Heraclitus

Fragments

A TEXT AND TRANSLATION

WITH A COMMENTARY BY

T.M. ROBINSON

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A TEXT AND TRANSLATION WITH A COMMENTARY
by T.M. Robinson

This volume provides a Greek text of Heraclitus with a new, facing-page translation, together with a commentary discussing the philosophical issues raised by Heraclitus' work and outlining the main problems of interpretation. The volume also contains an English translation of substantial material from the ancient testimonia concerning Heraclitus' life and teaching, and offers selective bibliographical guidance.

While much of the commentary follows lines of interpretation that have won general acceptance, it differs from many in its claim that the *logos* of which Heraclitus speaks in fragments 1, 2, and 50 means, essentially, 'statement.' This statement, uttered in words by Heraclitus, reflects that statement everlastingly uttered by the cosmos itself, which descriptively tells of how things are and prescriptively lays down patterns of cosmic activity that serve as the basis for human laws (fragment 114).

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Emily Evangeline Robinson

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ad memoriam

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CONTENTS

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PREFACE

This book has been written mainly for those with an interest in Greek philosophy as philosophy. It contains, along with the Greek text of the fragments of Heraclitus' writings, a translation of the fragments and *testimonia* printed by Diels-Kranz (*Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 6th edition [1951]), omitting *testimonia* 3b (the Greek text of which D-K do not provide), 14a (the relevance of which is unclear), and 2. The translation of the fragments is a new one; that of the *testimonia* is new where none previously existed but in other respects deviates from already published translations (usually in the Loeb series) only when it seemed necessary. I have also tried to write a commentary on the fragments (but not, except incidentally, on the *testimonia*, which could fill a volume by itself) which forgoes the temptation to pursue in as much detail as others have pursued them matters of philological, historical, and cultural interest, unless they are seen to be clearly germane to an understanding of Heraclitus' central beliefs as a philosopher. This means that a number of topics – like the controverted details of his meteorology – that have occupied a great deal of space in earlier accounts of Heraclitus receive minimal treatment. For the rest, I am of course indebted to the writings of many outstanding Heraclitean scholars, not least Diels, Reinhardt, Fränkel, Snell, Gigon, Kirk, Marcovich, and, most recently, Kahn. My own commentary, specialists will notice, is particularly indebted both to Kirk and to Kahn, and a couple of major heresies I draw gratefully from Kahn's subtle and stimulating study in particular, that is, that Heraclitus believed in four elements not three, and also in a doctrine of periodic conflagration (*ecpyrōsis*) of the universe. A further heresy – that Heraclitus had no 'doctrine' of *logos* – I draw from West.

After much thought I have also made the decision not to confuse readers with yet another ordering of the fragments. The order followed, therefore, is that of the Diels-Kranz edition (ie, an alphabetic one); those further interested in finding out what I take to be a number of natural groupings of the fragments may wish to scan my tentative reconstruction of Heraclitus' thought (Summary, pp 181–91), a reconstruction which of course makes no claims to knowledge of the order in which the fragments appeared in Heraclitus' own book, and is in no way contingent upon any particular ordering.

A few of the fragments found in D-K (particularly a number stemming from Marcus Aurelius) seem so clearly a particular author's own vague summary or reminiscence of some Heraclitean saying that, along with the great majority of commentators, I have simply omitted them. (These are fragments 13a, 68–71, 73, 81b, and 122.) Others, while doubtfully ascribable to Heraclitus in their present form, but catching, it seems to me, something of the spirit of Heraclitus' philosophy, I have signalled by square brackets. Others again, including one or two famous ones, that seem to me arguably not Heraclitean at all, though frequently ascribed to him, I have signalled with a question-mark.

The text that I have followed is basically that found in the edition of M. Marcovich, *Heraclitus: The Greek Text with a Short Commentary* (Merida 1967), though on a number of important points (eg, the text of fragment 51) I have followed others. My greatest single debt in this area is none the less still to Marcovich, whose collection of texts and *testimonia* remains an invaluable source-book for all students of Heraclitus.

I am particularly indebted to the publishers and the Loeb Classical Library for permission to reprint, with some changes of my own, the translation by R.D. Hicks of the Life of Heraclitus in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, vol. 2, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1959; and the translation by R.G. Bury of Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians*, 7.126–34, ibid, 1935. I should like at the same time to express my thanks to the following for allowing me to reprint, in slightly revised form, material that was originally published by them: the editor of the *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* for a critical notice of Charles H. Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus* (13 [1983], 607–21); Scholars Press for 'Heraclitus: Some Soundings,' in *Greek Poetry and Philosophy: Studies in Honour of Leonard Woodbury*, edited by Douglas E. Gerber (1984), 229– 40; and the editor of *The Monist* for 'Heraclitus on Soul' (69 [1986], 305–14).

As far as the actual production of the volume is concerned, I owe a special debt of thanks to the Editor and staff of *Phoenix* for the work they did on the preparation for press of the Greek text of the fragments; to my University of Toronto Press editor, Joan Bulger, for her many sound suggestions on numerous points of style and content; and to Christine Turner, who with unfailing good humour and unflagging energy typed the manuscript through several drafts to its present version.

I should like, finally, to thank – among many – Charles H. Kahn and my colleague David Gallop, both of whom read, and commented usefully on, an early draft of my translation and commentary, and a number of colleagues in Italy, especially Livio Rossetti (Perugia), Antonio Battegazzore (Genoa), and Renato Laurenti (Naples). To all I offer sincere gratitude for their help, while naturally absolving them of any responsibility for any blemishes in the book that remain.

T.M. ROBINSON

University of Toronto 1986

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Introduction

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INTRODUCTION

I LIFE OF HERACLITUS

Almost nothing is known of Heraclitus' life. One can say with some assurance, however, that he lived during the period spanning the end of the sixth century and the beginning of the fifth century BC. The details of his life that are found in Diogenes Laertius are late, anecdotal, and unreliable; many seem to be merely fractured extrapolations from material found in the surviving fragments.

What we know for certain is that he grew up in one of the richest and most splendid cities in Asia Minor, Ephesus, at a time when it flourished under Persian rule. He seems, however, to have stood outside Ephesian politics, and indeed actively to have disliked those who directed the fortunes of his city. He was almost certainly himself of aristocratic stock, and shows a good deal of prejudice towards what he dubs 'the mob,' though I suggest in the commentary that the prejudice was something he was able on occasion to overcome.

As a thinker he undoubtedly drew on the cosmological and cosmogonical writings of his Milesian forebears, especially Anaximander and Xenophanes, but in many significant respects it is the sheer uniqueness of his vision of things that separates him from other pre-Socratic thinkers, and perhaps accounts for the fact that it was some time after his death before the impact of his writings was felt in Greek philosophy.

II THE BOOK

Whether Heraclitus wrote a single treatise, and whether, if he did, he entitled it 'On Nature' (Diogenes Laertius 9.5) is disputed. Fragment 1

certainly reads like the introduction to a fairly formal treatise; individual sayings, by contrast, as D-K remark, suggest an apophthegmatic, not to say hierophantic, manner of communication far removed from the treatise-form. One obvious possibility is that his 'book' (Diogenes Laertius 9.6), for which he became famous after his death, was a collection of his most trenchant sayings, prefaced by one in particular that reads remarkably like a general introduction, put together either by himself or by one or more admirers.

Certainly nothing in the fragments suggests that Heraclitus' work fell into three main sections (cosmology, politics, theology: Diogenes Laertius 9.5); these divisions almost certainly reflect the codifying tendencies of later philosophy.

The style of the work was known for its great obscurity even in antiquity. Much of it remains impenetrable, though parts of it can be more lucid than some of the things that commentators on it have penned from time to time. I am myself satisfied that, whether the book was written in treatise-form or not, certain major philosophical commitments on Heraclitus' part are detectable; these I have attempted to encapsulate in essay form (see Summary, pp 181–91) and to treat in somewhat greater detail in the commentary.

The fragments of Heraclitus' output range all the way from direct quotations, penned in Heraclitus' own Ionic dialect, to vague reminiscences of doctrine sometimes attested more precisely in quotations we actually have (eg, fragments 72, 75, 82, 83). The result is that the reader of Heraclitus faces an immediate and major problem that readers of, say, Plato do not face: the reconstruction of what Heraclitus actually said, as distinct from what our ancient sources sometimes quote him as saying. I have attempted, in the notes to my commentary, to provide the reader with basic information on the problems involved in assessing the claim of any given fragment to authenticity or partial authenticity. The depth of some of these problems can be gauged from the fact that a note is on occasion longer than its attendant commentary. As will quickly become clear, readers of Heraclitus, most notably the Stoics, have often tended to see him in their own image and likeness, and much contemporary Heraclitus scholarship has involved itself with the question of the degree (if any) to which the Stoics in particular, in their search for a precursor, misread their hero and misled posterity on several matters of significance (such as, eg, the supposed doctrine of *logos*). The matter is a complex one, and still much controverted; my own views, rather more favourable to the Stoics on some matters (eg, Heraclitus' physical theory) than on

others (eg, his supposed doctrine of *logos*), should be treated with the scepticism any claims in this area deserve.

The interpretation of what are finally decided upon as authentic fragments is, in its turn, as challenging a matter as the attempt to establish their authenticity. Some of them are likely to remain forever impenetrable, but internal evidence suggests that many are not beyond our basic understanding. While Heraclitus exhorts us, for example, to learn by observation of the world (fragments 55, 35), he also suggests strongly that a careful scrutiny of his own account (*logos*), which is the counterpart in human words of that other account (*logos*) which is uttered by 'that which is wise' (or by the universe in its rational aspect), will also yield crucial insights into the real (fragment 50). In a word, the *language* Heraclitus uses and the way he uses it are of critical importance, for in the complexity and interrelatedness of language we see a verbal counterpart to the complexly interrelated universe itself. In this respect Kahn talks usefully of the 'linguistic density' of Heraclitus' writing, 'the phenomenon by which a multiplicity of ideas are expressed in a single word or phrase' (p 89), and of its 'resonance,' that 'relationship between fragments by which a single verbal theme or image is echoed from one text to another in such a way that the meaning of each is enriched when they are understood together' (ibid).

If Kahn is right, and I think he is, much will be learned by careful attention to the puns, ambiguities, and general word-play in which Heraclitus obviously revels. Examples (among many) of this are the ambiguous positioning – surely deliberate – of the adverb 'everlastingly' in fragment 1; his punning on the root *dok* ('seem') in fragment 28, or on the words 'bow' and 'life' in fragment 48; and his exploitation of the affinity between the words *logos* and *homologein* (fragment 50), or the words *xynos* and *xyn noōi* (fragments 113, 114). These are no doubt subtleties, and likely to be missed by an inattentive reader. But if the general observation about Heraclitus' use of language is correct, language, too, like nature, will have 'a tendency to conceal itself' (fragment 123), and must be penetrated in depth if it is to reveal its secrets. In language, as in nature, Heraclitus may even have held that an *un*apparent connection holds more firmly than does an obvious one (fragment 54). If this is true, the obligation to investigate the subtleties of his expression will be an even stronger one, involving no doubt strenuous labour but often productive of gold, however little (fragment 22).

III THE ANCIENT TESTIMONIA

While Heraclitus does not seem to have made any great impact on his own generation, his book, says Diogenes Laertius, 'won such a reputation for itself that it produced a set of disciples known as Heracliteans' (9.6). The most notable of these in fifth-century Greece was Cratylus (on whom see the commentary on fragments 12, 91a). Heraclitus was clearly read by Plato, though the latter's estimation of the importance of a supposed doctrine of 'flux' was probably exaggerated. For Aristotle, by contrast, Heraclitus was a *physikos* who believed in the critical importance of one of his own (Aristotle's) elements, fire. Neither Plato nor Aristotle is especially important as a source of direct quotation from Heraclitus, though fragments 8 and 10 (both from Aristotle) are significant.

As is well known, the Stoics saw Heraclitus as their precursor, and Stoicism tends to colour several of the works – eg, the writings of Marcus Aurelius – in which some of Heraclitus' words (or paraphrases thereof) were recorded and interpreted. The question of the plausibility or otherwise of Stoic interpretations of Heraclitus will be discussed in the context of individual fragments. Other notable sources of direct quotation are Christian writers (themselves influenced to a greater or lesser degree by Stoicism): Clement of Alexandria, Hippolytus, and Origen. Outside of the Christian tradition, and in the same general period, are two other significant sources: Plutarch, and the biographer Diogenes Laertius, who among other things has preserved a fair amount of Theophrastus' account – now lost – of Heraclitean doctrine.

Later on, the Neoplatonists too showed an interest in Heraclitus' writings; some significant fragments are preserved in the writings of Plotinus, Porphyry, and Proclus.

Other scattered sources of fragments are Sextus Empiricus (he preserves the all-important fragments 1 and 2), Aëtius (fragment 3), the geographer Strabo, and the fifth-century anthologist John Stobaeus.

For further detail on these authors the list of sources and authorities, pp 193–200, should be consulted.

Text and Translation

Commentary

The Ancient *Testimonia*

Heraclitus: A Tentative Summary of His Beliefs

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FRAGMENTS

In the enumeration of the fragments [ ] indicates that the item in question is only doubtfully ascribable in its present form to Heraclitus, though it captures something of the spirit of Heraclitus' thought; ? indicates that the item is doubtfully ascribable to Heraclitus at all. In the translations of the fragments ⟨ ⟩ indicates what seems to be a natural addition in English to make sense of the Greek text; [ ] indicates either the immediate context of the fragment or what looks like a comment or query or explanation on the part of the author quoting Heraclitus; ( ) indicates an explanatory comment by the translator; and † ... † or † indicates the presence of what appears to be a corrupt text. Italics and exclamation marks in the translation of the fragments and the *testimonia* are, of course, interpretational; they were not part of the apparatus of classical Greek.

The Greek text of many of these sources is to be found in *Doxographi Graeci*, edited by H. Diels (Berlin 1879), hereafter abbreviated as *Dox. Gr.*

ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΤΟΥ ΠΕΡΙ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ

Fragment 1

τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ' ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον. γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπείροισιν ἐοίκασι πειρώμενοι καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιουτέων ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγεῦμαι κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει. τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιοῦσιν ὅκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὕδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται.

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.132

Fragment 2

διὸ δεῖ ἕπεσθαι τῷ ⟨ξυνῷ⟩· [τουτέστι τῷ κοινῷ. ξυνὸς γὰρ ὁ κοινός.] τοῦ λόγου δ' ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν.

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.133

Fragment 3

(περὶ μεγέθους ἡλίου) εὖρος ποδὸς ἀνθρωπείου.

Aëtius 2.21 (*Dox. Gr.* 351)

HERACLITUS ON NATURE

Fragment 1

But of this account, which holds forever, people forever prove uncomprehending, both before they have heard it and when once they have heard it. For, although all things happen in accordance with this account, they are like people *without* experience when they experience words and deeds such as I set forth, distinguishing ⟨as I do⟩ each thing according to ⟨its⟩ real constitution, ie, pointing out how it *is*. The rest of mankind, however, fail to be aware of what they do after they wake up just as they forget what they do while asleep.

Fragment 2

That is why one must follow that which is ⟨common⟩ [ie, universal. For 'common' means 'universal']. Though the account is common, the many live, however, as though they had a private understanding.

Fragment 3

[The sun's] breadth is ⟨that⟩ of a human foot.

Fragment 4?

Heraclitus dixit quod *Si felicitas esset in delectationibus corporis, boves felices diceremus, cum inveniant orobum ad comedendum.*

Albert the Great, *De vegetatione* 6.401 (p 545 Meyer)

Fragment 5

καθαίρονται δ' ἄλλως αἵματι μιαινόμενοι, ὁκοῖον εἴ τις εἰς πηλὸν ἐμβὰς πηλῷ ἀπονίζοιτο· μαίνεσθαι δ' ἂν δοκέοι εἴ τις μιν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιθράσαιτο οὕτω ποιέοντα. καὶ τοῖς ἀγάλμασι δὲ τουτέοισιν εὔχονται, ὁκοῖον εἴ τις τοῖς δόμοισι λεσχηνεύοιτο, οὔ τι γινώσκων θεοὺς οὐδ' ἥρωας οἵτινές εἰσι.

Aristocritus, *Theosophia* 68 (p 184 Erbse); Origen, *Contra Celsum* 7.62

Fragment 6

ὁ ἥλιος [οὐ μόνον, καθάπερ ὁ Ἡράκλειτός φησι,] νέος ἐφ' ἡμέρῃ ἐστίν, [ἀλλ' ἀεὶ νέος συνεχῶς.]

Aristotle, *Meteorology* 2.2.355a13

Fragment 7

εἰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα καπνὸς γένοιτο, ῥῖνες ἂν διαγνοῖεν.

Aristotle, *De sensu* 5.443a23

Fragment 4?

[Heraclitus said that,] if happiness consisted in the pleasures of the body, we should call oxen happy whenever they come across bitter vetch to eat.

Fragment 5

They vainly ⟨try to⟩ purify themselves with blood when they are *defiled* ⟨with it⟩! – ⟨which is⟩ as if one who had stepped into mud should ⟨try to⟩ wash himself *off* with mud! He would be thought mad, were any man to notice him so doing. Furthermore, they *pray to* these statues! – ⟨which is⟩ as though one were to ⟨try to⟩ carry on a conversation with *houses*, without any recognition of who gods and heroes ⟨really⟩ are.

Fragment 6

The sun is [not only, as Heraclitus says,] new each day [but forever continuously new].

Fragment 7

If everything that exists should become smoke, nostrils would ⟨still⟩ distinguish ⟨them⟩.

Fragment 8?

τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον [καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν καὶ πάντα κατ' ἔριν γίνεσθαι.]

Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.2.1155b4

Fragment 9

[ἑτέρα γὰρ ἵππου ἡδονὴ καὶ κυνὸς καὶ ἀνθρώπου, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν] ὄνους σύρματ' ἂν ἑλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν· [ἥδιον γὰρ χρυσοῦ τροφὴ ὄνοις.]

Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.5.1176a7

Fragment 10

συλλάψιες· ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα, συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον, συνᾷδον διᾷδον [καὶ] ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα.

[Aristotle], *De mundo* 5.396b20

Fragment 11

πᾶν γὰρ ἑρπετὸν πληγῇ νέμεται, ὥς φησιν Ἡράκλειτος.

[Aristotle], *De mundo* 6.401a10

Fragment 8?

[Heraclitus said that] what opposes unites, [and that the finest attunement stems from things bearing in opposite directions, and that all things come about by strife].

Fragment 9

[For the pleasures of horse, dog, and man are different things, according to Heraclitus, who says that] donkeys would prefer refuse to gold.

Fragment 10

Things grasped together: things whole, things not whole; ⟨something⟩ being brought together, ⟨something⟩ being separated; ⟨something⟩ consonant, ⟨something⟩ dissonant. Out of all things ⟨comes?⟩ one thing, and out of one thing all things.

Fragment 11

Every animal is driven to pasture with a blow, [as Heraclitus says].

Fragment 12

ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ.

Arius Didymus, Fragment 39.2 (*Dox. Gr.* 471, 4)

Fragment 13b

ὗες βορβόρῳ ἥδονται μᾶλλον ἢ καθαρῷ ὕδατι.

Clement, *Stromateis* 1.2.2

Fragment 14

[τίσι δὴ μαντεύεται Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος;] νυκτιπόλοις, μάγοις, βάκχοις, λήναις, μύσταις· [τούτοις ἀπειλεῖ τὰ μετὰ θάνατον, τούτοις μαντεύεται τὸ πῦρ·] τὰ γὰρ νομιζόμενα κατ' ἀνθρώπους μυστήρια ἀνιερωστὶ μυοῦνται.

Clement, *Protrepticus* 22.2

Fragment 15

εἰ μὴ γὰρ Διονύσῳ πομπὴν ἐποιοῦντο καὶ ὕμνεον ᾄσμα αἰδοίοισιν, ἀναιδέστατα εἴργασται· ὠυτὸς δὲ Ἄιδης καὶ Διόνυσος, ὅτεῳ μαίνονται καὶ ληναΐζουσιν.

Clement, *Protrepticus* 34.5

Fragment 12

As they step into the same rivers, different and ⟨still⟩ different waters flow upon them.

Fragment 13b

Pigs enjoy filth more than they do pure water.

Fragment 14

[For whom does Heraclitus of Ephesus prophesy? For] night-wandering wizards, Bacchants, Lenaeans, initiates. [These are the ones he threatens with the things that come after death; for these he prophesies fire. For] the initiation-rites accepted among mankind they perform (are initiated into?) in an impious manner.

Fragment 15

If it were not in *Dionysus'* honour that they make a procession and sing a hymn to ⟨the⟩ shameful parts, their deed would be a most shameful one. But Hades and Dionysus, for whom they rave and celebrate the festival of the Lenaea, are ⟨one and⟩ the same!

Fragment 16

τὸ μὴ δῦνόν ποτε πῶς τις λάθοι;

Clement, *Paedagogus* 2.99.5

Fragment 17

οὐ γὰρ φρονέουσι τοιαῦτα πολλοὶ ὁκοίοις ἐγκυρέουσιν, οὐδὲ μαθόντες γινώσκουσιν, ἑωυτοῖσι δὲ δοκέουσι.

Clement, *Stromateis* 2.8.1

Fragment 18

ἐὰν μὴ ἔλπηται ἀνέλπιστον, οὐκ ἐξευρήσει, ἀνεξερεύνητον ἐὸν καὶ ἄπορον.

Clement, *Stromateis* 2.17.4

Fragment 19

ἀκοῦσαι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι οὐδ' εἰπεῖν.

Clement, *Stromateis* 2.24.5

Fragment 16

How would one escape the notice of that which never sets?

Fragment 17

Many people do *not* 'understand the sorts of thing they encounter'! Nor do they recognize them ⟨even⟩ after they have had experience ⟨of them⟩ – though they themselves think ⟨they recognize them⟩.

Fragment 18

If ⟨he⟩ doesn't expect ⟨the⟩ unexpected, ⟨he⟩ will not discover ⟨it⟩; for ⟨it⟩ is difficult to discover and intractable.

Fragment 19

[Reproving certain people for their credulousness, Heraclitus says:] ⟨They are⟩ people who do not know how to listen or how to speak.

Fragment 20

[Ἡράκλειτος γοῦν κακίζων φαίνεται τὴν γένεσιν, ἐπειδὰν φῇ·] γενόμενοι ζώειν ἐθέλουσι μόρους τ' ἔχειν, [μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναπαύεσθαι,] καὶ παῖδας καταλείπουσι μόρους γενέσθαι.

Clement, *Stromateis* 3.14

Fragment 21

[οὐχὶ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος θάνατον τὴν γένεσιν καλεῖ ... ἐν οἷς φησι·] θάνατός ἐστιν ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ὁρέομεν, ὁκόσα δὲ εὕδοντες ὕπνος.

Clement, *Stromateis* 3.21.1

Fragment 22

χρυσὸν γὰρ οἱ διζήμενοι γῆν πολλὴν ὀρύσσουσι καὶ εὑρίσκουσιν ὀλίγον.

Clement, *Stromateis* 4.4.2

Fragment 23

Δίκης ὄνομα οὐκ ἂν ᾔδεσαν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ ἦν.

Clement, *Stromateis* 4.9.7

Fragment 20

[Heraclitus at any rate is clearly abusing birth on those occasions when he says:] Once born, they consent to live and face their fate[s] [or rather: 'fall asleep'], and leave behind them children to become ⟨in their turn subject to their own particular⟩ fate[s].

Fragment 21

[Even Heraclitus does not call birth death, when he says:] Death is those things we see once we are awake; sleep† those things ⟨we see⟩ while we are sleeping.

Fragment 22

Those who seek gold dig up a great deal of earth and find little.

Fragment 23

Did these things not exist, ⟨people⟩ would not ⟨even?⟩ know the name '⟨the⟩ Right Way' ('Justice').

Fragment 24

ἀρηιφάτους θεοὶ τιμῶσι καὶ ἄνθρωποι.

Clement, *Stromateis* 4.16.1

Fragment 25

μόροι γὰρ μέζονες μέζονας μοίρας λαγχάνουσι.

Clement, *Stromateis* 4.49.2

Fragment 26

ἄνθρωπος ἐν εὐφρόνῃ φάος ἅπτεται ἑαυτῷ [ἀποθανὼν] ἀποσβεσθεὶς ὄψεις, ζῶν δὲ ἅπτεται τεθνεῶτος εὕδων, [ἀποσβεσθεὶς ὄψεις], ἐγρηγορὼς ἅπτεται εὕδοντος.

Clement, *Stromateis* 4.141.2

Fragment 27

ἀνθρώπους μένει ἀποθανόντας ἅσσα οὐκ ἔλπονται οὐδὲ δοκέουσιν.

Clement, *Stromateis* 4.144.3

Fragment 24

Those slain by Ares, gods and mankind honour.

Fragment 25

Greater (better) deaths win ⟨for themselves⟩ greater (better) destinies.

Fragment 26

A person in ⟨the⟩ night kindles a light for himself, since his vision has been extinguished. In his sleep he touches that which is dead, though ⟨himself⟩ alive, ⟨and⟩ when awake touches that which sleeps.

Fragment 27

There await people when they die things they neither expect nor ⟨even⟩ imagine.

Fragment 28a

δοκέοντα γὰρ ὁ δοκιμώτατος γινώσκει, φυλάσσει·

Clement, *Stromateis* 5.9.3

Fragment 28b

[καὶ μέντοι καὶ] Δίκη καταλήψεται ψευδῶν τέκτονας καὶ μάρτυρας.

Clement, *Stromateis* 5.9.3

Fragment 29

αἱρεῦνται γὰρ ἓν ἀντὶ ἁπάντων οἱ ἄριστοι, κλέος ἀέναον θνητῶν· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κεκόρηνται ὅκωσπερ κτήνεα.

Clement, *Stromateis* 5.59.4

Fragment 30

κόσμον [τόνδε,] τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται, πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα.

Clement, *Stromateis* 5.103.6

Fragment 28a

The most esteemed ⟨of people⟩ 'ascertains' – and holds fast to! – what ⟨merely⟩ seems ⟨to be the case⟩.

Fragment 28b

⟨The goddess⟩ Justice will catch up with fabricators of falsehoods and those who bear witness to them.

Fragment 29

The best choose one thing in place of all ⟨other⟩ things – ever-flowing glory among mortals. The majority, however, glut themselves (or: are glutted) – like cattle.

Fragment 30

⟨The ordered?⟩ world, the same for all, no god or man made, but it always was, is, and will be, an everliving fire, being kindled in measures and being put out in measures.

Fragment 31a

πυρὸς τροπαί· πρῶτον θάλασσα, θαλάσσης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ γῆ, τὸ δὲ ἥμισυ πρηστήρ.

Clement, *Stromateis* 5.104.3

Fragment 31b

θάλασσα διαχέεται, καὶ μετρέεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὁκοῖος πρόσθεν ἦν ἢ γενέσθαι γῆ.

Clement, *Stromateis* 5.104.5

Fragment 32

ἕν, τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον, λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς ὄνομα.

Clement, *Stromateis* 5.115.1

Fragment 33

νόμος καὶ βουλῇ πείθεσθαι ἑνός.

Clement, *Stromateis* 5.155.2

Fragment 31a

Fire's turnings: first, sea, and of sea half ⟨is⟩ earth and half 'burner.'

Fragment 31b

Sea is poured forth ⟨from earth⟩, and is measured in the same proportion as existed before it became earth.

Fragment 32

One thing, the only wise thing, is unwilling and willing to be called by the name Zeus.

Fragment 33

⟨It is⟩ law (custom) also to obey (respect) ⟨the⟩ counsel of ⟨a single⟩ one.

Fragment 34

ἀξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωφοῖσιν ἐοίκασι· φάτις αὐτοῖσι μαρτυρεῖ παρεόντας ἀπεῖναι.

Clement, *Stromateis* 5.115.3

Fragment 35

χρὴ γὰρ εὖ μάλα πολλῶν ἵστορας φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας εἶναι καθ' Ἡράκλειτον.

Clement, *Stromateis* 5.140.5

Fragment 36

ψυχῇσιν θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι, ὕδατι δὲ θάνατος γῆν γενέσθαι, ἐκ γῆς δὲ ὕδωρ γίνεται, ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ ψυχή.

Clement, *Stromateis* 6.17.2

Fragment [37]

[si modo credimus Ephesio Heraclito qui ait] *sues caeno, cohortales aves pulvere vel cinere lavari.*

Columella 8.4.4

Fragment 34

Uncomprehending, ⟨even⟩ when they have heard ⟨the truth about things?⟩, they are like deaf people. The saying 'absent while present' fits them well (literally, 'bears witness to them').

Fragment 35

[For, according to Heraclitus, men who are] lovers of wisdom ought very much to be enquirers into many things.

Fragment 36

For souls it is death to become water, and for water death to become earth. Water comes into existence out of earth, and soul out of water.

Fragment [37]

[... provided we believe Heraclitus of Ephesus, who said that] pigs wash themselves with mud, while farmyard birds wash with dust or ashes.

Fragment [38]

δοκεῖ δὲ κατά τινας πρῶτος ἀστρολογῆσαι ... μαρτυρεῖ δ' αὐτῷ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Δημόκριτος.

Diogenes Laertius 1.23

Fragment 39

ἐν Πριήνῃ Βίας ἐγένετο ὁ Τευτάμεω, οὗ πλέων λόγος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων.

Diogenes Laertius 1.88

Fragment 40

πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην, αὖτίς τε Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἑκαταῖον.

Diogenes Laertius 9.1

Fragment 41

ἓν τὸ σοφόν, ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην, †ὁτέη ἐκυβέρνησε† πάντα διὰ πάντων.

Diogenes Laertius 9.1

Fragment [38]

[Thales], according to some, seems to have been the first student of astronomy; a fact that both Heraclitus and Democritus bear witness to.

Fragment 39

In Priene was born Bias, son of Teutames, who ⟨is⟩ of more account than the rest ⟨of his compatriots?⟩.

Fragment 40

A lot of learning does not teach ⟨a person the possession of⟩ understanding; ⟨could it do so,⟩ it would have so taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, or for that matter (?) Xenophanes and Hecataeus.

Fragment 41

[He says that] the wise ⟨thing⟩ is a single ⟨thing⟩ (or, differently punctuated: one thing, the wise thing, ⟨is⟩) – knowing the plan †which steers† all things through all things.

Fragment 42

τόν τε Ὅμηρον ἔφασκεν ἄξιον ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ ῥαπίζεσθαι καὶ Ἀρχίλοχον ὁμοίως.

Diogenes Laertius 9.1

Fragment 43

ὕβριν χρὴ σβεννύναι μᾶλλον ἢ πυρκαϊήν.

Diogenes Laertius 9.2

Fragment 44

μάχεσθαι χρὴ τὸν δῆμον ὑπὲρ τοῦ νόμου ὅκωσπερ τείχεος.

Diogenes Laertius 9.2

Fragment 45

ψυχῆς πείρατα ἰὼν οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροιο, πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν· οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει.

Diogenes Laertius 9.7

Fragment [46]

τήν τε οἴησιν ἱερὰν νόσον ἔλεγε καὶ τὴν ὅρασιν ψεύδεσθαι.

Diogenes Laertius 9.7

Fragment 42

[He used to affirm that] Homer ought by rights to be ejected from the lists and thrashed, and similarly Archilochus.

Fragment 43

[He used to say that] there is a greater need to extinguish *hybris* than there is a blazing fire.

Fragment 44

[For, he said,] the people should fight on behalf of the law as ⟨they would⟩ for ⟨their⟩ city-wall.

Fragment 45

One would never discover the limits of soul, should one traverse every road – so deep a measure does it possess.

Fragment [46]

[He used to say that] thinking is ⟨an instance of the⟩ sacred disease [and that] sight is deceptive.

Fragment [47]

μὴ εἰκῇ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων συμβαλλώμεθα.

Diogenes Laertius 9.73

Fragment 48

τῷ οὖν τόξῳ ὄνομα βίος, ἔργον δὲ θάνατος.

Etymologicum Magnum, sv bios

Fragment 49

εἷς [ἐμοὶ] μύριοι, ἐὰν ἄριστος ᾖ.

Theodorus Prodromus, *Letters* 1 (Migne 1240a)

Fragment 49a

ποταμοῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐμβαίνομέν τε καὶ οὐκ ἐμβαίνομεν, εἰμέν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν.

Heraclitus, *Quaestiones Homericae* 24 Oelmann (Schleiermacher, fragment 72)

Fragment [47]

Let us not make random conjectures about the most important matters.

Fragment 48

The bow's *name* [then?] is 'life' (*bios*), but ⟨its⟩ *job* is death!

Fragment 49

One man ⟨is⟩ ⟨the equivalent of⟩ ten thousand, provided he be very good (excellent).

Fragment 49a

We step and do not step into the same rivers; we are and are not.

Fragment 50

'οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν ἓν πάντα εἶναι' ὁ Ἡράκλειτός φησι.

Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.9.1

Fragment 51

οὐ ξυνιᾶσιν ὅκως διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῷ ὁμολογέει· παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης.

Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.9.2

Fragment 52

αἰὼν παῖς ἐστι παίζων, πεσσεύων· παιδὸς ἡ βασιληίη.

Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.9.4

Fragment 53

Πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἔδειξε τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους.

Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.9.4

Fragment 50

'Not after listening to me, but after listening to the account, one does wisely in agreeing that all things are ⟨in fact?⟩ one ⟨thing⟩,' [says Heraclitus].

Fragment 51

They do not understand how, while differing from (or: being at variance), ⟨it⟩ is in agreement with itself. ⟨There is⟩ a back-turning connection, like ⟨that⟩ of a bow or lyre.

Fragment 52

Lifetime is a child playing, moving pieces in a backgammon (?) game; kingly power (or: the kingdom) is in the hands of a child.

Fragment 53

War is father of all, and king of all. He renders some gods, others men; he makes some slaves, others free.

Fragment 54

ἁρμονίη ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείττων.

Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.9.5

Fragment 55

ὅσων ὄψις ἀκοὴ μάθησις, ταῦτα ἐγὼ προτιμέω.

Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.9.5

Fragment 56

ἐξηπάτηνται, φησίν, οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν τῶν φανερῶν παραπλησίως Ὁμήρῳ, ὃς ἐγένετο τῶν Ἑλλήνων σοφώτερος πάντων. ἐκεῖνόν τε γὰρ παῖδες φθεῖρας κατακτείνοντες ἐξηπάτησαν εἰπόντες· ὅσα εἴδομεν καὶ ἐλάβομεν, ταῦτα ἀπολείπομεν, ὅσα δὲ οὔτε εἴδομεν οὔτ' ἐλάβομεν, ταῦτα φέρομεν.

Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.9.5

Fragment 57

διδάσκαλος δὲ πλείστων Ἡσίοδος· τοῦτον ἐπίστανται πλεῖστα εἰδέναι, ὅστις ἡμέρην καὶ εὐφρόνην οὐκ ἐγίνωσκεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἕν.

Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.10.2

Fragment 54

An unapparent connection is stronger (or: better) than one which is obvious.

Fragment 55

Whatsoever things ⟨are⟩ objects of sight, hearing, ⟨and⟩ experience – these things I hold in higher esteem.

Fragment 56

People are deceived, [he says], in the recognition of things that are obvious in much the same way Homer, who was wiser than all the Greeks, was deceived. For he was deceived by the words spoken to him by some boys killing lice: 'What we saw and caught we leave behind, while what we did not see or catch we take ⟨away with us⟩.'

Fragment 57

For very many people Hesiod is ⟨their⟩ teacher. They are certain he knew a great number of things – he who continually failed to recognize ⟨even⟩ day and night ⟨for what they are⟩! For they are one.

Fragment 58

οἱ ἰατροὶ τέμνοντες καίοντες [πάντῃ βασανίζοντες κακῶς τοὺς ἀρρωστοῦντας] ἐπαιτιῶνται μηδέν' ἄξιον μισθὸν λαμβάνειν [παρὰ τῶν ἀρρωστούντων] ταῦτα ἐργαζόμενοι †τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰς νόσους†.

Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.10.3

Fragment 59

γραφέων ὁδὸς εὐθεῖα καὶ σκολιή.

Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.10.4

Fragment 60

ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὠυτή.

Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.10.4

Fragment 61

θάλασσα ὕδωρ καθαρώτατον καὶ μιαρώτατον, ἰχθύσι μὲν πότιμον καὶ σωτήριον, ἀνθρώποις δὲ ἄποτον καὶ ὀλέθριον.

Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.10.5

Fragment 58

Doctors, who cut and burn [those who are sick, grievously torturing them in every way], complain that they do not receive an appropriate *fee* [from the sick] for doing these things.

Fragment 59

⟨The⟩ way of writing ⟨is⟩ straight and crooked.

Fragment 60

A road up ⟨and⟩ down ⟨is⟩ one and the same ⟨road⟩.

Fragment 61

Sea-⟨water⟩, [he says,] is very pure and very foul water – for fish drinkable and life-sustaining, for people undrinkable and lethal.

Fragment 62

ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοὶ ἀθάνατοι, ζῶντες τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τὸν δὲ ἐκείνων βίον τεθνεῶτες.

Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.10.6

Fragment 63

†ἔνθα δ' ἐόντι† ἐπανίστασθαι καὶ φύλακας γίνεσθαι ἐγερτὶ ζώντων καὶ νεκρῶν.

Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.10.6

Fragment 64

τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίζει κεραυνός.

Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.10.7

Fragment 65

καλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸ χρησμοσύνην καὶ κόρον.

Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.10.7

Fragment 62

Immortals ⟨are⟩ mortal(s), mortals immortal(s), these (the former?) living ⟨in?⟩ the death of those (the latter?), those (the latter?) dead in the life of these (the former?). Or: Mortals ⟨are⟩ immortal(s), immortals mortal(s), these (the latter?) living ⟨in?⟩ the death of those (the former?), those (the former?) dead in the life of these (the latter?).

Fragment 63

[He says that] †in his (its) presence† they arise and become wakeful guardians of living ⟨people⟩ and corpses.

Fragment 64

And thunderbolt steers the totality of things.

Fragment 65

[And he calls it (ie, fire)] 'need and satiety.'

Fragment 66

πάντα γάρ, φησί, τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὸν κρινεῖ καὶ καταλήψεται.

Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.10.6

Fragment 67

ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη, χειμὼν θέρος, πόλεμος εἰρήνη, κόρος λιμός [(τἀναντία ἅπαντα· οὗτος ὁ νοῦς),] ἀλλοιοῦται δὲ ὅκωσπερ ⟨πῦρ?⟩, ὁπόταν συμμιγῇ θυώμασιν, ὀνομάζεται καθ' ἡδονὴν ἑκάστου.

Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.10.8

Fragment [72]

ᾧ μάλιστα διηνεκῶς ὁμιλοῦσι [λόγῳ τῷ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι,] τούτῳ διαφέρονται.

Marcus Aurelius 4.46

Fragment [74]

καὶ ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ⟨ὡς⟩ παῖδας τοκεώνων (sc. ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν)

Marcus Aurelius 4.46

Fragment 66

Fire, [he says,] having come suddenly upon all things, will judge and convict them.

Fragment 67

God ⟨is⟩ day ⟨and⟩ night, winter ⟨and⟩ summer, war ⟨and⟩ peace, satiety ⟨and⟩ famine, and undergoes change in the way that ⟨fire?⟩, whenever it is mixed with spices, gets called by the name that accords with ⟨the⟩ bouquet of each ⟨spice⟩.

Fragment [72]

They are separated from that with which they are in the most continuous contact.

Fragment [74]

[He also said that we must not act and speak like] children of ⟨our⟩ parents.

Fragment [75]

τοὺς καθεύδοντας οἶμαι ὁ Ἡράκλειτος ἐργάτας εἶναι λέγει καὶ συνεργοὺς τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γινομένων.

Marcus Aurelius 6.42

Fragment 76a?

ζῇ πῦρ τὸν γῆς θάνατον, καὶ ἀὴρ ζῇ τὸν πυρὸς θάνατον, ὕδωρ ζῇ τὸν ἀέρος θάνατον, γῆ τὸν ὕδατος.

Maximus of Tyre 41.4

Fragment 76b?

πυρὸς θάνατος ἀέρι γένεσις, καὶ ἀέρος θάνατος ὕδατι γένεσις.

Plutarch, *De E apud Delphous* 392c

Fragment 76c?

ὅτι γῆς θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι καὶ ὕδατος θάνατος ἀέρα γενέσθαι καὶ ἀέρος πῦρ καὶ ἔμπαλιν.

Marcus Aurelius 4.46

Fragment [75]

[Those who are asleep I think Heraclitus calls] labourers and co-producers of what happens in the universe.

Fragment 76a?

Fire lives the death of earth and air lives the death of fire; water lives the death of air, earth that of water.

Fragment 76b?

Fire's death is birth for air, and air's death birth for water.

Fragment 76c?

[We must always remember Heraclitus, to the effect that] death for earth is to become water, and death for water to become air, and for air ⟨to become⟩ fire, and so on in backward sequence.

Fragment [77]

ὅθεν καὶ Ἡράλειτον ψυχῇσι φάναι τέρψιν ἢ θάνατον ὑγρῇσι γενέσθαι. [τέρψιν δὲ εἶναι αὐταῖς τὴν εἰς γένεσιν πτῶσιν. ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ φάναι] ζῆν ἡμᾶς τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον καὶ ζῆν ἐκείνας τὸν ἡμέτερον θάνατον.

Numenius, Fragment 30 (des Places) (Porphyry, *De antro nympharum* 10)

Fragment 78

ἦθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπειον μὲν οὐκ ἔχει γνώμας, θεῖον δὲ ἔχει.

Origen, *Contra Celsum* 6.12

Fragment 79

ἀνὴρ νήπιος ἤκουσε πρὸς δαίμονος ὅκωσπερ παῖς πρὸς ἀνδρός.

Origen, *Contra Celsum* 6.12

Fragment 80

εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ τὸν πόλεμον ἐόντα ξυνόν, καὶ δίκην ἔριν, καὶ γινόμενα πάντα κατ' ἔριν καὶ †χρεώμενα.†

Origen, *Contra Celsum* 6.42

Fragment [77]

[Which is why Heraclitus said that] for souls it is joy or death to become wet. [Elsewhere he says that] we live their death and they live our death.

Fragment 78

Human nature does not have right understanding; divine nature does.

Fragment 79

A man hears himself called silly by a *divinity* as a child does by a *man*.

Fragment 80

One must realize that war is common, and justice strife, and that all things come to be through strife and are ⟨so⟩ †ordained†.

Fragment 81a

κατὰ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον κοπίδων ἐστὶν ἀρχηγός.

Philodemus, *Rhetoric* 1, coll. 57,62

Fragment 82?

πιθήκων ὁ κάλλιστος αἰσχρὸς ἀνθρώπων γένει συμβάλλειν.

[Plato], *Hippias Maior* 289a

Fragment 83?

ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος φανεῖται καὶ σοφίᾳ καὶ κάλλει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν.

[Plato], *Hippias Maior* 289b

Fragment 84a

μεταβάλλον ἀναπαύεται.

Plotinus 4.8.1

Fragment 84b

κάματός ἐστι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μοχθεῖν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι.

Plotinus 4.8.1

Fragment 81a

[According to Heraclitus, Pythagoras is] chief captain of swindlers.

Fragment 82?

[You are unaware of the truth of Heraclitus' statement that] the most handsome of apes is ugly in comparison with ⟨a member of the⟩ human race.

Fragment 83?

[Or does not even Heraclitus ... say exactly this:] In the matter of wisdom, beauty, and every other thing, in contrast with God the wisest of mankind will appear an ape.

Fragment 84a

While changing it rests.

Fragment 84b

Weariness is toiling for the same ⟨people⟩ and being ruled ⟨by them⟩.

Fragment 85

θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπόν· ὃ γὰρ ἂν θέλῃ, ψυχῆς ὠνεῖται.

Plutarch, *Coriolanus* 22.2

Fragment 86

[ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν θείων τὰ πολλά, καθ' Ἡράκλειτον,] ἀπιστίᾳ διαφυγγάνει μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι.

Plutarch, *Coriolanus* 38 (= Clement, *Stromateis* 5.88.4)

Fragment 87

βλὰξ ἄνθρωπος ἐπὶ παντὶ λόγῳ ἐπτοῆσθαι φιλεῖ.

Plutarch, *De audiendo* 40f–41a

Fragment 88

ταὐτό τ' ἔνι ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκὸς καὶ τὸ ἐγρηγορὸς καὶ τὸ καθεῦδον καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν· τάδε γὰρ μεταπεσόντα ἐκεῖνά ἐστι κἀκεῖνα πάλιν μεταπεσόντα ταῦτα.

Pseudo-Plutarch, *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 106e

Fragment 85

It is difficult to fight passion (⟨one's⟩ heart), for whatever it wishes it buys at the price of soul.

Fragment 86

[But the greater part of things divine, according to Heraclitus,] escape ascertainment because of ⟨people's?⟩ lack of belief (or: lack of confidence).

Fragment 87

A stupid (sluggish?) person tends to become all worked up over every statement ⟨he hears⟩.

Fragment 88

And, (?) as ⟨one and⟩ the same thing, there is present ⟨in us?⟩ living and dead and the waking and the sleeping and young and old. For the latter, having changed around, are the former, and the former, having changed around, are ⟨back⟩ again ⟨to being⟩ the latter.

Fragment [89]

ὁ Ἡράκλειτός φησι τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν ἕνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον εἶναι, τῶν δὲ κοιμωμένων ἕκαστον εἰς ἴδιον ἀποστρέφεσθαι.

Pseudo-Plutarch, *De superstitione* 166c

Fragment 90

πυρός τε ἀνταμοιβὴ τὰ πάντα καὶ πῦρ ἁπάντων, ὅκωσπερ χρυσοῦ χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσός.

Plutarch, *De E apud Delphous* 338d–e

Fragments 91a? [91b]

[ποταμῷ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι δὶς τῷ αὐτῷ καθ' Ἡράκλειτον οὐδὲ θνητῆς οὐσίας δὶς ἅψασθαι κατὰ ἕξιν ⟨τῆς αὐτῆς⟩· ἀλλ' ὀξύτητι καὶ τάχει μεταβολῆς] σκίδνησι καὶ πάλιν συνάγει [(μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ πάλιν οὐδ' ὕστερον, ἀλλ' ἅμα)] συνίσταται καὶ ἀπολείπει καὶ πρόσεισι καὶ ἄπεισι.

Plutarch, *De E apud Delphous* 392b

Fragment [89]

[Heraclitus says that] for those who are awake there is a single, common universe, whereas in sleep each person turns away into ⟨his⟩ own, private ⟨universe⟩.

Fragment 90

The totality of things, [says Heraclitus,] is an exchange for fire, and fire an exchange for all things, in the way goods ⟨are an exchange⟩ for gold, and gold for goods.

Fragment 91a?, [91b]

(a) [For, according to Heraclitus, it is not possible to step twice into the same river, nor is it possible to touch a mortal substance twice in so far as its state (*hexis*) is concerned. But, thanks to ⟨the⟩ swiftness and speed of change,] (b) it scatters ⟨things?⟩ and brings ⟨them?⟩ together again, [(or, rather, it brings together and lets go neither 'again' nor 'later' but *simultaneously*)], ⟨it⟩ forms and ⟨it⟩ dissolves, and ⟨it⟩ approaches and departs.

Fragment 92

Σίβυλλα δὲ μαινομένῳ στόματι καθ' Ἡράκλειτον ἀγέλαστα [καὶ ἀκαλλώπιστα καὶ ἀμύριστα] φθεγγομένη [χιλίων ἐτῶν ἐξικνεῖται τῇ φωνῇ διὰ τὸν θεόν.]

Plutarch, *De Pythiae oraculis* 397a

Fragment 93

ὁ ἄναξ, οὗ τὸ μαντεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς, οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει.

Plutarch, *De Pythiae oraculis* 404d

Fragment 94

Ἥλιος γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα· εἰ δὲ μή, Ἐρινύες μιν Δίκης ἐπίκουροι ἐξευρήσουσιν.

Plutarch, *De exilio* 604a

Fragment 95

ἀμαθίην κρύπτειν ἄμεινον.

Plutarch, *An virtus doceri possit* 439d

Fragment 92

⟨The⟩ Sibyl, [according to Heraclitus,] uttering with raving mouth words mirthless, [unadorned, and unperfumed, reaches ⟨us⟩ with her voice up to a thousand years later, thanks to the god.]

Fragment 93

The lord whose oracle is in Delphi neither indicates clearly nor conceals but gives a sign.

Fragment 94

The sun ⟨god⟩ will not overstep ⟨his⟩ measures. Otherwise ⟨the⟩ avenging Furies, ministers of Justice, will find him out.

Fragment 95

It is better, [says Heraclitus,] to conceal ignorance.

Fragment 96

νέκυες κοπρίων ἐκβλητότεροι.

Strabo 16.26

Fragment 97

κύνες γὰρ καὶ βαΰζουσιν ὧν ἂν μὴ γινώσκωσι.

Plutarch, *An seni respublica gerenda sit* 787c

Fragment 98

αἱ ψυχαὶ ὀσμῶνται καθ' Ἅιδην.

Plutarch, *De facie in orbe lunae* 943e

Fragment 99

εἰ μὴ ἥλιος ἦν, ἕνεκα τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων εὐφρόνη ἂν ἦν.

Pseudo-Plutarch, *Aqua an ignis utilior* 957a; *De fortuna* 98c

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Fragment 100

... [περιόδους· ὧν ὁ ἥλιος ἐπιστάτης ὢν καὶ σκοπὸς ὁρίζειν καὶ βραβεύειν καὶ ἀναδεικνύναι καὶ ἀναφαίνειν μεταβολὰς καὶ] ὥρας αἳ πάντα φέρουσι καθ' Ἡράκλειτον ... .

Plutarch, *Quaestiones Platonicae* 1007d–e

Fragment 96

Corpses are more fit to be thrown out than dung.

Fragment 97

[According to Heraclitus] dogs just bark at whomsoever they do not recognize.

Fragment 98

[And Heraclitus said, admirably, that] [the? those?] souls ⟨have (use) the sense of⟩ smell in Hades.

Fragment 99

If ⟨the⟩ sun did not exist, [as far as the rest of the stars are concerned(?)] it would be night.

Fragment 100

[The sun ... shares with the chief and primal god the job of setting bounds to ... (the) changes and] seasons that bring all things, [according to Heraclitus].

Fragment 101

ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν.

Plutarch, *Adversus Coloten* 1118c

Fragment 101a

ὀφθαλμοὶ γὰρ τῶν ὠτων ἀκριβέστεροι μάρτυρες.

Polybius 12.27.1

Fragment 102

τῷ μὲν θεῷ καλὰ πάντα [καὶ ἀγαθὰ] καὶ δίκαια, ἄνθρωποι δὲ ἃ μὲν ἄδικα ὑπειλήφασιν ἃ δὲ δίκαια.

Porphyry, *Quaestiones Homericae* (on *Iliad* 4.4; p 69 Schrader)

Fragment 103

ξυνὸν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ πέρας ἐπὶ κύκλου [περιφερείας].

Porphyry, *Quaestiones Homericae* (on *Iliad* 24.200; p 190 Schrader)

Fragment 104

τίς γὰρ αὐτῶν νόος ἢ φρήν; δήμων ἀοιδοῖσι πείθονται καὶ διδασ-

Fragment 101

[Heraclitus, as though he has made some mighty and august utterance, says:] I investigated myself (or: I made enquiry of myself).

Fragment 101a

Eyes are more accurate witnesses than are [the] ears.

Fragment 102

To god all things are fair and just, whereas humans have supposed that some things are unjust, other things just.

Fragment 103

In the case of a circle['s circumference] beginning and end are common.

Fragment 104

What discernment or intelligence, [he says,] do they possess? They

κάλῳ χρείωνται ὁμίλῳ οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι 'οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἀγαθοί'.

Proclus, *In Alicibiadem I*, p 117 Westerink

Fragment 105

ἀστρολόγον φησὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον.

Scholia Homerica (on *Iliad* 18.251)

Fragment 106

εἴτε ὀρθῶς Ἡράκλειτος ἐπέπληξεν Ἡσιόδῳ τὰς μὲν ἀγαθὰς ποιουμένῳ, τὰς δὲ φαύλας, ὡς ἀγνοοῦντι φύσιν ἡμέρας ἁπάσης μίαν οὖσαν.

Plutarch, *Camillus* 19.1

Fragment 107

κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἐχόντων.

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.126

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place their trust in popular bards, and take ⟨the⟩ throng for their teacher, not realizing that 'the majority ⟨are⟩ bad, and ⟨only⟩ few ⟨are⟩ good.'

Fragment 105

[Heraclitus says that] Homer was an astronomer.

Fragment 106

[... Whether Heraclitus was right in upbraiding Hesiod ... for not knowing that] the real constitution of each day is one ⟨and the same⟩ ...

Fragment 107

Poor witnesses for people are eyes and ears if they possess uncomprehending (literally, 'barbarian') souls.

Fragment 108

ὁκόσων λόγους ἤκουσα, οὐδεὶς ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τοῦτο, ὥστε γινώσκειν ὅ τι σοφόν ἐστι, πάντων κεχωρισμένον.

John Stobaeus 3.1.174

[Fragment 109 = fragment 95]

Fragment 110

ἀνθρώποις γίνεσθαι ὁκόσα θέλουσιν οὐκ ἄμεινον.

John Stobaeus 3.1.176

Fragment 111

νοῦσος ὑγιείην ἐποίησεν ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, λιμὸς κόρον, κάματος ἀνάπαυσιν.

John Stobaeus 3.1.177

Fragment 112

σωφρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη, καὶ σοφίη ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαΐοντας.

John Stobaeus 3.1.178

Fragment 108

Of all those whose accounts I have listened to, none gets to the point of recognizing that which is wise, set apart from all.

[Fragment 109 = fragment 95]

Fragment 110

It is *not* better for people to get all that they want!

Fragment 111

Disease makes health pleasant and good, hunger satiety, weariness rest.

Fragment 112

Sound thinking ⟨is⟩ a very great virtue, and ⟨practical⟩ wisdom ⟨consists in our⟩ saying what is true and acting in accordance with ⟨the⟩ real constitution ⟨of things⟩, ⟨by⟩ paying heed ⟨to it⟩.

Fragment 113

ξυνόν ἐστι πᾶσι τὸ φρονέειν.

John Stobaeus 3.1.179

Fragment 114

ξὺν νόῳ λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ ξυνῷ πάντων, ὅκωσπερ νόμῳ πόλις, καὶ πολὺ ἰσχυροτέρως. τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς, τοῦ θείου· κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται.

John Stobaeus 3.1.179

Fragment [115]

ψυχῆς ἐστι λόγος ἑαυτὸν αὔξων.

John Stobaeus 3.1.180a

Fragment 116

ἀνθρώποισι πᾶσι μέτεστι γινώσκειν ἑωυτοὺς καὶ σωφρονεῖν.

John Stobaeus 3.5.6

Fragment 113

Thinking is common to all.

Fragment 114

Those who ⟨would⟩ speak with insight must base themselves firmly on that which is common to all, as a city does upon ⟨its⟩ law – and much *more* firmly! For all human laws are nourished by one ⟨law⟩, the divine ⟨law⟩. For it holds sway to the extent that it wishes, and suffices for all, and is still left over.

Fragment [115]

Soul possesses a *logos* (measure, proportion) which increases itself.

Fragment 116

All people have a claim to self-knowledge (literally, 'self-ascertainment') and sound thinking.

Fragment 117

ἀνὴρ ὁκόταν μεθυσθῇ, ἄγεται ὑπὸ παιδὸς ἀνήβου σφαλλόμενος, οὐκ ἐπαΐων ὅκη βαίνει, ὑγρὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχων.

John Stobaeus 3.5.7

Fragment 118

αὐγὴ ξηρὴ ψυχή, σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη.

John Stobaeus 3.5.8

Fragment 119

῾Ηράκλειτος ἔφη ὡς ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων.

John Stobaeus 4.40.23

Fragment 120

ἠοῦς καὶ ἑσπέρας τέρματα ἡ ἄρκτος καὶ ἀντίον τῆς ἄρκτου οὖρος αἰθρίου Διός.

Strabo 1.6

Fragment 121

ἄξιον ᾽Εφεσίοις ἡβηδὸν ἀπάγξασθαι πᾶσι καὶ τοῖς ἀνήβοις τὴν πόλιν καταλιπεῖν, οἵτινες ῾Ερμόδωρον ἄνδρα ἑωυτῶν ὀνήιστον

Fragment 117

Whenever a man is drunk, he is led along, stumbling, by a beardless boy; he does not perceive where he is going, because his soul is wet.

Fragment 118

A flash (or: ray) of light ⟨is⟩ a dry soul, wisest and best (or: most noble).

Fragment 119

[Heraclitus said that] a person's character is his fate (divinity).

Fragment 120

⟨The⟩ limits of dawn and evening are the Bear and, opposite the Bear, ⟨the⟩ Watcher(?) of bright Zeus.

Fragment 121

The adult Ephesians should all by rights go hang themselves, leaving the city to adolescents. For they expelled Hermodorus, the

ἐξέβαλον φάντες· ἡμέων μηδὲ εἷς ὀνήιστος ἔστω, εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλῃ τε καὶ μετ' ἄλλων.

Strabo 14.25

Fragment 123

φύσις δὲ καθ' Ἡράκλειτον κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ.

Themistius, *Orations* 5.69b

Fragment 124

σάρμα εἰκῇ κεχυμένον ὁ κάλλιστος, φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, [ὁ] κόσμος.

Theophrastus, *Metaphysics* 15 (p 16 Ross and Fobes)

Fragment 125

καὶ ὁ κυκεὼν διίσταται ⟨μὴ⟩ κινούμενος.

Theophrastus, *De vertigine* 9

Fragment 125a?

μὴ ἐπιλίποι ὑμᾶς πλοῦτος, ἔφη, Ἐφέσιοι, ἵν' ἐξελέγχοισθε πονηρευόμενοι.

John Tzetzes, Scholia on Aristophanes' *Plutus* 88

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most valuable man among them, saying, 'We will not have even a single one as the *most valuable* among us. If such there ⟨purports to⟩ be, ⟨let him be so⟩ elsewhere and among others.'

Fragment 123

⟨A thing's? (the world's?)⟩ real constitution [according to Heraclitus] has a tendency to conceal itself.

Fragment 124

The most beautiful order ⟨in the universe?⟩ (or: 'the (this?) most beautiful universe'), [says Heraclitus,] is a heap of sweepings, piled up at random.

Fragment 125

Even the barley-drink separates if it is not stirred.

Fragment 125a?

May wealth not fail you, [he said,] men of Ephesus, so that you may be convicted of being ⟨the?⟩ scoundrels ⟨you are⟩.

Fragment 126

τὰ ψυχρὰ θέρεται, θερμὸν ψύχεται, ὑγρὸν αὐαίνεται, καρφαλέον νοτίζεται.

John Tzetzes, Scholia *ad Exegesin in Iliadem*, p 126 Hermann

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Fragment 129

Πυθαγόρης Μνησάρχου ἱστορίην ἤσκησεν ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πάντων, καὶ ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγραφὰς ἐποιήσατο ἑαυτοῦ σοφίην, πολυμαθίην, κακοτεχνίην.

Diogenes Laertius 8.6

Fragment 126

Cold things become warm, a warm thing becomes cold; a moist thing becomes dry, a parched thing becomes moist.

Fragment 129

Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, trained himself to the highest degree of all mankind in ⟨the art of⟩ investigation, and having selected these writings constructed a wisdom of his own – a lot of learning, a disreputable ⟨piece of⟩ craftmanship.

COMMENTARY

References to well-known editions and critical studies of the works of Heraclitus and of other ancient sources (Reinhardt 1916, Gigon 1935, Kirk 1954, Marcovich 1967, Kahn 1979) are abbreviated to the author's surname, enclosed in parentheses: for example, '(Kahn),' '(Marcovich *ad loc*).' Full titles of such works can be found in the bibliography, pp 203–6. References to other critical studies are also abbreviated to the author's surname, but the specific page number is then cited; when more than one work by an author is listed in the bibliography, the individual items are identified by the date of publication. Pre-Socratic philosophers are referred to by their D-K numeration.

Fragment 1

We know from Aristotle (and later Sextus Empiricus) that this fragment comes from the beginning of Heraclitus' book. So it is not surprising to find him referring to 'this account' (*logos*); it was standard for Ionian prose-authors of the day to refer at the outset to the *logos* of which their book was going to treat (eg, Hecataeus of Miletus, Ion of Chios; for references see Kahn). But, as soon becomes apparent, the 'account' is no standard report on the latest piece of scientific investigation on which the author has been engaged: it is boldly claimed (a) to hold 'forever' (*aiei*), and (b) to be something of which people 'always (*aiei*) prove uncomprehending' (the position of the adverb *aiei* is a fine piece of systematic ambiguity; it can be meaningfully taken with (a), or with (b), or, most compellingly of all, with both).

Such, at any rate, would have been the natural interpretation of

these lines that any contemporary reader would have made, without further knowledge of what *else* Heraclitus might have to say about his *logos*. But since Heraclitus' time the *logos* of fragment 1 has been taken as much more than simply his 'account' ⟨of things⟩. For the Stoics it was also (and more importantly) that Rational Principle (*Logos*) which directs the universe, and for a number of modern commentators (notably Kirk) it is also (and more importantly) that 'patterned structure' of the real that is the *object* of Heraclitus' account. So for the Stoics a second and more powerful interpretation of the phrase *eontos aiei* is 'everlastingly *existent*,' and the same is true for those who take *logos* as 'structure' (if the *universe* is everlasting, so naturally is its patterned structure).

The Stoic interpretation can be dismissed: there is no convincing evidence that *logos* meant 'rational principle' for Heraclitus (his word for this is in fact *to sophon*, 'that which is wise'; see fragment 108), or that it had any such meaning in contemporary literature. The structural interpretation is less obviously wrong (the writings of Herodotus a generation later make it clear that *logos* can mean, among other things, 'ratio,' 'proportion,' and 'measure'), but it is still unlikely (West). For Heraclitus the *logos* (of fragments 1, 50) is something one 'hears' or fails to hear; one does not 'hear' ratios, proportions, or patterned structures. (Some of the latter senses do, however, appear in *other* fragments of Heraclitus; but in such instances – fragments 31, 45 – he does not appear to be talking about a *logos* that one 'hears.')

For these reasons it seems best to understand *eontos* (= the participle of the verb 'to be') in a veridical sense (see Herodotus 1.95.1, 1.116.5); ie, the *logos* 'is true' (or 'holds') forever. Whose *logos* is it? As far as fragment 1 is concerned, a natural assumption is that it is the *logos* of Heraclitus himself. But as one reads the fragments, it becomes clear that the *logos* of Heraclitus is merely a translation into human speech of the *logos* of 'that which is wise' (fragment 108; cf fragment 32). This *logos* is that statement (or complex of statements) which both descriptively announces that 'all things are one' (fragment 50) and prescriptively enunciates that 'divine' law which both underpins all human law (fragment 114) and ensures on pain of punishment (fragment 94) that measured change amidst stability which constitutes the real (fragment 31). As a statement of the 'law' of the operations of the *real* it comes close to being, in part at least, what we would call a '*formula* ⟨of science⟩' (Gigon, Kirk); the difference being that this particular *logos* is either the all-embracing formula for the operations of the real that subsumes all *other* formulae (after the manner, in some

way, of the formula $E = MC^2$) or else the sum total of such formulae. In the words of Sextus Empiricus (below, p 178), the *logos* is an explanation (or exposition or articulation, *exēgēsis*) of the mode of arrangement of the universe.

As is clear from other fragments as well (eg, fragments 17, 56, 57), Heraclitus has little confidence in either the open-mindedness of the majority of people ('both *before* they have heard it') or their abilities of comprehension. The experiential techniques that serve them well enough in ordinary matters fail when confronted with the language Heraclitus uses (his 'words') and the natural processes and events (the 'deeds' ⟨of nature⟩) which he describes, eg, in fragment 31 (the formula 'words and deeds' is common in epic poetry, and is here taken over by Heraclitus to serve a larger purpose). The reason, he seems to claim, is that most people are happy with, no doubt because they can get by comfortably with, a blurred account of the real. His own account makes careful distinctions, searching out the genuine articulations of the real and looking for the way things are *really* constituted (rather than the way they appear to be).*

The final sentence should be compared with fragment 34. Most people, says Heraclitus, in waking life see without awareness, just as, when they are asleep, they have dreams but cannot recollect those dreams; they are, in the words of the proverb (fragment 34), 'absent while present.' The remark is a disparaging one, but Heraclitus also believes that even 'barbarian' souls (fragment 107) can take steps towards understanding, if they show open-mindedness (fragment 18), breadth of interest (fragment 35) and perseverance (fragment 22).

Fragment 2

The antecedent of the phrase 'that is why' cannot be known for certain, but fragment 114 seems not unlikely to have been at least a part of it. The 'divine law' seen as the laws of physics (see fragment 94) is 'common' or 'universal' in that it commands universal assent and can be 'relied upon' (fragment 114); seen as the moral law, it commands

* For this sense of *physis* see Kirk, and compare fragment 123. Another possibility, however, is that *hokōs echei* means 'in the way each is in reality distinguished ⟨from the others⟩.' If this is correct, we may well be looking at the origin in Greek thought of Plato's celebrated doctrine of division according to 'natural articulations' (see Plato, *Phaedrus* 265e 1–2).

universal obedience. In practice such assent and obedience are not universal, and Heraclitus' goal is presumably to do something about it. The private 'understanding' or 'perception' by the majority of mankind of what the *'logos* as law' amounts to is not spelled out by Heraclitus, but one can reasonably guess that it involves a misapprehension of its application to how they must live. (*Phronēsis* is a word which is frequently connected to practical action.)

For *logos* as 'account' see commentary on fragment 1.

The words of Sextus, as the manuscripts give them, are 'that is why we must follow that which is universal' (κοινῷ), and this, in an apparent gloss by Sextus himself, is expanded to 'for common (ξυνός) *means* universal'; the whole not very coherent ensemble, after a further expansion by Bekker, reads, 'that is why we must follow that which is common (ie, universal; for "common" *means* "universal").' The whole sentence has been rejected by several recent commentators as a piece of moral exhortation by Sextus himself. But the word 'follow' is clearly used in its archaic sense of 'obey' (see, eg, Herodotus 5.18.2, where there is an exhortation to 'follow custom' [νόμος – a word which can also mean 'law']), and fragment 114 makes it equally clear that the *logos*, taken prescriptively, is a 'divine law' (θεῖος νόμος) (see fragment 41, 'plan') which, while no doubt covering in its range the laws of physics as well as the moral law, is in the matter of conduct 'common' (ξυνός) or 'universal' in the straightforward sense of 'commanding universal obedience' (see Lausdei 81). If this is the case, the notion of 'following' what is 'common' would not seem to be particularly un-Heraclitean; the real problem lies in coping with a sentence in Sextus which does not seem fully coherent unless a phrase, something along the lines of that supplied by Bekker, has dropped out. (On this see further Kirk 57–8).

Fragment 3

Without benefit of context we can only speculate about the import of this fragment. It could be naïvely literal; it could be ironical; it could be satirical. If Heraclitus really believed that there was a brand-new sun every day (see fragment 6), it could be argued that he should be taken literally as to its apparently tiny size. But there are reasons for thinking that fragment 6 (qv) is not to be taken literally, and this suggests that fragment 3 should be read with equal caution. From Aristotle (see Kahn, n 193) we can infer that the phrase 'the sun is a foot wide' was a standard example of deceptive appearance (like 'sticks look bent in

water'), and it seems not impossible (ibid) that the very late source for this fragment, Aëtius, influenced by the example, added an explicitness to Heraclitus' remark which was never intended. According to Diogenes Laertius (9.7), Heraclitus said merely that 'the sun is the size it appears.'

Fragment 4?

This 'fragment,' if it is one, is in fact reported speech and in another language than Heraclitus' own, so it must be viewed with caution. If it is anything like what Heraclitus said, it can hardly be interpreted (pace Kirk) along the same lines as fragments 9 and 13. Only if Heraclitus had said something like 'cattle like bitter vetch rather than honey; people like honey rather than bitter vetch,' would the point have been a similar one, and there is no evidence that Heraclitus? is here saying any such thing. As it stands, the supposed statement is, if anything, contrasting the pleasures of the body and those of the (rational) soul; only possessors of the latter – ie, only human beings – can ever in the strict sense of the word be called 'happy' (*felix*). Such a view sounds suspiciously Platonic/Aristotelian, and given the lack of supporting evidence can be at best tentatively attributed to Heraclitus.

Fragment 5

This fragment attacks certain features of current religious practice in the way that Xenophanes had earlier attacked religious anthropomorphism (Xenophanes, fragments 14–16 D-K), and the same *reductio ad absurdum* technique is used. The subject is, as often, 'people' – in the sense of 'ordinary, unenlightened people.'

On the nature of 'gods and heroes' Heraclitus is here silent. But he would not have been the first or the last Greek to believe in one god and many gods simultaneously, the 'one god' (*to sophon*, 'that which is wise', fragment 108) being in effect the supreme, and ultimately the only important one in his pantheon.

With the mss, I read ἄλλως ('in vain') rather than, with D-K, ἄλλῳ ('new,' 'fresh' ⟨blood⟩).

Fragment 6

The newness of which Heraclitus speaks was presumably not absolute newness.* We have it on the authority of Diogenes Laertius (9.9) that Heraclitus believed that the celestial bodies were 'bowls' (*scaphai*), and that when a 'bright' exhalation (from the sea) collected in the bowl of the sun and began to burn, daylight was caused, and when a 'dark' one (from the earth) superseded it, there was night-time. Whether the authority of Diogenes Laertius is enough is disputed. Kirk (272) believes that for Heraclitus there was only one exhalation, from the sea (= evaporation), and that Diogenes Laertius has been misled by an intervening *Aristotelian* theory of two exhalations. If Kirk is right, one can speculate that for Heraclitus the sun was a bowl filled with combustible material, ignited and fed by evaporation, extinguished at sunset by (sea-)water, and reignited and fed the next day by further evaporation. But Diogenes Laertius's account makes sense, and is not self-evidently wrong; so the matter is probably best left open.

A hint in Plato (*Republic* 498a) suggests that Heraclitus' original sentence also had in it a reference to the sun's being 'kindled' and 'extinguished,' and the scholiast on *Republic* 498a goes on to say that for Heraclitus the kindling was at dawn and the extinguishing at sunset.

Fragment 7

Aristotle, as so often, is interpreting his predecessors in the light of his own theories; as is universally agreed, there is no need to infer from the presence of the word 'smoke' that Heraclitus has in mind Aristotle's theory of 'intermediate' exhalations. But what meaning the fragment *is* meant to convey is still far from clear. One possibility (see Kirk *ad loc*, following Patin) is that Heraclitus is being ironical: even if the world's unity were to become manifest to all (ie, by all things turning into one physical, perceptible thing – smoke), men are forever sniffing around for differences, and their noses would surely find several – even in smoke! On this interpretation we are looking at yet another instance of Heraclitus' view that mankind has a habit of miss-

* The idea is not however as strange as it seems. Xenophanes, for example, was credited with the view that 'the sun comes into being each day from little pieces of fire that collect together' (Hippolytus 1.14.3).

ing the unity amidst the diversity of things. Its possible weakness lies in the profound difficulty any commentator has in knowing just what is and what is not irony in Heraclitus' writings.

A second possibility, first espoused by Reinhardt (1916, 180, n 2) and adopted – with variations – by many scholars since (see eg, Kirk) is that the senses are indeed the source of learning (fragment 55), but are valueless without the presence of an intelligent mind to interpret them (fragment 107). To the eye smoke is uniform, to the nostrils something differentiable. Were one to accept uncritically the 'evidence' of the one, the world is a unity; of the other, a diversity; when the truth of the matter is that for Heraclitus the world is *both*.

A third possibility, which tries to take account of the heavy stress laid on the sense of smell in Heraclitus' words, is one that makes no attempt to fit the words into some putative framework of 'unity and diversity,' and runs as follows: while the senses may often deceive (fragment 107), a less often used sense can occasionally, and usefully, 'correct' the immediate impression created by another more usually reliable one. Such a sense is smell, with its sometimes extraordinary powers of discrimination.

The phrase 'τὰ ὄντα' ('reality'), so common in later philosophical Greek, is excised by Kirk and Marcovich as Aristotle's own gloss on the word 'πάντα' ('all things') on the ground that, if retained, it would be a unique usage in Heraclitus. But, as Kirk himself admits (233), the phrase (in the sense of 'reality') is found in the writings of several other pre-Socratics, and this seems a respectable enough reason for retaining it.

It should also be pointed out that, given the structure of Aristotle's sentence, we cannot be sure whether what we have here is a direct quotation, an accurate rendering of Heraclitus into reported speech, or simply a loose paraphrase. The second and third possibilities seem to me the strongest; a direct quotation would have read ἐόντα (Heraclitus' Ionic dialect-word), not ὄντα.

Fragment 8?

The 'quotation' is in fact a series of reminiscences on Aristotle's part of phrases in Heraclitus that deal with the real as a balance between opposites. The final phrase is almost certainly a paraphrase drawn from what is now fragment 80, and the middle phrase yet another paraphrase, probably of the contents of fragment 51 (qv). The first

phrase, by contrast, contains an Ionic word (*antixoun*), and may well be drawn from a generalization Heraclitus himself may have once made about the implications of, for example, the lyre and bow analogies (fragment 51).

Fragment 9

If Aristotle's opening remarks catch something of an original statement by Heraclitus that he, Aristotle, has truncated for purposes of quotation, the original might have run somewhat as follows: 'Donkeys would prefer refuse to gold; ⟨human beings would prefer gold to refuse.'⟩ Heraclitus would be emphasizing once again how the same thing produces opposite effects on different objects (see fragment 61), and the point would be: 'the same thing, gold, produces opposite effects on different objects, pleasure in human beings and distaste in donkeys; the same thing, rubbish ... etc.' (See also fragment 13: the required sense will be: 'the same thing, filth, produces opposite effects on different objects – pleasure in pigs, distaste in human beings; the same thing, water ... etc'). If this is the case, an identity-thesis need no more be foisted on Heraclitus in this instance than in fragments 61 and 13. Heraclitus is not claiming that pleasure and disgust are themselves identical because produced by the same thing (filth/gold); as is clear from fragment 88 (qv, with n), the 'sameness' of which he occasionally speaks is to be understood rather as the interconnectedness of various apparent opposites.

The meaning of σύρματα is unclear; literally, it seems to mean anything that is 'trailed' (hence possibly straw, chaff, or rubbish generally).

