community-based comprehensive NSP were established at the Muhimbili National Hospital and by NGO Médecins du Monde, respectively. This made Tanzania the first country in sub-Saharan

Africa's to offer community-based NSPs. There are currently three OST programmes on the Tanzanian mainland (two in Dar es Salaam and one in Mbeya) and another is due to open in Mwanza in early 2018. Zanzibar, which has a separate health ministry and drug authority, also runs a methadone-based treatment programme and a needle-exchange programme. Across Tanzania, there are now 4 681 users on state-assisted methadone programmes²⁸⁵.

In 2012, Kenya introduced NSPs and opioid substitution therapy to help reduce HIV transmission among PWID.²⁸⁶ In 2015, nearly 90% of PWID reported using a clean syringe last time they injected compared to 51.6% in 2012.²⁸⁷ Kenya now has five (soon to be six) facilities providing methadone, which are low-threshold (meaning less demanding to the user) and non-residential, which increases the chances of adherence as well as being more cost-effective. While these programmes receive substantial international funding (including through PEPFAR and the Global Fund), there is also national ownership, with all staff, procurement and maintenance of facilities provided by the Kenyan government. Kenyan civil-society organisations provide follow-up care and psychosocial interventions. Kenya also has a particularly progressive attitude to drug users who are in conflict with the law (though its legal framework remains punitive) and prisoners are entitled to receive methadone while in jail.

This situation is not as progressive if one goes further south, however. Mozambique does not offer methadone, although civil-society activists are advocating for it. While South Africa has more than 80 private and public treatment centres,²⁸⁸ the government has not adopted a methadone treatment model, and the only treatment option available is abstinence. Treatment facilities in South Africa, although much more numerous than in other countries studied in this report, still fall short of demand.

A 2017 article by a number of public-health and policy experts noted: 'Some recent South African policy documents have called for such an approach. In practice, however, enforcement and punishment remain the dominant response, with the country only paying lip service to the provision of harm-reduction programmes.'²⁸⁹

Private medical aid pays for 28 days in a treatment centre, but does not cover OST. The average price of treatment is R1 500 (\$130) a month to start, then R700

a month for maintenance. This is far above average international pricing (\$100 a year).

Law enforcement does not create an enabling environment for harm-reduction approaches to succeed

Despite the heartening trend towards putting drug users' rights and access to health services at the centre of drug treatment approaches in several places, there remain serious gaps in the response. Firstly, there is the issue of scale and reach in all locations. Law-enforcement approaches are also out of sync with the harm-reduction approach (where this is implemented). By imposing harsh sentences for drug users, law enforcement does not create an enabling environment for harm-reduction approaches to succeed. There is also a significant lack of strategic information. There needs to be systematic collection of data on what drugs are being used in the region, how they are being used, how many people are dependent, and the broader trends in drug use in the region. Without this data, countries struggle to tailor their programmes to their specific problems and to make cost-effective policy interventions.

Communities affected by drug-related violence

Several communities in areas with large consumer markets are affected by violence linked to the drug trade. For example, Mombasa residents say that local gangs have mushroomed over the last few years to give protection to heroin barons.²⁹⁰ These gangs have been involved in turf wars and in eliminating anti-drug activists. A local drug-use expert claimed there was a relationship between these gangs and broader insecurity problems in the area. The Mombasa Republican Council, a violent secessionist group, and local politicians use muscle from these gangs, and the gangs recruit from al-Shabaab deserters, who have expertise in firearms.²⁹¹ Drug traffickers also hire indiscriminately from among the unemployed in Mombasa's slums, and so-called informal security actors compete fiercely for employment in the drug economy as scouts, bodyguards and peddlers.²⁹²

When job opportunities are more scarce – such as after election periods, or when drug barons are imprisoned – these ‘violent entrepreneurs’ become predatory and turn to extortion and robbery in the local community. At the same time, and in the midst of widespread impunity for the people who organise and profit the drug trade, lynching of drug users by anti-crime vigilante groups has also become common. As one report puts it:²⁹³

Having realized that they cannot capture powerful drug lords, vigilante groups systematically targets drug addicts ... a number of addicts who had received treatment were lynched after having been caught committing petty crimes such as mobile phone theft. Carrying out public lynchings, the vigilantes announced, ‘This is how [we] will be dealing with drug users that are stealing.’²⁹⁴

Meanwhile, in South Africa, as mentioned, use of *nyaope* and *unga* has also led to an increase in crime. *Nyaope* addicts resort to mugging, theft of copper cables and other criminal activities to finance their habit. Most significantly, however, two factors have served to greatly increase levels of violence in gang-controlled areas. The first was a flood of guns into the criminal market in Cape Town (sold from the police armoury to gangsters beginning in 2010), the second being a series of dramatic gang wars over drug turf. The Cape Town murder rate spiralled upwards from around 2011 and has only recently stabilised – albeit at extremely high levels, making the city one of the most violent in the world, on a par with several Latin American capitals. The most recent homicide figures for 2016/17 show a recorded rate of 63 deaths per 100 000 citizens – compared to 42 in 2009/10. The Cape Town homicide rate is double the national average.²⁹⁵

These drug-related wars have claimed the lives of many involved – as well as those of bystanders. In the Cape Flats, it is common for large numbers of gang members to fight openly on the streets using an array of weapons, and many adults and children are killed by stray bullets. Gang wars also affect people’s ability to access services. Schools on the Cape Flats close for weeks at a time when it is deemed too dangerous for their pupils to walk to school, and gangs often deny access to certain areas to ambulances when they are engaged in a firefight. And even if they do not directly threaten these medical staff, often there is not enough police capacity to safely escort them to do their work.

Such violence should be understood as an impact of the drug trade – though not one whose answers lie in increased law enforcement or punitive measures for street-level dealers.

Enhancing the regional policy discussion and response

This report has traced the growth of an integrated regional trade in heroin destined for developed-country markets, and how it became enmeshed with local politics over time. It is a long-standing phenomenon, but one that has undergone a rapid evolution in the last five years. The discussion has shown how, arguably, the trade has been intimately bound up with political financing, and has been facilitated by stability and rapidly growing economies. This does not imply a call for a turn towards one-party rule or authoritarianism, or against infrastructure development. Both development and multi-party democracy are to be welcome and supported in the region, but it does need to be recognised they bring greater vulnerabilities for illicit trafficking along the coast. It is a classic dilemma thrown up by globalisation – that economic growth and increased flows of goods and money between regions (or development success, depending on one’s perspective) are bound up with serious risks.

Law enforcement will have to cooperate and work with a range of other actors, so that illicit trades can be diminished, and not just displaced

The heroin economy is exerting a profound impact on governance and development, and it is being left almost entirely unchecked. The fact that organised criminals have been able to amass so much wealth and influence over the last three decades has, itself, severely compromised criminal-justice institutions, to the extent that they are unlikely to act against the heroin trade (or other illicit trades). Mounting an effective response is made even more complex because of the integration of these countries into a regional criminal economy. Integration leads to interdependence – in other words,

effects in one place manifest, in various ways, in other locations.

The upshot is not that enforcement is undesirable but that political incentives have to change to give law enforcement the 'licence' to act, and then these criminal markets have to be analysed across borders. Law enforcement will have to cooperate and work with a range of other actors, so that illicit trades can be diminished, and not just displaced.

As well as lacking an effective law-enforcement response, most countries in the region lack a vibrant public discussion and documentation of the effects of organised crime on their society. Or they lack an articulated moral code that condemns the involvement of powerful figures in illicit activity, one that could motivate for real accountability. Or they lack a policy debate about how to tackle these forces. Or they lack all of these things.

Civil society therefore has a key role to play, in exposing the extent of trafficking and its connection to politics, in advocating for evidence- and rights-based public-health responses, and in advocating for holistic responses for communities caught up in the violence of the trade.


Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful for the enormous contributions made by Julius Kaka and Jenni Irish-Qhobosheane, as well as other researchers who have asked not to be named. Joe Hanlon was especially useful in Mozambique, and Carina Bruwer provided crucial research inputs with a literature review of the heroin-smuggling economy. We would also like to thank the staff at the Global Maritime Crime Programme of the UNODC for their expert and generous assistance. In several cases, due to the sensitivity of the issues involved, colleagues have requested that their names be withheld. We are very grateful for their contributions all the same. The team would also like to thank the many people who made time to talk with us. This applies in particular to several law-enforcement officials, who showed a strong commitment and openness in engaging with us. It is again a demonstration that there are many people across the region who are strongly committed to ending trafficking and organised crime. Sebastian Ballard provided expert assistance with the map contained in this report. We are also thankful to Tuesday Reitano and Iris Oustinoff for all their support during the course of the research.

Annexe

Interview breakdown

Interviewees by role or occupation



Role/occupation	Kenya	Uganda	Tanzania	Mozambique	South Africa	Seychelles	Totals
Law enforcement, including maritime	8	15	13	8	12	2	58
Wildlife experts, environmentalists	3	5	0	1	0	0	9
Religious leaders	1	0	2	6	1	0	10
Media	11	5	0	6	0	0	22
Government officials, incl. customs and ports and international organisations	8	7	8	14	8	2	47
Private sector, including arms trade	7	2	0	1	3	0	13
Researchers, academics, professionals	3	9	0	1	5	0	18
Transport (taxis, buses, maritime transport)	2	9	1	0	0	0	12
NGOs and civil-society organisations	4	3	3	0	6	0	16
Judiciary, including prosecutors	3	0	0	4	0	0	7
Drug users, traffickers, activists	4	0	0	6	9	3	22
Politicians	1	0	3	2	0	0	6
Totals	55	55	30	49	44	7	240

Criminal market consolidation and fragmentation

In exploring the heroin trade in Southern and East Africa, we employ the concept of criminal market consolidation. The nature and presence of organised crime – and its connections to the state – are often a feature of the degree to which any criminal market is managed or controlled. That level of control can be understood as the degree to which either a small number of key players dominate the market or many different and competing criminal actors may be

present. In each of these situations, state actors are seldom neutral players and are key in providing protection for some or many criminal groups to operate.

At one end of the spectrum, a highly consolidated market would display features such as a single or limited number of criminal actors, strong protection by (some) state institutions of these actors, and a strong (including violent) response to outsiders who seek to break into the criminal market. Generally, consolidated markets show lower levels of violence, although selected and targeted assassinations may be used as an internal form of regulation.

At the other end of the spectrum, highly fragmented markets are those that are easily accessible by multiple criminal actors. Such markets could be described as loosely controlled, providing relatively easy access for new criminal actors. In such cases, market participants may suggest that there is space in the market for new players. Loose or fragmented markets may be characterised by high levels of violence, particularly if a squeeze on supply or demand occurs, thereby increasing competition between participants.

Criminal markets are seldom static. Highly consolidated markets may fragment under certain circumstances, such as the removal of key criminal actors. Fragmented markets may consolidate if one or two groups accumulate resources and the capacity for violence.

Although terms such as ‘consolidated’ or ‘fragmented’ can never entirely capture the complexities of criminal markets, they do provide a general description to help understand the functioning of any market.

Several important questions about criminal markets are useful to help elucidate the state of a local criminal economy. Although it is not always possible to ask these directly of all participants, answers to the following five questions provide a useful indication of the extent of fragmentation or consolidation:

Is it possible for new criminal actors to enter into a local market?

Consolidated and tightly controlled criminal markets will reject newcomers, while fragmented or less well-controlled markets are more likely to accommodate new arrivals.

Is violence highly targeted at specific individuals within the criminal economy, or is violence more general and widespread?

Targeted, carefully controlled or limited violence often denotes a relatively controlled criminal economy, whereas

high levels of seemingly random violence (such as gang wars) suggest more fragmented cases where different groups are engaged in turf conflicts. Violence that is hidden (or not reported on by the media) often denotes a highly consolidated and controlled market with state involvement.

Is it easy to name key groups or individuals in a particular geographic locality or is organised crime seen as the result of a complex network of individuals?

Individual names identified as gang bosses over long periods of time generally suggest a higher level of consolidation, whereas a sense that organised crime constitutes a complex and changing network suggests a higher level of fragmentation.

What role do state actors play in providing protection to some actors and not others?

State actors may often be key in ensuring a consolidated market, given that systems of protection may be well established and there is an ‘understanding’ between criminal actors and the state, not only to enrich individual officials, but also to reduce violence. In fragmented markets, different elements of the state may side with and protect different criminal actors, ensuring a multiplicity of different players.

Who controls the key infrastructure necessary for the criminal market – and how?

All criminal markets have key sets of choke points, or gateways, the control of which provides enormous power over other operators and in the market itself. A consolidated market will generally have strong control over market infrastructure (e.g. ports, customs and territory where commodities are sourced), whereas a fragmented market may have multiple sources of control.

More detail on the assessment framework can be found in the Global Initiative’s publication, *Development responses to organized Crime: An analysis and policy framework*.²⁹⁶

Drug categories seized in Cabo Delgado (2012–2016), according the 2014 Gabinete Provincial de Combate a Droga report

Drug	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Cocaine	-	-	0.048 g	2.0 g	2.0 g
Hashish	-	-	13 g	-	-
Heroin	-	-	-	-	-
Khat	-	-	40.1 kg	-	-
Mandrax	-	-	-	-	-
Amphetamine	-	-	2.12 kg	-	-
N-Acetylanthranilic acid	-	603.7 kg	-	-	-
<i>Cannabis sativa</i>	583.33 kg	166.16 kg	1 163.50 kg	983.17 kg	1 510.96 kg

Notes

- 1 A Cole, Heroin trafficking in the Indian Ocean: Trends and Responses, paper for Galle Dialogue, 1–2 December 2014.
- 2 UNODC, *UNODC World Drug Report 2015*, Vienna: UNODC, Preface; UNODC, Afghan opiate trafficking through the Southern Route, Vienna: UNODC.
- 3 The economics of this are clear: in Pakistan, a gram of heroin costs approximately US\$3; in Kenya, the cost is around US\$20; in the UK, US\$61; and in Denmark US\$213. See drug prices listed on Havoscope.com. (These prices are as of 16 November 2017.)
- 4 UNODC, *UNODC World Drug Report 2017*, Booklet 3, Vienna: UNODC.
- 5 Several East African countries have shown some progressive leadership in their public-health responses to injecting drug use. Both Kenya and Tanzania (including Zanzibar) have placed harm reduction at the centre for their response.
- 6 *Nyaope* is a cocktail of various drugs and other ingredients that has become widespread in South Africa; *unga* is a highly addictive heroin-based drug.
- 7 Guns were sold from the police armoury to gangsters beginning in 2010. See C Dolley, Western Cape cop, gun dealer arrested in massive firearms probe. *News24*, 10 October, 2017.
- 8 The most recent homicide statistics for 2016/17 show a recorded figure of 63 deaths per 100 000 citizens –against a figure for 42 in 2009/10. The Cape Town figure is double the national average. This data is from the Institute of Safety Governance and Criminology at the University of Cape Town. It draws on data from the South African Police Service, but because city boundaries do not match police ones, it has to be recalculated.
- 9 C Aucoin and Z Donnenfeld, Tackling heroin trafficking on the East African coast, *ENACT Policy Brief*, issue 4, April 2018
- 10 And beyond: many other countries along the southern route are affected by these dynamics.
- 11 Several groundbreaking academic works have led the way and highlight the methodological challenges involved. See, Frederico Varese, *The Russian Mafia: Private protection in a market economy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- 12 A good overview of different approaches can be found in Klaus von Lampe, *Organized Crime: Analyzing Illegal Activities, Criminal Structures and Extra-Legal Governance*, Los Angeles: Sage, 2016, pp. 36–55.
- 13 For example, a process including representatives from major development agencies has highlighted the importance of including calculations of the illicit economy in decisions around development funding and political engagement. See Tuesday Reitano and Marcena Hunter, *The Crime-Development Paradox: Organised Crime and the SDGs*, ENACT, Continental Report 2, February 2018.
- 14 There is strong consensus on this from criminologists. See Tim Newburn, *Criminology*, London: Routledge, 2007, pp. 947–971.
- 15 The Ugandan fieldwork explored the linkages between criminal economies in coastal countries and the interior, but did not reveal a substantial amount about the interior heroin trade. As such, Uganda does not feature prominently in this report.
- 16 The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) is a 31-nation naval force that has been patrolling the Indian Ocean in international waters since 2015.
- 17 Interview, veteran seafarer with detailed knowledge of the shipping trade in East Africa and the Horn of Africa, Mombasa, Kenya, 24 September 2017.
- 18 Interview, border agents, port officials and shipping company staff September 2017, Durban, South Africa.
- 19 J Wright, Transnational organized crime in eastern Africa: A threat assessment, Vienna: UNODC, 2013.
- 20 UNODC, *UNODC World Drug Report 2017*, Booklet 3, Vienna: UNODC.
- 21 See Drug prices listed on Havoscope.com. These prices are as of 16 November 2017.
- 22 Interview, senior Pakistani counter-narcotics officials, Peshawar, Karachi and Islamabad, November 2017.
- 23 Interview, veteran seafarer with detailed knowledge of the shipping trade in East Africa and the Horn of Africa, Mombasa, Kenya, 24 September 2017.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Interview with a senior military source, Nairobi, Kenya, 2 August 2017. Interview with a major in the Kenya Defence Forces, Nairobi, Kenya, 26 August 2017. See also *Journalists for Justice, Black and white: Kenya's criminal racket in Somalia*, 2015, <https://www.jfjustice.net/downloads/1457660562.pdf>.
- 26 For example, criminals take advantage of Kenya's role as the regional financial hub – with its 43 licensed commercial banks, deep regional networks, hundreds of microfinance and mortgage finance institutions, and forex bureaux and *hawallahs*. Interview, economist at the University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya, 19 September 2017.
- 27 Analysis compiled from multiple interviews in Mombasa, Nairobi, and in the Uganda–Kenya border region, August to September 2017.
- 28 Interview, former driver for a drug-trafficking organisation, Kampala, Uganda, 23 August, 2017; also, interviews conducted in the Uganda–Kenya border region, August to September 2017.
- 29 Interview, former drug courier, Kampala, Uganda, 23 August 2017.
- 30 See Mombasa container terminal at <https://www.kpa.co.ke/OurBusiness/pages/mombasa-container-terminal.aspx>.
- 31 Interviews with workers at the Port of Mombasa, August 2017.
- 32 Interview, officials from the Kenya Maritime Authority, Mombasa, Kenya, 25 September 2017.

- 33** Interview, veteran seafarer with detailed knowledge of the shipping trade in East Africa and the Horn of Africa, Mombasa, Kenya, 24 September 2017.
- 34** Interview, officials from the Kenya Maritime Authority, Mombasa, Kenya, 25 September 2017.
- 35** Interview, academic and practitioner in drug rehabilitation, Mombasa, Kenya, 25 September 2017.
- 36** A dry port is an inland port connected directly by road or rail to a seaport; it is used for the transshipment of goods to other destinations. Dry ports may also have facilities for storage and consolidation of goods, and customs clearance services. The purpose of a dry port is to relieve the pressure on space and facilities at its corresponding seaport.
- 37** Zanzibar was under the Omani Sultanate from 1698, then was a British Protectorate until 1890, and after a brief reversion to Omani rule in 1963 followed by independent statehood, it formed a political union with mainland Tanganyika in 1964, creating the modern United Republic of Tanzania. Today a separatist movement advocates for Zanzibari independence.
- 38** Interview, veteran seafarer with detailed knowledge of the shipping trade in East Africa and the Horn of Africa, Mombasa, Kenya, 24 September 2017.
- 39** The city hosts the East African Community. From 1994 to 2015, Arusha also hosted the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
- 40** Interview, official from an anti-narcotic unit, Nairobi, Kenya, 25 August 2017.
- 41** Interview in Dar es Salaam, September 2017.
- 42** Informal report provided to the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI) by analyst working for an intergovernmental organisation, October 2017.
- 43** Not to be confused with Pemba Island, Zanzibar.
- 44** Interview, Christian religious leader, Pemba, Mozambique, 12 September 2017; Interview, law-enforcement official with poaching expertise, Maputo, Mozambique, 11 September 2017; interview, Muslim religious leader in Cabo Delgado Province, Pemba, Mozambique, 13 September 2017.
- 45** Interviews in the north of Mozambique with religious leaders, journalists, government sources and people linked to the trade, September 2017.
- 46** This information is derived from interviews, including with people living in Nacala and Nampula, and who have come very close to the trade and its players. However, it is also confirmed in diplomatic cables from Todd Chapman, chargé d'affaires at the US Embassy in Maputo, 2007–2010, published on WikiLeaks. As well as Mohamed Bachir Suleman, he cites Gulam Rassul Roti, Rassul Trading, Grupo ARJ and the Ayoob family. From WikiLeaks, 25 Jan 2010, Maputo 000080, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MAPUTO1291_a.html.
- 47** Interview with senior police officer, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 29 September 2017; interview, senior law-enforcement officer, Seychelles, 17 October 2017;
- interview, international law-enforcement official, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 18 September 2017.
- 48** Interviews in the north of Mozambique with religious leaders, journalists, government sources and people linked to the trade, September 2017. These estimates also align with information contained in a report by Joseph Hanlon for the GI.
- 49** GI observations and research conducted in the north of Mozambique in August 2017. This was also discussed during an interview with a Christian religious leader, Pemba, Mozambique, 12 September 2017; interview, investigative journalist, Nampula, Mozambique, 16 September 2017; interview, government official, Nampula, Mozambique, 16 September 2017.
- 50** Multiple interviews conducted and coordinated by GI in Nampula, September 2017.
- 51** Report prepared for the GI by Joseph Hanlon.
- 52** These are estimates based on seizures documented in the South African media in 2017.
- 53** Draft report of the ESAAMLG high level mission to the Republic of Mozambique, 26–28 July 2017, Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group, <http://esaamlg.org/userfiles/ESAAMLG-ANNUAL-REPORT-2016-17.pdf>.
- 54** For example, heroin was found in a petrol tank of a Toyota Prada in March 2016; a truck was stopped with 145 kg of heroin packed in 1 kg bags at the Golela border post with Swaziland on 4 May 2017; and a similar amount was found in a truck at the Kosi Bay border post on 12 June 2017. Both border posts are on rural roads running from the south of Mozambique to South Africa.
- 55** Interview, veteran seafarer with detailed knowledge of the shipping trade in East Africa and the Horn of Africa, Mombasa, Kenya, 24 September 2017. This interviewee said that Cape Town's importance lies in the fact that the port's role is to 'switch oceans' between the Indian and the Atlantic.
- 56** Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Polokwane, Durban, Lanseria, Pilanesberg, Port Elizabeth, Uppington, East London, Oliver Tambo International and Mpumalanga.
- 57** Richards Bay, Durban, East London, Ngqura, Port Elizabeth, Mossel Bay, Cape Town and Saldanha Bay.
- 58** L Rondganger, Harbour's scanner exposes smuggling, IOL, 19 October 2015, <https://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/harbours-scanner-exposes-smuggling-1932356>.
- 59** S Haysom and M Shaw, Location, location, location: The settling of organised crime in Bedfordview, *South African Crime Quarterly*, 59, 2017.
- 60** The trucking industry is highly competitive and there are a significant number of transport and logistics companies – ranging from large corporations with massive fleets of trucks to small operators. The latter have to cut costs to compete. In this context, some trucking companies are vulnerable to trafficking networks that want them to transport their illicit goods. There are also some trucking companies that have links with organised-crime networks and are set up specifically to transport illicit goods.