Fragment 10

The term 'graspings' or 'things taken together' seems to make most sense if understood as shorthand for 'things taken together ⟨by the mind⟩.' By its synoptic powers the mind can combine formal features of the real which, *prima facie*, run counter to each other. In some general way these features may have been seen by Heraclitus as 'opposites,' but they are certainly not the straightforward 'opposites' (night/day, etc) of other fragments. In talking of 'whole'/'not whole,' he seems to be distinguishing (as Kahn points out) objects in the

world from the world itself, and in so doing offering a comment on the age-old question of the one and the many. Thus any object will be a 'whole' (ie, it will be a unity subsuming a diversity), yet *not* a whole (ie, it will be itself merely one whole or unity among many in that most complete of all wholes or unities, the universe itself). In slightly different terms, an object can be seen by the mind both from the point of view of the centripetal forces that make for its unity and from that of the centrifugal forces that make for its fragmentation into parts; mind's synoptic vision grasps both the unity in diversity and the diversity in unity of things. The metaphor of consonance and dissonance seems to be employed to make a similar point (see also fragment 51): any object, such as a lyre, exists in a state of balanced tension. In the particular state of balanced tension which makes the lyre a functioning whole or unity, its finely tuned strings 'sing together' (*synaidein*); any tendency in the opposite direction (ie, towards a slackening or over-tightening of the strings) will produce a malfunction, in which the strings 'sing apart' (*diaidein*) ⟨from one another⟩. The degree of tension of the strings can be viewed either as a force for unity (right functioning/consonance) or as a force for fragmentation (malfunctioning/dissonance), and both views are legitimate and complementary.

In talking of 'wholes'/'not wholes' Heraclitus had indicated that the one exception to the rule was the universe itself, and the fragment ends with a discussion of the universe. The point seems to be: while in this instance an important formal distinction ('whole'/'not whole') cannot be made, another point – 'unity'/'multiplicity' – can, and the synoptic mind makes it (compare fragment 50: 'all things are one'). The universe itself, in a word, is the supreme illustration of both unity in diversity (see fragment 50) and diversity in unity.

As in fragment 90 (qv), there is doubt as to whether the phrase 'all things' is to be understood collectively or distributively, and consequently whether the 'one thing' is the one mass of *aethēr* obtaining after one of the world's periodic destructions by fire (*ecpyrōsis*) – the ancient, and specifically Stoic understanding of Heraclitus' cosmology – or the one, everlasting universe a portion of whose *aethēr* exists everlastingly under the form of other elements. The fragment is sufficiently ambiguous to bolster either theory, or even both (as seems to be a clear possibility also in the case of fragment 31, qv).

The question of whether to read συλλάψιες ('graspings'? 'things grasped'? 'things taken together'? 'takings together'?) or συνάψιες ('contacts'?

'things in contact'?) is notoriously controverted. With Snell, Kirk, and others, I read συλλάψιες, and understand it as subject, not predicate (see fragment 67, where ὁ θεός is similarly subject).

Fragment 11

My own inclination is to see this fragment, along with fragment 125, as a powerful metaphorical statement concerning the cosmos. The natural tendency of things, says Heraclitus (anticipating a major law of physics), is to inertia; closed systems, left alone, tend to run down. Ongoing, active intervention and sustention is by parity of reasoning needed to keep the *cosmos* – the greatest of all systems – functioning, (the Great Intervenor and Sustainer being, eternally, 'that which is wise' (fragment 108)).

A hint, usefully discussed by Battegazzore (1979), that Heraclitus wishes us to understand his statement in terms of a 'law' (*nomos*, accented on the first syllable) of reality can be found in the verb *nemetai* ('is/are driven to pasture'), cognate to which is the noun *nomos* (accented on the last syllable) ('pasture'). For similar revelatory wordplay, see fragment 48 (*bios*, 'life': *bios*, 'bow'); and for the concept of a law of the real transcending human law see fragment 114.

I accept the reading πληγῇ ('with a blow') over the mss reading τὴν γῆν ('the earth'), understanding νέμεται as 'are driven' rather than 'crop.' The reading was clearly that of John Stobaeus, and probably that of Apuleius (see Kirk *ad loc*).

Fragment 12

Notoriously, Plato portrayed Heraclitus as an exponent of a doctrine of universal flux (*Theaetetus* 160d, *Cratylus* 401d), and at *Cratylus* 402a we read: 'Heraclitus says somewhere that all things are in movement and nothing stays put, and likening the real to the flowing of a river he says that one could not step twice into the same river.' Scholars have searched diligently for such an analogy (and for such doctrine) in Heraclitus, with results that suggest that Plato has hold of at best part of the truth. The 'change' in question is not some sort of subatomic change but rather the constant change, one into the other, of the great world masses (see fragments 30, 31a, 31b), and the evidence of

fragments 12 and 91a (qv) suggests that, in talking of rivers, Heraclitus is stressing their *unity* amidst change, rather than simply their change. (In terms of syntactical possibility, in fragment 12 Heraclitus may also be referring to the sameness of the *people*, which persists despite the different waters in which they bathe, but the point [*pace* Kahn] seems trivial, and hardly part of his intention.)

Partial though Plato's interpretation of Heraclitus' river-analogy is, it is valuable in that it shows how to some at any rate of Heraclitus' early successors the application of the analogy was to something much broader than the 'exhalation' of souls. In fact, given the fragmentary material available to us, we can go even further than Plato, Cleanthes, Zeno, and Plutarch (see commentary on fragments 91a, 91b) and with some confidence apply the analogy (here and in frs. 91a, 91b, 49a) to that supreme example of 'unity amidst change' which is the cosmos itself; see fragments 50, 10. For the river is a striking example of precisely that which preserves structural identity and unity while undergoing constant and predictable change of content.

Whether Heraclitus ever said in so many words 'you cannot step twice into the same river' is disputed (see on fragment 91a). What is clear, however, is that some such (tendentious and perhaps even jocose) resume or truncated version of his unity/diversity or sameness/change doctrine was current very soon after he propounded it; we know, for example (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5, 1010a14), that Cratylus was prepared to go one better and argue that one could not step even *once* into the same river! (See commentary on fragment 91a).

Some editors accept as Heraclitean the words 'and souls also are exhaled from moisture.' This is a possibility, but it is difficult to see in what sort of context (presumably psychological) the two sentences in question could have been meaningfully juxtaposed. For this reason I tentatively follow those editors who end the fragment at 'waters flow.' However, it may well have been that in some *other* context Heraclitus did indeed talk of souls' exhalation from moisture (see the commentary on fragment 36).

Fragment 13b

This fragment should probably be compared with fragments 9 and 61, as several commentators have suggested. If, as seems possible, it is a truncated version of a broader statement that 'pigs prefer filth to clean water, ⟨people clean water to filth⟩,' it will, like fragment 61 (and

fragment 9 similarly interpreted), constitute a further example of Heraclitus' view that the same thing produces opposite effects (in this case pleasure) on different objects, or in Kahn's words, 'in an opposed pair the negative term, as defined by human needs and desire, is never wholly negative ... [it] is revealed as a positive term for another form of life.' See also fragment 37.

The 'quotation' by Athenaeus, printed in D-K, is clearly a piece of 'transference' on his own part from 'pigs' (fragment 13) to 'the pig-like.' See the commentary on fragment 37.

Fragment 14

As it stands, this fragment is not an attack on initiation rites as such (the translations of both Marcovich and Kahn mislead in this regard), but an attack on the 'impious' manner in which 'they' (the 'night-wandering wizards, etc.' if the sentence is accepted as Heraclitean) perform them. The nature of the impiousness is not spelled out, but one can speculate from fragment 15 that for Heraclitus it lies in the frequently disgusting nature (as he sees it) of the activities involved in initiation-rites when performed by such people, and (more importantly, as Kahn points out) in the intolerable, unsubstantiated claims about such things as the after-life and salvation that such persons tend to propound. As fabricators of falsehoods such wizards, etc will not 'escape the notice of that which never sets' (fragment 16), and will ultimately be punished by the goddess Justice (fragment 28b). Given the close relationship between Dike (Justice) and Zeus, and for Heraclitus the apparent identity of Zeus and the fiery *aethēr* (see commentary on fragment 16), it is easy to see how Clement could take the 'punishment' of wizards, etc to be some sort of individual obliteration by fire (*ecpyrōsis*) akin to burning in hell. But it is doubtful whether Heraclitus himself would have made any such claim; if anything, he believes that *all things* (fragment 66) – other than *aethēr* – will be 'punished' in the end by fire.

The extent of the fragment is in doubt; some think the sentence 'For night-wandering . . . initiates' is part of the quotation from Heraclitus, others that this is a splenetic outburst on the part of Clement himself. What can be said with assurance is that: (1) such a 'context' for the genuine quotation is a not unsuitable one, for Heraclitus or for anyone else; (2) much of the

language used in the sentence (if not all of it) is as likely to have been used by Heraclitus as by Clement. For 'Lenaeans,' for example, see fragment 15, where the verbal form is used; and for a fifth/fourth-century use of a 'mystical' sense of βάκχοι and μύσται, something like 'elect and initiated,' see Kahn (*ad loc* and nn 296, 381).

On these grounds the quotation can be cautiously accepted, in outline if not in every detail, as Heraclitus' angry list of people who act 'impiously' when performing initiation-rites.

Fragment 15

The opening statement seems to be saying that participants in phallic rites in honour of the god Dionysus, while acting in a manner intrinsically disgusting,* are redeemed by the fact that they *are* none the less honouring Dionysus (the god of, appropriately, sexual vigour and exuberance). (Compare fragment 14, where the way in which initiation-rites are conducted by certain people, rather than initiation-rites as such, is attacked.) The next sentence, however, is more troublesome. Is Dionysus to be equated with life and Hades, god of the underworld, with death? This is a reasonable assumption, and one made by many; the further claim that they are 'one and the same' can then be unpacked, in Freudian terms, as a claim that the desire to reproduce oneself and the death-wish are (did we but know it) 'one and the same ⟨impulse⟩.' (The 'they' who celebrate the rites of Dionysus/Hades are, as so often in Heraclitus, 'people,' or 'unsophisticated people.')

Such an interpretation makes fair sense, but may be somewhat overstating Heraclitus' claim. As seems clear from fragments 60 and 88 (qv, with commentary), Heraclitus' use of the term 'the same' in no way implies commitment to some supposed doctrine of the 'identity of opposites.' At best it suggests a doctrine of 'perspectival identity' (= *interconnectedness* of apparent opposites), and such seems to be the case here as well. The perspectival identity in this case is probably

* The Lenaean festival is, as Kahn points out, here clearly characterized as an orgiastic festival (in honour of Dionysus). While wine was no doubt drunk in quantity at such a festival, Heraclitus is at pains to stress the frenzied and orgiastic (ie, 'Dionysiac') behaviour of the participants, not simply their drunkenness. But drunkenness (however 'inspired') there undoubtedly was, and the assumption of its existence – and consequences – seems necessary for a complete understanding of Heraclitus' remarks.

that which exists between the drunken couplings at Dionysiac festivals viewed as an act productive of life (ie, another life), and hence as an act of worship of the life-god, and the same viewed as an act productive of death (i.e., the death of one's own *psychē* ('soul') by drowning; see fragments 36, 117, 118), and hence as an act of worship of the death-god. Hades and Dionysus, on this interpretation, are 'the same' in the sense that one and the same act turns out to be an unwitting act of worship of both. As Heraclitus puts it in fragment 88, 'as ⟨one and⟩ the same thing, there is present ⟨in us?⟩ living and dead.' *Soul* is the most likely candidate for such a description, in moments of drunkenness and Dionysiac frenzy alive *qua* life-principle and reproductive force, but dead or near death *qua* rational and directive force.

Heraclitus can make his claim not least because Greek offers him the possibility of a number of verbal echoes not reproducible in English; in Kahn's words, 'the identification of Dionysus and Hades, fertility and insanity, is mediated by verbal connections between genitals (*aidoia*), shame (*aidōs*), shamelessness (*anaidestata* [literally, most shamelessly, TMR]), and Hades (*Aidēs*).' Whether anything can be also inferred from an etymological derivation of Hades as meaning 'un-seen' (*a-idēs*) seems however doubtful.

The phrase εἰ . . . μὴ is interpreted by most scholars (including this editor) 'if . . . not' (*si . . . non*) rather than (with Marcovich following Schleiermacher) 'unless' (*nisi*) (both interpretations are syntactically possible).

Fragment 16

We know (see Kirk's discussion) that Helios, the sun-god, was frequently involved as a witness of oaths: see Homer, *Iliad* 3.277, where he is addressed with the words, 'thou see-est and hearest all things.' So it is a safe assumption that Heraclitus' readers would have sensed a contrasting reference to Helios in the words 'escape the notice of' and 'that which *never* sets.' As for 'that which never sets,' it seems most naturally understood as that divine and immortal *aethēr* which, as director and organizer of the cosmos and its processes, controls Helios too. The point presumably is that the sun has us in view only in the daylight hours; when it goes beneath the earth, the all-encompassing *aethēr*, which Heraclitus seems to equate with that 'one wise thing which is not willing and willing to be called by the name Zeus' (fragment 32), continues to beam on us its own ever-seeing eye

(for the notion of Zeus as surveyor of all see, eg, Homer, *Odyssey* 13.213–14; Hesiod, *Works and Days* 267–8; Sophocles, *Electra* 175).

The whole fragment seems most naturally interpreted in terms of our inability to escape the *justice* of *aethēr*/that which is wise/Zeus, rather than (as Gigon and others have supposed) our inability to escape conflagration (*ecpyrōsis*). As Kirk points out, Zeus and Dike (Justice) were very much connected in popular thought (see Hesiod, *Works and Days* 256ff, where Dike, daughter of Zeus, sits next to his throne and 'oversees the affairs of mankind'), and significantly, in fragment 94, it is said to be the 'ministers of Dike' who see to it that the sun(god) does not 'overstep his measures.'

Fragment 17

This fragment is most naturally taken in conjunction with fragments 1–2. It is interestingly different from them in structure in that it makes its point by ridiculing accepted wisdom, as expounded by different Greek poets. The first phrase clearly attacks a famous, though somewhat obscure fragment of Archilochus (68 Diehl, 116 Lasserre) which Heraclitus, who had the advantage of knowing the context, seems to have taken to mean 'and they (ie, people) understand the sorts of thing they encounter ⟨in day-to-day life?⟩.' The second takes issue with Hesiod's claim (*Works and Days* 218) that a fool recognizes the consequences of crime after being punished (literally, 'suffering') for it (the word *pathein* can mean 'to suffer' and 'to experience'). For Heraclitus 'comprehension' or 'insight' (*gnōmē*: see fragment 78) is of course confined to himself and the few who are on a similar wavelength.

Fragment 18

My own inclination is to understand the subject of the first part of the sentence as something like 'the conscientious enquirer' (see fragment 35, *historas*), and to take the next phrase as catching something of both 'expecting the unexpected' *and* 'hoping for the hopeless,' in the possible senses mentioned above (the verb *elpizein* is notoriously ambiguous on the matter). The object of the discovery is most naturally taken as '[it]' in the sense of 'the truth' or 'the real' or both. As Heraclitus puts it elsewhere (fragment 123), '⟨a thing's?/the world's?⟩ real constitution has a tendency to conceal itself.'

The subject of Heraclitus' first sentence is unclear; most scholars understand it as 'one' or 'a person.' The next phrase is also obscure; is Heraclitus talking about 'expecting the unexpected' (in the sense, perhaps, of always being prepared for the unexpected) or 'hoping for the hopeless' (in the sense perhaps of 'hoping against hope' for eventual understanding)? And what, finally, is the (unstated) object of the subject's 'discovery'?

Fragment 19

This fragment is doubted by Marcovich, on the grounds that it sounds like a vague paraphrase of part of fragment 1. But this is in turn based on the assumption that the subject of the sentence is 'people in general,' or some such phrase, against the clear statement of Clement, who had the benefit of knowing the context, that the fragment refers to *'certain* people' (*tinas*). It is, therefore, hazardous to see it as applying to people in general, and hence as one more Heraclitean attack on that large majority of people for whom he seems to have felt such contempt. The evidence of, eg, fragments 40, 42, 56, 57, and 129 suggests rather that he may have had in mind a number of his poetic and philosophical predecessors.

To what cannot 'certain people' listen? Perhaps to the *logos* spoken by the real, if it is part of Heraclitus' argument that their souls do not understand its language (fragment 107). And if they cannot hear it, they also cannot voice it (*eipein*) for others.

Fragment 20

The language in which this fragment is couched makes interpretation hazardous. Heraclitus's meaning may be somewhat as follows: '⟨Were they given a choice, people would, if they could foresee their life on earth, choose not to be born at all⟩. Once born, however, they consent to live and face (literally, 'have') their fate(s) [ie, the shocks that flesh is heir to, with death to follow], and they leave behind them children to become ⟨in their turn subject to their own particular⟩ fate' (literally, 'to become fates').

Some commentators interpret the fragment as an attack by the aristocratic Heraclitus on the majority of his countrymen, thoughtlessly reproducing themselves and squandering their lives. But such seems to be neither a necessary nor a natural interpretation. As it stands, the fragment is much more straightforwardly taken as a statement on the

pathos of the human condition – a type of statement not normally ascribed by commentators to Heraclitus, but one certainly not out of keeping with what we think we know of the rest of his views.

The term μόρος (used twice) is difficult to interpret. Basically it means 'portion,' 'part,' 'share,' or 'lot,' in the sense of one's 'allotted share' or 'allotted portion' (of life/goods/happiness) from the gods; it then comes to mean specifically one's 'lot' in the sense of one's fate, and specifically that feature of one's fate which consists of death. In this fragment I understand it to refer in both instances to fate, on the grounds that the verb ἐλπίζειν is being used, as so often (see LSJ, sv), to express consent rather than active desire. (The phrase, 'or rather: "fall asleep"' is, of course, an 'aside' by Clement.)

I understand the final phrase of the fragment to be one of purpose. Many scholars take it as an infinitive of consequence without ὥστε, with μόρους as subject rather than complement of the clause in question; the meaning would then be, 'so that Death does not die out' (Reinhardt), 'so that new Death gets born' (Snell), 'so that (new) dooms become' (Marcovich), etc. This in terms of content perhaps amounts to much the same thing as taking the infinitive as one of purpose, but linguistically it seems without parallel, and should for that reason probably be rejected.

Fragment 21

As it stands, the fragment is tantalizingly obscure, leading us to expect a statement on life, in strong contrast with that on death, but not ending up doing so. For this reason even what Heraclitus means here by 'death' is obscure; without benefit of an intelligibly completed sentence, we cannot know whether he is talking about *instances* of death, or a generalized *state* of death, or something else again. The fragment clearly relates in some way to fragment 26, but the connection remains an obscure one.

The last word of this fragment, ὕπνος ('sleep'), makes little sense, and is probably corrupt. The two most interesting attempts at interpretation seem to me those of D-K (who retain it) and Marcovich (who excises it).

1 DIELS: 'Death is what we see when awake, sleep what we see when asleep, ⟨and life what we see when dead⟩.'
2 MARCOVICH: 'Death is what we see when awake, and what we see when asleep is *waking* reality (ὕπαρ).'

A third possibility is as in interpretation 1, but with ἐνύπνιον ('a dream') rather than ὕπνος ('sleep').

Fragment 22

This fragment is read most usefully in conjunction with fragments 18, 35, and 123, as Kahn suggests. It is, it seems, a cautionary tale (against overambitious expectations) for would-be enquirers into the real; knowledge ('gold') is attained by careful work and effort, not by some blinding flash from on high, and even then, when it is found, it turns out to be something less wide or comprehensive than one had hoped or imagined. (The contrast seems to be between the large amount (*pollēn*) of earth dug up and the small amount (*oligon*) of gold discovered.)

Fragment 23

Dikē (cf fragments 28, 80, 94) seems to be used here in the sense of the judge's decision or 'indication,' and also of the 'right way' (of action) that such a decision would suggest had been contravened. Heraclitus' line of thinking seems to be: concepts, like actions/events/states of affairs, can show evidence of 'necessary interconnectedness,' and a good example is the couplet *adikia/dikē* ('the non-indicated way,' 'injustice'/'the indicated way,' 'justice'). The point of the fragment seems to be that the judge can talk meaningfully of the 'right way' (ie, the just way) only to a public sufficiently acquainted with the *non*–right way (ie, the acts of injustice apparently denoted by the phrase 'these things') to appreciate its import. Without such acquaintance, even the name 'right way' (let alone its implications for action) would be unintelligible.

The reading 'would know,' 'would be acquainted with' (ἤδεσαν), is a conjecture of Sylburg, accepted by most editors over the meaningless 'would have bound' (ἔδησαν) of the mss. The subject of the sentence is unclear; most editors assume it is 'people' in general, as so often in Heraclitus. The referent of 'these things' is also unclear. Some see it as 'the laws' or 'Law,' and the subsequent mention by Clement of Socrates' views on law might appear to support this view. But if this is the case, no obvious sense can be made of Heraclitus' remarks. More likely 'these things' are acts of

injustice, etc, in view of which people come to recognize the 'right way' of action.

Fragment 24

For the sentiment (as far as mankind at any rate is concerned) see, eg, the poet Tyrtaeus, fragment 9.23–34. Why exactly gods honour those slain in war, and in what way they honour them, is not discussed; nor is it clear why Heraclitus chose the formulaic 'slain by Ares' over the simpler 'slain in war.' One can speculate, however, that one of the forms of reward is in fact conversion to the status of demigod in the after-life; see fragments 53 and (perhaps) 63, and (on the general relationship between death and destiny) fragment 25.

Fragment 25

The Greek sentence is neatly chiastic in structure, and exploits the common etymological origin of the nouns *moros* (see fragment 20) and *moira*. Both ultimately mean a 'share' apportioned to us by the gods, and both, by extension, can be used of that 'lot' or 'fate' which is a) our quality of life till death intervenes; b) the nature of our death; and (c) our 'destiny' *after* death. In this fragment Heraclitus seems to be suggesting a correlation between the quality of our death and the nature of the 'reward' we win for this life. If fragment 24 is to be our guide, he is perhaps hinting at what must have been a widely held military/aristrocratic ideal (see Tyrtaeus, fragment 9.23–34, usefully quoted by Kahn): a 'greater' (or 'better') death is one that occurs in battle. The reward will be twofold (fragment 24): esteem among those who live on (fragment 29) and the possibly immortal life of a demigod (see fragments 53 and perhaps 62) in some after-life.

Heraclitus may, however, be generalizing somewhat beyond the military/aristocratic ideal, and in that case the statement may be stressing the causal relationship between the rewards enjoyed in some kind of after-life and *any* noble type of death. But it should be pointed out that he offers no details on the *nature* of such rewards, except for what seems the specific promise of divinity and immortality for certain people (fragments 53, 62). Such a view is, of course, in line with the Orphic view that certain virtuous souls will finally break from the 'weary wheel of birth and death'; and the famous river-analogy can

also be read, not unintelligibly, in terms of reincarnation. But this would be flimsy grounds for attributing to Heraclitus a fully fledged commitment to Orphism in all its details – a commitment which would be profoundly difficult to reconcile with the spirit of the rest of his philosophy as it has come down to us, and one which, in the all-important matter of the *details* of the after-life, the evidence of fragment 27 (qv) suggests strongly that he rejected.

Fragment 26

This is one of the most puzzling of the fragments, drawing its apparent force, as so often in Heraclitus, from the exploitation of an ambiguity (*haptesthai* = (a) touch, (b) kindle, strike ⟨for oneself⟩). Any attempt at interpretation must base itself on certain assumptions, the main one being whether the 'night' in question is to be understood literally or as the 'night of death' (Clement). I am myself inclined to take it, following Clement, as the 'night of death.' If this is what Heraclitus had in mind, the rest of the fragment can be plausibly interpreted as the description of a form of 'continuity' (*haphē*, literally 'contact'; cf *haptesthai*) that constitutes a cycle closely analogous to the everlasting cycle of change of the great world-masses (fragment 31).

The point is made clearer if one takes Heraclitus' assertions in reverse order. Our waking selves and our sleeping selves are, as Heraclitus might well have expressed it (fragments 60, 88), 'one and the same.' In terms of the cyclical metaphor, there is no break between them, ie, no break in their continuity. The continuity is also such that

soul of the awake person in this world is describable as being at the furthest possible remove from, in the sense of 'most dissimilar in *state* to,' the soul of that same person when dead, and closest of all to, in the sense of 'most *similar* in state to,' the soul of that same person when asleep. The same can be said for the continuity between the soul of the living person and the soul of the same person when dead; it is once again one and the same soul, but the two 'states' thereof are the most similar to each other of all possible states of soul and thus, in terms of the cyclical metaphor, in closest 'contact' with each other.

At d ath (ie, at the time of separation of soul and body), the soul, which with the loss of physical sight loses contact with this world, establishes immediate contact, without break in the continuity, with the obscure world beyond by means of its *own* organ of vision (what Plato will later call 'the eye of the soul,' *Republic* 7.518c, 519b); in terms

of Heraclitus' own metaphor, the 'striking up (*haptesthai*) of the light' (always there but only lit on the occasion it is needed) and the 'striking up of *contact*' (*haptesthai*) with the next world are one and the same activity, and the soul in question one and the same soul, in 'separate' states that are in fact continuous with one another.

The circularity of the soul's progression, like that of the changing world-masses, rather than its rectilinear progression (towards its extinction) is the crucial point that Heraclitus wishes to make. For the life of the soul *là-bas* is precisely one which is 'continuous' with the waking life of that same soul upon reincarnation (which is where this discussion began); and so on. (On Heraclitus' apparent belief in reincarnation see the commentary on fragment 63.)

The text as we have it in Clement seems to incorporate one of his own glosses (ἀποθανών), which with most editors I delete, along with one fairly transparent piece of dittography.

Fragment 27

Two slightly different interpretations of this fragment are possible, depending on whether one understands *elpontai* to mean 'expect' or 'are hoping for' (both are in theory possible). If the latter is Heraclitus' intention, the surprises in question are presumably unpleasant ones, and the 'people' to whom he refers will be the (unenlightened) *majority* of people. But this interpretation seems unnecessarily restrictive. The reference to 'people' seems to be a quite generic one, and will presumably include those, for example, who die in battle (see fragments 24, 25, 53, and possibly 63), who after all are no more likely than anyone else to have an understanding of the *logos*, and may in consequence be *pleasantly* surprised at what happens to them in the hereafter. Heraclitus' point seems to be the straightforward one that life after death is different from what people expect and imagine; further discussion of the matter, as so often, he tantalizingly avoids. One inference can, however, fairly be drawn from this and other fragments: his conviction of the misleading nature, if not downright falsity, of the detailed accounts of the afterlife prevalent in contemporary Orphism. (Whether this makes him anti-Orphic in all other respects is, however, another question; see the commentary on fragment 25, end).

Fragment 28a

The sentence reads literally: 'The most esteemed ascertains – holds fast to – things seeming.' As so often, Heraclitus reinforces his point by a piece of word-play not paralleled in English, juxtaposing *dokein* ('to seem') and *dokimōtatos* ('most reputable,' 'most esteemed') (see Parmenides, fragment 1.31–2 for a similar piece of punning). The general thesis is one that reappears in fragment 17 (it will be noticed that the same verb, *dokein*, is used), and one made forcibly by both Xenophanes (fragment 34) and Parmenides: for the unenlightened majority the world is one of 'seeming' or 'appearance' (the same word in Greek) only, not one of genuine knowledge or ascertainment (*gnōsis*). The particular point Heraclitus is making here is that mere reputation does not create an exception to this rule.

The word *ginōskei* ('ascertains,' 'recognizes') is of course being used here ironically. For striking instances of similar epistemological 'success' words used in contexts denoting epistemological failure see Parmenides fragments 16.2 (*noos*), 2.2 (*noēsai*), and 6.6 (*plakton noon*) (Mourelatos 1970, 175).

Fragment 28b

This statement (which Clement links, unconvincingly, with fragment 28a) should be compared with fragment 94, where the 'ministers' of Justice are seen to operate also on a cosmic plane. Who the 'fabricators of falsehoods,' etc are is unclear. The reference could be generic or, as some have suggested, specific to, for example, Pythagoras, 'wizards,' and other Heraclitean bogey-men (see fragments 81, 129).

The nature of the retribution – whether here or in some after-life – is not disclosed; if it comes in the after-life, it will be presumably what was neither 'expected nor imagined' (fragment 27)!

Fragment 29

The fragment may, but does not necessarily, refer to death in battle as the source of the 'glory' in question; it should be compared with fragment 90, where a parallel *cosmic* 'exchange' is enunciated.

Some understand an ἀντὶ before θνητῶν ('instead of mortal things'), as in the preceding phrase, but a subjective genitive ('from mortals,' in the sense of 'in the eyes of mortals') seems more natural as a piece of Greek.

(The subjective genitive is not, *pace* Marcovich, out of keeping with fragment 24; the fact that gods honour those killed in battle is no argument that such honour heads the priority list of the deceased themselves.)

Fragment 30

Cosmos meaning 'ordered world' is to be found in Anaxagoras, fragment 8 and Diogenes of Apollonia, fragment 2, and *cosmos* meaning simply 'world' is to be found in Empedocles, fragment 134.5. So it seems not at all unlikely that Heraclitus, writing barely a generation earlier, was using the word in similar fashion (its earlier meaning was 'pattern,' 'adornment,' and 'order' of a particular type). The ordered world in question is a given (and is in that sense 'the same') for all people/all things, like the single universe and the shared 'account' thereof (fragment 2). It is a sempiternally ordered world, not something 'made' at some putative point in past 'time' by a divinity (the reference to 'man' is simply formulaic), and in its unceasing process differs crucially from Parmenides' eternal, unchanging *eon*, to which only the term 'is' is meaningfully applicable (fragment 8.5).

This ordered world is also described as 'fire,' and the most natural sense of this is surely that it is *composed of* fire (not simply, as some would have Heraclitus say, that its 'ordered processes' are in some way *symbolized* by the activity of fire). The fire is described as 'ever-living,' a term in keeping with the hylozoic tradition of which Heraclitus, like most of the pre-Socratics, is an integral part. But the further assertion of its being kindled and put out 'in measures' has caused problems. In antiquity it seemed obvious to Theophrastus (*De physicorum opinionibus*, fragment 1, 22 A 5 D-K; see below, p 99) that Heraclitus was speaking of *serial* kindling and quenching, and the view was adopted as canonical by the Stoics and is still accepted as correct by several recent commentators. On this reading the 'measures' in question are measured periods of time, and our world is basically *constituted* of fire, from which it comes, and into which it in due course returns, to be reborn as a variegated world still later, etc (the so-called *ecpyrōsis* or 'conflagration' theory of the Stoics). The reading has been attacked in recent times (for a useful discussion see Kahn 147ff) on the grounds that the word 'measures' can and should be understood

quantitatively (ie, as 'volumes'), and fragment 31 (qv) is usually adduced in support of the interpretation. On this view the world is a 'fire' in the sense that so much of it is at any one time still 'alight' that the whole, like a partly-lit bonfire, can be fairly described as 'on fire,' even though simultaneously the rest of it will be accurately describable as being (for the moment) '⟨burnt⟩ out'; with the passage of time the part(s) now alight will be once again burnt out, and the parts now burnt out (re-)kindled, and so on forever. The simile of the bonfire here is, of course, an imperfect one; there is nothing in Heraclitus to suggest that the world consists of some sort of combustible *Urstoff* which is serially or simultaneously alight and not alight; fire is *itself*, apparently, the *Urstoff* (see fragment 31).

There seems to be no fully acceptable way of solving the problem of how the word 'measures' is to be understood; fragment 31 (qv, with discussion) can be and is used by each side in the controversy to substantiate its case, and the matter is not ultimately important. On either interpretation (or a combination of both)* the existence of that *rational pattern of order* which direction by 'that which is wise' would seem to entail is clearly in evidence, and such is surely the main point that Heraclitus has in mind.

Why is 'fire' chosen by Heraclitus as the world's *Urstoff*, rather than, say, Anaximenes' 'air'? A plausible answer can be offered only if one assumes that the fire in question is *aethēr*, that purified form of fire which was thought by many to fill the upper sky and to be the material from which the celestial bodies were made. Like them (and unlike, say, fire in the grate, which, as many have pointed out, has no more obvious claim to supremacy than has any other natural body), it was considered divine, and immortal, and the *locus* from which the universe was directed. Given its characteristics of divinity and universality (characteristics earlier on attributed by Anaximenes to his *Urstoff*, 'air,' and by Anaximander to his, the *apeiron*), it could be claimed as at once (1) a material constituent of the universe, (2) the *prime* material constituent of the universe (and, as such, an example of what Aristotle was later to call a 'first principle,' or 'basic constituent' of things, its *archē*), and (3) the *directive force* – since it was of course also rational, being divine – eternally organizing and controlling the natural changes of elements one into another in a coherent and predictable fashion. It also has the advantage of serving as a striking *symbol* for cosmic change, everlastingly consuming fuel and everlastingly emitting

* For detailed discussion see the commentary on fragments 31a and 31b.

smoke and heat, as several have suggested, while itself remaining everlastingly the same, stable amidst change. Finally, in Aristotle's words (*De anima* A 2, 405a27), fire is the most 'non-bodily' of the elements and in constant flux, thus laying claim to being the most likely of the elements to act as the motive force in natural change.

τόνδε, found only in Plutarch and Simplicius, looks suspiciously like an insertion; κόσμος without an article to mean 'the world' was no doubt thought problematic. Plutarch and Simplicius also omit the phrase τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων, no doubt assuming it was some sort of gloss that had invaded the text. It must be conceded that it does indeed look like a gloss, but it still yields a perfectly acceptable sense, particularly if ἁπάντων is understood as 'all mankind' rather than 'all things.' (Both interpretations are grammatically possible.)

The formula 'was/is/will be' looks almost certainly existential, so with Bollack and Wismann I print a comma after ἔσται (the colon that H. Gomperz and others have inserted seems unnecessarily drastic).

Fragments 31a and 31b

These fragments purport to be about what fire 'turns into' at its ultimate 'turning points' (*tropai*) and what sea and earth, fire's *tropai*, *themselves* turn into. Whether the movement is synchronic or diachronic or both is disputed (see the commentary on fragment 30); I myself see no difficulty in believing that for Heraclitus it was both. If one could at any instant 'photograph' Heraclitus' universe, it might in terms of the volumes of matter in the world look something like table 1 (the proportions are arbitrarily chosen):

Table 1

(fire) *aethēr*	1/2
air	1/4
sea	1/8
earth	1/8

At this particular instant 1/2 of the volume of matter in the universe consists of *aethēr*. Of the world's remaining volume of matter 1/16 is on the path 'downward' to air, 1/16 on the path 'upward' to *aethēr*, maintaining the proportion of *aethēr* at 1/2 the volume of the whole. Air is

simultaneously in process, a portion of its mass (= 1/16 that of the universe) coming from and being converted into *aethēr*, a portion coming from and being converted into sea; and so is sea, 1/2 of its mass (= 1/16 of that of the universe) coming from and being converted into air, 1/2 coming from and being converted into earth. Finally, earth itself, consisting, like sea, of 1/8 of the volume of matter in the universe, is in process, 1/2 of its mass (= 1/16 of that of the universe) coming from and being converted into sea. If the steady state interpretation of Heraclitus' cosmology is correct, a 'photograph' of the universe will always show something like what appears in table 1; the ratio (whether the one I have suggested or some other) between the four* elements will always remain the same, thanks to the operation of a fixed conversion-formula. But what if the steady state theory is false – as I believe it is – and the conflagration (*ecpyrōsis*) theory right? This will mean that the state of affairs envisaged in table 1 is an illusion created by still-photography; such a state of affairs would only in fact obtain for that one instant when *aethēr* and all other forms of matter in the universe were in exactly equal balance. At any other time (a) during the 'upward' path (towards *ecpyrōsis*) the portion of *aethēr* being transmogrified into air is becoming progressively less than the portion of matter being transmogrified into *aethēr*; while (b) during the 'downward' path (towards the variegated world of space-time) the portion of *aethēr* being transmogrified into air is becoming progressively greater than the portion of matter being transmogrified from air into *aethēr*.

Table 2 attempts to illustrate this 'sliding shift.' Stage (a) represents a point at which *aethēr* constitutes, say, 9/10 of the volume of matter in the universe. At this stage, on a steady-state analysis, *aethēr* is conjecturally receiving 1/80 of the volume of matter from air into itself, and giving back 1/80 of the volume of matter to air; on the assumption that sea and earth each constitute 1/40 of the whole, the same volume of matter (1/80 of the whole) is undoubtedly being given and taken by earth ('of sea half ⟨is⟩ earth' and vice versa, 31a), and likewise given and taken twice (understanding 'burner' as ignited air) by air and sea. But, in fact, the 'sliding shift' is in continuous operation in the uni-

* With the Stoics (whom Kahn follows) and against many modern commentators, I assume that air was one of Heraclitus' elements, as it was for his Milesian forebears. The straightforward reason for his omitting to mention it in fragment 31 is the fact that such mention was irrelevant to his purpose; the *tropai* of fire are not the *next-most* turning-points of fire, but rather the *ultimate* turning-points of fire (via, no doubt, the intermediate turning-point, the stage constituted of air). On the whole question see Kahn 154.

Table 2

(a)	*aethēr*	9/10	
	air	1/20	
	sea	1/40	
	earth	1/40	
(b)	*aethēr*	19/20	↑
	air	1/40	|
	sea	1/80	|
	earth	1/80	|
(c)	*aethēr*	4/5	|
	air	1/10	|
	sea	1/20	|
	earth	1/20	↓

verse, and stages (b) and (c) are illustrative of this. On the 'upward' path, stage (b), the matter given over by *aethēr* to air has shifted from 1/80 to 1/160 of the total volume of matter, triggering a similar shift to 1/160 of the volume of matter in the interchanges of air, sea, and earth, and making *aethēr* as a consequence now 19/20 of the total volume of matter. On the 'downward' path, stage (c), the matter given over by *aethēr* to air has shifted from 1/80 to 1/40 of the total volume of matter, triggering a similar shift to 1/40 of the volume of matter in the interchanges of air, sea, and earth, and making *aethēr* as a consequence now only 4/5 of the total volume of matter.