- 61 Not all the private vehicles necessarily pass through the actual border post and some of the vehicles, particularly if 4x4s, can enter through the borderline. In northern KwaZulu-Natal, there is a 78-km stretch between South Africa and Mozambique that is separated by only a cattle fence. This borderline has a number of crossing points that can be navigated using a 4x4 and that have for a number of years been used by criminal networks involved in cross-border crimes. Likewise, near the Mananga border post and along a stretch of borderline between South Africa and Swaziland, there are a number of informal gates that are used by criminals for trafficking people, drugs and counterfeit goods. There are also reports of people crossing some of these borderlines on foot with drugs. These are then picked up by vehicles and transported to the next destination point inside the country. One crime intelligence police officer interviewed said this kind of foot traffic was common in the Kosi Bay area – interview, crime intelligence officer, Richards Bay, South Africa, 4 September 2017.
- 62 See S Christie *Under Nelson Mandela Boulevard: Life among the stowaways*, Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2017, for a narrative description of this small-scale heroin economy and the journey of drug mules between Dar es Salaam and Cape Town and other South African ports.
- 63 Interview, NGO director involved in heroin rehabilitation since the 1990s, Pretoria, South Africa, 24 October 2017.
- 64 Interviews in Maputo, Mozambique, September 2017.
- 65 There have, however, been only two reported seizures of heroin destined for export. One was the Overberg seizure described in the text. And in 2009, 150 kg of heroin was intercepted in a shipment of tourist souvenirs at Heathrow Airport, London, on a flight from South Africa; the trail was traced back to Durban and then Mozambique, where the South African organised-crime unit, the Hawks, said the heroin had been packed with the curios. See South African Hawks in drugs bust, BBC, 16 September 2016, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8259456.stm>.
- 66 T Kubheka, Mbalula committed to fighting corruption at OR Tambo airport, Eyewitness News, 22 July 2017, <http://ewn.co.za/2017/07/22/mbalula-committed-to-fighting-corruption-at-or-tambo-airport>.
- 67 Initially incorrectly identified in the media as cocaine. See Caryn Dolley, Police make massive R500m cocaine bust in Overberg town, News24, 22 June 2017, <http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/police-make-massive-r500m-cocaine-bust-in-overberg-town-20170622>.
- 68 The seizure seems to have happened entirely by accident. The container was being transported and the load shifted; farmworkers began to repack the container when they found some cases of wine had been replaced by heroin. The seizure was made on the Belgian-owned Eerste Hoop wine estate, and was intended for shipment to Antwerp, Belgium. See Aron Hyman, Heroin-smuggling plot 'foiled by sharp-eyed workers on Cape wine farm', *Sunday Times*, 23 June 2017, <https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/2017-06-23-heroin-smuggling-plot-foiled-by-sharp-eyed-workers-on-cape-wine-farm/>.
- 69 Interview, law-enforcement officials, Cape Town, South Africa, 26 October 2017.
- 70 Interview, veteran seafarer with detailed knowledge of the shipping trade in East Africa and the Horn of Africa, Mombasa, Kenya, 24 September 2017; report compiled by Joseph Hanlon for the GI – drawing on interviews in Maputo, September 2017.
- 71 Interview, law-enforcement officials, Cape Town, South Africa, 26 October 2017.
- 72 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017, https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan_opium_survey_2017_cult_prod_web.pdf.
- 73 N Gilman, J Goldhammer and S Weber (eds), *Deviant globalization: Black market economy in the 21st century*, New York: Continuum Press, 2011.
- 74 See the Annexe, under 'Criminal market consolidation' for information on how these determinations were made.
- 75 Interview, lawyer and human-rights activist, Nairobi, Kenya, 27 September, 2017.
- 76 Interview, senior journalist for a leading Kenyan newspaper, Mombasa, Kenya, 25 September 2017.
- 77 B Sanga and P Beja, Curtain falls on former Kanu Coast tycoons, *The Standard*, 15 January 2017, <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000229903/curtain-falls-on-former-kanu-coast-tycoons>.
- 78 Interview, anti-corruption activist, Nairobi, Kenya, 27 September 2017.
- 79 Kenya's former internal security minister, George Saitoti, named several of these figures in Parliament, drawing on an intelligence report provided to him by then US Ambassador Michael Rannenberg. Saitoti was later killed in a helicopter crash outside Nairobi. See Six Kenya MPs named in drug baron scandal, *The Daily Nation*, 22 December 2010, <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Six-Kenya-MPs-named-in-drug-baron-scandal/1064-1077186-hwjjiroz/index.html>.
- 80 L Bagnoli and L Bodrero, Kenya's drug barons, *Correctiv*, 16 April 2015, <https://correctiv.org/en/investigations/mafia-africa/articles/2015/04/16/kenyas-drug-barons/>.
- 81 The declaration was made on 1 June 2011 by President Obama and reported to Congress under Section 804(a) of the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, 21 USC 1901-1908 (the Kingpin Act). See <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001228327/drug-barons-exposed-why-uhuru-and-raila-allies-are-not-sleeping-easy>.
- 82 Government of Kenya, *Interim report on drug trafficking investigations*, 2011, <https://www.scribd.com/doc/49074255/Kenya-Police-Report-on-Drug-Trafficking-Investigations>.
- 83 Interview, lawyer and human-rights activist, 27 September 2017, Mombasa, Kenya.
- 84 P Gastrow, Termites at work: Transnational organized crime and state erosion in Kenya, International Peace Institute, 2011, https://www.ipinst.org/images/pdfs/ipi_epub-kenya-toc.pdf.

- 85** Interview, anti-drug-abuse activist, Mombasa, Kenya, 24 September 2017.
- 86** Interview, anti-corruption activist, Nairobi, Kenya, 27 September, 2017.
- 87** M Dimova, A new agenda for policing: Understanding the heroin trade in eastern Africa, presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Conference, University of Glasgow, 3–6 September 2014, <http://ecpr.eu/filestore/paperproposal/9e9dd3da-27fa-42cb-96c6-0bc8b5639c99.pdf>.
- 88** Comments from an expert source; see also media articles quoted below.
- 89** L Bagnoli and L Bodrero, Kenya's safe haven, *Correctiv*, 16 April 2015, <https://correctiv.org/en/investigations/mafia-africa/articles/2015/04/16/kenyas-safe-haven/>.
- 90** P Gitau, How Italian Mafia gained control of Malindi, *The Standard*, 3 July 2012.
- 91** G Rubino and C Anesi, 2015. Cosa Nostra Diamonds, *Correctiv*, 16 April 2015, <https://correctiv.org/en/investigations/mafia-africa/articles/2015/04/16/cosa-nostra-diamonds/>.
- 92** There have been a number of seizures of drugs at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport and Moi International Airport. In January/February 2017, a woman was arrested at Moi International Airport headed to Abidjan, Ivory Coast. Another arrest of a frequent traveller to Dubai was made. They were in possession of heroin valued at 10 million Kenyan shillings. In March 2017, the Nigerian National Drug Law Enforcement Agency arrested Roland Chukwudi Tochukwu, 37, with 2.045 kg of heroin imported from Nairobi. Two individuals in possession of narcotics were arrested at the Murtala Muhammed International Airport in Lagos with 2.045kg of heroin brought in from Nairobi. In the same month, the Kenya Revenue Authority intercepted 5 kg of heroin concealed in packages of turtle artefacts at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport.
- 93** Multiple interviews in Mombasa, September 2017.
- 94** Interview, anti-drug-abuse activist, Mombasa, Kenya, 24 September 2017.
- 95** Interview, prominent coastal politician, Mombasa, Kenya, 25 September 2017.
- 96** Interview, anti-corruption activist, Nairobi, Kenya, 27 September 2017.
- 97** Ibid.
- 98** Interview, investigative journalist, Mombasa, Kenya, 24 September 2017; interview, senior journalist for a leading Kenyan newspaper, Mombasa, Kenya, 25 September 2017.
- 99** E Oduor, Is Kenya set for most expensive elections? *The East African*, 22 May 2017, <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Millions-of-dollars-at-play-as-Kenyans-go-to-the-polls/2558-3937572-as8pr8/index.html>.
- 100** Interview, politician, Mombasa, Kenya, 25 September 2017. Higher figures have been quoted elsewhere in the media.
- 101** Millions of dollars at play as Kenyans go into their most expensive election yet, *The East African*, 22 May 2017, <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Millions-of-dollars-at-play-as-Kenyans-go-to-the-polls/2558-3937572-as8pr8/index.html>; Kenya poll one of the most expensive in the world, *The Nation*, 17 July 2017, <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Kenya-holds-one-of-the-most-expensive-elections/1056-4018144-10vpg41/>.
- 102** Interview, politician, Mombasa, Kenya, 25 September 2017.
- 103** Interview, academic and practitioner in drug rehabilitation, Mombasa, Kenya, 25 September 2017.
- 104** Interview, former senior member of the judiciary, Nairobi, Kenya, August 2017.
- 105** MP's two brothers seized, *The Nation*, 6 January 2006, <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/1056-101438-mfgiv3z/index.html>.
- 106** Family heads to court over officer killing, *The Nation*, 2 April 2015, <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Family-heads-to-court-over-officer-killing/1056-2674608-12w69fk/index.html>.
- 107** Interview, anti-corruption activist, Nairobi, Kenya, 27 September 2017.
- 108** Interview, lawyer and human-rights activist, Nairobi, Kenya, 27 September 2017.
- 109** Interview, senior police officer, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 29 September 2017.
- 110** Interview, former government official, Zanzibar, Tanzania, 21 September 2017; Interview, drug abuse NGO worker, Zanzibar, Tanzania, 22 September 2017; interview, ex-heroin user, Zanzibar, Tanzania, 22 September 2017.
- 111** Interview, senior police officer, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 29 September 2017.
- 112** Interview, investigative journalist, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 19 September 2017.
- 113** Interview, anti-drug abuse activist and NGO coordinator, Zanzibar, Tanzania, 21 September 2017.
- 114** Ibid.
- 115** Multiple interviews in South Africa, September–October 2017.
- 116** Interview, drug-abuse-oriented NGO, Pretoria, South Africa, 24 October 2017.
- 117** S Christie, *Under Nelson Mandela Boulevard: Life among the stowaways*, Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2017.
- 118** While the transition to a market economy began with a 1986 adjustment plan agreed with the International Monetary Fund, the legislative apparatus for privatisation was put into effect only in 1992, the same year that multi-partyism was restored and trade unions were made autonomous.
- 119** M Lofchie, *The political economy of Tanzania: Decline and recovery*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014.