On this understanding of Heraclitus' system, the notions of 'upward' and 'downward' cosmological paths will refer both to the *synchronic* movement of elemental masses at least partly visible to the eye in such processes as evaporation (sea to air) and condensation (air to sea) and to the *diachronic* movement of the whole universe in the alternating directions of *ecpyrōsis* and the elemental division of the world of space-time, the 'poles' of which are *aethēr* and our own region of 'earth' and 'sea.'

Just what a 'burner' was for Heraclitus is disputed, but a survey of the evidence (see, eg, Kirk and Kahn) suggests that it was probably a term for a bolt of lightning (the noun is formed from the verb 'to burn'). Why does Heraclitus talk of such a thing here? One possibility is a desire on his part to stress, in a single vivid phrase, something of the *violence* frequently attending the change from sea to air to *aethēr*

and vice versa (by contrast with the slow and relatively gentle change from sea to earth and vice versa). A time of storm is usually one in which the water-cycle is most evident: an abnormal build-up of heat eventually induces, by evaporation, an abnormal build-up of clouds and a storm breaks out. In that storm some of the clouds become *aethēr* and some are dissipated as rain. Simultaneously, *aethēr* is itself changing in part to air as part of the downward cycle, and something of that change is actually visible as lightning-bolts descending through the clouds. As Heraclitus sees it, what 'makes' such lightning-bolts is ultimately the sea; by its transformation into air it both feeds and replenishes *aethēr* and serves as the triggering mechanism for further, and frequently tempestuous re-transformation of such *aethēr* into air.

A further, natural reason for talk of lightning-bolts here is to indicate the divine power of *aethēr* as guide and controller of the cosmic process. This is suggested in another place (fragment 64), where Heraclitus talks of 'thunderbolt' as 'steering' all things; any Greek reader would of course have picked up a reference to Zeus, a symbol of whose power the thunderbolt was. If, as seems very probable, the divine and immortal *aethēr* was one and the same as Heraclitus' 'one wise thing, unwilling and willing to be called by the name Zeus' (fragment 32), then the *power* of Zeus, god of the bright *aethēr* (fragment 120), would be naturally expressed by what appeared to emanate violently from it – the thunderbolt and the lightning flash.

If Heraclitus did believe in a periodic conflagration of the cosmos, a time-period for this may have been 10,800 years, what he apparently called a 'Great Year' (D-K A 13). But so specific a conception may in fact be a Stoic importation, and should be treated with caution. (For contrasting views on the matter see Marcovich 347ff, who collects varying interpretations and expresses his own scepticism, and Kahn 156–7, who inclines to the view that the conception is in fact Heraclitean.)

As Kahn usefully points out, τροπή from Homer to Herodotus tends to mean (1) a 'rout' in battle, when the enemy 'turns and runs,' (2) the 'turnings' of the sun at solstice (ie, 'its limits in an annual oscillation, marking the seasons of the year'). So τροπαί here will almost certainly refer to *'extreme points* (my italics) in some kind of oscillation.' Many editors insert ⟨γῆ⟩ ('earth') as a subject for the second sentence, but this seems unnecessary; in context the subject seems readily understandable as '⟨that proportion or amount (*logos*) of⟩ sea which has turned into earth' (Kahn, following Reinhardt and Snell).

Fragment 32

That this fragment refers to what might be called Heraclitus' 'supreme divinity' is not disputed. But some problems remain. Is the adverb *monon* ('only') to be understood with the subject ('only one thing – the wise thing,' or 'one thing, the only ⟨truly⟩ *wise* thing') or with some aspect or aspects of the predicate, or perhaps with both? (For a similar instance of possibly intentional ambiguity see the use of *aiei*, 'always,' 'everlastingly' in fragment 1). As Kahn usefully points out, several possibilities converge to furnish a dense, pregnant sense. Three seem to me important, the first and third really conflating to reduce the number to two.

1 Only one thing – the wise thing' ...
2 One thing, the only ⟨truly⟩ wise thing' ...
3 ... the only thing ... to be called by the name Zeus.'

Of these senses (2) seems to me the dominant one and (3) to serve as a rider: (2) the only ⟨truly⟩ wise thing in the world is a single thing (*aethēr*, thunderbolt), 'set apart from all' (fragment 108). (Human wisdom, by contrast, consists at best in recognition of the existence and operations of such a wise thing; see fragments 108, 112). As a single *thing* (*hen*, the neuter form of 'one') rather than a single person (*heis*, the masculine form of 'one'), it is of course *un*willing to be called by the name Zeus; in this Heraclitus follows Xenophanes in rejecting anthropomorphic accounts of his supreme principle. As an *intelligent* thing, however, it actually shares an important characteristic, thinks Heraclitus, with persons; as such it will indeed tolerate an anthropomorphic description of itself and be willing to be called by the name Zeus. And there is in fact (3) no *other* candidate for the dual description!

A syntactically possible sense (4), '... to be called only by the name *Zeus*' (Kahn), can probably be dismissed.

The choice of the genitive 'Zēnos,' rather than 'Dios,' for the name Zeus may have been deliberate, but this is hard to know (the form is found constantly in early Greek literature, without apparent significance). If it *was* deliberate, it can be and has been argued that Heraclitus saw the verb 'to live' (*zēn*) in the word, and found it particularly appropriate, since his supreme principle is precisely what keeps the universe 'alive' (a view of the universe to which, of course, as a hylozoist he was profoundly committed; see fragment 30, 'ever-living fire').

Fragment 33

This fragment presents a number of ambiguities. Is Heraclitus talking about 'law' or 'custom' or both ('*nomos*' covers both possibililities)? And is the 'one' in question to be understood as one person, one divine principle, or both?

Without benefit of context one can speculate that the fragment is cosmological in import, and is talking of the obligation of obedience to that 'one thing, the wise thing, which is not willing and willing to be called by the name Zeus' (fragment 32), an obligation we are under in addition to (*kai*) our obligation to obey such bodies as the Council (*Boulē*) of our *polis*.

For such an interpretation to be valid, it must be assumed that a reference to *to sophon* ('the wise thing') either preceded or immediately followed the fragment, or both. If such seems too much to assume, a straightforward political interpretation in terms of custom/law to obey the counsel of one man is a clear alternative. '⟨While it is normal,' the full argument would run, 'that respect/obedience should be shown for the advice (*boulē*) of, for example, that Council (*Boulē*) which directs the *polis*, there will be times when⟩ custom/law also dictates respect/obedience for the advice of a *single* man.' Elsewhere Heraclitus talks of one who is *aristos* ('very good') as being for him 'like ten thousand' (fragment 49), and clear candidates for the title would be Bias of Priene (fragment 39) and Hermodorus of Ephesus (fragment 121). If Heraclitus is thinking of such, his argument, one must assume, is that on occasion the advice offered by a single wise individual such as these is identical to if not superior to the advice offered by a Council after careful consideration, the taking of votes, etc, so why not treat it with at least as much respect?

A final possibility is that the fragment was meant to sustain both the political and the cosmological interpretations. If this is the case, the argument would run somewhat as follows: '⟨While it is normal that respect/obedience should be shown for the advice (*boulē*) of governing *groups* of individuals, for example, that Council (*Boulē*) which directs the polis⟩, custom/law *also* dictates respect/obedience for the advice/plan of an *individual*, ⟨be that individual Zeus (propounder of the 'divine law' sustaining all human law, fragment 114) or an outstanding human individual (fragment 49)⟩.

Fragment 34

The subject of the sentence is presumably, as so often in Heraclitus, 'people,' 'the uninstructed,' 'the majority of mankind,' and its verbal echoes suggest strongly that it should be taken in close conjunction with fragment 1. What such people occasionally hear is, if not the *logos* itself, then the account thereof by such as Heraclitus, but they are incapable of taking it in.

Fragment 35

The fragment should be read along with fragments 18, 22, and 123, all of which suggest the difficulties involved in exploring the real, which reveals its secrets (fragment 123) only to the persevering (fragment 22) and open-minded (fragment 18) enquirer. Such virtues are of course to be distinguished from a mere mindless accumulation of facts (see the commentary on fragment 40).

The extent of the quotation is in doubt. I follow Marcovich and others in accepting only the phrase 'enquirers into many things' as certainly Heraclitean. The use of the word φιλόσοφος is found in Herodotus 1.30.2 and is attributed to Pythagoras by Heraclides of Pontus (fragment 87 Wehrli = Diogenes Laertius 1.12), but the extended phrase 'men who are lovers of wisdom' (φιλόσοφοι ἄνδρες) seems to be a coinage of Clement's own (it is found again at *Stromateis* 1.68.3). However, it is highly likely that the subject of Heraclitus' sentence was *something* like 'genuine lovers of truth,' even if he did not use the exact phrase found in Clement.

εὖ μάλα I understand, with Wiese, as governing χρή, and probably, as Marcovich suggests, an addition by Clement himself.

Fragment 36

The natural interpretation of this fragment is in terms of the world-process described in fragment 31. On such a reading 'souls' is introduced at a point where one might have expected 'air.' Given prevalent views on soul as air/breath (see, eg, Diogenes of Apollonia, fragment 5, and a century earlier Anaximenes, fragment 2), this is not surprising, except to those who read fragment 31 in such a way as to infer that Heraclitus believed in only three elements. In other frag-

ments Heraclitus describes soul as 'dry' (fragment 118) and 'wet' or 'moist' (fragment 117) – epithets, as Kahn rightly asserts, straightforwardly applicable to air in its various manifestations and wholly inapplicable to fire (aetherial or otherwise). The point seems to be reinforced by Aristotle's identification (*De anima* A 2. 405a24 = D-K A 15) of soul in Heraclitus with 'that exhalation of which everything else is composed.' As Kahn (259) points out, the word here translated 'exhalation' (*anathymiasis*) more precisely means 'billowing up,' and 'typically applies to smoke or steam.' The notion is found in verbal form in Cleanthes, after Arius Didymus (D-K fragment 12, end): 'and souls too are exhaled (*anathymiōntai*) from moisture.'

One natural conclusion of this fragment, vigorously expressed by Nussbaum (156), is that Heraclitus cannot have believed in *individual* life after death, if indeed he believed in life after death at all. This may be the case, but it is hard to reconcile with other fragments, a straightforward interpretation of which pulls in the opposite direction (eg, fragments 63, 98). The truth may be that there was an unresolved tension in Heraclitus' own mind on the whole matter; like so many other Greek philosophers, he may have found it impossible fully to break with his cultural inheritance, whatever the force of his own philosophical insights and convictions. Alternatively, he may have believed that the majority of souls dissolve into water (and eventually into earth) (fragment 36), while a minority, those of heroes, actually break from the wheel of birth (fragment 63).

Fragment [37]

Since the 'quotation' from Heraclitus is in indirect speech, it is difficult to know whether we are faced with a loose paraphrase here, or something close to an original statement. The former seems more likely, if we are to judge from fragment 13, in which a fuller and more comprehensible statement about the habits of pigs is made. Elucidation of the fragment is for this reason uncertain, but the following seems to fit reasonably well with fragments 9, 13, and 61 as interpreted by Kirk: 'pigs prefer mud to clean water (fragment 13), farmyard birds ⟨like to?⟩ wash in dust or cinders (fragment 37); ⟨people however prefer clean water to such things.⟩' (For the implications of this putative antithesis see the commentary on fragment 13.)

Less convincing is the interpretation that the 'pigs' in question in fragments 13 and 17 are really pig-like people (see fragment 29, 'the

majority ⟨of people⟩ glut themselves like cattle'); this seems to have been in origin simply a jocose(?) piece of transference (from fragment 13) on the part of Athenaeus (5.178f). Even more unconvincing are attempts at a full-blown 'Orphic' interpretation, in which Heraclitus is supposed to be referring obliquely to the fate of sinners (= pig-like people) who in their after-life, as in this, will 'lie in the mire' (Plato, *Phaedo* 69c). Were the latter interpretations correct, the metaphorical usage in question (ie, pigs = pig-like people) would constitute a unique instance of such usage in the fragments.

Fragment [38]

This 'fragment' is at best a loose *testimonium* concerning Thales as an astronomer; we have no evidence about what Heraclitus actually said about him in this capacity. (*Astrologos* here means 'astronomer,' in all likelihood, not 'astrologer'; in Heraclitus' time astrology was not yet in vogue in Greece.) For a similar *testimonium* about Homer see fragment 105.

Fragment 39

This fragment should be compared with fragment 121; cf fragments 33, 49. Bias of Priene was one of the Seven Wise Men of antiquity, living a couple of generations before Heraclitus in Priene, a town near Ephesus. His justice was legendary, and his views on others ('the majority of people are worthless,' Diogenes Laertius 1.88) clearly likely to recommend him to Heraclitus; see fragment 29. (For other sayings attributed to him see Kahn, *ad loc.*)

Logos in this fragment clearly means 'esteem' or 'account.' It echoes that other sense of *logos* (= statement, account) that begins Heraclitus' book (fragment 1), in the sense that some one of esteem or account is precisely such because *logoi* are uttered about him. Nothing deeper than this, however, appears to be intended.

Fragment 40

The point of this fragment seems to be that the mere accumulation of facts does not automatically produce insight or understanding (*noos*),

though serious, patient, and open-minded research is of course an absolute *sine qua non* for the final acquisition of such insight (see fragments 18, 22, 35). Insight will naturally be into that *logos* which states the truth of things (see the commentary on fragment 1).

The particle *authis* ('for that matter' (?)) seems to separate Xenophanes and Hecataeus from Hesiod and Pythagoras in some significant way. Perhaps the thought is: 'or else it would have taught the "experts" – old (Hesiod and Pythagoras) *and* new (Xenophanes, Hecataeus)!' (For other [disparaging] references to Hesiod see fragments 57, 106 [perhaps a paraphrase of 57], and to Pythagoras fragments 81, 129.)

The fragment should be compared with fragment 41, in which wisdom is said to consist of one thing only – insight into the operations of the real – not a multiplicity of things. The point is not exactly the same, but the one/many (*hen/poly*) contrast looks like a deliberate attempt on Heraclitus' part to draw attention to the difference between unified (= fruitful) and fragmented (= unfruitful) approaches to philosophy.

Fragment 41

Scholars have been unduly concerned about the meaning of the opening words of the fragment, thanks to the occurrence of the identical phrase at the beginning of fragment 32, where it undoubtedly refers to some transcendental, divine principle of wisdom. But the supposed problem is an unreal one. In Greek *to sophon* can be used with equal plausibility to mean 'the wise ⟨policy/procedure⟩,' 'whatsoever ⟨policy/procedure⟩ is wise,' or 'that thing/entity which is wise,' depending on context. In this context it clearly means 'the wise ⟨policy/procedure⟩.'

What does 'through all things' mean? From the evidence of other fragments (30, 31a, 31b, 90) the natural interpretation is in terms of all the phases or forms that the different world-masses take as part of the measured, everlasting change that constitutes the universe.

The 'plan' of which the fragment appears to speak seems to be one and the same as that 'statement' (*logos*), by 'that which is wise' (fragment 32), of the way things are and must be (the 'divine law' of fragment 114); see Lausdei 81. In more dynamic terms it is the operation of the thunderbolt (fragment 64) of that which is unwilling and willing to be called by the name Zeus (fragment 32).

The text as we have it is corrupt, and no emendation has proved universally satisfactory. Among emended versions the major ones (all of them presenting linguistic problems of one sort or another) are as follows:
1 'insight' as to '*how* all things are steered . . .' (ὅκη κυβερνῶται)
2 'the plan/ordinance which steers all things . . .' (ὁτέη ἐκυβέρνησε)
3 'the plan/ordinance, by which all things are steered' (ὁτέῃ κυβερνῶται).
In translation 1 the 'insight' is, of course, human insight; and for such an interpretation to be acceptable 'insight' will have to be understood as an 'internal' or 'cognate' accusative governed by the verb 'to know.' In translation 2 the aorist tense (translated as 'steers') must be understood as the 'tenseless' aorist (see fragments 53, 79) and (as also in translation 3) a feminine form of ὅστις (the sole known instance in Greek literature) must be tolerated. In translations 1 and 3 a passive form of the verb κυβερνᾶν is read which, while making good sense, looks very much like a *lectio facilior*, and so is unlikely to have caused the problems which Heraclitus' original words seem to have caused.

My own inclination, despite some qualms over an uncorroborated use of a putatively feminine form of ὅστις, is to accept translation 2, on the grounds that (a) 'αι' and 'ε' were pronounced identically in post-classical Greek (as they are now), and a misreading of the final syllable of ἐκυβέρνησε, thanks to such identity, could well have led a scribe (Pl, B) to 'correct' from the wholly unintelligible ἐκυβέρνησαι to the grammatically sound (if still syntactically unintelligible) κυβερνῆσαι; and (b) if, by transferred epithet, [Zeus'] *thunderbolt* can be said to steer all things (fragment 64), then [Zeus'] 'plan' or 'judgment' can just as plausibly – if not more plausibly – be said to do the same (cf Xenophanes, fragment 25 D-K).

If, by contrast, γνώμην is an internal accusative (interpretation 1), then it is well translated 'insight' (Kahn) (see fragment 78), and the rest of the sentence will refer to the manner of the world's steering [by Zeus/thunderbolt/'that which is wise'/αἰθήρ]. (See fragment 64.) But it is not clear that what Kahn calls a 'strong' sense of ἐπίστασθαι (ie, the sense of 'to master' something, the latter being expressed as an 'internal' accusative) is in question here, either as a dominant or secondary interpretaion; the 'acquaintance' sense of ἐπίστασθαι is perfectly respectable, and makes good sense in its own right.

Fragment 42

Curious as it appears to us, the more significant Greek poets were generally looked upon as, among other things, 'experts' on topics of

which their poems treated (see Plato, *Ion*, passim). Heraclitus demurs, criticizing by name the three greatest names among his predecessors, Homer (fragments 42, 56), Archilochus (fragment 42) and Hesiod (fragments 40, 57, 106). (For his views on the relationship between *genuine* expertise and insight [*noos*] see fragments 18, 22, 35, and 40.)

The fragment refers to rhapsodic competitions (held in conjunction with athletic contests) at which the poems of such as Homer and Archilochus were recited by 'rhapsodes' holding the symbol of their profession, the rhapsode's staff (*rhabdos*). Heraclitus, lover of word-play, imagines the poets actually present at such a competition and being 'thrashed' (*rhapizesthai*) for their pretensions; the rhapsode's staff is the staff they now (rightly) feel across their backs!

Fragment 43

The basic meaning of *hybris* is 'violence' or 'insolence'. While Heraclitus may well be thinking of the violence and insolence of what was commonly referred to by would-be *aristoi* as 'the mob,' it is equally possible he is thinking of *any* violence in a city, including that used by the rich and powerful (see Solon 3.8; 5.9; cf 1.11 Diehl), that disrupts good order. As an aristocrat Heraclitus is committed to the existence of a structured social order whose institutions must be defended by the general populace the way they would defend the very walls of their city (fragment 44).

Fragment 44

The interest of this fragment is in its appeal, not this time to the 'divine law' which grounds all human law (fragment 114), but to self-interest: the rule of law protects, not simply the powers that be, but the general populace (*dēmos*) as a whole. For similar sentiments see, with Kahn, Solon, fragment 3, 26–37 Diehl.

Fragment 45

As fragment 107 makes clear, for Heraclitus *psychē* ('soul') was seen as a cognitive principle, not simply a biological principle and/or source of our 'emotional,' non-rational selves, as seems to have been thought

by most of his predecessors (for a useful discussion see Kahn, *ad loc*); he is, as far as is known, the first Greek to have adopted such a view.

Talk of the soul's 'boundlessness' immediately evokes a recollection of Anaximander's principle of the 'unbounded/indefinite' (*apeiron*) or the 'unbounded/indefinite' expanse of Anaximenes' principle, 'air,' and this may well have been deliberate on Heraclitus' part. Physically, *psychē* will be 'unbounded' (in the sense, of course, not of 'infinitely large in extent', but of 'immensely large in extent,' as in Homer's 'boundless' Stream of Ocean) because it is identified by Heraclitus with the air around us (see the commentary on fragment 36); as a rational principle it will be 'unbounded' in the sense, perhaps, that the vast range of its cognitive capacities can never be discovered by any individual. Talk of (non)-'discovery' fits well with statements in fragments 18 and 22: honest researchers into the real must be persevering and open-minded and *expect little* as the result of their efforts.

The 'ways' or 'paths' travelled are presumably the ways of investigation (rather than, as some have suggested, the 'ways' around the body or blood, on the assumption that one or other of the latter constitutes soul's 'limits'); such seems clearly the force of the person of the verb *exheuroio*, where 'one' can only mean something like 'anyone investigating the matter.' (For the exact phrase 'path (*hodos*) of investigation' see Parmenides fragments 2.2, 6.3.)

As for soul's '*logos*,' most scholars are agreed that this must mean something like 'measure' (see fragment 31). If such is the case, Heraclitus will be saying that the 'depth' of *soul*, understood in terms of either its extent as the life-stuff of the universe or its capacity as an intellective principle (individual or cosmic) or both, cannot be gauged by any sounding-technique at our disposal.

Fragment [46]

This is a passage in reported speech, and so not an exact quotation; many have argued that it is not a quotation at all, even an inexact one. However, the striking metaphor for thought ('sacred disease' – ie, epilepsy) is in keeping with other metaphors of Heraclitus, and not inappropriate, in view of other statements on the problems involved in the investigation of the real (see fragments 18, 22): the 'thinker' (ie, the genuine investigator) is precisely one for whom 'thinking'* is a

* As Marcovich points out, the word used for 'thinking' here (*oiēsis*) is not otherwise found before the fourth century, so it is very unlikely to have been the precise word used by Heraclitus himself.

tendency to fall (and give up) against which he must never stop fighting. Heraclitus may also be alluding to the supposedly 'sacred' nature of epilepsy: our capacity for rational thought is that which makes us most akin to 'that which is unwilling and willing to be called by the name Zeus' (fragment 32).

As for the 'deceptiveness of sight,' we cannot know whether Heraclitus ever used any such precise phrase, but it is not out of keeping with the statement that 'poor witnesses for people are eyes and ears if they possess uncomprehending souls' (fragment 107); since the latter group of souls are for Heraclitus clearly those of the majority of mankind, it will be for that same majority that sight is describable as 'deceptive.'

Fragment [47]

Whether this is meant to be an exact quotation or a (metric) paraphrase is uncertain, but its context in Diogenes Laertius (= a series of other quotations which clearly *are* meant to be seen as literal) suggests that the statement is thought to be that of Heraclitus himself. Whatever the truth of the matter, the words are very much in line with Heraclitus' commitment to serious, unslovenly research into the real as the work of the honest seeker after truth; see fragments 18, 22.

Fragment 48

An accentual difference between two Greek words allows Heraclitus to make a point – though the exact nature of the point is debatable. *Bios* (accented on the final syllable) means 'bow'; *bios* (accented on the first syllable) means 'life.' This sort of word-play is familiar enough in Heraclitus, but it is left to us to puzzle out whether he wishes to stress the *contrast* between name (life) and function (death), or the essential *connection* between life and death, or both of these. Given the conscious density of so much of Heraclitus' word-play, I am myself inclined to think that both the contrast and the connection are intended.

The fragment serves also as a striking instance of how names can indicate the reality (or an aspect of the reality) of a thing (see fragments 23, 32, 67). In this case the bow will be equated, wholly or in part, with 'life' because, in dealing out death (to, say, the boar), it brings life (ie, livelihood) to the hunter (Kahn).

Fragment 49

For Heraclitus' heroes, and his commitment to the view that there is a law/custom of obedience/respect to 'one' as much as to a group, see fragments 39, 121, 33. Such a one, we now learn, is the equivalent of 'ten thousand' (alternate translation, 'innumerable' or 'myriad') others, provided he be 'very good' (or 'excellent'). A straightforward understanding of this will be: 'provided he be particularly beneficial to the *polis*' (see fragment 121, *oneistos*), like Hermodorus (fragment 121), and/or 'of the most account,' like Bias (fragment 39), and/or perhaps 'the most wise and the most just,' as we know from other sources Bias had the reputation of being (see the commentary on fragment 39).

Another, less agreeable (and less likely) possibility is that in this fragment Heraclitus is simply contrasting his own class with that of 'the mob' (fragment 104): *any* member of the class of *aristoi* is worth ten thousand (or countless numbers) of the rest. If this is Heraclitus' intent, *aristos* will best be translated 'noble.' However, a predicative (as distinct from substantive) use of *aristos* alone to mean 'noble' is not paralleled in the language, and should be viewed with caution.

There is some doubt as to whether Heraclitus said 'is ten thousand' or 'is, for me (ἐμοί), ten thousand.' With Bollack and Wismann, followed by Kahn, I am inclined to reject the commonly accepted [ἐμοί] as being poorly attested, and also out of keeping with the forthright, untentative way in which Heraclitus is inclined to express his views.

Fragment 49a

The authenticity of this fragment, like that of fragments 12, 91a, and 91b, has been and is greatly disputed. But the first half of it should undoubtedly be accepted. As fragment 12 makes clear, the universe is both a unity and a diversity, and fragment 49a makes sense as a partial elucidation of such a doctrine. As a unity the river (of the universe) into which we (the human race) step at time t_1 is the same river as the one into which we step at t_2; as a diversity, since its waters keep flowing, it is *not* the same. Therefore, 'we do and do not step into the same river.' (The singular 'river' would have been expected here, as in fragment 12, and I so interpret; the plural seems to be a feature of Heraclitus' peculiar linguistic thumb-print.)

The fragment differs from fragment 12 (and 91a, 91b) in that, as well as elucidating it (them), it lays greater stress on the 'fluid' nature of those who enter the river than on the static nature of the river itself. And this perhaps accounts for the second statement (if genuine) standing in severe parataxis to the first. An easy interpretation of it (Zeller's) runs: 'we are and are not ⟨the same people⟩' or 'we are and are not ⟨in the same river⟩' (just as the river 'is and is not' the same river), but such 'predicative' and 'locative' interpretations of the free-standing verb *einai* should be treated with caution. The more straightforward interpretation is surely existential: 'we exist and do not exist.' Such a statement wears an air of more than usual paradoxicality, even for Heraclitus, but to readers of fragment 88 it should appear as not self-evidently un-Heraclitean. If it is genuine, it is based upon an implicit *simpliciter/secundum quid* distinction (a distinction that had been made explicit by the end of the fifth century: see *Dissoi Logoi* 5.15), as indeed is the notion of the river's self-identity or otherwise. If this interpretation is correct, we are perhaps looking at the very statement which led Cratylus (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.1010a14) to make his own perverse-looking statement about not being able to step once into the same river: the phrase 'it is impossible to step *twice* ...' misleads precisely because the master *himself* once said that it is impossible to say *without qualification* that 'we' ever step *at all* into the same river. The paratactic sentence 'we exist and do not exist' then reads naturally as an *explanation* of the antecedent sentence: 'for the (eternal and unchanging) existence of the universe is existence *simpliciter*, whereas human existence is existence *secundum quid*.' Or in terms of Heraclitus' statement: '⟨for⟩ we [members of the human race] *are* ⟨real⟩ in one sense (ie, real *seriatim*), but are *not* ⟨real⟩ in the absolute sense in which the universe itself is real (ie, everlastingly and uninterruptedly so).'

If this non-linear understanding of the fragment is correct (and it has the advantage of not crediting Heraclitus with a belief in reincarnation to which, given his other strictures on popular fancies, he may not in fact have adhered), it lends added cogency to Plato's rendering of Heraclitus' doctrine at *Theaetetus* 160d. The doctrine of flux still remains, of course, only a *partial* statement of Heraclitus' views, but such a doctrine would be more strongly evidenced in the words of Heraclitus himself than many scholars have been prepared to admit.

Since we are not, however, certain that Heraclitus did in fact reject the doctrine of reincarnation (in fragments 63 and 98 he certainly seems to accept a doctrine of after-life, for some souls at any rate), the

linear interpretation of the fragment suggested by Plutarch cannot be completely discounted. On such an interpretation the 'river' is the river of existence. 'We step and do not step into the *same* river' will then mean: 'The river (of existence) into which we (on different occasions) step is and is not the same river. As a unity, the river of existence into which we step at time t_1 is the same river as the one into which we stepped at t_2 (in some previous incarnation); as a diversity, since its waters keep flowing (ie, since the world's matter is in everlasting flux), it is *not* the same. Therefore, "we step and do not step into the same river."' One might speculate that the phrase 'we exist and do not exist' would have been intended by Heraclitus to be read in the same way: we 'exist' now and in another incarnation, we 'do not exist' (at any rate in the same way) *between* incarnations.

Fragment 50

It has been said (eg, by Kirk) that the supposed contrast between a speaker and his *logos* is too eccentric a notion to be tolerable, even in Heraclitus, so *logos* in this fragment must mean something other than Heraclitus' own 'account' (like the world's 'pattern' or 'structure'), but this is *prima facie* implausible; one does not 'listen to' patterns, or structures (see the commentary on fragment 1), one listens to persons, and the things they say. There is surely no large difficulty in distinguishing a speaker and his message; as we might put it, 'Don't listen to me as an individual; listen to me as a *spokesman* [for "that which is wise"]. As an individual, I may unwittingly mislead; as a spokesman, I speak a *logos* which, while hard to understand, is universal (*xynos*, fragment 2) in its import, ⟨because uttered by "that which is wise"⟩ (fragment 108).' Or, slightly differently, 'You may not like me as an individual, so don't listen to me as an individual! Listen rather to what I have to say.' The distinction between speaker and *logos* here makes good sense, and, as West has pointed out, is in fact used by other Greeks nearly contemporary with Heraclitus (a fact which lends credence to Snell's reading of *logos* here as *Sinn* or *Bedeutung*).

The *logos* of which Heraclitus speaks is, on the above interpretation, 'his' *logos* in the sense that it is formulated in human speech of his own, but at a deeper level it is, via Heraclitus, the *logos* of 'that which is wise.' On either reading it is distinguishable from anything Heraclitus might say in a non-'representative' role.

The 'wise policy' (*sophon*) involved in agreeing that 'all things are

one ⟨thing⟩' (see also fragment 10) is such because it reflects the knowledge of 'that which is wise' (*sophon*) that such is indeed the case, and accords (*homo-logein*) with the everlasting 'statement' (*logos*) by 'that which is wise' that such is indeed the case. For an (apparent) account of the principle that unifies the cosmos see fragment 30.

The word λόγου ('account') here is the universally accepted emendation of Bernays for the ms reading 'doctrine' (δόγματος) (a word not otherwise found before the fourth century BC, and a very natural slip for a Christian theologian to whom Heraclitus' views are unacceptable 'doctrine'); and 'are' (εἶναι) is the nearly universally accepted recommendation of Miller for the ms 'know' (εἰδέναι) (which would, if correct, make the sentence run: 'the one wise thing knows all things,' or 'the wise thing is one, to know all things'). The word 'agree' (ὁμολογεῖν) is almost certainly a pun on the word 'account' (λόγος); for other such examples of punning in Heraclitus see fragments 1, 20, 25, 26, 28, 48, 114.

Fragment 51

The subject of the first main clause is presumably 'people' (see, eg, fragments 15, 34). That of the subordinate clause is correctly assumed by most, following Hippolytus, to refer to the sum of things; likewise the second main clause. The fragment is, in general terms, a variant on the general theme of human incomprehension of the unity amid diversity that constitutes the universe. The language used is rich and subtle. In terms of the world's physical structure and processes, the phrases *diapheromenon heautōi* and *palintropos harmoniē* and the similes of bow and lyre suggest a view of the world as the unity which consists of balance between centripetal and centrifugal forces (see also fragment 10). In terms of the universe as an object whose operations can be seen as those of 'that which is wise' (fragments 32, 108), the *logos* that it utters, being rational, is in fact devoid of inner contradiction (*homologeei*), despite its appearance to many as being at variance with itself (another sense of *diapheromenon heautōi*; the verb is in fact the standard verb for 'to differ'). This aspect of Heraclitus' statement Hipplytus usefully connects with fragment 50: the wise person will agree (*homo-logeein*) with the *logos* (of 'that which is wise') that all things are indeed one.

Harmoniē could mean 'construction'/'connection' (literally, 'fitting together,' from the verb *harmozein*) or 'attunement,' or both; both

senses can be applied with effectiveness to both bow and lyre, and each sense in turn catches something of the 'balanced state' of things that Heraclitus is at pains to stress: the *structure* of the bow and lyre, with their fine balance between wood and string, catches something of the balanced structure of the universe, the *operation* of the bow and lyre something of the co-ordinated, 'well-tuned' operation of the universe (see fragment 10, *synaidon*).

For a trite – though as far as it goes accurate enough – description of his balanced world as 'back-stretching' or 'in a state of tension' (*palintonos*), Heraclitus substitutes the more interesting adjective 'back-turning' (*palintropos*) (compare Parmenides 6.9), a word probably referring literally to the 'return' to its position of the bow-string or lyre-string after use. One is immediately reminded of the 'turnings' (*tropai*) of fire in fragment 31 and of the whole process of ordered, cyclical change at which the fragment hints. Not only is the universe balanced in its structure and operations *at any given time*, it is in an everlasting state of balancing itself *through time*, as seen in the cycle of the seasons, the sun's annual motion, etc. (In English some sense of the power of Heraclitus' adjective is caught if one substitutes for the phrase 'the balance of nature' a phrase which subsumes and enriches it, 'the [self-]balancing of nature.')

The text of this fragment has been needlessly controverted. As Kahn has pointed out, ὁμολογέειν is a trivial ms misreading for ὁμολογέει, and Zeller's correction to συμφέρεται is based upon nothing more substantial than a Platonic paraphrase in the *Symposium*. The same goes (see again Kahn) for the reading παλίντονος – a simple error for any scribe to fall into, given the universal schooling in Homer. The more subtle and more philosophically interesting reading παλίντροπος should be retained.

Fragment 52

This is one of the most puzzling of Heraclitus' statements, of which no universally acceptable elucidation has ever been propounded. *Aiōn* in Heraclitus' time meant basically 'human life' or the duration of that life, ie, a 'life-*time*,' as well as the vigorousness of life (see Pindar, fragment 116 Bowra, quoted by Kahn) and time generally. The game of *pessoi* seems to have been a game analogous to backgammon, in which one piece replaces another at a given point on the board.

A possible guide to interpretation, as Kahn suggests, is fragment

53, in which war is described as 'father of all, and king of all.' The fragment is clearly cosmological in import, which suggests that fragment 52 may be so as well. If it is, we have, in general terms, the following possibility of interpretation: war (= the clash of opposites) is the principle of change underpinning the real. As king and father of the whole, it directs the operations of the whole (see fragments 41, 64). The father's 'child' is the universe's everlasting life-time, across which (or in terms of the metaphor, via *whom*) the father's 'plan' (fragment 41) everlastingly unfolds. The power wielded by the child is 'kingly,' like that of the father, in that the universe's life-time serves as an indispensable condition for the great cosmic changes to take place, and in the sequence preordained (see fragments 30, 31). The game played by this life-time is like backgammon, in that pieces are moved around the board in replacement sequence (see again fragment 31) and according to a plan or strategy, not just haphazardly. To the uninstructed observer the movement of the pieces will from his own limited perspective often seem haphazard, if not unintelligible – the sort of thing in fact one would expect if a 'child' were behind it; but such an observer is without insight (fragment 17) into the nature, role, and powers of this particular Child. (For Heraclitus' thoughts on the power of children in general see the commentary on fragment 56.)

Fragment 53

The fragment has affinities with fragment 80, but is more clearly concerned with the opposite *effects* of the (cosmic) state of war than with the warfare between opposites themselves. It is also, by implication, an attack on the view of strife as found at Homer, *Iliad* 18.107 – 'If only strife would vanish from amongst gods and men!' As the phrase's structure indicates, we are probably meant to see in it a reminiscence of the Homeric description of Zeus as 'father of men and gods.' The reference to gods and human beings also suggests that the word 'all' in this fragment refers to persons only (Gigon, Kirk) rather than both to things that come to pass (Kahn) and to persons.

Whether or not Zeus and (cosmic) war were seen by Heraclitus as coextensive is hard to say. In fragment 80 strife is seen as a principle of order through opposition and war as a common feature of such order through opposition; in fragment 53 war is the agent producing particular states of opposition. The two descriptions are not of course incompatible; and the same could no doubt be said of that 'one wise

thing' which is 'not willing and willing to be called by the name Zeus' (fragment 32). If for Heraclitus God and that 'one wise thing' (which is the rationality of the world, or the world *qua* rational) are one and the same, then that 'one wise thing' could have been seen by him as in one crucial respect the same as (and to that degree willing to bear the name of) Zeus – ie, in respect of its power to *produce* order through opposition; but in a second respect wholly different from Zeus – ie, in so far as it is a *feature* of the universe. And the same holds true if in turn *war* and that 'one wise thing' were not distinguished by Heraclitus: as a *producer* of order though strife war has many of the features of what most people call Zeus and would presumably be willing to bear the name, but not in so far as it is merely a *feature* of the real.

A less 'intense' reading of this fragment involves understanding 'war' as simply war between humans (Gigon). This is certainly a possibility, and fits well with fragment 63, if the latter has been correctly interpreted as a reference to the divinization of those who die heroically in battle. If this was Heraclitus' intention, the fragment will serve as a specific instance of a cosmic state of affairs: the ongoing production of 'opposites' by the process of strife.

Fragment 54

The statement as we have it is couched in the most general terms. *Harmoniē* (see fragment 51) can mean (a) 'structure' or 'connection', (b) attunement, or (c) both, and *kreittōn* can mean 'stronger' or 'better' or both. One might hazard the guess that Heraclitus is thinking primarily of the surface-structures and surface-functioning of the real, acceptance of whose (genuine enough) *harmoniē* is never as powerful (*kreittōn*$_1$) or acceptable (*kreittōn*$_2$) a support for beliefs about the real as is insight into the real's deeper, and less obvious, structure and operations. For the *harmoniē* of surface structures and operations is at best a partial thing, and therefore potentially misleading as evidence, by contrast with that *harmoniē* of the structure and operations of the universe as a whole which is hidden (*aphanēs*) to most but which is by definition total as a piece of evidence. As the fragment stands, however, Heraclitus is generalizing even further than this, and it is unclear what the limits, if any, of the generalization are. If, as seems likely, given the sentence's structure, the whole statement is meant to be taken *completely* generally, one can speculate (with Kahn and others) that Heraclitus would include in his argument such claims as the

greater power and/or acceptability of the Pythagorean 'harmony of the spheres' (God-made, and unheard) than that of man-made *harmoniē*, or the greater power and/or acceptability of the deep, unifying structure of the real (God-made, and unseen) than that of man-made structures. A final possibility for inclusion might be a claim that the surface-connections of linguistic items within Heraclitus' own account (*logos*) of the real are less powerful, and less revelatory, than hidden and more subtle ones (see above, p 5).

Fragment 55

This fragment should be read in close conjunction with fragments 101a and 107. Experiential knowledge is important to the conscientious investigator into the real, sense-experience is a better guide than random conjecturing (fragment 47), and of the senses the eyes tend to be more reliable than the ears (fragment 101a). But the senses, too, can deceive, if one's *psychē* does not know the *language* spoken by reality (fragment 107); one will finish up either like the deaf (fragment 34) or like one who foolishly (and often mistakenly) interprets the utterance of a foreigner without knowledge of the language he speaks (fragment 107). *What* the real utters is, of course, that 'statement' (*logos*, fragment 1) which Heraclitus is at such pains to proclaim, by proxy, to the world.

Fragment 56

Homer, it was said in antiquity, died of chagrin at not being able to interpret the puzzle (ie, failing to see that the answer was 'lice'). Heraclitus clearly thought the answer 'obvious,' (eg, to the children who propounded it) and that Homer was consequently less wise than he had been held to be. (For another disparaging remark about Homer see fragment 42.)

What is it that is so 'obvious' to the boys in question and to Heraclitus? Perhaps, as Bollack and Wismann suggest, that the structural affinity between words in language, in this case *phtheir* ('louse') and *phtheirein* ('to destroy'), reveals, as so often, an important feature of the real: in this case that the boys are actually 'killing the killers.' In more general terms, Heraclitus' point may be as follows. So-called experts (such as some of Greece's better known poets – Homer, Arch-

ilochus, and Hesiod: see fragments 40, 42, 57, 106) are frequently so tortuous and complex in their thinking that they miss the wood, as we say, for the trees; children, by contrast, have a certain simplicity of regard which allows them to grasp certain truths immediately. The notion could perhaps be carried further to include people in general, who, says Heraclitus, have usually stopped listening (see fragments 34, 107) to that *logos* which the real is forever stating and is 'common' to all (fragments 1, 2, 50); their accumulated knowledge, if it *is* such, is valueless because their souls have unlearned the language (fragment 107), spoken by the real, that children pick up effortlessly and naturally. What the real has told them, among other things, in language they instinctively understand, and Homer either does not, or *will* not, is the truth, too 'obvious' (*phaneron*) to need expressing, that language *itself*, and in particular *written* language, can indicate truths otherwise difficult to excavate. The writing of Heraclitus himself, the prime characteristics of which are what Kahn (89) has called 'linguistic density' and the internal 'resonance' of particular verbal themes or images, offers striking examples of language which, for those who really listen to it, reveals much about the real. The paradigm case of a 'good listener' to such language is a child, in the sense, perhaps, that to the young language is still new – an object of delight and experimentation, a fresh universe in which truths are immediately apparent that are largely missed by that majority of people for whom constant usage has turned language into a thing too commonplace to be deemed in itself revelatory. As Heraclitus puts it elsewhere (fragment 52): 'kingly power is in the hands of a child.'

Fragment 57

Hesiod, in saying that night 'produced' day, failed to see their reciprocal relationship, and in so doing missed the fact of their 'unity.' The unity in question is the unity of complementarity and reciprocity, not of identity. Night and day are what Heraclitus elsewhere (fragment 10) calls 'things taken together' (like, say, concave and convex), which can be seen as a continuum (and thus 'one') where so taken. Elsewhere (fragment 67, qv) their continuousness is called 'God.'

A further possibility (Kahn) is that Heraclitus saw that night is merely the absence of sunlight (see fragment 99), and to that degree not really distinct from day at all (each is equally a time-period, and thus in a critical respect they are one and the same). Later astronomers

talked of the *nykthēmeron*, the twenty-four-hour period of night/day, and it is possible that Heraclitus is hinting at the basic reasonableness of some such unit of measurement.

The reference to Hesiod is presumably to *Theogony* 123–4: 'From Chaos came forth Erebus and black Night; in turn from Night came forth both Day and Aether.'

Fragment 58

For Hippolytus this quotation from Heraclitus is evidence that for Heraclitus 'good and evil are [one and the same thing].' No such identity-statement, however, seems inferrable from the text as we have it; the most that can be inferred, as in fragment 9, is the (innocuous) predicative statement that one and the same type of event (being cut/being burned) is in different circumstances good/bad, beneficial/harmful.

Notoriously, Aristotle accused Heraclitus of identifying good and evil, and of denying the law of contradiction (*Physics* A2, 185b19ff, *Topics* 5, 159b30ff, *Metaphysics* 7, 1012a24; though see *Metaphysics* 3, 1005b23, where he is less sure that the law of contradiction is really denied by Heraclitus); but the evidence of fragment 58 cannot be said to bolster Aristotle's case, except on the most trivial understanding of the term 'identity.' What it does appear to be saying is that context can have the effect of demonstrating the totally *opposite* (not simply *different*) outcomes of a single kind of action/event/state of affairs.

The text is uncertain in a number of respects; it appears to contain several explanatory interpolations, either by Hippolytus or his source, and the final (ungrammatical) phrase seems irretrievably corrupt, either as a remnant of Heraclitus' own words or as a gloss. If the reading μηδὲν ἄξιοι (Bernays, D-K) is accepted, Heraclitus will be saying that doctors demand a fee for their services, but deserve nothing. If one reads μηδέν' ἄξιον (Bywater, Zeller), the sense will be that doctors complain that the fee for their services is not big *enough*. If ταῦτα ἐργαζόμενοι (mss) is read, the phrase is presumably a causal one: 'for doing these things'; if τ' αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι (Sauppe, D-K), it is presumably concessive: 'although they produce the same effects ⟨as do the diseases themselves(?)⟩.' For the latter to be the case, the final five words of the fragment will have to be a corrupt and ungrammatical remnant of an original phrase of the form τὰ καὶ αἱ νοῦσοι (Wilamowitz).

With Kirk I follow Bywater and Zeller in reading μηδέν' ἄξιον, on the grounds that the notion of effecting good while actually inflicting pain (cauterizing and practising surgery – without anaesthetic!) is widely attested in Greek sources as the mark of a good doctor. (The reading championed by Bernays and D-K, which suggests that doctors never do any good at all, is by contrast poorly attested; see Kirk 89–91, Gigon 26). ταῦτα also seems slightly preferable to τ' αὐτὰ, and will refer simply to 'cutting and burning.' The final phrase, which (with Kahn and Kirk) I consider spurious, seems to be a commentator's gloss, meaning 'both the good effects they produce and the ⟨further⟩ diseases(!) they produce.'

Fragment 59

For Hippolytus this quotation is yet another example of Heraclitus' commitment to a doctrine of the so-called identity of opposites, but once again this is far from clear. Heraclitus' point seems to be that the path of writing, which is in fact one and the same path, can be viewed as either 'straight' or 'crooked'; all depends on whether one sees it in terms of the mean course or the actual course traced. If this interpretation is correct Heraclitus is offering a further illustration of a basic commitment: a single object/action/event/state of affairs can be demonstrated to have opposite features if viewed from different perspectives.

Before the word ὁδός the mss read γραφέων ('of things written,' possibly 'of writers') but some prefer to emend to γναφέων ('of fuller's carders') (Bywater, Zeller) or γναφείῳ ('for?, in? a fuller's shop') or γναφῶν ('carding rollers,' Marcovich, Kahn). If γραφέων is retained, the subsequent phrase (with the reading ἐν τῷ γναφείῳ, Bernays) must be understood as an interpretation, perhaps by Hippolytus himself, based either upon a misunderstanding of the meaning of γραφέων or (more likely) upon a corrupt reading of γναφέων or γναφείῳ before ὁδός in the text in front of him. If one must emend, γναφῶν (understood as some sort of circular carding instrument set with spikes, and apparently used as an instrument of torture; see Marcovich, *ad loc*) seems the best possibility; the machine operates in a circular fashion, and in doing so straightens out the woolen fibres. To call circular motion 'crooked,' however, seems irreducibly strange, and the best policy seems to be to try to make sense of what the mss present to us, while gratefully accepting Bernays' near-certain emendation ἐν τῷ γναφείῳ before the word περιστροφή.

The final phrase, 'It is,' he says, 'one and the same,' I take to be the words of Hippolytus himself. Had the phrase been that of Heraclitus, the Ionic form ὡύτη would have been expected (and is in fact found in fragment 60, quoted immediately afterward).

Fragment 60

Here again, as in fragment 59, Hippolytus sees evidence for a suposed Heraclitean doctrine of the identity of opposites. Heraclitus' text, however, does not lead naturally to any such bizarre conclusion. Its straightforward meaning is that apparent opposites (an 'up' road and a 'down' road) can frequently turn out to be the same thing (ie, a single road) viewed from different perspectives (in this case the bottom of a hill and the top of that hill). The doctrine being propounded would appear to be that general one found in, for example, fragments 9, 58, 59: opposite features of the same object/action/event/state of affairs will be highlighted, depending on the perspective from which it is viewed.

Since the quotation comes to us without context, it is impossible to know whether Heraclitus meant us to understand his phrase as referring specifically to cosmological processes (fragment 31), or to the cyclical destiny of soul, or to something else again. As it stands, it is couched in wholly generic terms, and is probably best so taken.

Fragment 61

A doctrine of the so-called identity of opposites is here again attributed by Hippolytus to Heraclitus (see also fragments 58, 59, 60). But Heraclitus' own words constitute a predicative statement, not an identity statement, and offer examples of the not very complicated truism that the same thing produces opposite effects on different objects.

Kirk (and others) compare fragment 61 with fragments 9 and 13, where Heraclitus lays emphasis on the different pleasures enjoyed by man and beast. For the point to be effectively taken we must assume that fragments 9 and 13 are truncated versions of statements comparing animals and people in the matter of their pleasures and preferences. The assumption seems plausible, but it is not something that admits of demonstration.

Fragment 62

Most rightly interpret the reference to 'immortals' as a reference to the eternally existent gods to whom the term 'immortals' was consistently applied by the Greeks. But Heraclitus the lover of language was, we can assume, fully aware that the word in Greek simply means 'deathless' (without necessarily implying 'birthless,' ie, enjoying 'eternal' life), and the resulting ambiguity allows him to propose a paradox that turns out on examination to be less extravagant than it has appeared to many. The key to the puzzle is, it seems to me, fragment 63, where the 'deathless ones' in question are those heroes whose everlasting reward is to become 'wakeful guardians of living ⟨people⟩ and corpses.' As humans they die; as *daemones* they are 'deathless,' that is, are not *further* subject, thanks to their new state, to death. So a certain class of 'immortals' (ie, the *daemones*, or more specifically those of them that are such after having once been human) 'is mortal' or 'consists of mortals' (ie, was once human) and a certain class of humans (ie, heroes) 'is immortal or 'consists of immortals' (ie, is from now on deathless).

The next phrases are more complicated, not least because of the uncertainty of interpreting the two accusatives 'life' and 'death.' Are they of the cognate form (as in 'dance a dance,' and then by extension 'dance the samba,' where in Greek the nouns 'dance' and 'samba' will be in the accusative case), or are they accusatives of respect (an equally common feature of the language)? An air of paradox is created by an assumption of the former, and the puzzle (in part) solved by an interpretation in terms of the latter. For it is in respect of their erstwhile mortality that hero-*daemones* are fairly describable as *immortal* (ie, no longer subject to mortality), and in respect of ⟨the present quality of their⟩ 'deathlessness', (ie, a deathlessness which, unlike that of the *everlasting* gods, had a beginning) that hero-*daemones* are fairly describable as 'mortals' (ie, they once *were* people subject to death).

For purposes of this interpretation it matters little whether Heraclitus meant the adjectives 'mortal'/'immortal' to serve as nouns or adjectives in the complement position in his opening words. For in either case no definite articles are used, either in the subject or complement position. Thus if syntax is to be our guide, Heraclitus has apparently carefully guarded himself against any universal interpretation of the form 'the class of X and the class of Y are one and the same' (ie, against an interpretation involving a supposed doctrine of the identity of opposites). The language in which he has chosen to ex-

press himself leaves open the possibility rather that he was thinking of subclasses within the class of 'mortals'/'everlasting ones'; in other words, that the statement 'immortals are mortal(s)' ... is to be unpacked as 'one subclass (X_1) of X and one subclass (Y_1) of Y are one and the same.' Once this is appreciated, the contents of fragment 63 become immediately relevant guides to interpretation; X_1 makes clear sense if understood as the subclass of immortals constituted by *daemones*, and Y_1 as the subclass of mortals constituted by heroes.

One of Heraclitus' best-known sayings is also one of his most puzzling. The opening words are, in terms of sentence-form, technically two identity-statements, and this is reflected in my different translations. For the rest, I have attempted to expand and interpret the quotation in a way that makes sense. (The use of ἐκεῖνος with two different references in one sentence, as Nussbaum [163] points out, is not paralleled; but the careful structuring of Heraclitus' sentence suggests strongly that that was none the less his intention).

Fragment 63

In view of the presence of the word 'guardians,' commentators have rightly seen an allusion here to Hesiod, *Works and Days* 121ff and 252ff, where thirty thousand members of the golden race were made 'divinities' (*daemones*) by Zeus upon their death and appointed 'guardians of mortal men'. If this is the case, one can hypothesize that the subject of Heraclitus' sentence (cf fragments 53, 62) will be heroes, such as those who die in battle (fragments 24, 25), and/or those *aristoi* one of whom is equal to 'ten thousand' (fragment 49). What becomes, as a 'greater destiny' (fragment 25), a 'guardian' is, of course, a hero's *psychē* (the notion of a *bodily* resurrection is clearly Hippolytus' own importation, and can be discounted); and this *psychē*, being constituted of air (see the commentary on fragment 36), is naturally described as 'rising up' ⟨from the earth to the realm of the gods⟩ to achieve its destiny. After 'dying as if overcome by sleep' (*Works and Days* 116) the heroes are, as guardians, 'awake' once more, to protect 'living ⟨people⟩ and corpses'. Why 'corpses'? One might hypothesize that Heraclitus is thinking specifically of the corpses of those who died in battle, the robbing or mutilation of which struck Greeks as a particularly horrifying act; in other contexts he suggests that 'corpses are more worthy of being thrown out than dung' (fragment 96).

In what precisely will the divinities' 'guardianship' consist? If Hesiod is again to be our guide, in the preservation of justice by 'watching over ⟨human⟩ judgments (= 'watching out for crooked judgments'?) and evil deeds' (253–4), the latter perhaps including, on my hypothesis, such things as the mutilation of corpses. A natural corollary of all this is that Heraclitus did in fact believe in reincarnation for some people (others – probably the majority – obliterate their souls by 'drowning,' fragment 36; cf fragment 117), in spite of the difficulties we ourselves face in reconciling this with the rest of his views. For if fragment 63 means what it appears to mean, only a small class of *aristoi break* from the wheel of birth to achieve a destiny outside of and beyond it.

The opening words of the fragment make little sense as they stand, and are almost certainly corrupt. (They should not, however, be excised. As Marcovich points out, Hippolytus seems to have found a reference to God in the quotation, and the phrase as we have it, mangled though it is, may still contain a reference to his presence.) The sentence is also in reported speech, so that Heraclitus would presumably have said something like 'They arise . . .' Nussbaum (167) would delete the phrase 'and corpses' as Hippolytus' own importation, but this seems unnecessarily drastic.

Fragments 64, 65

Fragment 64 should be compared with fragment 41, in which the world's 'steering' is again at issue. The 'thunderbolt' seems most likely, as Hippolytus points out, to be a symbol for that divine and immortal *aethēr* which Heraclitus sees as rationally directing the cosmos and its processes (see the commentary on fragment 30), and which in turn he appears to equate with that 'one wise thing which is not and is willing to be called by the name Zeus' (fragment 32). That the thunderbolt was known as Zeus' weapon is of course a commonplace.

For the possibly analogous roles of 'thunderbolt' and 'lightning flash' in Heraclitus' attempts to express the power of *aethēr*/Zeus in the directing of things see the commentary on fragment 31.

Fragment 65 was clearly read by the Stoics (whom Hippolytus follows) as a reference to world-formation ('need') and *ecpyrōsis* ('satiety'), but without benefit of context we cannot be sure that this was Heraclitus' intention. Two small suasions in its favour, noted by Kahn, are, first, the fact that fire 'needs' fuel, and might perhaps be

described as 'satisfied' when it finally burns itself out (ie, when there is a recognizable, variegated universe again) and, secondly, the association in the Greek mind of 'satiety' (*koros*) with *hybris*, and hence of imminent disaster (see Theognis 153), such a disaster being of course in human terms the eventual (re)destruction of the cosmos by fire.

Fragment 66

The authenticity of this fragment has been doubted by Reinhardt (1916, 164 ff; but cf Reinhardt, 1942, 22ff, where he is less trenchant) and Kirk (359 ff), but it should be accepted as genuine. It is simply accidental that a brilliant Heraclitean conceit fitted in perfectly with Hippolytus' notion of the fires of hell that awaited sinners after the day of judgment.* One can without qualm accept Kirk's translation (360) 'fire having come suddenly upon all things will bring them to trial and secure their conviction' (for the linguistic evidence for the translation see ibid), since the fire in question is presumably that divine and rational *aethēr* which guides and controls the sum of things (see the commentary on fragment 30) and 'is unwilling and willing to be called by the name Zeus' (fragment 32). As is well known, Zeus and Dike (Justice) were intimately connected in Greek thought (see the commentary on fragments 16, 94); and talk of *aethēr* 'punishing' those parts of the cosmos that have had the audacity to transmogrify themselves into something not *aethēr* is a natural, if bold, extension of the notion of Zeus as punisher of *human* transgression.That such an extension to the cosmological plane was at Heraclitus' disposal seems clear from Anaximander's earlier talk of the 'penalty and retribution' paid to one another for their 'injustice' by the great world masses.

Fragment 67

This fragment is significant in that it is the only description ('definition' [Kahn] is too strong a word) of Heraclitus' God that has come down to us. In it God is viewed as the *sum* of particular 'opposites' in the universe and presumably, by extrapolation, of *all* opposites in the

* Hippolytus can interpret Heraclitus the way he does because he understands 'all things' to mean 'all (*living*) things.' But there is no good reason for thinking that such was Heraclitus' intention.

universe. One can no doubt also assume that this God and that 'one wise thing' of which Heraclitus speaks in fragment 32 (see fragment 108) are one and the same, but the point is not in fact made by Heraclitus himself in any extant fragment. The 'God' in question is Heraclitus's God in the 'strong' or 'total' sense (just as God's view of justice in fragment 102 is the 'strong' or 'total' view); in the weaker sense he is that god whose structure and rational operations are most clearly seen, really and symbolically, in the structure and operations of a *part* of the cosmos – *aethēr* (fragments 16, 64, 66).

The opposites of the fragment are not meant to be themselves an exhaustive list, but rather representative thereof (so, rightly, Hippolytus). As predicates they derive what limited meaning they have from the restricted context in which they operate (see again fragment 102); in terms of the whole universe seen as the *sum* of *all* opposites (= God) they are wholly inapplicable (the universe as such is *neither* in daylight *nor* in darkness). This will be true even for the terms war/peace (despite fragment 53); states of war and peace may be major features of the universe, and the state of war indeed its dominant and ultimately most significant feature, but the universe itself, as the sum total of the real, cannot be said to be in a state of war or peace *vis-à-vis* anything else.

Whether one reads 'fire' or 'olive-oil' as the proposed analogue for God – both possibilities have been ably defended – makes little difference. The crucial point being made (if only by contraposition) seems to be that God/the universe is, as such, context-free, *un*changing and *un*changeable. People, by contrast, will invariably describe it from within the confines of the particular, limited context within which they operate, a context in which there will be change, movement, variety, and polarity and hence one in which God himself will (in the non-total sense; see above) be describable as subject to change. In so saying Heraclitus would not (*pace* Kahn) be revealing himelf as a proto-Aristotelian. It is not *qua* substrate that God/the universe is unchanging; it is its logically different status, as a context-free totality, from that of its component parts that renders it such. A similar, crucial point is made by Kant when, in exposing the antinomies of 'pure reason,' he argues that, while everything in the universe may be a potential object of perception, the universe *as a whole* can never be such.

The text is much controverted. Most editors (a recent exception being Kahn) understand the subject of 'undergoes changes' as 'the god'/'God' and

print some noun such as 'fire' (D-K), 'air' (Zeller), 'myrrh' (Heidel), 'olive oil' (Fränkel) after ὅκωσπερ.

Fragment [72]

The subject of the sentence is presumably, as so often in Heraclitus, 'people,' or 'the majority of mankind.' That from which they are 'separated' (see fragment 10) can only be the *logos* itself (fragments 1, 2, 50). But the *logos* is 'common' to all (fragment 2), did they but know it; they are 'absent' from it while 'present' to it (fragment 34).

This fragment has been doubted, by reason of its appearance in Marcus Aurelius in the midst of a list of 'quotations' (= 71–5 D-K) which by any reckoning are a set of vague reminiscences and paraphrases. But if the explicatory final sentence is excised as the gloss of Marcus himself (and itself a paraphrase of part of fragment 17), along with the explicatory phrase (immediately after ὁμιλοῦσι) 'the *logos* which directs the sum of things' (a Stoic version of the *logos* wholly alien to Heraclitus), the residue has a strikingly Heraclitean ring to it, and should probably be accepted as genuine. (Those who reject it see it as a vague reminiscence of fragment 17, qv).

Fragment [74]

The phrase 'children of ⟨our⟩ parents,' in Ionic Greek, is very likely drawn from Heraclitus himself. Marcus Aurelius' explanation ('that is, accept things simply as we have received them') may well indicate exactly what Heraclitus had in mind in the original context, but Marcus' own tendency to vague reminiscence and paraphrase suggests that it be treated with caution. If he is right, Heraclitus may have been attacking what he saw as a general tendency to take things on the say-so of various 'authorities,' such as parents, rather than on the say-so (*logos*) of the only authority that counts, ie, of 'that which is wise,' the real itself. But given our uncertainty about the original context, such an interpretation must remain speculative.

Fragment [75]

This 'quotation' is in reported speech and probably, like so much else that Marcus 'quotes' from Heraclitus, at best a vague reminiscence or

paraphrase. It may be drawn simply from the closing lines of fragment 1 (Marcovich), but the language suggests some different source. One might conjecture, with Kahn, that fragments 75 and 89 have a common source in Heraclitus, and that the sequence of thought was: (a) there is a 'common' world for the awake, while sleepers turn away into their own private universe (ie, into their dreams); (b) but even those asleep are none the less still in this universe, playing their part in the scheme of things.

Fragment 76?

All three 'quotations' from Heraclitus look like vague reminiscences and paraphrases of fragment 36, and should almost certainly not be attributed directly to him. Many scholars go further and see here a piece of Stoic interpretation of Heraclitus' cosmological system in terms of four elements, including 'air.' But there seems no good reason for doubting that for Heraclitus himself air was as 'real' as fire, water, and earth, and to be included in the world-masses undergoing everlasting change; see the note on fragment 31.

Fragment [77]

If we exclude the reference to 'joy,' the first part of this 'quotation' (in reported speech only) seems to be simply a vague reminiscence of the opening lines of fragment 36. However, as Kahn points out, the word 'joy' (*terpsis*) is an old one in the language, and is found once in the writings of Heraclitus' near-contemporary Herodotus; and the pains Numenius takes to offer an allegorical interpretation of the word suggests that it was in the text he was using. So it seems possible that Numenius is here drawing upon a genuine quotation from Heraclitus, in which Heraclitus stresses the pleasures souls have in dousing themselves (rather than, as in fragment 36, the death they risk undergoing); which would of course fit in well with his comments on drunkenness in fragment 117.

The second part of Numenius' 'quotation' (again in reported speech only) seems clearly just a reminiscence of the latter part of fragment 62.

With D-K I read ἢ θανάτων (rather than, with the mss, μὴ θανάτων). The

disjunction is presumably only a weak one; the drunkenness (fragment 117) that involves pleasure can also lead to death (fragment 36).

Fragment 78

Heraclitus does not spell out in what way exactly 'human nature' (= 'ordinary people'?) does not have 'right understanding,' or an 'accurate idea' (see fragment 41, where the singular form of *gnōmē* is used), but one might speculate that he is talking about the way the world is/should be, in which 'all things are steered through all' (fragment 41). That which of course possesses such insight (or such a plan, such an accurate idea) is, uniquely, that which 'is unwilling and willing to be called by the name of Zeus.' Alternatively, as Marcovich points out, Heraclitus might be referring to the unity that underpins the diversity of things (fragment 50), or to that *logos* which is 'common' to all (fragments 2, 114), or to the right understanding, possessed ⟨only?⟩ by the divine, of what is 'fair and just' (fragment 102), or to any or all combinations of these things.

Fragment 79

Some scholars, notably Fränkel (1938, 314), have found in this and other fragments (eg, 82, 83) what they consider a characteristic thought-pattern of Heraclitus, of the form A:B::B:C. Whatever the truth of this*, the present fragment is certainly understandable along such lines, ie, 'as a god is to a man, so a man is to a child.' The aorist tense *ēkouse* (literally, 'heard') is most naturally taken as gnomic, in the common sense of 'is called,' or 'hears himself called,' and the 'silliness' in question that lack of 'insight' or 'right understanding' credited to ordinary people ('human nature') in fragment 78, qv.

Fragment 80

In talking of war as 'common' ('*xynos*'), a poet such as Homer (*Iliad* 18.309), followed by Archilochus, fragment 38 Diehl, was of course

* See the commentary on fragments 82, 83.

merely suggesting the applicability of the effects of war to either side in war, depending on the tide of fortune. For Heraclitus the principle is universal, as is its expression (*logou*, fragment 2); it is that law (fragment 114), eternally expounded by 'that which is wise' (fragments 32, 108), whereby unity and balance are achieved through the endless clash of the opposites comprising the real.

The second phrase, 'justice is strife' (or: 'strife is justice'; syntactically the statement is one of identity), wears an air of perverse paradoxicality, but it is, in fact, in line with the apparent intent of fragment 102 (qv). The 'justice'/'strife' in question will be that overall, god's-eye-view of the real which constitutes cosmic justice/strife; in a given civic community particular acts will continue to be categorized (and fairly so) as just/unjust. The point would appear to be reinforced by Heraclitus' use, not of the word *adikia* ('injustice'), but of the older, more venerated word *dikē* ('an appointed or ordered or accepted way'; 'a right, or established way'); the orderer, being, of course 'that which is wise' (fragment 108)/'the god' (fragment 102).

A hint of the biological conception of change which is never far from the surface in early Greek thought emerges in the use of the word *ginetai*, which can mean 'are born,' 'come to birth,' as well as 'come to pass,' and one is immediately reminded of Heraclitus' other saying (fragment 53) that 'war is *father* of all.'

The text, as presented to us in the mss, has to be emended to make any sort of syntactical sense; following most recent editors, I read εἰδέναι as the infinitive that χρή presumably governed. The reading χρεώμενα is also almost certainly corrupt. If genuine, it would mean something like 'are ordained' or 'are proclaimed' ⟨by 'that which is wise'?⟩ If χρέων (Anaximander's word, fragment 1 D-K) is correct, it will of course be translated '⟨through⟩ necessity.' But the reading χρεώμενα is very likely based on a middle or passive *participle* in Heraclitus (hence Bywater's tentative emendation κρινόμενα); the importation from Anaximander is simply too easy a solution, as Kahn sees.

Fragment 81

Philodemus does not in fact name Pythagoras; for this we have to rely upon a very unclear passage of Timaeus (Historicus), itself quoted (how accurately?) by a scholiast on Euripides' *Hecuba* (for discussion see Marcovich, *ad loc*). If Heraclitus did, however, apply the term

'chief captain of swindlers' to Pythagoras, this would certainly be in keeping with his comments on him in fragments 40 and 129. Whether the 'swindling' or 'cheating' is meant to cover specifically *political* cheating we cannot tell; in general terms it undoubtedly covers that 'fabrication of falsehoods' and 'bearing witness thereto' that Justice will one day catch up with (fragment 28b).

Fragments 82, 83?

Both of these 'quotations' are in reported speech, but in such a form (using the conjunctions *hōs* and *hoti*) as possibly to preserve Heraclitus' original words. Both are rejected by some scholars (notably Marcovich and Bollack and Wismann) as (imaginatively) derivative from fragment 79, and this may well be right; the reference to the ape could stem quite simply from the nature of the Platonic dialogue (on Beauty) from which they are drawn. However, the two 'quotations,' argues Fränkel (1938, 314; followed by Kahn), could stem from an original Heraclitean statement of the form, 'the wisest of men is an ape in comparison to a god'. That is, 'in the matter of beauty/wisdom A:B::B:C' (for the same alleged thought-pattern see also fragment 79).

While Fränkel may be right, his theory should be treated with caution. Not only does it hypothesize a statement of Heraclitus' which has not as such survived, but as evidence it adduces what are at best reminiscenses/paraphrases of such an original and at worst imaginative extensions of fragment 79. If the latter is in fact the case, the whole 'thought-pattern' theory is also called into question, on grounds of circularity.

For these reasons I have tentatively dubbed fragments 82 and 83 'doubtful.'

Fragments 84a, 84b

Should the two quotations (if they are such) stem from the same context (and the Heraclitus-like contrast between 'rest' and 'weariness' has suggested to some that they do), it is difficult to interpret them with any assurance, not least because of difficulties of translation. My own (very hesitant) inclination is to see the first as generic, and cosmological, the second as specific, and sociological: (1) the sum of things is at rest *while* constantly changing and *by* constantly chang-

ing; in different terms, a single, ordered universe is the ongoing result of the clash of opposites; (2) the life of a slave is monotonous and wearisome. Such an interpretation is, like any other, pure conjecture, since we have no context to guide us; as Plotinus drily puts it: 'He neglected to make his argument clear for us' (4.8.1. 15–16 Henry and Schwyzer).

There is no way of knowing whether the 'quotations' preserved in Plotinus are genuine quotations or paraphrases based on memory; nor can one be sure of the context(s) from which they were drawn (Plotinus is clearly using them as a reinforcement for his own views on the incarnation of soul; there is no reason to believe Heraclitus had any such intention). The phrase τοῖς αὐτοῖς is also somewhat problematic. It is usually translated 'by the same ⟨rulers⟩,' and this is how I have translated it. But a dative with μοχθεῖν (as Bollack and Wismann point out; see also Kahn) usually refers to the cause or object of the toil, leading us to expect a translation like 'to toil over the same tasks.' But what does one then do with ἄρχεσθαι? Kahn weakly suggests a meaning 'to be ⟨always⟩ beginning' (ie, 'to toil continually at the same work and thus never to find rest by changing'); weakly because Heraclitus has just said that '⟨it⟩ *finds rest* in changing.' However, ἄρχεσθαι certainly is standard Greek for 'to begin' as well as 'to be ruled,' and the general sense of the fragment is too obscure for anyone to claim certainty as to which meaning was intended here.

A further, final difficulty is the referent of '⟨it⟩' and the force of the participle μεταβάλλον. *What* is it that rests, and is the change simply simultaneous with the rest or its cause or both?

Fragment 85

How one understands the (almost untranslatable) term *thymos* in this fragment is of some importance. Most scholars understand it to mean 'appetite' or 'desire,' though Aristotle and Plutarch (followed by Kirk, Kahn, and others) took it to mean 'anger.' And a case can be made out for either interpretation. Originally *thymos* seems to have meant the seat of both our intellectual and emotive selves, and was thought to be located in the lungs. It then comes to be used to denote both 'anger' and '⟨sensual⟩ desire' (especially for food and drink; for examples see LSJ sv *thymos*, and Marcovich, *ad loc*).

Which of the above interpretations is most likely in the present context? (1) If the meaning of *thymos* is 'desire,' it is easy to refer to

fragments 36, 117, and 118 for the doctrine alluded to: the 'desire' in question will be the desire for *drink*, which unfortunately has as a by-product the drowning or near-drowning of one's soul (*psychē*), ⟨and drowned or drowning souls are poorly equipped to put up (further) resistance⟩. (2) If it means 'anger,' a similar detriment to one's soul (= one's potentially immortal rational self; see the commentary on fragments 62, 117) will be involved, though not necessarily its actual destruction. For many the strength of interpretation 1 lies in its smooth coincidence with doctrine clearly propounded elsewhere as Heraclitean (fragments 117, 118), but its weakness is its arbitrary-looking restrictiveness; if he is talking about desire at all, Heraclitus is surely talking about gut-desire in general, not just the highly specific desire to drink. Interpretation 2, by contrast, is free of this particular difficulty. Nor, if *thymos* is taken as some sort of inner heat and effervescence, can it be said to contradict in any way the doctrine of fragment 118, for as Kahn points out, fr. 118 'distinguishes the wisest and best soul by its dryness and clarity, not by its heat'; not all 'fieriness' of soul is to soul's own best advantage.

(3) The third, and perhaps the most attractive possibility is that *thymos* here means the *seat* of desire/anger (heart? spirit?). *Thymos* is, after all, here credited with 'wishes,' and it would be strange, on the face of it, to find 'desire' or 'anger' (rather than that which *is* angry/driven) so described. If it does mean 'heart/spirit,' this of course can be easily understood as simultaneously *both* angry *and* driven by appetite; the 'choice' foisted upon Heraclitus by commentators is not one that he himself necessarily felt obliged to make. If this interpretation is correct, Heraclitus' point seems to be as follows: the *thymos* manifesting its more threatening self in anger/desire 'pays' for what it wants (desire satiated/anger allowed free rein) with a gruesome currency – a portion of the life of the person's soul. Soul, thus weakened (in the case of drunkenness, half drowned), is consequently even less able to resist when faced with the next assault, and so on, risking ultimate destruction both as a rational principle (fragment 117) and even as a principle of physical existence (fragment 36).

Fragment 86

That 'the greater part of things divine' (or however else Heraclitus expressed himself) should 'escape ⟨people's? experts'?⟩ ascertainment' is not an assertion that will surprise readers of the rest of the Heraclit-

ean fragments. For the basic realm of the divine is (no doubt 'unexpectedly' to those who believe in the simplicities propounded by contemporary religions, fragments 18, 27) that of *aethēr*, about which plain sense-observation will tell us little. Less easy to understand is the reason Heraclitus apparently offers: 'because of ⟨people's(?)⟩ lack of belief (or: lack of confidence).' Without benefit of context, one is, as so often, reduced to guess-work, and I offer the following conjecture. What ⟨people?⟩ fail to 'believe' or 'have confidence in' is the *logos* uttered by 'that which is wise'; could they but attend to it and accept it, the world in all its aspects (including 'those divine') would become *genuine* objects of ascertainment, rather than, as so often, mere objects of opinion *thought* to be objects of ascertainment (fragment 28a).

With most editors I read ἀπιστίῃ (dative), rather than the mss reading ἀπιστίη (nominative), assuming that Plutarch, in talking about 'the greater part of things divine,' is paraphrasing what was the subject of the verb in Heraclitus' original sentence.

Fragment 87

It is disputed whether Heraclitus is here mocking particular members of the human race ('fools,' or, less probably, 'sluggards'), or the human race in general; the former seems more likely, unless Heraclitus is to be credited with a fairly blatant untruism.

The difference between the fool and the person of intelligence, we can assume, is for Heraclitus the fact that the latter is equipped with among other things the power of discrimination among statements heard. With a carefully accumulated body of knowledge and an educated conceptual apparatus as a secure basis from which to operate, he is not overwhelmed when confronted with fresh claims, or new hypotheses, but examines each on its merits, accepting and rejecting them as dispassionately as he can on the evidence available. The 'fool,' by contrast, gets all excited (literally, 'all of a flutter') at any new thing he hears; true or false, such things generate a uniform response in him because, like an amoeba, he has a cognitive apparatus too unsophisticated to distinguish among, and hence deal intelligently with, varying stimuli (in this case, verbal stimuli). (See also fragment 97.)

Fragment 88

In this fragment we have a particularly clear statement that where Heraclitus speaks of 'sameness' he is referring to an entity's self-identity rather than to the supposed 'identity' of sequential and apparently 'opposite' characteristics it enjoys. In this case the entity in question could be either ourselves or attributes of (literally, for Heraclitus, 'in') ourselves. The former interpretation poses the fewest difficulties, at least *prima facie*: in the world there are creatures that, while preserving self-identity, progress, waking and sleeping, from youth to age, and finally die. It is, by contrast, *prime facie* strange to maintain that I have 'in' me, or am characterized by, something which wakes and sleeps, is growing and ages, etc, rather than that *I* wake and sleep, etc. (On the other hand, even Plato can affirm that it is my 'opinion' which opines [*Republic* 478a]).