- 120** Interview, investigative journalist, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 19 September 2017.
- 121** H Gray, The political economy of grand corruption in Tanzania, *African Affairs*, 114/456, 2015, 382–403; A Adreoni, Anti-Corruption in Tanzania: A political settlements analysis, Working Paper 001, Anti-Corruption Evidence, 2017.
- 122** D Paget, Tanzania: Shrinking space and opposition protest, *Journal of Democracy*, 28:3, 2017, 153–167.
- 123** D Paget, Dancers, branches, stereotypes and choppers: Party finance and capital-intensive campaigning in Tanzania, paper presented at the 60th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Chicago, November 2017 (forthcoming and not for distribution).
- 124** E Babeiya, Electoral corruption and the politics of elections financing in Tanzania, *Journal of Politics and Law*, 4:2, 2011.
- 125** D Paget, Dancers, branches, stereotypes and choppers: Party finance and capital-intensive campaigning in Tanzania, paper presented at the 60th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Chicago, November 2017 (forthcoming and not for distribution).
- 126** H Gray, Industrial policy and the political settlement in Tanzania: Aspects of continuity and change since independence, *Review of African Political Economy*, 40:185, 2013.
- 127** D Paget, Dancers, branches, stereotypes and choppers: Party finance and capital-intensive campaigning in Tanzania, paper presented at the 60th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Chicago, November 2017 (forthcoming and not for distribution).
- 128** Interview, investigative journalist, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 19 September 2017.
- 129** Interview, senior police officer, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 29 September 2017.
- 130** Interview, investigative journalist, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 19 September 2017.
- 131** Republic of Tanzania, *Tarifa ya hali ya dawa za kulevywa ya mwaka*, 2014.
- 132** Ibid.
- 133** Both Jakaya and Ridhiwani Kikwete have denied these allegations. Our information comes from multiple interviews in Dar es Salaam and Stone Town. Christie reports a drug shortage in the heroin houses of Dar es Salaam at the time – see S Christie, *Under Nelson Mandela Boulevard: Life among the stowaways*, Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2017. Also see media reports, such as Ridhiwani's China arrest is a lie, *The Citizen*, 5 August 2014, <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/national/JK--Ridhiwani-s-China-arrest-is-a-lie/1840392-2408656-kbeq5j/index.html>.
- 134** Interview, official working at Dar es Salaam Port, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 21 August 2017.
- 135** Interview, retired government official, 22 August 2017, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
- 136** The general elections of 2015 were set to be the closest for the ruling party. Due to internal party factionalism within CCM, which saw the Kikwete camp eliminate Edward Lowassa, the favourite, from the race. John Magufuli, a relatively unknown figure not considered to be a party heavyweight, was put forward as the CCM's presidential candidate. He ran on a platform of anti-corruption, and won.
- 137** Police, celebs named in drug ring, *The Citizen*, 3 February 2017, <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Police--celebs-named-in-drug-ring/1840340-3797944-p1qr4w/index.html>.
- 138** Interview, religious leader involved in civil-society response to drug abuse and drug trafficking, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 10 October 2017. The GI was told the Interfaith Council is building on a history of cooperation between religious groups, which has been important in the past, particularly in fraught electoral periods, as a means of preventing or calming intergroup conflict – an important, though poorly understood, aspect of the local politics in Tanzania.
- 139** Interviews in Dar es Salaam and in South Africa, September/October 2017.
- 140** Interview, international law-enforcement official, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 18 September 2017.
- 141** Lowassa is a veteran Tanzanian politician who was Prime Minister between 2005 and 2008 under President Kikwete's reign. He was forced to resign due to a fraud scandal. Nonetheless, he had a substantial support bases within the party and external financial backers. While he had been – reportedly – promised that he would be the next CCM leader and so the country's next President, Kikwete blocked his nomination for party leadership at an early stage of the process on technical grounds. As a result, Lowassa left the CCM and joined the main opposition party, Chadema.
- 142** M Collord, Tanzania – Where President Magufuli's political and economic strategy meet, *Presidential Power*, 2017. (These limiting measures have not been linked to the drug trade as such, but rather to constraining the private sector and regaining control over party-owned properties and other funds.)
- 143** Interviews, experts on Tanzanian politics, Dar es Salaam, Oxford and Nairobi, September–October 2017.
- 144** Interview, Mombasa, Kenya, 25 September 2017.
- 145** Interview, UN agency official, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 20 September 2017.
- 146** In March 2017, Makonda was also at the centre of a public scandal when CCTV footage showed he had stormed a radio station with armed policemen and assaulted staff when they had refused to air footage that maligned one of the suspects in the anti-drugs crackdown. See Makonda in hot water over night Clouds raid, *The Citizen*, 20 March 2017, <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Makonda-in-hot-water-over-night-Clouds-raid-/1840340-3856500-gakd6sz/index.html>.
- 147** D Paget, Tanzania: Shrinking space and opposition protest, *Journal of Democracy*, 28:3, 2017, 153–167.