Less easy to cope with is the reason Heraclitus offers for the self-identity of the creatures (ourselves?) he has in mind. The least problematic of the pairs of opposites is that of waking and sleeping; experience leads us to agree at once that they are poles of what Kirk has called a 'continuum of consciousness,' and that cyclical change between the poles continues for a life-time. In the case of birth/death, youth/age, the same claim seems absurdly false. Why, then, is Heraclitus apparently making it? The answer appears to be in the doctrine of transmigration of souls, a doctrine to which Heraclitus may, perhaps surprisingly, have adhered (see fragments 63, 98, where life after death is not apparently a notion he finds absurd). The person who is old in incarnation 1 is young again in incarnation 2, old again in the same incarnation, and young in incarnation 3, etc. But does this work in the case of life/death, since the soul is, one must assume, not itself subject to death and the body it inhabits is a different one in each incarnation? The answer seems to be yes, and on two grounds. (1) Heraclitus is not in fact wedded to the view that it is merely the composite that dies; he seems to have thought that some souls at any rate – ie, 'wet' ones – do on that very account themselves die (see fragment 36). (2) What of those 'heroic' souls that appear to achieve immortality (fragment 63)? All that is needed is to understand the subject of which the six epithets are predicated as '*incarnate* soul.' An 'immortal' soul, on this interpretation, will in a given incarnation 'come to life and die' in the sense that the *composite* will come to life and die; and likewise for waking/sleeping, youth/age. The six epithets 'change around' with the altered circumstances of incarnate soul, which throughout the proceedings enjoys self-identity (*t'auto*).

The mss are divided between τ' ἕνι and γ' ἕνι after τ' αὐτό. τ' is strange as a conjunctive outside of verse, and γε is strange standing alone. Were γ' ἕνι a corruption of γένει ('generically') (Wilamowitz), the whole phrase could of course be deleted as the gloss of some post-Aristotelian scribe or commentator, but it is hard to see how such an easy reading could have become corrupted to such a difficult one, rather than vice versa. ἕνι at least seems clearly Heraclitean, and can be provisionally accepted, but the matter is of minor importance. As the rest of the fragment makes clear, Heraclitus is thinking of a single entity endowed sequentially with apparently 'opposite' characteristics.

Fragment [89]

This fragment has been dubbed doubtful by some scholars. Linguistically there are reasonable grounds for this: Heraclitus' supposed statement consists only of the reported speech of Plutarch, and certain words (*koinon* ('universal') for the more characteristic Heraclitean word *xynon* ('common'), see fragment 2) seem very likely a paraphrase of his own. Philosophically, however, the grounds seem less strong. The notion of a universe common to all is undoubtedly Heraclitean (fragment 30), as are the linked opposites, waking and sleeping (fragment 88). In view of this, a further antithesis between the 'public' universe and the 'private' universe (of dreams) seems a particularly natural one. For this reason fragment 89 should probably be accepted as a genuine thought of Heraclitus. Even if we now see it only through the paraphrasing lens of Plutarch, there is no reason to think the lens has in any significant way distorted the image.

Fragment 90

The fragment should be read in close conjunction with fragments 30 and 31, and much will turn on whether one understands the phrase 'all things' collectively or distributively. Read collectively (as, eg, by Kahn) it can be taken as referring to the present world of sense-perception, periodically 'exchanged' for fire in an enormous conflagration and *vice versa* – and such was the way Theophrastus and the Stoics clearly understood it. Read distributively (as, eg, by Kirk), it can be taken as referring severally to those world-masses (two or

three, depending on one's interpretation; see the commentary on fragment 31) into which part of *aethēr* is everlastingly turning. (On the latter interpretation the phrase 'all things,' one must assume, is being used somewhat loosely, and must mean 'all things *excluding aethēr*.')

As in the case of fragments 30, 31, and 10, either or both interpretations seem possible, with the proviso that the 'synchronic' interpretation be understood to refer merely to a period (no doubt of great length) in the history of the cosmos, not to an everlasting state of affairs (see my interpretation of fragment 31).

Finally, the simile of gold suggests a judgment of *worth* on Heraclitus' part, and this is not surprising.* As the *locus* of, if not itself actually synonymous with, 'that which is wise' (fragment 108), *aethēr* is clearly for Heraclitus worth, in value, all the rest of the universe that is at any one time not *aethēr*.

As many have indicated, the metaphor of exchange used here by Heraclitus is directed towards the same general phenomenon (nature's balance, or, more precisely, continuous self-balancing; see the commentary on fragment 51) as Anaximander's earlier metaphor of *dikē* (penalty) and *tisis* (retribution). In more contemporary terms, Wiggins (16) points usefully to the analogous concept of 'energy' that the modern mind understands as the *Urstoff* of the universe that can be neither added to nor diminished; 'the great cosmic enterprise trades neither at a loss nor at a profit' (Wiggins 15).

Fragment 91a?

Whether this famous statement is meant to be read as Heraclitus' own words or simply as Plutarch's own summary of a longer statement we cannot know. Whatever the case, the question whether Heraclitus ever said *anything* like 'you cannot step twice into the same river' is a matter of deep dispute (see, eg, Reinhart 1916, 165, 207 n1, Gigon 106ff, Guthrie 441ff, Marcovich, Kahn).

If fragment 12 is genuinely Heraclitean, then, as several have argued (eg, Vlastos [338ff], Kahn), the original thought was presumably something like: 'One cannot step twice into the same river (fragment 91); ⟨for⟩ upon those who ⟨do⟩ step into the same rivers different and different waters flow' (fragment 12); or, possibly: 'Upon those who step into the same rivers different and different waters flow. ⟨For that

* For other, parallel judgments Kahn refers usefully to fragments 29, 49, 99.

reason) one cannot step *twice* into the *same* river.' This has a *prima facie* plausibility, but is ultimately unlikely, in that the causal clause is not in fact an explanation for the main clause constituted by fragment 12 at all. Fragment 12, spelled out, would presumably run: 'Upon those stepping into the same rivers different and different waters flow; (but the rivers *are none the less the same rivers*, however many times, and however many different people, step into them).' Fragment 91a, spelled out, would presumably run: 'You could not step twice into the *same* river; (for, given the constantly changing water, *no* river can ever be said to be the same at times one and two).' Now, while the two statements are admittedly not self-contradictory, since fragment 12 stresses the unity amid diversity that constitutes the universe (on the assumption, accepted by most modern editors, *contra* Plutarch, that the river-image *is* an analogical description of the universe) while fragment 91a stresses perhaps the sheer diversity of the universe, without reference to any putative unity that subsumes it, they do pull in such contrary directions that the use of one in explanation of the other risks begging the question.*

All that this shows, however, is that fragments 12 and 91a were unlikely to have been causally conjoined in some original Heraclitean statement; both as they stand catch something of Heraclitus' view of the unity amidst diversity of things. But fragment 12 has the advantage of stressing both the unity and the diversity of things, while underscoring the unity. Fragment 91a, by contrast, stresses merely the diversity, and is to that degree misleading.

If the two fragments were not originally conjoined, is it likely that they were uttered *separatim* by Heraclitus, with or without the contrasting statement (fragment 12) or explanation (fragment 91a) hypothesized above? Of this it is impossible to be certain, but the case for fragment 12 seems to me stronger than that for fragment 91a. In the case of fragment 12, a complete, coherent, and well-known Heraclitean doctrine is epitomized in a fragment and, hypothetically, a single contrasting statement; in the case of fragment 91a, the fragment and its putative explanation offer only a partial, and to that degree a tendentious, description of the same doctrine. The fragment could, it may be argued, be perhaps saved by the hypothesizing of a further statement or set of statements, now lost, in which Heraclitus went on

* An indication of just how contrary the directions are is evident in Kahn's unabashedly interpretive re-construction of fragment 12 as 'For as one steps into [*what is supposed to be*] the same rivers ... etc' (my italics).

to discuss a sense in which the river *was* in fact the same, but the apophthegmatic tone of the fragment, together with the heavy emphasis laid on the words *'the same'* river (in the Greek the words come last in the sentence – a strikingly emphatic position), make this an unlikely possibility.

However, it is easy to see how a pupil or interpreter, looking for a quick and not too technical summary of two famous Heraclitean river-statements (fragments 12 and 49a), would use some such portmanteau statement as: 'You could not step twice into the same river' (Plato, *Cratylus* 402a). But, it is in fact a summary which runs counter to the spirit of the original doctrine in that it catches merely one part of that doctrine ('different waters') and to that extent misleads concerning it.*

For the above reasons I am tempted, with many, to place fragment 91a among the 'questionable' fragments, as a well-intentioned but at best partially successful attempt to catch, in summary form, the import of a famous Heraclitean image, or at worst (a less likely possibility) a jocose, throw-away 'summary,' deliberately designed by some critic to make fun of Heraclitus at the expense of attention to the totality of his doctrine, and ultimately winning acceptance as Heraclitean by its pungency, neatness, and paradoxicality.

Fragment [91b]

It is extremely difficult to know: (1) how many of the three paired descriptions in this fragment are Heraclitean: estimates have varied from two (D-K) to all three (Kirk) to none whatsoever (Marcovich); (2) whether the putatively 'Heraclitean' pairs (however many) are drawn from a single context in Heraclitus, or just culled from various parts of Heraclitus' writings by Plutarch to illustrate a point of his own; and (3) whether, on the assumption that some or all of the pairs are Heraclitean, and part of a single quotation, they are in fact in any way part of the famous river-analogy.

The first pair consists of verbs which in every other known instance are transitive, while each of the second two pairs consists of intransitive verbs. So the 'safe' translation of the first pair will be something like 'it (the river?) scatters and gathers ⟨things?⟩,' rather than the intransitive or reflexive 'it scatters and gathers' (Kirk). The second pair is much more obviously adapted to cosmological and biological

* For as a summary it offers no hint that 'those who step' may in some real sense not be stepping *at all* (fragment 49a).

formation and dissolution than to anything else (see, with Kirk, Diogenes of Apollonia fragments 2 and 7, Euripides fragment 17.3 Nauck, 2nd ed). Only the third is clearly appropriate to the image of water flowing past a fixed point.

My own inclination is to see the three pairs as drawn from various parts of Heraclitus' writings by Plutarch in order to describe not so much the flow of a river's water as the vicissitudes of 'mortal substance.' Since Plutarch himself interprets the river-analogy in terms of the changeability of mortal substance, he can (and I suspect does) draw upon passages in which Heraclitus talks *either* of the river *or* of mortal substance to illustrate what Plutarch himself takes to be one and the same point anyway. If this interpretation is correct, the third of his paired descriptions could well have come from a context in which Heraclitus described the flow of a river's water past a fixed point, and the second from one where he described the formation/dissolution of human substance (see Plutarch's introductory statement). The first pair is uncertain both as to meaning and application; as it stands, it does not seem particularly suited to describe either the flow of a river or the changeability of human existence. It is not, however, impossible that, if it is legitimate to take it transitively or reflexively, it will refer to the changeability of a river's waters in terms of the various surface patterns (eddies, whirlpools) seen from a fixed point rather than the mechanical flow of water *past* a fixed point. But the 'if' is a big one, and the matter is best left open.

Fragment 92

How exactly Heraclitus saw the relationship between Apollo's priestess and '⟨the⟩ Sibyl' is not clear, but one can safely assume that each was seen by him as a (putative) 'medium' for the voice of the god that possessed her. But the reason for his reference to '⟨the⟩ Sibyl' (as Kahn notes, one cannot be sure whether he thought of her as an individual or a type) is still in doubt. Is he (1) *attacking* ⟨the⟩ Sibyl as some sort of charlatan (see fragment 14), or (2) saying that, just as ⟨the⟩ Sibyl, for all her mirthless 'ravings,' conveys the voice of Apollo, so he, Heraclitus, however strange he may sound, conveys the *logos* of 'that which is wise' (see fragment 50)? I am inclined, with Kahn, to accept the first interpretation, but the second certainly cannot be discounted.

It is difficult to know how much of this 'quotation' is Heraclitus and how much Plutarch; editors vary from acceptance of the whole sentence to acceptance of simply the words 'with raving mouth' (Reinhardt) to something in between these two extremes. With Kirk, Marcovich, and Kahn I accept the words '⟨The⟩ Sibyl . . . mirthless' as belonging to the original quotation from Heraclitus; the reference to 'a thousand years' has to be Plutarch's own addition since it is undoubtedly based on a calculation back from his own time to the approximate time of the appearance of the Delphic Pythia (the subject of his essay).

Fragment 93

Given the notorious ambiguities of the utterances of the Delphic Apollo, it is not difficult to see why Heraclitus should characterize him, not as clearly revealing or utterly concealing, but as forever offering only indications of the truth; indications, it may be added, which are highly likely to mislead those who place their faith merely in the surface-meaning of statements. But to what, if anything, is he, by analogy, referring? To his own enigmatic style of utterance (*logos*)? To the *logos* everlastingly being uttered by 'that which is wise'? Or to both?

I am myself inclined to accept the third possibility. Whether one talks of Apollo himself or of his priestess speaking, the utterance is describable as ambiguous or riddling in either case (see fragment 92, interpretation 2), being in the final analysis one and the same statement. In similar fashion the *logos* of 'that which is wise,' whether directly ascertained, or ascertained via the medium of Heraclitus, will invariably be enigmatic, if not downright misleading to all who do not possess insight enough to realize that the genuine, as distinct from the surface-meaning, of the *logos* has, like the 'real constitution' of things, 'a tendency to conceal itself' (fragment 123; cf fragment 54: 'an unapparent connection is stronger (or: better) than one which is obvious'). As such, it is only likely to reveal itself to those who are prepared to 'dig' perseveringly (fragment 22), extensively (fragment 35), and with open-mindedness as to what may in the end be uncovered (fragment 18).

One conclusion of all this is that the *logos* of Heraclitus/'that which is wise' will, like the utterances of the Delphic Apollo, contain much systematic, challenging and in the final analysis profoundly meaning-

ful ambiguity. The degree and quality of insight into that *logos* will distinguish the cautious from the hasty, the genuine enquirers (fragment 35) from the charlatans (fragments 42, 56, 57, 106) and mere polymaths (fragment 40), and the lovers of truth from those who simply 'conjecture at random' (fragment 47).

Fragment 94

The word *metron* ('measure') can be used spatially, or temporally, or both. In this fragment both meanings make excellent sense, and for that reason both are very likely intended. The world is so organized, says Heraclitus, that the sun will not deviate from its well-known path through the sky from season to season – low on the horizon in winter, nearer the meridian in summer – nor in the lengths of time it takes to traverse the sky from season to season. For the world is an ordered thing, a *cosmos* (fragment 30), and order and predictability go hand in hand.

The point is reinforced by a *per impossible* consideration, couched in religious terms readily comprehensible by any reader of Heraclitus' predecessor Anaximander (fragment 1): the sun-god, if he ever did transgress his measures, would, like any other disturber of the natural scheme of things, be caught by the goddess 'Right Way' (*Dikē*), via her minions, the avenging Furies. And *Dikē*, as we know from Hesiod, is the daughter of Zeus himself, that 'wise thing' (fragment 32) whose utterance is the grounding law of the real (fragment 114).

As part of a general commitment to the view of an ordered universe, Heraclitus seems committed to a particular epistemological view startling in the depth of its difference from a view of Hume that has, in its turn, become the *locus* of a problem: not only, says Heraclitus, do we know for certain that the sun *will* rise, we also know where, and when – and why!

Fragment 95

This quotation has a proverbial ring to it, and without context is difficult to interpret. The word translated as 'ignorance' has overtones of 'not having learned' ⟨something one might have⟩; if Heraclitus meant to emphasize this, his point may have been that such a common human failing (fragment 17) should at least be recognized by

people, and prudential measures taken by them not to flaunt it to their detriment.

With Marcovich and several earlier editors, I take the words ἔργον . . . οἶνον (printed by D-K) as a comment by Plutarch himself.

Fragment 96

This statement shocked the sensibilities of a lot of Greeks, as the many ancient 'echoes' of it (collected by Marcovich) clearly demonstrate. But Heraclitus is only being consistent. If the *psychē* is one's genuine self, and potentially a demigod (fragments 62, 63), the body can be regarded as of little consequence, and contemporary burial rituals, with their elaborate respect for the corpse, as wholly misleading. (On the question of the corpses of those who die in battle see the commentary on fragment 63.)

Fragment 97

The exact import of this fragment is not certain, but Kahn's suggestion that it be read in conjunction with fragment 87 is attractive: 'as dogs react to strangers (see Plato, *Republic* 376a), ⟨so do foolish men to every *logos*⟩.' What dogs and fools share, on this reading, is an inability to *discriminate* among things that are presented to them as new; their conceptual apparatus, being in each case not highly developed, is unable to analyse and accommodate anything perceived as new with tranquillity. A rider to the argument might have been: 'and if this is true of the new but unimportant, how much more so will it be when that newest and most important of all challenges to some deep-seated beliefs presents itself – ie, the *logos* uttered by "that which is wise"?'

Fragment 98

It is important to realize at the outset that Heraclitus does not say that souls have *only* the sense of smell in Hades (as many commentators seem to assume); his meaning could just as well be that souls in Hades *retain* the sense of smell ⟨as well as the use of senses such as, eg, sight⟩. Hades (etymologically, to many, 'the invisible ⟨place?⟩'; see Plato, *Cratylus* 403a), the dark and gloomy kingdom seen by most

religious-minded Greeks as the destination, or at any rate long-term stopping place, for human souls after separation from the body, is unlikely to have been thought by anyone to have been absolutely invisible to the souls within it. It was 'invisible', surely, in any strict sense only to those attempting to catch a glimpse of it from without. Unless therefore one interprets the 'light' of fragment 26 as 'smell,' and smell seen strictly as a replacement for the now useless sense of sight (a possible but far from obvious interpretation), fragment 98 seems most naturally understood as a claim that in the dinginess of Hades the sense of sight needs to be supplemented by smell, which, as Heraclitus affirms elsewhere, has extraordinary powers of differentiating things reduced, as far as the eye is concerned, to the undifferentiated uniformity and impenetrability of smoke (fragment 7). There may also be a reference to souls 'smelling' the blood of sacrificed animals (Homer, *Odyssey* 11.36–7), as Marcovich suggests.

The quotation is in reported speech, but is prefaced by the conjunction ὅτι, leaving open the possibility that the words quoted are those of Heraclitus himself. The definite article before 'souls' is unusual, and leads Nussbaum to interpret the fragment as a sardonic description of those souls talked about by, for example, Homer. This is possible, but it seems equally possible (given that we have no context to guide us) that Heraclitus could have been referring generally to 'the souls of those who die,' and this is how I have understood him.

Fragment 99

This fragment seems to be read most naturally in conjunction with fragment 57, qv. Night and day, Heraclitus may be saying, are 'one,' in the sense that they are complementary and reciprocal periods of time, only differentiable by the presence of sunlight. The natural conclusion of this is that, in the absence of sun, the entire twenty-four-hour period (not just half of it) would be darkness, and vice versa; or, in Heraclitus' own words, suitably expanded: 'it would be night ⟨*when we would expect day*⟩.'

If the phrase 'as far as the rest of the stars are concerned' is accepted as part of the quotation, the phrase 'it would be night' will presumably have to be construed as 'it would be ⟨everlasting⟩ night.'

It is disputed whether the phrase 'as far as the rest of the stars are con-

cerned' (found in the version of the fragment at Plutarch, *De fortuna* 98c) is Heraclitean, or Plutarch's own addition. I tentatively reject it, but a counter-case (see Marcovich) can certainly be argued.

Fragment 100

This phrase is in dactylic rhythm, and is thus possibly part of a line of (epic) poetry Heraclitus is quoting for some purpose unknown to us. In a brilliant piece of reconstruction Reinhardt (1942, 228–35) connected the thought with two other ideas claimed as Heraclitean by later sources, that of generations consisting of thirty years and that of the so-called Great Year, but this is simply speculation, drawing what strength it has from the philologically correct assumption that *horē* can mean 'hour,' or 'period of time' as well as 'season' (see further Kahn *ad loc*).

Fragment 101

The fragment we have is too small and flimsy a foundation on which to build much. If Heraclitus is stressing the word 'myself,' he might perhaps be suggesting that he does well to direct at *himself*, as well as to the real as such, any attempt at a serious explanation of the real and its operations. For the self is a microcosm of the whole universe in the 'depth' of its 'measure' (fragment 45). The contrast might also be between himself and others (or, as we might put it, 'other minds'); the former, Heraclitus could be suggesting, is more readily investigable than the latter.

If he is stressing the word 'investigated,' he might be suggesting that in so acting he is also demonstrating, like Socrates later, his obedience to the Delphic maxim 'get to know thyself' (*gnōthi sauton*).

A further possible reading of the fragment, espoused by Kahn, is 'I searched for myself'; but the concept of self-alienation (as distinct from alienation from the world) is not one readily confirmed by any other of the fragments.

A final, somewhat different possibility, backed in antiquity by Diogenes Laertius, is that Heraclitus meant 'I made enquiry of *myself*' (as distinct from others),' that is, 'I have been my own teacher.'

Fragment 101a

This fragment (whose textual base is somewhat flimsy; see Marcovich, *ad loc*) is in line with Heraclitus' other statements on the value of the senses and in general of experiential learning (fragment 55) – provided of course that our *psychai* understood the language spoken by the real (fragment 107). His apparent commitment to the supremacy of sight is one shared by many Greek philosophers, notably Plato and Aristotle; but for interesting comments on the particular value of the sense of smell see fragments 7, 98.

Fragment 102

The first thing to be said is that the sentence attributed to Heraclitus takes the form of an apparent contrast (*men ... de*): for God all things are X, for men some things are X, some not-X. Secondly, it suggests strongly that what men think is merely a supposition; the God's-eye-view is the accurate one. The question is: can either of these views be accepted as genuinely Heraclitean? The answer in both instances seems to be yes.

'Justice' for Heraclitus, as later for Plato, seems to mean the harmony/balanced tension of opposites (see, eg, fragments 51, 53, 80). How the term is used will turn on context. In the context of a given city-state (*polis*) actions tending to promote the harmonious functioning thereof will be seen as just; those producing the opposite effect, unjust. In such a context justice as harmony or justice as attunement (see fragments 51, 54) tends to be stressed. But in that broader context which is the cosmos itself ('all things,' viewed synoptically) a *polis* at peace with itself or a *polis* at war with itself is but one element in a mass of conflicting elements whose ongoing 'warfare' (fragments 53, 80) produces that *universal* balance through strife which is the object of the God's-eye-view and which equals the 'higher' justice.

If this interpretation is correct, there is no need to see the second part of the fragment as an imperfect, 'subjective' statement of something in fact objectively the case (Kahn). People err, says Heraclitus, precisely in their failure to take account of the broader context. While in some *weak* sense of the word 'just' actions tending to promote the harmony and sound functioning of the *polis* can be described as 'just,' and vice versa (see fragment 23 and the doctrine at which it apparently hints: acts of injustice in society sharpen our sense of justice in its

regard), in a *stronger* sense the term 'just' can and must be applied to all situations/events/states of affairs in the cosmos, in that each and every one ('all things') is seen by the synoptic vision of 'that which is wise' (fragment 108) within the context of that *whole* ('all things') whose 'justice' is strife (fragment 80).

The syntax of Porphyry's sentence suggests that the words attributed to Heraclitus are a paraphrase only. How exact the paraphrase is cannot be known for certain; most modern commentators see no reason for not accepting it as fairly exact, but Kahn is sceptical. With Marcovich I bracket καὶ ἀγαθά.

Fragment 103

The natural meaning of Heraclitus' phrase is that the (supposed) 'beginning' and 'end' of a circle are one and the same (*xynon*, 'common') will on such an interpretation be simply a linguistic variation for *mia kai hōytē* ('one and the same')). Porphyry offers no hint as to a possible referent of 'circle' here; if there is one, it could well be, as Gigon (100) suggests, the cyclical changes in nature. Understood in the purely general terms in which it is couched, however, the phrase looks like yet another illustration of a basic Heraclitean commitment: the same object (action/event/state of affairs) – as illustrated by a point on a circle – will appear possessed of opposite properties, depending on the perspective from which it is viewed. See fragments 9, 58, 59, 60.

[περιφερείας] I take to be a word added by Porphyry himself, as it is not otherwise found before Aristotle.

Fragment 104

It is unclear whether Heraclitus is here attacking the majority of mankind or some specific group, such as the Ephesians (see fragment 121). Either way, his disdain for a group of people which only listens to 'the throng' (ie, to itself), and actually believes the things said by bards and poets (see fragments 42, 56, 57, 106), is total. And the reason offered – a quotation, perhaps, of a current proverb fashionable among aristocrats – leaves no doubt as to his own social preferences. Examples of *agathoi* would presumably be for him Bias (fragment 39) and Hermodorus (fragment 121), whose 'discernment and

intelligence,' we can assume, were for Heraclitus evidenced in their willingness to listen to, and rule in accordance with the *logos* (fragment 112).

Fragment 105

This is a piece of information, not a quotation. As in fragment 38, *astrologos* must mean 'astronomer.' But what Heraclitus said about Homer's 'astronomy' we do not know.

Fragment 106

If Plutarch is reporting accurately, Heraclitus' exact criticism may have been: 'in counting some days good, some bad, Hesiod did not appreciate that ⟨the⟩ 'real constitution' (see, eg, fragment 123) of each day is one ⟨and the same⟩.' The reference is apparently to Hesiod's distinction between 'lucky' and 'unlucky' days (*Works and Days* 765ff), in which Heraclitus perhaps saw yet another instance of a poet propounding doctrine (this time a doctrine of 'opposites') that flouts one of his own most characteristic contentions, that is, that supposed 'opposites' in the real are in fact in some important sense 'the same.' (For the sense in which they are 'the same' see the commentary on fragment 88).

If this was Heraclitus' line of attack, however, it was surely misguided, since Hesiod's statement hardly commits him to the view that each day is *essentially* different from the next one. Perhaps Heraclitus' dislike of poets (see, eg, fragments 42, 56, 57, 106) has simply led him to overstate his case; this seems more likely than the possibility (Kirk, following Reinhardt) that the supposed 'quotation' is Plutarch's own garbled and incorrect version of fragment 57.

Fragment 107

This fragment should be read in conjunction with fragments 55 and 101a. For the Greeks a *'barbaros'* meant one who did not understand Greek; a 'barbarous' *soul* is presumably one which does not understand the language spoken by 'that which is wise,' the language in

which the *logos* of the real (fragments 1, 2, 50) is couched. Without a knowledge of this language, the soul will never be able accurately to 'interpret' sights and sounds, however extensively and however accurately presented to it in sensation. In possession of the knowledge, the soul will be equipped to interpret them, and the way will be open for insight (*noos*, fragment 40) into the real.

An alternate reading, espoused by many, is to understand *barbarous* as meaning 'ignorant of the language used by the *senses* (of sight and hearing).' This is a clear possibility; the 'witnesses' (eyes and ears) will be 'poor' ones when *they* speak a language that is not understood by the soul.

A final, and perhaps the best, possibility combines something of both interpretations. 'That which is wise' speaks (directly and/or via such as Heraclitus) to the soul (fragments 1, 2, 50), and so do the senses; and the language they speak is ultimately the *same* language. So a deepening of our understanding of the language of the latter will be, by the same token, a deepening of our understanding of the language in which the description of the real is itself couched by that which is wise. How soul gets to learn the language Heraclitus does not say, but one can assume that minimum conditions will be breadth of interest (fragment 35), open-mindedness (fragment 18), perseverance (fragment 22), and a willingness to listen (fragment 50). A predisposition to such learning is guaranteed by the fact that the soul is itself part of the world it attempts to understand, being composed of air/fire.

Fragment 108

Two translations of a crucial phrase seem possible: (1) placing a comma after *esti* (Bollack and Wismann, Kahn), 'to recognize what is wise, set apart from all,' and (2) 'to recognize *that* ⟨the?⟩ wise is set apart from all.'

According to the second view, we must understand *ginōskein* as an instance of propositional knowledge (knowing that such and such is the case) rather than acquaintance (knowing Socrates). But the interpretation of the adjective *sophon* as subject of the subordinate clause remains obscure. In what *sense* is 'wise' set apart from all things/mankind? To interpret 'wise' as 'wisdom,' as many do, seems linguistically hazardous. To interpret it as '⟨the⟩ wise' (in the sense of 'that

which is wise,' fragment 32) is more linguistically acceptable, in that Heraclitus does on occasion apparently dispense with the definite article when dealing with nouns formed from neuter adjectives and neuter participles (see, eg, fragment 88). If this interpretation is correct, the statement does in fact coincide propositionally with what version (1) seems to state as a matter of acquaintance.

If, as I believe, interpretation (1) is to be preferred, *ho ti sophon* ('that which is wise') will be straightforwardly identical to that 'wise thing' which Heraclitus describes in fragment 32 as 'unwilling and willing to be called by the name Zeus.' As *aethēr*/thunderbolt/Zeus, it is of course clearly 'set apart' from all things/mankind.

Fragment 110

As Kahn points out, fragment 110 looks like an attack on those who accepted the doctrine of the so-called Delian Inscription, which Aristotle cites (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1099a25, *Eudemian Ethics* 1214a1): 'The fairest is what is most just, the best of all is health; / But the sweetest thing of all is to obtain what one loves (*erai*).' (A prose version of the second line is ascribed to Thales, as quoted in Demetrius of Phaleron, D-K no. 1, p. 64: 'The sweetest thing is to obtain what one desires (*epithymeis*).') But as an attack it misses the mark: the Delian Inscription in fact described 'health' as the *best* thing of all. As in the case of fragment 106 (qv) Heraclitus' dislike for poets and the charlatans behind popular religion (fragment 14) may have led him into a certain amount of misrepresentation. What most people find 'the sweetest thing of all,' we can infer from fragment 29, is to 'glut themselves like cattle,' and with this statement 'Thales' and the author of the Delian Inscription might very well in fact have agreed; just as they might have agreed that such indulgence could turn out to one's ultimate disadvantage. Nothing that Heraclitus has said touches their claim about the *pleasure* involved in fulfilling one's desires.

If the fragment is *not* meant as an attack on the Delian Inscription, it is probably best read, as D-K suggest, in conjunction with fragment 85; getting what one wants may be buying something 'at the price of ⟨one's own⟩ soul.'

In John Stobaeus this fragment is directly juxtaposed with fragment 111, and Bywater and others have taken the two together as a single statement. This seems to me doubtful; for reasons see the commentary on fragment 111.

Fragment 111

In this fragment we have much more of a stress on the contrast between certain opposites than on any nexus between them. Yet the contrast, in its own way, suggests some sort of link between them. For the antecedence of certain 'negative' opposites often highlights and adds savour to (and in this sense, links) their 'positive' antitheses, when these eventually come to pass. An example of such pleasures for Plato are (*Republic* 583) the pleasures of relief. How much further one can safely go in interpreting the fragment is doubtful. For John Stobaeus (followed by several twentieth-century commentators) its import is clearly ethical, and we can see why: for him it is directly linked to fragment 110 (qv) and follows it without a break. One can speculate that he (mistakenly) equated 'better' in fragment 110 with 'pleasanter,' and conjoining this with the reference to health as 'pleasant' (fragment 111), saw the combination as an 'ethical' response by Heraclitus to the Delian Inscription (see the commentary on fragment 110) in terms of the doctrine of opposites. And it may be conceded that the phrase 'pleasant and good' could well constitute an oblique reference to the Delian Inscription; though what is 'pleasant' and what is 'good' are there carefully *distinguished* from each other. But had the two statements been linked in the original, *gar* ('for') or some such connective would surely have been expected, and is conspicuously missing.

Another remote possibility is that Heraclitus is propounding a doctrine of hedonism (*hēdy kai agathon* = 'pleasant, ie good' where 'ie' translates a use of the so-called explicative *kai*). But the possibility *is* very remote; the doctrine is in fact one of the many claims to fame of the Sophists, and no ancient commentator ever claimed to find evidence of it in Heraclitus' work.

D-K, following Heitz, emended ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν to ἡδύ, κακὸν ἀγαθόν. But this is to assume a doctrine of 'identity' in Heraclitus to which he may never in fact have adhered, and the emendation is rightly rejected by recent editors.

Fragment 112

Heraclitus begins by signalling his assent to a commonplace of contemporary moral thinking: that 'sound thinking,' or 'good sense,' is a 'very great virtue,' and in so doing he consciously shifts the use of the

word *aretē* (till then almost exclusively used of bravery in battle) in a direction in which it will enjoy a long and distinguished philosophical history. His next move signals his dissent from the commonly accepted: ⟨'practical⟩ wisdom' (*sophiē*, literally, 'skill') ⟨upon which such sound thinking is based⟩, consists of the following:

1 *saying* what is *true* (or: the case);
2 *acting* in accordance with the 'real constitution' ⟨of things⟩ (alternatively, 'acting ⟨out?⟩ what is true'; but such a usage is, as Kahn admits, without parallel in the language);
3 (an indispensable condition of 2) paying *heed* ⟨to the real constitution of things⟩.

Statement 1 is, on the face of it, paradoxical: there are surely times when it seems anything but the mark of practicality to speak the truth. But on examination Heraclitus' statement turns out to be perfectly defensible. As it stands, it commits him to no more than the minimal assertion 'When you speak, it is practical wisdom that *what* you say be true,' ⟨though it need not necessarily be the whole story⟩. The reason for this is found clearly stated in fragment 28b: 'Justice will catch up with fabricators of falsehoods.'

Statements 2 and 3 wear less of an air of paradoxicality, given what we know from elsewhere of Heraclitean doctrine. Right conduct cannot possibly consist in knowing the truth about the real and not acting in a manner consonant with such knowledge. And truth about the real *can* be known; for while it is no doubt the case that '⟨the world's(?)⟩ real constitution has a tendency to hide itself' (fragment 123), it *is* none the less, with effort, ascertainable (fragments 1, 22), and this bears implications for conduct. Without paying heed to the real constitution of *soul*, for example, one risks its very destruction (fragment 36) – the ultimate in impracticality. And how, in any case, could anyone 'escape the notice of that which never sets' (fragment 16)?

The authenticity of this fragment has been doubted by many, notably Kirk and Marcovich, as a banal paraphrase of other fragments. There are also problems of punctuation and interpretation. Bollack and Wismann (followed by Kahn) place the first comma after σοφίη ('Thinking well is the greatest excellence and wisdom'), and there is dispute whether ποιεῖν has an understood object ⟨ἀληθέα⟩, or operates solely in conjunction with the adverbial phrase κατὰ φύσιν. In spite of this, however, it seems to me that the fragment is not only genuine but a powerful statement of Heraclitean doctrine.

Fragment 113

The lack of context and a not unusual piece of grammatical ambiguity make this fragment difficult to interpret (*pasi* can mean 'to/for all people' or 'to/for all things'). As Kahn points out, the ascription of thinking to all *things* is to us perhaps the more startling possibility, but not necessarily to contemporary Greek thinkers, for whom hylozoism was almost a truism; and so understood Heraclitus' statement is in fact paralleled in Empedocles (fragment 110.10 D-K). Since *phronein* is the nearest word the Greek language had at this time for 'to be conscious,' Heraclitus (followed by Empedocles, *ibid*) was perhaps trying to indicate that all things in the world are in some sense 'aware,' and this would place him in a tradition that, if Aristotle is correct, goes right back to Thales ("all things are full of gods": *De anima* 411a9) and to most Greek mythology before him. For this reason the 'strong' interpretation of *pasi* as 'all things' seems a distinct possibility. The 'weak' interpretation, however, 'to all people,' may have been all that Heraclitus (for whatever contextual purpose) intended.

Fragment 114

The 'divine law' of which this fragment speaks (the first known use in Greek thought, unless Kahn's interpretation is correct; see note) seems to be that 'everlastingly true *logos*' spoken of in fragment 1, with the stress this time on its *pre*scriptive rather than its *de*scriptive role. As the law eternally propounded by 'that which is wise' (fragment 32), it is of everlasting, unchanging, and universal application; in the phrases 'common to all' and 'suffices for all' the word 'all' can be taken to mean simply 'all mankind' or 'all things' (including mankind). Knowledge of the existence of such a law and of its formulator is a demonstration of that 'insight' (*noos*) which for Heraclitus stems from 'inquiry into a good many things' (fragment 35) and is indeed the mark of the 'lover of wisdom' (*ibid*). (Compare fragments 108 and 116, where the favoured word is 'recognition' or 'ascertainment,' and Parmenides fragments 2.7–8, 3, 6.1, 8.8, 8.34, 8.36, 16.2, 16.4, where such ascertainment is by definition of that which is real or is the case.)

Whether the 'divine law' in question is supposed to be generic or specific in its import is uncertain, though it seems more likely it is generic. If it is taken simply as the divine counterpart of human law, it will in effect be no more what is now called the moral law; Heraclitus'

words will be an attempt to place himself firmly on the side of Greek tradition, and to obliterate in a swift verbal stroke a spectre raised by contemporary ethnographical studies, ie, the spectre that morality might actually be culture-bound. Such an interpretation might seem to be bolstered by the introductory words of fragment 2: 'that is why one must follow that which is ⟨common⟩,' where the word 'follow' clearly suggests obedience to a code of conduct. A broader interpretation, however, will see 'divine law' as that general 'law of the real' which subsumes even the moral law, and which underpins that 'unity in diversity' which is the heart of Heraclitus' philosophy. It would be not too misleadingly described as a certain law of nature that in Heraclitus' estimation both forms the basis of all sound human law and serves as the blueprint for the world's physical operations. It applies to all people and all things, and does so at all times (see fragment 1), and it is at all times more than adequate to the needs of all people and all things, by contrast with a city's laws, which are 'common' only to its own citizens. In this broad sense it is a law on which one can confidently rely (*ischyrizesthai*).

There is a pun in the Greek that cannot be captured in English. To speak 'with insight' (ξὺν νόῳ) is to base oneself on 'what is common' (τῷ ξυνῷ) (a favourite Heraclitean word: see fragments 80, 103, and perhaps 2).

'One [law], the divine [law]': Kahn thinks τοῦ θείου should be construed rather as a reference to 'the divine' in the sense of 'the supreme cosmic principle.' A substantival adjective at this point in the sentence (rather than the expected masculine noun 'law') is linguistically harsh, but the use of the phrase ἕν, τὸ σοφόν in fragment 32 leaves open the possibility that it may have been what Heraclitus had in mind.

'Is still left over': with Kirk (see LSJ sv II 3). The verb περιγίγνεσθαι can also mean to 'overcome,' but this would in context produce no clear sense. Used absolutely, it suggests that the divine law is not itself exhausted by the provision of nourishment to lesser, human laws; being divine, ie, eternal, it is forever unaffected by the laws of man that it underpins.

Fragment [115]

This fragment, if genuine (it has been assigned to Heraclitus by some commentators not least because of the reference to soul's *logos* in fragment 45), seems sufficiently different in content from fragment 45 to be considered not just an echo of it. But its meaning is somewhat

obscure, and John Stobaeus actually assigns it to Socrates (it is placed by Stobaeus immediately after fragment 114, assigned by him to Heraclitus).

If it is genuine, it probably means that the soul, like the body it inhabits, grows, and, also like the body, proportionately and in measured fashion, not simply haphazardly (for *logos* in the sense of 'measure,' 'ratio' and 'proportion' see fragments 31, 45). If this interpretation is correct, a not misleading paraphrase of the fragment might run: 'measured increase is a mark of soul.' The concept of soul here is clearly physicalist; there is nothing in Heraclitus to suggest commitment to (or even awareness of) the concept of immateriality, of soul or anything else.

Fragment 116

Metesti in this fragment (doubted by Marcovich) is often translated 'have a share in,' with the result that Heraclitus' claim seems self-evidently false. But *metesti* can also mean 'have a claim to' (see LSJ sv II), and this is surely how it is to be understood.

On this interpretation Heraclitus is saying that it is in fact the birthright of all to achieve soundness of thinking ⟨in general⟩ and, as part of this, knowledge of oneself ⟨in particular⟩. (On the former see fragment 112; on the latter, the injunction on Apollo's temple at Delphi 'get to know thyself,' *gnōthi sauton*.) Whether Heraclitus seriously felt this to be at any future time a likelihood is doubtful (a discouraging note is struck in fragment 22), but his commitment to the principle is in itself remarkable. This places him in a tradition of epistemic optimism significantly removed from Xenophanes (fragments 34, 35), Parmenides (fragment 8, 51ff) and Plato, and suggests that his aristocratic prejudices have not taken control of all aspects of his thinking.

Fragment 117

This fragment should be read in conjunction with fragment 36 (and, for verbal echoes, with fragments 112, 121, 56). The man's drunkenness leads first to loss of rational control (for soul as rational principle in Heraclitus see fragments 107, 118), and later (see fragment 36) to possible *death* of the soul (as biological principle). The boy who leads the man, by contrast, has a better perception (*epaiein*) of where he is

going because, still being young (see the commentary on fragment 56), he has a better perception of the nature of the real in general (fragment 112) than the old man, who, by abuse of his soul, is rapidly *un*learning any prior knowledge he had of the nature of the real and of the language that it speaks (fragment 107).

Fragment 118

The positioning of the adjective *xērē* ('dry') leads, technically, to a syntactical ambiguity; is Heraclitus talking of a dry flash of light or of a dry *soul*? Since the former seems to make no sense, we probably do best to assume the latter. Which leaves us with two Heraclitean statements:

1 a dry soul ⟨is the⟩ wisest and best (most noble) ⟨one⟩' (or, since syntactically the sentence-form is that of identity statements: 'the wisest and best (most noble) soul is a dry soul');
2 'a dry soul ⟨is⟩ a flash (or: ray) of light' (or: 'a flash of light is a dry soul').

(1) In view of fragments 36 and 117 (qv) it seems clear that Heraclitus is claiming that a soul is most rational, most noble, and most alive when it is at the furthest remove from the wetness which constitutes death. This has, of course, nothing to do with its supposed composition of fire; an average incarnated soul for Heraclitus is constituted of *air*, as Kahn (see also Gigon, 110 *et alib.*) rightly and painstakingly points out (see also his commentary on fragment 36), this being the only element that is uncomplicatedly describable as becoming progressively 'wetter' and 'drier' and as coming (by evaporation) *from* water and turning (by condensation) back *into* water (fragment 36).

For Heraclitus (human) soul is also of course a rational principle (fragments 107, 117), not just the principle of life, and such a *psychē* is for him most 'alive' precisely to the degree that it is most rational.

(2) Why is a 'dry' soul called a flash or ray of light (or sheen [of metal], or flare [of fire], or any form of gleaming or glittering)? The answer is unclear, but again Kahn's suggestion is a plausible one: '... the poetic associations of the word connect it with the light of the sun as a figure for life itself, as in the Homeric phrase "to see the rays (*augai*) of the sun," meaning "to be alive" (*Iliad* 16.188; cf *Iliad* 1.88, *Odyssey* 11.498, etc). The radiance of the sunlit sky thus stands traditionally for life; it is the innovation of Heraclitus to identify this physically with the finest state of the *soul*.'

The upshot of this is that for Heraclitus the most rational and most noble (human) soul is one composed, sequentially, of (a) the driest form of *air*, and (b) (after death) of *aethēr*, the clear, hot and dry upper atmosphere that he took to be divine, and home of the gods of fire, the stars. It is precisely such noble souls, many of them demonstrating that nobility by death in battle (fragment 24), who rise up after death to their reward and destiny (fragment 25) as demigods in such an environment (fragment 63). At the extreme ends of the spectrum are (a) those other souls (the majority) who inhabit the dank atmosphere that surrounds us and who (because also constituted of it) are forever running the risk of death by condensation; and (b) the souls of the gods, composed of pure fire, not simply (like those of the demigods) of that element most akin to it (*aethēr*).

On this interpretation, for Heraclitus the composition of soul ranges all the way across a spectrum from damp air (*aēr*) (the majority) to dry, clear air, then later *aethēr* (the heroic few) to pure fire (the star-gods that populate the *aethēr*, who in terms of the dryness-criterion, not to mention accepted religious belief, will of course be the 'wisest and best' souls of all). To describe the nature of soul for Heraclitus simply as either 'air' or 'fire' is therefore somewhat misleading, though of the two descriptions the former is probably the less so.

The text of the opening words of this fragment is greatly disputed. With the ms tradition, D-K, Bollack and Wismann, and Kahn I read them as αὐγὴ ξηρὴ ψυχή (for extended discussion – and disagreement with each other – see Marcovich and Kahn).

Fragment 119

Daemōn can mean either one's 'fate' (in the senses both of one's doom and one's good fortune) or one's 'divinity.' In this fragment we probably see something of both meanings, with particular reference to views expressed earlier by Hesiod (*Works and Days* 121–3). For Hesiod noble souls who 'lived like gods' become, as their reward, *daemones* after death and 'guardians of mortal men,' and Heraclitus seems himself to accept this view (fragment 63). In the present fragment he also appears to carry the matter one step further. Not only do mortals have as their guardian-divinities the souls of noble people that have gone before; their own *character* is their 'guardian-divinity.' (For a similar expression of this sentiment see Epicharmus B 17 D-K.) In this sense

one's own character is also one's *destiny* (*daemōn*), for that judgment (fragment 29) which determines one's destiny is clearly character-based.

The connectedness of destiny and character is expressed, as often in Heraclitus (see the commentary on fragment 88), in terms of an identity-statement: his carefully structured sentence can be taken both as '*daemōn* is character' and 'character is *daemōn*,' but if this is the case, what becomes of those *daemones* that were once noble souls on earth (fragment 63)? If fragment 119 is a genuine identity-statement, is it not the case that for Heraclitus the class of *daemones* is one and the same as the class of 'characters,' leaving open no possibility of further *daemones* beyond that class? Were this true, fragment 119 would undoubtedly be hard to reconcile with the apparent meaning of fragment 63, but the different tone of the two fragments suggests that Heraclitus had a saving distinction in mind. The 'hero'-*daemōn*, like the 'guardian-angel' of a later religious tradition, is there to help, but one bears no responsibility for its actions; for the *daemōn* that is one's character one bears *full* responsibility and must one day render account to the goddess Justice (fragment 28b). On this understanding the *daemōn* that is character (fragment 119) is strictly and solely that *daemōn* for which *we* are responsible.

Fragment 120

The interpretation of this fragment is much disputed, though all commentators are agreed that Strabo is wrong in his assertion that the last three words are a reference to the Antarctic circle.* There is, however, a measure of agreement on the meaning of some particular terms in the fragment.

1 'Dawn' and 'evening' could equally well mean 'east' and 'west.'
2 'The Bear' is probably the Great Bear (Big Dipper), used then as now as an indicator of the position of the celestial pole and by extrapolation of 'the north' in general.

In view of this agreement, many commentators (eg, Burnet, Kranz [D-K], Kirk) take the final three words as an arcane reference to 'the south,' and the whole fragment as a (somewhat obscure) discussion of

* As Kirk points out (289-90), there is no reason to believe that Heraclitus believed in a spherical earth or a south pole or an Antarctic circle; like his contemporaries, he no doubt assumed that the earth was a flat disc, surrounded by the Stream of Ocean.

the points of the compass: 'east' and 'west' will be, in Kirk's words, divided by 'a line drawn from north to south through the position of the observer.' This makes good sense, but it is based on the assumption that *ouros* must mean 'boundary,' and the final three words 'that area of the sky in which the sky-god Zeus is at his brightest' (ie, the southern sky). As is well known, however, *ouros* can also mean (1) 'fair wind,' (2) 'watcher,' and (3) 'mountain,' and all three possibilities have been countenanced by various interpreters. Of the three, meaning (2), backed by Kahn, is the most attractive, in that the 'watcher' in question would then very likely be the star Arcturus (referred to as 'the Bear-watcher' in Aratus' *Phaenomena*).

Fragment 121

We know nothing for certain of Hermodorus, except for what Heraclitus tells us here (for his other hero, Bias of Priene, see fragment 39). The city for which Heraclitus thought him 'most valuable' is, of course, Heraclitus' own, which he here castigates for a form of political envy so extreme that it refuses to recognize a claim by any citizen to superior political usefulness.

It should be noted that this fragment is no evidence for Heraclitus' supposed preference for authoritarian regimes over democratic ones; it is in fact compatible with a belief in a Periclean-style *democracy*(!), in which a citizen who is 'most valuable' is accepted as such. Which is not of course to say that Heraclitus was not anti-populist in his *social* inclinations (see fragment 104) or (to modern eyes) supercilious in his claims concerning the extent among ordinary people of insight into the real. But the evidence of fragments 116 and 44 suggests that even in this regard his prejudices were something he could on occasion put aside.

For further expression of his views on the frequently greater clear-sightedness of the young than of adults see fragments 56, 117, and (on Marcovich's interpretation) 52.

Fragment 123

The fragment should probably be read in conjunction with fragment 54. What is 'unconcealed' (ie, the surface-appearance, surface-operation, of a thing) is rarely a good indicator of its 'real constitu-

tion' because it is at best a partial picture only. The *total* picture involves an ascertainment of what is concealed from the eyes of most.

The translation of *physis* in this fragment has been much disputed: eg, 'stuff' (Burnet), 'Nature' (D-K), 'Nature/Being' (Kranz), 'Becoming/Growth' (Gigon) (for further detail see Kirk's discussion). Of these 'Being' and 'Growth' seem to come nearest to catching the two earliest senses of *physis* (*physis* = 'nature' is almost certainly a late use of the word), and of the two 'Being' seems the more likely possibility, given other uses of the term in pre-Socratic literature. I translate it, with Kirk, as 'real constitution.'

Fragment 124

If we take Heraclitus to be offering a positive statement of his own, fragment 124 may be a reflection of one of those moods of pessimism which have periodically afflicted various philosophers, particularly as old age draws on. But it is not impossible that the quotation is, as often, a partial one; the full text could have been somewhat as follows: '⟨*for the uninstructed*⟩ the most beautiful order ...' If the latter reading is the correct one, what Heraclitus is saying is of course fully in line with all that he says elsewhere about the majority of mankind's lack of understanding of the *logos*.

The text of this fragment is too doubtful to be relied upon; attempts at interpretation should therefore be treated with more than the usual dose of scepticism. With D-K I tentatively accept σάρμα ('sweepings') for the mss σάρξ ('flesh'), and with Usener I read κεχυμένον and delete ὁ before κόσμος.

Fragment 125

The *kykeōn*, as we know from Homer, *Iliad* 2.638ff, was a drink made from ground barley, grated cheese, and wine (also sometimes honey: see Homer, *Odyssey* 10.234). If the whole were not stirred, the contents would not fully mix – and the *kykeōn* as such would not exist, though its ingredients would (with the cheese and barley at the bottom of the cup, and the wine at the top).

The point seems to be, as so often in Heraclitus, that of the importance of ordered movement in the cosmos, particularly that of

rotatory movement. Without the rotation of the stars and planets, and the sun's annual movement through the ecliptic, there would be no ordered universe as we know it, merely different sets of 'ingredients' isolated into different 'natural' *loci*, with heavy objects at the 'bottom'/centre and lighter objects at the 'top'/periphery. The source of the (eternal) motion is, of course, the Great Stirrer, 'that which is wise' (fragment 108). An interesting further possibility (Battegazzore, 1982, 18) is political in cast: the city too has a dynamism of its own. Without constant efforts on the part of all groups to keep it in fluid operation, its natural tendency is towards stratification rather than community, inertia rather than vitality.

All editors except Bollack and Wismann agree that μὴ must be supplied to make sense of the fragment (see Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Problemata* 4.2, ἐὰν μή τις ταράττῃ).

Fragment 125a?

Whether this sentiment should be attributed to Heraclitus is in doubt. All agree that some of the language is much later than Heraclitus (eg, *ponēreuesthai* as a verb first occurs in Aristotle), but this does not preclude the possibility that it is a reconstituted version of something Heraclitus actually said. If it is at base Heraclitean, the somewhat tortuously expressed wish seems to be that the Ephesians' enjoyment of wealth continue, and lead to that surfeit or gluttedness (*koros*, see fragment 29) which produces the *hybris* (see Theognis 153) which will guarantee the conviction they deserve at the hands of the goddess Justice (fragment 28b). A suasion in favour of this interpretation is the substitution of the word *tychē* ('good fortune') for 'wealth' in the pseudo-Heraclitean Epistle 8; the same 'Theognean' sentiment would be equally well expressed by the use of such a term.

The matter however is a speculative one. For an undoubtedly Heraclitean view on the Ephesians see fragment 121.

Fragment 126

Without benefit of context all that can be safely affirmed of this fragment is that Heraclitus is describing a number of elementary

facts of observation. Substances can and do move from one polar state to another. A natural, and straightforward, interpretation is that Heraclitus is putting forward yet another piece of evidence for his general doctrine of the basic unity underlying apparent change (see, eg, fragment 60); the substance growing hotter/colder does not cease to preserve its self-identity.

Fragment 129

This fragment should be compared with fragments 40 and 81. While we cannot know what the 'writings' are that Pythagoras is supposed to have 'selected,' or even their provenance (they may have been drawn from the works of his master Pherecydes), we can reasonably guess that what made the enterprise 'disreputable' in Heraclitus' eyes was the fact that it was devoid of a basic understanding of how to investigate the real. Instead of listening to the 'common' *logos* and looking carefully at the world, Pythagoras chose to compile a 'private' wisdom or philosophy (see fragment 2) from the views of others. To make matters worse, his compilation involved selection, and selection without reference to a viable selection-principle (such as might have been provided by listening to the *logos*). The result is, necessarily, claims Heraclitus, just an unstructured mound of learning, devoid of insight, for all the training to which Pythagoras subjected himself.

THE ANCIENT *TESTIMONIA*

This section contains a translation of all the *testimonia* concerning Heraclitus printed in D-K (139ff) except numbers 2, 3b, and 14a; the numbering system and the order of the *testimonia* in D-K has also been followed. Subdivisions within a *testimonium* reflect standard editorial practice for the author in question. The symbol [ ] indicates the immediate context of the *testimonium*; ⟨ ⟩ indicates what seems to be a natural addition in English to make sense of the Greek text; ( ) indicates an explanatory comment or query by the translator; and † ... † or † indicates the presence of what appears to be a corrupt text.

For short notes on the sources of these *testimonia* see Sources and Authorities, pp 193–200.

1

Diogenes Laertius 9.1–17

(1) Heraclitus, son of Bloson or, as some would have it, of Heracon, was a native of Ephesus, and was active during the 69th Olympiad (504–501 BC). He surpassed all others in arrogance and disdainfulness, as is clear from his book, in which he says, 'A lot of learning does not teach a person the possession of understanding; ⟨could it do so⟩ it would have so taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, or for that matter (?) Xenophanes and Hecataeus' (fragment 40). For 'the wise ⟨thing⟩ is a single ⟨thing⟩, he says; '– knowing the plan †which steers† all things through all things' (fragment 41). Or 'Homer,' he used to affirm, 'ought by rights to be ejected from the lists and thrashed, and similarly Archilochus' (fragment 42). (2) He would also say that 'There is a greater need to extinguish *hybris* than there is a blazing fire' (fragment

43), and 'the people should fight on behalf of the law as ⟨they would⟩ for ⟨their⟩ city-wall' (fragment 44). He upbraids the Ephesians as well for expelling his friend Hermodorus, with the words: 'The adult Ephesians should all by rights go hang themselves, leaving the city to adolescents. For they expelled Hermodorus, the most valuable man amongst them, saying "We will not have even a single one as the *most valuable* among us. If such there ⟨purports to⟩ be, ⟨let him be so⟩ elsewhere and amongst others"' (fragment 121). When he was asked by them to make laws, he spurned the request, on the grounds that the city had already fallen under the control of a corrupt administration.

(3) He had a habit of retiring to the temple of Artemis and playing dice with the children. When the Ephesians came and stood around him, he said, 'Why are you surprised, you scoundrels? Isn't it better to do this than involve myself with you in your political affairs?'

He finished up a hater of mankind, spending his time wandering in the mountains and living off grass and herbs. Since this led, however, to his contracting dropsy, he came back to the town and in the form of a riddle enquired of the doctors whether they could create drought from a deluge. They could not make sense of him, so he threw himself into a cow-byre, in the expectation that the heat of the manure would cause his dropsy to evaporate. Even this failed him, however, and he died at the age of sixty ...

(4) According to Hermippus, he asked the doctors whether one could draw off the moisture by evacuating the bowels. When they said No, he laid himself in the sun and told the children to plaster him with cow-dung. In that state, and stretched out on the ground, he died one day later, and was buried in the market square. Neanthes of Cyzicus, however, says that he stayed in that position because he could not tear the cow-dung off himself, and not being recognized –thanks to the change he had undergone – became food for dogs.

(5) From childhood on he was extraordinary; even as a youth he would claim that he knew nothing – though once he had become an adult he used to claim he knew everything! He was no one's pupil, but said that he 'had made enquiry of himself' (fragment 101) and had learned everything from *himself*. Sotion, however, tells us that according to some he was the pupil of Xenophanes, and that Ariston, in his book *On Heraclitus*, says that he was cured of dropsy and died of another disease. (Hippobotus says this as well.)

As for the book which is commonly held to be his, it is a continuous treatise *On Nature*, but divided into three sections, on the universe, politics, and theology respectively.

(6) According to some, he deposited the book in the temple of Artemis – a book he had taken pains to write in a somewhat obscure fashion so that ⟨only⟩ those equipped to do so might approach it, and to avoid the contempt that could well befall it were it to become familiar. This is the man whom Timon too gives a sketch of in the following words:

And amongst them there arose cuckoo-voiced Heraclitus, mob-reviling, man of riddles.

Theophrastus says that it was melancholia that caused him to write down some things in half-finished form and other things differently at different times. And Antisthenes, in his *Successions*, says that there is evidence for his magnanimity, in that he renounced his claim to the kingship in favour of his brother. His book won for itself such a great reputation that there even arose a school of disciples – called, after him, the Heracliteans.

(7) His doctrines can be summed up as follows. All things are composed of fire and are resolved into fire; all things also come into being in accordance with destiny, and existent things are fitted together through the contrariety of the directions in which they turn. All things are, moreover, filled with souls and divinities. He has also spoken of all the conditions ⟨of things⟩ exhibited in ⟨the⟩ universe, and says that the sun is the same size as it appears to be. (Another of his sayings is: "One would never discover the limits of soul, should one traverse every road: so deep a measure does it possess" (fragment 45). 'Thinking,' he would also say, is a 'sacred disease' (fragment 46), and that the sense of sight deceives us. Sometimes, however, in his book he produces statements of clarity and lucidity, so that even the most stupid person can easily understand them, and derive from them elevation of soul. The brevity and weightiness of his expression are incomparable.)

(8) An account of his detailed views is as follows. Fire is elementary and all things are an exchange for fire (fragment 90), coming into being by rarefaction and condensation. (His exposition of this matter is, however, not at all clear.) All things come into being by ⟨a process of⟩ opposition and the sum of things is in flux, like a river; what is more, all that is is limited, and constitutes a single universe. This universe is born from fire and converted back again to fire in a process of cyclical alternation throughout all eternity; and this takes place in accordance with destiny. Of the opposites, that one which leads to birth is called war or strife (fragment 80), while the one that leads to

destruction by fire is called concord or peace. Change is a pathway up and down, and the universe comes into being by a process of such change. (9) For on contraction fire turns watery, ⟨this⟩ in turn on condensation becomes water, while water on solidification turns into earth. This process he calls the 'path downward.' Then once again, in its turn, earth becomes liquefied, from this water results, and from water the rest ⟨of the elements in the series⟩, practically all of which he relates to that particular exhalation which rises from the sea. This process is the 'path upward.'

Exhalations arise from both earth and sea; the former are dark, the latter bright and pure. Fire is augmented by the bright exhalations, the moist ⟨element⟩ by the rest. He does not make clear what sort of thing the surrounding ⟨element⟩ is. He does say, however, that there are in it bowls with their concave side turned towards us, in which the bright exhalations are collected and produce flames; these are the stars.

(10) The flame of the sun is the brightest and hottest. For the other stars are further away from the earth and for that reason give less light and warmth. The moon, which is nearer the earth, is borne through a region ⟨of the universe⟩ other than the pure one. The sun, however, lies in a translucent and pure region, and keeps a proportionate distance from us. That is why it affords us more warmth and light. Eclipses of sun and moon occur when the bowls are turned upwards; the moon's monthly phases are brought about by the bowl's turning little by little in its place. Day and night, months, seasons, years, rains and winds and similar things are brought about by the various exhalations. (11) Thus the bright exhalation, set aflame in the hollow side of the sun, creates day, while the opposite exhalation, when it gains the upper hand, produces night. The increase of warmth brought about by the bright exhalation creates summer, while the preponderance of moisture brought about by the dark exhalation produces winter.

His account of the reasons for the other phenomena ⟨of nature⟩ also is consonant with the above. When it comes to the earth, however, he gives no clear account of what sort of thing it is; or for that matter what sort of thing the bowls are.

Such are the views he held. I have mentioned in my chapter on Socrates the story Ariston tells of him and what he said when he came upon Heraclitus' book (brought to him by Euripides). (12) However, Seleucus the grammarian says that a certain Croton relates in *his* book *The Diver* that one *Crates* brought the book into Greece – and that Croton also said that one needed a diver from Delos if one wasn't going to drown in it! Some people entitle his book ⟨*The*⟩ *Muses*, others

On Nature, Diodotus describing it as 'a precise helm for the regulation of life,' others as 'a guide for conduct, a unique enhancement of character.' The story goes that, when he was asked why he preserved silence ⟨on the matter,⟩ he said, 'To let you people chatter'! Darius, too, was very anxious to make his acquaintance, and wrote to him as follows:

(Nos. 13–14, Darius' letter and Heraclitus' reply, are omitted by D-K.)

(15) Such was the kind of man he was, even in dealing with the Great King! Demetrius, in his *Men of the Same Name*, says that he despised even the Athenians, though they held him in the very highest esteem; and that he preferred his own home, even though the Ephesians held him in contempt. Demetrius of Phalerum, too, makes mention of him in his *Defence of Socrates*, and commentators on his treatise are very numerous: Antisthenes and Heraclides of Pontus, Cleanthes and Sphaerus the Stoic, as well as Pausanias (the one called 'Follower of Heraclitus'), Nicomedes, and Dionysius; among the grammarians there was Diodotus, who says that the treatise is not about nature, but about government, the section on nature being included by way of illustration.

(16) Hieronymus says that (among others) Scythinus the satirical poet undertook to set his account of things (*logon*) to verse. There are many epigrams of which he is the subject, including the following one:

> Heraclitus I; why drag me up and down, you boors?
> I toiled for those who understand me – not for you!
> To me, one man is full thirty thousand, countless
> Worth none; so say I even *chez* Persephone!

Another runs as follows:

> Haste not to reach the end of Heraclitus the Ephesian's book –
> The path is hard to travel;
> Gloom is there, and lightless dark; but if your guide
> Be one initiate, 'tis brighter than clear sunlight.

(17) Five men have borne the name Heraclitus. The first is the one under discussion; the second was a lyric poet, who wrote a hymn of praise to the twelve gods; the third was an elegiac poet from Halicarnassus, for whom Callimachus composed the following:

They told me Heraclitus, they told me you were dead,
They brought me bitter news to hear and bitter tears to shed.
I wept as I remembered how often you and I
Had tired the sun with talking and sent him down the sky.

And now that thou art lying, my dear old Carian guest,
A handful of grey ashes, long, long ago at rest,
Still are thy pleasant voices, thy nightingales, awake;
For Death, he taketh all away, but them he cannot take. (Trans. Cory)

The fourth, a native of Lesbos, wrote a history of Macedonia; and the fifth was a jester, who changed to this profession after having been a cithara-player.

1a
Suda
Heraclitus, son of Bloson (or Bautorus, or according to others Heracinus), a native of Ephesus and philosopher of nature, nicknamed 'the Obscure.' He was the disciple of none of the philosophers, but received his training by dint of natural endowment and diligent care. When he contracted dropsy, he did not go along with what the doctors wanted to prescribe for his cure, but personally smeared his entire person with cow-dung and allowed it to dry out in the sun. As he lay in this state, dogs came along and tore him to pieces. Others say he died buried in sand. Some say he was a pupil of Xenophanes and Hippasus the Pythagorean. He flourished in the 69th Olympiad, during the reign of Darius son of Hystaspes, and wrote a great deal in an artistic style.

2
Strabo 14.3 (omitted)

3
Clement *Stromateis* 14.25
For Heraclitus son of Blyson persuaded the dictator Melangcomas to give up his rule. He ⟨also⟩ spurned King Darius' request that he come to Persia.

3a
1 Strabo 14.25
Significant men have been natives of Ephesus. Of the ancients one should mention Heraclitus, who was called 'the Obscure,' and Her-

modorus, concerning whom Heraclitus says: 'The adult Ephesians should all by rights go hang themselves, leaving the city to adolescents. For they expelled Hermodorus, the most valuable man among them, saying, "We will not have even a single one as the *most valuable* among us. If such there ⟨purports to⟩ be, ⟨let him be so⟩ elsewhere and among others"' (fragment 121). This man (ie, Hermodorus, TMR) seems to have drawn up a number of laws for the Romans.

2 Pliny, *Natural History* 34.21
There stood in the council-chamber, dedicated at public expense, [a statue] of Hermodorus of Ephesus, who served as interpreter of the laws which the *decemviri* would write.

3b
Themistius, *De virtute* p 40 (omitted)

3c
Plutarch, *De garrulitate* 17
And are not those who indicate by signs, without a word, what must be done, very much praised and admired? So Heraclitus, when the citizens asked him to propound an opinion on concord, mounted the platform, took a cup of cold water, sprinkled some barley into it, stirred it with a pennyroyal, drank it off and left. In so doing he had shown them that being satisfied with whatever one chances upon and not desiring expensive things keeps cities in peace and concord.

WRITINGS

(Compare *Testimonium* 1, nos. 5–7, 12, 15, 16.)

4
1 Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.1407b11
In general, a written composition must be easy to read and easy to deliver (which is one and the same thing). The majority of connecting words or clauses fall into this category, but a small number do not – including writing that is not easy to punctuate, like that of Heraclitus. Punctuating Heraclitus' writing is a problem because it is unclear whether ⟨a word⟩ goes with ⟨the words⟩ that go before it or after it. An example of this is found at the outset of his treatise, where he says: 'Of this account, which holds forever, people forever prove uncomprehending' (fragment 1). Here it is unclear to which of the two clauses the word 'forever' should be joined by punctuation.

2 Demetrius (Phalereus Rhetor), *De elocutione* 192
Clarity [of style] involves a fair number of things. First it involves ⟨the use of⟩ current words, and next of words bound together. Writing which is *not* bound together or is wholly unconnected is totally unclear; for thanks to the looseness ⟨of the structure⟩ it is not obvious where each member begins. An example of this lies in the writing of Heraclitus. For its looseness ⟨of structure⟩ makes it for the most part obscure.

3 Diogenes Laertius 2.22
They say that after giving him (ie, Socrates) Heraclitus' treatise Euripides asked him, 'How does it strike you?' And Socrates is said to have replied: 'What I understood struck me as excellent; and even what I didn't understand I imagine equally so. Except that one needs a Delian diver!'

TEACHING

5
1 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 3.984a7
Heraclitus of Ephesus holds [that fire is of the four simple bodies most truly the basic one].

2 Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* 23.33
These too, Hippasus of Metapontum and Heraclitus of Ephesus, considered ⟨the universe⟩ one, in motion, and limited, but made fire the first principle, and make existent things *out of* fire by condensation and rarefaction and break them back down again *into* fire, on the grounds that this reality (ie, fire, TMR) is the single underlying one. For Heraclitus says that all things are an exchange for fire. He also creates a certain order and bounded time out of the universe's change in accordance with a certain destined necessity.

3 Aëtius 1.3.11 (*Dox. Gr.* 284)
Heraclitus and Hippasus of Metapontum say that fire is the first principle of the sum of things. For all things come into being from fire, they say, and all things finish up turning into fire. While this is in process of being put out, the totality of things becomes organized into a universe. For the denser part of fire contracts into itself and becomes earth, then [the] earth is loosened by [the] fire and by a natural process finishes up as water, and this water when drawn up as

vapour becomes air. The universe and all bodies are consumed once again by [the] fire in the ⟨re-⟩conversion ⟨of things⟩ into fire.

4 Galen, *De elementis secundum Hippocratem* 1.4 (1.443 Kühn)
Those who call fire (an element, TMR) are the same ones who reason that the element ⟨in question⟩ is fire from the fact that when fire comes together and contracts it becomes air; that when it is subjected even more intensively to this process it becomes water; and that when contracted to the maximum degree it becomes earth.

6

1 Plato, *Cratylus* 402a
Heraclitus says somewhere that all things are in process and nothing stays still. Comparing the things that are to the flowing of a river he says that one would never step twice into the same river.

2 Aëtius 1.23.7 (*Dox. Gr.* 320)
Heraclitus wished to abolish stillness and stability from the totality of things, since these are a characteristic of corpses. He was for bestowing movement upon absolutely everything – everlasting movement on everlasting things and perishable movement on perishable things.

7

Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 3.1005b23
For it is impossible for anyone at all to think that the same thing is and is not – as certain people take Heraclitus to be saying.

8

1 Aëtius 1.7.22 (*Dox. Gr.* 303)
Heraclitus held that the recurrent fire is everlasting, and that destiny is a *logos* which fashions existent things through the contrariety of the directions in which they tend to run.

2 Aëtius 1.27.1 (*Dox. Gr.* 322)
Heraclitus held that everything comes about through destiny, and that necessity is the same thing as destiny.

3 Aëtius 1.28.1 (*Dox. Gr.* 323)
Heraclitus tried to show that that *logos* which pervades ⟨the⟩ essence of the universe is ⟨the⟩ essence of destiny. And the essence of the universe is that body which is composed of *aethēr*, which is the seed

from which the universe originates and the controlling principle of its fixed rotation.

9

Aristotle, *De partibus animalium* A5.645a17
There is a story which tells how visitors wanted to meet Heraclitus. They entered, and saw him warming himself at the stove. As they stood there, he bade them be of good heart, saying, 'There are gods even in this place!' So too we should likewise enter upon the investigation of each individual living thing with cheerful countenance, on the grounds that in every one of them there is something natural and beautiful.

10

1 Plato, *Sophist* 242d
Certain muses in Ionia and Sicily realized that ... the safest thing ... was to say that that which is is both many and one, and that it is held together by enmity and friendship. 'For while being separated it is always being brought together' (fragment 10), say the stricter of these muses. The milder, however, softened the assertion that this is always the case, and say that the universe alternates: at one time it is one and at peace through the power of Love, at another time a multiplicity and at war with itself owing to some sort of Strife (Empedocles, fragment 17).

2 Aristotle, *De caelo* A10.279b12
Now all say that [the universe] is a thing that came into being, but some claim that, having come into being, it continues everlastingly, others that it is perishable like any other thing constituted by nature, and others again that it alternates, being at one time as it is now and at another time changing and perishing, and that this process continues in this fashion everlastingly. This latter opinion is held by Empedocles of Acragas and Heraclitus of Ephesus.

3 Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's *De caelo* 94.4
Heraclitus, too, says that at one time the universe is consumed by fire, at another time reconstituted *from* fire in accordance with particular cycles of time, as appears from his words 'being kindled in measures and being put out in measures' (fragment 30). To this doctrine the Stoics, too, later on adhered.

4 (a) Aëtius 2.1.2 (*Dox. Gr.* 327)
Heraclitus ... said that the universe is one.
(b) Aëtius 2.4.3 (*Dox. Gr.* 331)
Heraclitus said that the universe is not ⟨something⟩ generable in accordance with time but in accordance with intelligence.
(c) Aëtius 2.11.4 (*Dox. Gr.* 340)
[Parmenides] ⟨Heraclitus⟩ ... said that the universe is constituted of fire.

11
1 Aëtius 2.13.8 (*Dox. Gr.* 342)
Parmenides and Heraclitus said that the stars are compressed portions of fire.

2 Aëtius 2.17.4 (*Dox. Gr.* 346)
Heraclitus ... said that the stars are nourished by the exhalation that comes from the earth.

12
1 Aëtius 2.20.16 (*Dox. Gr.* 351)
Heraclitus ... said that the sun is that intelligible ignited mass which comes from the sea.

2 Aëtius 2.22.2 (*Dox. Gr.* 352)
...bowl-like, hump-backed ...

3 Aëtius 2.24.3 (*Dox. Gr.* 354)
[the eclipse occurs] through the bowl-shaped body's turning in such a way that the concave side points upward and the convex side downward – to where we can see it.

4 Aëtius 2.27.2 (*Dox. Gr.* 358)
Heraclitus said that the moon is bowl-like.

5 Aëtius 2.28.6 (*Dox. Gr.* 359)
Heraclitus said that the sun and the moon are affected in identical fashion. For being bowl-like in their shape, and receiving the rays from the moist exhalation, the stars give off an *apparent* light; the sun is brighter, because it is borne along in purer air, whereas the moon appears dimmer, because it is borne along in more muddied air.

6 Aëtius 2.29.3 (*Dox. Gr.* 359)
Heraclitus ... said that the moon is eclipsed through the bowl-like body's turning and sideways-sloping.

13
Aëtius 2.32.3 (*Dox. Gr.* 363)
Heraclitus said that [the Great Year consists of] 10,800 solar years. (Cf Censorinus 18.10: This year is also called *heliacos* ['solar'] by some, and by others [Heraclitus?] 'God's Year' ... Heraclitus and Linus ⟨thought it occurred after the passage of⟩ 10,800 ⟨years⟩.)

14
Aëtius 3.3.9 (*Dox. Gr.* 369)
Heraclitus said that thunder is caused by the aggregation of winds and clouds and the crashing of masses of air into the clouds; lightning is caused by the act of *kindling* of what gets burned; and hurricanes are caused by burnings and dousings ⟨rushing⟩ down from clouds.

14a
Nicander, *Alexipharmaca* 171–6 (omitted)

15
1 Aristotle, *De anima* A2.405a24
Heraclitus too says that the first principle is soul – soul being that exhalation of which everything else is composed.

2 Macrobius, Commentary on Cicero's *Dream of Scipio* 14.19
Heraclitus the philosopher of nature said that [soul] was a spark struck from the essential substance of the stars.

3 Aëtius 4.3.12 (*Dox. Gr.* 389)
Heraclitus said that the soul of the universe (an exhalation from those things in it that are moist) and the soul in living things (an exhalation from the external exhalation and the exhalation inside them) were the same in kind.

16
1 (a) Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.126–34
(126) And Heraclitus – since he again supposed that man is furnished with two organs for gaining knowledge of truth, namely sensation and reason – held, like the philosophers of nature previously men-

tioned, that of these organs sensation is untrustworthy, and posited reason as the standard of judgment (ie, as to whether something is true or not, TMR). ⟨The claim of⟩ sensation he expressly refutes with the words, 'Poor witnesses for people are eyes and ears, if they possess uncomprehending (literally, 'barbarian,' TMR) souls' (fragment 107), which is equivalent to saying, 'To trust in the *non-rational senses* is a mark of uncomprehending souls.'