- 148** Interview, law-enforcement officials, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 18 September 2017.
- 149** Comments made by practitioners working with drug users in Dar es Salaam at our expert group meeting, 13–14 November, 2017, Nairobi; interview with anti-drug-abuse activist and NGO coordinator, 21 September 2017, Zanzibar, Tanzania.
- 150** Interview, journalist with sources in these locations involved in or linked to Tanzanian heroin networks, 20 September 2017, Cape Town, South Africa.
- 151** Interview, two senior police officers, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 29 September 2017.
- 152** Interview, UN agency official, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 20 September 2017.
- 153** Interview, 24 October 2017.
- 154** Interview, investigative journalist, Maputo, Mozambique, 10 September 2017.
- 155** Interview, employee in licit business owned by drug trafficker, Beira, Mozambique, 17 September 2017.
- 156** Momade Rassul and his wife, Saidata, built a school for Guebuza's wife's foundation. Saidata Rassul hosted a reception for the first lady in her Maputo house on 27 August 2007. A journalist interviewed by the GI obtained a copy of Saidata Rassul's speech at the event.
- 157** This information is contained in a CV belonging to Rassul that was provided to the GI by one of his competitors.
- 158** See Mozambique Prosecuting Authority press release, Procuradoria Provincial da República – Nampula, Comunitado de Imprensa n° 02/PPRN/2017, <http://weeklyxpose.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Mozambique-Prosecuting-Authority-release.pdf>.
- 159** Multiple interviews in Nampula, September 2017.
- 160** Interview, investigative journalist, 16 September 2017, Nampula, Mozambique.
- 161** A type of printed fabric worn as a sarong, dress or skirt.
- 162** Interview, former employee in licit business owned by drug trafficker, Beira, Mozambique, 17 September 2017.
- 163** L Nhachote, *Traficante de droga procurado em Portugal, Zambeze*, 1 October 2008, <http://manueldearaujo.blogspot.co.uk/2008/10/traficantes-de-droga-tm-estatuto.html>; and <http://muliquela.blogspot.co.uk/p/mohamad-khalid-ayoob-momad-aiuba-irmao.html>.
- 164** Ibid.
- 165** Momed Khalid Ayoob was arrested on 1 December 2010 by the Swazi Police in possession of R18 million (\$2.6 million) in banknotes. He was taking the money from Mozambique to Dubai, in violation of both Mozambican and Swazi exchange legislation.
- 166** Nacala was more generally identified with the heroin trade during interviews with heroin users who had become addicted through their work in the hotels in the town, which is where a lot of heroin is sold. Interview with drug user, Nacala, Mozambique, 25 August 2017.
- 167** Interview with former employee in licit business owned by drug trafficker, Beira, Mozambique, 17 September 2017; interview with investigative journalist, Nampula, Mozambique, 16 September 2017. The journalist's information came from truck drivers, taxi drivers, port workers, customs officials and agents of the SISE, Mozambique's official intelligence agency.
- 168** Interviews, scanner company employees, Nampula and Maputo, 17 September 2017.
- 169** Interview, political scientist, Maputo, Mozambique, 10 September 2017; this claim is also made by Joseph Hanlon, in a report prepared for the GI based on interviews in the country.
- 170** Interview, senior staff member of a drug policy NGO, Maputo, Mozambique, 10 September 2017; interview with former customs official, Maputo, Mozambique, 10 September 2017.
- 171** These markets include kidnapping, heroin, money laundering and smuggling of grey goods.
- 172** Report prepared for the GI by Joseph Hanlon.
- 173** G Wannenburg, *Africa's pablos and political entrepreneurs: War, the state and criminal networks in West and southern Africa*, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2006.
- 174** Interview, political scientist, Maputo, Mozambique, 10 September 2017.
- 175** L Nhachote, *Leis que levaram ao fuzilamento de Gulamo Nabi*, Canal de Mozambique, 22 March 2007, http://macua.blogs.com/moambique_para_todos/2007/03/leis_que_levara.html; see also *Condenados a morte seis bandidos, Noticias*, 4 April 1983, http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/justice/tmr/19830404_6_condenados_a_morte.pdf
- 176** Reported in Savana online, 20 October 2009. This is no longer available online.
- 177** Report prepared for the GI by Joseph Hanlon.
- 178** Ibid.
- 179** This analysis stems from our interviews with a range of sources in Mozambique, as shown in the examples put forward as evidence of this 'quid pro quo' that follow.
- 180** These figures were reported in Savana online, 20 October 2009 and in *Noticias*, 23 June 2006, AIM English 9 May 2007. Articles are no longer available online.
- 181** Chapman also claimed MBS had 'connections in the Ibrahim Dawood international drug syndicate'. Then, on 1 June 2010, Obama designated MBS as a 'drugs kingpin', making it illegal for US citizens, US companies and businesses that operate in the US to conduct financial or commercial transactions with him or his three businesses, Grupo MBS, Kayum Centre and Maputo Shopping Centre. From WikiLeaks, 16 November 2009, Maputo 001291 and 25 January 2010, Maputo 000080; https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MAPUTO1291_a.html.
- 182** The US Department of the Treasury stated that 'Mohamed Bachir Suleman is a large-scale narcotics trafficker ... [he] leads a well-financed narcotics trafficking and money

- laundering network in Mozambique'. See US Department of the Treasury press release, 'Treasury sanctions entities owned by drug kingpin Mohamed Bachir Suleman', TG-729, 1 June 2010.
- 183** Article 17 of Decree 30/2001 of 15 October does not allow a Public Administration agent to participate in administrative procedures or in contractual acts, either public or private. See M Mosse, Procurement Público e Transparência em Moçambique, Centro de Integridade Pública Moçambique, December 2007, https://cipmoz.org/images/Documentos/Anti-Corruptcao/21_CIP_NEWSLETTER_Set-Dez_2007.pdf.
- 184** Interview, former employee in licit business owned by drug trafficker, Beira, Mozambique, 17 September 2017; interview, senior manager for major corporate in Maputo, Maputo, Mozambique, 11 September 2017.
- 185** Centro de Integridade Pública Moçambique, *Carta do Comité Central confirma negócio ilícito do Partido no Poder*, July 2014, <http://www.cip.org.mz/historico/index.asp?sub=iafl>.
- 186** As documented in a letter issued on 10 January 2014 by FRELIMO's Department of Finance, the party gave authorisation to a private company to pay out a FRELIMO invoice and ordered the Millennium Bim Bank to receive money from the private company.
- 187** Traders awarded these privileges have also sold them on to others. Documents in the possession of the GI reveal that Momedede Rassul (Rassul Trading) had received permission to import diverse goods and then sold them to Hassan Gulam (Maiaia Grupo), another trader in Nacala, in 2010.
- 188** Interview, investigative journalist, Nampula, Mozambique, 16 September 2017. His information came from truck drivers, taxi drivers, port workers, customs officials and SISE agents.
- 189** SISE is Mozambique's official intelligence agency, which operates inside and outside Mozambique. It has the normal functions that any intelligence agency has, but it is also used by the ruling party to monitor and control the political opposition and journalists.
- 190** Interview, investigative journalist, Nampula, Mozambique, 16 September 2017. His information came from truck drivers, taxi drivers, port workers, customs officials and SISE agents.
- 191** Informal report provided to the GI by an analyst working for an intergovernmental organisation, October 2017.
- 192** Interview, political scientist, Maputo, Mozambique, 10 September 2017; also, J Hanlon, report prepared for the GI, 2017.
- 193** Interview, government official, Nampula, Mozambique, 16 September 2017.
- 194** Ibid.
- 195** Interview, police officer, Nampula Province, 20 August 2017.
- 196** Interview, senior police officer, Nampula Province, 20 August 2017.
- 197** Interview with a well-informed source, Nampula, Mozambique, 19 August 2017. Also confirmed by interview with police officer, 20 August 2017, Nampula, Mozambique.
- 198** Interview, government official, 29 August 2017, Cabo Delgado Province.
- 199** The two drivers of the vehicle, men from Guinea-Conakry, were arrested. According to the police spokesperson in Cabo Delgado, the truck had left Nairobi, Kenya, and the intended destination of the heroin was South Africa.
- 200** *Polícia apreende 600 kg de heroína em Cabo Delgado, O País*, 7 March 2013, <http://opais.sapo.mz/index.php/sociedade/45-sociedade/24463-policia-apreende-600-kg-de-heroina-em-cabo-delgado.html>.
- 201** Interview with a well-informed source, Nampula, Mozambique, 19 August 2017.
- 202** *Cabo Delgado: Mueda e Meluco lideram a produção de soruma, Notícias*, 13 June 2015, <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/provincia-em-foco/37998-cabo-delgado-mueda-e-meluco-lideres-na-producao-de-soruma.html>.
- 203** This is the authors' conclusion based on several interviews in Mozambique.
- 204** Interview, Muslim religious leader, Cabo Delgado Province, 13 September 2017.
- 205** Interview, retired policeman, Maputo, Mozambique, 12 September 2017.
- 206** In 2013-14 Mozambique took US \$2 billion in loans, organised in secret by Credit Suisse and the Russian bank VTB, ostensibly to create a coastal protection system. A subsequent audit by Kroll showed that more than half of the \$2 bn could not be accounted for, suggesting a substantial amount of money was diverted to the accounts of senior Frelimo people. Donors have since retracted budget support, triggering a financial crisis for the Mozambican state. The government has barely collaborated with attempt to investigate the scandal. The public debate has, understandably, focused on grand corruption, cronyism in Frelimo, and public financial management. See Kroll, 2017. Independent audit related to loans contracted by ProIndicus S.A., EMATUM S.A. And Mozambique Asset Management S.A. Report prepared for the The Office of the Public Prosecutor of the Republic of Mozambique.
- 207** Mozambique Prosecuting Authority, Procuradoria Provincial da República - Nampula, Comunidade de Imprensa n° 02/PPRN/2017, <http://weeklyxpose.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Mozambique-Prosecuting-Authority-release.pdf>.
- 208** Interview, former employee in licit business owned by drug trafficker, Beira, Mozambique, 17 September 2017.
- 209** They are known locally as 'al Shabaab', but do not appear to have any link to the Somali political and military group of the same name. Some people claim they are foreigners, but, in reality, the phenomenon appears to be home-grown - most, if not all, the members are Mozambican.
- 210** Interview, Christian religious leader, Pemba, Mozambique, 12 September 2017; interview, Muslim religious leader, Pemba, Mozambique, 13 September 2017.

- 211** Our interviews reveal that locals are very concerned, as the group promotes a harsh version of Islam at odds with local values (for instance, they do not believe in the education of women or use of the formal health system) as well as with local traditions of religious co-existence. Residents also reported to us that they were armed (with knives and bludgeons) and violent. Interview, Christian religious leader, Pemba, Mozambique, 12 September 2017; interview, Muslim religious leader, Pemba, Mozambique, 13 September 2017.
- 212** See E Morier-Genoud, 2017, Why Islamist attack demands a careful response from Mozambique, *The Conversation*, 18 October 2017, https://theconversation.com/why-islamist-attack-demands-a-careful-response-from-mozambique-85504?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=twitterbutton.
- 213** Historically, cannabis has always been widely available in South Africa, and has been both grown and traded domestically and for markets in Europe and North America. Cannabis has always been trafficked extensively across the borders between South Africa and Lesotho. In the 1980s, South Africa was one of the biggest global consumers of mandrax (the base of which is methaqualone).
- 214** Previously, drug use had been more or less differentiated among the country's racial groups.
- 215** S Howell et al, The wrong type of decline: Fluctuations in price and value of illegal substances in Cape Town, *South African Crime Quarterly*, 54 (2015).
- 216** J Boshoff, New killer drug, *Middelburg Observer*, 16 June 2014, <https://mobserver.co.za/12405/new-killer-drug/>; Middelburg situated on popular drug route, *Middelburg Observer*, 25 July 2017, <https://mobserver.co.za/69733/middelburg-situated-popular-drug-route/>.
- 217** Interview, NGO director involved in heroin rehabilitation since the 1990s, Pretoria, South Africa, 24 October 2017. According to the same source, Tanzanians arrived in South Africa already enmeshed in the heroin economy and set up business discreetly, learning from the mistakes of Nigerians in Johannesburg. They didn't concentrate the trade in one area, but instead made heroin available in many areas. After the xenophobic attacks of 2009, to make themselves less conspicuous they deployed local runners, usually people who were already dependent on heroin.
- 218** Interview, NGO director involved in heroin rehabilitation since the 1990s, Pretoria, South Africa, 24 October 2017.
- 219** Interview, senior police officer, Cape Town, South Africa, 8 September 2017.
- 220** Interviews, various members of several community policing forums on the Cape Flats in gang-controlled areas in Cape Town, 25-26 October 2017.
- 221** Interview, NGO director involved in heroin rehabilitation since the 1990s, Pretoria, South Africa, 24 October 2017.
- 222** Interview, anti-drug activist, Durban, South Africa, 3 September 2017.
- 223** Interview, law-enforcement officials, Cape Town, South Africa, 26 October 2017; interview, international drug control official, Pretoria, South Africa, 27 October 2017.
- 224** UNODC, South Africa Country Profile – Part 1, October 1999.
- 225** Eastern and Southern African Anti Money Laundering Group, ESAAMLG Typologies Working Group, Laundering the proceeds of illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, ESAAMLG Conference, Mauritius, 8 September 2011.
- 226** See South African Police Service *Annual report 2015/16*, https://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/annual_report/2015_2016/saps_annual_report_2015_2016.pdf.
- 227** Interview, law-enforcement officials, Cape Town, South Africa, 26 October 2017.
- 228** Interview, former general in the police force, Cape Town, South Africa, 10 September 2017.
- 229** See News24, Police make massive R500m cocaine bust in Overberg town, 22 June 2017, <http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/police-make-massive-r500m-cocaine-bust-in-overberg-town-20170622>.
- 230** The interviews referred to here were with well-informed people associated with the Cape gangs, heroin rehabilitation workers, and law-enforcement personnel in South Africa between September and November 2017.
- 231** In 2009, 150 kg of heroin was intercepted in a shipment of tourist souvenirs at Heathrow Airport on a flight from South Africa. The trail was traced back to Durban and then Mozambique, where the South African organised-crime unit, the Hawks, said the heroin had been packed with the curios. See South African Hawks in drugs bust, BBC, 16 September 2016, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8259456.stm>.
- 232** Interview, Western Cape police detective, Cape Town, South Africa, 8 October 2017.
- 233** Interview, law-enforcement officials, Cape Town, South Africa, 26 October 2017.
- 234** Interview, individuals close to the Cape gang milieu, Cape Town, South Africa, November 2017.
- 235** Interviews with various members of several community policing forums on the Cape Flats in gang-controlled areas in Cape Town, 25-26 October 2017; interview, community leaders and gang members, Cape Town, South Africa, 27 October 2017.
- 236** Interview, former senior police officer involved in organised-crime investigations, Cape Town, South Africa, 9 September 2017.
- 237** Ibid.
- 238** Interview, senior police officer, Cape Town, South Africa, 8 September 2017.
- 239** J Pauw, *The President's Keepers*, Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2017.
- 240** For a whistle-blower's account, see J van Loggerenberg, *Rogue: The Inside Story of SARS's Elite Crime-busting Unit*, Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2016.
- 241** C Dolley and A Serrao, Underworld, tobacco and drug war sparks shootings and protests, News 24, 12 May