(127) Reason, on the other hand, he declares to be the judge of truth – not, however, *any* sort of reason you might care to mention but that reason which is 'common' and divine. What this latter is needs a brief explanation. A favourite tenet of the philosopher of nature is that what encompasses us is rational and intelligent. (128) Homer too had indicated such a view a long time beforehand, when he said,

> The mind possessed by men that dwell upon the earth
> Is like the day brought to them by the sire of gods and men. (*Odyssey* 18.136–7)

Archilochus as well says that men have thoughts 'such as the day Zeus brings them' (fragment 115 Lasserre). The same thing has also been said by Euripides:

> Descrying who thou art, O Zeus,
> Is something hard to puzzle out.
> Be thou Necessity of Nature,
> Or mankind's intelligence –
> I invoke thee, none the less! (*Trojan Women* 885–7)

(129) According to Heraclitus, by drawing in this divine *logos* through our breathing we become intelligent; we are also forgetful ⟨of it⟩ when we are asleep, but rational again upon awakening. For since, in sleep, the sense-passages are closed, the mind within us is cut off from its natural union with the surrounding ⟨substance⟩ (the only attachment that is preserved is by way of respiration, like that of a root), and cut off ⟨in this way⟩ it loses the power of memory that it previously possessed. (130) When one awakes, however, it peeps out again through the sense-passages – through windows, as it were – and by linking itself with the surrounding ⟨substance⟩ becomes invested with the power to reason. Thus, just as cinders, when placed near fire, become ignited by the alteration (ie, of place, TMR), but die out when placed at a distance, so too the portion of the surrounding ⟨substance⟩ to which our bodies are host is rendered near-irrational

by the separation ⟨from that substance,⟩ but by its *continuity* ⟨with it⟩ via the multiplicity of passages it is made like in kind with the whole.

(131) Heraclitus says, then, that this 'common' and divine *logos* – by participation in which we become rational – is the yardstick of truth. So that which appears ⟨such and such⟩ to all in common is trustworthy (for it is grasped by the 'common' and divine *logos*), but that which strikes only an individual as ⟨such-and-such⟩ is – for the opposite reason – *un*trustworthy.

(132) Thus the aforementioned man begins his work *On Nature*, and in a certain fashion points out ⟨the existence of?⟩ the surrounding ⟨nature⟩ with the words: 'Of this account, which holds forever, people forever prove uncomprehending, both before they have heard it and when once they have heard it. For although all things happen in accordance with this account, they are like people *without* experience when they experience words and deeds such as *I* set forth, distinguishing ⟨as I do⟩ each thing according to its real constitution, ie, pointing out how it *is*. The rest of mankind, however, fail to be aware of what they do after they wake up just as they forget what they do while asleep' (fragment 1).

(133) For having in these words expressly stated the view that we do and apprehend everything thanks to our participation in the divine *logos*, he goes on a little further, then adds: 'That is why it is necessary to follow that which is ⟨common⟩. Though the account (*logos*) is common, however, the many live as though they had a private understanding' (fragment 2). This *logos* is nothing else than an explanation (exposition, articulation, *exēgēsis*) of the mode of arrangement of the universe. That is why we speak truly whenever and in so far as we share in the recollection of it (ie, of the *logos*, TMR) but are invariably mistaken on matters of private opinion.

(134) So here and in these words he states clearly that the common *logos* is the yardstick ⟨of truth⟩; the things that appear such and such *in common* are trustworthy, as being judged by the common *logos*, whereas those that appear ⟨such and such⟩ to each person privately are false.

1 (b) Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 8.286
Moreover, Heraclitus says expressly that 'Man is not rational; only the surrounding ⟨substance⟩ is intelligent.'

2 Apollonius Tyanensis, *Letters* 18 (= Heraclitus, fragment 133 Bywater)

Heraclitus the philosopher of nature said that by nature man is non-rational.

17

Aëtius 4.7.2 (*Dox. Gr.* 392)
[Heraclitus said that the soul is indestructible.] For when it departs ⟨the body⟩, and goes back to the soul of the universe, it returns to that to which it is identical in kind.

18

Aëtius 5.23 (*Dox. Gr.* 434ff)
Heraclitus and the Stoics say that man begins to be mature about the time of the second seven-year period, round about which time the seminal fluid starts stirring.

19

1 Plutarch, *De defectu oraculorum* 1.415e
Those who read 'of those in the prime of life' (Hesiod, fragment 304.2 Merkelbach-West) make a generation thirty years according to Heraclitus, that being the time it takes for a parent to produce offspring and for that offspring to become himself a parent.

2 Philo Judaeus, *Fragments* (p 20 Harris)
It is possible for man to become a grandfather in his thirtieth year; he can reach maturity round about his fourteenth year and beget a child, and he in turn ... in his fifteenth year begets a child like unto himself.

3 Censorinus 17.2
A generation is that sizable portion of human life that is bounded by birth and death. That is why those who considered a generation to consist of thirty years seem to have been very much mistaken. Heraclitus was the one who first called this period of time a 'generation,' on the grounds that in that period a life-span completes a cycle; what he calls the completion of a life-span's cycle is the period during which nature, having started from human seed, turns back into seed.

4 John the Lydian, *De mensibus* 3.14
This is why Heraclitus is not wide of the mark when he calls the month a generation.

20

Chalcidius, *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* 251 (p 260 Waszink)
Heraclitus indeed (and the Stoics agree with him) connects our reason

with the divine reason that rules and controls the affairs of this world; made aware, he says, when our souls are at rest, of what it (ie, divine reason, TMR) has rationally decreed – thanks to its inseparable companionship with it – our reason, with the aid of the senses, announces what will come to pass. That is why it happens that ⟨when we sleep⟩ there appear before us representations of places we do not know and images of people living as well as dead. And the same Heraclitus asserts that ⟨human reason has⟩ the power of divination, and that in cases where divine powers guide the worthy, it is subject to forewarning.

21

Clement, *Stromateis* 2.130

For they say that Anaxagoras of Clazomenae said that contemplation, and the freedom which stems from it, is the goal of life; and that Heraclitus of Ephesus ⟨said that the goal was⟩ self-satisfaction.

22

1 Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics* H1.1235a25

And Heraclitus criticizes the poet who wrote, 'Would that strife would perish from amongst gods and humankind' (Homer, *Iliad* 18.107). For, he says, attunement would not exist unless there were a low note and a high note, nor living things without female and male – which are opposites.

2 Numenius, Fragment 52 (des Places)

Numenius praises Heraclitus for castigating Homer for desiring the death and destruction of life's evils, on the grounds that Homer did not realize that ⟨in so desiring⟩ he was ⟨actually⟩ consenting to the *universe's* being destroyed, since – as is the case – *matter*, which is the source of evil, would be obliterated.

23

Polybius 4.40

... it would no longer be proper to use poets and mythographers as our evidence for things of which we have no knowledge – a policy adopted by our predecessors in the majority of matters! – offering untrustworthy sureties for facts that are disputed, as Heraclitus puts it ... (Cf fragments 40, 42, 56, 57, 104.)

HERACLITUS: A TENTATIVE SUMMARY OF HIS BELIEFS

An account of Heraclitus can reasonably begin with his views on the nature of knowledge. Is knowledge possible, and, if so, under what circumstances and to what extent? The question had been posed earlier by Xenophanes (fragment 34), and the response had been a pessimistic one: 'no one knows, or will ever know, the clear truth about the gods and about everything I speak of; for even if one chanced to say what was completely true, one does not oneself *know* this (ie, that it *is* completely true, TMR). Seeming, rather, is wrought over all things.' For Heraclitus, by contrast, knowledge is not only possible, but its specific and most significant object – the 'plan' that directs the operations of the universe – in fact exhausts the plenitude of wisdom (fragment 41).

Its attainment is, however, beset with pitfalls, and several fragments alert us to what such pitfalls are. An uncritical acceptance of what passes for knowledge among popular bards or the ordinary run of people (fragment 104), for example, will lead us nowhere; nor will unfocused, random conjecturing (fragment 47) or the piling up of an unstructured mass of learning (fragments 40, 129). The apparent obviousness of the 'connectedness' of certain things is a poor basis for a serious claim to knowledge; *un*apparent connections in fact hold more firmly than do obvious ones (fragment 54). Like the apparently obvious, a feeling of comprehension of certain states of affairs, even when bolstered by direct experience, is also an unreliable basis for a claim to knowledge (fragment 17); much more is needed to avoid self-deception. And uncritical reliance on the senses will frequently let us down unless the process is directed by what Heraclitus calls a 'comprehending soul' (fragments 46, 107).

Getting all worked up over everything we hear attests merely to our stupidity (fragment 87), not to our progress in knowledge. And in certain areas – not least in matters theological – knowledge should be recognized as impossible of attainment without a concomitant 'belief' or 'confidence' (*pistis*, fragment 86).

On the positive side, whatever knowledge we can achieve (which is real enough [fragment 41], even if by reference to the most rigorous standard, that of God's knowledge, it can hardly be classified as right understanding at all [fragment 78]) is achievable in certain clear and precise ways. One must first focus attention on the real constitution (*physis*) of things (fragment 112; cf fragments 1, 106, 123), and this one is most likely to succeed in doing by paying heed to that which is 'common' (*xynon*) to all, in the sense that it is potentially observable by all. This will involve careful observation of the particular, despite the known deceptiveness of the sense of sight (fragment 46). Of all the senses, sight and hearing are, however, the most reliable (fragment 55), and of these two sight is superior (fragment 101a). A trustworthy guide to knowledge is experience (fragment 55), and this is gained by enquiry into a wide range of things (fragment 35), not least into oneself (fragment 101) (for self-knowledge, like knowledge of other things, *is* attainable [fragment 116]). Two necessary conditions for the success of such enquiry are openness to possibilities (fragment 18) and patience before the difficult task of uncovering a reality and truth which lie concealed (fragment 123) but are worth digging for (fragment 22).

If knowledge is attainable, of *what* is such knowledge claimed by Heraclitus to be? It is of the content of that universal (fragment 2) 'statement' or 'account' (*logos*) which, says Heraclitus, 'holds forever', but of which 'people forever prove uncomprehending, both before they have heard it and when once they have heard it' (fragment 1). But statements are uttered by persons. Which person (or persons) utters this particular statement? In broad terms, one who has learned wisdom such as Heraclitus himself (fragment 1); in the most exact and strict terms, Wisdom, that principle of wisdom in/of the universe which Heraclitus calls at various times 'that which alone is wise' (fragment 32), a thunderbolt steering the sum of things (fragment 64), and that reality, 'separated from all things,' which 'is unwilling and willing to be called by the name Zeus' (fragment 32). Descriptively the 'account' or 'statement' is that everlastingly true statement which describes a reality both everlastingly stable and everlastingly subject to

change; prescriptively it is that divine law which underpins all human law (fragment 114).

We are now at the heart of Heraclitus' system, that is, the *content* of that statement, listening to which is to listen, first, to Wisdom's own *de*scription of the way things have been, are, and always will be and, secondly, to Wisdom's own *pre*scription of the norms of conduct. A powerful element in that all-encompassing statement, serving in large measure as a summary of the way things are, is the affirmation that 'all things are one' (fragment 50). Whatever the surface diversity of the real, what makes ultimate sense of it is the unity that underpins it. Such unity in things obtains even though surface investigation might suggest merely the opposite: 'what opposes,' he says, '⟨in fact? also?⟩ unites' (fragment 8). Other forms of unity discoverable by the patient investigator are the unity of inseparability ('⟨day and night⟩ are one' [fragment 57]), the unity/identity of essence ('the real constitution – *physis* – of each day is one ⟨and the same⟩' [fragment 106]), and the unity underpinning perspectival difference ('a road up ⟨and⟩ down ⟨is⟩ one and the same ⟨road⟩' [fragment 60]; cf fragment 61).

A corollary of the unity amid diversity of things is the fact that apparent opposites are in fact in some basic sense connected. The point is made powerfully, if obliquely, in the statement 'God ⟨is⟩ day ⟨and⟩ night, winter ⟨and⟩ summer, war ⟨and⟩ peace, satiety ⟨and⟩ famine, and undergoes change in the way that ⟨fire?⟩, whenever it is mixed with spices, gets called by the name that accords with ⟨the⟩ bouquet of each ⟨spice⟩' (fragment 67). In this statement God and the real are taken to be synonymous, and its clear import is that change in the cosmos is never more than the incidental change of what is in itself changeless. A similar statement, couched boldly in terms of identity, runs: 'as one and the same thing there is present ⟨in the world?⟩ living and dead and the waking and the sleeping and young and old' (fragment 88). Many see here a supposed doctrine of 'identity of opposites,' but Heraclitus' own explication makes it clear that the 'sameness' is one of *terminus*, attained through a form of change which is cyclical: 'for the latter, having changed around, are the former, and the former having changed around, are ⟨back⟩ again ⟨to being⟩ the latter' (fragment 88; see also fragment 62). Taken together, the statements suggest strongly that for Heraclitus 'opposites' such as night and day are 'the same' but merely in terms of a given perspective; they do not share a common identity. Day and night, for example, are the same from the perspective of the common substance (the world) of

which they are cyclical features; so likewise are, for example, waking and sleeping from the perspective of the individual of whom *they* are cyclical features. This fascination, on Heraclitus' part, with the perspectival emerges in other fragments. 'Sea(-water),' he says, 'is very pure and very foul water – for fish drinkable and life-sustaining, for people undrinkable and lethal' (fragment 61); in other words, one and the same substance can produce different effects on different people/objects (see also fragments 9, 13). A related point seems to be made elsewhere: 'doctors, who cut and burn, complain that they do not receive an appropriate *fee* for doing these things ...' (fragment 58); that is, something normally considered harmful can under different circumstances be considered beneficial to one and the same person.

The above suggests strongly that for Heraclitus the supposed sameness of opposites – a doctrine too often attributed to him – is in fact the much more interesting and defensible doctrine of the *interconnectedness* of opposites. It is a doctrine expressed with characteristic power and subtlety in a famous fragment: 'they do not understand how, while differing from, it is in agreement with itself. ⟨There is⟩ a back-turning connection, like ⟨that⟩ of a bow or lyre' (fragment 51). The fragment is commonly, and it seems to me rightly, taken cosmologically: the world is a unity, a functioning whole, like the bow or the lyre. The world is forever 'connected,' 'turning back' upon itself in an everlasting process of cyclical change, while losing nothing of its essential nature as the world, just as the bow and the lyre are each 'connected' wholes, 'turned/bent back' upon themselves to form that state of balanced tension which makes them what they are. In all these instances the 'connectedness' of polar points or states makes for the unity of the substance in question, for the bow and the lyre the conjunctive agent being the taut string(s), for the world a planned ('measured'), balanced, predictable, and unending process of change. '⟨The ordered?⟩ world,' he says 'the same for all, no god or man made, but it always was, is, and will be – an ever-living fire, being kindled in measures and being put out in measures' (fragment 30). The 'measures' in question, laid down by that Justice which is surely to be equated with 'that which alone is wise' (fragment 32), are in effect the unbreakable laws of physics: 'the sun⟨-god⟩ will not overstep ⟨his⟩ measures. Otherwise ⟨the⟩ avenging Furies, ministers of Justice, will find him out' (fragment 94).

Whether the 'fire' of fragment 30 is meant to be taken as Heraclitus' basic substance, or as a metaphor for change, or both, is disputed, but fragment 31a strongly suggests both its substantiality and its status as

the physical *terminus a quo* and (since the process is clearly taken to be cyclical) the *terminus ad quem* of that change which makes the cosmos the unity that it is: 'fire's turnings: first sea, and of sea half ⟨is⟩ earth and half 'burner' ...'; such change is once again, characteristically, described in terms of measure and proportion: 'sea is poured forth ⟨from earth⟩, and is measured in the same proportion as existed before it became earth' (fragment 31b; see fragment 36). On the role and status of fire more below; for the moment suffice it to notice that for Heraclitus 'changing' and 'stable' are clearly non-contradictory properties of the universe, a point forcefully affirmed in a celebrated piece of metaphor: 'as they step into the same rivers different and ⟨still⟩ different waters flow ⟨upon them⟩' (fragment 12; see also fragment 49a).

The unified, ordered world of balanced change is also a world in which the 'laws' or norms of justice prevail (see above, fragment 94): '⟨the goddess⟩ Justice will catch up with fabricators of falsehoods and those who bear witness to them' (fragment 28b). More generally, such norms can be described as 'divine law' in nature, a law that is 'common' or universal in its accessibility and applicability: 'those who ⟨would⟩ speak with insight must base themselves firmly on that which is common to all, as a city does upon its law – and much more firmly! for all human laws are nourished by one ⟨law⟩, the divine ⟨law⟩ ...' (fragment 114). But the justice that is cosmic law is the justice of disruption and revolution, of war and violence, not that of balm and healing. 'One must realize,' he says, 'that war is common, and justice strife, and that all things come to be through strife and are ⟨so⟩ †ordained†'; elsewhere he puts it, 'War is father of all, and king of all' (fragment 53). If this strikes us as paradoxical, it is because of our failure to recognize the different perspective that a God's-eye-view necessarily has of the real: 'to God all things are fair and just, whereas humans have supposed that some things are unjust, other things just' (fragment 102). According to such a God's-eye-view all change, however violent, be it the macrochanges of nature and the outer cosmos or war among states, or civic strife, or the battles that rage in the human heart, can be seen as integral parts of the law or 'plan' that 'steers all things' (fragment 41), producing,through change, that higher unity which is the cosmos.

Two problems remain a major matter of dispute: whether Heraclitus believed in the constant interchange of *four* elemental masses of material in the universe (earth/air/fire/water) or simply three (earth/fire/water); and whether his philosophy included a theory of the peri-

odic conflagration (*ecpyrōsis*) of the sum of things, as the Stoics believed. In my commentary I argue that he probably believed in four, not three, elemental masses, and that the fragments (notably fragment 66; see below) can at any rate tolerate an interpretation in terms of a doctrine of periodic *ecpyrōsis* as well as one of continuous elemental transmutation.

Such, in brief, appear to be Heraclitus' broad commitments. As far as his particular beliefs are concerned, one can begin with a short description of his views on the macrocosmos. First and foremost is the prominence of the role played by fire, and more specifically of that *aethēr* (the fiery substance of the outer heaven) which, like so many of his fellow Greeks, he had no difficulty in equating with divinity, and particularly cosmic justice: 'Fire,' he says, 'having come suddenly upon all things, will judge, and convict them' (fragment 66). Fire is apparently both the *Urstoff* of which the universe's other elemental masses are transmutations (fragments 31a-b; see also fragment 90) and, especially in its macrocosmic manifestations, the directive force that guarantees that such changes take place according to a rational and predictable pattern (fragments 31a-6): 'thunderbolt,' he says, 'steers the totality of things' (fragment 64). In its most perfect physical manifestation – *aethēr* – and in the most impressive manifestation of *aethēr*'s activity – 'thunderbolt' – 'ever-living fire' not only symbolizes but *is* that justice or wisdom which 'is not and is willing to be called by the name Zeus' (fragment 32). The mention of Zeus, the supreme god, is important: *other* manifestations of fire than *aethēr*/thunderbolt will also manifest and symbolize divinity, but divinity of a lesser power and stature. 'The sun(-god),' he says, 'will not overstep ⟨his⟩ measures. Otherwise ⟨the⟩ avenging Furies, ministers of Justice, will find him out' (fragment 94). The sun's role, however, in the scheme of things is still pivotal, despite the smallness of its size (fragment 3), and its ongoing power to perform that role is perhaps to be traced to its daily rejuvenation (fragment 6). In the matter of controlling the 'seasons that bring all things' Plutarch maintains that, according to Heraclitus, Zeus actually shared the task with the sun (fragment 100), and a famous fragment catches its importance as the lightener of cosmic darkness (fragment 99).

For other, putatively Heraclitean views on astronomy and the macrocosmos we have only secondary sources to guide us, and they do not always agree on details. It seems, however, reasonable to believe that for Heraclitus sun, moon, and stars consisted of bowls, the contents of which are fed by exhalations from the sea. Most of the time

the bowls have their concave side turned towards the earth; eclipses are caused when the concave side of sun or moon is turned upwards (Diogenes Laertius, Aëtius) and/or when the bowl 'turns and slopes sideways' (Aëtius). Of the astral bodies, the stars are furthest away, which is why they give less light and warmth (Diogenes Laertius); the moon is the nearest astral body and is not a citizen of that realm of pure *aethēr* that sun and stars inhabit. As for other celestial phenomena, 'thunder,' says Aëtius, 'is caused by the aggregation of winds and clouds and the crashing of masses of air into the clouds; lightning is caused by the act of *kindling* of what gets burned; and hurricanes are caused by burnings and dousings ⟨rushing⟩ down from clouds.'

In all of this Heraclitus never budges from a basic commitment to the hylozoism espoused by his predecessors and contemporaries: the macro-and microcosmos are alive, and the principle and sustainer of that life is soul. So much is easy to say, but a full understanding of soul will be forever beyond us: 'one would never discover the limits of soul, should one traverse every road – so deep a measure does it possess' (fragment 45). Some things can none the less be said. Soul, it seems, is not simply a principle of life; in humans (and *a fortiori* in the gods) it is the principle of rationality: 'whenever a man is drunk, he is led along, stumbling, by a beardless boy; he does not perceive where he is going, because his soul is wet' (fragment 117). It is a material substance, born initially of water (fragment 36) and ranging in character from air to fire. The degree of its rationality depends on the quality of its dryness: 'a flash (or: ray) of light,' Heraclitus says, '⟨is⟩ a dry soul, wisest and best (or: most noble)' (fragment 118). The air that constitutes the soul of the drunken man (fragment 117) is sodden, and close to that point at which it condenses to form water and ceases to be a soul at all: 'for souls it is death to become water' (fragment 36). This process he wryly admits can also be very pleasurable: 'for souls it is joy or death to become wet' (fragment 77). The soul of the best and wisest person, by contrast, consists of air that is dry, and the reward for a brave death in battle in particular is transformation of the warrior's soul into that of a guardian demigod, ie, transformation from dry air to something still higher on the scale of rationality/divinity – *aethēr*, the ultimate in dryness. 'War,' he says, 'renders some gods' (fragment 53); '† in his (its) presence † they arise and become wakeful guardians of living ⟨people⟩ and corpses' (fragment 63).

Soul's rationality is also, as it happens, a currency that circulates freely, and is used with particular abandon by our passions, says Heraclitus: 'it is difficult to fight passion (⟨one's⟩ heart), for whatever

it wishes it buys at the price of soul' (fragment 85). But whatever the difficulty, passion, and particularly the passion of *hybris*, must be resisted: 'there is a greater need to extinguish *hybris* than there is a blazing fire' (fragment 43). The *hybris* in question is apparently that of setting oneself above the law, and 'the people must fight on behalf of the law as ⟨they would⟩ for ⟨their⟩ city-wall' (fragment 44). Such a law would not necessarily be that of a democratic institution: '⟨it is⟩ law,' he says, 'also to obey (respect) the counsel of ⟨a single⟩ one' (fragment 33), and 'one man ⟨is the equivalent of⟩ ten thousand, provided he be very good' (fragment 49) – a point missed apparently by the people of Ephesus, his own city. 'The adult Ephesians', he says, 'should ... go hang themselves, leaving the city to adolescents. For they expelled Hermodorus, the most valuable man among them, saying, "We will not have a single one as the most valuable among us. If such there ⟨purports to⟩ be, ⟨let him be so⟩ elsewhere and among others" (121). Some people (like Bias of Priene) are quite simply of more *account* than others (39), and such people, whom Heraclitus calls 'the best' or 'the most noble,' 'choose one thing in place of all ⟨other⟩ things – ever-flowing glory among mortals' (fragment 29). The aristocratic prejudice hinted at here (and a commonplace in his day) seems reinforced elsewhere: 'the majority ⟨are⟩ bad,' he says; '⟨only few ⟨are⟩ good' (104), and 'the majority' – by contrast with the minority who are 'the best' – 'glut themselves – like cattle' (fragment 29). However, some sympathy for the feelings of the ruled may occasionally have stirred him: 'weariness is toiling for the same ⟨people⟩ and being ruled ⟨by them⟩'(fragment 84b).

The virtue of 'the best' is for Heraclitus, as for so many other Greeks, most clearly manifested on the battlefield. 'Gods and mankind,' he says, 'honour those slain by Ares' (fragment 24). Not all death, however, is noble; and the problem of how ordinary people deal with their own prompts Heraclitus to a statement of peculiar poignancy: 'once born, they (people) consent to live and face their fate, and leave behind them children to become ⟨in their turn subject to their own particular⟩ fate[s]' (fragment 20). As for death as such, his views on the matter are expressed in ways that continue to defy universally acceptable interpretation. On the one hand, he seems committed to the view that certain souls can, by such abuses as drunkenness, be actually destroyed (fragments 36, 117); on the other hand, the souls of 'the best' seem to be assured of divinization and immortality (fragments 53, 62, 63). Not all souls, then, are assured of a hereafter. Those that do achieve it have, however, fallen into no 'sleep of

death'; their new life is one to which they in fact awake (fragments 21, 63), kindling for themselves a light to illuminate the surrounding darkness (fragment 26). What awaits them in their new state they can hardly even guess at: 'there await people when they die things they neither expect nor ⟨even⟩ imagine' (fragment 27). One such surprise may be that, whatever other perceptual losses they may suffer, one sense at least, that of smell, will remain active (fragment 98); another that the goddess Justice, then if not earlier, 'will catch up with fabricators of falsehoods and those who bear witness to them' (fragment 28b).

Whether Heraclitus adhered to the doctrine of the cyclical *reincarnation* of non-divinized souls is uncertain, but one famous fragment has been interpreted along such lines: 'we step and do not step into the same rivers; we are and are not' (fragment 49a). If such was his belief, however, it remains a problem how he reconciled this drift in his thought with the more materialistic drift of the rest of his ideas. The same could be said of his more general belief in personal immortality. Some have solved the problem by denying that Heraclitus *had* any belief in the after-life, but a more cautious note, and one that does less violence to the evidence at our disposal, seems to be to leave Heraclitus, like Empedocles, holding *both* views in unresolved tension.

Some of Heraclitus' views can be cautiously pieced together by comparative inference, since a good deal of his time is spent ridiculing and lampooning others for what he takes to be their foolish notions. The great poets of Greece, for example, are no guide to wisdom, nor are the popular bards who recite them (fragment 104). Worse than that, some are a positive source of mischief, and deserve punishment, not praise: 'Homer ought by rights to be ejected from the lists and thrashed, and similarly Archilochus' (fragment 42). Others, like Hesiod, have become the teachers of Greece; yet his ignorance was such that he 'continually failed to recognize ⟨even⟩ day and night ⟨for what they are⟩! For they are one' (fragment 57). Even Homer, who was wiser than all the Greeks, could be on occasion equally deceived (fragment 56). So 'what discernment or intelligence' is shown by those who use such people as their guide? (fragment 104).

The same scorn is heaped on other Greek philosophers. Pythagoras in particular is singled out as the 'chief captain of swindlers' (fragment 81a). One of his errors, shared by several, was to assume that polymathy could lead to understanding: 'a lot of learning does not teach ⟨a person the possession of⟩ understanding; ⟨could it do so⟩ it would have so taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, or for that matter (?) Xenoph-

anes and Hecataeus' (fragment 40). Another lay, not in his determination to investigate the real (which is in fact imperative, [fragment 35]), but in a certain *selectiveness* in that investigation which led to the construction of a private, rather than a universal wisdom (fragment 129).

As for the majority of mankind, they are just about beyond redemption. Apart from the fact the majority ⟨of people⟩ 'glut themselves like cattle' and ⟨only⟩ few ⟨of them are⟩ good' (fragment 104), ordinary people's religious beliefs are often illogical and absurd. 'They vainly ⟨try to⟩ purify themselves with blood,' for example, 'when they are defiled ⟨with it⟩! – ⟨which is⟩ as if one who had stepped into mud should ⟨try to⟩ wash himself off with mud!' (fragment 5). They see, but do not notice (fragment 1); they experience, but do not learn from that experience (fragment 1); 'uncomprehending, ⟨even⟩ when they have heard ⟨the truth about things?⟩, they are like deaf people. The saying 'absent while present' fits them well' (fragment 34).

But their political leaders cannot escape censure for some of the misguided beliefs of the general run of mankind. 'What discernment or intelligence,' he asks, 'do such leaders possess?' (fragment 104). 'They place their trust in popular bards, and take ⟨the⟩ throng for their teacher ...' (fragment 104). Their religious leaders, lampooned as 'night-wandering wizards, Bacchants, Leneans, initiates' (fragment 14), are no less worthy of castigation. 'The initiation-rites accepted amongst mankind,' he says, 'they perform in an impious manner' (fragment 14), and their singing of hymns to '⟨the⟩ shameful parts' is itself saved from shamefulness only by the fact that, unbeknownst to them, Life (Dionysus) and Death (Hades) are one and the same (fragment 15).

None of which is to suggest that for Heraclitus there are no features of popular religion that are worthy of respect. Popular belief in the Zeus of Olympus, for example, points to the profounder truth that the world is directed by a wisdom 'which is unwilling and willing to be called by the name Zeus' (fragment 32). A similar pointer to the truths that comprise the 'account' (*logos*), like the words of the goddess who indicates the way to Parmenides, are the utterances of Delphic Apollo: 'the lord whose oracle is in Delphi neither indicates clearly nor conceals, but gives a sign' (fragment 93). The same can be said of the Sibyl, mirthless though her utterances may be (fragment 92). Such 'signs' will, of course, figure prominently among the 'many things' that 'lovers of wisdom ought very much to be enquirers into' (fragment 35). And one of many results of such investigation will probably

be the discovery that talk about 'divinity' frequently masks a more down-to-earth truth: 'a person's *character*,' for example, 'is his fate (divinity)' (fragment 119).

A final and, perhaps happily, unanswerable question: how much of 'Heraclitus' did Heraclitus himself believe? The many fragments that suggest that his own account of a reality directed by wisdom and the real's own account of itself more or less coincide have already been mentioned. But a more pessimistic, and less confident, self may well lie below the surface. 'The most beautiful order ⟨in the universe?⟩ (or: 'the (this?) most beautiful universe),' he says, 'is a heap of sweepings, piled up at random' (fragment 124). If such were his deepest thoughts, Heraclitus himself may be the most compelling instance of the 'interconnectedness of opposites.'

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Sources and Authorities

Bibliography

Index

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AËTIUS, an eclectic philosopher, author of a compilation of the views of earlier Greek thinkers, the pre-Socratic portion of which is based ultimately on the *Opinions of the Natural Philosophers* of Theophrastus. Aëtius' date is uncertain, but the first century AD is probable. The portions of his work preserved by later authors are edited by H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin 1879) 273–444.

ALBERT THE GREAT (ca 1200–80), bishop of Ratisbon, and one of the leading theologians of his age. Among his many noteworthy works are the *Liber de causis* (1254–70) and the *Summa theologiae* (1270–80).

APOLLONIUS TYANENSIS, a letter-writer of the first century AD. His *Letters* have been edited by C.L. Kayser, *Philostratus* i.

ARISTOTLE (384–22 BC), the founder of the Peripatetic school of philosophy, who studied in Plato's Academy. Theophrastus (qv) was his most important student. His works are an important source of quotations from and comment upon the pre-Socratics.

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CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA (ca 150–ca 213), a convert to Christianity, who spent much of his life attempting to point out the errors of paganism. In his *Protrepticus* ('Exhortation') he attacks the pagan deities and exhorts the reader to adhere to Christianity; in the *Paedagogus* ('Tutor') he offers instructions in Christian living; and in the *Stromateis* ('Patchwork,' or 'Miscellanies') he presents us with a collection of his philosophical opinions. Impressively well read, he is a valuable source of quotations from Greek poets and philosophers. The text of these works can be found in the series *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte* (Leipzig 1905–9). The *Stromateis* (in a 2nd edition by L. Fruchtel) is to be found in volume 52 (Berlin 1960).

COLUMELLA, a native of Gades (Cadiz), who lived in the first century BC. Of his several works on agricultural topics, the *Res rustica* (in twelve books) and the *De arboribus* have survived. A text of Book 8 of the *Res rustica* can be found in the edition of W. Lundström and Å. Josephson (Uppsala 1897–1955).

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DIOGENES LAERTIUS, late second/early third century AD, author of a compendium, *The Lives of the Philosophers*, which preserves much valuable material. The work is edited by H.S. Long in the Oxford Classical Texts series (Oxford 1964) and is also included in the Loeb Classical Library.

While his writing is often trivial, scurrilous gossip, drawn from Hellenistic sources, he none the less preserves what seem to be straightforward and reasonably reliable descriptions of Heraclitean doctrine, following a generally Theophrastean tradition (9.7–11), and

at times shows a fair sense of literary criticism (9.7, end). His biographical anecdotes may on occasion have historical foundation but should be treated with caution; several seem to be based simply on his own or some predecessor's extrapolation from Heraclitus' own writings.

ETYMOLOGICUM MAGNUM. Compiled by T. Gaisford (Oxford 1848), this etymological dictionary, of unknown authorship, appears to be of twelfth-century orgin.

GALEN, of Pergamum, second century AD, physician and author, who lived for many years in Rome. His complete extant works are to be found in the *Corpus medicorum graecorum* (Leipzig 1918–), under the editorship of H. Diels et al.

HERACLITUS (PSEUDO-HERACLITUS), a Stoicizing author, otherwise unknown, of Homeric allegories, living in the first century AD. His *Allegoriae* (or *Quaestiones Homericae*) have been edited for the Teubner series by F. Oelmann (Leipzig 1910).

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ORIGEN (ca 185–253), a Christian theologian of Alexandria, who was much influenced by Platonic and Stoic thought. His *Contra Celsum*, an attack on a pagan opponent, manifests a good deal of common philosophical ground with him. The Greek text of the work can be found in the Teubner edition of his works by P. Koetschau (Leipzig 1899).

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PLATO (ca 429-347 BC), Athenian philosopher, and founder of the Academy.

PLINY (first century AD), a voluminous writer on natural history. His *Historia naturalis* has been edited (in five volumes) by C. Mayhoff in the Teubner series (Leipzig 1892–1909).

PLOTINUS (205–69/70 AD), Neoplatonic philosopher. His works, the

Enneads, are edited by P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer in three volumes (Paris/Brussels 1951–73); a sound text and translation is provided in the Loeb series (1966–) by A.H. Armstrong.

PLUTARCH of Chaeronea, a Platonist and author of a wide range of works, who lived in the late first and early second centuries AD. A text and translation of his *Moralia* (Moral Essays) and *Parallel Lives* are easily accessible in the Loeb series; the text found in the Teubner series is, however, frequently better. Plutarch is a rich source of quotations, not least from the pre-Socratic philosophers.

[PLUTARCH], or PSEUDO-PLUTARCH, a section from an anonymous history of philosophy in doxographic tradition preserved by Eusebius in his *Praeparatio evangelica* 1.7.16ff, who refers to it as the *Miscellanies* of Plutarch. It is edited separately by H. Diels in *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin 1879) 579–83.

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THEODORUS PRODROMUS, a minor church father. His *Letters* can be found in volume 133 of J.-P. Migne's *Patrologia Graeca* (Paris 1844–64).

THEOPHRASTUS, student, associate, and successor of Aristotle, who lived from the mid-fourth century to 288–5 BC. Of his voluminous works, most of them lost, his *Opinions of the Natural Philosophers* was the origin and main source for the ancient doxographical tradition. Fragments of it are edited by H. Diels in his *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin 1879) 473–95. The most recent edition of his *Metaphysics* is that of W.D. Ross and F.H. Fobes (Oxford 1929); of his *De vertigine* the Teubner edition of F. Wimmer (Leipzig 1854–62).

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Amidst a daunting mass of secondary literature, English-language readers approaching Heraclitus for the first time will find useful introductory accounts in Barnes, Burnet, Guthrie, Hussey (1972), J.M. Robinson, and Wheelwright. Those interested in a full-length study of an explicitly, though not solely, philosophical cast will profit from the challenging volume of Kahn (1979).

Readers with a knowledge of Greek will find the volume by Kirk, Raven, and Schofield a useful starting-place. For the same readers an indispensable critical study is that of Kirk (1954), and an edition notable for its extraordinarily comprehensive compilation of source-material that of Marcovich (1967). Outstanding older studies in languages other than English are those of Gigon (1935) and Reinhardt (1916). (The more recent commentary of Bollack and Wismann is by contrast in many ways eccentric and should be read with caution.)

On particular topics the work of the following scholars struck this editor as being especially noteworthy (though the views expressed are not necessarily those espoused in the present volume): Emlyn-Jones (1976) on the doctrine of opposites; Fränkel (1938) on verbal structures and thought-patterns; Nussbaum on the concept of soul; Snell on Heraclitus' use of language; and West on the supposed doctrine of *logos*. A very useful (though not fully comprehensive) bibliography of Heraclitus scholarship to 1971 is provided by Roussos, and much subsequent scholarship is covered in the volumes of *L'Année philologique* that have appeared since that date. Most recently (1986) we have the splendid new bibliography (to 1984) by de Martino, Rossetti, and Rosati, which appeared too late to be used in the present volume. Much of the detailed and often rewarding work included

in these bibliographies is unfortunately easily accessible only to those with a specialized knowledge of Greek and Greek culture; noteworthy among modern scholars engaged in such work are Battegazzore (Genoa), Darcus (Sullivan) (Vancouver), and Mouraviev (Moscow).

Students of Heideggerian inclination will wish to consult his essays on *logos* and *aletheia* in *Vorträge und Aufsätze 3*, 3rd ed (Pfullingen 1967); an English translation of these can be found in *Early Greek Thinking*, trans D.F. Krell and F.A. Capuzzi (New York 1975); M. Heidegger and E. Fink, *Heraklit. Seminar Wintersemester 1966/1967* (Frankfurt 1970); and the volume devoted to Heraclitus in the *Gesamtausgabe*, vol 55 (Frankfurt 1979), the contents of which go back to semester-work in 1943/4 and are of prime importance for an understanding of the later *logos* and *aletheia* essays. A good deal of discussion of Heraclitus can also be found passim in *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (New Haven 1959), trans R. Manheim.

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