- 2017, <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/underworld-tobacco-and-drug-war-sparks-shootings-and-protests-20170512>.
- 242** Ibid.
- 243** C Dolley, Gang, guns and rogue crime intelligence claims ruffle underworld, News 24, 9 September 2017, <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/gang-guns-and-rogue-crime-intelligence-claims-ruffle-underworld-20170919>.
- 244** Cape gangster gets VIP invite to Zuma's party, News24, 27 April 2014, <http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Cape-gangster-gets-VIP-invite-to-Zumas-party-20140427>.
- 245** C Dolley, Underworld unmasked, News24, 11 August 2017, <http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/news24-showcase-unmasking-cape-towns-underworld-20170811>.
- 246** Assassinations have spread beyond locations that they were traditionally associated with, namely KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and, to some extent, Gauteng. This data is from the Assassinations Witness Project run in collaboration with the University of Cape Town. A more detailed analysis can be found in a forthcoming edition of *African Affairs*.
- 247** Although workers claim they are always paid their salaries, they know that the revenues of these hotels are too low to support the hotels' operating costs (such as labour costs, toiletries and cleaning products, cleaning services, taxes, electricity, telephone and other services). The workers explain this discrepancy by saying that the owners of the hotels have 'other businesses' that support the hotels' costs. Interviews with various hotel staff, Nampula, 6 October 2017.
- 248** Interview, prominent anti-corruption activist, Nairobi, Kenya, 27 September 2017.
- 249** Interview, editor of Dar es Salaam property and real-estate trade newspaper, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 22 September 2017.
- 250** F Varese, *Mafia Life: Love, Death and Money at the Heart of Organised Crime*, London: Profile Books, 2017.
- 251** C Olver, *How to steal a city: The Battle for Nelson Mandela Bay - An insider account*, Cape Town: Jonathan Ball publishers, 2017, 233.
- 252** Interview, investigative journalist, Maputo, Mozambique, 12 October 2017.
- 253** See, for example, the money that FRELIMO has raised from the illegal timber trade. L Mabunda, *Partido Frelimo financiou-se com dinheiro de contrabando de madeira na Zambézia*, Centro de Integridade Pública, November 2014, https://cipmoz.org/images/Documentos/Anti-Corrupcao/329_CIP-a_transparencia_11.pdf.
- 254** Interview, investigative journalist, Maputo, Mozambique, 12 October 2017.
- 255** G Wannenburg, *War, the state and criminal networks in West and southern Africa: Africa's pablos and political entrepreneurs*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2006.
- 256** See D Paget, Dancers, branches, stereotypes and choppers: Party finance and capital-intensive campaigning in Tanzania, paper presented at the 60th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Chicago, November 2017.
- 257** T Madonsela, *State of capture*, Office of the Public Protector, government of South Africa, 2014.
- 258** A number of books have documented this process. See, for example, the following whistle-blower accounts: J van Loggerenberg, *Rogue: The Inside Story of SARS's Elite Crime-busting Unit*, Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2016; J Pitchford, *Blood on their hands: General Johan Booysen reveals his truth*, Cape Town: Pan Macmillan; C Olver, *How to steal a city: The Battle for Nelson Mandela Bay - An insider account*, Cape Town: Jonathan Ball publishers, 2017.
- 259** Though as a part of the criminal-justice system, these are also compromised.
- 260** This is not to say the criminal-justice system is not compromised - indeed, the police are seen to be perhaps the most corrupt (and powerful) institution in the country.
- 261** Informal report provided to the GI by an analyst working for an intergovernmental organisation, October 2017.
- 262** Interview, judge, Maputo, Mozambique, 10 September 2017.
- 263** Interview, retired bank employee, Maputo, Mozambique, 12 September 2017.
- 264** Informal report provided to the GI by an analyst working for an intergovernmental organisation, October 2017.
- 265** S Beckerleg, M Telfer and GL Hundt, The rise of injecting drug use in East Africa: A case study from Kenya, *Harm Reduction Journal*, 2:12, 2005.
- 266** GP Kilonzo et al, Rapid situational assessment for drug demand reduction in Tanzania, UN Development Programme, 2001.
- 267** E Muhondwa, R Mpembeni and F Mayunga, An assessment of the treatment needs of drug users in Dar es Salaam, report by Christ Compassion in Action prepared for Save the Children UK, Tanzania Programme, 2002.
- 268** Most recent data from UNAIDS.
- 269** Where high, low and medium estimates exist, then the medium estimate is provided.
- 270** UNODC/ICHIRA, Rapid situational assessment of HIV prevalence and risky behaviours among injecting drug users in Kenya, 2011.
- 271** Information provided for annual report questionnaire reporting.
- 272** UNODC/ICHIRA, Rapid situational assessment of HIV prevalence and risky behaviours among injecting drug users in Kenya, 2011.
- 273** National AIDS Control Programme, Consensus estimates on key population size and HIV prevalence in Tanzania, July 2014. Based on the following studies: Médecins du Monde. Assessment of risk practices and infectious disease

- among drug users in Temeke District, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 2011; Williams et al, HIV seroprevalence in a sample of Tanzanian intravenous drug users, *AIDS Educ Prev*, 21:5, 2009, 474-483; Timpson et al, Substance abuse, HIV risk, and HIV/AIDS in Tanzania, *African Journal of Drug and Alcohol Studies*, 2006; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Tanzania, Mapping of people who use drugs and people who inject drugs in Tanzania, 2014 (unpublished); Dahoma et al, HIV and substance abuse: The dual epidemics challenging Zanzibar, *African Journal of Drug and Alcohol Studies*, 2006.
- 274** National AIDS Control Programme, Consensus estimates on key population size and HIV prevalence in Tanzania, July 2014.
- 275** Figure provided by Tanzanian Health Authority, taken from a study that is forthcoming. Rates of both HIV and hepatitis C are higher among female users in Tanzania.
- 276** Isabel Sathane et al, Estimating the number of people who inject drugs in two urban areas in Mozambique using four different methods, *J Int AIDS Soc.*, 2015; 18(Suppl 4): 20479.
- 277** Ibid.
- 278** Ibid.
- 279** G Setswe et al, Programmatic mapping and size estimation of key populations: Sex workers (male and female), men who have sex with men, persons who inject drugs and transgender people, Cape Town: Networking HIV and AIDS Community of Southern Africa, 2015.
- 280** A Scheibe, B Brown and M dos Santos, Rapid assessment of HIV prevalence and risk factors among people who inject drugs from five South African cities, 2014.
- 281** Interim results of unpublished study provided to the authors.
- 282** In South Africa there are privately funded NSP and OST programmes, and projects funded by international donors. There is one OST project serving some 300 people who use heroin in Pretoria, which is funded by the local government. The national government does not fund any NSP or OST projects, and methadone and buprenorphine are not available on the essential drug list for maintenance therapies.
- 283** Comment made by a public-health expert at an expert group meeting, 13-14 November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.
- 284** Larney et al, Global, regional, and country-level coverage of interventions to prevent and manage HIV and hepatitis C among people who inject drugs: A systematic review, *The Lancet*, 5, 2017, e1208-20.
- 285** Figure provided by Tanzanian Health Authority, taken from a study which is forthcoming. Rates of both HIV and HVC are higher among female users in Tanzania.
- 286** The International HIV/AIDS Alliance, Achievements and challenges in introducing a harm reduction programme in Kenya, 2016.
- 287** Ibid.
- 288** These are the traditional residential 'rehab' centres, which reported to the government body SACENDU (The South African Community Epidemiology Network on Drug Use). In 2012 (before the large surge in use), 23% of the admissions to these centres were for heroin addiction. Government of South Africa, The National Drug Master Plan, 2012-2016, Department of Social Development, 2012.
- 289** A Scheibe, et al, Safe treatment and treatment of safety: Call for a harm-reduction approach to drug-use disorders in South Africa, *South African Harm Reduction Journal*, 20th anniversary edition, 2017.
- 290** Among these gangs are Wakali Kwanza ('dangerous first') in Mombasa's Kisauni area, Wakali Wao ('most dangerous'), Wakali Kweli ('dangerous indeed') and Wakali Che ('dangerous till dawn'). Others, according to an academic who studies the drug trade, are Wajukuu wa Bibi ('wife's descendants'), Funga File ('kill and close the file'), Taliban and Kapenguria Six.
- 291** Interview, academic expert and practitioner in drug rehabilitation, Mombasa, Kenya, 25 September 2017.
- 292** M Schuberth, The impact of drug trafficking on informal security actors in Kenya, *Africa Spectrum*, 49:3, 2014, 55-81.
- 293** This phenomenon was noted by respondents with direct experience of such attacks at our expert group meeting in Nairobi on 13 November 2017.
- 294** M Schuberth, The impact of drug trafficking on informal security actors in Kenya, *Africa Spectrum*, 49:3, 2014, 55-81.
- 295** This data is from the Institute of Safety Governance and Criminology at the University of Cape Town. It draws on South African Police Service data but, because city boundaries don't match police ones, it has to be recalculated.
- 296** Available at <http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Global-Initiative-Assessment-and-Programmign-Tool-for-Organized-Crime-and-Development-April-2016.pdf>.



About the authors

Mark Shaw is the director of the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI TOC) and a senior visiting fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science's International Drug Policy Project. He was until recently the National Research Foundation Professor of Justice and Security at the University of Cape Town's Centre of Criminology, where he is now an adjunct professor.

Simone Haysom is a Senior Analyst at GI TOC and a visiting academic at the Department of African Studies at the University of Oxford. She has previously worked as researcher at the Overseas Development Institute in London, and spent several years working as a consultant on issues to do with forced displacement, urban development, organised crime and policing.

Peter Gastrow is a senior adviser at GI TOC. He lives in Cape Town and has practiced as an advocate of the Supreme Court, served as a parliamentarian, and as adviser to the South African minister of police. Organised crime has been his main research focus since he served as Cape Town director of the Institute for Security Studies and as a senior fellow at the International Peace Institute in New York.

About ENACT

ENACT builds knowledge and skills to enhance Africa's response to transnational organised crime. ENACT analyses how organised crime affects stability, governance, the rule of law and development in Africa, and works to mitigate its impact.

ENACT is implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

Acknowledgements

ENACT is funded by the European Union (EU). This publication has been produced with the assistance of the EU.